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March 15, 1973
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Approved For Releas 01/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 R00100ii,1e10004-0 ALEXANDRIA, VA. GAZETTAAR 15 1973 E -- 16,840 Capital Fare uIgHe By Andrew Tully The McNaught Syndicate Inc. WASHINGTON - Testimony by a Centel Intl ' e c Agen- sy analyst thaf If miT~cary officials in Vietnam lied to the public about the strength of Communist forces during the late 1960s rang a bell at this desk because I have some knowledge if not expertise on the subject. That is to say, I suggested pretty much the same things in a rather exhaustively research- ed book, "The Super Spies," in 1969 -? and suffered (savored?) the wrath of the establishment for my pains. ;i?ue~ Adams,,-a defense witness in tie Pentagon papers trial of Daniel Ellsberg and An- thony J. Russo, testified that in 1968 when Communist forces were increasing in Vietnam, of- ficial U. S. estimates released to the public were going down. This, said Adams, was done by "removing components" from the enemy's order of battle "to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was." Adams implied that Gen. Earle E. Wheeler, then chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. William C. Westmore- land then commander in Viet- nam, were involved in the falsi- fications, which he described as "a result of political pressures HS/HC- q4'o rdTthat I don't know about that. But, as my book relates, in late 1967 and early 1968 almost every scrap of field intelligence was perdicting a major Red offen- sive in late January of '68. This intelligence, of course, was veri- fied by the Communists' terri- fying Tet offensive of January- March. Intelligence even correctly named, the date the offensive would he launched - Jan. 30. A captured enemy document stated, that a "general offensive early in 1968" would "empha- size attacks on enemy key units, cities and towns and lines of communication." Throughout December 1967, and the first weeks of January 1968, Communist documents were captured in bales. They verified reports of native spies that Viet Cong agents and even soldiers in North Vietnamese uniforms were circulating open- ly in several cities, spreading the promise of "liberation." Again and again, these agents predicted that "the end" could come on Jan. 30. Ila! At just about that time, General Westmoreland and Am- bassador Ellsworth Bunker, our Saigon man, were in Washing- ton radiating optimism for the edification of Congress and the stateside press. Neither of them mentioned the Communist build- up or Jan. 30. What they told Congress and Washington newsmen was that the United States was winning the war, that it was steadily wearing down the enemy. They noted the decrease in the rate of infiltration of troops from Hanoi from a peak of 14,000 men in June 1966, to 5,000-6,000 a month. They said soldiers were deserting in increasing numbers from the Viet Cong, that supplies to the VC by sea had been seriously interrupted. Indeed, Westmoreland predict- ed that the enemy mostly would use the coming truce during the Tet holidays to build up and resupply his forces. He was pre- occupied with the 40,000 enemy troops reportedly massed around the Marine strongpoint and Khen Sanh, and said everything pointed to a major battle there, with diversionary attacks in other areas. Well, the reader knows what happened - we almost lost the war during the Tet unpleasant- ness. Maybe the setback couldn't have been avoided, al- though I for one won't buy that argument. However, that isn't the point. Samuel Adams, whose job was to analyze intelligence during the Vietsain war, has confirmed that the P,,ilitary and the White House lip to the people. What effect his testimony will have on the E ll'sberg-Russo case is irrelevant in a broader context.- Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 WW yoix TIMES Approved For Releasv.2001/06/09 **. CIA-RDP84-00499ROO10OW0004-0 2 5 MAR 1973 U.S. and Libya Trouble Again Over The `Flint' WASHINGTON-Periodically, over the last 20 years or so, the United States has become involved in inter- national incidents arising out of the "elint"-electronic intelligence - mis- sions that are performed by American reconnaissance ships and planes along the coasts and borders of other coun- tries. There were the aircraft shot down by the Soviet Union in the 1950's. In the 1960's there were the American destroyers that got involved with North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, the U.S.S. Liberty, attacked by Israel, and the Pueblo, captured by North Korea. In 1.969 there was the EC-121 that was shot down by North Korea, presenting the Nixon Adminis- tration with its first foreign-policy LADfVQd] crisis. Last week the United States was caught up in an incident with Libya, under circumstances that are still not clear except that they involved a United States Air Force C-130 on a reconnaissance swing over the eastern Mediterranean. The State Department announced that two Libyan Mirage fighters had intercepted and fired upon an unarmed C-130 82 miles off the Libyan coast. The plane and its crew returned un- harmed to a base near Athens. The United States protested to Libya against this "provocative" attack. The State Department stressed that the plane was always over interna- tional waters and had never ap- proached closer than 75 miles to Libya, which claims a 12-mile boundary on its territorial waters. Beyond that, the official account remained fuzzy. But Government sources privately admit- ted that the C-130 was on an electron- ic intelligence mission to monitor radio communications and radar frequencies. Whether the C-130 was snooping on Libyan and Egyptian installations or monitoring Soviet naval units in the area was left unclear. It was also un- clear whether the aircraft was on a course headed for the Libyan coast at the time it was intercepted. But information leaked at the Pentagon suggested that the shooting might not have been completely unprovoked- at least from the Libyan viewpoint. The Libyan fighters, it appeared; had given the internationally recog- nized signals to the camouflaged trans- port to "follow me," and it was only after, the C-130 took evasive action -=ducking into a cloud formation- that the fighters, on orders from a control tower in Tripoli, opened fire. It was also acknowledged by Amer- ican officials that Libya last year hed declared a "restricted air zone" stretching out 100 miles from Tripoli -a zone the United States told Lib- ya it would not recognize, since it contravened the 1944 Chicago air con- vention to which Libya is a signatory. Perhaps there was another aspect to the incident. In the emotional and vengeful atmosphere of the Middle East there might have been some relationship between the Libyans' trigger-happy state and Israel's down- ing of a Libyan airliner over the Sinai last month. The Libyan Gov- ernment, one of the most radical in the Arab world, regards the United Sates as Israel's close ally. --JOHN W. FINNEY Approved For Release001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499ROO10GO10004-0 DETROIT, MICH. FREE PRESS - 530,264 -- 578,254 MAR 2 (' 103 Too Mucfl Th i, ~ .Junked? CIA Housecle'aninfle Prompts itest from the Old Pros placed in charge of co- Braden ordinating the effort of what is called the in- telligence community, as distinct from ag- ency. On paper, the "coin munity" means all the departments and agencies which have anything to do with gathering foreign infor- mation. In practice, it means the Department of Defense, which spends the biggest share of the $5 billion the taxpayers put out each year for intelligence. To replace Tweedy, Schlesinger installed Maj. Gen. Daniel Graham. CIA veterans shuddered. To put a general in charge of rid- ing herd on the Defense Department seemed to them to he destructive of the President's purposes and of civilian control. Is a general likely to say "no" to generals who are senior to him or on whose goodwill his promotion may one day depend'? , Next Schlesinger b e g a n lopping heads among the CIA's seniors who compile the na- very quickly, and it is not. surprising that a number of. knowledge- able observers think he moved too quickly and are afraid he will con- tinue to do so. Schlesinger's f i r s t trove was to fire Bron- son Tweedy, a veteran who had been recently between a valuable asset and junk, The director moved BY TOM BRADEN WASHINGTON - A house ought to be cleaned after 27 years, which is why Presi- dent Nixon's appointment of James R. Schles- inger to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency was greeted by veterans of the agency as a wise move. Schlesinger has a reputation as a housecleaner and the house of the CIA has not been cleaned since it was built in 1947. But the same people who greeted hcs ap- pointment as a good one because they thought a. housecleaning; was essential are now saying that Schlesinger doesn't know the difference tional estimate -- the assessements of capa-. bilities and intentions of other nations. Presi- dent Nixon is said to think the estimates are wishy-washy, that there is no point in read- ing long papers which add up to "on the one hand and on the other hand." CIA veterans are afraid Schlesinger will de- stroy the objectivity of the estimates. There is always the danger that an intelligence agency will tell a President what its senior officials think a President wants to hear. Finally, Schlesinger has made it clear dur- ing his first meeting with the CIAs' top offi- cials that "a lot of heads will roll." The same senior officials are afraid that his next move will be to start chopping the clandes- tine services. They have been a long time in building and would take long to build again. No doubt there is deadwood here. A number of professionals have always questioned why the agency had people undercover in coun- tries nobody has inquired about for years. The answer has always been that you never could tell when you would want information which only a man on the spot could provide. It's difficult to know how to judge the accu- sations now being made against Schlesinger by people who have served much longer in the field than he. Those who have lived for a long time in a house usually hate to go through a housecleaning. Everything gets moved around and for a time, at least, seems uncomfortable and wrong. Moreover, it is natural for them to complain that the new director i`7 behaving in a brusque and rude manner. When a favorite chair is taken from its accustomed place, its users often complain that it was taken rudely and without sufficient warning. In short, Schlesinger may he on the right track despite the sounds of alarm which are coming from those who bloat the agency and care a great deal whether it is effective. But there is a danger in ~iouseclcaning. 'T'hose old vases stored in the basement could be Ming. A wise housecleaner will seek expert advice before consigning them to the trash. HS/HC- 9SO I p~*oved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 Approved For Release%3001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01OO'Q 0004-0 CHICAGO, ILL. TRIBUNE M - 767,793 S - 1,016,275 MAR 2 9 1973 I. T. T. and Chile Officials of International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., a large conglom- erate, have stated in testimony before a Senate subcommittee that the corpora- tion proposed thru the Central Intel- ligence Agency that $1 million of its funds be used to head off the ascension of Marxist Salvador Allende as presi- dent of Chile in 1970. The corporation had assets of $165 million in the country, consisting main- ly of I. 70 per cent ownership in the Chilean telephone system. One of its vice presidents, William R. Merriam, said. that.-I. T. T. feared that an Allende regime would "steal" its properties. The fear was warranted. President Al- lende subsequently nationalized I. T. T. holdings and the properties of American copper companies without compensation. John A. McCune, former director of the C. I. A., now a director of I. T. T., discussed with CIA officials a plan to unite the two cippusiton parties against .Allende's assumption of power. The C. I. A.' failed to act and Mr. McCone said that Dr. Henry Kissinger, Presi- dential adviser on foreign relations, whom he also approached, did not re- ply to his proposals. I. T. T. has been a favorite whipping boy for Senate Democratic "liberals" ever since the Justice Department, be- fore last year's Presidential election, settled an antitrust action against the corporation. 1. T. T. at the time propos- ed making a substantial contribution to the Republican National Convention ,,when it was originally scheduled for San Diego, where the corporation owned a hotel. An I. T. T. Washington lobbyist, Dita Beard, in a memorandum which came into possession of the Senate, made sweeping claims about her agency in reaching the settlement which put her employer in a questionable light and sought to imply that the Nixon admin- istration had been bought off. If it were not for this checkered back- ground, the Senate critics would have had less reason to indulge in the present field clay over the attempted interven- tion in Chile. After all, it has tradition- ally been regarded as a responsibility of the federal government to protect American lives and property abroad. In the past, stern measures have been tak- en to carry out that responsibility. Businessmen therefore have a proper right to make approaches to the gov- earnmentin defense of their interests. We wouldn't say I. T. T. has taken the most intelligent approach in asserting this right; but it is only fair to re- member that I. T. T. and the govern-,.R ment might not have been led to invite the present suspicion of secret conspi- racy if earlier governments had not conditioned the world to think that American business interests can be kicked around with impunity. And the same people who encouraged this atti- tude in the past. are in general the ones who now think they can tar I. T. T. and the administration and make political hay all at the same time. -.'`' pproved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 Approved For Releas%,~001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499 ROO1OeW 0004-0 I,VILMLivu TON, DEL., JOURNAL E - 89,875 M. ) .i.1 , ~. r r ITTIS Million and Chile Chile does not have much going for itself these days, except the Senate hearings on IT`1' in Washington. Senior officials of the ITT are testify- Ing in a glare of publicity, perforce spilling unpleasant truths and making fools of themselves by trying to make fools of their interrogators. ITT had holdings of about $15) million in Chile before the election of Marxist President Salvador Allende, and all evidence indi- cates very strongly that ITT first sought to ward off Dr. Allende's e?lcc- 'tion and then, when he was elected, to create economic chaos in Chile. ITT, it seems, had the support of at least some people in the Central Intel- I i g e n c e Agency, but its various proposals to deal with the "situation" in Chile, even though carried to the level of at least Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's foreign policy adviser, were given some consideration and then ap- parently rejected. That should be little cause for satisfaction, however. Of more concern should be the fact that the ITT people had the gall to carry such proposals to such a level and were able to get some consideration. On the matter of what the offer of a million dollars by the ITT to the U.S. government was supposed to achieve, the corporation is advancing the novel idea that the money was to be used for "constructive" purposes. John A. Me- Cone, former CI.uieL and now a. director of IT , compared his corpora- tion's million-dollar offer to the U.S. government's aid programs for Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the Berlin Airlift. "International Commun- ism," he declared, "has said time and again that its objective is the destruc- tion of the free world, economically, politically and mrrilitarily." Yet the same ITT is negotiating with The Soviet Union for expanding its busi- ness there. The fact of the matter is that ITT was concerned with its proper- ty and profits, not with ideology, and it attempted to confuse its corporate in- terest with the national interest, doing considerable damage to the latter in the whole ignoble process. IN J HS/HC-9 .0 Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 Hl AGO, eas' d~Tb6/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0010G+`10004-0 MEWS E - 434,849 MAR 2 1973 tt1on to block CIA official By William J. Eaton Of Our Washington Bureau WASHINGTON.- The Cen- tral Intelligence Agency once proposed action by American companies to create economic chaos in Chile to block the the presidency, a top CIA man election of Salvador Allende to has testified. William V. Broe, director of CIA's clandestine services for the Western Hemisphere, said he made the suggestion late in September, 1970, to Edward J. (Ned) Gerrity, senior vice president of International Tele- phone and Telegraph Corp. Gerrity had testified earlier that he rejected the plan as impractical. A transcript of Brce's testi- mony, cleared by the CIA, was made public late Wednesday by a Senate subcommittee on multinational corporations. It was the first known congres- sional testimony by a CIA agent about a secret operation. BROE SAID that at one time ITT president Harold S. Gen- een had offered the CIA a "substantial" fluid to help Al- lende's leading opponent in Chile. Broe said he turned down that offer. ITT executives feared that Allende, a IvIarxist, would na- tionalize the ITT-owned Chi- lean telephone company if he became president. He won the election in the Chilean Con- gress and has moved to take over the ITT-owned company. B roe, who said he acted with the approval of former CIA Di- rector Richard Helms, testi- fied that he gave Gerrity a list of U.S. companies operating in Chile as possible participants in the economic warfare. THE CIA plan was presented five days after Allende had been the top vote-getter in the popular election but still re- quired approval from a major- ity of the Chilean Congress. "There was a thesis that ad- ditional deterioration in the economic situation could in- fluence a number of Christian Democratic congressmen who were planning to vote for Al- lende," Broe said. Among other steps, Broe said, he. mentioned the possi- bility of banks not renewing credits in Chile, delays in spending by American-owned companies and delays in deliv- eries, withdrawal ctF technical help and pressure to shut the doors of savings and loan asso- ciations. CIA and a director for ITT, re- layed through Helms to Broe, the agent testified. HERE'S AN excerpt from the transcript: Sen. Frank Church D-Ida.): Did Mr. Geneen say to you that he was willing to as- semble an election fund for one of the Chilean presidential candidates, Mr. Jorge E. Ales- sandri? Broe: Yes, he did. Church: Did you explain to Mr. Geneen why the CIA could not accept such a fund? Broe: I told him we could not absorb the funds and serve as a funding channel. I also told him that the J.S. govern- was not supporting any ment candidate in the Chilean elec- tion. Church: During the dis- cussion did Mr. Geneen at any time indicate that the fund ... was intended for constructive use, technical assistance to ag- riculture,thebuilding of houses or anything of that character? Broe: No, it was to support Jorge Alessandri. , Other ITT executives have said the ITT had offered to put up $1 million for social pro-i grams, housing and technical aid to influence the outcome of the Chilean elections. Geneen has been summoned to testify Monday. RI G.ZIMING the li:;t of U.S. companies, Broe said he told Gerrity that "these were cone- panies that could contribute, providing the economic course Was fe..sih,e... . Broe said he iret with Gen- oil July 1(3, 1970, before Al- lende's victory in the popular vote. The meeting., was held at the sU gestioa of John proved For Release 2001/Q6109no,e RDP+84+00f488R001000110004-0 HS/HC- . to change fa- s. enough. The Nixon-Schlesinger forrnu }a may be no more than a long over' .rue attempt to modernize it. Bu that', what it is, both the intellit? community and the public ou g. be Laken into confidence by tc ern,nent to the fullest extent p- So far, they have heard. little ,pore than meaningless assurances anti in- nuendo. 0 ,1973, Victor Zorr fro ed For Release 2001/06/09 CIA-RDP84-00499R001000110004-0 1 8/H' - +l P 1 Approved For Release 200406/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO0100011 G W4-0 ~,-,91' rw-d? J J' ?',ark 7744 I?t A9 y , 3. x m +4rec,f TT Cal s Fund was forAi By JEREMIAII O'LEARY tional Telephone & Telegraph Chairman. Frank Church, Star-News staff wruer Corp. had offered to supply $1 . D-Idaho, said, "we 'can't find A senior ITT executive said 'million to block Allende's elec- any plan for technical assist- today that his corporation's tion was when McCone, now ance or housing in the ITT 1970 offer of $1 million for use an ITT director, disclosed it documents we "have." in Chile was intended to dem Yesterday: Gerrity replied, "in spite of onstrate to Marxist presiden- Sen. Charles Percy, R-Ill., a all discussions, no action was tial candidate Salvadore Al- member of the Senate subcom- ever taken against Allende." lende that ITT had confidence mittee on multinational corpo- Sen. Clifford Case, R-N.J., in Chile and wanted to stay rations, said "the implausabil- asked, "this milliop dollars there. ity of this story bothers us. It was not intended to be disrup- The testimony before a Sen- doesn't hold together that ITT tive but only to make Allende ate subcommittee by Edward was trying to work with Al- happy about the American Gerrity, vice president for cor- lende. It's unbelievable that presence?" porate r e l a t i o n s , differed ITT would propose supplying Gerrity said that ITT offi- sharply from what former CIA this fund for the development cials told the State Depart-. director John McCone told the of Chile to the CIA instead of anent and presidential national' committee yesterday. the State Department." security adviser Henry A. Kis- Gerrity said that the first Gerrity's t e s t i in o n y ap- singer that they would partici- time he had heard the Interna- peared to be in direct contra- pate with other companies in .._ _._n ...... diction to McCone's account of the $1 million offer. Giving his version of the $1 million ITT fund, Gerrity said "it was plain (in the fall of 1970) that Allende was going to be elected. I discussed this with ITT President Harold S. Geneen and we considered the chances were 90 to 10 that Al- lende would expropriate our Chilean properties. "Geneen told me that per- haps ITT could demonstrate to Allende that the company had confidence in Chile and he said we ought to go to the State Department to see if there was any plan for private in- dustry to reassure Allende. "The idea was to get togeth- er with a group of other com- panies and to help the Chilean 6 HS/HC- fro economy and reaffirm our confidence with some projects like low-cost housing, farming and other joint ventures. We said that the" State Depart-. ment came up with something along these lines we would put forward a figure of about Bev- en figures," Gerrity said. such a development plan "un- der your aegis" but he said "we never got a response and decided the U.S. government was not interested." Gerrity testified he had only met CIA Latin American chief William B. Broe once and that the CIA official made sugges- tions to him'-that banks should not renew credits to Chile, that companies should delay shipments there, that pressure be brought on companies to close down and that the United States should withdraw all technical assistance. Church said these sugges. tions sounded to him as if they See CHILE, Page A-8 Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : GIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 Approved For Relile i.) IA bP A"00110004-0 Wdfor Aid to Allende'. that he did not go into any ' expropropriate us and we have Continued From Page A-1 ers," on the Chilean situation were intended to create eco- but that all their recommenda- nomic problems in Chile. tions were funneled to ITT de- Gerrity agreed and said Broe cision-makers. told him that money was not a Gerrity said that in October problem. 1;070, between the popular elec- "I never heard of that $1 tion and Allende. 's run-off vic- million and its intended use tory in Congress; ITT tried to until I heard Mr. McCone yes- pin down the State Depart- terday. I had a different.un- ment on its attitude. derstanding of what it would "We wanted State to put in ; be used for. It is not my infor- writing its attitude toward mation that any was made Chile," Gerrity testified. "I available" for economic dis- wanted their views on what ruption in Chile. would happen in Chile and Gerrity said he did not think what they would do if we were Broe's ideas were very good at all and that he didn't see how expropriated." ITT could induce other compa- He said there were many nies to follow Broe's sug- proposals made in staff papers gested plan because "it would about reducing the U.S. diplo- be self-defeating to induce eco- matic presence and other eco- nomic chaos in Chile." nomic measures but said these. Gerrity further testified that were, not adopted and were Geneen agreed that the Broe only staff papers that are plans were not. workable but common in business practice. suggested the CIA agent be "I have heard that the Unit- handled carefully. ed States has contingency "Geneen said to me it plans for the invasion of Cana- doesn't make sense," Gerrity da," Gerrity told the subcom- testified. "We didn't want any mittee, "but that doesn't mean part of it." we're going to do it." The senators pointed out an. He acknowledged that Ge- other conflict in testimony' necn met on Aug. 4 with therm when Gerrity said Jack Neal, ? Atty. Gen. John Mitchell but a former diplomat and direr- understood the conversation tor of ITT international rela- was about antitrust policy not Ge- tions here, had been sent to Chile, n and also said that Washington inform two U.S. officials of the, nee company proposal to apply $1 chief William Merriam had million to technical assistance met with White House aides projects in Chile. Charles Colson and John Ehr- Gerrity said Neal was sent lichman but that once again the discussion was about anti- to discuss this with former As- trust matters, not Chilean af- sistant Secretary of State for fairs. Inter-American Affairs "We'd still like to work out Charles A. Meyer and Viron P. some kind of arrangement Vaky, then Latin American with Allende that would be fair specialist on the Kissinger to Chile and to us," Gerrity staff. said. "But frankly, we pre- Church told Gerrity that ferred that Allende not be Neal testified earlier this week elected. He was elected, he did indicated it may reran lreai w explore the inconsistency be- tween his testimony and Gerri- ty's. Sen. Edward Muskie, D-Maine, told Gerrity that even if the $1 million was for social or constructive purposes { it might be regarded as an act e'? of political intervention. Asked about recommenda- tions made by ITT operatives Hal Hendrix and Robert Ber- rellez from Santiago on possi- ble means of stopping Al lende's election, Qerrity said their a was to report, to Approved For Relpg 1/(I EIAmc RC)P84-004998001000110004?Q Approved For Release 20006/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110,Q4-0 By Margaret Thomas-The Washington Post ITT's Merriam: "I had no notion he (a CIA operative) wag clandestine." ES/HC- I eke Wednesday, A1&r`21,1973 THE WASHINGTON POST S y' CIA M- an ff]; ia a s Aiiti-Allende Plans By Laurence SternWashfn?ton Post Staff Writer A top Central Intelligence Agency operative "approved" by the International Tel- ophofte and Telegraph Corp. Intended to block the election President Salvador Allende Chile in 1970, an ITT offi told senators yesterday. Services-to discuss anti Al- lende strategy. Broe specifically He said assent to an ITT plan gave his to subsidize ze an anti-Allende in an effort to pro- newspaper mote political opposition to the e Marxist candidate in the 1070 election. on. In a morning of halting tes- timony timony punctuated by fre- president and former chief Washington representative for ITT, acknowledged that he and other excrutives of the Corporation nict repeatedly riam gave the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations a general picture of close liason between ITT and the CIA with the CIA executive- -WiI-I'I--throughout 1970 and 1971' ro ddnFir ReleaWee2O61YU61109 :i'l A5FR1iML(9fl499R00F11 a1>iet'ro t }fief of t'l?iluie; t.inc by Sen. Frank Cwart h (1) Idaho), Is negotiating with the CIA for Broe's testimony in order to determine to what ex- tent he was carrying out theI agency's policy in his dealings with ITT and other American Companies. At one point Merriam refer- red to Broe as "our man" in the agency. The CIA official, who held the equivalent of a' GS-18 Civil Service rank, was in charge of all covert intelli- gence programs in Latin America and reportedly sat in on top-level National Security Council uwcl.ings dcalinc with hisre?io=. od1 i~bb0`'`-`O lircn lr? I 'l T, 1 t`el, :t Approved For Relea 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499RO018W110004-0 ITT, From Al red to another job in the agency. The CIA is understood to have refused to permit him to testify publicly in the pro- ceeding. Merriam said he was intro- duced to Broe, by ITT's board chairman and chief operating officer, Harold S. Geneen, at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel on the night of July 16, 1970. Gen- een "told me to stay in touch with Mr. Broc," Merriam said. Merriam testified he was unaware of ]3roe's role in the when and if Allende Is elect-, ed." In the memo Merriam reported Broes assertion that all sources of U.S. monetary aid to Chile would be cut off "as soon as expropriations take place. Pressed by members of the Senate panel on the sources of Broe's Intelligence, Merriam replied that "I believe as a member of the CIA, he (Bros) had periodic meetings with the White House staff." At one point Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) incredulously asked Merriam why the CIA should ask ITT to pressure the White House on Chilean pol- icy matters. Sen. Stuart Symington (D- Mo.) observed that "the CIA reports only to the President." . And apparently to Mr. Merriam," Case snapped. . Merriam was transferred to 'Rome after the surfacing. of the ITT papers and now spe- cializes in international trade matters. He said that Broc used to send a special messen. ger to pick up ITT's own field intelligence reports, and that Broe regarded the ITT data from Chile as highly as any in- telligence reports from other sources. In February, 1971, ITT took a leading part in an effort by American business Interests in Chile ' to put pressure on the Allende government against expropriation of their hold- ings. , The subcommittee made pub- lic an internal memo by Bank of America's Washington rep- resentative, Ronald R. Rad- datz. It described a meeting in Merriam's office on Feb. 9, 1971, attended by repr.'esenta- tives of five other U.S. com- panies doing business in Chile: Anaconda, Kennecott, W. R. CIA's covert wing, which oper- ates under, the Deputy Direc- tor for Plans. "I had no notion he was clandestine," the' ITT official testified. "We had lunches in places where 300 or 400 people were present," he added to a roar of laughter from the com- mittee room. On one occasion, Merriam testified, .Broe told him the CIA had contacted a group of American businesses in hopes of applying anti-Allende politi- cal 'pressure through con- certed economic action. In an Oct. 7, 1970 memo to Edward Gerrity Jr., ITT's sen- ior vice president for corpo- rate relations, Merriam rela- ted that Broe had told him "repeated calls to firms. such as GM, Ford and banks in Cal- ifornia and New 'York have 'drawn no offers of help. All have some sort of excuse.", The memo was one in a series made public last year. by col- umnist Jack Anderson. Asked by subcommittee members who ' made the "repeated calls," Merriam said Broe told him it was the agency. Merriam further confirmed that-on the strength of in- formation from Broe-he had advised ITT board member and former CIA Director John McCone on Oct. 9, 1970 that t1le Nixon administration "will take a very, very hard line Grace, Pfizer Chemical and Ralston Purina. "The thrust of the meeting," the memo related, ,was toward the application of pressure on the government wherever pos- sible to make it clear that a Chilean takeover would not be tolerated without serious rep- ercussions following. "ITT believes that the place to apply pressure is through the office of Iiemy Kissinger. They feel that this office and the CIA are handling the Chile: pr. oblem," Raddatz reported to his superiors. ' Merriam described the meetings of an ad hoe com- mittee "a v e r y informal group." He a c k nowledged, however, that the Allende government had indicated at the time that it was prepared to bargain in good faith for compensation on the seizure of ITd"s Chilean Telephone Co. Speaking of the companies in the "ad hoc group," Church said "if I ever found out that those companies were meet- ing concerning an election of mine, 1'd be concerned." The ITT testimony and sup-I porting documents show that! the anti-Allende campaign was most intense between the Sept. 4, 1970 popular election, and the final congressional runoff Oct. 24. Allende had to contend in the runoff because he failed to win a clean ma- jority in the popular election. During the interim period two ITT field operatives, Harold Hendrix and Robert Berrellez, recommended pur- chase of advertising by U.S. firms in the anti-Allende Mercurio chain of newspapers and the hiring of "propagan- dists" in radio and television to support Allende's opposi-; tion. The object of the campaign' was to restore Christian Dem- ocrat Eduardo Frei Montalvo, regarded by ITT as friendly to its interests, to the presi- deny through a series of po- litical maneuvers. These pro- posals had been reviewed by Broc,' according to Merriam's testimony. Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00100011,0004-0 Approved For Relefise.2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00100c10004-0 In a press release issued at the start of yesterday's open- ing hearing, ITT said it had never taken any improper ac- tions in Chile. "It is ITT's opinion that it is perfectly proper to appeal to the gov- ernment to protect against un- lawful expropriation and that the government is justified in taking requests of this kind into account so it may formu- late appropriate national pol- icy," the company said, Under questioning by the subcommittee, Merriam ac- knowledged setting upa meet- ing in September, 1971 be- tween Goneen and then-White House. adviser on interna- Ian, Prohe T 01 Peterson. After the session Merriam sent Peterson an 18- point ITT draft program de- signed "to see that Allende does not get through the cru- cial next six months." It included such measures as cutting off private lines of credit to Chile, subsidizing the anti-Allende press and. discussing "with CIA how it can- assist the six-month squeeze." Although credit re- strictions were imposed on Chile by the Export-Import and 'Inter-American Develop- ment Banks, there is no evi- dence that the Nixon admin. gram submitted to Peterson. Merriam also acknowledged. that former Treasury Secre- tary John Connally set up an. other meeting between Ge. neon and Peterson in April, 1971, to discuss ITT's anti. trust differences with the Ju-% Lice Department, which want. ed the company to divest the $2 billion Hartford Fire In- surance Co. The Connally intercession was first disclosed last week. end with the release of 6ecur. ities and Exchange Commis sion internal working papers by the House Commerce Com- mittee. Approved For Release 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000110004-0 Approved For Release-Q001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 ROO100Q0004-0 xs~azc= qx'v '7'HE~NEW YORK TINE S,WEDNESDAY MARCH 21,1973'.' C.I.A. Cutting Personnel Lii A ency's'Biggest Layoff 1,000 Posts to Be Abolished By SEYMOUR M. IHERSII Speciel to The New York Times WASHINGTON, March 20- Jollies It Schlesinger, tho' new Director of Crntrnl Intelligence, has begun the largest person- nel cutback in the history' of the agency. Unofficial, C.I.A. sourees esti- mated that at least 1,000 - and possibly as many as 1,800 of the agency's approximately 18,000 jobs would be abolished by the end of the current fiscal year, Juno .30.. An official agency source acknowledged that what he termed a "reduction in force" - known in the Government as a RIF- was under way "on a very selective basis" to 'eliminate "marginal perfor- :mers." But he woul1 give no figures' for the cutback. No official announcement of the cutbacks has been ' made to employes at the C.I.A. head- Continued on Page 13, Column 1' , For Release 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000110004-0 Approved For Release 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499R00100Qy10004-0 CJA- Cutting ]Personnel in Agency's Biggest Layoff Continued From Page 1, Col. 2 quarters in nearby Langley, 1; Va., creating much unc0.rtq li?y there. "This is the first place' I've 9 ever been in where all the rumors come true," ono,:.gcncy employe said. "You get a;call and get an interview and that's it," he said, describing the job- elimination process. "No pre- liminaries and ceremonies. They just give the word." ' "Nobody feels safe," the source added," High-Level Shake-Up In' addition to the layoffs, Mr. Schlesinger has initiated a high-level shake-up of key management positions inside the agency, and is, expected to continue his efforts to trim manpower and cut costs in y other intelligence . agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Se- curity Agency. He has reportedly been told by President Nixon to improve the efficiency of the nation's over-all intelligence operations, which costs more than $6-bil- lion a year. The C.I.A. reportedly spends about $602-to $800-million annually, although it is not known whether all of ' the agency's costs for its extensive Southeast Asian operations are included in that estimate. { Intelligence sources acknowl- edged that there was much waste in the personnel struc- ture of the C.I.A. "There's a lot of fat and a lot of dead wood that he's get- ting rid of," one agency cm- ployc said. "I guess I'm for it as long as it doesn't include me." Another employe complained that many of his colleagues "don't understand what the cri- terion is" for the job elimina- tions. "There's no hard data; no facts," ho said, adding that a seemingly heavier portion of jobs had been abolished from management staff and the agency's Research and Devel- opment, situated in nearby Rosslyn, Va., was said to be particularly affected, The office is responsibl efor most of the agency's basic research proj- ects. , 'A Wringing Out' The official C.I.A. source, however, described the cuts as being "across the board" and not limited to any specific of- fice. "What's going on is not a mindless cutting," the source said, "but a real search for the minimal performers and a wringing uot" . Those officers with low fit- in the agency's history took place shortly after John J. Mc- Cone was named director in 1961 by President Kennedy, a few months after the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. About 260 agents employed by the agency's clandestine ser- vice were eliminated then, the former official said, "and that was very carefully handled." Some Congressmen `serving on intelligence committees, while reluctant to speak for the record, applauded Mr. Schles- inger's cutbacks and indicated he would get full Congression- al approval. "I'm convinced that we're gatheri nga whole lot of infor- mation we don't need," one senior Congressman said. "It's been pretty hard to pull our horns in." .. Mr. Schlesinger,; 'who re- ness reports would be among the first to retire, he said. Unofficial sources said that an appea (mechanism had been month, has established a new intelligence research advisory committee inside the C.I.A. that is expected to monitor the in- telligence activities of defense agencies closely. The only major intelligence office in the Government that' is expected to escape personnel cutbacks is the State Depart-! ment's Bureau of Intelligence Research, headed by Ray S.~ Cline, a former high-ranking C.I.A. official. Mr. Cline's 300- man department has been au- thorized to request.100 more positions next year, and was al- located 30 new personnel spots, in, the current budget. Some Government officials! have urged htat the State De-, partment unit be upgraded. in: an effort, to supply more rode-; pendent intelligence judgments, on critical questions. . to eliminate their jobs. Those 7`HE NEW YORK TIMES,WEDNESDAY MARCH 21 who make such appeals, the; of immediate retirement should their efforts fail.' A former high-'evel C.I.A. of- ficial expressed surprise when told today of the' large-scale. personnel cutbacks ordered by, Mr. Schlesinger. "The C.I.A.. doesn't have RIFs," he said.' "That's always been considered a security risk." The only significant cutback Approved For Release 2001/06/09 :CIA-RDP84-00499R001000110004-0 .- v . v-V, V . 11 , Apprd For Release 2&6/09 : WAS1-1 N0TON WASHINGTON, D. C., WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 1973-108 PAGES By SEYMOUR M. HERSH New York Times Necrs Service James R. Schlesinger, the new di-, rector of the Central Intelligence Agency, has begun the-largest person- nel cutback in the history of the agency. Unofficial CIA sources estimated that at least 1,000-and possibly as many as 1,800-of the agency's ap- proximately 18,000 jobs will be abol- ished by June 30. In addition, the CIA director is expected to continue cutbacks in other intelligence agencies, too, such as the huge National Security Agency, staffed by 100,000 people, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, which employes about 3,000. An official agency source ac- knc;e'--edged that what he termed a "re- duction in force"-known in the gov- ernment as a RIF-is under way "on a very selective basis" to eliminate "marginal performers." But he would give no figures. No official announcement of the cutbacks has been made to employes at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. "This is the first place I've ever been in where all the rumors com true, one agency employe said. "You get a call and get an interview and that's it," he said, describing the job-elimi- ,nation process. In addition to the layoffs, Schles- inger has initiated a high-level shake- up of key management positions in- side the agency. He reportedly has been told by President Nixon to improve the effici- ency of the nation's over-all intelli- gence operations, which costs more than $6 billion a year. The CIA's Office of Research and Development in Ro,sslyn is said to be particularly affected. T]-c office is re- sponsible for most of the s ~ ncy's basic research projects. The ufficial CIA Approved For Release 2001/06/09 CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 RI -?. " i w " - r.r n S ----> Phone 484-5000 CIRCULA1ION 484.03 10 Cents CLASSIEI_D 484.606000 source, however, described the cuts as being "across the board" and not lim- ited to any specific office. The Associated Press quoted sources as saying that reports of a 10 percent reduction at CIA are high. In some cases, sources told AP, some em- ployes have been transferred to other jobs, and some administrative person- nel have been reshuffled. A former high-level official ex- pressed surprise when told of the large- scale personnel cutbacks. "The CIA doesn't have RIFs," he said. "That's always been considered a security risk." The only significant cutback in the agency's history took place shortly after John J. bicCone was named di- rector in 1961 by President Kennedy, a few months after the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. About 260 agents employed by the agency's clandestine service were eliminated then, the fm,' er official said, "and that was v. 1re ally handled." Approved For Releasa,2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499RO010jJ110004-0 C. 1. A.-I. T,-T, PLANS' ON CHILE REPORTED Company Aide Says Agency Also Urged Measures to Bar Allende in 1970 C.I.A.-I,T.T. PLANS ON CHILE IS CITED Continued From Page 1, Col. 4' porations that operate around 97 / MAO? 14 1 74HE'NEW YORK TIML'S,;WEDNESDAY 4VA.RCH 2 the globe. Anderson. Among the main things the Today's testimony, together subcommittee wants to find out with additional documents is the extent to which these' made public by the subconr multinational corporations in- mitts -- documents that were By EILEEN SIIANAHAN fluence United States foreign; voluntarily submitted by the Special to The New York 71men policy, corporation - depicted a much WASHINGTON, March 20 The first two weeks of the' more prolonged and extensive A vice' president of the inter-+ hearings will deal exclusively! pattern of consultation between ;national Telephone and Tele y with the reported attempts of the company offiiaand ls than various gov. 'rah Cor oration said today International Telephone and; t p p p Telegraph to enlist, the help of viously been disclosed. I that a top official of the Cen-,,; various brancht!s of. the United .. Mr. Merriam spoke, for ex-1 tral Intelligence Agency had' States Government to keep Dr. ample, of "25 visits" to' the.'. "agreed with the reconunenda- Aliendo out of office. State Department and of hav- 1_ __ ,-.._..._ -..inc talked with Mr. Kissinger' It t yet Lry to 1" 'ev l "'? telligenco Agency will testify, j Y111" Mr. Merriam also acknowl- Salvador Allende Gossens, a His testimoney also indicated Marxist, as President of Chile. public session or bet ind cloaca ~' that most of the visits by com- Mgddko when asked, that a The recommendations in 1;170 doors, about the agency's ac pony officers to six high.Nixon ntives ofWas i plt nles e pr sent. w co. Thee Administration officials in 1971 s th tivities regarding Chile nomic interest te i d Chil h d l h p s s n e e u ad reporic ly inc . and 1971-these were disclosed su to be egotiating ngwith he te C. A. yesterday by another Congres- met- several times in his office (maneuver the departing Chil? n can President back into power, negotiat the L sional committee-had the duals to dsicuss how to cope with about this. about the'; the Allende Government. ose of talkin i ht e g purp !to foment violenc that m g What. came of the reported It was not he who initiated bring about 'a, military tape- company's antitrust problemsl agreement on a course of ac-with the Justice Departmen,: > the meetings of this ad hoc to usc~l , tion between the corporation group Mr Merriam said but f the country ' , . , over o ;dbot LTT s attempts to an au.., American governmental agen- and the agency was not made keep Dr. Allende from being i 'rather theF Washington repre propaganda . to uu-, . ~.?' Dr. Allende was elected American countries, or some president of Chile and took of combination of these things. figs on Nov. 3, 1970. He sub-; The C.I.A. official who was sequently took over business these and some other United States,' esproposals was William W companies, as he had promised Broc, director of the agency's in his campaign and as corpora-; clandestine activities in Latin tion officials had feared he, The LT.T. official who testi.I of the Central Intelligence and: fied about this conversation and International Telegraph as hard- many others with Mr. Brbe and line anti-Communist groups other high officials of. the Uni?I that greatlyfeared Dr. Allende's fed States Government was', accession to power and that worked together to try to per- William R. Merriam, formerly head of the corporation's.Wash- IilgtOit effict!, Mr. Merriam was the -first q witness to, a be heard special in subcompublic' Disclosed a Year Ago n b o y suadc the State Department and Henry A. Kissinger, the eA aas Qlil ip p n ity tto ! tta c A ,'iew. i e ually hard anti-Allendev s~ssl mlttee of the Senate ,Foreign The tion's outlines attempt of to the coenlistpora- the Relations, Committee that ht help of the Government to pre- haaded . by senator. Pranlc serve its interests in Chile were Church, Democrat of Idaho. disclosed a year ago when por- The subcommittee will con- tions of a number of internal duct what is, expected to be a I.T.T. documents were pub- two-year inquiry into the be lished by the columnist, Jack Anderson. Continued on ~uI IR ideas to bring about "economic collapse" in Chile, according to company documents and testimony. Other Companies Approached As part of this plan, accord- ing to Mr. Merriam, C.I.A. offi- cials made "repeated calls to firms such as General Motors, Ford Motor Company and banks in California and New York," asking them to stop or reduce their activities in Chile to hurt her economy. These companies, refused, according to other I.T.T. documents that were put into the record. Among other items of eco- nomic warfare against the Al- lende Government that were proposed by the company were a cessation of all United States aid, under the guise of a re- view, and intercession with the World Bank and the Inter- American Development Bank to get them to stop making loans to Chile. It was not clear whether any of these proposals were accepted. per Company. Other compa- nies represented included, he said, Kcnnecott Copper, W. It. an dthe Bank of America. Such meetings among corporate rep- resentatives in Washington oc- cur "all the time," he said. Mr. Merriam said that the group had never arrived at any conclusions on what to do. Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine, asked why I.T.T. wanted to bring about the collapse of the Chilean economy if its aim was, as Mr. Merriam said, to make sure that Chile gave the corporation "better terms" in payment for Chitelco, the. telephone com- pany owned largely by the cor- poration after the Allende Gov- ernment took it over. Mr. Merriam replied that he' thought "the threat of economic collapse" might prove effective with Mr. Allende "if he knew that the banks might stop lend- ing." Senator Muskie suggested that thre threat was an attempt to "blackmail Allende," CIA-RDP84-00499 RO01000110004-0 Approved For ReleaseaOO1/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 ROO1001 ,10004-0 THE 'WASHINGTON POST Sunday, March 18, 1973 A7 owneyo. A CIA Aqrent in From the (],old 0 . Recruit on Double Mission Over China When Captured in 1952 By Thomas O'Toole Wasiiington Post SLatt Wrltor There were 30 of them there that day in 1951, 30 graduating Yale seniors all drawn to a small room on the New Haven campus by a recruitment notice on the bulletin board. One of them re- members that the notice was next to one put there by Procter & Gamble. They were met by a middle-aged man dressed in the Ivy League flan- nels of the (lay, noteworthy for noth- ing except that he smoked a pipe and wore the Yale tie. He told the seniors that he's been a member. of the. OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during World War II and had operated behind German lines all during the Allied ad- vance across Europe. Ile said he was now with the 'Central Intelligence none of the Yale seniors had heard of when he was released two weeks ago it. after 20 years in a Chinese prison, but The recruiter said he was at Yale to ~ reliable sources say he was on a dou- bring qualified bright young men into the C[A, which needed to grow be ble mission that fateful day when his cause of the Chinese intervention into C-47 aircraft was shot down by small the Korean War. He said little about arms fire inside China. what qualified bright young men could For years, the United States had dis- expect in the CIA, leading several of avowed Downey's mission and where- the Yale seniors to press him on what abouts the day he was caught. they might have to do. Downey's friends say he could "Well, this is purely hypothetical," have ben released as early as 1955 if the recruiter said, "but we might ex- the United States had only acknowl- pect you to parachute Into China to , edged that he was a CIA agent. His help set up. a communications appara- friends call him a victim of the Cold tus, sort of get things started. / War, a victim of the China Lobby that Hypothetical as it might have been ' kept the United States friendly with at the time, that is almost what Jack Chiang Kai-shek and a victim of the Downey was doing in 1952 when he virulent anti-Communism of the 'S0s was captured by the Chinese in the and '60s. foothills of the Manchurian mount.alns. which: was . then so new that Downey refused to discuss his missioa - See DOWNEY, A7, Col. 1 Approved For 'Releasep01 /06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499R00100Q4;0004-0 THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, March 18,1973 A7 1"'"T0111 DOWNEY, From Al. been that Downey was a Defense De- partment employe, on an authorized flight from Seoul to Tokyo the day his plane was lost. Downey had been a CIA agent for more than a year, one,of a dozen Yale:, graduates who had been recruited off the campus that day in 1951. He was participating In a tradition that grew " through the fifties and on into the six- ties, when Yale men tended to domi nate the ranks of the CIA. Downey was stationed by the CIA in Japan, where he trained Taiwanese from Chiang Kai-Shek's isolated island in the arts and crafts of the profession he'd been taught in Washington. Dow- ney was considered one of the best young agents in the Far East. He was ' strong, durable, quickminded and a born leader of men. That leadership was obvious even in Downey's early CIA days. His class of 40 was asked at the end of their train- ing which man in the class they'd like to lead them or be with them in trou- ble sports. Thirty-one of the 40 chose' nose agent who was already inside China. The plane was then to continue on to the mountains of Manchuria and parachute seven other Taiwanese into China to set up a communications base. . Downey's plane never made it to the mountains. Sources said the Chinese arrested the Taiwanese agent Downey was supposed to pick up before Dow- ney's plane left for China. Sources also said the Chinese Intercepted radio messages inbound to the Taiwanese agent, which alerted them to the time and place of the pick-up. When Downey's plane flew. into China, men and weapons were waiting for it. The C-47 is understood to have come in low and slow over the spot designated for the pickup when Chi- nese troops opened fire on the plane. The C-47 crash-landed in a Manchu- " rian field, which explains how Downey is said to have walked away from the wreckage. All eleven people on board survived the crash, Besides Downey, there was CIA Agent Richard Fecteau, two Taiwanese. pilots and the seven Ta- iwanese agents who were to be para- chuted into the mountains. A.4sodated Press Downey was the mission chief, Fecteau Downey's) remembers oindd auiound nAIVVPV ... Cara recruit rea, where his "fishing junk" was drop- Downey has said he spent the first ping Korean agents into the north., plane. Ile said that' while Downey 10 months of imprisonment in leg "We though we were aground on an didn't defy re6relations he overstepped irons. ome rd University l.aw Profes- ? sor Jerrome A. Cohen, a classmate of uninhabited island, where we'd be safe his participation in the mission by be. Downey's at Yale and today a special. until' the tide lifted us off," he said. ing on the plane. 1st in Chinese law, said there ,was uoth- "Then the fog began to lift and we dis- we were less than 100 ing unusual about Downey's treatment. covered yards "Jack flew with his men because he from the main railroad line that liked them and wanted. to be ..with',.. "All criminals were treated the same moved men and supplies down from them when they jumped," the one-time way-in the People's Republic of Chi- Vladivostok." agent said. "ghat was one reason he. na," Cohen said. "They socked it to, . but, Downey knows how was there. The other one, I guess, was ' 'you from the start, then became len- Nobody, many missions but he flew over China, but, that it was a lovely moonlit night and ient as you reformed, as you told the Jack Just wanted to see China." truth and.as you repented about the the men who knew him in the CIA as:',;' " some he'd been there more than once. . The mission Downey flew is believed truth. One former agent said there was never to have been a double one. It Is under- Downey said he' told his captors ev- any need for Downey to be' on the stood the C-47 was to pick up a Taiwa- erything he knew in -those first 10 Approved For' Release 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 Approved For Release4001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO0100?Q4;0004-0 THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, March 18,1973 A7 'months. He was quoted by newsmen interviewing him last week at a hospi- tal in New Britain, Conn., where his mother Is recuperating from a stroke: "I would say I revealed about every bit of information I piad." When,he'd told the Chinese the de- tails of his work, Downey was taken out of leg irons. But he was kept in solitary -confinement for another 14 months, during which time he was not allowed to talk to anybody but his cap- tors. Even that conversation was lim- ited to chats with the jailer who super- vised his 30 minutes of courtyard exer- cise every day. Downey and Fecteau were moved out of solitary In a rural prison and into Peking's Grass Basket Prison In' December 1954. There, they were put in with the crew of a B-29 that had. been shot down over North Korea. They were also tried and convicted of espionage by a Chinese military tribu- nal, which announced the conviction to, the world. "We were., elated at the conviction," remembers one of Downey's class- mates who had gone into:the CIA with him. "We'd never heard of his capture. We'd' all given Jack up for dead." The Korean War ended before the Chinese announced Downey's capture and conviction. When it ended, negoti. ations began bet w e,e n the United States and the People's Republic of China to arrange a prisoner exchange. A list of prisoners was swapped in Ge- neva in April 1954. The United States listed 129 Chinese it had detained, mostly scientists and economists who'd been teaching or working in the United States. The Peo- ple's Republic listed 40 Americans, in- cluding the fliers Downey sat in prison with in Peking. Downey and Fecteau were not on the list. "They weren't on' the list because John Foster Dulles would not admit they worked for the CIA," said liar- yard Law Professor Jerome Chen, j Downey's Yale classmate who was later to become a force behind. his re- lease. "We 'never admitted he was missing so they never admitted ho was ' captured." When the Chinese announced that they were holding Downey and Fee- teau, Secretary of State Dulles refused to budge. The story that the State De- they stuck to until early this year. Downey and Fecteau worked for the U.S.-Ariny. Their plane had gone. off , course between Korea and Japan and .ended up over Manchuria. The flier's who were in the Peking prison with. Downey and Fecteau were released by the Chinese in August, 1955. Downey and. Fecteau stayed be. hind,;victims of the growing Cold War between China and the United States. A witness to this is one of the fliers who met Downey and Fecteau in prison, a man named Steven Kiba, who teaches Spanish in a high school in Norton, phio. "I asked a Chinese commisar If Dow- ney and Fecteau would go home when we went home," Kiba said, "and he told me, 'The only way they will ever get out will be for your government to admit they are CIA agents.' " . KIba said he told this to the CIA when he was released. He said he passed along a message from Fecteau that the Chinese were aware of his and Downey's attempt to set up a CIA spy ring under the code name "Operation Samurai." "The CIA man told me to forget it, forget about the whole period with Downey and Fecteau," Kiba. said. "They. said as far as they were con- cerned it never happened. They said it looked pretty hopeless for. them and seemed to indicate they would never _get out." Harvard Law Professor Cohen is'one who insists the Chinese tried to main- tain some kind of contact with the United States over the Downey and Fecteau cases from 1954 to 1957. He said China tried to regularize relations with the United States during this pe- riod, but that the United States re- jected Chiha's moves because the United States did not want to under. mine, its relations with Chiang Kai- shek. China made a last attempt at recon- ciliation in 1957, when Premier Chou En-lai offered to repatriate Downey and Fecteau if the United States would allow American newsmen. to visit that if the United States were to let that .hap- pen it would be giving Its approval to a regime that "practiced and trafficked in evil." Downey and Fecteau were finally re- leased when President Nixon chose to acknowledge their roles as CIA agents. He did it at a press conference just be- fore presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger left on one of his trips to China. He did It in answer to the last question asked at the press conference, in a way that conviced DJack Dow- ney's friends that the question:was planted and the answer rehearsed. Jack Downey emerged from his 20 years in prison looking and acting- like a man who'd never been in prison, al- most a symbol of the detente that now exists between the United States and China. Downey had two recreations in prison, reading and exercising. 'To- gether, they saved his santiy. He came out of prison speaking Chi- nese and able to read and write Rus- sian, which he learned from Russian ccilmates and from. the Russian novels his Chinese captors let him have. His friends say he is in excellent physical shape at the age of ?42. He can run 10 miles, do 100 pushups and as many as 50 chinups. His weight Is 190 pounds, a little less than it was when he wrestled and played varsity football for Yale. Jack Downey is the'last of the 'Yale class of 1951 to come in from the Cold War between the U.S. and China, almost a symbol of the last 20 years. The others who went Into the CIA when the Korean War looked like'an? Ameiican disaster all left years ago. One, is a freelance photographer in New York, another in an Asian scholar at Yale, a third runs a hosiery mill and a fourth a lobster-tail business in the Solomon Islands. ,"We all got bored and disillusioned," one of them said the other day. "The ?bureauracy, the paper work and the politicking got too stifling. That,.and the times changed. So did we change." Approved For Release 2001/06/09 :' CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000110004-0 Approved For ReleWs 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499 R0O1W 110004-0 THE STAR and NEWS A-3 Washington, D. C. Saturday, March 17, 1973 i? Lost on CIA Mission Secretary of State William P- Rogers has been asked to help a 77-year-old Oregon woman find' out exactly ;how her son died during a U.S. spy mission in China more than 20 years ago. Sen. Mark O. Hatfield and Rep. John Dellenback, both R-Ore., sent Rogers a letter on behalf of Myrtle Snoddy of Creswell, Ore., yesterday. Mrs. Snoddy's son, Robert C. Snoddy, and Norman Schwartz of Louisville, Ky., participated in the mission in which Central Intelligence Agency operative John Thomas Downey and Richard Fecteau were captured. The Snoddy and Schwartz families were told in 1954, two years after the pair disappeared, that the two men were killed on the Downey-Fecteau flight. Snoddy and Schwartz reportedly flew the plane, a cargo version of the DC3 twin-propeller aircraft, that was shot down during a flight over China's Kirin Province on Nov. 29, 1952. Fectcau and Downey were imprisoned on espionage charges. Fecteau was released in December 1971? Downey was freed Monday. "The only thing I know is what I read in the papers," said Mrs. John Boss of Creswell, Snoddy's sister, "after 21 years, I think they can come out and tell me where he was, what he was doing. "I think it's high time to learn what happened. I don't think anyone could be hurt now. I think my mother deserves that."--SAP Approved For Release OO1/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499 ROO1OO4OOO4-0 A-2 THE EVENING STAR and DAILY' NEWS Washington, D. C., Friday, March 16, 1973 craw=000 ar knows about th(: left. But em- abailable for him. in his own, ployes, reading, the cutback as directorate, the second, for a best they cam, see it trimming Job elsewhere in the agency. about 10 percent in many units - with nurust of those affected in the over-45 bracket. The r:.uts are to go into effect Jurc; 30. Indications are that c,'ome older woriicrs are being pressured to sign up for retire- OUT IN THE CGU),, ment annuities, thereby for- That's where an unknown feiting the small appeals number of Central intelligence rights available to them under -Agency cmployes are going, the law. under a layoff which CIA re- By CIA rules, an employe portedly refuses to call a lay- declared surplus in his imme off. diate office is entitled to two In the compartmentalized subsequent screenings the CIA,',. the right hand :never first, to see if another job Is Ha/HHC Q, d For Release 2001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 Approved For Release. 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 New York Times tlUn AT ODDS WITH U,A.. V.PMUm.y, who$c ld notibe Friday, March 16, 1973 FORD FOUNDATION ` The Police Foundation is an offshoot t of of the Ford Founda? 28 C Bundy Denies Fund Sought Training of Policemen By DAVID BURNHAM The president of the Ford Foundation has denied an as- sertion by the Central Intel- ligence Agency that New City policemen were trained by the agency at the suggestion of the foundation. The denial contradicted a "fact sheet" on the case pre- pared by the agency for Rep- Representative Chet Holified, Democrat of California chair- man of the House Govern- ment Operations Committee. In the sheet, the C.I.A. said that "at the suggestion of the foundation representative, the NYC police sought assistance from the agency as to the best system for analyzing data." The denial of the agc'ncv's assertion came in a lcticu ;roan McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, to Rep- resentative Edward I. Koch, Democrat of Manhattan, who has charged that C,I.A. train- ing of policemen from more than a dozen cities violated the law. After Mr. Koch had com- plained to Mr. Holificld, James R. Schlesinger, the new Direc- tor of Central Intelligence, said in a letter made public on March 5 that because of the sensitive nature of such train- ing, it would be "undertaken in the future only in the com- pelling circumstances and with my personal approval." was quoted yesterday by Dep- uty Police Commissioner Rich- ard Kellerman and an official - of the Ford Foundation as saying he believed the idea of going to the C.I.A. originated with Don R. Harris, a private consultant. Federal Grant Used Mr. Harris, a former C.I.A. intelligence analyst, was one of three consultants hired by the Police Department last year under a $166,000 grant from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to help the department reoganize its intelligence files. In November of 1971, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a branch of the Justice Department, pub- lished a 150-page manual, co- authored by Mr. Harris, which was designed to instruct state and local police agencies how to "apply intelligence to com- bat organized crime." The other author was E. Drexel Godfrey Jr., also a former C.I.A. employe. Informed of Mr. Murphy's be- lief that Mr. Harris had origi- nated the, idea of sending 14 New York poLicement for train- ing with the C.LA., an agency spokesman in Washington said the available information indi- cated the plan first was sug- gested by Wayne Kerstetter, one of six lawyers brought into the department in October, 1971, under a grant from the Police Foundation, the branch of the Ford Foundation. Neither Mr. Kerstetter, who recently left New York for a law enforcement position in Illinois, nor Mr. Harris could be reached for comment last night, member of the Ford Founda- tion or the Police Foundation or any employe o" the New Yrok City pro.jc't funded by the Police Found:.. i,._. 'No Evidence' Found T r. Bundy, responding to an inquiry mll Mr. Kocih, said that h. ,ad carefully examineu~~' the ( ..: assertion and had conci, ded that "these inquiries disclose no evidence" that any suggestion for C.I.A. training of a' policemen was made "by any':. Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 Approved For Release601/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 ROO 1 0OW0004-0 THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS Washington, A C., Wednesday, March 14, 1973 A-3 n and felt that it "broke the ice and probably had a good effect on my situation." Downey, in other comments, said his treatment at the hands of the Chinese had met "the, minimum standards." He said he had been kept in leg irons during the first 10 months of his imprisonment, but he said the action was "s t and a r d procedure" for someone like him awaiting trial in China. have . a more sophisticated grasp of American society. It's still the greatest." He said his views have evolved, "but' so has the world." He changed .his mind about the Chinese somewhat in the years he spent in prison, he said. He called them energetic and spirited. "I think the people are more behind their government than I dreamed would be possible," Downey said. Mrs. Mary V. Downey, 75, was elated by his return. She had, not been told of her son's release until just before he walked into her room at New Britain hospital. Downey himself was admit- ted to the hospital yesterday, and given a room near his mother to recuperate from the exhausting flight from Hong Kong. At times he was kept togeth- He risoners ith Chinese . p er w also was taken on closely su- pervised trips to farms, facto- ries and the Great Wall, but he did not learn to speak Chinese. On a typical day, Downey said, he was up at 6 a.m. he was made to listen to political broadcasts and to take part In Ideological "study periods." ~t'~r .1?, r?t0i+1i I's A NEW SPIRIT ,GROWS IN CHINA' A new spirit, achieved at' the cost of some of the color- and vibrancy of legendary China, is now spreading, among Red China's people,,, New York Times associate editor Harrison E. Salis- bury found in his recent' travels there. The final article in his" four-part series discusses, the life- styles of today's" mainland China. Page A-25... ,Americap llte, ?`; I would say; ?H$/HC- Appr ved For Release 2001/06/09 :.,CIA-RDP84-06499 R001000110004-0 Downey Gave Chinese Secret Information NEW BRITAIN, Conn. tral Intelligence Agency but (UPI) - Korean war spy John does not plan to remain with T. Downey told newsmen to- the secret agency. day he gave his Chinese cap- Of the 20 years in prison, tors secret information during Downey said, "I can.only say the 20 years he spent in a it all dropped off sue like a "I can say, yes, I revealed like I'm putting you On. It's I just feel done with bit of information over t b , , every ou a I had," Downey, 42, said at a great." news conference when asked Downey said he was "aston- whether he had given the fished" to learn of President Chinese secret information. Nixon's visit to China last year i Downey was released by the Chinese yesterday on an ap- i peal from President Nixon, + who had advised Premier Chou En-lai that the prisoner's mother was critically ill. The CIA agent was flown first to Clark Air base in the Phillp- mission that brought him to captivity in November 1952, cell for anywhere from half an when his plane was shot down hour to four hours of exercise, over Manchuria. in a 30-foot by 90-foot court- He said he still considered yard. ' himself an employe of the Cen- Out of the intensive political ;ntirpfrinntinn. Downey said, pines and then to Connecticut for a reunion with his mother' last night. He said he felt the two dec- ades he spent in Chinese pris- ons was to a large extent "wasted." "I wouldn't recommend it for any character building or anything like that," Downey said, adding that he didn't think the episode "benefited anybody," including the United States. Downey, a former defensive guard on the 1950 Yale football team, declined to discuss the Approved For Release4fi@01/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000,y10004-0 THE EVENING STAR and DAILY-NEWS` ' NEW BRITAIN, Conn. (AP) Downey from the Philippines, -"You'll probably be a celeb- said his mother's pulse rate rity now--don't let it go to showed "a little bleep" when . your head," the ailing mother she was told John had been of CIA agent John T. Downey freed and was in the hospital.: told her son last night at e "He took mothers hand and hospital room reunion. kissed her and spoke to her," ' Released Sunday, after 20 William Downey, a New York. 24 hours and rushed to the her." bedside of Mrs. Mary V. Dow- Mrs. Downey visited her son . i early because of Mrs. Dow- king's Grass Basket prison. ney's illness Downey and Richard Fecteau Mrs. Downey, was elated by, of Lynn, Mass., were captured his return, United Press Inter- in November 1952 -after their national reported. She had not plane was shot down over been told of her son's release - Manchuria. Fecteau was re-.. until just before he walked leased in 1971, at about the into her room at New Britain same time Downey's life term hospital. was commuted to five more r~ s: d it yeare T)nwney the last known' a m ted to the hospital yesterday, captive of the Korean war era, and given a room near his was reportedly captured when mother to recuperate from the his plane was shot down over ehausting flight from Hong China. The Chinese said he, 1, Kona. was dropping and picking up schoolteacher, ' suffered a Downey's brother said ha stroke Wednesday and re- found him "as close to being' mained unconscious until Sun- unchanged as anyone bould be Downey smiled as he was , "He indicated his great te-;'. , greeted }}~~ hundreds f friends lief in being a free sna . I and won wishers, . ncludmg wouldn't rate him at 'ell es,, Gov. Thomas J. Meskill, a bitter" because of his impris personal friend, at Hartford's onment. He said his brother; i Bradley International Airport. told him he had not been Downey's younger brother abused in. prison -- "interro-' William, who accompanied gated, yes-tortured, no." H$'1I3C- - Appr bved For Release 2001/06/09 :? CIA-RDP84-00499 R001000116004-0 By HENRY S. BRADSHER Star-News Staff Writer HONG KONG - More than 20 years after being shot down while re-supplying Central In- telligence Agency spies in Chi- na, John Thomas Downey' emerged from China today by act of clemency from Premier Chou En-Lai. Downey, who is 42, has spent half his life in Chinese prisons. He was smiling and apparent- ly in good health when he crossed the border into Hong Kong. "I am so glad. It's like a dream," Downey told an American Red Cross repre- sentative who met him, Eu- gene D. Guy. American officials had a hel- icopter waiting to whisk Dow- ney to Hong Kong's airport. Within 35 minutes of the time he walked across Lowu bridge from China in a blue Chinese shirt and trousers, a special U.S. Air Force medical evacu- ation plane was airborne, tak- ing Downey to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Operation Homecoming offi- cials at Clark who are han- dling prisoners released from Vietnam sped Downey on to see his critically ill mother in New Britain, Conn. Almost immediately after arriving at Clark, Downey boarded an Air Force C141 Starlifter transport which was to fly him via Anchorage, THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS --Washington, D. C., Monday, March 12, 1973 Alaska, to Windsor Locks, Conn. Downey was met at Clark by his brother William, who said doctors who flew with John from Hong Kong reported he was in good shape. "He certainly feels and looks good," William Downey said. Downey spoke briefly to newsmen when he arrived at Clark, United Press Interna- tional said. "I just wanted to say how grateful I was for being re- leased. I appreciate the Chinese government for letting me go at this time and Presi- dent Nixon for his efforts on my behalf and (presidential adviser) Dr. Henry A. Kissin- ger," he said. "I'm very pleased to be out," he said. "At the same time, I'm very anxious to get home to see my mother." "He had a firm handshake and he was up to date, very well informed," one of the offi- cers on the flight from Hong Kong said. "We were very sur- prised. He's got no problems at all." President Nixon asked Chou to release Downey after his mother suffered a stroke Wednesday. Within 48 hours the Chinese informed Wash- ington they would. Downey's mother, who suf- fered a stroke last Wednesday, was reported "vastly im- proved" to day. She will be See DOWNEY, Page A-6 Approved For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 -DOWNEY. %pptoved For Releas 0 /09 : CIA-R-0 99R0010 1,0% pa% 0W& riswl lq:;2.r Freed Continued From Page A-1 1 Then recently, Nixon, by told of her son's release before ; what seemed almost to have his arrival tonight. been a slip of the tongue, re- Peking also said it would re-1 ferred to Downey as. a CIA lease Thursday the last two agent. Whether this was final- Americans known to be im- ly a public admission which prisoned in China. They are China had sought remains un- tally different world political ci!als he'Iived fora while with China and the United States the two fliers, U.S. Navy Lt. are now coming closer togeth- Cmdr. Robert J. Flynn, 35, of er, although somewhat warily, Houston, Minn., and U.S. Air while China is in hostile con- Force Maj. Philip Smith, 38, of frontation with the Soviet Un- Roodhouse, Ill. ion. When Downey was shot "According to him (Dow- down Americans saw China ney), they were in excellent and the Soviet Union as part- spirits and health," said ners in the Korean War James E. Bolling, a Red against t'he United States. Gross regional director who D o w n e y graduated from flew from Hong Kong to the Yale University in 1951. The Philippines with Downey. CIA was recruiting healthy The two pilots had always young men with a taste for been expected to be released adventure at the time. When North Vietnam returned According to the finding at a prisoners it held there. But the Chinese trial of Downey, Fec- releaese of Downey was a spe- teau and a number of Chinese cial concession in a new at- Nationalists, Downey selected . mosphere of Sino-American and trained Nationalists into It was regarded by China- watchers here as more than simply a goodwill gesture, however. It marked the close of what China had considered a long period of U.S. provoca- tion and hostility-a mirror image of the American atti- tude during the 1950s and 1960s that China was hostile and provocative. During those years, while Downey sat in prison the U.S. government denied the finding of his trial in China that he was a Central Intelligence Agency agent. Downey and Richard George Fecteau were A four-man team was para- chuted into Kirin Province in Northeast China adjoining Ko- rea in July 1952. A larger team was parachuted into adjacent Liaoning Province in Septem- ber. Fecteau joined the CIA in 1952, according to the trial re-, port. On the night of Nov. 2,9, 1952, lie accompanied Downey on a DC3 twin-engine trans- port plane to resupply the Kir- in agents and picizup one agent. The plane was shot down. It was only two years later in announcing the trial-at convicted together as CIA _ which several of the Chinese agents. agents were sentenced to Fecteau was given a 20-year death and others to long prison sentence and released in De- terms-that the Chinese re- comber 1971 after serving 19 veiled that Downey and Fee- years. Downey's sentence was tcau were still alive. Sur- at that time reduced from life prised, Washington put out a to five more years. story of their being civilians, a sign of developing friend- ship. But Peking was not ready then to simply release Downey. American officials quietly stopped insisting that Downey and Fectcau were civilians working for the U.S. Army, whose plane got lost on a flight from Japan to Korea during the Korean war. But they re- mained unwilling to admit the CIA connection. al Dag Hammarskjold visited China in 1955, he obtained the release of 11 Americans from another plane which the Chinese said had been shot 'down while dropping agents. It was a U.S. Air Force plane which Hammarskjold said was part of the U.N. command in Korea, but, the Chinese said, Hammarskjold told them the United States had not claimed that Downey and Fectcau were part of the U.N. com- mand, so he did not seek their release. The American Red Cross was allowed to send parcels to the two prisoners. Downey's mother visited him three times in Peking during the years when almost no other, Americans were allowed to go to China. Guy said today that Downey told him artificial sweeteners in parcels helped him, avoid getting fat on Chinese food. Guy gave a receipt for Dow- ney to Chinese officials who escorted him to the border. It said that "the American peo- ple are most appreciative for this humanitarian action on the part of the Peoples Repub- lic of China." At the request of the U.S. Consulate, reporters were kept away from Downey by British police. The consulate's press release on his passage through this British colony mentioned only Red Cross officials but American diplomats hovered in the background of the oper- ation. One diplomat, a specialist on Chinese internal politics who is almost exactly Downey'$ age, Sherrod McCall, met Downey at the border and flew with him to the Philippines as escort officer. So far as could be learned, no one from the CIA section of the U.S. Consulate was pres- ent. THWash ENU'4 CTMondday,M rrchL 2, 19 WS Approved For Rele a 001d, 6/09 'CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001`1'0004-0 ice- ACa t: Approved For Releas*,a,001/06/09: CIA-RDP84-00499 R00100QV 0004-0 -United Press International Downey arrives in Hong Kong wearing a broad smile and Red Chinese clothing. -Associated Press By the time he reached Clark Air Base, Downey had changed to American garb. THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS - Washington, D. C., Monday, March 12, 1973 Approved For Rel,ea$e?20310.6109 CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001 0' ?Ala 3 9RO0100WO0004-0 C11 lnese R rrive sznU? By Bernard D. No4Kiter Waehlgaton Poat staff Wr,ter of j t described as one maipion Spies.' i n i inA's rAnki L nf{ Urot to the U n i e as bro ught ed f a t (113 froth 0 Pla vosterd ay gue. the arrival of no Ho Pekin Shu ''~.,w,~'~+{E-rge d' aff airy in By Bernard D. Nossiter Washington Post Staff Writer The State Department yes- Peru has expropriated rday brushed off a protest oil fields and the G r.Cla+r'^``y+ Liao Ho?shu and the headlines he caused: "Moscow radio immediately dubbed him 'Peking's, *S/HC- 9ro oved For Reld4YeTkl906 coLf"1'i4-Ikdlil, ngkd04QOu+ipp04ftg-'g-ng the U.S. had kidnapped him. I t J` Ntim'y L, ROSS West requested political asylum in the United States. Liao Ho-shu, 46, charge d'affaires at the Chinese mission .ej feet n Iti1ze ? se 44rrzve stn12S J3 17' B Wa ernard D. Nogvlter A k as4ington post atuft writ., dlploni at described es of to S In ILuroChinti's one ptes. ranking,. In sc_ -- ne v_ . -+-om the 8aneyesterday The ' arrival of ekin Liao Ho Shu rge 'affair in, demand for Envoy's return Adds Strains By Stanley, Karnow washirston Post staff writer, iONG,,1Sp G, Fe 7- ton has a.oided giving i f /4 or 7k ,O'f!Ne (1r1.1. I& ZIC.- ~~N -~~p! vpP o~~P pit ?~ o~^ ~~, By William Perklm,.-.The Washington Yost In The! Hague, was reported at the time to he'ad.the Chinese spy network in Europe. His defection was considered the West's most important intelligence coup in years. Moscow radio immediately dubbed him "Peking's James Bond." Taiwan cabled Washington it would give him a hero's welcome. Peking demanded his return, charging the U.S. had kidnapped him. When we refused, the Chinese canceled the upcoming session of Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, our only official channel of communication at that time. Secretary of State William P. Rogers expressed formal diplomatic "regret," and that was the end of contacts until January, 1970. The resumption eventually led first to Henry Kissinger's and eventually to President Nixon's visit a year ago to the-People's Republic of China. Two months before that historic'trip', the White house received a letter from Liao Ilo-shu. He wrote he could not get used to the, t mer-ican way of life, had "made. .a mistake" in defecting and asked permission to return to mainland China. The letter was turned over to the State Department for routine processing. In May Liao was on his way home via the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, Paris and Shanghai. This time there were no headlines. His departure remained unknown to the public at large until January of this year when a succinct wire dispatch from Hong Kong quoted a local magazine as saying he had returned to the PRC. Ile disappeared behind the Bamboo Curtain like a pebble in. a pond. What happened to make the defector redefect? Did Liao-an embarrassing reminder of the cold war-become a sacrificial lamb on the Nixon-Mao altar of peace and friendship? Was this man, the product of a totalitarian society, unable to cope with the unregimented life in a democracy? Was he the pawn in the ideological match between resident Chinese here dedicated to Taiwan and those favoring the motherland? Or was he merely the casualty of extended exile-deprived of family and meaningful opportunity for career advancement, physically ill and mentally unbalanced? Is it possible he was a double agent-or was he, in fact, no spy at all? The following is an attempt to reconstruct the life of one Chinese defector in the United States, from the time he disappeared from the headlines until he reappeared for one last brief instant. Since Liao left no known diary, his story derives from the comments of those few Americans and Chinese whose paths lie crossed. Many of the former were reluctant to talk, either because of their involvement with the CIA or with mental hospitals and patients. Some of the latter gave conflicting accounts, depending-one suspects-on their own political loyalties. The CIA at first refused comment, but later confirmed the essential elements of this portrait. The story of intrigue and incipient insanity that is Liao Ilo?shu's began in what is now Wuhan, a city in the central province of Hupei, where he was born in 1923. Little is known here of his formative years except that he studied economics at the University of Peking, was assigned to the See LIAO, K2, Col. 5 liately dubbed him 'Peking's . James Bond.' Taiwan cabled Washington it would give the U.S. had hide lPd "For Release 2001/06/09 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000110004-0 PAG al Oliahoothe Cold: LIAO, From KI outcry fueled the fires of suspicion K Street and a home in Vienna, Va., Foreign Ministry in 1981 and joined here that Liao was indeed the chief of signed the lease. Chinese intelligence operations in Eu- When asked in an Interview about the Communist Party two years later. rope. Liao and the apartment, he replied he He married a pediatrician and had If Liao were not sent back, Peking had no knowledge of either. Still, he two children. He, went to The Hague warned of "grave consequences." admitted it was possible his firm had In 1964. Consistent with P.R.C. prat- These proved to be cancellation of the rented the apartment, following its tice at that time, his wife and chil- Sino-American talks, which were custom, for out of town guests "at dren, then aged 4 and 9, were not scheduled to resume Feb. 20 after be- times like the Cherry Blossom Festi. allowed to accompany him. Liao re- ing suspended for 13 months. val." mained there without returning home Peking accused Washington of A couple of days later, after check- throughout the Cultural Revolution- dors were summoned home for reedu- cation. In 1966 a sensational Incident occur- red at a Chinese legation building in The Hague. A visiting rocket techni- cian, Hsu Tzu-tsai, was snatched from a hospital X-ray table, where he had been taken after either falling from a window trying to defect or after foul play. Liao later told the CIA he was one of the kidnappers. A day later the engineer died at the mission. Peking's news agency said at the time Hsu had passed Information to the -Central Intelligence Agency in ex- change for a promise of asylum. The Netherlands demanded the recall of the charge d'affaires, Li En-chiu and another diplomat. Liao, who then be- came charge and the highest ranking Chinese diplomat left in Europe, later learned his ex-colleagues were harshly and even physically attacked by the Red Guards when they returned to China. Red Guard diplomats soon were sent to The Hague mission. The younger of. ficials tried to take over his job, Liao told the CIA, accusing him of being a capitalist. "They told me it was bour- geois to raise flowers, that I should raise vegetables instead," Liao later re- called. . One day in late 1968 a Chinese ship arrived in Rotterdam. When his revo- lutionary colleagues suggested Liao send his baggage to the ship, he sensed he was about to be Shanghaied, the intelligence sources say. Fearing the same fate as his predecessors once back in Peking, he turned himself in to Dutch police headquarters on Jan. 24, 1969, at 4:30 - a.m., wearing only pajamas and a raincoat. Eluding the Chinese diplomats who were trying to find Liao, Dutch secu- rity officials turned him over to Amer- ican authorities who promptly flew him to this country. The first official word that he had arrived here came on Feb. 4 when State Department spokes- man Robert McCloskey announced that Liao's request for political asylum in the United States was "under con- sideration." A few days later Peking's Foreign Ministry charged the U.S. and the Dutch governments with "deliber- ately engineering" Liao's e s c a p e and demanded the "traitor's" re- turn. (This marked the first time since the Korean war that the Chinese had China incidents." goy. Though he had no record-of pay. Of course, all was forgiven nearly a ment he thought he had sublet the year later when the machinery was put apartment to Neagoy, whom he de- In motion to end a quarter century of scribed as a one-time client for whom isolation between the two super pow- he thought he had drawn up a will- ers. Clearly the Liao affair was a dead Neagoy told him he needed the apart. issue; the man Liao was not, however. ment for out-of-town relatives. Though dubbed "Peking's James Neagoy, who lives in Chevy Chase, to Bond" Liao certainly bore no physical an employee of the CIA. or social resemblance to Ian Fleming's The two apartments adjoining 606 hero. Tall for a Chinese, he was thin, were at that time rented to a Soviet balding, and wore horn-rimmed diplomat and a Defense Department glasses. intelligence officer, causing a rental "He was the least outgoing person agent for the Sherry Hall Apartments I've ever known," recalled Dr. Michael to joke, "One-half of the building was J. McCaskey, head of the Chinese-Japa- foreigners and the other half, the CIA nese language department at George watching them." town University. The two first met in Interrogation led the CIA, at least, August 1969 when a government offi- to conclude that Liao was no master cial brought Liao around to work as a spy, simply a middle echelon diplomat. "casual laborer" ($1.80 an hour) on a It Is unresolved whether even so he National Defense Language Institute was able to supply U.S. authorities project to revise basic Chinese lan- with any worthwhile information. guage courses for the military. Why then had some people thought Liao's existence for those months be- he was a spy in the first place? For fore he "surfaced" at the university in one thing, the climate of mutual suspi. August, can be reconstructed only cion and hostility coupled with a piecemeal. Ile almost never talked dearth of knowledge of events inside about his first months in this country China sufficed to make the intelll- and for a while even declined to let his gence community jump at anything colleagues know where he was living. when defectors were as scarce as (The university listed the department dragons' teeth. For another, a Chinese of Chinese as his mailing address). He diplomat of lesser rank than Liao, who went to elaborate pains to get off the defected from the embassy in Damas? Wisconsin Avenue bus a few blocks cus in 1966, had told Washington that away from his apartment. Peking was anxious to avoid becoming Though he habitually refused offers directly entangled in the Vietnam war. of a lift home, a driving rain once per- Of all those questioned about Liao, suaded him to accept. Even then he in- not one in retrospect thought he could sisted on getting out of the car before have been a master spy. "His general reaching his -building and walked the indecisiveness made him unsuited for rest of the way. positions of high command and his lit- Come September he did list his ad- eral-minded openness made him un- dress on university records as 2702 suited for political intrigue," com- Wisconsin Ave., although he did not in- tnented one of his closest American ac- clude the apartment number. The jani.- quaintances. Still, the idea that the tor at the Sherry Hall apartments, CIA even suspected he was a high- Willy Barnes, at first denied ever see- ranking agent, said a Chinese friend, log the tall, lanky Chinese. Later, was one reason Liao disliked America. when told Liao's apartment number, Having finished Its questioning, the 605, Barnes recalled the Chinese did U.S. government 'began the process of indeed live in the one-bedroom unit- disengagement. The defector was "although he would be gone sometimes given a monthly allowance, believed to for as long as a month at a time." be $300, a permanent resident's visa, a Three or four other men with their Social Security card and a job. . own keys used the apartment as well Liao's job at Georgetown was to by day, he said, though he knew only copy in long hand elementary Chinese one of them. lessons, a monotonous, mechanical Apartment 605 was rented from assignment he performed with much April 1963 to January 1970 in the name grumbling. He made it obvious he con- of John F. Gionfriddo, thee n me sidered this work beneath him yet a fi udiorTY fitc~o`,`S 1 l rt `bl ~e4r10004-0 See LIAO, K3, Col. I l 2702 Wisconsin Ave. NW LIAO, From K2 declined to accept any more interest- ing task. "Ile wanted everything all at once," ,'recalled Dr. McCaskey, "but didn't know how to do anything. His knowl- edge of economics was outdated. He wanted to make a career for himself- anything but diplomacy because he was tired of governments. He kept mentioning he had gone to talk to 'the representative of the U.S. government' (Neagoy) about a permanent job. But nothing ever came of it." find the CIA indeed led him to be- lieve it would furnish him a good posi-, tion as a reward for defection and in- '~Iformatlon and then defaulted when he proved uninteresting? The CIA denied any "deal" with Liao, but told him It was legally re- ' sponsible for his welfare while he was an alien In the U.S.A. "I believe he saw himself in the role ?,=--of Confucian sage, rejected by an em- ' "peror wiio has lost the Mandate of Heaven," wrote Dr. D. Graham Stuarc, 'a Georgetown University professor of ,!'linguistics now on sabbatical in Hot- 'land. At Dr. Stuart's urging Liao enrolled ZIn September 1969 in the university's ''School of Languages and Linguistics 'as a candidate for an M.A. In Chinese. ,~'Ilowever, due to his poor command of "English, Liao was unable to complete 4 the required courses in phonetics and `phonemics given in that language. Ile 'tried the course at least twice more, withdrawing each time after a few weeks. Ile abandoned his effort finally in February 1970. Meanwhile he had enrolled the pre- ' Vlouli month in a 10-week,course in the school's English as a Foreign Lan- guage division, intermediate level, Ile "received a ?B plus in the course, the tained a certain arrogance about his expectations. His primary concern throughout that period continued to be finding a good job. This led him several times to the brink of accepting employment offered by the Nationalist Chinese. Besides work, he was also seeking a new wife .and asked Chinese acquaintances if anyone in Taiwan would marry him if he went there. "He was very lonely," said McCaskey, "although he never. wanted to meet any women here." From the moment he set foot in this. country, the Taiwan government had. tried to recruit him. In the Chinese lexicon, a defector from Communism is presumed friendly to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Ku' Cheng-kang-the man in Taipei in charge of defectors, or as he is officially titled, president of the Free China Relief Association- sent a cable to -the Chinese Embassy in Washington inviting Liao to visit Taiwan. Pressure was put on then- Ambassador Chow Shu-kai, now Tai- pei's Minister without Portfolio, 'to influence Liao, who was open to the idea. Six months or so later, after the CIA interrogation was over, Lino and Chow finally met. The meeting was arranged through Chiang Te-elreng, a junior high school classmate of Liao's and now assistant manager 'of the (Nationalist) Chinese Information Service in New York. Another college friend of Liao's, a former Washington correspondent for a Taiwan paper, Wang Yu-hsu, now studying at George- town, also tried to help Liao decide whether to go to Taiwan. According to them, Liao attended r t. National Day reception and several banquets at the embassy-where Wang's wife works-and had "Intimate and friendly conversations" with Am- bassador Chow. Liao was offered a $500 a month "sweatshop" job with the Chinese Merchants Association, a ship. ping company in. New York's China- town that Is owned by the Republic of China. One of the conditions was that he would first have to visit Taiwan. Wang prepared to accompany Liao to Taipei, but at the last minute Liao balked. This was to happen several times' until the embarrassed Nationalists gave up on luring Liao, intelligence sources said. The reasons for his refusal were never clear. Once, for example, he de- clined at the last moment to sign the regulation Internal Revenue Service form stating he, an alien, had paid his taxes in full. Because the statement is commonly known as a "sailing form" Liao refused to sign, lest he be "slopped" out instead of being sent by plane. A week of explanation failed to convince him. Then, too, Liao must have known that if he went to Taiwan, it would fi 1 04 1 - w.-/ cit/ lei s journalist in the Washington area, who wrote under a pseudonym the article on Liao for the Hong Kong magazine North-South Pole, Ambassador Chow gave Liao three guarantees in ex- change for agreeing to visit Taiwan: (1) he could return to the United States of his own free will: (2) the Re- public of China would support him financially; and (3) they would not use him as a propaganda tool. Liu points out that Liao must have been aware that two previous defec- tors, famed violinist Ma Sitson and diplomat Chen Pal, had also agreed to such a deal. But when their plane ar- rived in Tokyo airport, Taipei put out = a statement on their behalf without consulting them. I And others say Liao, as usual, was just unable to make a decision. The half -way house Chinese, or to his loneliness and ina- bility to cope with a. strange environ- ment, or to his ingrained habits as a long-time Communist, Liao became ex- tremely suspicious and distrustful of everyone. He thought everyone worked for the Chinese government-Ameri- can, mainland or Taiwan-and seemed a little disappointed to find out his Georgetown colleagues were just ordi- nary people, McCaskey said. Once Liao received it piece of rQdical student literature urging participlrtion in a political demonstration. "I had the' hardest time trying to convince him the flyers were sent to all (Georgetown) grad students; that they didn't mean to single him out in par- ticular," McCaskey reminisced. Liao imagined colleagues joking about hint. Ile was disturbed by police sirens during his nights of insomnia. A televised broadcast of July 4 fireworks 'only one lie ever finished. III April he rule out any remaining chance of re- sent him panic stricken into the street, returned to his dull copying job, re- tturning to the mainland, hone and sure someone was shooting at him. lie maining through September. lie re- fanily, iven the enmity between the hailed it taxi and drove around for fused Approved-For September. ii JA RD 84itOO499R00100011000044veiu going to Dulles Airport calling? himself unworthy of it, yet re- According to henry Liu, a Chinese with some vague idea of fleeing, be- fore he calmed down and returned home at 3 a.m. . Passionately secretive, he refused all publicity. Ile continually looked over his shoulder as he walked in the park, convinced someone was following him. Indeed, he was under surveillance, per- haps out of humanitarian more than political reasons. The CIA kept an eye on Liao even after he moved from Wisconsin Avenue to his own tiny efficiency apartment at 1717 H St. NW in early 1970. Though he had made a few friends in the American and Chinese commu- nities early in the game, he began to turn them away. "Don't bother me," he shouted at colleagues who offered to visit. Ile had only one regular Chinese 'male visitor, Wang, and, of course, Neagoy. In the past he occasionally went to restaurants. Now he would accept invi- tations to have a northern Chinese din- ner-he disliked American food except for milk-at friends' homes, and then not show up. He preferred to eat out of moldy cans, alone. In the fall of 1970 Liao began to neg- lect his appearance badly. He fancied his food was poisoned. He became emaciated, stooped,- his teeth abscessed, and he refused to have a sty treated. "It was almost like someone going through a religious crisis,, doing pen- ance by fasting and abstinence. By the strictest ethical conduct, he distanced himself from common men who are less righteous, less literally truthful," a Georgetown mentor concluded. Alarmed he would let himself die of starvation or would commit suicide, Liao's CIA contact took him to a psy- chiatrist. He was sent to the psychiat- ric ward of the Washington Hospital Center Nov. 18, 1970, and three weeks later transferred to D.C. General's ward; The psychiatrist, who asked his name not be used because of his con- nection with the CIA, diagnosed "as se- vere a case of depression as you would want to see. I've seen a lot of schizoids like that; they can't talk to people and feel alone in a hostile world." One sign of his illness, the doctor said, was his refusal to doff his over- coat while indoors. The doctor was unable to find out anything about Liao's past, but said it was conceivable he had had such a breakdown before. In accordance with medico-legal pro-, cedure, a hearing to commit him was held Jan. 25, 1971. Many Chinese-: American friends testified on Liao's behalf. The -proceedings were dropped when the patient was discharged Feb. 11 by doctors who found him "improv- ed." Strangely enough, McCaskey re- membered, that democratic process persuaded Liao for the first time that not everyone was involved in a conspi- racy against him. lie even asked upon there'until October of that year he re- N mained generally uncommunicative with the other residents. He did not 'like eating with them. And although the kitchen is open 24 hours a day, he did not feed himself either, because he disdained a house rule requiring a per- son to clean up after himself. During that period he worked on special projects for Georgetown's Dr. Stuart. His task consisted largely of running down references in scientific journals on linguistics problems, al- though he also did some independent research. "While 'working for me he gathered more than 800 separate reference items in six different languages from a score or so different libraries," wrote Dr. Stuart. "I paid him the going rate for student help ... Although he rap- idly made himself Indispensable to me in my work, he was constantly suspi- cious that I was really only making work for him. He resigned saying that he could not take money for doing tasks that any 14-year-old boy could1 do." The halfway house frowns on resi- dents without jobs, and besides, Liao was not happy there. Determined not to accept what he considered charity, Liao moved in October, 1971 to an $18- a-week boarding house at 927 Massa- chusetts Ave. NW, the edge of Wash- ington's Chinatown. The grim old brownstone, curtains hung between its once magnificent dark woodwork doors to give a (modicum of privacy, reeks of stale food and downtrodden humanity. Liao was so furtive, it was two months before the CIA caught up with him there. ' The managers, several generations of the Lee Yew family, chatted excit- edly when told about the exotic past of their boarder. He never talked to any- one, except to say hello to the chil- dren, they said. His only visitor was the director of the halfway house who came twice. He had no job, yet seemed to be do- ing "some texts for an embassy" on his battered typewriter. He went out every afternoon for a walk. One day in May he left without saylpg goodbye ... or taking his meager belongings. This marked the resolution of the Liao story, the final phase of which be- gan in December 1971. Ile was at the bottom of a downward spiral, fore- saken he thought by the U.S. govern- ment and the Nationalist Chinese, al- ienated from his few friends, unable to get a decent job, separated without news of his family in Peking, of no use to anyone. His thoughts turned to home. That dark winter he composed a let. ter to President Nixon. In it he ex- pressed his gratitude, but said he just could not get used to the American way of life or learn enough English. he know that if he went back he would go on trial for treason. He also ex- pressed - fear of dying jar from his motherland. - The letter was turned over to the State Department which told Liao he was free to return to China. "No one tried to dissuade him," a spokesman recalled. Still Liao hesitated. "He seemed to be asking us to deport him. He wanted us to contact the (Communist) Chinese for him. We told him to contact the embassy in Otta- wa." In February 1972 Liao wrote to U.N. Ambassador Huang Ila in Now York, signifying his desire to return. Peking took its time deciding what to do with the defector.who wanted to come home. Finally, permission granted, Liao flew to Ottawa in May, then on to Shanghai. Stopping in Paris en route, Liao penned post cards to the boarding house family and a few other friends, telling them he was on his way to China. . That was the first his acquaintances here knew of his deci$ion to return- and the last they ever heard of him. "It was always in the back of my mind he was playing a double game," Mc- Caskey mused. "But if he did, it was the most fantastic game I've ever seen." There were no headlines in either the Chinese or American press. "We weren't going to publicize it," said the State Department official. "It could have been misconstrued as a deal whereby we forced him to go back." In the end Liao Ho-shu was a victim of cultural shock in America as,well as the Cultural Revolution In China. His isolation left him mentally bro- ken. His only sense of importance de- rived from the attention paid him by "the representative of the U.S. Govern- ment." The irony of this is that-what- ever the CIA first thought-Liao was not the superspy of the headlines- but in all likelihood a small fish left stranded on the shoals of international politics. Liao went ~JJ d1 {r d1@t a 20Oi'l'0/U9'u1dIIA 19Pi84= 4 1 001000't~Ft eEI IT on Conneeticu veuiie or c ise large( - tee ie ia( ninade a mistake iii c e ee - psychiatric patients. 't'hough he lived lug and wanted to correct it although 927Il o.vsa(lt u.etl.s Ave. Nlf" Approved For Release 20Q.1106109 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01 0001 I,V04-0 -Bundy T ells Ellsberg T rial ' Data Did Not Damage U.S. By MARTIN ARNOLD special to The New York Tlme, LOS ANGELES, March 9-McGeorge Bundy, one of the architects of America's Vietnam war policy, testified today that disclosure of three of the documents in the Pentagon papers case had not dama ed' --- - g the national defense. Testifying with apparent as- surance, Mr. Bundy referred to the documents as "the first cut of history" and said that they could best be understood that way, "not as an intelligence account." Mr. Bundy served as special assistant for national security, affairs to Presidents Kennedy; and Johnson and as such was called by the defense as an expert witness on three of the 19 "top secret-sensitive" docu-, ments now Involved in this trial. He spoke first of eight pages of a 4968 Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, disclosure of which theGovernment has con. tended damaged' the United States and could have been helpful to Hanoi during thel Vietnam war. Questioned by Defense Under examination by 'Charles R. Nesson, a defense attorney, he was asked If .either of those suppositions was true, and to both he an- swered, "I do not think so." Mr. Bundy, who is now presi- dent of the Ford Foundation, gave three reasons for this. One was that the most im- portant part of the document, a recommendation by the chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send 206,000 more troops to Vietnam, had become common knowledge world- wide two weeks after it was written, initially in The New in an article in The Times "had ceased to be classified Continued on Page 1U, Column 3 BUNDY SAYS DATA DID NOT HURT U.S. Continued From Page 1, Col. 6 two weeks after it was writ- ten," he said. The rest of the document, he said, was merely "an argu- ment to persuade the reader that General [William C.] West- moreland needed 206,000 more troops, an argument of a case that had less importance than a regular intelligence report." This information, he said, had a "very short. life as a secret; in the nature of things, I it was either overtaken, by Staff at the time, and General of the American troops In Viet- Staff memorandum was con- cerned, "those whose business It was to judge whether infor- mation was classified, long be- fore October, 1969, had formal- ly declassified the information" sive version of the information to be distributed in a Govern- ment Printing Office publication written by General Westmore- land, As for the two volumes of the Pentagon papers, entitled "Evolution of the War," which he was called upon to testify about, ha Said that although they "touched upon military questions,' they primarily con- cerned military events," and that the information in them "would be known to the North Vietnamese at a very great speed.". Furthermore, he said, the two documents "lost importance 4 P% I HS/IAC - fo xed or R $$9nA0t~0 i~ n%e THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 10, 197, Manner Is Assured Mr. Bundy gave his testi- mony under direct examination by Charles R. Nesson, a defense lawyer, in a calm and assured manner. He will be 53 years old, at the end of this month. He is; a slightly bald, plump man who o wears steel-rimmed eyeglasses es and who testified today in a two-button blue suit that bulged somewhat at the middle. At first, he spoke with his hands clasped before him, but later he leaned back in the wit- ness chair and faced the jury, ry, somewhat like a lecturer in a classroom. There had been some dis- sension among defense aides s over calling Mr. Bundy because e some of them did not want to o associate their cause with a man they considered one of the e prime movers of America's war policy in Vietnam.' And Mr. Bundy, was at first somewhat raluol ~4=~Q~99R00100~,~?1'0004-0 By Jfccd~ _dr~rler?GO~z Ijlack ~e~yien>;rnbassy in Iihartourn to ~ the fedayecn t holly from any commit their latest atrocitq? separate existence." Apparently, the terrorists hint; Hussein, however, had hoped to shock the world and intelligence reports of al-P'a- embarrass the Saudis in the tab's involvement in the Slacl: process by taking over thrir~ September attack upon ~Vafsi emiaassy and executing t.llrcc of their distinguished t;uc:sts, irzclueling F.znericau hnzbassa- dor Cleo Noel Jr. here is the background from secret CIA reports, which have been shown to us: 1'he I31ack September move- ment, named fo1? the month of Scpternhcr, 1070, when Iiin? Iltzssein sCaz?ted Ilia successful drive to crush the Palestinians 'fell, These reports "inclieatecligeneral counsel of ITT, said the Kin;* and his family were j that the alle~~ations in the equally tarnets of Fatah assas-;coluzrul "are completely inaa He asked King Faisal t:o send a representative to Jor- dan "to be informed in detail curate and untl?ue." "ITT never hired E. How- ard Hunt or any so-called '11Iis- siort Impossible team,' Thez?e of the evidence of Fatah's in-his no link between ITT and volvement." Faisal eountered~any of the Watergate defend- by invii.in~ Ilussein to send. a ants, or break-ins of ttzo rcpresezttativo to Saudi Ara- Chilean embassy or Chilean in Jordan, began as the terror-~ Shanqutti was immediately bia. Jordanian Ambassador diplomat's residences," Bate- ~~:. .J..A ~..: .: J. ~..~ J:J Approved For Releas~001/06/09 : C~4~ftt~0499R00100~?1,10004-0 Fay Sanford .F. Ungar Wnslxinttton Fost 61:aff Wr1LCr LOS ANCaIs'LI:S, rilarch 8--- !tn analyst for the Central In- telligence Agency charged under oath today that there had been "a definite attempt on the part of the ;Tovernment to prevent nxc from testifying" as a xvitzxess in the Pentatott Papers trial. ~,amucl A. ,Adams, wh.o was suhpoenaccl to testify in de- fcrise of llaniel )Jllsberg and Anthony J. l:usso Jc., said i.hat his su}>er?iors at tlxo CIA "lied" t.o him in an effort to dissuade him fl?otn appearinb in-federal court here. i~fter learninh of dc?t}in;;s between lisle Jttst.ice Ltepart- nxent prosecutors in this case and an assistant Ctrl rieneral counsel, Adanxs told the ,jury, he came to the conclusion that: "1 had begirt had." 'f.'he unusual testintonv zvas the first inl;lint; the ;jury ltas had of defense alle~~utious that the prosecution in this case has "sul)pressed" evidence and the top-secret documents Which they duplicated iu 19ti9 crou? tamed falsified statistics on t.lre "enemy order of batLlc." ~s a result of those stat.is-~ talking with Morton II. Hal- perin, aformer Defense De- partment ofi'icial who is a con- sultant to the defense at.tor? Heys here, that Adams learned this infor?matiou was "inaccu- witness. U.S. Distz?ict Court Jud_te VI'. Matt T3yr, ne Jr. prohibited A~l- ams from discussitx:,r some as- pects of the sit:uation--includ- ing matters that have previous- ]y occurred in court out of the presenne of the jttrp--but ad- mitted the testimony oft th?- nat?row iastte of whcth.er Ad-; ams }s "biased or prejudiced"_ against either stele in the case. 'T'hat: Was the in-,pressiou which clxief prosecutor David It. itiissen sought to ;;ive dur- inT; extended cross-cx.antina- tion of Adams toda~~. Nissen's questions were ap- parr.ntly aimed at portraying the intclliftence analyst as a- rltt'onic complainar within tYtc (;TA, wA?ho once accused top military officials of bctt>~ in al "concpir~tcy" to fabricate data on Vict.n;tmcse Communist troop stren;;ih. ;dams bas hold i}tat ~~iew for several. yeses Harr, anct U)at was the thrust of Iris ors:rinaRlp~D~O~YrBO~t?Fmcrt?R~IL her;,; slut Russo-t.Lat some of the time, Adams testified, they would have been "viri.u- Tkxc prosecution has denied 'that it made any atteml)t to suppress Adams' evidence, turn the hands of a forcit;n ~ and Gt?caney-i^ an affidavit nation's intelligence apps-~ submitted to the court two rants. When he first read neWS- p;tpcr I'CportS Of tC:;tlrnony to t.lxe i?ontrarv from a prosecu- weeks ado--said the allegation that he sou~~ht. to persuade the CIr1. analyst not to testify was `absolutely false." lion witness, Lt, Geti. 'iZ'illiam i -\ciams has now boon on the G, DePuc, Adams ttr~red his I v'itnesti stand for t1)rea days,' supcrtors t:o s.ctxd internal Cla fat lon~~cr than originally memoranda he hacl written on the "order of battle" to the Justice Department for trans- mission to the court here. '.!'he intelligence analyst felt that he had evidence which might tend to establish the ;i!?nocence of the defendants -namely, that U.S. military officials had itttcntionaily un- derestimaied the opposing forces }n Victaiam its order to ~ create "l:he impression that. tYlerc was lihht at the end of tliC t11nT1C1." (~uestionecl by the jucl~.~e this afternoon, Adams said anumpated, and tlns has de-: !laved the ttatimony o1.' i1lc-~. Gcor~e I3undy, tivtto was na-~ Itional security adviser to thei hate Presidents l~ennedy and' Johnson and is now president of tYte }~ ord h"oundat-ion. IC was also revealed in cotn?t ~ today that the defense had subpoenaed a recently retired ~ :1rmy colonel, Gaines lia~vk- itis, of 1Pcst Yoint, ilTississippi, 1o cor?r?oboratc Adams' tests-~ moray on the alleged fabrica- tion of the "order of battle" ~ but that. Hawkins on arrival in Los .~neles had declined to cooperate. with defense at? torneys and bad been dis- ~hc was "advised by assistants missed from the subpoena. CI.~ Gc~ncral Counsel John IL. Grearxcy ghat his went-~ rands had been submitted to the court, only to learn later that. they had not at the lime actually been turned over to the ,jud,(c. Greanev told Adtuns in a written mcnxo on I' gib. 9 that, ~ aecordin~; to a message trans-. nutted from \isscn throul;h the Justice I)eparhnent, tttc ~ jucl~;c had decided the rna-~ iterial Was not- "esculpr;arle C. Wheeler, iduct will be dealt with in a then _Chairman of the Jointltvay other than just a wax'n? Chiefs of Staff, assessing the ing," ! , WASHI~;GTOi1 POST deciding who should bey in- No Communist units was en- added "the people" to .Adams' chart of the components in the Vietnamese Communist "This case is not bein t ied HS/HC-/lA~r ved For Release 2001/06/09 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000110004-0 Approved For Release~pb1/06/09 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000004-0 ~ ~ ~$ Wednesday,Marc>