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December 21, 2000
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January 18, 1972
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it4SHINGTON STAR Approved For Retetse 2001/013/NAMARDP84-004k9R001000100012-2 KASHMIR FUMBLE? CI tuestioned On India Policy By HENRY S. BRADSHER Star Staff Writer HONG KONG?Recent revelations about Central Intelli- gence Agency estimates on the India-Pakistan war raise curious questions. How balanced are the sources of the CIA's information in a place like New Delhi? In other words, how vulnerable is the agency to one-sided rumors? Some of the CIA estimates contained in the Anderson pa- pers disclosed in Washington amount to rumors circulating in the Indiana capital at the beginning of the war last month. They were rumors that well-informed Indian sources flatly denied at the time?and their denials seem to have been borne out by de- velopments. ? The CIA thought India was going to make an all-out at- tempt to smash the military power of West Pakistan and capture the Pakistani-held part of disputed Kashmir state, according to the Ander- son papers. This was reported as an Indian goal after captur- ing East Pakistan? which is now Bangladesh. Helms Quoted Richard Helms, CIA direc- tor, is quoted as telling a Dec. 8 meeting of Washington's spe- cial action group on the India- Pakistan war: "It is reported that prior to terminating the present hostil- ities. Mrs. (Indira) Gandhi (Indian Prime Minister) in- tends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities." Helms and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, thought India intended to seize the rest of Kashmir, the Himalayan state which India claims but Pakistan has held part of for a quarter-century. The U.S. government's "tilt" toward Pakistan appar- ently was based on these as- sumptions of Indian intentions to try to smash West Pakistan into "an impotent state," as Kissinger put it. But were those ever really the serious intentions of the people who controlled policy in New Delhi, rather than being simply the dr am of some -F dian hawks vROp.riet policy? Interpretation Report Cited This correspondent reported from New Delhi Dec. 9, and The Star published Dec. 10, that "the best available indi- cations are that India will want to bring the war to a speedy end once Bangladesh is cleared" of Pakistani troops. The dispatch went on: "In- dian military commanders have been itching for a chance to smash Pakistani tank and warplane strength in the West with major battles which they are confident of winning. But political control of the situa- tion, heavily influenced by the Soviets, is against provok- ing big battles." There was considerable So- viet pressure on India to hurry up and capture East Pakistan and then end the war. Both Moscow and New Delhi envis- aged the capture "and then cease-fire on the Western front," that dispatch said. India declared the cease-fire the day after Dacca fell. The dispatch, and several others that repeated the same points as background to devel- opments, was based on high- ranking informants in both the Indian government and Saviet mission in New Delhi. What they said would hap- pen is what happened, contra- ry to the Helms-Kissinger ex- pectations. The question is what sort of sources the CIA was using. Embassy Locked One correspondent, even one with the kind of contacts built up by five years of reporting from New Delhi and almost as long from Moscow, cannot compete with the CIA's exten- sive system of sources for in- formation. That other political o ease02 9 a section in the U.S i its doors locked, as distinct from the political section with an open-door policy?picks up all sorts of information. Maybe the problem is evalu- ation. If the CIA heaps Indian generals talking about smash- ing Pakistani military power, maybe it believes them rather than believing those quieter ci- vilians wlio hold them back. The armed forces in India never have been able to do as they pleased regardless of ci- vilian politicians, unlike a number of other undevel- oped countries and overdevel- oped generals with which the CIA is a lot more familiar. And Mrs. Gandhi is not the personality to let her armed forces start such impudence, as anyone who has been in India long should know. Weather Problms As for India's trying to take Pakistani territory problems of winter weather and the lo- gistical situation of the Indian army were involved. Perhaps Helms and Kissin- ger had noted the Indian state- ment that India would no long- er respect the old United Na- tions cease-fire line dividing Kashmir and they had made the herotic jump of lbgic?or, considering the georgraphy, winter and logistics, illogic?to conclude that India wanted to capture everything beyond the line. But in fact, as reported from New Delhi, Indias' ambitions were limited to clearing out some Pakistani army outposts that endangered Indian coma- The U.S. government has argued that its estimate was right and that only its efforts prevented the larger war which it foresaw. Thus, the dispatch of a naval task force built around the nuclear pow- ered aircraft carrier Enter- prise to the Bay of Bengal has been claimed in Washington to have had the effect of limiting india's war aims. And Ameri- can influence in Moscow got the Soviets to restrain Indian according to claims. Perhaps this will have to be marked down in the doubtful column on U.S. policy influ- ence and results. Perhaps Washington more influential in limiting the South Asian viar anCitAaRDP84000499R001000100012-2 e WA.SHINGTON POST Approved For Release 2g011/007.2CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 The Washington Merry-Go-Round Protesters Leak Their By Jack Anderson ? The planners in the White House basement, who howled In pain over our disclosure of their India-Pakistan secrets, have slipped fragments from the same secret documents to their friends in the press. This illustrates how the White House uses official se- crecy to control the flow of news to the public. Favorable West Pakistan. But the same facts are leaked out; unfavora- disgests also suggested India nation reserved for the dar- kest of the CIA's secrets. Alsop's 'Proof' Alsop told us he never read the CIA reports himself. He had no way of knowing, there- fore, that his sources gave him only part of the story. These CIA digests, true enough, raised the possiblity of an Indian attempt to crush ble news is suppressed. ? The official le.akers are nm,v spreading the word that Presi- dent Nixon's pro-Pakistan pol- icy was not the disaster it ap- peared but really saved West Pakistan from dismember- ment. ' As evidence, the boys in the basement leaked a few selec- tive .secrets to our column- writing colleague; Joseph Alsop, who has excellent con- tacts at the highest levels of government. Alsop stated "on positive au- thority" that the U.S. govern merit had "conclusive proof" of India's Intention to crush the main body of the Pakistan army in West Pakistan. This positive proof, he wrote, was "the centerpiece of every one of the CIA's daily reports to the White House during the crisis period." We have read the CIA's !daily reports to the White , House during the India-Paki- stan war. They are stamped 1"Top Secret Umbra," a desig- would accept an early cease- fire. Here is a typical excerpt: "There have been reports that (Indian Prime Minister) Gan- dhi would accept a cease-fire and international mediation as soon as East Bengal had been liberated ... On . the other hand, we have had several re- cent reports that India now in- tends not only to liberate East Bengal but also to straighten its borders in Kashmir and to destroy West Pakistan's air and armored forces." The strongest CIA warning was sent to the White House on December 10. "According to a source who has access to information on activities in Prime Minister Gandhi's of- fice," declared the report, "as soon as the situation in East Pakistan is settled, Indian forces will launch a major of- fensive against West Paid- sten." But the CIA also took note of repeated Indian assurances to American Ambassador Ken Lyn Secrets Keating that India has no ter- ritorial ambitions and wished only tO end the conflict with the least possible bloodshed. Dubious 'Proof' It is clear from the secret documents in our possession that the CIA had no "conclu- sive proof" of an Indian plan to dismember West Pakistan. The CIA had received a num- ber of reports that a major In- dian offensive might be immi- nent on the western front. But CIA: viet Union . .," according to the CIA. "Kuznestsov has told Indian officials that the Soviet Union is not prepared to rec- ognize Bangladesh until Dacca falls and until the Indian army successfully liberates Bangladesh from Pakistani forces," The question of an Indian offensive . against West "Paki- stan was brought up the next day by Soviet Ambassador Ni- kolai ? Pegov. Reported the. these were discounted by both the State and Defense Depart- ments. Only Henry Kissinger, the President's foreign policy czar, seemed eager to believe the worst. Alsop's sources also told him that President Nixon in. no longer exists. tervened with the Kremlin, "If India should decide to threatening "an ugly show- down," to stop Mrs. Gandhi's army from. carving up West Pakistan. In response, Alsop claims that the Kremlin hurriedly dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznestsov to New Delhi on December 12 to tell Mrs. Gandhi not to attack West Pakistan. The secret CIA report on "Pegov pointed out that India has achieved a marvel- ous military victory. Pakistan is no longer a military force, and it is therefore unneces- sary for India to launch an of- fensive into West Pakistan to crush a military machine that take Kashmir, Pegov added; the Soviet Union would terfere, but India would have to accomplish this objective. within the shortest possible time." Joseph Alsop is an enter- prising and conscientious col- umnist. He acknowledged to us that "it is possible to be lied to on the very highelst level." But he assured us his his mission, however, doesn't source had "never lied be- mention any ultimatum fore." The evidence in our posses- sion, however, suggests that the White House is playing peekaboo with CIA secrets to distort the truth. Bell-McClure Syndicate against attacking West Paki- stan. "Vasily Kuznestsov arrived in India on 12 December to discuss the political recogni- tion of Bangladesh by the So- , 7.4 011, Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 Ta1,3; Approved For Re*lase 2001A3/51/51: .WRDP84-004NR001000100012-2 Close !h on Secret Pa BY WILLARD EDWARDS (Chicano Tribune Press Service] WASHINGTON, Jan. 15?The Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion has reportedly narrowed an original field of about 200 suspects down to a few individ- uals in its pursuit of the feder- al official responsible for leak- ing secret documents dealing with the India-Pakistan crisis to columnist Jack Anderson. One highly placed staff aide, in particular, is under suspi- cion. His identification, if and when it comes, should serve to dispel some of the wide-rang- ing speculation published about this incident. ? But in the strange world of the capital, where political ma- neuvers command more atten- tion than illegal acts, the ? "why" of the leak to Anderson has provoked more concern than the "who" and the "how." Second Thoughts Begin The first instinctive reaction . here of many was almost unanimous: "Someone in gov- ernment must surely hate Henry Kissinger!" I But, after a few days, second I thoughts have begun to spread i about the motive inspiring this I massive disclosure of the inti- mate details of National Secu- rity Council meetings properly labeled "secret-sensitive." Under examination, the "get- Kissinger" theory began to lose substance. A higher target ?President Nixon himself?be- came visible. Inconsistencies Seen Kissinger, chief assistant to the President in national secu- rity affairs, was initially thought to be the intended vic- ers Lea President Nixon sessed, it became evident that Kissinger was always Presi- dent Nixon's spokesman, relay- ing his impatience and his de- . m ands for an anti-Indian! "tilt." ' The President, Kissinger re- ported on one occasion, pre- sumably in a voice dripping. with sarcasm, was under the "illusion" that he was direct-; .! versations, never intended for ing foreign policy. He was giv- ! publication, gave the public a Henry Kissinger Democrats zealous to see the I President defeated in Novem- ber. The verdict was unanimous that there was nothing particu- larly new or startling in the so- called Anderson papers. But they made good reading. There were many pungent quotes and the reporting of private con- it ? ? ? ing Kissinger e The minutes did not even delightful sense of eavesdrop. make clear that Kissinger !! agreed with the President in;1 Tries No Concealment taking Pakistan's side against ! One novel theory, based on India. But he was faithful in emphasizing Nixon's position. Nixon Is Target Thus, if there was a target in the unauthorized disclosure, it was the President, not Kis- singer. Sen. Edmund S. Muskie [Me.], leading contender for unquestioned authority in the the Democratic Presidential intelligence field. speculation like all the others, has been advanced in the search to establish a motive for the deliberate and calculat- ed disclosure of secret data to a newspaper columnist. It was provided by a man of nomination, was quick to sense He noted that Anderson, a! the political value of the veteran specialist in publishing leaked documents. In several private papers of every vane- recent speeches, he hammered ty, did not in this case, as of- tim because he was quoted ex- their revelations of how the ad- ten in the past, make any at- tensively in the minutes of the ministration handled the India- tempt to conceal the secret council meetings. A comparison of Kissinger's statements in a "background briefing," later made public, and his private remarks to the wanted "government in secret council, as revealed in the or government in the He made no attempt, for ex- leaked documents, revealed sunshine." ample, to paraphrase their contents, a practice often fol- what may lowed to handicap investigation y mildly, be described For every political enemy as inconsistencies. Therefore, a Kissinger may have blade in of the sources from which se- number of commentators comparatiVely briefWashing- opined, the leak was designed ton career, politicians agreed , has been 'busy appearing on cret papers are obtained. He i Pakistan crisis. He called classification of the papers, the them evidence of "duplicity" officials to whom they were by Nixon and demanded that distributed, ' or their exact the country decide whether it wording. to impugn his integrity and Nixon has 10 foes in govern- te i s thus "destroy:ft When a m raYeS dilcrIPSP#113P11?34?16 r gat an o er e era partments are crowded with holdover ; authorized to possess, and has of all' the documents was made, and their import as- ? r. I been boldly challenging in his statements. Anderso'n, in the opinion of , this expert, seems to be invit- ing prosecution and he sug- gested an explanation offering ! delight to lovers of Machiavel- ! lian intrigue. ? Anderson was given the pa- pers, he submitted, after pledging that he would not seek to avoid indictment and trial for "conversion to private ;use of government documents." Linked to Eilsberg This is the same chrage lev- eled in a West Coast indict- ment of Daniel Ellsberg, a for- mer Pentagon aide, who con- fessed that he leaked the Pen- tagon Papers to newspapers. Anderson, it was suggested, has a good chance of beating this charge in the District-of Columbia ferliral courts where, it is well known in the legal world, "liberal" jurists domi- nate the judicial philosophy. Thus, a precedent could be set by similar leniency in Ells- berg's later trial. There is this much to sup- port such an admitted venture into surmise: Powerful groups in government and the journal- istic world are determined to protect Ellsberg from the con- sequences of his confessed vio- lation of the laws regulating classified information. 01000100012-2 Approved For Reldlr?e 200Wig A forgotten footlocker ; Mergelf-Er01?,909R001000100012-2 The Game of the Foxes . The Untold Story of German Espionage In the United States and Great Britain during World War II. By Ladislas Farago. McKay. 696 pp. $11.95 Reviewed by RICHARD HANSER ? rt does seem a little" late in the day?doesn't it??fOr the international spy to be _dusted oft and taken out for another literary airing. With Ids Godes and covers, and his devilish stratagems for stealing the plans to the fortifica- tions, he may not yet be quite one with Nineveh and Tyre, but he's getting there. Today he seems so quaintly , and dimly World War II-ish that he takes his place with the intrepid commando, the gung-ho 'Marine, and Rosie the Riveter?all cherishable dements of our folklore in their time but now grown a touch fusty, somewhat stale around the edges. The fictional 007 having long since become a ividesereen joke, it is a little hard to take US/7-362, his honest-to-god counterpart, very seriously. , ,Ladislas Farago does, though, and in no less than 696 pages of unrelenting prose. Your average writer can lead It long, productive life without once using the word "spy- master," but Farago uses it four times on one page, and three of the four times in the same sentence. his book is trumpeted on the cover as "more exciting than any spy thriller,"-' which is a little puzzling, since the book in- Richard Hauser is the author of Putsch! How Hitler Made Revolution. dubitably is a spy' thriller. Its area is German espionage in America and Britain- during WW II, a field in which Farago is thoroughly grounded. This is his sixth or sev- enth book on spying? and helms had some rather special experience at first hand in that curious endeavor. Though a naturalized citizen, and a native of a country with which we were at war, he rose high in U.S. Naval Intelligence, an exploit that not just every immigrant who comes through customs could duplicate. (It is perhaps not nec- essary to explain that Farago comes from Hungary. Hun- garians, as we know, have a knack.) The Game of Foxes tells how agents of the Abwehr, the German Intelligence Service, pulled off such dazzling feats of cloaking and daggering as swiping the Norden bomb sight, trickling spivs into sensitive spots in Wash- ington and Lo don, ta hihe osevelt-Cht line and the Mid.PN cu9iL, IMP . We are never toldthe name . , of a Politburo member , whose urinesainple was stolen from a noted Viennese urologist.. .. (here called Trails) between agents,. and pilfered docu- ments, and sensational reports relayed to a "Nest'? in Hamburg known as `,Axt,X.",Before we are through we are well -steeped in what Farago himself calls "the hoary melodrama of espionage and it bizarre rituals." Every- thing is scrupulously, not -to say laboriously, documented,. down to the last street number, date, and middle initial.' (Well, perhaps not. eVerything. We are never told the naine of. the Politboro Manlier whose urine sample was stolen by the. CIA from the laboratory 'cif "a noted Vien- nese Urologist.") . - At the end, though, one wonders whether the game of foxes has been worth the candle. Despite the successes, of Nazi eSpionage--semetimes detailed here with what can only be called misplaced enthusiasm?nothing really de- cisive was accomplished. The theft of the Norden bomb- sight did not win the air war for Germany. Stealing secrets of Allied shipping and troop mpveinents did not prevent our troops and supplies from getting there, and in over-. whelming quantities. Eavesdropping on Roosevelt and Churchill, if it actually occurred, did not save Hitler and Goering and Goebbels from dying like dogs in utter de.-: feat. As the Bible itself 'says', the little foxes spoil the vines'. They do not brinc, down the house. - Farago's book isthe outgrowth of a find he made "in a dark loft of the National Archives in Washington, D.C." The find was a forgotten footlocker Which :turned out to.". contain microfilm documents on the inteimal 'workings of the Abwehr under its enigmatic chief, Admiral Canaris. Farago has based his story on what he calls "the incon- trovertible evidence of the {Abwehr's] own' papers.: An agency's :Pim papers are seldom incontrovertible evidence. of :anything but the agency's natural desire 'to. make itself look good. From other sources it 'IS pb86ble to get a quite different picture of- the AbWehn Others have seen it as a monumentally foaled-up operation, inefficientlY run by CanariS (who may have been pouring Sand in his own gas tank) and caut,lit in an insane tangle of rivalries. with other Nazi intelligence agencies, of which there, was a mushroom-like proliferation in the Third Reich. There is, to be sure, a certain fascination in getting this unexpected peek into all those Strettg .Geheinil papers from that forgotten footlocker, but the fun is a good deal diminished by the circumstance that the Abwehr, like Ger-1;' many itself, was 'a loSer. How Mitch thrill can there .be in kibitzing a pokeihand, be it held ever so close to the vest, when somebody else wins the pot? It is a little like being made privy to the football play book of 1971 Buffalo Bills. vo/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 NEW MX DM? 1/Mr Approved For Reltivese 2001/63M A-RDP84-004249R001000100012-2 Secv t pers: PALI. wdhi' 5iautrShe Rad Kremlin Pied Washington, Jan. 14 '(Special)----Columnist Jack Anderson released today the text of a summary of another White House meeting on the India-Pakistan war. In it, a senior administration official was quoted as attributing to Prime Minister Indira Gan- dhi a statement that the Soviet Union had promised to take "appropriate counterac- tion" if China intervened in the war. The summary of the Dec. 8 meeting of key administration of- ficials includes the widely quoted remarks by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger that Presi- dent Nixon "does not want to be even-handed' in his position on the war because he "believes that India is the attacker." Stamped "Secret" The summary was one of four that Anderson obtained and used as a basis for his columns earlier this month detailing the adminis- tration's attempt to cope with the India-Pakistan crisis. The documents received by Anderson were stamped "secret sensitive." Anderson published his stories on the premise of the public's right to know. Kissinger charged that Ander- son quoted him out of context. Anderson then made public the texts of the summaries of the meetings, which were conducted by the Washington Special Action "She said that the Soviets had Jack Releases Anclesapn another text Group of the National Security Council. ? Attended by 20 Bef or e today, Anderson re- leased the texts of the group's meetings Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. 6.? ? The Dec. 8 meeting was attend- ed by 20 representatives of such agencies as the CIA, Agency for International Development, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department and Defense Department, accord- ing to the summary. Among the main speakers at the 70-minute meeting were Kis- singer; CIA Director Richard M. Helms; David Packard, who re- signed Dec. 14 as deputy secre- tary of defense; Assistant Secre- tary of State Joseph J. Sisco; U. Alexis Johnson, undersecretary of state, and Maurice Williams, dep- uty administrator of AID. Seven-Page Summary The India-Pakistan war broke out Dec. 3 and ended Dec. 17. Packard announced his resigna- tion Dec. 11, three days after he attended the meeting. The following are excerpts from the seven-page confidential sum- mary that Anderson made public: "Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mention- ing that Mme. Gandhi, when re- ferring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chi- nese intervention in the West. "Dr. Kissinger said that We cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. 'The lady' is cold- blooded and toughu and will not turn into a Soviet satellite mere- ly because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this ap- proach to take his case to the President. Ambassador Ken- neth) Keating, he suggested, is offering enough reassurance on his own." "Next Turn of Screw" The summary also shows Kis- singer's deep interest in U.S. aid to India and Pakistan. Pakistan's aid was cut off before the war; most of India's after it began. Having been assured that very little aid was getting through to India, "Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be." At another point, when dis- cussing the 1972 AID budget, 'Dr. Kissinger stated that cur- rent orders are not to put any- cautioned her that the Chinese thing into the budget for aid to might rattle the sword in Lad- India. It was not to be leaded dakh but that the Soviets have 1 that AID had put money in the promise dto take appropriate budget for India only to have the counteraction if this should oc- 'wicked' White House take it cur. Mr. Helms indicate dthat there was no Chinese buildup at this time, but, nevertheless, even with- out a buildup, they could make 'motions and rattle the sword.'" (Ladakh, a remote part of Kashmir n India, juts between China's Sinkiang province and Tibet. The Chinese overran the area in 1951 and, without the Indians finding out about it for a year, built a road from Sink- iang to Tibet across Ladakh's Aksai Chin Plateau in an effort to protect its Tibetan supply line. The Chinese last made a show of force in Ladakh in November 1965.) On the Kissinger remark, the text reads as follows: "Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. There can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does not want to be even-handed. "The President believes that India is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India has jeopardized relations with the United States. out." The document recorded Kissin- ger's interest in a suggestion that the U.S. might get military supplies to Pakistan by routing them through , Jordan. Question of F-104s "Mr. Packard explained that we could not authorize the Jor- danians to do anything that the USG (United States government) could not do," the document read. "If the USG could not give the F-104s (American F-104 jets) to Pakistan, we .could not allow Jordan to do so. "If a third country had ma- terial that the USG did not have, that was one thing, but we could not allow Jordan to transfer the 104s unless we make a finding that the Paks, themselves, were eligible to purchase them from us directly. "Dr. Kissinger suggested that perhaps we never really ana- lyzed what the real danger was when we were turning off the arms of Pakistan." Pressures on Aides The pressures on Nixon's ad- visers to come up with some basis for Nixon's apparent sueport for Pakistan was seen in the follow- ing exchange: "Ambassador Johnson said that we must examine the possi- ble effects that additional sup- plies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F-104s might not make any difference once the real war in the West starts. They could be considered cnly as a token. If, in' fact, we were to move in West Pakistan we would be in a new ballgaine. "Ambassador Johnson said that one possibility would be our re- nly to Foreign Minister (Indian Foreign Minister Swaran) Singh, in which we could acknowledge the Indian pledge that they do not have territorial designs. He also stated we must also consider the fact that the Paks may them- selves by trying to take Kashmir. "After discussing various pos- sible commitments to both Pawis- tan and India, Mr: Packard stated that tre. overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or do- ing nothing. "If you don't win, don't get in- volved. "If we were to attempt some- thing it would have to be with a certainty that it would affect the outcome. Let's not get in if we are going to lose. Find out some way to stay out." Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 WASIaINGTON FOS% Approved For Relealg 2001/03ap frfiligfADP84-00490D001000100012-2 Hill Committees Met Secretly One-Third Congressional QuarterlY met in secret one-third of the . of Time in 1971- . Congressional -committee time last year. Congressional Quarterly's annual tabulation of commit- tee sessions showed 36 per . cent were held behind closed doors in 1971, the year a new law?aimed at opening meet- ings to the public?went into effect. This marked a decrease from the 41 per cent closed committee sessions recorded in 1970, but matched the 36 per cent secrecy score for 1969. . Since 1953, when Congres- sional 'Quarterly began its an- nual tally, the highest secrecy score was 43 per cent in 1968. The record low was 30 per cent closed sessions in 1959. The House, as usual, topped the Senate in the number of executive sessions. The public, was barred from 41 per cent- 1,131 out of 27,858 of its com- mittee sessions. This was a de-, crease from the 48 per cent of 1970 but comparable to the 42 per cent recorded in 1969. Senate committees had a se- crecy score of 30 per cent? down from the 33 per cent of 1970 tut up from the 28 per cent in 1969. It closed 580 of Its 1,905 meetings. Most noteworthy in 1971 was the opening of selected House Appropriations Com.- mittee hearings. Although only eight per cent of its sessions-36 out of a total of 455?were open, this was in contrast to the zero per cent recorded in the past. The Legislative Reorganiza- tion Act of 1970?the first re- form act in 24 years?was de- signed, in part, to open up committee proceedings to pub- lic scrutiny. It stipulated that Senate committee business meetings are to be open, except for 'markup (when a committee re- *vises and decides on the final language of a bill) and voting sessions, or when the commit- tee closes them by majority vote. Ninety-seven per cent of those Senate committee meet- ings specifically designated in the Congressional Record as business sessions?organizing, markup, voting, briefing ses- sions?were closed to the pub- lic in 1971. According to the reorganza; lion act, House committee business meetings, are to be open, except when the com- mittee closes them by major- ity vote. Excluding the House Appro- priations Committee, 79 per' cent of the sessions listed as business were held behind closed doors. (House Appropri- ations subcommittee markup sessions are not reported to the Record.) Approved for Release 200 6 : CIA-RDET4-00499R001000100012-2 rC 7:73 1 FEB '1972 Approved For Rehaase 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00469R001000100012-2 NW RULES URGED ON SECRET PAPERS, SeCurity Agency Proposes a Presidential Order on Law Special to The Stew York Times WASHINGTON, Feb. 10?The National Security Council has proposed an Executive order tightening regulations govern-' ing_ the, hen, ng of classified information i Suggested the possibility that the President might seek legislation to make it a crime for unauthorized per- sons to receive secret docu- ments, a White House officiial said Thursday night. Tbe legislative suggestion, if accepted, would result in a pro- posal by the President of a tough new law similar to the British Official Secrets Act, which imposes stiff penalties on those who receive as well as on those who disclose classi- fied information. ? This was one of three alter- natives suggested for the Presi- dent in a draft proposal now being circulated among the De- partments of State, Defense and Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other governmen- tal bodies, the White House of- ficial said. Of the two others, the draft suggested that the President might seek revision of a sec- tion of the Federal Esrionage Act to make it a crime to give classified information to any unauthorized person. The law noW provides penalties for dis- closure to "a foreign agent." Other Passibility The other possibility suggest- ed .was merely that present laws be left unchanged. These were the only legis- lative suggestions in the draft proposals, which were offered in response to the President's demand for a study of the handling of classifed material, made shortly after the publica- tion of the Pentagon Papers, the . Defense Department's se- cret study of the United States drift into the Vietnam War. ? The other suggestions in the draft proposal applied primarily to the classification of Govern- ment documents, setting up regulations over how materials should be classified, the length of time certain documents could remain classified, and who would be allowed to re- ceive them. These, the draft proposal said, could be effected in a re- vision of the Ekecutive order that now controls the handling of classified information. The draft Was being circulat- ed to the various agencies for their comments. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 By Approved For Re!Cage 23151/e1OrphtWczagi9itR001000100012-2 ...1.11=11111.{.11?111111?111 The Secrecy ilemma ? You can't run the Government if every important secret is going to be handed over to the press ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Ir. A popular Government, without -popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. ?JAMES MADISON (to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822). IT .says in the 29th chapter of Deuteronomy, "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God." This has not been a view; however, wholly accepted by the American press. Last month, when Jack Ander- son published classified documents showing how the Nixon Administra- tion really felt about the Indo-Paki- stani war, he observed an established tradition of journalism. At the same time he transgressed an established tradition of government. Here were the two solemn principles, disclosure and confidentiality, equally porten- tous and equally-venerated, in sharp collision. The conflict of principles left many Americans, I would think, considerably baffled. - OD You can't run a free press if it is a crime to publish everything the Govern. ment stamps secret membered their intense displeasure over equivalent journalistic audacity when they were in power. Still, both Republicans and Democrats probably agree that you cannot run a govern- ment if every internal memorandum is promptly handed to the press. And ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Jr. is Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York. both probably agree that you cannot run much of a press if it is a crime to publish anything stamped secret by the Government. The question is whether between these extremes it is possible to discern further guiding principles. One principle surely is that the Government's case for a measure of secrecy is not altogether frivolous or self-serving. "The Federalist" is gen- erally worth consulting on these mat- ters; and its authors clearly specified . The recent publication of secret , documents has produced a collision between two equally venerated prin- ciples?disclosure and confidentiality It should have given some too a sense of intellectual discomfiture. Re- publicans who denounced Anderson might have remembered their own delight when The Chicago Tribune printed secret defense plans of the secrecy and immediate thspatch are fore Pearl" HMV. tftemocratsVo son, it- is true, 11. atAir Roosevelt 4doiViiMoitr pwr.t DAV/101TMt r 'a a two fields where secrecy seemed to them essential. The first was diplo- matic negotiation: "It seldom hap- pens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect that "diplomacy shall proceed always' frankly and in the public view" and called for "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." Before World War I the French Assembly did not know the secret clauses of the Franco-Rus- sian alliance; nor did the British For- eign Secretary inform even his own Cabinet of the military understand- ings between the British and French General Staffs. This is what Wilson hoped to abolish. But, as he himself made clear at Versailles, he really meant by "diplo- macy" not the processes but the re- sults of negotiation. In practice he favored plenty of talk out of "the public view" but no concealment of results?i.e., open covenants secretly arrived at. As for the negotiating process, Jules Cambon, who was French Ambassador to Berlin before World War I and whom that acute student of diplomacy Harold Nicolson regarded as perhaps the best profes- sional of the century, was only mildly exaggerating when he wrote, "The day secrecy is abolished, negotiation 97 of any kind will become impossible. His recent trans-Atlantic shuttling suggests that Henry Kissinger would agree. Whether blowing the secrecy destroys his capability for future pri- vate negotiations is a problem that one hopes Mr. Kissinger has pondered. A second field noted in The Fed- eralist" as requiring secrecy was that? of intelligence: "There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery." Contemplation of these two fields led "The Federalist" to conclude: "So often and so essen-. dpcttriro. tia1.416 have we heretofore suffered id 4 0 9R001t0 00400012u2chs. applauded Anderson might have re- pudiate this doctrine when he said patch, that the Constitution would 00n t LIMO d Approved For Relel have been in cusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects." In such terms "The Federal- ist" vindicated the right of the exec- utive branch to conduct negotiations and, by inference, intelligence opera- tions, without any immediate obliga- tion to supply Congress or the people the detail of what it was doing. So from the start the American Government has been into secrecy. War, of course, provided a third cate- gory of legitimate restriction. The ? National Archives tells us that such classifications as "secret," "confiden- tial" and "private" can be traced back to the War of 1812. Military plans, movements and weaponry remain items that can be plausibly withheld from immediate publication. A fourth category includes information that might compromise foreign govern- ments or leaders or American friends or agents in foreign lands. The case for withholding such information is obviously strong; as too is the case, in a fifth category, for withholding personal data given to the Govern- ment on the presumption that it will be kept confidential ? tax returns, ? personnel investigations and the like. A sixth category includes official plans and decisions which, if prematurely disclosed, would lead to speculation in lands or commodities, preemptive buying, private enrichment and high- er governmental costs. One doubts whether the most .righteous opponent of official secrecy would seriously argue that Government must at once throw open its files in these six categories. Yet no one can doubt either that a legitimate system of restriction has long since escalated into an extrava- gant and indefensible system of de- nial. The means by which this has been done is primarily the device of "security classification"?i.e., restrict- ing access to public information on the grounds of national security. In 1962 the House Committee on Gov- ernment Operations found there were "more than a million Government employes [permitted] to stamp per- manent security designations on all kinds of documents," adding that few of them seemed to heed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's sensible injunction, "When in doubt, under- classify." The General Accounting Office estimates that the security system costs taxpayers. from $60- to $80-million a year. Testifying last summer before Congressman William Moorhead's Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, William G. Florence, a retired Pentagon secu. rity officer, pkrtraxed tire, cerAtriso,-1?,si rary conditiaP9 tUrt%scit-feafibWi'iR1 e 20R1/93/06 : CIA-RDP84-00S?R001000100012-2 r? no e entagon's top security secret' is the specific invention of bureaucracy." If secrecy in some cases remains a necessity, it also can easily become the ? means by which Government dissembles its purposes, buries its mistakes, safe- guards its reputation, manipulates its citizens, maximizes its power and corrupts itself. The secrecy system, once out of control, offers temptations few gov- ernments have the fortitude to resist. I suppose there may be situations of dire emergency when gov- ernments have no alternative but to deceive the people. But uncontrolled secrecy makes it easy for lying to become rou- tine. And, even short of lying, governments can hardly resist, exploiting secrecy to their own advantage. There have been few greater frauds, for exam- ple, than the idea put over by the executive on Congress and public opinion that only those with access to classified infor- mation know enough to have a judgment on questions of foreign policy. Actually 99 per ?cent of the information neces- sary for intelligent political judgment is available to any careful reader of The New York Times. We would have been far better off in Vietnam during the Kennedy years had our Government confined it- self to reading newspaper dis- patches and never opened a Top Secret cable signed Har- kins or Nolting. The myth of inside information ? "if you only knew what we knew"? is essentially a trick to ob- struct democratic control of foreign policy and defend the monopoly of the national se- curity bureaucracy. As Justice Potter Stewart has observed, a secrecy sys- tem constructed on present lines will inevitably be "ma- nipulated by those intent on self-protection and self-pro- motion." It will also inevita- bly invite defiance. Indeed, given Congressional apathy, defiance remains about the. only recourse when legitimate secrecy balloons into illegiti- mate secrecy and an adminis- tration runs the system in the interest not of the nation but of itself. So, as a corrective, aggrieved citizens through our history have felt themselves morally warranted in violat- ing what they have seen as a system of secrecy laid down ,unilaterally by the executive ease the superiority branch for its own protection. of the profes- In 18 officer, he said, believed that the classification system should even ex- tend to information in the public domain; and zealous security-stamp- ers, particularly in the Navy, had been discovered classifying newspaper clippings. Florence estimated that the Pentagon files contained about 20 million classified documents and that "the disclosure of information in at least 99.5 per cent of those classified documents could not be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation." He later changed this estimate to read that 1 to 5 per cent "must legit- imately be guarded in the national interest," but this hardly affects the point. The classification system has plainly got hopelessly out of control. And the reason for this is evident enough?it is that the only control over the system has been exercised by the executive branch itself. The legal basis for security classification was first provided by general orders of the War and Navy Departments; then by a 1940 executive order of President Roosevelt's, still confined to military intelligence; then by a 1951 executive order of President Truman's, extending the system to nonmilitary agencies and authorizing any executive department or agency to withhold information it con- sidered "necessary in the interest of national security"; then in 1953 by President Eisenhower's executive order 10501?"The bible of security- stamping," Florence calls it. It was as a result of this order that the system got completely out of hand, for it provides no effective control over the classification of documents and no feasible method for their declassification once the sacred stamp has been placed on them. Neither the Truman nor Eisen- hower executive orders were based n specific statutory authority; but, S Eisenhower's Commission on Gov- ernment Security argued in 1957: 'In the absence of any law to the ontrary, there is an adequate con- titutional and statutory basis upon hich to prediCate the Presidential uthority to issue Executive Order 0501." This very formulation im- lies, however, that Congress has he power to control the classifica- ion system should it wish to do so. Since Congress has not wished to o so, the executive branch has had free hand in dealing with classified formation. Naturally.this has made vulnerable to its own worst stincts. "Every bureaucracy," Max eber has written, "seeks to in- a a 1 a in it in cr cUIVIIMOS .k,tAgRDP84410414hati MOM 2-2 eir intentions se- debate over the acquisition of Cret. . . . The concept (if the 'official Texas, tried to sneak a treaty of annexation through .the ervatior -f secrecy? Has it Senate in ex Senator Beni Ohio, irate at this procedure, cratic control of the Govern- wrote his brother Lewis, the ment is not to become a fic- New York abolitionist: "Sup- tion? Here is a President who pose I send you the Treaty & last year held five formal press Correspondence, will you have conferences, plus four last- it published in the Evening minute chats with White House Post in such a way that it correspondents; who in the cannot be traced back?" Lewis year before held four formal Tappan, a little apprehensive, conferences and one at the consulted with Albert Galla- last minute. Here is an execu- V6411?T,Mhet21?111/119g- tin, who had served as Jeffer- ? son's Secretary of the Treas- ury and later as minister to Paris and to London. The el- der statesman told him to go ahead. William Cullen Bryant published the treaty in an Eve- ning Post extra, and Tyler's stratagem was defeated. Were the Tappans, Gallatin and Bryant to be condemned? Or, did Tyler's abuse of secrecy justify their action? The aniwer might well be that the functioning of democ- racy requires some rough but rational balance between se- crecy and disclosure, between official control of information and public need for it. When the Government upsets that balance by deceiving the pub- lic, lying to it or withholding information essential for in- formed debate and decision, a healthy democracy is likely to move, in one way or an- other, to re-establish the bal- ance, whether through the agency of dissenting officials, indignant legislators or re- sourceful newspapermen. "Se- crecy can be preserved," Jus- tice Stewart has reminded us, "only when credibility is truly maintained." THIS principle of re-estab- lishing the balance is con- fessedly elusive. Anyone who acts on it is taking a chance. Only the aftermath can prove him right or wrong in decid- ing that government has vio- lated its part of the contract. "The line of discrimination be- tween cases may be difficult," as Jefferson wrote in a dis- cussion of the question wheth- er the violation of written taw was ever justified; "but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril and throw himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives." The Anderson case suggests the 'problem. Has the Nixon Administration really fulfilled Its part of the contract? Has it maintained the credibility that Justice Stewart tells us is necessary tojustify the pres- tive branch which old Wash- ington hands regard as the least open the country has seen for years. Then came the Indo-Pakistani war?with the President in an evident pet; with a valuable Assistant to the President for National Se- curity Affairs saying in private "the President does not want to be even-handed," demanding in private that his colleagues "tilt" American power in favor of Pakistan, while telling the press, "There have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally in- accurate" (and while the State Department, if that body mat- ters any longer, was proclaim- ing in public a stance of "ab- solute neutrality"); and with a proven military dunderhead, still inexplicably blessed with great responsibility, wrong once again in his military fore- casts. Here, above all, was an Administration dead against internal or external debate in the face of highly controver- sial decision. Given this situation, what recourse was there? If the An derson columns display the kind of Government we have, it is surely appropriate in a democracy that we know it; it is definitely not the func- tion of a secrecy system to shield public officials from ac- countability for their tantrums, folly or mindlessness. Nor did the disclosure jeopardize on- going negotiations or intelli- gence operations or military plans. Worst of all, by out- lining the "tilt" policy only behind locked doors, the Nixon Administration deprived Con- gress and the electorate of the opportunity ? one might -say the right?to discuss President Nixon's pro-Pakistan program on its merits. This was the unpardonable sin; and some anonymous, disgusted and courageous bureaucrat, with the help of Jack Anderson, was trying to rectify the situ- ation and to re-establish the balance. What can be done to save Approved FortiRdeite SRN" nial need for restor the thus far not provided the R &AA Nevem itogotiogelt2s2xpected to ways. GWernmenf as "the do so this year. right to preserve for a period both the confidentiality of its internal processes and the se- curity of information in those categories where security is vital. It has manifestly abused that right. Writing in 1953, Harold Nicolson said, "I am confident that, ? in the Free World at least, the age of secret treaties is behind us." He was wildly optimistic; and it is ironic that secret cove- nants should have enjoyed so rich and rank a revival in Woodrow Wilson's native land. The contents of the so-called Hyde Park Aide-Memoire con- cerning the uses ? of atomic energy, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park on Sept. 18, 1944, were not known in this country until published by the State Depart- ment in 1960. The Symington subcommittee in the Senate has unearthed a parade of se- cret agreements withheld from Congress and the people ? Ethiopia hi 1960, Laos in 1963, Thailand in 1964, South Korea In 1966, Thailand again in 1967, not to mention secret annexes to the Spanish Bases Agreement of 1953. Senator Clifford Case has now intro- duced a bill?or rather revived a bill the Senate passed in 1955?that would require the President to transmit all exec- utive agreements to the for- eign affairs committees of both houses. If the President deems an agreement too sensitive for publication, he can hand it over under the seal of secre- cy; but he can no longer lock it up in his own office and tell no one. N addition to the control of secret agreements, we urgently need a rational and orderly system for the classi- fication and declassification of official documents and for the withholding and release of nonclassified documents. The Nixon Administration has recently shown itself aware of the need for reform. In the wake of the Pentagon Papers, President Nixon asked Con- gress for .$636,000 to begin the declassification of World War II papers?a vast moun- tain of material, 160 million 'pages in 49,000 cubic feet of storage space. This was to have launched a declassifica- tion program that would have employed 110 persons for five years at a cost now set CI n:1459084scoy499frooain616hclintrosniei,-D2avid Kahn, continued The legislative hesitation may well be justified. The Na- tional Archives estimates that at least 95 per cent of the classified documents of World War II would be declassified as a result of this program. Thus we would be spending at least $6-million (in all like- lihood the ultimate cost would be much greater) to identify that 5 per cent of World War II documents that must, it is supposed, be kept secret for a few years longer. ? "Systematic declassifica- tion," William L. Langer has written, "is patently impos- sible: The records are so vo- luminous that it would take large teams of highly quali- fied personnel years to com- plete the assignment." Profes- sor Langer is not only the leading American historian of European diplomacy; he also served as chief of the Re- search and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Serv- ices, in an equivalent post in the Central Intelligence Agency and as a member of the President's Foreign Intel- ligence Advisory Board. His testimony cannot be dismissed as that of a naive scholar who has spent his life in the stacks and doesn't understand the realities of public affairs. Document-by-document de- classification will not do. An automatic declassification pro- cedure was nominally insti- tuted in 1961; but this sys- tem, however praiseworthy in intent, left so many excep- tions as to become substan- tially meaningless. What we must have is a system which after a stated period (of which more later) automati- cally declassifies practically everything, including infor- mation on diplomatic nego- tiations and military plan- ning. A longer period?prob- ably a very much longer period?should apply to doc- uments that describe intelli- gence operations, compromise foreign citizens or invade the privacy of American citizens, that is, the materials in cate- gories two, four and five of legitimate restriction. (The al- legation that declassification would expose our diplomatic and military codes is now a bogeyman. With the domina- tion of cryptography by so- phisticated computers, the old ciphers have been abandoned, Approved For Relate 2001/03/06: the author of "The Codebreak- as Prime Minister, once re- ers," tells us, "are, in all marked that his inclination practical senses, unbreak- 'would be rather to tighten able.") up the 50-year rule than to The schedule of automatic relax it." But Harold Wilson's declassification should be Labour Government, in one accompanied by some form of its few visible achieve- of appellate procedure. That ments, reduced the closed pe- is, if a department or agency rind (except for Home Office feels that disclosure in a par- papers and other records ticular case would injure the breaching personal privacy) to 30 years. The Heath Gov- ernment has recently in one brilliant stroke opened the Cabinet records and other departmental papers for World War II ? the period which the Nixon Administra- tion would keep closed for five more years until its de- classification teams slog through the . snow-drifts of records, drift by drift. seOREOVER, Mr. Justice Caulfield's historic decision in the recent prosecution of The London Sunday Telegraph and its big talk about reclaiming Jonathan Aitken for publish- lost powers, it ought to pass publish- ing a secret report about Bi- such legislation anyway. (One afra has greatly damaged the difficulty is that Congress's old Official Secrets Act; now own record in making public the Government has appoint- its own papers ?and proceed- ed a Committee of Inquiry ings is far from inspiring.), under Lord Franks to review the whole problem of Govern- THE question remains how added that in Sweden, as al- ment secrecy. It should be long the closed period should ways an admirable country, be. Practice abroad varies almost all records, I under- widely. Denis Mack Smith, stand, including very recent the best English historian of papers and excepting only ? Italy, has just published a royal documents of the King book entitled "Victor Eman- in council, can be examined by any citizen. nation, it should have an op- portunity to claim exemption before an independent review board. But the burden of proof must always be on those who wish to lock the informa- tion up. The executive has it within its power to establish such a system immediately on its own initiative. If it does not do so, then Congress must pass legislation defining the criteria for classification and declassification and providing for Congressional oversight of the results. If Congress is by any chance serious in uel, Cavour and the Risorgi- mento" dealing with events in For most of its history, the the period from 1840 to 1870. United States has led the In conducting his research, he world in permitting access was denied access to the to official archives. That in- papers of Count Cavour and dispensable series, "Foreign to the royal archives. Cavour Relations of the United died a solid 110 years ago; States," began the publication Victor Emanuel died 94 years of diplomatic dispatches in ago. This would seem an 1861. Until nearly the end excess a caution. In the So- '? of the 19th century, the nev".. viet Union, though the Bol- volume each year published sheviks threw open the Czar- official secrets of the year ist files, they have clamped preceding, with no perceptible down hard on their own; a harm to national security. scholar doing research in Mos- The 1870 volume ran a dis- cow runs the risk of being patch of that same year from George P. Marsh, the Amer- ican Minister in Florence, in which he criticized the Italian Government for its "vacilla- tion, tergiversation and du- plicity." The dispatch was reprinted in an Italian news- paper on the very day that Marsh was dining with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. "Was Mr. Marsh handed his expelled as a spy. But other nations are re- sponding to the pressures for access. Until very recently the French required specific clearance for the use of offi- cial documents after 1871; in a burst of liberalism, the Ar- chives Diplomatiques have now accepted a 30-year rule in principle. The British for a long time had a passport?" William M. Frank- rule; Sir AlApiatomdrEtoriReileaser2001403/06r: of the State Department His- torical Office has written. ne Mr March hart CIA-RDP84-00AR001000100012-2 to admit, the only result was that the Italians tredted him better than ever. He con- tinued happily and success- fully in his Italian post until his death 12 years later." Per- haps candor is a more nego- tiable diplomatic commodity than those State Department officials understand who in recent years have tried to pre- vent the publication in "For- eign Relations" of dispatches 20 or more years old because they contain frank comment on men still active in the pub- lic life of their countries. Partly for this reason and even more because budgetary allocations to the Historical Office have failed to keep pace with the swelling flood Of documentation, the series has fallen behind even the 20-year rule it set for itself after the war. The year 1971, for example, saw the publi- cation of volumes for 1946; an,d subsequent years will be even further delayed until the Nixon Administration decrees the release to the State De- partment of the National Se- curity Council records of the Truman Administration. The situation is made worse by the fact that scholars are not permitted access to State De- partment files before the "Foreign Relations" volumes for the year have been re- leased (and access is permit- ted only on a restricted basis through independent discov, for the several years preced- ery, clandestine disclosure or mg). Nevertheless "Foreign other means." It added: "Clas- Relations" remains an impres- sification establishes barriers sive achievement. Most other between nations, friendly as nations committed to docu- well as not, creates areas of mentary series are still bogged uncertainty in the public mind down in the prewar period. on public issues and impedes Concerned with the delays, the flow of useful information President Kennedy wrote Sec_ within our own country." The retary of State Dean Rusk Task Force even reflected that on Sept. 6, 1961, "In my view, "more might be gained than any official should have a i lost f our nation were to clear and precise case involv_ adopt, unilaterally if neces- ing the national interest be_ sary, a policy of complete fore seeking to withhold from openness in all areas of in- publication documents or formation" but decided that, papers 15 or more years old." "in spite of the great ad- If our Government had lived vantages that might accrue up to the Kennedy rule, his. from such 'a policy, it is not torians would be much hap- a practical proposal at the pier. Its failure to do so has Present time." Instead it rec- contributed to the recent ommended a 90 per cent de- pressure for much more rapid crease in the amount of disclosure. Other. events, of scientific and technical infor- course, have intensified the mation under classification: pressure, including the dis- closures by Jack Anderson, HE idea of no secrets at Neil Sheehan, and Daniel Ells- all is an arresting one. It is berg. In addition, the knowl- perhaps true that our secrecy edge that Government offi- system has kept more things cia i documents o mem- than it has from the enemy. eiNgE9P134400499ROCT*00011.00031e2k2n people bets of Congress or news- The North Vietnamese, the papermen when they find leaking to their own or their department's advantage, or when they are trying to com- bat their own Government's policy, has increased outside skepticism about the sacro- sanctity of the secrecy sys- tem. Undoubtedly the prolif- eration of memoirs in which former Presidents, diplomats and even Special Assistants to Presidents break the official deadline with impunity has also encouraged people to question the 20-year or even the 15-year rule. Now we have the appari- tion of Dr. Edward Teller, who not too long ago was hound- ing J. Robert Oppenheimer as a security risk, sudden- ly asking, "Can we and should we keep any secret for more than a year?" He evidently received this revelation as a member of a Task Force for Security set up by the Penta- gon in 1970 under the chair- manship of Frederick Seitz, the physicist and former pres- ident of the National Academy of Sciences. The, Task Force itself concluded more formally that it was unlikely ''that classified information will re- main secure for periods as V:aig as five years and that it is more reasonable to assume its knowledge by others in periods as short as a year Chinese anARWOlaidieED rnae i ilatisv20111dOWlef: OA-Rialik8440494YROMalilic1121112-9t _with_a_ view to amending the knew all about the CIA. war the secrecy system, recently sition. Professor Langer sag- of exceptions. ,he range In Laos; only the American proposed that any paper gests that confidential and Congress and electorate were stamped Secret should become secret documents be made Another means of legisla- kept in the dark. It is also true public in two years; Top available "to qualified schol- tive action lies in the narrow- that the secrecy system has Secret would take three years. ars" after five or 10 years. ing of the use of "executive been a fertile source of blun- He would also empower a James MacGregor Burns pro- privilege" as a means by der and folly in foreign policy. Congressionallyappointed poses eight to 10 years. My which the executive branch Without secrecy, the British commission to grant excel- own vote would be for 10 withholds information. Mem- would not have got into Suez tions. Senator Muskie would years?i.e., two and a half hers of Congress ordinarily nor the Americans into the set up an independent board Administrations? with some can obtain classified docu- Bay of Pigs, nor would it have authorized to transmit classi- type of appellate procedure to ments on request, at least been so easy for successive fied documents at any time permit extensions in cate- when it serves the purpose of administrations to deepen to Congress and, when they gories two, four and five and the executive branch. The ef- American involvement in Indo- are two years old, to make other exceptional cases. I am feet- of classification is usually china, them public. George Ball, the strengthened in the belief that less to deny secret informa- Moreover, the abolition of former Under Secretary of a decade would be about right tion than to prevent public secrecy might well diminish State and an astute and ex- by the remark of Winston discussion and debate of such international tensions by mak- perienced public servant, has Churchill in the House of information (and also to make ing it harder for one power advocated a five-year rule. Commons on May 15, 1930: it harder to know what to to place the most sinister pos- Yet such ideas raise prob- "When we come to the queg- request). Congress also on tt h far these matters oc- sible interpretation on the lems ? problems which the tion of how casion may request unclassi- actions of another. Ignorance total abolition of secrecy are affected by the lapse of fied material?internal memo- time I would point out that makes it easy to conclude the would raise in even more randa, minutes of meetings worst; but the worst may not acute form. It is important, it is nearly 10 years ago. That and so on?that might reveal always be the most accurate. for example, that disclosure is a very long time." With disagreements within the ex- We begin to see today that not be so precipitate as to the increase in the velocity ecutive branch or expose both America and Russia did inhibit Government officials of history, it is an even longer bureaucrats advocating unpop- things in the early Cold War from making unorthodox sug- time 40 years later. Yet the ular views to Congressional that each government saw gestions. The McCarthy period Nixon Administration refuses retaliation. Immediate Con- as modestly defensive in pur- had a dismal enough effect to make a blanket declassifi- gressional or public access to pose and tbat the other gov- on the public service; think cation of World War H docu- the internal communications ernment saw as intolerably what that effect would have ments after 27 years! of the 'executive would un- aggressive and hostile. If a been if members of the For- If Congress declines to make doubtedly end the full and series of Pentagon Papers and eign Service knew that every-. a frontal attack on the secrecy frank exchange among Gov- Kremlin Papers, recording in thing they put on paper or system, it is still not without ernment officials on which Sheehan-Anderson detail what said at a meeting would be means of improving public ac- wise policy depends. When these two governments were submitted to Roy Cohn in cess to official records. The Government wants to turn actually saying and planning the next two or three years. Freedom of Information Act, down Congressional requests in their inner councils, had It is also important that dis- passed in 1966 after a dec- for material, classified or un- been published, say, in 1949, closure not be so rapid as ade's labor and perseverance classified, and if methods of each side might have recen- to invite fishing expeditions by Congressman John Moss of bureaucratic attrition fail, it sidered its view that the other by one political party in the California, is based on the may threaten or invoke exeeu- was fanatically bent on world files of its predecessor. And, proposition that disclosure nye privilege. conquest. Herbert Feis, after from the viewpoint of the should be the rule, not the Obviously executive privi- half a career in the State historian, it is urgently im- exception, and that, in Moss's lege is essential to protect the Department and the other half portant that the system of words, "the burden should be inner workings of Govern as a historian and therefore disclosure not tend to dilute on the agency to justify the ment. Obviously also it is ha- with intimate knowledge of the research quality of docu- withholding of a document ble to grave abuse. A decade both interests, recently and, mentary records. Herman and not fon] the person who ago President Kennedy tried I believe, correctly observed Kahn?not the thermonuclear requests it." The act further to end the practice by which of the conventional objections Herman Kahn, but the Herman provides for judicial review lesser officials in the executive to shortening the closed period, Kahn now at Yale, whose ser- when access is denied. How- branch assumed this authority "Earlier publication of the vices as head of the Franklin ever, the act also allows for on their own cognizance. "Ex- American record would, on the D. Roosevelt Library and later nine categories of exception, ecutive privilege," he wrote whole, dispel suspicion and of .the Presidential libraries the first of which is for mat- Representative Moss in 1962, mistrust of our policies rather system have benefited a gen- ters "specifically required by "can be invoked only by the President and will not be used than nourish them." eration of scholars?recently executive order to be kept se- without specific Presidential ? But I guess that Dr. Seitz said, "My own conviction is cret in the interest of the na- approval." However, when and his comrades are right, that there has been a decline tional defense or foreign pol- President Nixon's Secretary of The abolition of official secre- in the qualities of frankness icy." When Julius Epstein of Defense cried executive privi- cy presupposes a different and honesty in our records to the Hoover Institution on , lege last summer as an excuse world. If rigorously carried a considerable degree because War, Peace and Revolution of the great pressure to make for not showing the Senate out, it would make interna- tested the statute in his laud- Foreign Relations Committee, everything immediately avail- tional negotiation difficult and able campaign to secure the able. to historians and journal- even on a confidential basis, personal privacy impossible.release of the Operation Keel- who want to do historical the Pentagon's five-year plan But it is an excess in a good haul documents?a file deal- for military assistance, the writing about what happened direction; and the same kind ing with the forced repatria- sorely tried chairman, Senator yesterday, last month or last of skepticism about secrecy tion of Soviet displaced per- sorely responded by intro- year." Too much eagerness has recently produced a num- sons after World War II?the o. n the part of historians for ducing legislation requiring ber of more moderate schemes instant access may well defeat courts rejected his plea. In the President to take personal for a still drastic abbreviation their own long-term interests. practice, the Freedom of In- responsibility for the use of of the closed period. Con- formation Act has simply not gressman Moorhead, whose affected classified information, executive privilege and to ex- instructive hearings have . HIS perhaps is one reason The Moorhead subcommittee plain,_, detail. thrown as usual a continued _re.?. rnAppcosisabRor ease 2004163/06v.eGIA4RIDRE344000499R001MOOTZ-Z: r n such is- i Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-004R001000100012-2 sues, held hearings on the Ful- bright bill last autumn before his Subcommittee on the Sep- ' aration of Powers. THE problem is that the se- crecy- system has been uni- laterally determined and con- trolled by a major party at linterest?the executive branch of the Government. The result is that Government has been able to move rather easily from legitimate to illegitimate uses of secrecy. Harold Nicol- son, we have seen, lost no opportunity to emphasize the essentiality of secrecy in negotiations. But he distin- guished sharply between ne- gotiation and policy and always added, with equal ern- .phasis, that policy "should never be secret, in the sense 1T. that in no circumstances BE.LOKT should the citizens of a free ON HSI country be committed by their Qi-IAN Government to treaties, en- gagements, promises or corn- mitments, of which they have A - not had full knowledge," Ask which the press has not had full opportunity to publish and the legislature to .debate and approve. "I feel it to be the duty of every citizen in a free country," Nicolson declared, "to proclaim that he will not consider himself bound by any treaty entered into by the Ad- ministration behind his back." This was President Nixon's particular offense in the Indo- Pakistani affair?keeping his policy secret from the Ameri- can people. But he was far froth the first offender. Every President since the war has done much the same thing at one point or another. If gov- ernments were always wiser than citizens, such a course might be justified. But the theory of democracy is that they are not; and the practice of recent years generally veri- fies the theory. Illegitimate secrecy has corrupted our conduct of foreign affairs and deprived I he people of the in- formation necessary .for the democratic control of foreign policy. So long as the execu- tive branch persists in these abuses and so long as Con- gress remains unwilling to as- sert itself, the courage of the Andersons,-Sheehans and Ells- bergs would seem to provide the only restraint and recourse if we are to get our democra- cy back into working equi- librium. However, with intel- ligence and dAppooved*or Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 can surely think up a better way. 1111 WASIIINGT011 NS% Approved For Relelte irkiff/6/672: CIA-RDP84-004141R001000100012-2 New Light on the Cuban Missile Crisis 01 19 By Chalmers M. Roberts TIIE CUBAN missile crisis of 1962 never ceases to intrigue those who lived through it or had anything to do with it. And so two e On Occ. 18 Radvanyi attended the first edge are well worth reporting. One is a new works that add to the general knowl- of three meetings with Soviet Ambassador unique look at the crisis by a Communist Anatolyi F. Dobrynin and the heads of all diplomat then in Washington. The other is the Communist embassies in Washington. an analytical study by an associate professor Dobrvnin discussed the meeting the previous at the Kennedy School of Government at day between President Kennedy and Soviet Harvard. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. After Janos Radvanyi was the Hungarian charg?inner at the Czech embassy Dobrynin "as- in Washington at the time (there was no am- sured his audience that recent reports of So- bassador), an affable fellow with whom I had viet ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba were much contact. On May 17, 1967, he defected, completely without foundation." As to the turning up later at Stanford where he wrote Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, "nothing ex- "Hungary and the Super Powers" to be pub- traordinary had happened"; the German sit- lished in May by the Hoover institution. The nation had been discussed at length along book is largely about Hungarian-American with disarmament. At this point in his ac- relations. But one chapter on the missile cri- count, Radvanyi states that "it seems highly sis will, have far wider interest. What follows unlikely to me" that Gromyko had not been is from it. "privy to the Kremlin discussions" about the c+.0 ? missiles but that "it is altogether possible IN SEPTEMBER and October, 1962, Rad- that Dobrynin may not have been in- vanyi reported home that the United States formed." was overreacting to reports of Soviet activity in Cuba. He did so in part because Soviet dip- lomats here had told him the uproar was part of the American pre-election campaign. But one day he received a copy of a cable to Budapest from Hungarian Ambassador Janos Beck in Havana. Beck "made it a point to discount information he had re- ceived from the Chinese embassy in Havana as being provocatively anti-Soviet," Radvanyi writes. But "the Chinese ambassador had ap- parently told him that according to informa- tion he had received from private sources the Soviet Union was delivering surface-to- surface ballistic missiles to Cuba and that Soviet military advisers had come to Cuba not as instructors but as members of Soviet special rocket' force units to operate these missiles." Radvanyi goes on: "Ambassador Beck re- marked that his Chinese friends had com- plained of Soviet unwillingness to disclose any details and had asked Beck whether he knew anything more about the whole affair. Beck argued that the story of the deploy- ment of ground-to-ground missiles had been launched by 'American warmongers' and ob- served that neither the Soviet ambassador in Havana nor high-ranking Cuban officials had mentioned anything to him about the missile build-up." This message apparently was sent in late July or early August. Soviet arms shipments were arriving at that time, though the first medium range missiles did not come until Sept. 6. On Aug. 22 CIA Director John Mc- Cone voiced to President Kennedy his suspi- cions that the Soviets were preparing to in- troduce offensive missiles, perhaps on the basis of Information gathered in Cuba that month by French intelligence agent Philippe De liesjoll. However, on Sept. 19 the United States Intelligence Board's estimate was that the Soviets would n t introduce offen- sive missiietkpprOMec Jr IIRe4e&I another story. Former Hungarian, Diplomat Here Reveals Some Intriguing Background nist diplomats on Oct. 26, this time at the Soviet embassy, they discussed Walter Lippmann'e voliiren of, the previous day sug- gesting dismantling of American missiles in Turkey along with the Soviet missiles in. Cuba. "The Soviet embassy." writes Rad- vanyi, "apparently considered the Lippmann article a trial balloon, launched by the U.S. administration to seek out a suitable solu- tion. Dobrynin sought their (Commu- nist diplomats') opinion as to whether they thought the Lippmann article should be re- garded as an indirect suggestion on the part of the White House." Only the Romanian ambassador indicated he had some reason to think that it was just that; Lippmann, as far as I know, has never said whether the idea was simply his own. According to RFK's ac- count, Adlai Stevenson on the 20th had sug- gested a swap involving withdrawal of American missiles from both Turkey and Italy and giving up the naval base at Guan- tanamo Bay in Cuba. The President rejected THE CRISIS became public with the Pres- the proposal. ident's Oct. 22 speech. Next day Dobrynin e*s AT the meeting on the 26th Dobrynin said called the diplomats together again, explain- ing that the purpose was "to collect informa. tion and to solicit opinions on the Cuban sit- he still had no information on how Moscow nation." Dobrynin "characterized it as seri- would meet the quarantine. "I told him," ous and offered two reasmis for his concern. writes Radvanyi, "that according to my infor- First of all, he foresaw a possible American mation the American buildup for an inva- attack on Cuba that would almost surely re- sion of Cuba was nearly completed and that suit in the death of some Soviet military American missile bases had aimed all their personnel who had been sent to handle the missiles toward targets on the island. Only a . sophisticated new weapons. Thus by impliea- go-ahead signal from the President was tion the Soviet ambassador was admitting needed. The Soviet ambassador concurred the presence in Cuba of Soviet medium- with my .analysis, adding that the Soviet range missiles. Secondly, he feared that Union found itself in a difficult position in when Soviet ships reached the announced Cuba because its supply lines were too long quarantine line a confrontation_ and the American blockade could be very was inevita effective. (Czechoslovak ambassador) Ruzek bk." Dobrynin "explained that any defensive weapon could be labeled offensive as well remarked grimly that if the Americaes in- and dismissed American concern ever a vaded, it would definitely trigger a nuclear war. At this point I lost self-control and threat from .Cuba. The Pearl harbor 'attack, he suggested, might have been responsible asked Whether it was not the same to die for this unwarranted paranoia. Everybody from an American missile attack as from a agreed that the situation was serious and Soviet one. Dobrynin attempted to assure that the possibility of an American invasion me that the situation had not reached such of Cuba could not be discounted." Asked Proportions and that a solution would no ... how Moscow intended to deal with the quer. doubt be found "At the close of the meeting, any last re- antine, "Dobrynin was forced again to reply that he simply had no information ..." maining ray of hope I may have had for a On Oct. 23 at the Soviet embassy's mill- .peaceful solution was abruptly shattered. tary attache party Dobrynin told Radvanyi Dobrynin now announced mat the Soviet "that the situation was even more confused embassy was this very moment burning its and unstable . ? ." But, as Radvanyi notes, the archives. Shocked at this news I inquired of Soviet envoy did not disclose that before the Dobrynin whether he planned to evacuate party he had met with Attorney General the families of Soviet diplomatic personnel. Robert F. Kennedy in the third floor of the Dobrynin replied in the negative. :embassy. It was then that Robert Kennedy "Back once again at the Hungarian lege- told Dobrynin the President knew he had tion I rushed off to Budapest a long sum- been deceived by. assurances from Dobrynin mary of my latest meeting with Dobrynin, and others that no offensive missiles would and informed the foreign ministry that Do- be placed in Cuba, as detailed in Robert brynin had confirmed the information that the Kennedy's posthumously published "Thir- Americans were militarily prepared to in- t-en Da_ye." vade Cuba. I emphasized that unless a quick /OM :gellAbRDP04t0 tymmtiftiorpittopflf2und within the next 2 few days, tAPPLEPAfitEgroaKeaM 141?;11t1494,1; pa-113PE440,4149 .R001000100012-2 with the invasion and nothing short of a miracle could save the world from nuclear ? war. "Within two hours I received a troubled Inquiry from Budapest asking whether I could possibly be aware of the implications of my words. I insisted that I would take full responsibility for every word in my re- port." On the 27th Soviet Premier Khrushchey offered to swap missiles in Cuba for missiles in Turkey but the next day he accepted the Kennedy demand for outright removal of both missiles and planes from Cuba. Fidel Castro was outraged and Moscow sent Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba to reason with him. After three weeks there Mikoyan stopped in Washington en route home and Dobrynin invited the Communist diplomats to dinner with him on Nov. 30. Mikoyan ex- plained how he had tried to win Castro's ap- proval to the United Nations inspection of the missile dismantling process in Cuba, one of the President's terms to which Khru- shchev had agreed, but which Castro rejected. According to Mikoyan's account, he was the one who "proposed to Moscow instead that the Americans observe the evacuation of the missiles from the air and, if necessary, might inspect Soviet ships on the high seas." They were inspected from the air, the tarpu- Iins covering them pulled back by the Soviet Alors on ships taking them home. "After dinner," recounts Radvanyi, "Mi- koyan continued his briefing by explaining that the Cuban situation had been compli- cated by the continual advice which Castro had received from the Chinese. Peking, ac- cording to Mikoyan, had sent tons of propa- ganda material, and Mao Tse-tung had transmitted to Havana one message after another assuring the Cubans that the eight hundred million Chinese stood firmly be hind them and that the Americans were paper tigers. Mikoyan reported that while the Chinese had done nothing to help de- fend Castro, they had refrained from shell- ing Quemoy and Matsu during the days of the crisis. Mikoyan noted ironically that they might easily have stepped up pressure against Taiwan which?with the Americans involved in the Caribbean?could have changed the whole situation ? . " In defense against the Peking charges, hurled by now at Moscow, of "adventurism" in deploying the missiles and "capitula- tionism" for taking them out, "Mikoyan of- fered two explanations for the Soviet action. The missile deployment in the Caribbean, he said, was aimed at defending Castro on the one hand and, on the other, at achieving a definite shift in the power relationship be- tween the socialist and the capitalist worlds. After evaluating the strong American reac- tion during the crisis, however, the Presid- ium had decided against risking the security of the Soviet Union and its allies for the sake of Cuba." This account squares With Khrushchev's in, "Khrushchev Remembers." There the So- viet leader contended that while the "main thing" was to defend Cuba, "in addition" "our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call the 'balance of power.' " 6-4,4 IN THE second book, "Essence of Decision" by Graham T. Allison, published. by Little- Brown, a thor accepts as "the most satisfactory ex- planation" of the Soviet move the effort to end the Soviet "missile gap" then existing. The missiles in Cuba "amounted to a dou- bling of Soviet first-strike capabilities." Two other points made by Allison struck me. He concludes that the American warnings against 'installation of the missiles may not have seemed all that strong to Moscow and hence the Soviets went on. Ile notes that on Oct. 14 McGeorge Bundy, Mr Kennedy's as- sistant for national security, said publicly that he knew there was "no present evi- dence, and I think there is. no present likeli- hood" of "a major offensive capability" be- ing installed in Cuba. Yet on Sept. 28 the United States had taken pictures that Bundy knew about of crates on the decks of. Soviet ships in route to Cuba crates similar to those used to send IL-28 light bombers to Egypt and Indonesia. So Allison says that "the conclusion that the administration had discovered a way to tolerate one type of offensive weapon in Cuba is unavoidable." Second, Allison concludes from Robert Kennedy's account, published hi'. 1069, that what he told Dobrynin just before Kruslichev agreed to pull out the missiles amounted to offering a private deal: to oo secretly what the President refused to do publicly, pull American missiles out of Turkey in exchange for Soviet missiles out of Cuba. In, REK's account he said he told Dobrynin- that "there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure" but that he also told Dobrynin that "President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long per- iod of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after the crisis was over, those missiles would be gone." After the crisis abated they were withdrawn. 4. AppPoitedtftroReleasei2001/03/06 : C IA-RDP84-00499 R001000100012-2 2 Approved For Relefte 2001E FrsT7`Tmr--"", 4-00496R001000100012-2 , ":"`;'",:t.??? -.:,., -- , ."."-2Y'1110411.11.!.? r71,-'?'4!ttiulomi);., - ,T4,1P,Tm41;1-?,. . . ;..i.:,..:._ F-4;?11'::7,!IF rzo,,,? " 4 ,,O1111111111stialimIllit.?" ,1'1,11111:1111111iki ,11111111:11111117 ? ?? .C.7.71P'.17... 5 ? . i,;1'3113;SiC1111)11111M111,111111::, 't",111111711MIIIM)1114/77"7.7-.: AISI3I3311111111111111?51111111MIV. Z.'77;.'"..7:17't''11 )1111)11112 t !HP'. . ? '1t11411111191141111111"1""""" ........... ? CIA Headquarters in Virginia ck yar CI The, Central Ilitelligence Agen- cy always insists its men aren't in- - .volved in domestic police work.But in Chicago CIA agents have been working with the FBI and-Tresury men in an - effort to pin the bank bombings on radical groups. Heretofore,clandestine CIA police work within the US was centered around counter espionage .efforts aimed at the Soviet KGB.CIA maintains secret bases in all major US cities.The agency also has training camps in Virginia and the Carolinas.These are masked as reg- ular military bases.Spooks are trained for duty at Williamsburg,Va. Two years ago CIA employees were surprised when members of the Chicago policefAproved F oReFease201/0* 000100012? -2 treatment at Langley, Va., headquarters They met there with-Helms, were shown around, and taken to the secret training camps. That was the beginning of rumors within the agency that the CIA had been given the go ahead to move into domestic police operations. ' While everyone denied it, the theory ? I was that the.CIA Was told to get the , radicals. ? Two recent personnel changes increased speculation. One involved resignation of Helm's special assis- tant, Robert Kiley-. Kiley handled the student operations through National Student Association facades. He re- cently turned up as associate director of the Police Foundation, a new group launched with a $30 million Ford Foundation grant. The money is meant to be used to improve local police. The second personnel shift involved Drexel Godfrey; who wis head of ifie CIA's Office of Current Intelligence. He quit this high ranking job, turned up in the narcotics bureau of the Justice Commission at Harrisburg, Pa. The commission is another new police. Both personnel shifts are cited by agency people to bolstering fronts in the US, thistime, moving into was given a new title recently, making him head of all intelligence and presumably providing him with a . legitimate interest in internal police operations. But such suggestions are bitterly denied all around. CASE FILE [DESCRIPTION) IIEWInvw.vw.y Place card upright in place of charged out folder. lace c horizontally in returned file folder. DATE Approved For ReleaseelgIM146ciaqh-151J4a149R001000100012-2 FORM NO. ? Rill, GI 10 REPLACES FORM.36.152 I IQ kvuir.t4 u?v RE USES. (7) Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 B-6 THE EVENING STAR Washington, D. C., Friday, January 7, 1972 Disclosures Reported Pleasing Keating By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG New York Times Neys Service NEW DELHI ? Sources else to Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating indicate that he was not unhappy about the dis- closure of his secret cable- gram to Washington taking is- sue with American policy on the Indian-Pakistani war. Asked yesterday to com- ment on his policy views and on last month's cablegram, which was divulged in Wash- ington by columnist Jack An- derson, Keating would say only: "This is a matter I can- not discuss." It is known in New Delhi, however, that from the time Pakistani troops in East Paki- stan moved to crush the Ben- gali secession movement there last March, Keating cam- paigned privately against the Nixon administration's pro- Pakistani stand. He even did so publicly until he was si- lenced by Washington in April. Posture Correct In recent months, Keating's official posture has been rigid- ly correct. He has refused to discuss his views with report- ers, even in private. hi his regular columns in a U.S. In- formation Service fortnightly newspaper that is widely dis- tributed in India, he has con- sistently defended the admin- istration policy. He has been criticized for doing so in the Indian press and elsewhere. From the beginning of the India - Pakistan crisis, which culminated in India's victo- rious support of the East Paki- stan separatists, the American ambassador's cables to Wash- ington ,have argued strongly for a different American poli- cy. He pressed for a policy that would be based on what he views as the moral and political "realities" on the subcontinent. Only a few days after the Pakistani crackdown in East Pakistan began, he sent a ca- ble containing more than a hint of outrage. In it he re- ferred to the killings of Ben- galis as "selective genocide" and urged Washington to come down hard on the Pakistani military regime. The word "massacre" was also used. Reportedly Rebuked After an April 15 news con- ference in Bombay at which he differed with the adminis- tration's contention that the events in East Pakistan were an "internal affair," he was reported to have been rebuked by Washington and told to con- fine his public remarks to sup- port the administration posi- tion. "The phrase 'internal affair' should not be overdone," he said at the news conference. He added that the meaning of the phrase was "limited to the geographical fact that all of this is taking place in what is now Pakistan. The Pakistan government is understood to have filed a pro- test with Washington about his remarks. Keating continued to press his argument in his cable- Approved For R A? - - _ _ 1 grams to Washington. His view all along, according to confidants, was that Pakistan was an unstable, crumbling military dictatorship; that In- dia was not only an increas- ingly stable democracy but also the dominant power on the subcontinent; and that East Pakistan seemed certain to emerge as an independent state. The Bengali separatists have proclaimed the establish- ment of Bangladesh. The ambassador argued that the morality of the situation, a reference to "genocide," as well as the political realities should lead the United States to lean toward India rather than Pakistan. By his determined dissent, Keating, a former Republican senator from New York who is a political appointee of Presi- dent Nixon and a former law partner of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, may have caused these two men consid- erable anguish and irritation over the last 10 months, but his arguments have had little Obvious effect. There have been periodic press reports that Keating has threatened to resign. lease 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 I up raieFamii nAtiWolgatico Velting By William Greider Washington Post Staff Writer U.S.. interests promoted? and then apparently backed away from?plans for a right- wing military coup in Chile two years ago to prevent the election of Marxist Salvador ;11Iende as president, accord- ing to internal memoranda of ITT, the giant international conglomerate. "It is a fact," said an Oct. 16 for ITT said Anderson's first trust episode?President Har- message from Latin America to corporate headquarters in New York, "that word was Passed to Viaux from Wash- ington to hold back last week. It was felt that he was not ad- equately. prepared, his timing was off, and he shpuld 'cool it' for .a later, unspecified date. Emissaries pointed out to him that, if he moved prematurely and lost, his defeat would be tantamount to a 'Bay of Pigs in Chile.' "As part of the persuasion to delay, Viaux was given oral assurances he would receive material assistance and sup- port from the U.S. and others for a later maneuver. It must be noted that friends of Viaux subsequently reported Viaux was inclined to be a bit skepti- cal about only oral assur- ances." These and many other less sensational glimpses into U.S. government and corporate ma- neuvering in Chile are drawn from a new batch of secret documents from ITT's files, obtained by .columnist Jack At one point, according to Anderson and made available yesterday to The Washington Post. -The copies of 26 memos, messages and staff reports hint at many questions which are left unanswered?What role did the Central Intelli- gence Agency play? How seri- ously was the military plot en- tertained? How deeply was ITT involved? Yesterday, the White House, 1eaSee200140300ed tel CIA all refused to comment. In New York, a spokesman ? The U.S. government, ac- cording to the ITT papers. first gave a "green light" to I he U.S. ambassador-in Santia- go?"maximum authority to do all possible, short of a Do- minican Republic type action, to keep All.ende from taking power." The U.S. government also promised, according to the in documents, to selected Chilean military leaders "full material and financial assist-- ance by the U.S. military es- tablishment" if civil war erupted?even though Ambas- sador Edward Korry charac- terized Chile's armed forces as "a bunch of toy soldiers." column Tuesday on the Chi- lean episode, alleging a CIA- ITT plot to provoke economic chaos in the Latin American country, was "without founda- tion in fact." Former Gen. Viaux is now in jail in Chile, charged with mutiny against the govern- ment, in cOnnection' with the preelection assassin ation of Gen. Rene Schneider, com- mander of ,the Army. That at- tack was generally regarded as an unsuccessful attempt to stir right-wing resentment and possibly to touchoff a military takeover. The ITT documents mention the incident and Viaux's arrest, but do not say anything to indicate that the shooting was inspired by U.S. interests. ITT, which had more than $150 million invested in Chile, has since lost its major capi- tal, an 80 per cent interest in the ,Chile Telephone Company, and is negotiating with Al- lende's government over com- pensation for its loss. ITT con- tinues to operate two Shera- ton hotels and a telecommuni- cations factory there. Taken as a whole, the ITT messages from Latin Ameri- can agents to Washington and New York suggest a picture of frantic, sometimes bitter, sometimes contradictory com- munications within the corpo- ration, trying to find some- thing that would keep the Chi, lean congress from certifying the documents, ITT informed the U.S. government that it would volunteer funds in "seven figures," $1 minion or More, to aid in some unspeci- fied way the efforts to keen Allende out of power. Finally, the ITT documents state that in mid-October' of 1970?a week before All.ende would be elected ? a right- wing Ax- eneral. wiled R erto VATta OfftwrDE ho" by the ITT operatives in Chile, was advised to hold of. old Geneen, Washington office vice president W. R. Merriam, public relations vice president E. J. Gerrity and others. In some memos, the ITT executives reported a plan for ? stimulating economic chaos? which might in turn, have pro- voked a military coup. But it is not clear that the corpora- tion embraced the idea fully and acted upon it. The Wash- ington officers attributed it to a "Mr. Broe" or a representa- tive from "the McLean agen- cy," references to the CIA and to William Broe, CIA director I in Latin America, according to columnist Anderson. Gerrity, for example, re- ported in one memorandum his skepticism: "Realistically, I do not see how we can in- duce others involved to follow the plan suggested. We can contact key companies for their reactions and make sug- gestions in the hope that they might cooperate. Information we received today from other sources indicates that there is a growing economic crisis in any case." At another point, Gerrity re- lated that Geneen, the board chairman and president, re- garded the plan as "unwork- able." As Allende's election drew near without any "crisis" to prevent it, the ITT memos turned sour and pessimistic in tone, blaming the State De- partment for not taking a An- g to lobby Wilhite House for a stiffer U.S. policy.' 1 are t gritiallagMlt have figured in the ITT anti. k W Oise 2001/0 AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1971 PAGE A.22 The White House Brief on South Asia The White House, with an assist from Senator Goldwater, has now revealed publicly what the United States did privately over the last eight months to ease the South Asia crisis. A "back. ground" news conference with Dr. Henry Kissinger on Tuesday, which the senator was good enough to put into the Congressional Record on Thursday, establishes that in fact Amoebas officials did work to induce political compromise in Pakistan and mili- tary restraint in India. The record is at once so important and judgmental that it needs to be in- spected in detail That Rs duress, Including pressure from Wash- ington, was affecting Pakistan is plain. As the White House noted, Islamabad replaced the cruel military governor in the East, allowed relief there to be internationalized, offered formal amnesty to refugees who might choose to return, and had agreed to restore a facade of civilian rule this month. President Yahya Khan had agreed to talk to Calcutta representatives of Bangle Deck (the Bengali nation proclaimed hi former East Paki- stan/ though not to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or his nominees?"Mujib," the acknowledged and elected Bengali leader, is the Pakistanit' prisoner trial tar Giessen. Islamabad was reportedly ready to grant the East autonomy in everything but for- . eign policy, defense and currency. Further Paki- stani concessions were expected in the week of Nov. 22. The Indians, according to the White House, knew all this. They also knew Islansabad had offered to let Americans communicate with Mujib through his lawyer. On Nov. 19 they were told the U.S. was prepared to discuss with Islamabad a timetable for establishing autonomy in East Bengal But with. out waiting, without giving word of Its own mili- tary timetable, India struck on Nov. 22. The White House conclusion: peaceful mans had not been exhausted; recourse to arms was accordingly unjustified. The question, of course, Is whether Delhi moved because It was sure American diplomacy would fall to produce a Bangle Desh state independent of Pakistan, India's goal; or whether Delhi moved nut of fear that the Americans would succeed and thus deprive it of a long-sought chance to bash the Poke. The answer, we submit, must take into account the constantly reiterated Indian position that ne- gotiations had to begin with Mujib. Whether India figured realistically that otherwise negotiations would be meaningless, or whether It calculated cynically that President Yahya could not stomach that course, does not alter the uncontested fact that the Americans knew from the start this was the Delhi position. By Nov. 19, or by Nov. 22, Pres- ident Yahya had talked with no Bengalis. He had ruled out Mujib and Mujib's choices. Ile had Said the autonomy he would grant would not cover foreign affairs, defense and currency?dominant heights of any country's public life. Eight months had passed. Refuge. were continuing to pour in. Press reports of India's grooving impatience were rampant. And presumably Washington was not altogether dependent on India's formal statements to learn the status of its preparations for open war. Knowing now what the administration kept secret before, we are not an inclined to criticize the ad. ministration for its attitude as for Its judgment. Through eight months of gathering misery and tension it stuck in a public posture of support for Pakistan on the ostensible grounds that it could apply more effective leverage. At the end, it had only persuaded Pakistan to promise talks?not yet In begin them?for a limited purpose with Bengalis whom the Wiens regarded as stooges. And on this basis it expected India to hold still. The Indians have Non rough anti irceilicruiliim they have encouraged and directly taken part in the dismemberment of a sovereign state. But could the war have been avoided It, early on, Washington Dad openly and entirely withdrawn support from Pakistan and demanded that it honor the free elec- tions which Mujib was and Yahya nullified in March? Was not the appearance of American favor crucial in allowing Yahya to sustain his misrule to the point where the Indians jumped him? We note that, contrary to some accounts. evidencs Is lacking that the White House and State Depart. went have different views on the crisis. The Depart. ment on Dec. 4 had cited India as the aggressor. But the White House did not really shy away from this indictment as sharply as some reports made it seem; rather, it reinforced the indictment by offer- ing a diplomatic record intended to show what peaceful possibilities the Indians had preempted. In noting that the first charge of aggression came from State, the White House?the briefing tran- script makes clear?was trying to rebut other charges that American favor for Pakistan had flown from the personal preferences of the Presi. dent. In short, there are other places?and aspects other than Internecine conflict between the White House and State?at which to look for the flaws and failure of American policy. Around Teachers College at 120 With a fascinating past and great promise for Ike future, the District of Columbia Teachers Col- lege has had much to celebrate on the occasion of (is 120th anniversary this month. To begin with, ec this chm'ished community institution go back to the roots of racial segregation in the na- tion's capital, when the education of Negroes was anything but a priority item. It was in this setting that Myrtilla Miner, awhile woman from Madison County, N.Y., dedded to opens school at 11th Street and New York Avenue NW, to -prepare "colored girls to teach." By the 1870s, it had become the Miner Normal School, which, along with the Wilson Normal School, had developed from one-year institutions into schools offering three-year .eourses. Racially separated normal schools continued here uMil 1929, when Congress authorized the es. tablishment of two teachers colleges? still segre- gated. It wasn't until 1955 that the two colleges merged into the Integrated D.C. Teachers College. Today, the college has an enrollment of more than 4,500 students and, under the presidency of Dr. Paul P. Cooke, is exploring new roles In the life of the community, as well as in the field of public higher education here. One current com- munity activity, for example, is the Adult Courtesy Patrol, an organization of men and women who patrol 14th Street NW to provide better security for citizens; there is also a children and youth community recreation program, under which the college is providing its basketball courts, playroom and gym for neighborhood activities; there Is a pilot District police project, to work on police-con, malty relations between some 900 police officers and the neighborhood they serve, as well as dozens of other student and faculty projects. Above all, D.C. Teachers is on Its way to becom- ing a general community college, with hopes of some day functioning as a vital part of a Federal City University concept. This plan envisions a net- work of breach colleges for junior college educe- tine, to supplement and feed the city's four-year liberal arts omits:on aad the Washington Technical Institute. The college, which has been accredited for the next 10 years by the Middle States Association of College and Secondary Schools, has been a keystone of public higher etlacation here, and merits re- newed cong,resslonal and community support as It moves toward a greater role in the years ahead. Fare Smudging Man Is born to trouble; hut Attorney Philip Hirschkop who has rendered much service to civil liberty and public order in this community, seems Os have had more than his fair share of it. Trouble began for him when he was appointed to defend the amealled "D.C. Nine?an aggregation of Roman Catholic dergy and laymen charged with ransack. log the Dow Chemical Co. Washington office in what they conceived of as a protest against the use of napalm in the Vietnam war. The trial before Federal District Court Judge John Pratt was a tumultuous one in which the judge and Mr. Hirsch- hop collided constantly. At its conclusion Judge ) Pratt summarily found the defense attorney guilty of Contempt; and on top of that filed charges against him before the court's committee on admis- sions and grievanceS. The contempt conviction is still pending before the Court of Appeals. The Ethics Committee of the local bar association found no occasion for dis- clplinary action against Mr. Hir.hkop. But the court's committee on admissions and grievances recommended his disbarment. About six weeks ago Town a three-judgr panel of the mud-reviewing the case concluded against disbarring or suspending Mr. Ilirschkop but found that his defense of his clients "went far beyond the hounds of zealous repre- sentation." They censured the lawyer for "prof.- sional miscionduct" bed observed that this rniseon. titiot iaaTi iiiin tathatiTi tLit the respondent's behavior before the various courts in this area has been exemplary." 5.1r. Hirschkop hailed the news of this finding by saying that he did not believe the panel would have censured him at all except as "a face.saving device for Pratt." Whereupon, the members of the panel filed new charg. against Mr. Ilirschkop with Ike grievance committee, accusing him of "know. ingly making false accusations." Since when is a defendant foreclosed from commenting on a ver- dict? Otis an absurdity to characterize this offhand remark made to a reporter as "false accusation" against a court. The action does nothing to save face for Judge Pratt, It serves only to smudge the face of the District Court. Pop Sculpture We are enchanted by the new abstract sculptures that flank Rock Creek Parkway and frame the Lb. coin Memorial as you approach Memorial Bridge. For all the monuments and statuary in this city, there isn't much modern art In public places. The David Smith alongside the Universal Building on Connecticut Avenue and the Alexander Calder, Jose de Rivera and George Rickey around the Smith- sonian's History and Technology museum are all we can think of, now that the Corcoran sold Barnett Newman's rust red, up-side-down obelisk to Hoots. ton.) The Constructivist, translucent cubes near the Lincoln Memorial, at any rate, seem truly in- spired, a perfect expression of our time. They are bold in their utter stinplieily, in keeping with the monumentality of the Lincoln Memorial Yet, being translucent, they also blend quietly into the en. vironMent, Merely marking a point in space, ern- phasiring the perspective on the Memorial, the traffic around It, the trees, the sky, the river, the infinily of the ecology. These petifeelly seared plas- tic cubes on granite pedestals, moreover, are, like all true art, hauntingly Mysterious. (What could be more mysterious than golden horses shimmering through plastic sheets") They +obviously symbolize the ultimate union of art and technology, with the former all wrapped up In the latter. What could be more metaphysical? And all of this Is, of course, with it, lois relevant, ills op and it is pop. It's a happening. But unhappily it will unhappen in a few weeks, the Park Service tells us. The repair and re.plating of the statues will be completed and the scaffold. ing will come down. We will again be treated to the familiar sight of the strutting stallions repre- senting peace ?which were given to us by the Italian government In 1951. Kissinffer's tackgroundei on the War in South Asia FInsT OF All, lot no get a number of things straight. There have been some com- ments that the administration is antdIndian. Thin is totally inaccurate. India is a great country. It is the most populous free coon try. It is governed by democratic prom- dues. Americans through all administrations in the postwar period have felt a commitinent In the progress and development of India, and the American people have contributed to this to the extent of $10 billion. Last year, in this administration, India received from all sources $1.2 billion for development as. sistance, economic assistance, of which $700 million came from the IfMted States in var. Ions forms. Therefore, we have a commit- nient to the progress and to the future of India, and we have always recognized that the success of India, and the Indian demo- cratic experiment, would be of profound significanee to many of the countries in the undertleveloped world. Therefore, oh en we have differed with India, as we have in recent weeks, we do NO with great sadness and with crest dig. appointment. Now let me describe the situation as we saw it going hark to March 25, Mardi 25 is, of course, the day when the central gov- ernment of Pakistan decided to establish military rule in East Bengal and started the process which has led to the present situa- tion. The United Stales has never supported HE RI' ISSINGER the particular action that led to this tragic series of events, and the United States has always recognized that this action had con- sequences which had a considerable impact on India. We have always recognized that the influx of refugees into India produced the danger of communal strife in a country always precariously Poised on the edge of communal strife. We have known that it is a strain on the already scarce economic re- sources of 0 country in the process of de- vetopment. Therefore, from the beginning, the United States has played a very active role in at- tempting to ease the suffering of the refu- gees and the impact on India of this large Intim of unexpected people. The United States position has been to attempt two ef- forts simultaneously: One, to ease the human suffering and to bring about the re. turn of the refugees; and secondly, we have attempted to bring about a political resolu. tion of the conflict which generated the ref- ugees in the first place. Now, the United States did not condone what happened in March 1971; on the con. trary, the United States has made no new development loans to Pakistan since March, 1971. Secondly, there has been a great deal of) talk about military supplies to Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that Immediately after the actions M East Pakistan at the end of larch of this past year, the United States mtspended any new licenses. It stopped the shipment of al1 military supplies out of ARICH.CAO depots or that were under Amen. 'no governmental centred. The only arms that were continued to be shipped to Paki. stan were arms on oLd licenses in commer. Oat channels, and those were spare parts. There were no lethal enditems involved. To give you a sense of magnitude. the hinted Slates cut off $35 million worth of arms at the end of March of this year, or eat.V. April of this year, immediatrty after the actions in East Bengal, and continued to ship something less than $5 million worth; whereupon, all the remainder of the pipe- line was Out off. ereeR Ir is true the United States did not make any pudic declarations on its views of the evolution, because the United States wanted to use its influence with both Delhi and Isla. mailed to bring about a political settlement that would enable the refugees to return. At Ohs request of the President, this was ex. plained by me to the Indian Foreign Minis- ter and to the Indian Prime Minister when I was in New Delhi In early July, and both In- dicated that they understood our-decision in this respect and made no criticism stone de. cision. They did make a criticism of the arms shipments. Secondly, we consistently used our influence that we gained in this manner to urge the Government of Pakistan in the direction of a political evolution. We urged the Government of Pakistan and they agreed that relief supplies be distributed by Intemational agencies, in order to take away the critidam In East Pakistan that they might be used to strengthen the central au- thority, and the government agreed that a "A spokesman," "high officials..? in formed sources" ? these are the players in as game called "for background only" which government officials play with newsmen and which everybody but the reader wins: the newsmen get a story and government officials can speak candidly, or self-servingly, without taking official responsibility for what they say. Last week, however, the reader won one when Senator Goldwater put into the Congressional Record the transcript of a White House "backgrounder" with the press and thereby gave away the identity of the source: Dr. Henry Kissinger. The result, excerpts of which are printed here, ,offers a revealing glimpse of what the White House thinks ?or wants everybody to believe it thinks?about the origins and causes of the India?Pakistan war. timetable be established for returning Pain stan to civilian rule. That was supposed to be done by the and of December. We urged a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border, and when India rejected this, we urged a unilateral withdrawal of .Pakistan troops from the border, and that wasi accepted by Pakistan and never replied On by India. We urged an amnesty for all refugees, and that wan accepted. We went further. We established contact with the Bangle Desk people in Calcutta. and during August, September and October of this year no fewer than eight such con' lane took place. We approached President Yahya Khan three times In order to begin negotiations with the Bangle Desh people in Calcutta. The Government of Pakistan neeeated were tald by our contacts in Calcutta that the Indian Government discouraged such net- gotiations. In other words, we attempted to promote a political settlement, and if I can sum up the difference that may have existed between as and the Government of India, it was this: We told the Government of India on many occasions?the Secretary of State saw the Indian Ambassador 18 times; I saw him seven times since the end of August on be. half of the President We all said that po- litical autonomy for East Bengal was the inevitable outcome of a political evolution, and that we favored it. The differences may have been that the Government of India wanted things so rapidly that it was no longer talking about, political evolution, but about political collapse. Without attempting to speculate on the motives of the Indian Government, the fact of the matter, as they presented themselves to us, was as follows: We told the Indian Prime Minister when aloe was here of the Pakistan offer to withdraw their troops uni? laterally from the border. There was no response. We told the Indian Prime Minister when she was here that we would try to arrange negotiations between the Pakistanis and members of the Amami League, spedfically approved by Mujibur, who is in prison. We Sold the Indian Ambassador shortly before his return to Indian that we were prepared even to discuss with them a political time a precise timetable for the establish. ment of political autonomy in East Bengal. The conversation was held on November lath. On November 22nd, military action started in East Bengal. We told the Pakistan Foreign Secretary when he was here that it was desirable on November 15th; that we thought It was time for Pakistan to develop a maximum pro- gram. lie said he could not give us an an- ewer until the week of .November 22nd when he would return to his country. He also pointed out to us that there would be a re- turn to civilian rule at the end of December, at which time it might be easier to bring about such matters as the release of Mull. bur, whose imprisonment had occurred under military rule. This information Was transmitted, and military action, nevertheless, started during the week of November 22nd. On when we say Ileal there was no need for military action, we do not say that India did not suffer. We do not say that we are unsympathetic to In- dia's problems or that we do not 0510,0 India. This country, which in many respects has had a love affair with India, can only, with enormous pain, accept the fact that military action was taken in our view without ade- quate muse, and if we express this opinion In the United Nations, we do not do so be. Douse we want to aupport one particular point of view on the subcontinent, or be. cause we want to forego our friendship with what will always be one of the great roan. tries in the world; but because we believe that if, as some of the phrases go, the right of military attack is determined by arith. metie, if political wisdom consists of saying the attacker has 500 million and the de. Sender has 100 million, and, therefore, the United States must always be on the side of Ohm numerically stronger, then we are crest- ing a situation where, in the foresecalote fu- ture, we will have international amrchy, and where the period of peace, which is the greatest desire for the President to estab- lish, will be jeopardized; not at first for Americans, necessarily, but for peoples all over the world. The unilateral withdrawal, that was with- out any qualifications. The willingness to talk to the Bangle Desh people involved a disagreement between the Indians and the Bangle Desh on the one side, and the Pakis- tanis on the other. The Indians took the view that the negotiations had to begin with Mujibur, who was in prison. What we attempted to promote was a as. collation with Banda Dego people who were 000 10 prison, and who were in Calcutta. The Pakistanis Said they would talk only to these Bangle Dash people who were not charged with any particular crime in Pakistan, and I don't know whom that would have excluded. There is no personal preference on my part for Pakistan, and the IRDWN that I. ex. pressed at the beginning, of the American position--that is, about the crucial Mum, tance of India as a country in the world and in the subcontinent?have always been stiontic held mo Bra SIANDCBUY support those as an expression of bipartisan American policy in the postwar period. As for the President, I was not aware of his preference for Pakistan leadem over Ili. dian leaders, and I, therefore, asked him this morning what this might be based on. Ile pointed out?as pm know, I +vas not a- quainted with the President before his ores. not position?but he pointed out to me that an his trip in 1967, he was liebeived very warmly by the Prime Minister and by the President of India; that the reports that he was snubbed at any point are ovithout any foundation, and that in any event, the Warmth of the reception that we extended in the Milian Prime Minister two weeks before the attacks on Pakistan started should make clear what enormous value we attach toll. 'din? friendship.' While I can understand that theile can be sincere differences of opinion about the wise RA/ Mit A. courts to take,' I do not think we do min selves any justice If we ascribe policies to Ike personal pique of individuals. Besides, the charge of aggression was not made in this building moths first place. ? Q: Dr. Kissinger, I would 1110 00 ago you s clarifying, question about something you said just a motnent ago. You said that the charge of aggression was not made in this budding. Dec Kissinger: We do not disagree with its but it was in reference to a point that the President and I have an anti-Indian bias. (4, Does this carry the implication that you are putting the responsibility for that original charge of aggression on the State Department? . Or. Kissinger) No. There is a united go, ernmental view soil Wobingtan Vast EUGENE MEYER. 1815-1959 PHILIP L. MADAM. 191,1963 PAM R. IGNATIUS BENJAMIN C. BRADLEE PreAdent ExeeeBee 'MIN L. Myelin. EdItortal Pare Editor: Rowan, Berno o emee J? BeD. eBee eBBRdent Thome. Tre Joee r ld W. Siegel. Res Pre ret L. .3333 133 3 3,1331133 313 The. Weshinetav 3.033 COM3511.11, FREDERICK. B. PERIM Chairman Of the Boer.] 1.111=1.1,11101 mz.rmirgg Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 Indians Say China May Aid Evacuailar8rNartalgas DELHI, From Al Indian alarm at this new development was reflected today in new rounds of urgent talks between top officials in both New Delhi and Moscow. According to the Infor- mation gathered by Indian Intelligence sources, the Chinese-Pakistan plan is for the boats, believed to he a motley assembly of met, chant ships, barges and other craft, to sail out un. der the Chinese flag when they are fully loaded with escaping soldiers. The Indian eastern naval rommand, which is in the Ray of Bengal not for off lite coast, has given a warn- ing that all ships in the area will be subject to in- MI-option. India hag also warned repeatedly that boats attempting to take es- taping troops back to West Pakistan will be attacked and sunk. Indian nava( and aW units have already attacked sev- ',rat small. Galt taking rot dier out of East Pakistan toward Burma. They were spotted hugging the coast In a bid to escape. India's chief spokesman tonight would not disclose any details of discussions believed already to have taken place with the Ran- goon government about any Pakistan soldiers who man- age to make their way to Burma, If the Indians carry out their threat and attack me lensibly Chinese vessels, this would clearly raise the risk that China would re- gard India as having made a direct attack on her. The Indian concern has been made apparent by the frequent radio messages teemed to Pakistan soldieta in East Pakistan by Gen. Sam Manekshaw, Indian commander-in.chlef, urging them to surrender. These were sent all through yes- terday afternoon and again today at five-minute inter- THE WASHINGTON POST Ilolvicy,ii?1,13,197I A21. AILOSAGE MEAT Grand Union . - AREIMISS Mated Irreta Internat.,. Patricia Poldhanunor. 18, of Beloit, Kan., greets a friend Sunday night in a Singapore hotel lobby after arriving on one of three evaroation flights from Daccn. vale on a variety of wave- lengths. Another factor in the situation is the almost cer- tain presence in the Bay of Bengal of Chinese sub- marines. The U.S. 7th Fleet is also believed to be within easy reach of the are. With fighting apparently stalemated Mr the present on the western front, the possibility of Chinese inter. welkin could lake the con. Dist to a potentially danger- ous new stage. India has reckoned it un- likely that the Chinese would give Pakistan any- thing stronger than verbal Fneport. Despite Moscow's concern over China's ling with the Pakistan military regime, the Russians arc likely to discourage the Indians from attacking any escaping boats flying the Chinese flag even if the price is that p dal. 1407 H St. N.W. (DOWNTOWN) ? 05 7.1300 7351 Wisconsin Ave. (Bethesda) ? OL 6?8300 49th and Mass. Ara. N.W. (Spg. Va Iley) ? 244-7722 POINTSETTIAS For Christmas Phone and Charge it with your credit card $7.50 to $25.00 MINI ADORA CEDAR TREES $7.95 Premium Men Violet. (New Crop) Melees $10, $12, $15, $20 dos. $3.00 per beech $7.50 & up Nearby Deliveries 50e, Suburb. Am. $1.00 sion or more of soldier. gen home to fight ladle again on the western front. The Russians are believed to be anxious to bring the war to an end as soon as possible after the establish. ment of a stable govern. moot in East Pakistan and have sought to be a strong modern influence on New Delhi. la addition to possible Chinese involvement, In. than sources have charged the United States with sup- PlYing military equipment either directly or indirectly through an Asian ally, per- haps Turkey, to Pakistan. The foreign ministry spokesman said last night: "Some foreign aircraft have landed military stores at Karachi civil airport The government of India is obliged to reserve the right to secure that civil airports are not used for such mili. tory plaToese." The spokesman refused to identify the nationality of the foreign aircraft but made it plain that he was referring to the U.S. Ulster Gunmen Kill Senator, Blast His house BELFAST, Northern Ireland, Dec. 12 (AP)?Gunmen allot a hard-line Protestant Senator tonight, then wrecked his' country mansion with a bomb. His body was buried under, tons of rubble. Sen. John Barnhill, a right- wing member of the Protes- tantbased Unionist Party that rules the British province, was the first member of the North- ern Ireland Parliament to die in two years of violence that has now resulted in Igh d ath His- wife said he went to answer the door at their home at Strabane, close to the border with the Trish Repub- lic. She said she heard tvvo shots and found her husband lying near the door with a gunman kneeling at his side. Then a second man helped drag him into the main room, where the attackers planted a gelignite bomb beside his body, she said. GIVE YOURSELF A DREAM FOR CHRISTMAS AT ARLINGTON TRUST THE DREAMS THE DREAM MAKERS annoy I'e' 59e M ERKRAUT 417 39' Grand Union 'SAUCE 3 4.09'if 1 00 Strictly Fresh rand Unio an Wnda.Keen,l LEAN GROUND BEEF bleelni-leolly lean-with pro, tem rich real beef. We've changed the name from chuck la lean ground beef, and it only has 15So average far careentl ID 't i ' . STYLE HAIR SPRAY I PrItsgular, Super, Unscented _ f 13.. on 69C lemon Up .,, SHAMPOO L."0i2 1 19 Wen Mexican Dinner Mee ie.r53c Beaf Enchilada Dinner pleat: Chem* Erehiteda Dinner a.s onE5c TOrtIllee so, . 29c GOLD MEDAL FLOUR At Pomace 1HAI KARATE Alter 5have Lunen CHRISTMAS TURKEYS Swift's Premium Deep Basted BUTTERBALLS 20-24 lbs. 16)020 lbs. lb. sc lb. 4 tIlts lac ee 16 lbs. lb. 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IMPERIAL MARGARINE " CHEESE SPREAD Chef Deli he 2.tb Proormed laaf PEPSODEN TOOTH PAS With tic Off Lobe! tzgi WHIPPED AAARGARI Mrs. Filbert's gicst. 41 EFFEROENT Densure Pikg 1 29 Cleennr . o WOOLITE POWDI 6;17 79c Pink Meat HANOVER FROZEN SEEDLESS GRAPEFRUIT NDXZEMilk SHAVE CREAM 5 I59` Regular, . 109 ; Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00100010 CIA Policy Shifts Urged B,y Cooper, McGovern By JAMES DOYLE Star Staff Writer Republican Sen. John Sher- man Cooper of Kentucky, senior member of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee, submitted leg- islation today which would make available to Congress all the intelligence information and analyses developed by the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and similar government agencies. Cooper proposed an amend- ment to the National Security Act of 1947 which would require that the CIA make its intelli- gence discoveries and conclu- sions available to the commit- tees on Armed Services 9 od For- eign Relations In both branches. He said that as the law now says the information is only a vaila ble to the executive branch. In a related move, Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., pro- posed that the CIA expenditures each year be listed as an over- all total in the national budget. McGovern's Amendment also would prohibit use of CIA funds by other departments and agen- cies. The South Dakota Senator said he recognized that security limi- tations would prevent a full dis- closure of all CIA funding, but said a single line item in the budget would "put the Congress in a position to judge if we want- ed to spend more on intelligence operations and clandestine wars than on improvement of the en- vironment ,or on education or even on other aspects of national defense." Cooper said his bill "would not, in any way, affect the activ- ities of the CIA, its sources or methods." But he said it would put Con- gress "in a much better position to make judgments, much more informed and broader perspec- tive than is now possible." CIA expenditures are overseen by a select subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. All of its deliberations and decisions are kept secret. Funds for the CIA are Oen hidden away in other money bills. Cooper said his bill would not affect the method of congres- sional oversight. 012-2 1 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00100010 012-2 VEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1972 Phoue 223-6000 g::,;11algi, 243,--6,2170 1.5s Beyond Washington, 10 Maryland and Virginia Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100012-2 Secret U.S. Papers Barcd By Sanford J. Ungar Washington Post Stait writer Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a major challenge to the secrecy surrounding U.S. policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night gave The Washington Post the full texts of three secret documents describing meetings Of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG). The documents indicate that Henry A. Kis- singer, President Nixon's national security ad- viser, instructed government agencies to take a hard line with India in public statements and private actions during last month's war on the Indian subcontinent, Anderson released the documents after Kis- singer told reporters Monday during an air- borne conversation en route to the Western White House in San Clemente that the col- umnist, in stories based on the materials, had taken "out of context"AtnyrimideittaFortRt the administration was kgtinst Among the significant statements bearing on U.S. policy following: ? "KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being ,tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakis- tan. He feels everything we do cornea out otherwise." ? "Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was put- ting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking presidential wrath. The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind." ? "Dr. Kissinger also directed that hence- forth we show a certain coolness to the In- dians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be in the documents were the. Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pak- istan. Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs) stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate re- cipient, such as Pakistan." ? "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs) suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could .be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from 'extin- guishing' West Pakistan." ? "Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them . . . Dr. Kissinger said that the President may 14*`cr VisistIlle916.1e.tAD.: .' Texts of documents. v. ke 11 4 O 1e)gte ea-ARr- w04 9 9 R 0 0 100 0 00017-2 A9, have the right to authorize Jordan or SaudiCol. 1 Page AS ColumnistBamcSresteiR?U:ST2Papers DOCUMENTS; From Al want to honor those requests The matter has not been brought to Presidential atten- tion but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated." After getting the documents from Anderson, The Post de- cided to print the full texts in today's editions. Anderson said he would make the documents able to other members of the press today, and he invited Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chair- man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ?to use them as the basis for an in- vestigation of U.S policy in South Asia, Fulbright, out of Washing- ton during the congressional recess, could not be reached for comment. The columnist also suggested that other members of Con- gress might wish to investi- gate government security clas- sification policy. Most of the significant state- ments in the three documents released last night had al- ready appeared in Anderson's column, which is distributed to 700 newspapers, including The Washington Post. The Justice Department ac- knowledged yesterday that the FBI is investigating the nature of the security leak that led to the disclosures. But Anderson, who said he will write several more col- umns based on the documents, pointed out that no govern- ment agent had visited him and that he had received no request to halt publication. The Post has not received any such request either. Pentagon Sources said an- other investigatiOn is under- way by military security agents. They said the scope of their investigation would be narrow because "very few peo- ple" have access to minutes of the meetings. Anderson, in an interview with The Post, said he also had copies of cables to Wash- ington from the U.S. ambassa- dors to India and Pakistan, as well as numerous other docu- ments bearing on American policy. He showed this reporter a briefcase with about 20 file ' folders, each containing some of the documents. Anderson declined to name his sources, but suggested that they occupy high positions in ' the Nixon administration. "TC the sources were identi- fied," he said "it wAtninyn hart-ass the admiliaTEtroli more than it would me. It HENRY A. KISSINGER, ... coolness to India would make a very funny story." Since the controversy last year over release of the Penta- gon Papers, a top-secret his- tory Of U.S. policy in Vietnam, Anderson said, his sources had become more, rather than less, willing to disclose classified material. The texts obtained by The Post provide 'substantial de- tails of the back-and-forth at Special Action Group meet- ings among representatives of the White House, State and Defense departments, Con- ti-al intelligence Agency, Na- tional Security Coulicil, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Agency for International Development. The three texts are: ? A "memorandum for FCC- Ord" about a WSAG meeting in the Situation Room of the White House on Dec. 3, by James H. Noes, deputy as- sistant secretary' of defense tot- Near Eastern. African and ' South Asian affairs. lt Was ap-, Proved by G. Warren Nutter, as- sistant Secretary of defense for international security affairs, and was printed on his station- cry. ? A memorandum for the Joint Chiefs .of Staff, on their stationery, concerning a Meet- ing an Dee. 4, by Navy Capt. Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer. ? Another memorandum by Kay on JCS stationery about a meeting on Dec. 0. The first of the three meet- ings was held on the opening day of full-scale hostilities be- tween India and Pakistan. That was he day Pakistani aircraft launched a series of strikes against Indian air- fields on the western border. Indian Prime Minister Indira )kkitlFcirReiletse 2001 her country to be on a "war footing." JACK ANDERSON ... releases documents By the time of the second meeting, the war had spread through East and ? West Paki- stan; by the third meeting, Mrs. Gandhi had announced India's recognition of Bangla- desh, formerly East Pakistan, as a sovereign country. The Post obtained type- written copies of photocopies of the documents in Ander- son's possession. Acopies,nderson's which were inspected by a represent- ative of The Post, showed that the original documents were, stamped "SECRET SENSIT-! IVE" at the top and bottom! of each page. Anderson said he hoped his- columns on the Indo-Pakistani! situation, and now the release! of the documents, would pro- voke a "showdown" on the government classification sys- tem. lie said he had been "timid" originally about quot- ing from the documents, but, later quoted more extensi',7ely when he became convincea of the "colossal blunders" of U.S. policy. Invoking his own view of . what might harm national sec- urity, he said he would not; release the exact texts of;; cables, "just in case they would be useful to crypto- graphers." Anderson said the doe- , uments should not have been I classified in the first place. He said they showed that "Kissinger is surrounded, by secrecy. tie is treated I Ike a new weapons system." T h e Anderson documents differ from the Pentagon Pa- pers in that his disclosures cover current diplomatic ac- tivities, rather than history. /03i060t C1AaRDP8440499 R001000100012-2 printed articles based on the 47-volume Pentagon Papers ever had possession of the four volumes deserfbed by the gov- ernment as the most sensitive. Those volumes dealt with U.S. diplomatic contacts t hip ough other nations, for a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war. After government suits against The New York Times, The Washington Post arid other newspaper had worked their way through the federal courts, the Supreme Court de- clared on June 30 that the gov- ernment had not proved its contention that publication would endanger national se- curity. ? in releasing the documents last night, Anderson said "I don't think the public should have to take either my word or Dr. 'Kissinger's" about whether his columns had quoted the documents "out of context!' "I invite reporters to com- pare Dr. Kissinger's state- ments at the secret strategy sessions with the transcript of Di. Kissinger's background briefing to reporters on Dec. 7." That "background" talk be came public when Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) placed i in the Congressional Record, to the surprise of the White House. In the meeting with news men on Dec. 7, Kissinger said, "First of all, let us get a num- ber ef things straight. There have cen sonic comments that the ad min is trtio n is anti-Indian. This is totally in- accurate Kissinger said, howeve r, that the United States, "which in many respects has had a love affair with India, can only! with enormous pain accept the I fact that military action was! taken in our view without ade- quate cause . . ." State Department officials denied yesterday that any in- vestigation of the leak was Un- derway there. Other sources. at State said no one there had been required to under- go lie 'detector tests, as in some previous security invest-. Igattons. Anderson said, however, that his sources told him investiga- tions were being conducted at State. Defense and the White !House,, reportedly under the !coordination of Robert C. Mardian, assistant attorney general in charge of the Jus- tice Department's Internal Se- curity Division. A .Justice Department spokesman said last4 night, howe,V,M -that "assistant at- torney generals don't coordi- nate investigations." if any Prosecution were initiated, he added, that might fall into 1"Mardian's bailiwick." ! "If Mardian's investigating, ,Inc." said Anderson, who took over the "WashingtonMerry- (in-Round" column from the late Drew Pearson, "I'm go-1 ittgl to investigate him." "I have an idea I'll know more about him than he'll' know about me," Anderson; ;,...rided. "He can take his to a! grand jtuy, and I'll take mine to the public." ThreApWcriltdiftir IiJdeie MUSKIE, From Al panion and Muskie neighbor at Kennebunk Beach, and long-time Muskie aides and advisers Berl Bernhard, Ge- orge Mitchell, Don Nicoll and Milton Semer. As always, Muskie did lit tie talking, but went around the room asking each man's views. Harriman was first, and he declared the Presi. dent Nixon's methods would backfire, that Muskie should pick a few issues and stick In those but make a deter- mined, nearly Open run 100 We top office. By all means, he should run. "I'm an old man, and I don't want to die with Richard Nixon in the While linage," said the 78-year-old patriarch of the party. There was general agree. mcnt Mr. Nixon was valuer. able and that Mashie was the one Democrat with the stature and credibility to snake the liberal position make sense in opposition. But prior to the 1972 race, Muskie was faced with seek- ing re-election to the Senate in November, 1970. There was much discussion of the proper blend of the presi- dential buildup with the si- multaneous Senate race in hinter. Characteristically cau- tious, Muskie was reluctant toga very for down the trail leading to the White House. After nearly three hours of talk, Clark Clifford, who likes to speak last, summed up the consensus. Some brat steps toward staffing the presidential drive should now begin, but quietly and slowly at first. "You don't have to decide everything today. 'there is lots of time," Clifford de- clared. Muskie made no commit- ment at the close of the meeting. but it was clear to everyone that a bridge was being crossed. It was agreed that Muskie would institu- tionalize his effort to ex- plore the presidential bid, opening the first small downtown office as a staff renter for this purpose and raising funds to support a growing exploration. Within a few weeks, some 57,000 in campaign money Viet Policy Correct, Marines' Chief Says By George C. 1111000 wtaitaidas sod ssts weer I'S. Vietnam italic,/ "was Going into Vietnam "kept sga wsritselfour word on the international reaped economic and strategie ;,or"% ow?moot-a to dII. dends, the new Marine .dn7dthe nh:tZsthtionNa'ri?g Corps commandant said in a Pentagon press conterence Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., YesterdaS 56. the 25th commandant of ! the coins, made those remarks when asked if he believe thel Vietnam War had been "worth I it." Specifically, he said/ "I do believe that the policy was correct of getting the Vi' I etnamese country. both the po- litical and military sides, in, such shape that they could reach their own decisions as : to how they wished to he gov. erned and not permit 11 00 be forced by an invading army from the North. 'T do believe that.' Cush- man added, "and I do believe, that we succeeded. and that ue're withdrawing now at the prop, time." said. , Asked how Vietnam was im- portant to U.S. strategic inter- ests and what the war "bought us," Cushman replied, "I be- lieve it may be important eco- nomically as well as strategi- catty in a geographic sense to have friends In that area." As to whether this was worth the billions the war cost, Cushman said "I don't really feel qualified to an- swer." Turning to his coming four , year stewardship of the Marine 'Corps, Cushman said he will hew to the course of being lean and tough. He said the biggest single problem loom- ing in the corps' future was re. eruiting enough qualified men To maintain the current force level 01 200,010. left over from the 1968 vice presidential drive was trans- ferred to a new account am- biguously labeled "Muskie Election Committee" (which might refer to Maine or to the nation at large.) From this day forward, the Mus- kie presidential campaign was scarcely ever in doubt. Whatever his disclaimers (usually accompanied by a grin), he was off and run- ning. it was a long and often rocky trail that brought the shy son of a Polish immi- a,rant tailor from Rumford, Maine, to a starting gate po- sition as the tallyho for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972. Like the political path of many American leaders, the M.- kie trail includes many acci- dental turns, some detours and a considerable number of lucky breaks. ' A mere glance at the sur. lace facts demonstrate that this is an extraordinary can- didaey in many respects. According to the trash. tonal wisdom of American politics, the Democratic Party would be most unlikely to choose as its 1972 standard-bearer a Roman Catholic from a prcdomi nanny Republican state ion far corner of the nation, a state with only four elec. total votes and 00 010 over 15.000 population. Moreover, Muskie is nei- ther HO nor the favorite of the rich; unthl. four years ago he was virtually un- known to most Americans, he has no interest group (such as organized labor) en- thusiastically behind him. He has little experience in foreign affairs ond except for some. reputation as a pol- lution n widely fighter, is not known for any particuLar ac- complishment or political stand. In a sense. he is every- body's candidate and no candidate. There are few strong objections to him from any segment of the Democratic Party or voting public, but there are also few enthusiastib backers. Mashie's chief assets now are the absence of powerful rivals. his understated per- sonality that projects a spe- cial serenity and decency through the powerful politi- cal instrument of television, and the widespread impres- sion that Ms appeal would be likely to unite most fac- tions of the Democratic Party and simultaneously deny Mit Nixon the et s IIUQj of the independent "ticket splitter," votes the Presi- dent must have to win a sec- ond term in the White House. Whether all this will en- dure or perish in the con- frontations of the primaries and beyond is an unanswer. able question. But as of today Muskie seems to have first crack at the Demo- cratic nomination. lobe can maintain his appeal to Americans when they come to know hue better, he is likely to be nominated?anti would be a very serious threat In Mr. Nixon this November. As national leaders go, Xd. mend Sixtus al uskie started late, Born in 191a he mace virtually unknown small town lawyer until age 40. when he was eleeted Maine's first Democratic governor in two decades. In that year 019541, Richard Nixon was vice president of the United States, Hubert Humphrey Wale controver- sial and well known U.S. senatar and Henrs M Jaek- son was lakina a prominent role in the Senate hearings on Joseph MuCarthe after more than a dozen years in Congress. After two terms 00 001,01" our. Muskie eame to Wash- ington in 1958 as the first Democrat,/ senator fro Maine in nearly half a cen- tury. He noose quiet. amen/ troversial. hardworking sen. ator, weliliked and re. sperted within the instil. tion but little knawn oul? side. Muskies first national fling Was in 1064, and it was both modest and synthetic. He was fatting a reelection campaign in Maine that fall, and staff aides thought d would do him some good at home to be mentioned as a possible vice presidential running mate for President Johnson. The aides spread the. word that Muskie was the logical choice, because of his ethnic background and New England regional appeal. Johnson never seri- ously considered him. but Muskie's name was often mentioned in press specula- tion. Mashie's big chance mine when Hubert, Humphrey chose him ao the Democratic vice presidential nominee in 1068. Muskie did not cam- paign for the job/ Hum- Ithrey picked him largely he vause no faetion of the party objected 10 him, he was THE WkSHINCTON POST 41AMORWWW914611.00012.2-2 A 7 compatible personally and politically, and yet had a contrasting and appealing style. "I went for the quiet man,? Humphrey said later. "I know I talk too much.., two Hubert Humphreys might be one too many!' During the fall campaign, Mashie's ecool" approach won him much acclaim as a welcome contrast to all three men sharing the na- tional tickets? Humphrey, Nixon and Spiro Agnew. Demoeratic Party planners and the press gave aluskie unusual attention as a coun- terpoint to Agnew, who was considered the weak link in the GOP ticket, Mashie enlarged from the campaign well known and well liked, and there had been kindled ill IliS mind the weighty am baton known in Washington as "presidential fever." The man from 'Maine traveled widely M early 1960, making 57 speeches in 00 states in the firs/ three months of the >ear to test his charm. By summer. Ile was disenuraged. People were cordial and he was welcome, but he received lit- tle press attention and the polls showed Ted Kennedy far ahead as the first sluice of Democrats for the next presidential nod. Musky had crone clase giving up when the accident al Chappaquiddiek changes! everything. By the fall of 1969. Muske was couvinced that Kennedy was' out of the ratings dropped. Muskie's jumped. Easily reselected to the Senate, lie had been the Democratic nomination. given a major boost toward He has the generally ac. his paety's nomination. The Jan. 4, 1970, meeting with his advisors confirmed '1h/00ie's determination to make a serious bid for the Democratic nomination. That spring, the downtown office was opened to Pre- pare Inca national race, and Inter that year Margie hired Robert Squier as his televi- sion consultant, ostensibly for the Maine senate cam. paign that fall. Duce again, it was televi. sion that propelled aluskie into a national leadership position. On election eve. President Nixon chose to purchase 15 minutes cm na- tionwide TV to mak,/ a par- tisan "law and order" appeal for Republican caadidates in the form of a political rally speeeli he had given several slays earlier in Phoenbx. lt was a scratehy and nap/a/- Cession. tape and an appeal that seemed narrow and 1111- presidential. biter lye Democrats lammed that Mr. Nixon was Inm Mg time party leaders //hose Muskie to eive reply. The Mashie answer. a fireside chat from Maine written in part hy veteran ghostwriter Dick Goodwin, conveyed a low key yet ring. ing indignation. Even Re- publicans conceded that the political op. peals constituted a /grave setback for the Presideat and triiihmh for liuskie. The President's poll Yesterday Muskie for- malty joined the race for Still, Muskie was a man of caution. Some of his advis- ers urged him to "put the heat on" early in 1971 to by to sew up commitments for the Democratic nomination. The senator decided other- wise, lie felt Ms popularity after the election eve per. romance might be a passing thing: he didn't feel he had the organization in place or the finanetat backing in place to move quickly. Instead, Inc went 10 the Middle Pont. the Soviet Union and Europe to build his foreign policy creden- tials and continued his slowly growing effort to win support Last summer and fall. Mr. Nixon made a political come. back with his wage-Priee freeze, his newsmaking opening to China and other surprising at/tiotm. And in Septembee, .Muskie made a costly polite:al slip in Los Angeles, where he told a meeting /if black leaders that he did not believe the American people would vote for a ticket with a black as the viee presidential candi- date. Mr. Nixon called Mus- kies remark "a libel on the American people." and the senator's Democratic rirals, who had been buildings sten /gill in 1971, began to exploit it. knowledged fronkrunner but was by no means a sure winner. Like many experi- enced politicians, Muskie has a fatalistic streak in nim, an inner voice that reminds him that nobody can predict the breaks and whatever will be, will be. "You work hard and you get some breaks and you try to build some inomeolum." the senator mused yester- day. He worked hard on the announcement speech Our television and if Mal goes over well?he said be had an idea that it would?it should help. Whatever hal0 pens, he has nothing to lose ?lie never planned tllat Ile would spend decades in In/li- lies, and he certainly never planned at the heginning that lied have a ehanee 10 be President. Ile has prepared hiniself as well as he knows how, and now is ready for the trail ahead. "Whether or not, ran really meet the test of the presideneY I don't s0P- pose I would know unless I were elected to that office," he told Maine newsmen in Portland yesterday. Rlit by the end of the campaign sea- son, I ought to halos better idea?and the country onght to have a better idea. That's what a campaign is all about. McGovern Enters Primary in N.H. Sell. I:C01, S. McGovern, file Thursday. Thal will com. in Tilton. N.H., Rep. Paul didacy for the Denmeratie Ma S.D./ formally entered i he Mete thr fo..... field vying a 1 eCI os key 11-1 -11110 charged presidential nomination soon, l New Ilampshiee presidential , fee In Demorratie convention that President Nixon is perste said. 'Vietnam is being esea prime, yesterday, nrnmi'ing - delegates and the psarbologi- ine the bombing of North lated and the American people fronbrunner Sen. Edmund S., eat advantuae of winning the Vietnam to keep the South Vi- arc wondering what han. Muskie Ill 'bind a leery. Hist PrimagY. , elnamese government from pened." very tough fight" in the March, Polls taken in New Ham, , falling unthl. after the 1972 Also touriug Florida yester. 7 enntest. , shire last boar gave Muskie !U.S. elections. day was Sen. Henry al. aack? ur,,,,,, fl,, ///,,,, ,, anw yhee. r from 3-10-1 to 54.1 He told a high schoolW audi- son (D.asha, who predieted I' Hl b n,/,/, -, '/ I margins over aleGovern, with mime, "President Nixon insists That retention of Vice Prest- here Fd Muskie is ri ht next feri'ing 7000a2Zdr/i';-if,esta,?laltnost, 0010 01 the voters pre., that we continue to prevent :dent Spiro T. Agnew on the other candidates orn- u, the unification of Vietm !R na." epublican ticket th s- w is yeaill g, cern ..iii in (2.0?1 decided. No polls on the! In Columbus, Ohio. Seta , be an asset to Democrats in cord, Nil. 'Tut I don't con-1 Hartke and Yorty strength !Robert Taft 10.01110) an-,Novembem cede him this state no-gnu , ha,'Eeern,r?fnee,d/ hil Endicott Pea- '''''''"e" fth/alrittiee.sOen%Tddird'at?e tjs'eon 1/'?dAg=',Yaa'rT01,1/i;/./0e.5. other. L think were g?i'gto body.'ernOr of Mas- 'f'sT leosidaevn't. and now hopes a meets in overkill and will do very well.'' :saehusetts who announced last unifitd delegation pledged to work adversely on the Nixon McGovern's New Hampshire, week he will run for vice pre. President Nixon will be cho- administration." tic also pre- backers, who have been organ., ideal, filed his nomination pa- sen from mat state. dieted that Southerners will izing for the fight sinee early, : pert yesterday in the New In Miami, Rep. Shirley not "throw their vote away" by last year filed petitions wita , Hampshire Democratic pri- Chisholm In-N.Y.) began an. casting ballots for Alabama 011001 2.000 signatures to Plaee /nary. "I am runt/deg for the day campaign tour by telling Gov. George C. Wallaetit. 1101. Ohsname on the hallat vice presideney," he said, "be- University of :Miami students Mee has indicated he will enter 'Iashie is scheduled to file caime it is thne that the peo- that 'domestic war 0111 0000k the Florida primary and ob, here on Thuesday. Sea. Vance ple had a say in who should be out in this country unless the severs to believe he would Ilartke of Indiana f iled testeit;elertell Lo the seeond most inm Vietnam conflict is soon run strong in the northern con. day saul )1,1-1e pedant publie nth, in lily ended." Mrs. Chisholm, who II gressional districts that Jack- s., vorty's supporters arc itt , expected to announce her can. son hopes lo carry. 'ortavemer to Nit. P. leis Mi. Co, De- pi e ent.ttive W-GDIDIJVAIRE) 1,0"1"FIROP - CO FAS! HO\ R-OW\ JTJR OW "KNITS ARE FOR GOING PLACES"...PRESENTED BY WOODVVARD & LOTHROP IN COOPERATION WITH VOGUE PATTERNS AND STEHLI TREVIRAp POLYESTER NEW.FOR-SPRING KNIT FABRICS! 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