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December 12, 2016
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December 18, 2000
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December 19, 1973
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Approved For Rdse 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-00499RQ01~00120001-2 ~~~~~ ~~ro~s~~~ New York'ISmes Newe Service NEW YORK -Many of the major news-gathering organizations say they' would fire any correspon- dent who was also found to be working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Their stands were made known following the recent disclosure in the Washing- ton Star-News that the CIA had about three dozen American newsmen working ,abroad on its payroll as undercover informants or as ,full-time intelligence agents who use journalism as their cover. In addition, over the years, the agency has at- tempted to recruit newsmen working in the United States to supply it with domestic intelligence. Interviews with news offi- cials indicated that the idea that newsmen would work for any government agency, including the CIA, was pro- foundly disturbing for,news- gathermg organizations,,for ~t raised the question'of credibility of any news that such an agent-journalist would file. KEITH FULLER, vice president and assistant general manager of the Associated Press, said, "We would npt permit it for one moment: We don't want our people working for any gov- ernment agency, under any circumstances." The AP has nearly 800 full-time employes working overseas, and nearly 850 ' `stringers" -journalists who usually work for them- selves and sell news arti- cles, one at a time, to news organizations. Most foreign news that appears in American news- papers and is reported on radio and television here is supplied by either the AP or .the United Press Interna- tional, which has about 600 full-time employes over- seas. Both organizations said that they would imme- diately dismiss any come- ; spondent found to be work- ing also for the'CIA. "I'm satisfied that none of our Reople, are .involved with the CIA," 'said H.L. Stevenson, UPI managing editor. "And our Washing- ton manager is satisfied that we are clear." in response to queries, the CIA has assured the New York Times, where dismissal would be immedi- ate, and Time magazine and the Star-News, among others, that their corres- pondents were not con- nected with the agency. But Fred Taylor, manag- ing editor of.the Wall Street Journal, said that the agen- cy would not admit it if it had a valuable agent who was also a newsman. William E. Colby, direc- tor of Central Intelligence, has indicated that full-time staff correspondents work? ing for general circulation news-gathering arganiza~ tions will be phased out of CIA work but that about 30 others-mostly agents wha work abroad as free-lance writers and stringers-will continue to be maintained. Malcolm Browne, a -New York Times foreign corre- spondent, said that when he was working for UPI in Sai- gon there were. a number of ' foreign correspondents he ' believed were working at least, in part, for the agen- cy. , One New York Times cor-. respondent, Juan de Onis,. said that when he worked in Latin America and South A-22 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS * Washington, D. C., Wednesday, December 19, 1973 America there "were some (American journalists] who seemed to have developed unusually close relations, ;which have served the .agency in putting out its line." He said he felt the agency tried to use correspondents to manage the news -that. 'is, to write articles reflect- ing the desires of the agen- cy. DURING the revolution in the Dominican Republic in 1965, De Onis and Martin Arnold of The Times were approached by an agent of the CIA who had with him a large pile of documents. The documents: were pur- ported, by the,~agent to show that the-Dominican revolt tion was being conducted t orders from Communists z Europe. TYiis was the Joh;- son administration's contei tion. De Onis, an expert on La, in American affairs, dr. clined to write an artic:i because, he said, there w~' no way to determine whet:'.. er or not the documen were authentic. ved For Release 2001/12/04 :.CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2 Approved For Rele~e 2001/12/04 `. CIA-RDP84-00499R0 Hunt ~a~~ ~e~ E. Howard Hunt Jr. has told Senate Watergate in- vestigators he directed a small-scale surveillance of Sen. Barry Goldwater, R- Ariz., during the 1964 presi- dential campaign on in- structions from his superi- ors at the Central Intelli- The operatives, one of whom may have been a woman, obtained advance campaign schedules, news releases, and "any other information they could get," Hunt told the investi- gators. Hunt said he reported gence.Agency. _ such information to his su- the orders for the spying operation on Goldwater's Washington campaign head- - quarters "had come down from the White House." He indicated that at least one of his superiors was sta- tioned at the White House, the sources said. -Hunt indicated at least one of his superiors was sta- tioned at the White House, the sources said. AT THE TIME, the sources said, Hunt was in charge of a downtown Washington office for the CIA. A SPOKESMAN for the CIA declined to comment on the reported accounts of Hunt's testimony. . Hunt served with the CIA 20 years before quitting to go to work for a Washington public relations firm and later to take on an assign- HUNT, NOW serving a 2'/z- to 8-year prison term for his role in the Watergate burglary, revealed the Goldwater surveillance dur- ing an interview Monday with Republican staff mem- bers of the Watergate com- mittee, who have been prob- ing the CIA role in the bur- glary and bugging of Demo- cratic National Committee Headquarters. "It was only discussed for a minute or two," one source said. , Hunt told the investiga- tors he did not participate in the spying operation it- self, but rather - on orders from his CIA superiors -~, "dispatched a couple of people to the Goldwater ', headquarters to sec what was going on." Goldwater that. year op- posed President Lyndon Johnson and lost the elec- tion in a landslide. Goldwa- ter has maintained he was the object of a spying effort similar to the one carried out at the Watergate. H~~~b"~' ment far the White House, including membership in a group known as "the plumb- ers" assigned to try to stop leaks of classified informa- tion. Sources said Hunt gave the investigators the names of his former CIA superiors who allegedly ordered the surveillance, but no deci- sion has been made yet on whether they will be ques- tioned. If Hunt's information is correct, the sources said, the CIA would have been violating a law forbidding it to conduct domestic opera- tions. "It's kind of up in the air right now," one source satd, noting that the Senate pan- el's mandate is limited to matters relating to the 1972 -presidential campaign. "This is very interesting. and important, but we're not going to try to squeeze every last ounce out of it," one minority staff aide said. I~ Q - lac. -q ~ G 7 3 Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-00499R00100a120001-2' Approved For Ruse 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004991000120001-2 A 18 Thu~sd ?-,~ cepted. t Accordingly, I omitted the red erences from my book and loft it to others to reveal the secret; monitoring method. Not untilon?,r ,a than 1'L hours, according to in-'w;th President Soda h ?-;ats, terviews with Uni~tcd States+ officials and Soviet, Israeli and~v'as near a state ,,iiapse. European diplomats, but the' h- addition the, an III crucial exchange-delivery ofl~'''rps, on the east bank. vi the Uhe Brezhnev note and the call- Suez Canal opposite ae cit} nog of the alert-took place in of Suez, faced encircic~~nt:nt ay r less than an hour, approximate- the Israelis as a re ,ult at the 1y between 10:40 and 11:30 P.M. Continued on Page 17, Column 1 pproved-For,Release 2001/12/04: CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-~' ,. Approved For f~elease 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-0049~,~001000120001-2 `Implied Soviet Threat L-ed to U. S. MilitaryA. Continued From Page 1, Col. 7 Israeli crossing to the western . bank .early that morning. Mr. Kosygin.returned to Mos- ' coW Oct. i9 urging that the Soviet Government press far an immediate .cease-fire in the Middle East war, ? which was then in its 14th day. Mr. Brezh- nev thereupon invited President Nixon to send Mr. Kissinger to Moscow, and. the Secretary ar- home from Moscow. Four hours from demanding a mere real-?viet weapons, to the Suez bat- after he had left, Israeli forces firmation of the cease-fire res- went en to cgmp]ete their en- olution of Oct. 22-a reaffirma- circlement of the Egyptian III Uon was voted Oct. 23, and the new truce went into effect Corps, an action he heard about Oct. 24-to a resolution au- later, reportedly with great dis- thorizing an expeditionary may and a sense of betrayal. force far the Suez region, to While the Russians were said a'resolution authorizing aUnit- to. have been outraged at what ed States-Soviet expeditionary force. they regarded as a breach of The intelligence community, their "Oct. 21 understanding drawing principally on elec- with the Americans, they also tropic surveillance of Soviet ? rived the next day. I~"'?.'" "- ~"- - ,tablish alarge Soviet presence Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev reached a compromise in which Moscow won its point that no time could be lost in achieving a cease-fire, while the Ameri- cans won their point of that the cease-fire must be linked to negotiations between ?the " Arabs anti Israelis. The, joint cease-fire ?proposa] they? agreed upon was adopted by the United Nations Security Council early Oct. 22, atnd the "-truce in place ,officially went - into effect .about i2 hours later. in the Middle East and they re- portedly solicited President Sa- dat's Oct. 24 call for United States and 5aviet troops. A United States official fa- miliar with the event said the original Brezhnev proposal on Oct. 24 ~ for a ~o~nt United States-Soviet force for the Mid- dle East made Mr. Kissinger apprehensive that tougher mo- ments were ahead. Mr. Kissinger was also get- ting. what he later described as "puzzling" reports from the United Nations. There the So- viet representative, Yakov A. tool an, that day on his waylMallik, had shifted suddenly land, sea and air forces, had already noted the presence of seven landing craft and two ships with troop helicopters in eastern Mediterranean waters. The landing craft had been there 17efore, "milling around," as one intelligence official put it,. recalling tha.C a week before there had been e~ighC~ landing craft in the eastern Mediter- ranean. r Troop Standby Monitored Electronic surveillance had also monitored signals putting; seven divisions of Soviet fir borne troops - about 49,000 men - on a standby alert. One division had been placed on a higher level of alert during the day, making i ready to move' out on call. But, the intelligence official observed, there had been 50-, vier alerts before during the~l Middle East conflict, which began Oct. 6, and anore Soviet landing craft in the region. So the activities of Soviet forces on Oct. 24 by themselves had 'caused no undue alarm at the Defense Department, one of the officials said. Still the Soviet Air Force had pulled most of its large trans- ports back from Damascus and Cairo to their home bases that day and some Pentagon official interpreted this as a sign that ~Moscaw might usethem to take (Soviet troops, rather than So-meeting- of what Mr. ~chles-' Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2 tie zone. When the second Brezhnev note came at about 10:40 P,M.~ warning that the Soviet Union "may be obliged to. consider acting alone," the responsible American officials-principally Secretary Kissinger and De- fense Secretary James R., Schlesinger-put that together with the electronic intelligence evidence and concluded that the Soviet Union was deter- mined to put troops in the Mid- dle East . Suggestion to President . Describing the situation later, one of the Cabinet officials in- voived in the decision-making said of the second note and the intelligence estimates, "Eithdr one, apart, we could have ignored." Ambassador Dobrynin -left the the second note with Mr. Kis- singer without obtaining a reply. The Secretary of State im- mediately telephoned President Nixon, who was i?n his upper floor living quarters in the White House and suggested the United States response should be military as well as political, Mr. Nixon concurred. This was tiro genesis of the United States alert. President Nixon remained in charge throughout, his aides say, but he was also remote, staying the entire night in his White House apartment and re- ceiving the telephone messages of Mr. Kissinger "and Mr: Schlesinger. Mr. Nixon em- powered them to manage the crisis an their awn, the Cabinet official said, leaving ?them to conceive and carry out thel various moves. Mr. Kissinger convoned a;. Approved For lease 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-00499Fj001000120001-2 , lert and a Test of Wi11s, Capital Aides Report 'finger later termed "the abbre- viated National Security Coun- cil" in the austere, map-filled ;Situation Room 4n the White ,House basement. It was abbreviated ' in part .because the chairman of what had been asix-man panel, ]?resi- dent Nixon,. was upstairs. Mr. Kissinger was there ?in his dual capacity as Secretary of State and the President's assistant for national ,security affairs. Another chair .was empty be- cause Spiro T. Agnew had re- signed, and there was no di- rector of the Office of Emergen- cy Preparedness since George A. Lincoln had retired. 4 months before. Security Council met at aboutja United States official said: Through Mr. Scali, Mr. Kis- I 1 P.M., and Mr. Kissinger and ^No, the alert itself was a" sig- singer was working to get the Mr. Schlesinger swiftly agrecd~nal which we knew they would Soviet Union to agree to a new on a modified alert as thei et through their owri electronic resolution in the Security Coun- United States military response g designed to persuade the Soviet intelligence." cil setting up apeace-keeping Union against acting alone. I Ilcightened United States force for the disputed Suez The technical torm for theimilitary activity could clearly region. alert is Defense Condition 3, ~ be discerned through the amount explained by a Pentagon offi- and nature of the radio traffic, Reply to Brezhnev Drafted riot as "an order to stand by it was said. Finally, Mr. Kissinger. drafted far further orders that may Mr. Kissinger was busy, mean- a reply to the last Brezhnev come." It is an order any area while, an the diplomatic front. note saying the United States commander can issue without He conferred repeatedly from would not tolerate a unilateral higher authority if he feels }tis the outset of the American- action by the Soviet Union, forces may be threatened. (Soviet exchanges with Israel's hoped that Moscow would not Mr. Schlesinger. is said to Ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, ad- take that course, and warned have issued it,at 11:30 P. M., vising him of Soviet and Unit- that any such move would dam- and it was passed to the service ed States moves. age the cause of peace. He also chiefs by Admiral Moores About 1 A.M. he told the Brit- called for joint action in the i "Officially the meeting ron-I While the service chiefs were fish Ambassador, the Earl of United Nations. sisted of Kissinger, Kissingcrlayrare of the moverrtcnts of Cromer, of the note and the That done, according to an and Schlesinger," a council aide Soviet military units, they were alert. Other members of the aide, a weary Mr. Kissinger commented, said to be so surprised by the~North Atlantic Treaty Organi- walked upstairs and reported Attending as the intelti?;ence diplomatic, messages that they zation were informed through to President Nixon and ob- adviser was William E. Colby, sent. an aide to the C.LA. and the meohanism of the North At- tained his "ratification" of'the Director of Central Intelligence,ithe State Department to seek ' whose agency had played a ma- jor role in handling the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and 'was now on the sidelines. Mr. Colby had been called in belatedly. '-The C.LA- was familiar with the electronic intelligence ob- tained by its powerful sister agency, t]te National Security Agency, but it. was not apprised of the Soviet notes until Mr. ,Colby'.arrived .at the White House. Haig's Role Described Attending as the military ad- viser was Adm. Thoma:~ H. Moorer, Chairman of the. Joint ~Chicfs of Skiff. Mr. Schlesinger had been. told of the second Soviet note by Alexander M. Haig Jr., chief of the White House staff.. He, in turn called Admiral Mo~arer. General Haig functioned ,more 'as a go-between than as a member of the decision-making group, aides said. The abbreviated National further word on Soviet inten- tions. I-Te apparently returned empty-handed. The Washington order alerted most but not all United States forces. The Coast Guard, with its vital air-sea rescue system, was not brought in until 12 }lours later. Strategic Air Com- mand tanker planes hovering along the United States-to- Israel airlift route were left in Llteir Middle Atlantic patterns rather than sent north for pos- sible fueling of long-range B-52 bombers. Mr. Schlesinger returned to the Pentagon about 1:30 A.M. to bolster the alert by ordering the aircraft carrier Joltn F. Ken- nedy from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean with her A-4 fighter-bombers and telling-the 15,000-man 82d Airborne Divi- sion at Fart Bragg, N. C., to get ready to board transport craft. Asked if the Soviet Undbn had been notified oaf the aler0, ]antic Council in Brussels, which moves, including the second was advjsed of the alert by the note to Mr. Brezhnev. It was . Defense Department about 2 about 3 A.M. on Oct. 25, three A.M. Pentagon officials say the and a halt hours after lire alert news went out to the alliance had been called. capitals much later because of At his news conferonce at a foul-up in the Brussels com- noon, the Secretary publicly re- munication machinery. minded Moscow- that both the In retrospect, however, also- Soviet Union and the United elates of Mc Kissinger acknowl- States had nuclear arsenals edge that the 'crisis-managers "capable oP annihilating hu- "botched" the job of promptly ntanity," but that they also had informing United States oiliest"a special duty to see to it on the night's actions. ithat confrontations are kept "We could have called up alllwithin bounds." the top allies," said a United! An hour or so later, both States official. "But it miglatcountries joined in the 14-to-0 have ttleant delaying the alert." vote by which the iJnited Na- Mr. Kissinger was also in lions Security Council decided touch with the United Stales to establish a United Nation$ delegate to the United Nations, peace-keeping force excluding John A. Scalf, who had just the major powers-a move that been through some bruising ex- in effect brought the American- changes with Mr. Malik. Sovie texchanges to an end. The Soviet delegate had ac- And in those exchanges, of- cused the United States of al- ficials noted, the hot-line tele- lowing Israel to violate the type machine that connects cease-fire of Oct. 22 and make ashington and Moscow was territorial gains. never used. Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2 I Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-00499~Q01000120001-2 ~rx~; w~sAlvr~~,otir ~osr Iiy Laurence Stern Nasllln?ton Post Stat1 writer ?Che current, and former di- rectors of the Central Inteili- t;encc Agency denied, to sena- torial questianers that they h::d any advance knowledge of the 4Vaterdate burglary. "1"Ste issue was opened up Burin; a Senate Armed Scrv- ices Committee closed ltearin,ti ~?esterday to hear testimony by free-lance writer Andrew St. George and by CIA Direc- tor William 1;. Colby. 13ut Colby did acknowledge that one of the convicted ltfatergate conspirators- Euge- t~o ?Martinez, alerted the CIA to 1~:. Howard Aunt's presence iri i\4iami late in 1971 and a;ain in Marcia, 1972, .ht the time R'fartinez was working for Hunt's burglary i.eam, which lead already bur- ~*Iarized the effice of Daniel F;IIs'uerg's psychiatrist, and }\Tartinez was also employed as a contract employee of the CT;1. Colby's allusion to the Mar- tin,ci incident was made in a written response to n series of questions by Sen. Howard Baker (I2-Terut.), vice chair- man' of. the Senate Watergate committee. According to Colby's ac- count, b!fartincz advised a CIA 11liarni field rr_preseutative of Ilunt's whereabouts and the report was passed on to CIA headquarters. -CTA headquarters, said Colby, told the Miaftti. supervisor that "hc.should not; concern himself wit}i,the travel of Mr. HunC who was an employee of the White House undoubtedly on domestic White House busi- ness of no interest to CIA," ac- to Colby's latesC state- z~fent, _...~. RICHARD HELri7:S ,- 'Chia incident occurrca se- ueral ntontlts after the CIA terminated technical assist- ance to .T-Iunb including the xupply of spy paraphernalia, which was used in the >Jlls- berd burglary. CTA officials siisid they cut off Hunt in Au- tu~-t, 1971, because they came to fire conclusion that the re- qur:;ts were improper-even' tltouh they were made under Wbae HOt1Se auspices. ~~One oP the allegations made by tit. Georgo, in an article in ~ the current ITarper's . mah*a-' ri:ne,~ is that 14lartinez was se- r~:?etly reporting to the CIA on life activities of the White T:T;ouse burglary team under Bunt's supervision. ; 5atttrday, ~Vou. l7,1J73 ...tx '['his was denied by Colbyy and by Helms, in a separate written statement. Helms also denied a claim by St. George that he had a 'conversation with a CIA watch .officer the morning after the Watergate break-in acknowl- crlging that he was tipped off to t.hc operation. The St. George article claimed the watch officer called Helms on the morninh of Jttne 17, 1972, and told }tim of the arrest of "the White House crew." It quotes Helms as responding, "ah, well, they Finally did it." Helms' statement, released yesterday by Sen. Stuart Sym- in ;ton (D-Mo.), said: "I am prepared to swear that no such conversation ever took place." St. George invoked the First Amendment in refusing to identify his source for the re- port during ,yesterday's execu- tive session, according to Sym- ington. The free-lance writer, a self- 'described adventurer with a heavy Hungarian accent, said he would consult with officials of Harper's before returnin; to testify before' the Senate committee next Wednesday. St. George was interviewed at length earlier this week by Baker and Senate Watergate committee minority counsel Fred D. Thompson. Baker has displayed a per? sistent interest in the question of possible CIA involvement in Watergate. Symington, on the other hand, has been a staunc}t defender of Helms for having withstood White I~ourle pressures to involved CIA in Life Watergate cover-ug. :~ tr A ved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2 a~~;1~~: - ~J (~ Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2 '1'TTI; N~1tiTTT~\G1'ON P~)7Z' ..R 13y T.aurence Stern Wnshlnaton Post Slntf Wrllcr T~cars chat sensitive CTA Ol)Cl'atI011:i mi.~hL be compro- mised by "leakage in the h'~i" led Prichard 1VI. Helms, tl]c agency's former direc- tor, to propose sharply dc- fiued limits on the Water- gate investigation in 1Z~Ierico. TTelms was also concerned about an :@'13I "fishinh cxpc- dition into CIA operations" when he laid down guido- lines 11 days after the Watergate breal:-in designed to confine the FP,I's inquir- ies to "personalities already arrested ~or directly under suspicion." this was the gist of four- pagc merorandum submit- ted yesterday by CIA Direc- tor William L. Colby to Scn. Stuart Symington (D-MoJ, acting chairman of the Scu- ate Armed Service Committee. Colby's memo was in- tended to clear up wl]at; he described as "recent specu- lation in t3]e press and else- where" over an , apparent conflict between a June 23, 1972, memo from Helms to his ~lepu'ty, Gen. Vernon 1Valters, and testimony by IIelms to five congressional committees and 'federal ZVatergate prosecutors. 'CI]is conflict was first mentioned-altl]ou;_;h Zi?ith- out. any spcclfic reference to I-Ielms-b;;r former ~i'at, r- gate Special Yrosecutar :ir- ~chibald Cox in an appcsn'- ance last week before the Senate Judiciary Commit- tee. Cos said he had evi- dence that a major witness in the Watergate inquiry had ,sharply contradicted his testimony in a memorandum that had come to the attcu- tion of the prosecuting staff. The newly surfaced 1972 m,cmo instructed Walters that "we (the CT,~) still ad- here to the request that they (the T'BI) confine t]]em- sclves to the personalities ah?eady arrested or directly under suspicion and that they desist from expending this investigation into other areas which may Well, even- tually, rtut afoul of our oper? a 1.10115." Rut [Ich]ls and \Valtcrs have repeatedly testified that they told White IIouse officials and former P'BI Acting Director 1.. I'atriclc Gray III that the ZV`atcrrat-c investigation illltcxico Would not jcop:~~d~rc any C l:\ actlVttle5. Colby's memo l.o Syming? ton ailudecJ to a strong sansc of susl)iciuu witl]in t.'lc Cl.\ ot~cr the prospec- t.ive 1~BI invest-igation of the 11"atergatc scandal's i~Icxi- can connection. IIe cited as one'ingrcdient of the CIA's concern Gray's p^rsistence -despite rcpeat- ocl denials by I-3clms - "in queryin, the Agency about possible CTA involvement in the Watergate incident." IIe also recalled that the i~'BT refused to inform ti]c CiA on June 22, 1.972, of the status of its investiill have to forget me forcibly, rubbing me of j' the blackboard. My heart uxxs inexhaustible. Pablo Neruda, 19041973 In Santiago the generals are executing people. In ~? Santiago the generals say they haven't killed as many ' -~ as the refugees say they have. In Santiago They are burning books, Marx, ]Viso Tse-tuug and the Marxist ? '. Neruda, Chile's Nobel Laureate. Rub him off the black- . board, not dead a week from cancer or other causes. In Santiago they warehouse the political prisoners. In Washington the new government is recognized and the denials flow. After three years of using every eco- nomic lever to destroy the Chilean government, they ' tell us it wasn't a CIA hitman whose machine gun chaffered the teeth out of Allende's skull. But hard on those assertions we have Howard Hunt, the 20-year CIA -man, giving us an on-camera demonstration . of the kind of people that agency hires, pramotes and com- mends. If Howard Hunt told you the CIA didn't have anything to do with Watergate in Washington or mur- der and incarceration in Chile, would you believe him? P'or the first time, t:he Ervin hearings have given us a chance to judge (CIA personnel. Recently we've seen hunt, and last summer, another retired CIA career ~r~an, J.rmcs W. McCord, was on t9ze stand displaying his kind of incompetence and deficient judgment. is that whole place, into which it is estimated we put sonze- thin~; Like ~6 bullion a year, stocked with such people? ~ have we armed and paid for an army of marauding simpletons who know how to plot cheeseball coup d'etats but are so out of contact with reality they think a major party candidate for fhe presidency could be on Fidel Castro's payroll? It's possible, since they have made a . career of putting major party politicians i~n other .countries on their payrol~a. i . ? I3S/HC- ~J ~a Nor does it seem to get better further up the line in 'the agency. The CIA's new boss, William E. Colby, distinguished himself in Vietnam as an architect of the Phoenix program of political assassination and midnight arrest. The society he helped build is one even a Russian might nave difficulty adjusting to. A generation ago CIA monkeyshines may have made some sense. Perhaps in 1953 overthrowing Premier Mohammed Mosadeg~h of Iran did save the oil for us and perhaps it was worth it if you think we must do such things to survive. But Allende's downfall isn't going to save the American copper mines or ITT's in- vestments. The nationalization of American interests in Chile was voted for unanimously by the Chilean eon- gress. The generals can't stay in power and hand them back to their former stockholders in New York. Chilean democracy may never be restored, but neither will we; is another anti-American dictator like Peron in Argentina preferable to an Allende? A William Corby or a Howard Hunt may have what they think is a rational answer to that question; a Henry Kissinger may tell us what's done is done, the generals are in power, and we have no more right to meddle in their internal affairs than we have to pass the Jackson amend- ment and meddle in Russia's. The rest of us may ponder whether we ,are caught up in a gangbustering, nonfdealogical careening around the world. Wo send killers into Cuba to get Castro, and perhaps ho sends them back to got Kennedy. Brezhnev comes here and campaigns for Nixon. We give him wheat and campaign for him in Russia; which gives us title to help Thieu lack up 200,000 political prison- ers, and the Chilean generals bomb the Moneda Palace. A CIA world with Solzhenitsyn suppressed in Russian and Neruda burnt in Santiago, rubbed off the black- board.- But he won't be, and you don't have to be an idealist to know that. At night they hand-copy the forbidden texts in Russia; now they'll go into the moun- tains, into the Andes, to do the same with Neruda. pp 1973, Thy Wsahinston Poet/H1nR Fs~tiura ~sndie~b _...Ap.proved For Release.2001/12/0.4~A-RnP84-0049980010001,~,QQ1-~~,,~,_~, Appro~l For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP8~0499R001000120001-2 A-6 ~r 1NA,SNdPJG?t~Fl S7A(8-N~i/S Washington, D. C., friday, September 21, 1973 ~~ta ` fact, commit suicide or whether he was shot down The State Department is formally denying as "ab- surd" the claim of Salvador Allende's widow that the CIA secretly financed polit- ical opponents of the late Chilean president's regime, which was overthrown in a military coup-last week. Earlier, the department's ranking official in Latin American affairs had pro- voked a .spate of rumors. over Mrs. Allende's charges by refusing to discuss them in a public congressional hearing yesterday. Assistant Secretary of State Jack D. Kubisch oth- erwise went to great lengths to deny any i1.S. responsi- bility for the coup, either through political or military intervention or through economic pressures. He was testifying before a House Foreign Affairs subcommit- tee. WHEN CONFRONTED with Mrs. Allende's charges, which were broad- cast yesterday through a New York Times interview, Kubisch said the question was too sensitive to be dis- cussed in public and was better reserved for a closed-door session. When reporters pointed out to him after the hearing that his refusal to discuss the question left open an implication that the United States, in fact, had helped anti-Allende groups, Ku- bischsaid this was not what he intended to imply. But he 6~` 2 _~ again refused to discuss the matter. Later, the State Depart- ment issued .through its press office a specific deni- al of Mrs. Allende's charge that the CIA helped finance dissident Chilean truck owners whose nationwide strike during the summer brought the country to the brink of chaos, helping to set the stage for the coup. e The administration has no precise knowledge.; whether Allende did, in , by his captors, as some of ', his supporters have claimed. ? The administration has not yet made a formal deci- sion to establish diplomatic relations with the new gov- ` ernment, but the likelihood is that the decision will be made soon . ~ The administration had' 'received "some reports of a; confidential nature" con-' corning claims by the junta that large quantities of So ` viet block arms had been stockpiled by Allende sup- porters before the coup. In discussing the reported stockpiling by Chilean left- ists of East European arms, for example, Kubisch re- . fused to go further than his' hint that the State Depart- . ment had received intelli- gence reports about those stockpiles. He offered to . expand on the subject be- hind closed doors. KUBISCH TOOK special pains to deny the claim of , many liberal commentators that U.S. economic policies forced political chaos on the Allende regime by denying international loans to the faltering Chilean economy. ~. "There was no hidden blockade" of Chile, Kubisch declared. "The fault was. internal." Kubisch noted that previ- ously committed Agency for International Development and Food for Peace loans "SUCH SUGGESTIONS are absurd," the depart- ment disclaimer said. "The United States played no part, financial or otherwise, in that strike or in the other stoppages or protests mounted by the opposition to Allende" In his testimony yester- day, Kubisch was otherwise sweeping in his denials of U.S. involvement. He also denied that Washington had any specific foreknowledge of the coup, but he admit- ted that officials here have been expecting some such move by the Chilean mili- tary for several months. Denials had been issued repeatedly by government press officials over the past week, but Kubisch's state- ment at a hearing on the Chile coup marked the first time that a responsible gov- ernment official has made these points publicly. Touching on a variety of questions raised since the overthrow of President Sal- vador Allende and his vio- lent death, Kubisch said: continued to the Allende regime, even though some ~w700 million in U.S. corpo- rate assets were expropriat- ed and some $100 million in international debts were defaulted. He noted that internation- al banks extended some $83 million in loans . to Chile ? from 1971 to 1973, which he termed an increase over the yearly average in pre-Al- lende days. Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2 Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-0049Q~01000120001-2 SEGUR/TY THRF.~7' FF.4RED ~~~ ~~G`~$~ ~~ ~~~ xs~xc- y ~'~ IIY Oswald Johnston star-News Scuff writer .Victor L. Marchetti, the one-time CIA agent who lost a c