TULLY HEARD THAT BELL RING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000110004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 163
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 15, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Releas 01/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 R00100ii,1e10004-0
ALEXANDRIA, VA.
GAZETTAAR 15 1973
E -- 16,840
Capital Fare
uIgHe
By Andrew Tully
The McNaught Syndicate Inc.
WASHINGTON - Testimony
by a Centel Intl ' e c Agen-
sy analyst thaf If miT~cary
officials in Vietnam lied to the
public about the strength of
Communist forces during the
late 1960s rang a bell at this
desk because I have some
knowledge if not expertise on
the subject.
That is to say, I suggested
pretty much the same things in
a rather exhaustively research-
ed book, "The Super Spies," in
1969 -? and suffered (savored?)
the wrath of the establishment
for my pains.
;i?ue~ Adams,,-a defense
witness in tie Pentagon papers
trial of Daniel Ellsberg and An-
thony J. Russo, testified that in
1968 when Communist forces
were increasing in Vietnam, of-
ficial U. S. estimates released to
the public were going down.
This, said Adams, was done by
"removing components" from
the enemy's order of battle "to
display the enemy as weaker
than he actually was."
Adams implied that Gen.
Earle E. Wheeler, then chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and Gen. William C. Westmore-
land then commander in Viet-
nam, were involved in the falsi-
fications, which he described as
"a result of political pressures
HS/HC- q4'o
rdTthat
I don't know about that. But,
as my book relates, in late 1967
and early 1968 almost every
scrap of field intelligence was
perdicting a major Red offen-
sive in late January of '68. This
intelligence, of course, was veri-
fied by the Communists' terri-
fying Tet offensive of January-
March.
Intelligence even correctly
named, the date the offensive
would he launched - Jan. 30.
A captured enemy document
stated, that a "general offensive
early in 1968" would "empha-
size attacks on enemy key units,
cities and towns and lines of
communication."
Throughout December 1967,
and the first weeks of January
1968, Communist documents
were captured in bales. They
verified reports of native spies
that Viet Cong agents and even
soldiers in North Vietnamese
uniforms were circulating open-
ly in several cities, spreading
the promise of "liberation."
Again and again, these agents
predicted that "the end" could
come on Jan. 30.
Ila! At just about that time,
General Westmoreland and Am-
bassador Ellsworth Bunker, our
Saigon man, were in Washing-
ton radiating optimism for the
edification of Congress and the
stateside press. Neither of them
mentioned the Communist build-
up or Jan. 30.
What they told Congress and
Washington newsmen was that
the United States was winning
the war, that it was steadily
wearing down the enemy. They
noted the decrease in the rate
of infiltration of troops from
Hanoi from a peak of 14,000
men in June 1966, to 5,000-6,000
a month. They said soldiers
were deserting in increasing
numbers from the Viet Cong,
that supplies to the VC by sea
had been seriously interrupted.
Indeed, Westmoreland predict-
ed that the enemy mostly would
use the coming truce during the
Tet holidays to build up and
resupply his forces. He was pre-
occupied with the 40,000 enemy
troops reportedly massed
around the Marine strongpoint
and Khen Sanh, and said
everything pointed to a major
battle there, with diversionary
attacks in other areas.
Well, the reader knows what
happened - we almost lost the
war during the Tet unpleasant-
ness. Maybe the setback
couldn't have been avoided, al-
though I for one won't buy
that argument. However, that
isn't the point.
Samuel Adams, whose job was
to analyze intelligence during
the Vietsain war, has confirmed
that the P,,ilitary and the White
House lip to the people. What
effect his testimony will have
on the E ll'sberg-Russo case is
irrelevant in a broader context.-
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 WW yoix TIMES
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2 5 MAR 1973
U.S. and Libya
Trouble
Again Over
The `Flint'
WASHINGTON-Periodically, over
the last 20 years or so, the United
States has become involved in inter-
national incidents arising out of the
"elint"-electronic intelligence - mis-
sions that are performed by American
reconnaissance ships and planes along
the coasts and borders of other coun-
tries.
There were the aircraft shot down
by the Soviet Union in the 1950's.
In the 1960's there were the American
destroyers that got involved with North
Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf
of Tonkin, the U.S.S. Liberty, attacked
by Israel, and the Pueblo, captured
by North Korea. In 1.969 there was the
EC-121 that was shot down by North
Korea, presenting the Nixon Adminis-
tration with its first foreign-policy
LADfVQd]
crisis.
Last week the United States was
caught up in an incident with Libya,
under circumstances that are still not
clear except that they involved a
United States Air Force C-130 on a
reconnaissance swing over the eastern
Mediterranean.
The State Department announced
that two Libyan Mirage fighters had
intercepted and fired upon an unarmed
C-130 82 miles off the Libyan coast.
The plane and its crew returned un-
harmed to a base near Athens. The
United States protested to Libya
against this "provocative" attack.
The State Department stressed that
the plane was always over interna-
tional waters and had never ap-
proached closer than 75 miles to Libya,
which claims a 12-mile boundary on
its territorial waters. Beyond that, the
official account remained fuzzy. But
Government sources privately admit-
ted that the C-130 was on an electron-
ic intelligence mission to monitor radio
communications and radar frequencies.
Whether the C-130 was snooping on
Libyan and Egyptian installations or
monitoring Soviet naval units in the
area was left unclear. It was also un-
clear whether the aircraft was on a
course headed for the Libyan coast
at the time it was intercepted. But
information leaked at the Pentagon
suggested that the shooting might not
have been completely unprovoked-
at least from the Libyan viewpoint.
The Libyan fighters, it appeared;
had given the internationally recog-
nized signals to the camouflaged trans-
port to "follow me," and it was only
after, the C-130 took evasive action
-=ducking into a cloud formation-
that the fighters, on orders from a
control tower in Tripoli, opened fire.
It was also acknowledged by Amer-
ican officials that Libya last year hed
declared a "restricted air zone"
stretching out 100 miles from Tripoli
-a zone the United States told Lib-
ya it would not recognize, since it
contravened the 1944 Chicago air con-
vention to which Libya is a signatory.
Perhaps there was another aspect
to the incident. In the emotional and
vengeful atmosphere of the Middle
East there might have been some
relationship between the Libyans'
trigger-happy state and Israel's down-
ing of a Libyan airliner over the
Sinai last month. The Libyan Gov-
ernment, one of the most radical in
the Arab world, regards the United
Sates as Israel's close ally.
--JOHN W. FINNEY
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DETROIT, MICH.
FREE PRESS
- 530,264
-- 578,254
MAR 2 (' 103
Too Mucfl Th i, ~ .Junked?
CIA Housecle'aninfle Prompts
itest from the Old Pros
placed in charge of co- Braden
ordinating the effort of what is called the in-
telligence community, as distinct from ag-
ency. On paper, the "coin munity" means all
the departments and agencies which have
anything to do with gathering foreign infor-
mation. In practice, it means the Department
of Defense, which spends the biggest share
of the $5 billion the taxpayers put out each
year for intelligence.
To replace Tweedy, Schlesinger installed
Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham. CIA veterans
shuddered. To put a general in charge of rid-
ing herd on the Defense Department seemed
to them to he destructive of the President's
purposes and of civilian control. Is a general
likely to say "no" to generals who are senior
to him or on whose goodwill his promotion
may one day depend'? ,
Next Schlesinger b e g a n lopping heads
among the CIA's seniors who compile the na-
very quickly, and it is
not. surprising that a
number of. knowledge-
able observers think he
moved too quickly and
are afraid he will con-
tinue to do so.
Schlesinger's f i r s t
trove was to fire Bron-
son Tweedy, a veteran
who had been recently
between a valuable asset and junk,
The director moved
BY TOM BRADEN
WASHINGTON - A house ought to be
cleaned after 27 years, which is why Presi-
dent Nixon's appointment of James R. Schles-
inger to be director of the Central Intelligence
Agency was greeted by veterans of the
agency as a wise move. Schlesinger has a
reputation as a housecleaner and the house of
the CIA has not been cleaned since it was
built in 1947.
But the same people who greeted hcs ap-
pointment as a good one because they thought
a. housecleaning; was essential are now saying
that Schlesinger doesn't know the difference
tional estimate -- the assessements of capa-.
bilities and intentions of other nations. Presi-
dent Nixon is said to think the estimates are
wishy-washy, that there is no point in read-
ing long papers which add up to "on the one
hand and on the other hand."
CIA veterans are afraid Schlesinger will de-
stroy the objectivity of the estimates. There is
always the danger that an intelligence agency
will tell a President what its senior officials
think a President wants to hear.
Finally, Schlesinger has made it clear dur-
ing his first meeting with the CIAs' top offi-
cials that "a lot of heads will roll." The
same senior officials are afraid that his next
move will be to start chopping the clandes-
tine services. They have been a long time
in building and would take long to build
again.
No doubt there is deadwood here. A number
of professionals have always questioned why
the agency had people undercover in coun-
tries nobody has inquired about for years. The
answer has always been that you never could
tell when you would want information which
only a man on the spot could provide.
It's difficult to know how to judge the accu-
sations now being made against Schlesinger
by people who have served much longer in
the field than he. Those who have lived for a
long time in a house usually hate to go
through a housecleaning. Everything gets
moved around and for a time, at least, seems
uncomfortable and wrong.
Moreover, it is natural for them to complain
that the new director i`7 behaving in a brusque
and rude manner. When a favorite chair is
taken from its accustomed place, its users
often complain that it was taken rudely and
without sufficient warning.
In short, Schlesinger may he on the right
track despite the sounds of alarm which are
coming from those who bloat the agency and
care a great deal whether it is effective. But
there is a danger in ~iouseclcaning. 'T'hose old
vases stored in the basement could be Ming.
A wise housecleaner will seek expert advice
before consigning them to the trash.
HS/HC- 9SO I
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CHICAGO, ILL.
TRIBUNE
M - 767,793
S - 1,016,275
MAR 2 9 1973
I. T. T. and Chile
Officials of International Telephone
and Telegraph Corp., a large conglom-
erate, have stated in testimony before
a Senate subcommittee that the corpora-
tion proposed thru the Central Intel-
ligence Agency that $1 million of its
funds be used to head off the ascension
of Marxist Salvador Allende as presi-
dent of Chile in 1970.
The corporation had assets of $165
million in the country, consisting main-
ly of I. 70 per cent ownership in the
Chilean telephone system. One of its
vice presidents, William R. Merriam,
said. that.-I. T. T. feared that an Allende
regime would "steal" its properties.
The fear was warranted. President Al-
lende subsequently nationalized I. T. T.
holdings and the properties of American
copper companies without compensation.
John A. McCune, former director of
the C. I. A., now a director of I. T. T.,
discussed with CIA officials a plan to
unite the two cippusiton parties against
.Allende's assumption of power. The
C. I. A.' failed to act and Mr. McCone
said that Dr. Henry Kissinger, Presi-
dential adviser on foreign relations,
whom he also approached, did not re-
ply to his proposals.
I. T. T. has been a favorite whipping
boy for Senate Democratic "liberals"
ever since the Justice Department, be-
fore last year's Presidential election,
settled an antitrust action against the
corporation. 1. T. T. at the time propos-
ed making a substantial contribution to
the Republican National Convention
,,when it was originally scheduled for
San Diego, where the corporation owned
a hotel.
An I. T. T. Washington lobbyist, Dita
Beard, in a memorandum which came
into possession of the Senate, made
sweeping claims about her agency in
reaching the settlement which put her
employer in a questionable light and
sought to imply that the Nixon admin-
istration had been bought off.
If it were not for this checkered back-
ground, the Senate critics would have
had less reason to indulge in the present
field clay over the attempted interven-
tion in Chile. After all, it has tradition-
ally been regarded as a responsibility
of the federal government to protect
American lives and property abroad. In
the past, stern measures have been tak-
en to carry out that responsibility.
Businessmen therefore have a proper
right to make approaches to the gov-
earnmentin defense of their interests.
We wouldn't say I. T. T. has taken the
most intelligent approach in asserting
this right; but it is only fair to re-
member that I. T. T. and the govern-,.R
ment might not have been led to invite
the present suspicion of secret conspi-
racy if earlier governments had not
conditioned the world to think that
American business interests can be
kicked around with impunity. And the
same people who encouraged this atti-
tude in the past. are in general the ones
who now think they can tar I. T. T. and
the administration and make political
hay all at the same time. -.'`'
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I,VILMLivu TON, DEL.,
JOURNAL
E - 89,875
M. ) .i.1 ,
~. r r ITTIS Million and Chile
Chile does not have much going for
itself these days, except the Senate
hearings on IT`1' in Washington.
Senior officials of the ITT are testify-
Ing in a glare of publicity, perforce
spilling unpleasant truths and making
fools of themselves by trying to make
fools of their interrogators. ITT had
holdings of about $15) million in Chile
before the election of Marxist President
Salvador Allende, and all evidence indi-
cates very strongly that ITT first
sought to ward off Dr. Allende's e?lcc-
'tion and then, when he was elected, to
create economic chaos in Chile.
ITT, it seems, had the support of at
least some people in the Central Intel-
I i g e n c e Agency, but its various
proposals to deal with the "situation" in
Chile, even though carried to the level
of at least Dr. Henry Kissinger, the
President's foreign policy adviser, were
given some consideration and then ap-
parently rejected. That should be little
cause for satisfaction, however. Of
more concern should be the fact that
the ITT people had the gall to carry
such proposals to such a level and were
able to get some consideration.
On the matter of what the offer of a
million dollars by the ITT to the U.S.
government was supposed to achieve,
the corporation is advancing the novel
idea that the money was to be used for
"constructive" purposes. John A. Me-
Cone, former CI.uieL and now a.
director of IT , compared his corpora-
tion's million-dollar offer to the U.S.
government's aid programs for Greece
and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the
Berlin Airlift. "International Commun-
ism," he declared, "has said time and
again that its objective is the destruc-
tion of the free world, economically,
politically and mrrilitarily."
Yet the same ITT is negotiating with
The Soviet Union for expanding its busi-
ness there. The fact of the matter is
that ITT was concerned with its proper-
ty and profits, not with ideology, and it
attempted to confuse its corporate in-
terest with the national interest, doing
considerable damage to the latter in the
whole ignoble process. IN J
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MEWS
E - 434,849
MAR 2 1973
tt1on to block
CIA official
By William J. Eaton
Of Our Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON.- The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency once
proposed action by American
companies to create economic
chaos in Chile to block the
the presidency, a top CIA man
election of Salvador Allende to
has testified.
William V. Broe, director of
CIA's clandestine services for
the Western Hemisphere, said
he made the suggestion late in
September, 1970, to Edward J.
(Ned) Gerrity, senior vice
president of International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Corp.
Gerrity had testified earlier
that he rejected the plan as
impractical.
A transcript of Brce's testi-
mony, cleared by the CIA, was
made public late Wednesday
by a Senate subcommittee on
multinational corporations. It
was the first known congres-
sional testimony by a CIA
agent about a secret operation.
BROE SAID that at one time
ITT president Harold S. Gen-
een had offered the CIA a
"substantial" fluid to help Al-
lende's leading opponent in
Chile. Broe said he turned
down that offer.
ITT executives feared that
Allende, a IvIarxist, would na-
tionalize the ITT-owned Chi-
lean telephone company if he
became president. He won the
election in the Chilean Con-
gress and has moved to take
over the ITT-owned company.
B roe, who said he acted with
the approval of former CIA Di-
rector Richard Helms, testi-
fied that he gave Gerrity a list
of U.S. companies operating in
Chile as possible participants
in the economic warfare.
THE CIA plan was presented
five days after Allende had
been the top vote-getter in the
popular election but still re-
quired approval from a major-
ity of the Chilean Congress.
"There was a thesis that ad-
ditional deterioration in the
economic situation could in-
fluence a number of Christian
Democratic congressmen who
were planning to vote for Al-
lende," Broe said.
Among other steps, Broe
said, he. mentioned the possi-
bility of banks not renewing
credits in Chile, delays in
spending by American-owned
companies and delays in deliv-
eries, withdrawal ctF technical
help and pressure to shut the
doors of savings and loan asso-
ciations.
CIA and a director for ITT, re-
layed through Helms to Broe,
the agent testified.
HERE'S AN excerpt from
the transcript:
Sen. Frank Church D-Ida.):
Did Mr. Geneen say to you
that he was willing to as-
semble an election fund for
one of the Chilean presidential
candidates, Mr. Jorge E. Ales-
sandri?
Broe: Yes, he did.
Church: Did you explain to
Mr. Geneen why the CIA could
not accept such a fund?
Broe: I told him we could
not absorb the funds and serve
as a funding channel. I also
told him that the J.S. govern-
was not supporting any
ment
candidate in the Chilean elec-
tion.
Church: During the dis-
cussion did Mr. Geneen at any
time indicate that the fund ...
was intended for constructive
use, technical assistance to ag-
riculture,thebuilding of
houses or anything of that
character?
Broe: No, it was to support
Jorge Alessandri. ,
Other ITT executives have
said the ITT had offered to put
up $1 million for social pro-i
grams, housing and technical
aid to influence the outcome of
the Chilean elections.
Geneen has been summoned
to testify Monday.
RI G.ZIMING the li:;t of U.S.
companies, Broe said he told
Gerrity that "these were cone-
panies that could contribute,
providing the economic course
Was fe..sih,e... .
Broe said he iret with Gen-
oil July 1(3, 1970, before Al-
lende's victory in the popular
vote. The meeting., was held at
the sU gestioa of John
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HS/HC- . to change fa- s.
enough. The Nixon-Schlesinger forrnu
}a may be no more than a long over'
.rue attempt to modernize it. Bu
that', what it is, both the intellit?
community and the public ou g.
be Laken into confidence by tc
ern,nent to the fullest extent p-
So far, they have heard. little ,pore
than meaningless assurances anti in-
nuendo.
0 ,1973, Victor Zorr
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~,-,91' rw-d? J J' ?',ark 7744 I?t A9 y , 3. x m +4rec,f
TT Cal
s Fund was forAi
By JEREMIAII O'LEARY tional Telephone & Telegraph Chairman. Frank Church,
Star-News staff wruer Corp. had offered to supply $1 . D-Idaho, said, "we 'can't find
A senior ITT executive said 'million to block Allende's elec- any plan for technical assist-
today that his corporation's tion was when McCone, now ance or housing in the ITT
1970 offer of $1 million for use an ITT director, disclosed it documents we "have."
in Chile was intended to dem Yesterday: Gerrity replied, "in spite of
onstrate to Marxist presiden- Sen. Charles Percy, R-Ill., a all discussions, no action was
tial candidate Salvadore Al- member of the Senate subcom- ever taken against Allende."
lende that ITT had confidence mittee on multinational corpo- Sen. Clifford Case, R-N.J.,
in Chile and wanted to stay rations, said "the implausabil- asked, "this milliop dollars
there. ity of this story bothers us. It was not intended to be disrup-
The testimony before a Sen- doesn't hold together that ITT tive but only to make Allende
ate subcommittee by Edward was trying to work with Al- happy about the American
Gerrity, vice president for cor- lende. It's unbelievable that presence?"
porate r e l a t i o n s , differed ITT would propose supplying Gerrity said that ITT offi-
sharply from what former CIA this fund for the development cials told the State Depart-.
director John McCone told the of Chile to the CIA instead of anent and presidential national'
committee yesterday. the State Department." security adviser Henry A. Kis-
Gerrity said that the first Gerrity's t e s t i in o n y ap- singer that they would partici-
time he had heard the Interna- peared to be in direct contra- pate with other companies in
.._ _._n ...... diction to McCone's account of
the $1 million offer.
Giving his version of the $1
million ITT fund, Gerrity said
"it was plain (in the fall of
1970) that Allende was going to
be elected. I discussed this
with ITT President Harold S.
Geneen and we considered the
chances were 90 to 10 that Al-
lende would expropriate our
Chilean properties.
"Geneen told me that per-
haps ITT could demonstrate to
Allende that the company had
confidence in Chile and he said
we ought to go to the State
Department to see if there
was any plan for private in-
dustry to reassure Allende.
"The idea was to get togeth-
er with a group of other com-
panies and to help the Chilean
6 HS/HC- fro
economy and reaffirm our
confidence with some projects
like low-cost housing, farming
and other joint ventures. We
said that the" State Depart-.
ment came up with something
along these lines we would put
forward a figure of about Bev-
en figures," Gerrity said.
such a development plan "un-
der your aegis" but he said
"we never got a response and
decided the U.S. government
was not interested."
Gerrity testified he had only
met CIA Latin American chief
William B. Broe once and that
the CIA official made sugges-
tions to him'-that banks should
not renew credits to Chile,
that companies should delay
shipments there, that pressure
be brought on companies to
close down and that the United
States should withdraw all
technical assistance.
Church said these sugges.
tions sounded to him as if they
See CHILE, Page A-8
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Wdfor Aid to Allende'.
that he did not go into any ' expropropriate us and we have
Continued From Page A-1 ers," on the Chilean situation
were intended to create eco- but that all their recommenda-
nomic problems in Chile. tions were funneled to ITT de-
Gerrity agreed and said Broe cision-makers.
told him that money was not a Gerrity said that in October
problem. 1;070, between the popular elec-
"I never heard of that $1 tion and Allende. 's run-off vic-
million and its intended use tory in Congress; ITT tried to
until I heard Mr. McCone yes- pin down the State Depart-
terday. I had a different.un- ment on its attitude.
derstanding of what it would "We wanted State to put in ;
be used for. It is not my infor- writing its attitude toward
mation that any was made Chile," Gerrity testified. "I
available" for economic dis- wanted their views on what
ruption in Chile. would happen in Chile and
Gerrity said he did not think what they would do if we were
Broe's ideas were very good at
all and that he didn't see how expropriated."
ITT could induce other compa- He said there were many
nies to follow Broe's sug- proposals made in staff papers
gested plan because "it would about reducing the U.S. diplo-
be self-defeating to induce eco- matic presence and other eco-
nomic chaos in Chile." nomic measures but said these.
Gerrity further testified that were, not adopted and were
Geneen agreed that the Broe only staff papers that are
plans were not. workable but common in business practice.
suggested the CIA agent be "I have heard that the Unit-
handled carefully. ed States has contingency
"Geneen said to me it plans for the invasion of Cana-
doesn't make sense," Gerrity da," Gerrity told the subcom-
testified. "We didn't want any mittee, "but that doesn't mean
part of it." we're going to do it."
The senators pointed out an. He acknowledged that Ge-
other conflict in testimony' necn met on Aug. 4 with therm
when Gerrity said Jack Neal, ? Atty. Gen. John Mitchell but
a former diplomat and direr- understood the conversation
tor of ITT international rela- was about antitrust policy not
Ge-
tions here, had been sent to Chile,
n and also said that Washington
inform two U.S. officials of the, nee
company proposal to apply $1 chief William Merriam had
million to technical assistance met with White House aides
projects in Chile. Charles Colson and John Ehr-
Gerrity said Neal was sent lichman but that once again
the discussion was about anti-
to discuss this with former As- trust matters, not Chilean af-
sistant Secretary of State for fairs.
Inter-American Affairs "We'd still like to work out
Charles A. Meyer and Viron P. some kind of arrangement
Vaky, then Latin American with Allende that would be fair
specialist on the Kissinger to Chile and to us," Gerrity
staff. said. "But frankly, we pre-
Church told Gerrity that ferred that Allende not be
Neal testified earlier this week elected. He was elected, he did
indicated it may reran lreai w
explore the inconsistency be-
tween his testimony and Gerri-
ty's.
Sen. Edward Muskie,
D-Maine, told Gerrity that
even if the $1 million was for
social or constructive purposes
{
it might be regarded as an act
e'? of political intervention.
Asked about recommenda-
tions made by ITT operatives
Hal Hendrix and Robert Ber-
rellez from Santiago on possi-
ble means of stopping Al
lende's election, Qerrity said
their a was to report, to
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By Margaret Thomas-The Washington Post
ITT's Merriam: "I had no notion he (a CIA operative) wag clandestine."
ES/HC-
I
eke
Wednesday, A1&r`21,1973 THE WASHINGTON POST
S y' CIA M- an
ff]; ia a s
Aiiti-Allende Plans
By Laurence SternWashfn?ton Post Staff Writer A top Central Intelligence Agency operative "approved" by the International Tel- ophofte and Telegraph Corp.
Intended to block the election President Salvador Allende Chile in 1970, an ITT offi told senators yesterday.
Services-to discuss anti Al-
lende strategy.
Broe specifically
He said
assent to an ITT plan
gave his
to subsidize ze an anti-Allende
in an effort to pro-
newspaper
mote political opposition to
the e Marxist candidate in the
1070 election.
on.
In a morning of halting tes-
timony timony punctuated by fre-
president and former chief
Washington representative for
ITT, acknowledged that he
and other excrutives of the
Corporation nict repeatedly
riam gave the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations a
general picture of close liason
between ITT and the CIA
with the CIA executive- -WiI-I'I--throughout 1970 and 1971'
ro ddnFir ReleaWee2O61YU61109 :i'l A5FR1iML(9fl499R00F11
a1>iet'ro t }fief of t'l?iluie; t.inc by Sen. Frank Cwart h (1)
Idaho), Is negotiating with the
CIA for Broe's testimony in
order to determine to what ex-
tent he was carrying out theI
agency's policy in his dealings
with ITT and other American
Companies.
At one point Merriam refer-
red to Broe as "our man" in
the agency. The CIA official,
who held the equivalent of a'
GS-18 Civil Service rank, was
in charge of all covert intelli-
gence programs in Latin
America and reportedly sat in
on top-level National Security
Council uwcl.ings dcalinc with
hisre?io=.
od1 i~bb0`'`-`O lircn lr? I 'l T, 1 t`el, :t
 Approved For Relea 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499RO018W110004-0
ITT, From Al
red to another job in the
agency. The CIA is understood
to have refused to permit him
to testify publicly in the pro-
ceeding.
Merriam said he was intro-
duced to Broe, by ITT's board
chairman and chief operating
officer, Harold S. Geneen, at
the Sheraton Carlton Hotel on
the night of July 16, 1970. Gen-
een "told me to stay in touch
with Mr. Broc," Merriam said.
Merriam testified he was
unaware of ]3roe's role in the
when and if Allende Is elect-,
ed." In the memo Merriam
reported Broes assertion that
all sources of U.S. monetary
aid to Chile would be cut off
"as soon as expropriations
take place.
Pressed by members of the
Senate panel on the sources of
Broe's Intelligence, Merriam
replied that "I believe as a
member of the CIA, he (Bros)
had periodic meetings with
the White House staff."
At one point Sen. Clifford
P. Case (R-N.J.) incredulously
asked Merriam why the CIA
should ask ITT to pressure the
White House on Chilean pol-
icy matters.
Sen. Stuart Symington (D-
Mo.) observed that "the CIA
reports only to the President."
. And apparently to Mr.
Merriam," Case snapped. .
Merriam was transferred to
'Rome after the surfacing. of
the ITT papers and now spe-
cializes in international trade
matters. He said that Broc
used to send a special messen.
ger to pick up ITT's own field
intelligence reports, and that
Broe regarded the ITT data
from Chile as highly as any in-
telligence reports from other
sources.
In February, 1971, ITT took
a leading part in an effort by
American business Interests in
Chile ' to put pressure on the
Allende government against
expropriation of their hold-
ings. ,
The subcommittee made pub-
lic an internal memo by Bank
of America's Washington rep-
resentative, Ronald R. Rad-
datz. It described a meeting in
Merriam's office on Feb. 9,
1971, attended by repr.'esenta-
tives of five other U.S. com-
panies doing business in Chile:
Anaconda, Kennecott, W. R.
CIA's covert wing, which oper-
ates under, the Deputy Direc-
tor for Plans.
"I had no notion he was
clandestine," the' ITT official
testified. "We had lunches in
places where 300 or 400 people
were present," he added to a
roar of laughter from the com-
mittee room.
On one occasion, Merriam
testified, .Broe told him the
CIA had contacted a group of
American businesses in hopes
of applying anti-Allende politi-
cal 'pressure through con-
certed economic action.
In an Oct. 7, 1970 memo to
Edward Gerrity Jr., ITT's sen-
ior vice president for corpo-
rate relations, Merriam rela-
ted that Broe had told him
"repeated calls to firms. such
as GM, Ford and banks in Cal-
ifornia and New 'York have
'drawn no offers of help. All
have some sort of excuse.",
The memo was one in a series
made public last year. by col-
umnist Jack Anderson.
Asked by subcommittee
members who ' made the
"repeated calls," Merriam said
Broe told him it was the
agency.
Merriam further confirmed
that-on the strength of in-
formation from Broe-he had
advised ITT board member
and former CIA Director John
McCone on Oct. 9, 1970 that
t1le Nixon administration "will
take a very, very hard line
Grace, Pfizer Chemical and
Ralston Purina.
"The thrust of the meeting,"
the memo related, ,was toward
the application of pressure on
the government wherever pos-
sible to make it clear that a
Chilean takeover would not be
tolerated without serious rep-
ercussions following.
"ITT believes that the place
to apply pressure is through
the office of Iiemy Kissinger.
They feel that this office and
the CIA are handling the Chile:
pr. oblem," Raddatz reported to
his superiors. '
Merriam described the
meetings of an ad hoe com-
mittee "a v e r y informal
group." He a c k nowledged,
however, that the Allende
government had indicated at
the time that it was prepared
to bargain in good faith for
compensation on the seizure
of ITd"s Chilean Telephone
Co.
Speaking of the companies
in the "ad hoc group," Church
said "if I ever found out that
those companies were meet-
ing concerning an election of
mine, 1'd be concerned."
The ITT testimony and sup-I
porting documents show that!
the anti-Allende campaign
was most intense between the
Sept. 4, 1970 popular election,
and the final congressional
runoff Oct. 24. Allende had to
contend in the runoff because
he failed to win a clean ma-
jority in the popular election.
During the interim period
two ITT field operatives,
Harold Hendrix and Robert
Berrellez, recommended pur-
chase of advertising by U.S.
firms in the anti-Allende
Mercurio chain of newspapers
and the hiring of "propagan-
dists" in radio and television
to support Allende's opposi-;
tion.
The object of the campaign'
was to restore Christian Dem-
ocrat Eduardo Frei Montalvo,
regarded by ITT as friendly
to its interests, to the presi-
deny through a series of po-
litical maneuvers. These pro-
posals had been reviewed by
Broc,' according to Merriam's
testimony.
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In a press release issued at
the start of yesterday's open-
ing hearing, ITT said it had
never taken any improper ac-
tions in Chile. "It is ITT's
opinion that it is perfectly
proper to appeal to the gov-
ernment to protect against un-
lawful expropriation and that
the government is justified in
taking requests of this kind
into account so it may formu-
late appropriate national pol-
icy," the company said,
Under questioning by the
subcommittee, Merriam ac-
knowledged setting upa meet-
ing in September, 1971 be-
tween Goneen and then-White
House. adviser on interna-
Ian, Prohe T 01
Peterson. After the session
Merriam sent Peterson an 18-
point ITT draft program de-
signed "to see that Allende
does not get through the cru-
cial next six months."
It included such measures
as cutting off private lines of
credit to Chile, subsidizing
the anti-Allende press and.
discussing "with CIA how it
can- assist the six-month
squeeze." Although credit re-
strictions were imposed on
Chile by the Export-Import
and 'Inter-American Develop-
ment Banks, there is no evi-
dence that the Nixon admin.
gram submitted to Peterson.
Merriam also acknowledged.
that former Treasury Secre-
tary John Connally set up an.
other meeting between Ge.
neon and Peterson in April,
1971, to discuss ITT's anti.
trust differences with the Ju-%
Lice Department, which want.
ed the company to divest the
$2 billion Hartford Fire In-
surance Co.
The Connally intercession
was first disclosed last week.
end with the release of 6ecur.
ities and Exchange Commis
sion internal working papers
by the House Commerce Com-
mittee.
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xs~azc= qx'v
'7'HE~NEW YORK TINE S,WEDNESDAY MARCH 21,1973'.'
C.I.A. Cutting Personnel
Lii A ency's'Biggest Layoff
1,000 Posts to Be Abolished
By SEYMOUR M. IHERSII
Speciel to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 20-
Jollies It Schlesinger, tho' new
Director of Crntrnl Intelligence,
has begun the largest person-
nel cutback in the history' of
the agency.
Unofficial, C.I.A. sourees esti-
mated that at least 1,000 -
and possibly as many as 1,800
of the agency's approximately
18,000 jobs would be abolished
by the end of the current
fiscal year, Juno .30..
An official agency source
acknowledged that what he
termed a "reduction in force"
- known in the Government
as a RIF- was under way
"on a very selective basis" to
'eliminate "marginal perfor-
:mers." But he woul1 give no
figures' for the cutback.
No official announcement of
the cutbacks has been ' made
to employes at the C.I.A. head-
Continued on Page 13, Column 1' ,
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 Approved For Release 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499R00100Qy10004-0
CJA- Cutting ]Personnel in Agency's Biggest Layoff
Continued From Page 1, Col. 2
quarters in nearby Langley,
1; Va., creating much unc0.rtq li?y
there.
"This is the first place' I've
9 ever been in where all the
rumors come true," ono,:.gcncy
employe said. "You get a;call
and get an interview and that's
it," he said, describing the job-
elimination process. "No pre-
liminaries and ceremonies.
They just give the word." '
"Nobody feels safe," the
source added,"
High-Level Shake-Up
In' addition to the layoffs,
Mr. Schlesinger has initiated a
high-level shake-up of key
management positions inside
the agency, and is, expected to
continue his efforts to trim
manpower and cut costs in
y other intelligence . agencies,
such as the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the National Se-
curity Agency.
He has reportedly been told
by President Nixon to improve
the efficiency of the nation's
over-all intelligence operations,
which costs more than $6-bil-
lion a year.
The C.I.A. reportedly spends
about $602-to $800-million
annually, although it is not
known whether all of ' the
agency's costs for its extensive
Southeast Asian operations are
included in that estimate.
{ Intelligence sources acknowl-
edged that there was much
waste in the personnel struc-
ture of the C.I.A.
"There's a lot of fat and a
lot of dead wood that he's get-
ting rid of," one agency cm-
ployc said. "I guess I'm for it
as long as it doesn't include
me."
Another employe complained
that many of his colleagues
"don't understand what the cri-
terion is" for the job elimina-
tions. "There's no hard data;
no facts," ho said, adding that
a seemingly heavier portion of
jobs had been abolished from
management staff and the
agency's Research and Devel-
opment, situated in nearby
Rosslyn, Va., was said to be
particularly affected, The office
is responsibl efor most of the
agency's basic research proj-
ects. ,
'A Wringing Out'
The official C.I.A. source,
however, described the cuts as
being "across the board" and
not limited to any specific of-
fice. "What's going on is not a
mindless cutting," the source
said, "but a real search for the
minimal performers and a
wringing uot"
. Those officers with low fit-
in the agency's history took
place shortly after John J. Mc-
Cone was named director in
1961 by President Kennedy, a
few months after the aborted
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.
About 260 agents employed
by the agency's clandestine ser-
vice were eliminated then, the
former official said, "and that
was very carefully handled."
Some Congressmen `serving
on intelligence committees,
while reluctant to speak for the
record, applauded Mr. Schles-
inger's cutbacks and indicated
he would get full Congression-
al approval.
"I'm convinced that we're
gatheri nga whole lot of infor-
mation we don't need," one
senior Congressman said. "It's
been pretty hard to pull our
horns in."
.. Mr. Schlesinger,; 'who re-
ness reports would be among
the first to retire, he said.
Unofficial sources said that
an appea (mechanism had been
month, has established a new
intelligence research advisory
committee inside the C.I.A. that
is expected to monitor the in-
telligence activities of defense
agencies closely.
The only major intelligence
office in the Government that'
is expected to escape personnel
cutbacks is the State Depart-!
ment's Bureau of Intelligence
Research, headed by Ray S.~
Cline, a former high-ranking
C.I.A. official. Mr. Cline's 300-
man department has been au-
thorized to request.100 more
positions next year, and was al-
located 30 new personnel spots,
in, the current budget.
Some Government officials!
have urged htat the State De-,
partment unit be upgraded. in:
an effort, to supply more rode-;
pendent intelligence judgments,
on critical questions. .
to eliminate their jobs. Those 7`HE NEW YORK TIMES,WEDNESDAY MARCH 21
who make such appeals, the;
of immediate retirement should
their efforts fail.'
A former high-'evel C.I.A. of-
ficial expressed surprise when
told today of the' large-scale.
personnel cutbacks ordered by,
Mr. Schlesinger. "The C.I.A..
doesn't have RIFs," he said.'
"That's always been considered
a security risk."
The only significant cutback
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 .- v . v-V, V . 11 ,
Apprd For Release 2&6/09 :
WAS1-1 N0TON
WASHINGTON, D. C., WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 1973-108 PAGES
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
New York Times Necrs Service
James R. Schlesinger, the new di-,
rector of the Central Intelligence
Agency, has begun the-largest person-
nel cutback in the history of the
agency.
Unofficial CIA sources estimated
that at least 1,000-and possibly as
many as 1,800-of the agency's ap-
proximately 18,000 jobs will be abol-
ished by June 30.
In addition, the CIA director is
expected to continue cutbacks in other
intelligence agencies, too, such as the
huge National Security Agency, staffed
by 100,000 people, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency, which employes
about 3,000.
An official agency source ac-
knc;e'--edged that what he termed a "re-
duction in force"-known in the gov-
ernment as a RIF-is under way "on
a very selective basis" to eliminate
"marginal performers." But he would
give no figures.
No official announcement of the
cutbacks has been made to employes
at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.
"This is the first place I've ever
been in where all the rumors com true,
one agency employe said. "You get
a call and get an interview and that's
it," he said, describing the job-elimi-
,nation process.
In addition to the layoffs, Schles-
inger has initiated a high-level shake-
up of key management positions in-
side the agency.
He reportedly has been told by
President Nixon to improve the effici-
ency of the nation's over-all intelli-
gence operations, which costs more
than $6 billion a year.
The CIA's Office of Research and
Development in Ro,sslyn is said to be
particularly affected. T]-c office is re-
sponsible for most of the s ~ ncy's basic
research projects. The ufficial CIA
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RI -?. " i w " - r.r n S ---->
Phone [phone] CIRCULA1ION 484.03 10 Cents
CLASSIEI_D 484.606000
source, however, described the cuts as
being "across the board" and not lim-
ited to any specific office.
The Associated Press quoted
sources as saying that reports of a 10
percent reduction at CIA are high. In
some cases, sources told AP, some em-
ployes have been transferred to other
jobs, and some administrative person-
nel have been reshuffled.
A former high-level official ex-
pressed surprise when told of the large-
scale personnel cutbacks. "The CIA
doesn't have RIFs," he said. "That's
always been considered a security risk."
The only significant cutback in
the agency's history took place shortly
after John J. bicCone was named di-
rector in 1961 by President Kennedy,
a few months after the aborted Bay of
Pigs invasion of Cuba. About 260
agents employed by the agency's
clandestine service were eliminated
then, the fm,' er official said, "and
that was v. 1re ally handled."
 Approved For Releasa,2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499RO010jJ110004-0
C. 1. A.-I. T,-T, PLANS'
ON CHILE REPORTED
Company Aide Says Agency
Also Urged Measures to
Bar Allende in 1970
C.I.A.-I,T.T. PLANS
ON CHILE IS CITED
Continued From Page 1, Col. 4'
porations that operate around
97 / MAO? 14 1
74HE'NEW YORK TIML'S,;WEDNESDAY 4VA.RCH 2
the globe. Anderson.
Among the main things the Today's testimony, together
subcommittee wants to find out with additional documents
is the extent to which these' made public by the subconr
multinational corporations in- mitts -- documents that were
By EILEEN SIIANAHAN
fluence United States foreign; voluntarily submitted by the
Special to The New York 71men policy, corporation - depicted a much
WASHINGTON, March 20 The first two weeks of the' more prolonged and extensive
A vice' president of the inter-+ hearings will deal exclusively! pattern of consultation between
;national Telephone and Tele y with the reported attempts of the company offiiaand ls than various gov.
'rah Cor oration said today International Telephone and; t p
p p Telegraph to enlist, the help of viously been disclosed.
I
that a top official of the Cen-,,; various brancht!s of. the United .. Mr. Merriam spoke, for ex-1
tral Intelligence Agency had' States Government to keep Dr. ample, of "25 visits" to' the.'.
"agreed with the reconunenda- Aliendo out of office. State Department and of hav-
1_ __
,-.._..._ -..inc talked with Mr. Kissinger'
It
t yet
Lry to 1" 'ev l "'? telligenco Agency will testify, j Y111" Mr. Merriam also acknowl-
Salvador Allende Gossens, a His testimoney also indicated
Marxist, as President of Chile. public session or bet ind cloaca ~' that most of the visits by com- Mgddko when asked, that a
The recommendations in 1;170 doors, about the agency's ac pony officers to six high.Nixon ntives ofWas i plt
nles e pr sent. w co.
Thee Administration officials in 1971
s th tivities regarding Chile
nomic interest
te
i
d
Chil h
d
l
h
p
s
s
n
e
e
u
ad
reporic ly inc
. and 1971-these were disclosed
su to be
egotiating ngwith he te C. A. yesterday by another Congres- met- several times in his office
(maneuver the departing Chil? n
can President back into power, negotiat the L sional committee-had the duals to dsicuss how to cope with
about this.
about the'; the Allende Government.
ose of talkin
i ht
e
g
purp
!to foment violenc
that m g What. came of the reported It was not he who initiated
bring about 'a, military tape- company's antitrust problemsl
agreement on a course of ac-with the Justice Departmen,: > the meetings of this ad hoc
to usc~l ,
tion between the corporation
group
Mr
Merriam said but
f the country
'
,
.
,
over o
;dbot LTT
s attempts to
an au.., American governmental agen- and the agency was not made keep Dr. Allende from being i 'rather theF Washington repre
propaganda . to uu-, . ~.?' Dr. Allende was elected
American countries, or some president of Chile and took of
combination of these things. figs on Nov. 3, 1970. He sub-;
The C.I.A. official who was sequently took over business
these and some other United States,'
esproposals was William W companies, as he had promised
Broc, director of the agency's in his campaign and as corpora-;
clandestine activities in Latin tion officials had feared he,
The LT.T. official who testi.I of the Central Intelligence and:
fied about this conversation and International Telegraph as hard-
many others with Mr. Brbe and line anti-Communist groups
other high officials of. the Uni?I that greatlyfeared Dr. Allende's
fed States Government was', accession to power and that
worked together to try to per-
William R. Merriam, formerly
head of the corporation's.Wash-
IilgtOit effict!,
Mr. Merriam was the -first
q
witness to, a be heard special in subcompublic'
Disclosed a Year Ago
n b
o y
suadc the State Department
and Henry A. Kissinger, the
eA
aas
Qlil
ip
p
n
ity tto
!
tta
c A
,'iew.
i
e
ually hard anti-Allendev
s~ssl
mlttee of the Senate ,Foreign The tion's outlines attempt of to the coenlistpora-
the
Relations, Committee that ht help of the Government to pre-
haaded . by senator. Pranlc serve its interests in Chile were
Church, Democrat of Idaho. disclosed a year ago when por-
The subcommittee will con- tions of a number of internal
duct what is, expected to be a I.T.T. documents were pub-
two-year inquiry into the be lished by the columnist, Jack
Anderson.
Continued on ~uI IR
ideas to bring about "economic
collapse" in Chile, according
to company documents and
testimony.
Other Companies Approached
As part of this plan, accord-
ing to Mr. Merriam, C.I.A. offi-
cials made "repeated calls to
firms such as General Motors,
Ford Motor Company and
banks in California and New
York," asking them to stop or
reduce their activities in Chile
to hurt her economy. These
companies, refused, according
to other I.T.T. documents that
were put into the record.
Among other items of eco-
nomic warfare against the Al-
lende Government that were
proposed by the company were
a cessation of all United States
aid, under the guise of a re-
view, and intercession with the
World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank to
get them to stop making loans
to Chile. It was not clear
whether any of these proposals
were accepted.
per Company. Other compa-
nies represented included, he
said, Kcnnecott Copper, W. It.
an dthe Bank of America. Such
meetings among corporate rep-
resentatives in Washington oc-
cur "all the time," he said.
Mr. Merriam said that the
group had never arrived at any
conclusions on what to do.
Senator Edmund S. Muskie,
Democrat of Maine, asked why
I.T.T. wanted to bring about
the collapse of the Chilean
economy if its aim was, as Mr.
Merriam said, to make sure
that Chile gave the corporation
"better terms" in payment for
Chitelco, the. telephone com-
pany owned largely by the cor-
poration after the Allende Gov-
ernment took it over.
Mr. Merriam replied that he'
thought "the threat of economic
collapse" might prove effective
with Mr. Allende "if he knew
that the banks might stop lend-
ing."
Senator Muskie suggested
that thre threat was an attempt
to "blackmail Allende,"
CIA-RDP84-00499 RO01000110004-0
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THE 'WASHINGTON POST Sunday, March 18, 1973 A7
owneyo. A CIA Aqrent in From the (],old
0
. Recruit on Double Mission Over China When Captured in 1952
By Thomas O'Toole
Wasiiington Post SLatt Wrltor
There were 30 of them there that
day in 1951, 30 graduating Yale seniors
all drawn to a small room on the New
Haven campus by a recruitment notice
on the bulletin board. One of them re-
members that the notice was next to
one put there by Procter & Gamble.
They were met by a middle-aged
man dressed in the Ivy League flan-
nels of the (lay, noteworthy for noth-
ing except that he smoked a pipe and
wore the Yale tie. He told the seniors
that he's been a member. of the. OSS
(Office of Strategic Services) during
World War II and had operated behind
German lines all during the Allied ad-
vance across Europe. Ile said he was
now with the 'Central Intelligence
none of the Yale seniors had heard of when he was released two weeks ago
it. after 20 years in a Chinese prison, but
The recruiter said he was at Yale to ~ reliable sources say he was on a dou-
bring qualified bright young men into
the C[A, which needed to grow be ble mission that fateful day when his
cause of the Chinese intervention into C-47 aircraft was shot down by small
the Korean War. He said little about arms fire inside China.
what qualified bright young men could For years, the United States had dis-
expect in the CIA, leading several of avowed Downey's mission and where-
the Yale seniors to press him on what abouts the day he was caught.
they might have to do. Downey's friends say he could
"Well, this is purely hypothetical," have ben released as early as 1955 if
the recruiter said, "but we might ex- the United States had only acknowl-
pect you to parachute Into China to , edged that he was a CIA agent. His
help set up. a communications appara- friends call him a victim of the Cold
tus, sort of get things started. / War, a victim of the China Lobby that
Hypothetical as it might have been ' kept the United States friendly with
at the time, that is almost what Jack Chiang Kai-shek and a victim of the
Downey was doing in 1952 when he virulent anti-Communism of the 'S0s
was captured by the Chinese in the and '60s.
foothills of the Manchurian mount.alns.
which: was . then so new that Downey refused to discuss his missioa - See DOWNEY, A7, Col. 1
 Approved For 'Releasep01 /06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499R00100Q4;0004-0
THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, March 18,1973 A7
1"'"T0111
DOWNEY, From Al.
been that Downey was a Defense De-
partment employe, on an authorized
flight from Seoul to Tokyo the day his
plane was lost.
Downey had been a CIA agent for
more than a year, one,of a dozen Yale:,
graduates who had been recruited off
the campus that day in 1951. He was
participating In a tradition that grew "
through the fifties and on into the six-
ties, when Yale men tended to domi
nate the ranks of the CIA.
Downey was stationed by the CIA in
Japan, where he trained Taiwanese
from Chiang Kai-Shek's isolated island
in the arts and crafts of the profession
he'd been taught in Washington. Dow-
ney was considered one of the best
young agents in the Far East. He was '
strong, durable, quickminded and a
born leader of men.
That leadership was obvious even in
Downey's early CIA days. His class of
40 was asked at the end of their train-
ing which man in the class they'd like
to lead them or be with them in trou-
ble sports. Thirty-one of the 40 chose'
nose agent who was already inside
China. The plane was then to continue
on to the mountains of Manchuria and
parachute seven other Taiwanese into
China to set up a communications
base. .
Downey's plane never made it to the
mountains. Sources said the Chinese
arrested the Taiwanese agent Downey
was supposed to pick up before Dow-
ney's plane left for China. Sources also
said the Chinese Intercepted radio
messages inbound to the Taiwanese
agent, which alerted them to the time
and place of the pick-up.
When Downey's plane flew. into
China, men and weapons were waiting
for it. The C-47 is understood to have
come in low and slow over the spot
designated for the pickup when Chi-
nese troops opened fire on the plane.
The C-47 crash-landed in a Manchu- "
rian field, which explains how Downey
is said to have walked away from the
wreckage. All eleven people on board
survived the crash, Besides Downey,
there was CIA Agent Richard Fecteau,
two Taiwanese. pilots and the seven Ta-
iwanese agents who were to be para-
chuted into the mountains.
A.4sodated Press
Downey was the mission chief, Fecteau
Downey's) remembers oindd auiound nAIVVPV
... Cara recruit
rea, where his "fishing junk" was drop- Downey has said he spent the first
ping Korean agents into the north., plane. Ile said that' while Downey 10 months of imprisonment in leg
"We though we were aground on an didn't defy re6relations he overstepped irons. ome rd University l.aw Profes-
? sor Jerrome A. Cohen, a classmate of
uninhabited island, where we'd be safe his participation in the mission by be. Downey's at Yale and today a special.
until' the tide lifted us off," he said. ing on the plane. 1st in Chinese law, said there ,was uoth-
"Then the fog began to lift and we dis-
we were less than 100 ing unusual about Downey's treatment.
covered yards "Jack flew with his men because he
from the main railroad line that liked them and wanted. to be ..with',.. "All criminals were treated the same
moved men and supplies down from them when they jumped," the one-time way-in the People's Republic of Chi-
Vladivostok." agent said. "ghat was one reason he. na," Cohen said. "They socked it to,
. but, Downey knows how was there. The other one, I guess, was ' 'you from the start, then became len-
Nobody,
many missions but he flew over China, but, that it was a lovely moonlit night and ient as you reformed, as you told the
Jack Just wanted to see China." truth and.as you repented about the
the men who knew him in the CIA as:',;' "
some he'd been there more than once. . The mission Downey flew is believed truth.
One former agent said there was never to have been a double one. It Is under- Downey said he' told his captors ev-
any need for Downey to be' on the stood the C-47 was to pick up a Taiwa- erything he knew in -those first 10
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 Approved For Release4001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO0100?Q4;0004-0
THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, March 18,1973 A7
'months. He was quoted by newsmen
interviewing him last week at a hospi-
tal in New Britain, Conn., where his
mother Is recuperating from a stroke:
"I would say I revealed about every bit
of information I piad."
When,he'd told the Chinese the de-
tails of his work, Downey was taken
out of leg irons. But he was kept in
solitary -confinement for another 14
months, during which time he was not
allowed to talk to anybody but his cap-
tors. Even that conversation was lim-
ited to chats with the jailer who super-
vised his 30 minutes of courtyard exer-
cise every day.
Downey and Fecteau were moved
out of solitary In a rural prison and
into Peking's Grass Basket Prison In'
December 1954. There, they were put
in with the crew of a B-29 that had.
been shot down over North Korea.
They were also tried and convicted of
espionage by a Chinese military tribu-
nal, which announced the conviction to,
the world.
"We were., elated at the conviction,"
remembers one of Downey's class-
mates who had gone into:the CIA with
him. "We'd never heard of his capture.
We'd' all given Jack up for dead."
The Korean War ended before the
Chinese announced Downey's capture
and conviction. When it ended, negoti.
ations began bet w e,e n the United
States and the People's Republic of
China to arrange a prisoner exchange.
A list of prisoners was swapped in Ge-
neva in April 1954.
The United States listed 129 Chinese
it had detained, mostly scientists and
economists who'd been teaching or
working in the United States. The Peo-
ple's Republic listed 40 Americans, in-
cluding the fliers Downey sat in prison
with in Peking. Downey and Fecteau
were not on the list.
"They weren't on' the list because
John Foster Dulles would not admit
they worked for the CIA," said liar-
yard Law Professor Jerome Chen,
j Downey's Yale classmate who was
later to become a force behind. his re-
lease. "We 'never admitted he was
missing so they never admitted ho was '
captured."
When the Chinese announced that
they were holding Downey and Fee-
teau, Secretary of State Dulles refused
to budge. The story that the State De-
they stuck to until early this year.
Downey and Fecteau worked for the
U.S.-Ariny. Their plane had gone. off
, course between Korea and Japan and
.ended up over Manchuria.
The flier's who were in the Peking
prison with. Downey and Fecteau were
released by the Chinese in August,
1955. Downey and. Fecteau stayed be.
hind,;victims of the growing Cold War
between China and the United States.
A witness to this is one of the fliers
who met Downey and Fecteau in
prison, a man named Steven Kiba, who
teaches Spanish in a high school in
Norton, phio.
"I asked a Chinese commisar If Dow-
ney and Fecteau would go home when
we went home," Kiba said, "and he
told me, 'The only way they will ever
get out will be for your government to
admit they are CIA agents.' " .
KIba said he told this to the CIA
when he was released. He said he
passed along a message from Fecteau
that the Chinese were aware of his and
Downey's attempt to set up a CIA spy
ring under the code name "Operation
Samurai."
"The CIA man told me to forget it,
forget about the whole period with
Downey and Fecteau," Kiba. said.
"They. said as far as they were con-
cerned it never happened. They said it
looked pretty hopeless for. them and
seemed to indicate they would never
_get out."
Harvard Law Professor Cohen is'one
who insists the Chinese tried to main-
tain some kind of contact with the
United States over the Downey and
Fecteau cases from 1954 to 1957. He
said China tried to regularize relations
with the United States during this pe-
riod, but that the United States re-
jected Chiha's moves because the
United States did not want to under.
mine, its relations with Chiang Kai-
shek.
China made a last attempt at recon-
ciliation in 1957, when Premier Chou
En-lai offered to repatriate Downey
and Fecteau if the United States would
allow American newsmen. to visit
that if
the United States were to let that .hap-
pen it would be giving Its approval to
a regime that "practiced and trafficked
in evil."
Downey and Fecteau were finally re-
leased when President Nixon chose to
acknowledge their roles as CIA agents.
He did it at a press conference just be-
fore presidential assistant Henry A.
Kissinger left on one of his trips to
China. He did It in answer to the last
question asked at the press conference,
in a way that conviced DJack Dow-
ney's friends that the question:was
planted and the answer rehearsed.
Jack Downey emerged from his 20
years in prison looking and acting- like
a man who'd never been in prison, al-
most a symbol of the detente that now
exists between the United States and
China. Downey had two recreations in
prison, reading and exercising. 'To-
gether, they saved his santiy.
He came out of prison speaking Chi-
nese and able to read and write Rus-
sian, which he learned from Russian
ccilmates and from. the Russian novels
his Chinese captors let him have. His
friends say he is in excellent physical
shape at the age of ?42. He can run 10
miles, do 100 pushups and as many as
50 chinups. His weight Is 190 pounds, a
little less than it was when he wrestled
and played varsity football for Yale.
Jack Downey is the'last of the 'Yale
class of 1951 to come in from the Cold
War between the U.S. and China,
almost a symbol of the last 20 years.
The others who went Into the CIA
when the Korean War looked like'an?
Ameiican disaster all left years ago.
One, is a freelance photographer in
New York, another in an Asian scholar
at Yale, a third runs a hosiery mill and
a fourth a lobster-tail business in the
Solomon Islands.
,"We all got bored and disillusioned,"
one of them said the other day. "The
?bureauracy, the paper work and the
politicking got too stifling. That,.and
the times changed. So did we change."
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 Approved For ReleWs 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499 R0O1W 110004-0
THE STAR and NEWS A-3
Washington, D. C.
Saturday, March 17, 1973
i?
Lost on CIA Mission
Secretary of State William P- Rogers has been asked to
help a 77-year-old Oregon woman find' out exactly ;how her son
died during a U.S. spy mission in China more than 20 years
ago.
Sen. Mark O. Hatfield and Rep. John Dellenback, both
R-Ore., sent Rogers a letter on behalf of Myrtle Snoddy of
Creswell, Ore., yesterday.
Mrs. Snoddy's son, Robert C. Snoddy, and Norman
Schwartz of Louisville, Ky., participated in the mission in
which Central Intelligence Agency operative John Thomas
Downey and Richard Fecteau were captured.
The Snoddy and Schwartz families were told in 1954, two
years after the pair disappeared, that the two men were killed
on the Downey-Fecteau flight.
Snoddy and Schwartz reportedly flew the plane, a cargo
version of the DC3 twin-propeller aircraft, that was shot down
during a flight over China's Kirin Province on Nov. 29, 1952.
Fectcau and Downey were imprisoned on espionage
charges. Fecteau was released in December 1971? Downey was
freed Monday.
"The only thing I know is what I read in the papers," said
Mrs. John Boss of Creswell, Snoddy's sister, "after 21 years, I
think they can come out and tell me where he was, what he
was doing.
"I think it's high time to learn what happened. I don't
think anyone could be hurt now. I think my mother deserves
that."--SAP
 Approved For Release OO1/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499 ROO1OO4OOO4-0
A-2
THE EVENING STAR and DAILY' NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, March 16, 1973
craw=000 ar
knows about th(: left. But em- abailable for him. in his own,
ployes, reading, the cutback as directorate, the second, for a
best they cam, see it trimming Job elsewhere in the agency.
about 10 percent in many units
- with nurust of those affected
in the over-45 bracket.
The r:.uts are to go into effect
Jurc; 30. Indications are that
c,'ome older woriicrs are being
pressured to sign up for retire-
OUT IN THE CGU),, ment annuities, thereby for-
That's where an unknown feiting the small appeals
number of Central intelligence rights available to them under
-Agency cmployes are going, the law.
under a layoff which CIA re- By CIA rules, an employe
portedly refuses to call a lay- declared surplus in his imme
off. diate office is entitled to two
In the compartmentalized subsequent screenings the
CIA,',. the right hand :never first, to see if another job Is
Ha/HHC Q, d For Release 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0
 Approved For Release. 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0
New York Times
tlUn
AT ODDS WITH U,A.. V.PMUm.y, who$c ld notibe
Friday, March 16, 1973
FORD FOUNDATION ` The Police Foundation is an
offshoot t of of the Ford Founda?
28 C
Bundy Denies Fund Sought
Training of Policemen
By DAVID BURNHAM
The president of the Ford
Foundation has denied an as-
sertion by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency that New City
policemen were trained by the
agency at the suggestion of the
foundation.
The denial contradicted a
"fact sheet" on the case pre-
pared by the agency for Rep-
Representative Chet Holified,
Democrat of California chair-
man of the House Govern-
ment Operations Committee.
In the sheet, the C.I.A. said
that "at the suggestion of the
foundation representative, the
NYC police sought assistance
from the agency as to the best
system for analyzing data."
The denial of the agc'ncv's
assertion came in a lcticu ;roan
McGeorge Bundy, president of
the Ford Foundation, to Rep-
resentative Edward I. Koch,
Democrat of Manhattan, who
has charged that C,I.A. train-
ing of policemen from more
than a dozen cities violated the
law.
After Mr. Koch had com-
plained to Mr. Holificld, James
R. Schlesinger, the new Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, said
in a letter made public on
March 5 that because of the
sensitive nature of such train-
ing, it would be "undertaken
in the future only in the com-
pelling circumstances and with
my personal approval."
was quoted yesterday by Dep-
uty Police Commissioner Rich-
ard Kellerman and an official
- of the Ford Foundation as
saying he believed the idea of
going to the C.I.A. originated
with Don R. Harris, a private
consultant.
Federal Grant Used
Mr. Harris, a former C.I.A.
intelligence analyst, was one of
three consultants hired by the
Police Department last year
under a $166,000 grant from
the Federal Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration to
help the department reoganize
its intelligence files.
In November of 1971, the
Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, a branch of
the Justice Department, pub-
lished a 150-page manual, co-
authored by Mr. Harris, which
was designed to instruct state
and local police agencies how
to "apply intelligence to com-
bat organized crime." The
other author was E. Drexel
Godfrey Jr., also a former
C.I.A. employe.
Informed of Mr. Murphy's be-
lief that Mr. Harris had origi-
nated the, idea of sending 14
New York poLicement for train-
ing with the C.LA., an agency
spokesman in Washington said
the available information indi-
cated the plan first was sug-
gested by Wayne Kerstetter,
one of six lawyers brought into
the department in October,
1971, under a grant from the
Police Foundation, the branch
of the Ford Foundation.
Neither Mr. Kerstetter, who
recently left New York for a
law enforcement position in
Illinois, nor Mr. Harris could be
reached for comment last night,
member of the Ford Founda-
tion or the Police Foundation
or any employe o" the New
Yrok City pro.jc't funded by
the Police Found:.. i,._.
'No Evidence' Found
T r. Bundy, responding to an
inquiry mll Mr. Kocih, said
that h. ,ad carefully examineu~~'
the ( ..: assertion and had
conci, ded that "these inquiries
disclose no evidence" that any
suggestion for C.I.A. training of a'
policemen was made "by any':.
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 Approved For Release601/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 ROO 1 0OW0004-0
THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, A C., Wednesday, March 14, 1973
A-3
n
and felt that it "broke the ice
and probably had a good effect
on my situation."
Downey, in other comments,
said his treatment at the
hands of the Chinese had met
"the, minimum standards."
He said he had been kept in
leg irons during the first 10
months of his imprisonment,
but he said the action was
"s t and a r d procedure" for
someone like him awaiting
trial in China.
have . a more sophisticated
grasp of American society.
It's still the greatest." He said
his views have evolved, "but'
so has the world."
He changed .his mind about
the Chinese somewhat in the
years he spent in prison, he
said. He called them energetic
and spirited.
"I think the people are more
behind their government than
I dreamed would be possible,"
Downey said.
Mrs. Mary V. Downey, 75,
was elated by his return. She
had, not been told of her son's
release until just before he
walked into her room at New
Britain hospital.
Downey himself was admit-
ted to the hospital yesterday,
and given a room near his
mother to recuperate from the
exhausting flight from Hong
Kong.
At times he was kept togeth-
He
risoners
ith Chinese
.
p
er w
also was taken on closely su-
pervised trips to farms, facto-
ries and the Great Wall, but he
did not learn to speak Chinese.
On a typical day, Downey
said, he was up at 6 a.m. he
was made to listen to political
broadcasts and to take part In
Ideological "study periods."
~t'~r .1?, r?t0i+1i I's
A NEW SPIRIT
,GROWS IN CHINA'
A new spirit, achieved at'
the cost of some of the color-
and vibrancy of legendary
China, is now spreading,
among Red China's people,,,
New York Times associate
editor Harrison E. Salis-
bury found in his recent'
travels there.
The final article in his"
four-part series discusses,
the life- styles of today's"
mainland China. Page A-25...
,Americap llte, ?`; I would say;
?H$/HC- Appr ved For Release 2001/06/09 :.,CIA-RDP84-06499 R001000110004-0
Downey Gave Chinese
Secret Information
NEW BRITAIN, Conn. tral Intelligence Agency but
(UPI) - Korean war spy John does not plan to remain with
T. Downey told newsmen to- the secret agency.
day he gave his Chinese cap- Of the 20 years in prison,
tors secret information during Downey said, "I can.only say
the 20 years he spent in a it all dropped off sue like a
"I can say, yes, I revealed like I'm putting you On. It's
I just feel
done with
bit of information over
t
b
,
,
every
ou
a
I had," Downey, 42, said at a great."
news conference when asked Downey said he was "aston-
whether he had given the fished" to learn of President
Chinese secret information. Nixon's visit to China last year
i Downey was released by the
Chinese yesterday on an ap-
i peal from President Nixon,
+ who had advised Premier
Chou En-lai that the prisoner's
mother was critically ill. The
CIA agent was flown first to
Clark Air base in the Phillp-
mission that brought him to
captivity in November 1952, cell for anywhere from half an
when his plane was shot down hour to four hours of exercise,
over Manchuria. in a 30-foot by 90-foot court-
He said he still considered yard. '
himself an employe of the Cen- Out of the intensive political
;ntirpfrinntinn. Downey said,
pines and then to Connecticut
for a reunion with his mother'
last night.
He said he felt the two dec-
ades he spent in Chinese pris-
ons was to a large extent
"wasted."
"I wouldn't recommend it
for any character building or
anything like that," Downey
said, adding that he didn't
think the episode "benefited
anybody," including the
United States.
Downey, a former defensive
guard on the 1950 Yale football
team, declined to discuss the
 Approved For Release4fi@01/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000,y10004-0
THE EVENING STAR and DAILY-NEWS`
' NEW BRITAIN, Conn. (AP) Downey from the Philippines,
-"You'll probably be a celeb- said his mother's pulse rate
rity now--don't let it go to showed "a little bleep" when .
your head," the ailing mother she was told John had been
of CIA agent John T. Downey freed and was in the hospital.:
told her son last night at e "He took mothers hand and
hospital room reunion. kissed her and spoke to her," '
Released Sunday, after 20 William Downey, a New York.
24 hours and rushed to the her."
bedside of Mrs. Mary V. Dow- Mrs. Downey visited her son
. i early because of Mrs. Dow- king's Grass Basket prison.
ney's illness Downey and Richard Fecteau
Mrs. Downey, was elated by, of Lynn, Mass., were captured
his return, United Press Inter- in November 1952 -after their
national reported. She had not plane was shot down over
been told of her son's release - Manchuria. Fecteau was re-..
until just before he walked leased in 1971, at about the
into her room at New Britain same time Downey's life term
hospital. was commuted to five more
r~ s:
d
it yeare T)nwney the last known'
a
m
ted to the hospital yesterday, captive of the Korean war era,
and given a room near his was reportedly captured when
mother to recuperate from the his plane was shot down over
ehausting flight from Hong China. The Chinese said he,
1, Kona. was dropping and picking up
schoolteacher, ' suffered a Downey's brother said ha
stroke Wednesday and re- found him "as close to being'
mained unconscious until Sun- unchanged as anyone bould be
Downey smiled as he was , "He indicated his great te-;'. ,
greeted }}~~ hundreds f friends lief in being a free sna . I
and won wishers, . ncludmg wouldn't rate him at 'ell es,,
Gov. Thomas J. Meskill, a bitter" because of his impris
personal friend, at Hartford's onment. He said his brother;
i Bradley International Airport. told him he had not been
Downey's younger brother abused in. prison -- "interro-'
William, who accompanied gated, yes-tortured, no."
H$'1I3C- - Appr
bved For Release 2001/06/09 :? CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000116004-0
 By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star-News Staff Writer
HONG KONG - More than
20 years after being shot down
while re-supplying Central In-
telligence Agency spies in Chi-
na, John Thomas Downey'
emerged from China today by
act of clemency from Premier
Chou En-Lai.
Downey, who is 42, has spent
half his life in Chinese prisons.
He was smiling and apparent-
ly in good health when he
crossed the border into Hong
Kong.
"I am so glad. It's like a
dream," Downey told an
American Red Cross repre-
sentative who met him, Eu-
gene D. Guy.
American officials had a hel-
icopter waiting to whisk Dow-
ney to Hong Kong's airport.
Within 35 minutes of the time
he walked across Lowu bridge
from China in a blue Chinese
shirt and trousers, a special
U.S. Air Force medical evacu-
ation plane was airborne, tak-
ing Downey to Clark Air Force
Base in the Philippines.
Operation Homecoming offi-
cials at Clark who are han-
dling prisoners released from
Vietnam sped Downey on to
see his critically ill mother in
New Britain, Conn.
Almost immediately after
arriving at Clark, Downey
boarded an Air Force C141
Starlifter transport which was
to fly him via Anchorage,
THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
--Washington, D. C., Monday, March 12, 1973
Alaska, to Windsor Locks,
Conn.
Downey was met at Clark by
his brother William, who said
doctors who flew with John
from Hong Kong reported he
was in good shape.
"He certainly feels and
looks good," William Downey
said.
Downey spoke briefly to
newsmen when he arrived at
Clark, United Press Interna-
tional said.
"I just wanted to say how
grateful I was for being re-
leased. I appreciate the
Chinese government for letting
me go at this time and Presi-
dent Nixon for his efforts on
my behalf and (presidential
adviser) Dr. Henry A. Kissin-
ger," he said.
"I'm very pleased to be
out," he said. "At the same
time, I'm very anxious to get
home to see my mother."
"He had a firm handshake
and he was up to date, very
well informed," one of the offi-
cers on the flight from Hong
Kong said. "We were very sur-
prised. He's got no problems
at all."
President Nixon asked Chou
to release Downey after his
mother suffered a stroke
Wednesday. Within 48 hours
the Chinese informed Wash-
ington they would.
Downey's mother, who suf-
fered a stroke last Wednesday,
was reported "vastly im-
proved" to day. She will be
See DOWNEY, Page A-6
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 -DOWNEY.
%pptoved For Releas 0 /09 : CIA-R-0 99R0010
1,0% pa% 0W&
riswl lq:;2.r Freed
Continued From Page A-1 1 Then recently, Nixon, by
told of her son's release before ; what seemed almost to have
his arrival tonight. been a slip of the tongue, re-
Peking also said it would re-1 ferred to Downey as. a CIA
lease Thursday the last two agent. Whether this was final-
Americans known to be im- ly a public admission which
prisoned in China. They are China had sought remains un-
tally different world political
ci!als he'Iived fora while with China and the United States
the two fliers, U.S. Navy Lt. are now coming closer togeth-
Cmdr. Robert J. Flynn, 35, of er, although somewhat warily,
Houston, Minn., and U.S. Air while China is in hostile con-
Force Maj. Philip Smith, 38, of frontation with the Soviet Un-
Roodhouse, Ill. ion. When Downey was shot
"According to him (Dow- down Americans saw China
ney), they were in excellent and the Soviet Union as part-
spirits and health," said ners in the Korean War
James E. Bolling, a Red against t'he United States.
Gross regional director who D o w n e y graduated from
flew from Hong Kong to the Yale University in 1951. The
Philippines with Downey. CIA was recruiting healthy
The two pilots had always young men with a taste for
been expected to be released adventure at the time.
When North Vietnam returned According to the finding at a
prisoners it held there. But the Chinese trial of Downey, Fec-
releaese of Downey was a spe- teau and a number of Chinese
cial concession in a new at- Nationalists, Downey selected
. mosphere of Sino-American and trained Nationalists into
It was regarded by China-
watchers here as more than
simply a goodwill gesture,
however. It marked the close
of what China had considered
a long period of U.S. provoca-
tion and hostility-a mirror
image of the American atti-
tude during the 1950s and 1960s
that China was hostile and
provocative.
During those years, while
Downey sat in prison the U.S.
government denied the finding
of his trial in China that he
was a Central Intelligence
Agency agent. Downey and
Richard George Fecteau were
A four-man team was para-
chuted into Kirin Province in
Northeast China adjoining Ko-
rea in July 1952. A larger team
was parachuted into adjacent
Liaoning Province in Septem-
ber.
Fecteau joined the CIA in
1952, according to the trial re-,
port. On the night of Nov. 2,9,
1952, lie accompanied Downey
on a DC3 twin-engine trans-
port plane to resupply the Kir-
in agents and picizup one
agent. The plane was shot
down.
It was only two years later
in announcing the trial-at
convicted together as CIA _ which several of the Chinese
agents. agents were sentenced to
Fecteau was given a 20-year death and others to long prison
sentence and released in De- terms-that the Chinese re-
comber 1971 after serving 19 veiled that Downey and Fee-
years. Downey's sentence was tcau were still alive. Sur-
at that time reduced from life prised, Washington put out a
to five more years. story of their being civilians,
a sign of developing friend-
ship. But Peking was not
ready then to simply release
Downey.
American officials quietly
stopped insisting that Downey
and Fectcau were civilians
working for the U.S. Army,
whose plane got lost on a flight
from Japan to Korea during
the Korean war. But they re-
mained unwilling to admit the
CIA connection.
al Dag Hammarskjold visited
China in 1955, he obtained the
release of 11 Americans from
another plane which the
Chinese said had been shot
'down while dropping agents. It
was a U.S. Air Force plane
which Hammarskjold said was
part of the U.N. command in
Korea, but, the Chinese said,
Hammarskjold told them the
United States had not claimed
that Downey and Fectcau
were part of the U.N. com-
mand, so he did not seek their
release.
The American Red Cross
was allowed to send parcels to
the two prisoners. Downey's
mother visited him three
times in Peking during the
years when almost no other,
Americans were allowed to go
to China.
Guy said today that Downey
told him artificial sweeteners
in parcels helped him, avoid
getting fat on Chinese food.
Guy gave a receipt for Dow-
ney to Chinese officials who
escorted him to the border. It
said that "the American peo-
ple are most appreciative for
this humanitarian action on
the part of the Peoples Repub-
lic of China."
At the request of the U.S.
Consulate, reporters were kept
away from Downey by British
police. The consulate's press
release on his passage through
this British colony mentioned
only Red Cross officials but
American diplomats hovered
in the background of the oper-
ation.
One diplomat, a specialist on
Chinese internal politics who
is almost exactly Downey'$
age, Sherrod McCall, met
Downey at the border and flew
with him to the Philippines as
escort officer.
So far as could be learned,
no one from the CIA section of
the U.S. Consulate was pres-
ent.
THWash ENU'4 CTMondday,M rrchL 2, 19 WS
Approved For Rele a 001d, 6/09 'CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001`1'0004-0
ice- ACa t:
 Approved For Releas*,a,001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 R00100QV 0004-0
-United Press International
Downey arrives in Hong Kong wearing a
broad smile and Red Chinese clothing.
-Associated Press
By the time he reached Clark Air Base,
Downey had changed to American garb.
THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
- Washington, D. C., Monday, March 12, 1973
Approved For Rel,ea$e?20310.6109 CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001 0'
?Ala 3
 9RO0100WO0004-0
C11 lnese R
rrive
sznU?
By Bernard D. No4Kiter
Waehlgaton Poat staff Wr,ter
of j t described as one
maipion
Spies.' i
n i
inA's rAnki
L
nf{
Urot
to the U n i
e
as bro
ught
ed f a t (113
froth 0 Pla
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ay
gue.
the arrival of no Ho
Pekin
Shu
''~.,w,~'~+{E-rge d'
aff
airy in
By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Staff Writer
The State Department yes- Peru has expropriated
rday brushed off a protest oil fields and the G
r.Cla+r'^``y+
Liao Ho?shu and the headlines he caused: "Moscow radio immediately dubbed him 'Peking's,
*S/HC- 9ro
oved For Reld4YeTkl906 coLf"1'i4-Ikdlil,
ngkd04QOu+ipp04ftg-'g-ng the U.S. had kidnapped him.
 I t J` Ntim'y L, ROSS
West
requested political asylum in the United States.
Liao Ho-shu, 46, charge d'affaires at the Chinese mission
.ej
feet n
Iti1ze
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ernard D. Nogvlter
A k as4ington post atuft writ.,
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ptes. ranking,.
In sc_ -- ne v_ .
-+-om the 8aneyesterday
The
' arrival of
ekin Liao Ho Shu
rge 'affair in,
demand for Envoy's
return Adds Strains
By Stanley, Karnow
washirston Post staff writer,
iONG,,1Sp G, Fe 7- ton has a.oided giving i
f
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or
7k ,O'f!Ne (1r1.1.
I& ZIC.-
~~N -~~p! vpP o~~P
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By William Perklm,.-.The Washington Yost
In The! Hague, was reported at the time to he'ad.the
Chinese spy network in Europe. His defection was
considered the West's most important intelligence coup in
years.
Moscow radio immediately dubbed him "Peking's James
Bond." Taiwan cabled Washington it would give him a
hero's welcome. Peking demanded his return, charging the
U.S. had kidnapped him.
When we refused, the Chinese canceled the upcoming
session of Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw,
our only official channel of communication at that time.
Secretary of State William P. Rogers expressed formal
diplomatic "regret," and that was the end of contacts until
January, 1970. The resumption eventually led first to
Henry Kissinger's and eventually to President Nixon's visit
a year ago to the-People's Republic of China.
Two months before that historic'trip', the White house
received a letter from Liao Ilo-shu. He wrote he could not
get used to the, t mer-ican way of life, had "made. .a mistake"
in defecting and asked permission to return to mainland
China. The letter was turned over to the State Department
for routine processing.
In May Liao was on his way home via the Chinese
Embassy in Ottawa, Paris and Shanghai. This time there
were no headlines. His departure remained unknown to the
public at large until January of this year when a succinct
wire dispatch from Hong Kong quoted a local magazine as
saying he had returned to the PRC. Ile disappeared behind
the Bamboo Curtain like a pebble in. a pond.
What happened to make the defector redefect? Did
Liao-an embarrassing reminder of the cold war-become
a sacrificial lamb on the Nixon-Mao altar of peace and
friendship? Was this man, the product of a totalitarian
society, unable to cope with the unregimented life in a
democracy?
Was he the pawn in the ideological match between
resident Chinese here dedicated to Taiwan and those
favoring the motherland? Or was he merely the casualty
of extended exile-deprived of family and meaningful
opportunity for career advancement, physically ill and
mentally unbalanced?
Is it possible he was a double agent-or was he, in fact,
no spy at all?
The following is an attempt to reconstruct the life
of one Chinese defector in the United States, from the time
he disappeared from the headlines until he reappeared
for one last brief instant.
Since Liao left no known diary, his story derives from
the comments of those few Americans and Chinese whose
paths lie crossed. Many of the former were reluctant to
talk, either because of their involvement with the CIA or
with mental hospitals and patients. Some of the latter gave
conflicting accounts, depending-one suspects-on their
own political loyalties. The CIA at first refused comment,
but later confirmed the essential elements of this portrait.
The story of intrigue and incipient insanity that is Liao
Ilo?shu's began in what is now Wuhan, a city in the central
province of Hupei, where he was born in 1923. Little is
known here of his formative years except that he studied
economics at the University of Peking, was assigned to the
See LIAO, K2, Col. 5
liately dubbed him 'Peking's . James Bond.' Taiwan cabled Washington it would give
the U.S. had hide lPd "For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0
PAG
 al Oliahoothe Cold:
LIAO, From KI outcry fueled the fires of suspicion K Street and a home in Vienna, Va.,
Foreign Ministry in 1981 and joined here that Liao was indeed the chief of signed the lease.
Chinese intelligence operations in Eu- When asked in an Interview about
the Communist Party two years later. rope. Liao and the apartment, he replied he
He married a pediatrician and had If Liao were not sent back, Peking had no knowledge of either. Still, he
two children. He, went to The Hague warned of "grave consequences." admitted it was possible his firm had
In 1964. Consistent with P.R.C. prat- These proved to be cancellation of the rented the apartment, following its
tice at that time, his wife and chil- Sino-American talks, which were custom, for out of town guests "at
dren, then aged 4 and 9, were not scheduled to resume Feb. 20 after be- times like the Cherry Blossom Festi.
allowed to accompany him. Liao re- ing suspended for 13 months. val."
mained there without returning home Peking accused Washington of A couple of days later, after check-
throughout the Cultural Revolution-
dors were summoned home for reedu-
cation.
In 1966 a sensational Incident occur-
red at a Chinese legation building in
The Hague. A visiting rocket techni-
cian, Hsu Tzu-tsai, was snatched from
a hospital X-ray table, where he had
been taken after either falling from a
window trying to defect or after foul
play. Liao later told the CIA he was
one of the kidnappers. A day later the
engineer died at the mission.
Peking's news agency said at the
time Hsu had passed Information to
the -Central Intelligence Agency in ex-
change for a promise of asylum. The
Netherlands demanded the recall of
the charge d'affaires, Li En-chiu and
another diplomat. Liao, who then be-
came charge and the highest ranking
Chinese diplomat left in Europe, later
learned his ex-colleagues were harshly
and even physically attacked by the
Red Guards when they returned to
China.
Red Guard diplomats soon were sent
to The Hague mission. The younger of.
ficials tried to take over his job, Liao
told the CIA, accusing him of being a
capitalist. "They told me it was bour-
geois to raise flowers, that I should
raise vegetables instead," Liao later re-
called.
. One day in late 1968 a Chinese ship
arrived in Rotterdam. When his revo-
lutionary colleagues suggested Liao
send his baggage to the ship, he sensed
he was about to be Shanghaied, the
intelligence sources say. Fearing the
same fate as his predecessors once
back in Peking, he turned himself in
to Dutch police headquarters on Jan.
24, 1969, at 4:30 - a.m., wearing only
pajamas and a raincoat.
Eluding the Chinese diplomats who
were trying to find Liao, Dutch secu-
rity officials turned him over to Amer-
ican authorities who promptly flew
him to this country. The first official
word that he had arrived here came on
Feb. 4 when State Department spokes-
man Robert McCloskey announced
that Liao's request for political asylum
in the United States was "under con-
sideration."
A few days later Peking's Foreign
Ministry charged the U.S. and the
Dutch governments with "deliber-
ately engineering" Liao's e s c a p e
and demanded the "traitor's" re-
turn. (This marked the first time since
the Korean war that the Chinese had
China incidents." goy. Though he had no record-of pay.
Of course, all was forgiven nearly a ment he thought he had sublet the
year later when the machinery was put apartment to Neagoy, whom he de-
In motion to end a quarter century of scribed as a one-time client for whom
isolation between the two super pow- he thought he had drawn up a will-
ers. Clearly the Liao affair was a dead Neagoy told him he needed the apart.
issue; the man Liao was not, however. ment for out-of-town relatives.
Though dubbed "Peking's James Neagoy, who lives in Chevy Chase, to
Bond" Liao certainly bore no physical an employee of the CIA.
or social resemblance to Ian Fleming's The two apartments adjoining 606
hero. Tall for a Chinese, he was thin, were at that time rented to a Soviet
balding, and wore horn-rimmed diplomat and a Defense Department
glasses. intelligence officer, causing a rental
"He was the least outgoing person agent for the Sherry Hall Apartments
I've ever known," recalled Dr. Michael to joke, "One-half of the building was
J. McCaskey, head of the Chinese-Japa- foreigners and the other half, the CIA
nese language department at George watching them."
town University. The two first met in Interrogation led the CIA, at least,
August 1969 when a government offi- to conclude that Liao was no master
cial brought Liao around to work as a spy, simply a middle echelon diplomat.
"casual laborer" ($1.80 an hour) on a It Is unresolved whether even so he
National Defense Language Institute was able to supply U.S. authorities
project to revise basic Chinese lan- with any worthwhile information.
guage courses for the military. Why then had some people thought
Liao's existence for those months be- he was a spy in the first place? For
fore he "surfaced" at the university in one thing, the climate of mutual suspi.
August, can be reconstructed only cion and hostility coupled with a
piecemeal. Ile almost never talked dearth of knowledge of events inside
about his first months in this country China sufficed to make the intelll-
and for a while even declined to let his gence community jump at anything
colleagues know where he was living. when defectors were as scarce as
(The university listed the department dragons' teeth. For another, a Chinese
of Chinese as his mailing address). He diplomat of lesser rank than Liao, who
went to elaborate pains to get off the defected from the embassy in Damas?
Wisconsin Avenue bus a few blocks cus in 1966, had told Washington that
away from his apartment. Peking was anxious to avoid becoming
Though he habitually refused offers directly entangled in the Vietnam war.
of a lift home, a driving rain once per- Of all those questioned about Liao,
suaded him to accept. Even then he in- not one in retrospect thought he could
sisted on getting out of the car before have been a master spy. "His general
reaching his -building and walked the indecisiveness made him unsuited for
rest of the way. positions of high command and his lit-
Come September he did list his ad- eral-minded openness made him un-
dress on university records as 2702 suited for political intrigue," com-
Wisconsin Ave., although he did not in- tnented one of his closest American ac-
clude the apartment number. The jani.- quaintances. Still, the idea that the
tor at the Sherry Hall apartments, CIA even suspected he was a high-
Willy Barnes, at first denied ever see- ranking agent, said a Chinese friend,
log the tall, lanky Chinese. Later, was one reason Liao disliked America.
when told Liao's apartment number, Having finished Its questioning, the
605, Barnes recalled the Chinese did U.S. government 'began the process of
indeed live in the one-bedroom unit- disengagement. The defector was
"although he would be gone sometimes given a monthly allowance, believed to
for as long as a month at a time." be $300, a permanent resident's visa, a
Three or four other men with their Social Security card and a job. .
own keys used the apartment as well Liao's job at Georgetown was to
by day, he said, though he knew only copy in long hand elementary Chinese
one of them. lessons, a monotonous, mechanical
Apartment 605 was rented from assignment he performed with much
April 1963 to January 1970 in the name grumbling. He made it obvious he con-
of
John F. Gionfriddo, thee n
me sidered this work beneath him yet
a
fi udiorTY fitc~o`,`S 1 l rt `bl ~e4r10004-0 See LIAO, K3, Col. I
l
 2702 Wisconsin Ave. NW
LIAO, From K2
declined to accept any more interest-
ing task.
"Ile wanted everything all at once,"
,'recalled Dr. McCaskey, "but didn't
know how to do anything. His knowl-
edge of economics was outdated. He
wanted to make a career for himself-
anything but diplomacy because he
was tired of governments. He kept
mentioning he had gone to talk to 'the
representative of the U.S. government'
(Neagoy) about a permanent job. But
nothing ever came of it."
find the CIA indeed led him to be-
lieve it would furnish him a good posi-,
tion as a reward for defection and in-
'~Iformatlon and then defaulted when he
proved uninteresting?
The CIA denied any "deal" with
Liao, but told him It was legally re-
' sponsible for his welfare while he was
an alien In the U.S.A.
"I believe he saw himself in the role
?,=--of Confucian sage, rejected by an em-
' "peror wiio has lost the Mandate of
Heaven," wrote Dr. D. Graham Stuarc,
'a Georgetown University professor of
,!'linguistics now on sabbatical in Hot-
'land.
At Dr. Stuart's urging Liao enrolled
ZIn September 1969 in the university's
''School of Languages and Linguistics
'as a candidate for an M.A. In Chinese.
,~'Ilowever, due to his poor command of
"English, Liao was unable to complete
4 the required courses in phonetics and
`phonemics given in that language. Ile
'tried the course at least twice more,
withdrawing each time after a few
weeks. Ile abandoned his effort finally
in February 1970.
Meanwhile he had enrolled the pre-
' Vlouli month in a 10-week,course in the
school's English as a Foreign Lan-
guage division, intermediate level, Ile
"received a ?B plus in the course, the
tained a certain arrogance about his
expectations.
His primary concern throughout that
period continued to be finding a good
job. This led him several times to the
brink of accepting employment offered
by the Nationalist Chinese. Besides
work, he was also seeking a new wife
.and asked Chinese acquaintances if
anyone in Taiwan would marry him
if he went there. "He was very lonely,"
said McCaskey, "although he never.
wanted to meet any women here."
From the moment he set foot in this.
country, the Taiwan government had.
tried to recruit him. In the Chinese
lexicon, a defector from Communism
is presumed friendly to the Chiang
Kai-shek regime. Ku' Cheng-kang-the
man in Taipei in charge of defectors,
or as he is officially titled, president
of the Free China Relief Association-
sent a cable to -the Chinese Embassy
in Washington inviting Liao to visit
Taiwan. Pressure was put on then-
Ambassador Chow Shu-kai, now Tai-
pei's Minister without Portfolio, 'to
influence Liao, who was open to the
idea.
Six months or so later, after the
CIA interrogation was over, Lino and
Chow finally met. The meeting was
arranged through Chiang Te-elreng, a
junior high school classmate of
Liao's and now assistant manager 'of
the (Nationalist) Chinese Information
Service in New York. Another college
friend of Liao's, a former Washington
correspondent for a Taiwan paper,
Wang Yu-hsu, now studying at George-
town, also tried to help Liao decide
whether to go to Taiwan.
According to them, Liao attended r t.
National Day reception and several
banquets at the embassy-where
Wang's wife works-and had "Intimate
and friendly conversations" with Am-
bassador Chow. Liao was offered a $500
a month "sweatshop" job with the
Chinese Merchants Association, a ship.
ping company in. New York's China-
town that Is owned by the Republic of
China.
One of the conditions was that he
would first have to visit Taiwan. Wang
prepared to accompany Liao to Taipei,
but at the last minute Liao balked.
This was to happen several times' until
the embarrassed Nationalists gave up
on luring Liao, intelligence sources
said.
The reasons for his refusal were
never clear. Once, for example, he de-
clined at the last moment to sign the
regulation Internal Revenue Service
form stating he, an alien, had paid his
taxes in full. Because the statement is
commonly known as a "sailing form"
Liao refused to sign, lest he be
"slopped" out instead of being sent by
plane. A week of explanation failed to
convince him.
Then, too, Liao must have known
that if he went to Taiwan, it would
fi 1
04 1
- w.-/ cit/ lei s
journalist in the Washington area, who
wrote under a pseudonym the article
on Liao for the Hong Kong magazine
North-South Pole, Ambassador Chow
gave Liao three guarantees in ex-
change for agreeing to visit Taiwan:
(1) he could return to the United
States of his own free will: (2) the Re-
public of China would support him
financially; and (3) they would not use
him as a propaganda tool.
Liu points out that Liao must have
been aware that two previous defec-
tors, famed violinist Ma Sitson and
diplomat Chen Pal, had also agreed to
such a deal. But when their plane ar-
rived in Tokyo airport, Taipei put out =
a statement on their behalf without
consulting them. I
And others say Liao, as usual, was
just unable to make a decision.
The half -way house
Chinese, or to his loneliness and ina-
bility to cope with a. strange environ-
ment, or to his ingrained habits as a
long-time Communist, Liao became ex-
tremely suspicious and distrustful of
everyone. He thought everyone worked
for the Chinese government-Ameri-
can, mainland or Taiwan-and seemed
a little disappointed to find out his
Georgetown colleagues were just ordi-
nary people, McCaskey said.
Once Liao received it piece of rQdical
student literature urging participlrtion
in a political demonstration. "I had the'
hardest time trying to convince him
the flyers were sent to all
(Georgetown) grad students; that they
didn't mean to single him out in par-
ticular," McCaskey reminisced.
Liao imagined colleagues joking
about hint. Ile was disturbed by police
sirens during his nights of insomnia. A
televised broadcast of July 4 fireworks
'only one lie ever finished. III April he rule out any remaining chance of re- sent him panic stricken into the street,
returned to his dull copying job, re- tturning to the mainland, hone and sure someone was shooting at him. lie
maining through September. lie re- fanily, iven the enmity between the hailed it taxi and drove around for
fused Approved-For September. ii JA RD 84itOO499R00100011000044veiu going to Dulles Airport
calling? himself unworthy of it, yet re- According to henry Liu, a Chinese with some vague idea of fleeing, be-
 fore he calmed down and returned
home at 3 a.m.
. Passionately secretive, he refused all
publicity. Ile continually looked over
his shoulder as he walked in the park,
convinced someone was following him.
Indeed, he was under surveillance, per-
haps out of humanitarian more than
political reasons. The CIA kept an eye
on Liao even after he moved from
Wisconsin Avenue to his own tiny
efficiency apartment at 1717 H St.
NW in early 1970.
Though he had made a few friends
in the American and Chinese commu-
nities early in the game, he began to
turn them away. "Don't bother me," he
shouted at colleagues who offered to
visit. Ile had only one regular Chinese
'male visitor, Wang, and, of course,
Neagoy.
In the past he occasionally went to
restaurants. Now he would accept invi-
tations to have a northern Chinese din-
ner-he disliked American food except
for milk-at friends' homes, and then
not show up. He preferred to eat out
of moldy cans, alone.
In the fall of 1970 Liao began to neg-
lect his appearance badly. He fancied
his food was poisoned. He became
emaciated, stooped,- his teeth abscessed,
and he refused to have a sty treated.
"It was almost like someone going
through a religious crisis,, doing pen-
ance by fasting and abstinence. By the
strictest ethical conduct, he distanced
himself from common men who are less
righteous, less literally truthful," a
Georgetown mentor concluded.
Alarmed he would let himself die of
starvation or would commit suicide,
Liao's CIA contact took him to a psy-
chiatrist. He was sent to the psychiat-
ric ward of the Washington Hospital
Center Nov. 18, 1970, and three weeks
later transferred to D.C. General's
ward;
The psychiatrist, who asked his
name not be used because of his con-
nection with the CIA, diagnosed "as se-
vere a case of depression as you would
want to see. I've seen a lot of schizoids
like that; they can't talk to people and
feel alone in a hostile world."
One sign of his illness, the doctor
said, was his refusal to doff his over-
coat while indoors.
The doctor was unable to find out
anything about Liao's past, but said it
was conceivable he had had such a
breakdown before.
In accordance with medico-legal pro-,
cedure, a hearing to commit him was
held Jan. 25, 1971. Many Chinese-:
American friends testified on Liao's
behalf. The -proceedings were dropped
when the patient was discharged Feb.
11 by doctors who found him "improv-
ed." Strangely enough, McCaskey re-
membered, that democratic process
persuaded Liao for the first time that
not everyone was involved in a conspi-
racy against him. lie even asked upon
there'until October of that year he re-
N mained generally uncommunicative
with the other residents. He did not
'like eating with them. And although
the kitchen is open 24 hours a day, he
did not feed himself either, because he
disdained a house rule requiring a per-
son to clean up after himself.
During that period he worked on
special projects for Georgetown's Dr.
Stuart. His task consisted largely of
running down references in scientific
journals on linguistics problems, al-
though he also did some independent
research.
"While 'working for me he gathered
more than 800 separate reference
items in six different languages from a
score or so different libraries," wrote
Dr. Stuart. "I paid him the going rate
for student help ... Although he rap-
idly made himself Indispensable to me
in my work, he was constantly suspi-
cious that I was really only making
work for him. He resigned saying that
he could not take money for doing
tasks that any 14-year-old boy could1
do."
The halfway house frowns on resi-
dents without jobs, and besides, Liao
was not happy there. Determined not
to accept what he considered charity,
Liao moved in October, 1971 to an $18-
a-week boarding house at 927 Massa-
chusetts Ave. NW, the edge of Wash-
ington's Chinatown. The grim old
brownstone, curtains hung between its
once magnificent dark woodwork doors
to give a (modicum of privacy, reeks of
stale food and downtrodden humanity.
Liao was so furtive, it was two months
before the CIA caught up with him
there. '
The managers, several generations
of the Lee Yew family, chatted excit-
edly when told about the exotic past of
their boarder. He never talked to any-
one, except to say hello to the chil-
dren, they said. His only visitor was
the director of the halfway house who
came twice.
He had no job, yet seemed to be do-
ing "some texts for an embassy" on his
battered typewriter. He went out every
afternoon for a walk. One day in May
he left without saylpg goodbye ... or
taking his meager belongings.
This marked the resolution of the
Liao story, the final phase of which be-
gan in December 1971. Ile was at
the bottom of a downward spiral, fore-
saken he thought by the U.S. govern-
ment and the Nationalist Chinese, al-
ienated from his few friends, unable to
get a decent job, separated without
news of his family in Peking, of no use
to anyone. His thoughts turned to
home.
That dark winter he composed a let.
ter to President Nixon. In it he ex-
pressed his gratitude, but said he just
could not get used to the American
way of life or learn enough English.
he know that if he went back he would
go on trial for treason. He also ex-
pressed - fear of dying jar from his
motherland. -
The letter was turned over to the
State Department which told Liao he
was free to return to China. "No one
tried to dissuade him," a spokesman
recalled. Still Liao hesitated. "He
seemed to be asking us to deport him.
He wanted us to contact the
(Communist) Chinese for him. We told
him to contact the embassy in Otta-
wa."
In February 1972 Liao wrote
to U.N. Ambassador Huang Ila in Now
York, signifying his desire to return.
Peking took its time deciding what to
do with the defector.who wanted to
come home. Finally, permission
granted, Liao flew to Ottawa in May,
then on to Shanghai. Stopping in Paris
en route, Liao penned post cards to
the boarding house family and a few
other friends, telling them he was on
his way to China.
. That was the first his acquaintances
here knew of his deci$ion to return-
and the last they ever heard of him.
"It was always in the back of my mind
he was playing a double game," Mc-
Caskey mused. "But if he did, it was
the most fantastic game I've ever
seen." There were no headlines in
either the Chinese or American press.
"We weren't going to publicize it,"
said the State Department official. "It
could have been misconstrued as a
deal whereby we forced him to go
back."
In the end Liao Ho-shu was a victim
of cultural shock in America as,well as
the Cultural Revolution In China.
His isolation left him mentally bro-
ken. His only sense of importance de-
rived from the attention paid him by
"the representative of the U.S. Govern-
ment." The irony of this is that-what-
ever the CIA first thought-Liao was
not the superspy of the headlines-
but in all likelihood a small fish left
stranded on the shoals of international
politics.
Liao went ~JJ d1 {r d1@t a 20Oi'l'0/U9'u1dIIA 19Pi84= 4 1 001000't~Ft eEI IT
on Conneeticu veuiie or c ise large( - tee ie ia( ninade a mistake iii c e ee -
psychiatric patients. 't'hough he lived lug and wanted to correct it although
927Il o.vsa(lt
u.etl.s Ave. Nlf"
 Approved For Release 20Q.1106109 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01 0001 I,V04-0
-Bundy T ells Ellsberg T rial '
Data Did Not Damage U.S.
By MARTIN ARNOLD
special to The New York Tlme,
LOS ANGELES, March 9-McGeorge Bundy, one of the
architects of America's Vietnam war policy, testified today
that disclosure of three of the documents in the Pentagon
papers case had not dama
ed' --- -
g
the national defense.
Testifying with apparent as-
surance, Mr. Bundy referred to
the documents as "the first cut
of history" and said that they
could best be understood that
way, "not as an intelligence
account."
Mr. Bundy served as special
assistant for national security,
affairs to Presidents Kennedy;
and Johnson and as such was
called by the defense as an
expert witness on three of the
19 "top secret-sensitive" docu-,
ments now Involved in this
trial.
He spoke first of eight pages
of a 4968 Joint Chiefs of Staff
memorandum, disclosure of
which theGovernment has con.
tended damaged' the United
States and could have been
helpful to Hanoi during thel
Vietnam war.
Questioned by Defense
Under examination by
'Charles R. Nesson, a defense
attorney, he was asked If
.either of those suppositions
was true, and to both he an-
swered, "I do not think so."
Mr. Bundy, who is now presi-
dent of the Ford Foundation,
gave three reasons for this.
One was that the most im-
portant part of the document,
a recommendation by the chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to send 206,000 more
troops to Vietnam, had become
common knowledge world-
wide two weeks after it was
written, initially in The New
in an article in The Times
"had ceased to be classified
Continued on Page 1U, Column 3
BUNDY SAYS DATA
DID NOT HURT U.S.
Continued From Page 1, Col. 6
two weeks after it was writ-
ten," he said.
The rest of the document,
he said, was merely "an argu-
ment to persuade the reader
that General [William C.] West-
moreland needed 206,000 more
troops, an argument of a case
that had less importance than
a regular intelligence report."
This information, he said,
had a "very short. life as a
secret; in the nature of things,
I
it was either overtaken, by
Staff at the time, and General
of the American troops In Viet-
Staff memorandum was con-
cerned, "those whose business
It was to judge whether infor-
mation was classified, long be-
fore October, 1969, had formal-
ly declassified the information"
sive version of the information
to be distributed in a Govern-
ment Printing Office publication
written by General Westmore-
land,
As for the two volumes of
the Pentagon papers, entitled
"Evolution of the War," which
he was called upon to testify
about, ha Said that although
they "touched upon military
questions,' they primarily con-
cerned military events," and
that the information in them
"would be known to the North
Vietnamese at a very great
speed.".
Furthermore, he said, the two
documents "lost importance
4 P%
I HS/IAC
- fo
xed or R $$9nA0t~0 i~
n%e
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 10, 197,
Manner Is Assured
Mr. Bundy gave his testi-
mony under direct examination
by Charles R. Nesson, a defense
lawyer, in a calm and assured
manner. He will be 53 years old,
at the end of this month. He is;
a slightly bald, plump man who
o
wears steel-rimmed eyeglasses
es
and who testified today in
a
two-button blue suit that bulged
somewhat at the middle.
At first, he spoke with his
hands clasped before him, but
later he leaned back in the wit-
ness chair and faced the jury,
ry,
somewhat like a lecturer in
a
classroom.
There had been some dis-
sension among defense aides
s
over calling Mr. Bundy because
e
some of them did not want to
o
associate their cause with
a
man they considered one of the
e
prime movers of America's war
policy in Vietnam.' And Mr.
Bundy, was at first somewhat
raluol ~4=~Q~99R00100~,~?1'0004-0
By Jfccd~ _dr~rler?GO~z
Ijlack ~e~yien>;rnbassy in Iihartourn to ~ the fedayecn t holly from any
commit their latest atrocitq? separate existence."
Apparently, the terrorists hint; Hussein, however, had
hoped to shock the world and intelligence reports of al-P'a-
embarrass the Saudis in the tab's involvement in the Slacl:
process by taking over thrir~ September attack upon ~Vafsi
emiaassy and executing t.llrcc
of their distinguished t;uc:sts,
irzclueling F.znericau hnzbassa-
dor Cleo Noel Jr. here is the
background from secret CIA
reports, which have been
shown to us:
1'he I31ack September move-
ment, named fo1? the month of
Scpternhcr, 1070, when Iiin?
Iltzssein sCaz?ted Ilia successful
drive to crush the Palestinians
'fell, These reports "inclieatecligeneral counsel of ITT, said
the Kin;* and his family were j that the alle~~ations in the
equally tarnets of Fatah assas-;coluzrul "are completely inaa
He asked King Faisal t:o
send a representative to Jor-
dan "to be informed in detail
curate and untl?ue."
"ITT never hired E. How-
ard Hunt or any so-called '11Iis-
siort Impossible team,' Thez?e
of the evidence of Fatah's in-his no link between ITT and
volvement." Faisal eountered~any of the Watergate defend-
by invii.in~ Ilussein to send. a ants, or break-ins of ttzo
rcpresezttativo to Saudi Ara- Chilean embassy or Chilean
in Jordan, began as the terror-~ Shanqutti was immediately
bia. Jordanian Ambassador diplomat's residences," Bate-
 ~~:. .J..A ~..: .: J. ~..~ J:J
Approved For Releas~001/06/09 : C~4~ftt~0499R00100~?1,10004-0
Fay Sanford .F. Ungar
Wnslxinttton Fost 61:aff Wr1LCr
LOS ANCaIs'LI:S, rilarch 8---
!tn analyst for the Central In-
telligence Agency charged
under oath today that there
had been "a definite attempt
on the part of the ;Tovernment
to prevent nxc from testifying"
as a xvitzxess in the Pentatott
Papers trial.
~,amucl A. ,Adams, wh.o was
suhpoenaccl to testify in de-
fcrise of llaniel )Jllsberg and
Anthony J. l:usso Jc., said
i.hat his su}>er?iors at tlxo CIA
"lied" t.o him in an effort to
dissuade him fl?otn appearinb
in-federal court here.
i~fter learninh of dc?t}in;;s
between lisle Jttst.ice Ltepart-
nxent prosecutors in this case
and an assistant Ctrl rieneral
counsel, Adanxs told the ,jury,
he came to the conclusion
that: "1 had begirt had."
'f.'he unusual testintonv zvas
the first inl;lint; the ;jury ltas
had of defense alle~~utious that
the prosecution in this case
has "sul)pressed" evidence and
the top-secret documents Which
they duplicated iu 19ti9 crou?
tamed falsified statistics on
t.lre "enemy order of batLlc."
~s a result of those stat.is-~
talking with Morton II. Hal-
perin, aformer Defense De-
partment ofi'icial who is a con-
sultant to the defense at.tor?
Heys here, that Adams learned
this infor?matiou was "inaccu-
witness.
U.S. Distz?ict Court Jud_te VI'.
Matt T3yr, ne Jr. prohibited A~l-
ams from discussitx:,r some as-
pects of the sit:uation--includ-
ing matters that have previous-
]y occurred in court out of the
presenne of the jttrp--but ad-
mitted the testimony oft th?-
nat?row iastte of whcth.er Ad-;
ams }s "biased or prejudiced"_
against either stele in the case.
'T'hat: Was the in-,pressiou
which clxief prosecutor David
It. itiissen sought to ;;ive dur-
inT; extended cross-cx.antina-
tion of Adams toda~~.
Nissen's questions were ap-
parr.ntly aimed at portraying
the intclliftence analyst as a-
rltt'onic complainar within tYtc
(;TA, wA?ho once accused top
military officials of bctt>~ in al
"concpir~tcy" to fabricate data
on Vict.n;tmcse Communist
troop stren;;ih.
;dams bas hold i}tat ~~iew
for several. yeses Harr, anct
U)at was the thrust of Iris
ors:rinaRlp~D~O~YrBO~t?Fmcrt?R~IL
her;,; slut Russo-t.Lat some of
the time, Adams testified,
they would have been "viri.u-
Tkxc prosecution has denied
'that it made any atteml)t to
suppress Adams' evidence,
turn the hands of a forcit;n ~ and Gt?caney-i^ an affidavit
nation's intelligence apps-~ submitted to the court two
rants.
When he first read neWS-
p;tpcr I'CportS Of tC:;tlrnony to
t.lxe i?ontrarv from a prosecu-
weeks ado--said the allegation
that he sou~~ht. to persuade
the CIr1. analyst not to testify
was `absolutely false."
lion witness, Lt, Geti. 'iZ'illiam i -\ciams has now boon on the
G, DePuc, Adams ttr~red his I v'itnesti stand for t1)rea days,'
supcrtors t:o s.ctxd internal Cla fat lon~~cr than originally
memoranda he hacl written on
the "order of battle" to the
Justice Department for trans-
mission to the court here.
'.!'he intelligence analyst felt
that he had evidence which
might tend to establish the
;i!?nocence of the defendants
-namely, that U.S. military
officials had itttcntionaily un-
derestimaied the opposing
forces }n Victaiam its order to
~ create "l:he impression that.
tYlerc was lihht at the end of
tliC t11nT1C1."
(~uestionecl by the jucl~.~e
this afternoon, Adams said
anumpated, and tlns has de-:
!laved the ttatimony o1.' i1lc-~.
Gcor~e I3undy, tivtto was na-~
Itional security adviser to thei
hate Presidents l~ennedy and'
Johnson and is now president
of tYte }~ ord h"oundat-ion.
IC was also revealed in cotn?t ~
today that the defense had
subpoenaed a recently retired ~
:1rmy colonel, Gaines lia~vk-
itis, of 1Pcst Yoint, ilTississippi,
1o cor?r?oboratc Adams' tests-~
moray on the alleged fabrica-
tion of the "order of battle" ~
but that. Hawkins on arrival
in Los .~neles had declined
to cooperate. with defense at?
torneys and bad been dis-
~hc was "advised by assistants missed from the subpoena.
CI.~ Gc~ncral Counsel John
IL. Grearxcy ghat his went-~
rands had been submitted to
the court, only to learn later
that. they had not at the lime
actually been turned over to
the ,jud,(c.
Greanev told Adtuns in a
written mcnxo on I' gib. 9 that,
~ aecordin~; to a message trans-.
nutted from \isscn throul;h
the Justice I)eparhnent, tttc
~ jucl~;c had decided the rna-~
iterial Was not- "esculpr;arle C. Wheeler, iduct will be dealt with in a
then _Chairman of the Jointltvay other than just a wax'n?
Chiefs of Staff, assessing the ing," ! ,
WASHI~;GTOi1 POST
deciding who should bey in-
No Communist units was en-
added "the people" to .Adams'
chart of the components in the
Vietnamese Communist
"This case is not bein
t
ied
HS/HC-/lA~r ved For Release 2001/06/09 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000110004-0
 Approved For Release~pb1/06/09 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000004-0
~ ~ ~$ Wednesday,Marc>