PRESS OFFICIALS SCORE CIA 'NEWSMEN'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000120001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

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~~~~~ ~~ro~s~~~
New York'ISmes Newe Service
NEW YORK -Many of
the major news-gathering
organizations say they'
would fire any correspon-
dent who was also found to
be working for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Their stands were made
known following the recent
disclosure in the Washing-
ton Star-News that the CIA
had about three dozen
American newsmen working
,abroad on its payroll as
undercover informants or as
,full-time intelligence agents
who use journalism as their
cover.
In addition, over the
years, the agency has at-
tempted to recruit newsmen
working in the United
States to supply it with
domestic intelligence.
Interviews with news offi-
cials indicated that the idea
that newsmen would work
for any government agency,
including the CIA, was pro-
foundly disturbing for,news-
gathermg organizations,,for
~t raised the question'of
credibility of any news that
such an agent-journalist
would file.
KEITH FULLER, vice
president and assistant
general manager of the
Associated Press, said, "We
would npt permit it for one
moment: We don't want our
people working for any gov-
ernment agency, under any
circumstances."
The AP has nearly 800
full-time employes working
overseas, and nearly 850
' `stringers" -journalists
who usually work for them-
selves and sell news arti-
cles, one at a time, to news
organizations.
Most foreign news that
appears in American news-
papers and is reported on
radio and television here is
supplied by either the AP or
.the United Press Interna-
tional, which has about 600
full-time employes over-
seas. Both organizations
said that they would imme-
diately dismiss any come-
; spondent found to be work-
ing also for the'CIA.
"I'm satisfied that none of
our Reople, are .involved
with the CIA," 'said H.L.
Stevenson, UPI managing
editor. "And our Washing-
ton manager is satisfied
that we are clear."
in response to queries,
the CIA has assured the
New York Times, where
dismissal would be immedi-
ate, and Time magazine and
the Star-News, among
others, that their corres-
pondents were not con-
nected with the agency.
But Fred Taylor, manag-
ing editor of.the Wall Street
Journal, said that the agen-
cy would not admit it if it
had a valuable agent who
was also a newsman.
William E. Colby, direc-
tor of Central Intelligence,
has indicated that full-time
staff correspondents work?
ing for general circulation
news-gathering arganiza~
tions will be phased out of
CIA work but that about 30
others-mostly agents wha
work abroad as free-lance
writers and stringers-will
continue to be maintained.
Malcolm Browne, a -New
York Times foreign corre-
spondent, said that when he
was working for UPI in Sai-
gon there were. a number of '
foreign correspondents he '
believed were working at
least, in part, for the agen-
cy. ,
One New York Times cor-.
respondent, Juan de Onis,.
said that when he worked in
Latin America and South
A-22 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
* Washington, D. C., Wednesday, December 19, 1973
America there "were some
(American journalists] who
seemed to have developed
unusually close relations,
;which have served the
.agency in putting out its
line."
He said he felt the agency
tried to use correspondents
to manage the news -that.
'is, to write articles reflect-
ing the desires of the agen-
cy.
DURING the revolution in
the Dominican Republic in
1965, De Onis and Martin
Arnold of The Times were
approached by an agent of
the CIA who had with him a
large pile of documents.
The documents: were pur-
ported, by the,~agent to show
that the-Dominican revolt
tion was being conducted t
orders from Communists z
Europe. TYiis was the Joh;-
son administration's contei
tion.
De Onis, an expert on La,
in American affairs, dr.
clined to write an artic:i
because, he said, there w~'
no way to determine whet:'..
er or not the documen
were authentic.
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 Approved For Rele~e 2001/12/04 `. CIA-RDP84-00499R0
Hunt ~a~~ ~e~
E. Howard Hunt Jr. has
told Senate Watergate in-
vestigators he directed a
small-scale surveillance of
Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-
Ariz., during the 1964 presi-
dential campaign on in-
structions from his superi-
ors at the Central Intelli-
The operatives, one of
whom may have been a
woman, obtained advance
campaign schedules, news
releases, and "any other
information they could
get," Hunt told the investi-
gators.
Hunt said he reported
gence.Agency. _ such information to his su-
the orders for the spying
operation on Goldwater's
Washington campaign head-
- quarters "had come down
from the White House." He
indicated that at least one
of his superiors was sta-
tioned at the White House,
the sources said.
-Hunt indicated at least
one of his superiors was sta-
tioned at the White House,
the sources said.
AT THE TIME, the
sources said, Hunt was in
charge of a downtown
Washington office for the
CIA.
A SPOKESMAN for the
CIA declined to comment on
the reported accounts of
Hunt's testimony.
. Hunt served with the CIA
20 years before quitting to
go to work for a Washington
public relations firm and
later to take on an assign-
HUNT, NOW serving a
2'/z- to 8-year prison term
for his role in the Watergate
burglary, revealed the
Goldwater surveillance dur-
ing an interview Monday
with Republican staff mem-
bers of the Watergate com-
mittee, who have been prob-
ing the CIA role in the bur-
glary and bugging of Demo-
cratic National Committee
Headquarters.
"It was only discussed for
a minute or two," one
source said. ,
Hunt told the investiga-
tors he did not participate
in the spying operation it-
self, but rather - on orders
from his CIA superiors -~,
"dispatched a couple of
people to the Goldwater ',
headquarters to sec what
was going on."
Goldwater that. year op-
posed President Lyndon
Johnson and lost the elec-
tion in a landslide. Goldwa-
ter has maintained he was
the object of a spying effort
similar to the one carried
out at the Watergate.
H~~~b"~'
ment far the White House,
including membership in a
group known as "the plumb-
ers" assigned to try to stop
leaks of classified informa-
tion.
Sources said Hunt gave
the investigators the names
of his former CIA superiors
who allegedly ordered the
surveillance, but no deci-
sion has been made yet on
whether they will be ques-
tioned.
If Hunt's information is
correct, the sources said,
the CIA would have been
violating a law forbidding it
to conduct domestic opera-
tions.
"It's kind of up in the air
right now," one source satd,
noting that the Senate pan-
el's mandate is limited to
matters relating to the 1972
-presidential campaign.
"This is very interesting.
and important, but we're
not going to try to squeeze
every last ounce out of it,"
one minority staff aide said.
I~ Q - lac. -q ~ G 7 3
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 Approved For Ruse 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004991000120001-2
A 18 Thu~sd
?-,~
cepted. t
Accordingly, I omitted the red
erences from my book and loft it
to others to reveal the secret;
monitoring method. Not untilon?,r ,a
than 1'L hours, according to in-'w;th President Soda h ?-;ats,
terviews with Uni~tcd States+
officials and Soviet, Israeli and~v'as near a state ,,iiapse.
European diplomats, but the' h- addition the :.by:?, an III
crucial exchange-delivery ofl~'''rps, on the east bank. vi the
Uhe Brezhnev note and the call- Suez Canal opposite ae cit}
nog of the alert-took place in of Suez, faced encircic~~nt:nt ay r
less than an hour, approximate- the Israelis as a re ,ult at the
1y between 10:40 and 11:30 P.M. Continued on Page 17, Column 1
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,.
 Approved For f~elease 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-0049~,~001000120001-2
`Implied Soviet Threat L-ed to U. S. MilitaryA.
Continued From Page 1, Col. 7
Israeli crossing to the western
. bank .early that morning.
Mr. Kosygin.returned to Mos-
' coW Oct. i9 urging that the
Soviet Government press far an
immediate .cease-fire in the
Middle East war, ? which was
then in its 14th day. Mr. Brezh-
nev thereupon invited President
Nixon to send Mr. Kissinger to
Moscow, and. the Secretary ar-
home from Moscow. Four hours from demanding a mere real-?viet weapons, to the Suez bat-
after he had left, Israeli forces firmation of the cease-fire res-
went en to cgmp]ete their en- olution of Oct. 22-a reaffirma-
circlement of the Egyptian III Uon was voted Oct. 23, and
the new truce went into effect
Corps, an action he heard about Oct. 24-to a resolution au-
later, reportedly with great dis- thorizing an expeditionary
may and a sense of betrayal. force far the Suez region, to
While the Russians were said a'resolution authorizing aUnit-
to. have been outraged at what ed States-Soviet expeditionary
force.
they regarded as a breach of The intelligence community,
their "Oct. 21 understanding drawing principally on elec-
with the Americans, they also tropic surveillance of Soviet
? rived the next day. I~"'?.'" "- ~"- -
,tablish alarge Soviet presence
Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev
reached a compromise in which
Moscow won its point that no
time could be lost in achieving
a cease-fire, while the Ameri-
cans won their point of that
the cease-fire must be linked
to negotiations between ?the
" Arabs anti Israelis.
The, joint cease-fire ?proposa]
they? agreed upon was adopted
by the United Nations Security
Council early Oct. 22, atnd the
"-truce in place ,officially went
- into effect .about i2 hours later.
in the Middle East and they re-
portedly solicited President Sa-
dat's Oct. 24 call for United
States and 5aviet troops.
A United States official fa-
miliar with the event said the
original Brezhnev proposal on
Oct. 24 ~ for a ~o~nt United
States-Soviet force for the Mid-
dle East made Mr. Kissinger
apprehensive that tougher mo-
ments were ahead.
Mr. Kissinger was also get-
ting. what he later described
as "puzzling" reports from the
United Nations. There the So-
viet representative, Yakov A.
tool an, that day on his waylMallik, had shifted suddenly
land, sea and air forces, had
already noted the presence of
seven landing craft and two
ships with troop helicopters in
eastern Mediterranean waters.
The landing craft had been
there 17efore, "milling around,"
as one intelligence official put
it,. recalling tha.C a week before
there had been e~ighC~ landing
craft in the eastern Mediter-
ranean.
r
Troop Standby Monitored
Electronic surveillance had
also monitored signals putting;
seven divisions of Soviet fir
borne troops - about 49,000
men - on a standby alert. One
division had been placed on a
higher level of alert during the
day, making i ready to move'
out on call.
But, the intelligence official
observed, there had been 50-,
vier alerts before during the~l
Middle East conflict, which
began Oct. 6, and anore Soviet
landing craft in the region. So
the activities of Soviet forces
on Oct. 24 by themselves had
'caused no undue alarm at the
Defense Department, one of the
officials said.
Still the Soviet Air Force had
pulled most of its large trans-
ports back from Damascus and
Cairo to their home bases that
day and some Pentagon official
interpreted this as a sign that
~Moscaw might usethem to take
(Soviet troops, rather than So-meeting- of what Mr. ~chles-'
Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2
tie zone.
When the second Brezhnev
note came at about 10:40 P,M.~
warning that the Soviet Union
"may be obliged to. consider
acting alone," the responsible
American officials-principally
Secretary Kissinger and De-
fense Secretary James R.,
Schlesinger-put that together
with the electronic intelligence
evidence and concluded that
the Soviet Union was deter-
mined to put troops in the Mid-
dle East .
Suggestion to President .
Describing the situation later,
one of the Cabinet officials in-
voived in the decision-making
said of the second note and
the intelligence estimates,
"Eithdr one, apart, we could
have ignored."
Ambassador Dobrynin -left the
the second note with Mr. Kis-
singer without obtaining a
reply.
The Secretary of State im-
mediately telephoned President
Nixon, who was i?n his upper
floor living quarters in the
White House and suggested the
United States response should
be military as well as political,
Mr. Nixon concurred.
This was tiro genesis of the
United States alert.
President Nixon remained in
charge throughout, his aides
say, but he was also remote,
staying the entire night in his
White House apartment and re-
ceiving the telephone messages
of Mr. Kissinger "and Mr:
Schlesinger. Mr. Nixon em-
powered them to manage the
crisis an their awn, the Cabinet
official said, leaving ?them to
conceive and carry out thel
various moves.
Mr. Kissinger convoned a;.
 Approved For lease 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-00499Fj001000120001-2 ,
lert and a Test of Wi11s, Capital Aides Report
'finger later termed "the abbre-
viated National Security Coun-
cil" in the austere, map-filled
;Situation Room 4n the White
,House basement.
It was abbreviated ' in part
.because the chairman of what
had been asix-man panel, ]?resi-
dent Nixon,. was upstairs. Mr.
Kissinger was there ?in his dual
capacity as Secretary of State
and the President's assistant
for national ,security affairs.
Another chair .was empty be-
cause Spiro T. Agnew had re-
signed, and there was no di-
rector of the Office of Emergen-
cy Preparedness since George
A. Lincoln had retired. 4
months before.
Security Council met at aboutja United States official said: Through Mr. Scali, Mr. Kis-
I 1 P.M., and Mr. Kissinger and ^No, the alert itself was a" sig- singer was working to get the
Mr. Schlesinger swiftly agrecd~nal which we knew they would Soviet Union to agree to a new
on a modified alert as thei et through their owri electronic resolution in the Security Coun-
United States military response g
designed to persuade the Soviet intelligence." cil setting up apeace-keeping
Union against acting alone. I Ilcightened United States force for the disputed Suez
The technical torm for theimilitary activity could clearly region.
alert is Defense Condition 3, ~ be discerned through the amount
explained by a Pentagon offi- and nature of the radio traffic, Reply to Brezhnev Drafted
riot as "an order to stand by it was said. Finally, Mr. Kissinger. drafted
far further orders that may Mr. Kissinger was busy, mean- a reply to the last Brezhnev
come." It is an order any area while, an the diplomatic front. note saying the United States
commander can issue without He conferred repeatedly from would not tolerate a unilateral
higher authority if he feels }tis the outset of the American- action by the Soviet Union,
forces may be threatened. (Soviet exchanges with Israel's hoped that Moscow would not
Mr. Schlesinger. is said to Ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, ad- take that course, and warned
have issued it,at 11:30 P. M., vising him of Soviet and Unit- that any such move would dam-
and it was passed to the service ed States moves. age the cause of peace. He also
chiefs by Admiral Moores
About 1 A.M. he told the Brit- called for joint action in the
i
"Officially the meeting ron-I While the service chiefs were fish Ambassador, the Earl of United Nations.
sisted of Kissinger, Kissingcrlayrare of the moverrtcnts of Cromer, of the note and the That done, according to an
and Schlesinger," a council aide Soviet military units, they were alert. Other members of the aide, a weary Mr. Kissinger
commented, said to be so surprised by the~North Atlantic Treaty Organi- walked upstairs and reported
Attending as the intelti?;ence diplomatic, messages that they zation were informed through to President Nixon and ob-
adviser was William E. Colby, sent. an aide to the C.LA. and the meohanism of the North At- tained his "ratification" of'the
Director of Central Intelligence,ithe State Department to seek
'
whose agency had played a ma-
jor role in handling the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962 and 'was
now on the sidelines. Mr. Colby
had been called in belatedly.
'-The C.LA- was familiar with
the electronic intelligence ob-
tained by its powerful sister
agency, t]te National Security
Agency, but it. was not apprised
of the Soviet notes until Mr.
,Colby'.arrived .at the White
House.
Haig's Role Described
Attending as the military ad-
viser was Adm. Thoma:~ H.
Moorer, Chairman of the. Joint
~Chicfs of Skiff.
Mr. Schlesinger had been. told
of the second Soviet note by
Alexander M. Haig Jr., chief
of the White House staff.. He,
in turn called Admiral Mo~arer.
General Haig functioned ,more
'as a go-between than as a
member of the decision-making
group, aides said.
The abbreviated National
further word on Soviet inten-
tions. I-Te apparently returned
empty-handed.
The Washington order alerted
most but not all United States
forces. The Coast Guard, with
its vital air-sea rescue system,
was not brought in until 12
}lours later. Strategic Air Com-
mand tanker planes hovering
along the United States-to-
Israel airlift route were left in
Llteir Middle Atlantic patterns
rather than sent north for pos-
sible fueling of long-range B-52
bombers.
Mr. Schlesinger returned to
the Pentagon about 1:30 A.M. to
bolster the alert by ordering
the aircraft carrier Joltn F. Ken-
nedy from the Atlantic to the
Mediterranean with her A-4
fighter-bombers and telling-the
15,000-man 82d Airborne Divi-
sion at Fart Bragg, N. C., to get
ready to board transport craft.
Asked if the Soviet Undbn
had been notified oaf the aler0,
]antic Council in Brussels, which moves, including the second
was advjsed of the alert by the note to Mr. Brezhnev. It was .
Defense Department about 2 about 3 A.M. on Oct. 25, three
A.M. Pentagon officials say the and a halt hours after lire alert
news went out to the alliance had been called.
capitals much later because of At his news conferonce at
a foul-up in the Brussels com- noon, the Secretary publicly re-
munication machinery. minded Moscow- that both the
In retrospect, however, also- Soviet Union and the United
elates of Mc Kissinger acknowl- States had nuclear arsenals
edge that the 'crisis-managers "capable oP annihilating hu-
"botched" the job of promptly ntanity," but that they also had
informing United States oiliest"a special duty to see to it
on the night's actions. ithat confrontations are kept
"We could have called up alllwithin bounds."
the top allies," said a United! An hour or so later, both
States official. "But it miglatcountries joined in the 14-to-0
have ttleant delaying the alert." vote by which the iJnited Na-
Mr. Kissinger was also in lions Security Council decided
touch with the United Stales to establish a United Nation$
delegate to the United Nations, peace-keeping force excluding
John A. Scalf, who had just the major powers-a move that
been through some bruising ex- in effect brought the American-
changes with Mr. Malik. Sovie texchanges to an end.
The Soviet delegate had ac- And in those exchanges, of-
cused the United States of al- ficials noted, the hot-line tele-
lowing Israel to violate the type machine that connects
cease-fire of Oct. 22 and make ashington and Moscow was
territorial gains. never used.
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-00499~Q01000120001-2
~rx~; w~sAlvr~~,otir ~osr
Iiy Laurence Stern
Nasllln?ton Post Stat1 writer
?Che current, and former di-
rectors of the Central Inteili-
t;encc Agency denied, to sena-
torial questianers that they
h::d any advance knowledge of
the 4Vaterdate burglary.
"1"Ste issue was opened up
Burin; a Senate Armed Scrv-
ices Committee closed ltearin,ti
~?esterday to hear testimony
by free-lance writer Andrew
St. George and by CIA Direc-
tor William 1;. Colby.
13ut Colby did acknowledge
that one of the convicted
ltfatergate conspirators- Euge-
t~o ?Martinez, alerted the CIA
to 1~:. Howard Aunt's presence
iri i\4iami late in 1971 and
a;ain in Marcia, 1972,
.ht the time R'fartinez was
working for Hunt's burglary
i.eam, which lead already bur-
~*Iarized the effice of Daniel
F;IIs'uerg's psychiatrist, and
}\Tartinez was also employed
as a contract employee of the
CT;1.
Colby's allusion to the Mar-
tin,ci incident was made in a
written response to n series of
questions by Sen. Howard
Baker (I2-Terut.), vice chair-
man' of. the Senate Watergate
committee.
According to Colby's ac-
count, b!fartincz advised a CIA
11liarni field rr_preseutative of
Ilunt's whereabouts and the
report was passed on to CIA
headquarters.
-CTA headquarters, said Colby,
told the Miaftti. supervisor that
"hc.should not; concern himself
wit}i,the travel of Mr. HunC
who was an employee of the
White House undoubtedly on
domestic White House busi-
ness of no interest to CIA," ac-
coxtli.ng to Colby's latesC state-
z~fent,
_...~.
RICHARD HELri7:S
,- 'Chia incident occurrca se-
ueral ntontlts after the CIA
terminated technical assist-
ance to .T-Iunb including the
xupply of spy paraphernalia,
which was used in the >Jlls-
berd burglary. CTA officials
siisid they cut off Hunt in Au-
tu~-t, 1971, because they came
to fire conclusion that the re-
qur:;ts were improper-even'
tltouh they were made under
Wbae HOt1Se auspices.
~~One oP the allegations made
by tit. Georgo, in an article in ~
the current ITarper's . mah*a-'
ri:ne,~ is that 14lartinez was se-
r~:?etly reporting to the CIA on
life activities of the White
T:T;ouse burglary team under
Bunt's supervision. ;
5atttrday, ~Vou. l7,1J73
...tx
'['his was denied by Colbyy
and by Helms, in a separate
written statement.
Helms also denied a claim
by St. George that he had a
'conversation with a CIA watch
.officer the morning after the
Watergate break-in acknowl-
crlging that he was tipped off
to t.hc operation.
The St. George article
claimed the watch officer
called Helms on the morninh
of Jttne 17, 1972, and told }tim
of the arrest of "the White
House crew." It quotes Helms
as responding, "ah, well, they
Finally did it."
Helms' statement, released
yesterday by Sen. Stuart Sym-
in ;ton (D-Mo.), said: "I am
prepared to swear that no
such conversation ever took
place."
St. George invoked the First
Amendment in refusing to
identify his source for the re-
port during ,yesterday's execu-
tive session, according to Sym-
ington.
The free-lance writer, a self-
'described adventurer with a
heavy Hungarian accent, said
he would consult with officials
of Harper's before returnin;
to testify before' the Senate
committee next Wednesday.
St. George was interviewed
at length earlier this week by
Baker and Senate Watergate
committee minority counsel
Fred D. Thompson.
Baker has displayed a per?
sistent interest in the question
of possible CIA involvement
in Watergate. Symington, on
the other hand, has been a
staunc}t defender of Helms for
having withstood White I~ourle
pressures to involved CIA in
Life Watergate cover-ug.
:~ tr
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a~~;1~~:
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 Approved For Release 2001/12/04 :CIA-RDP84-004998001000120001-2
'1'TTI; N~1tiTTT~\G1'ON P~)7Z'
..R
13y T.aurence Stern
Wnshlnaton Post Slntf Wrllcr
T~cars chat sensitive CTA
Ol)Cl'atI011:i mi.~hL be compro-
mised by "leakage in the
h'~i" led Prichard 1VI. Helms,
tl]c agency's former direc-
tor, to propose sharply dc-
fiued limits on the Water-
gate investigation in 1Z~Ierico.
TTelms was also concerned
about an :@'13I "fishinh cxpc-
dition into CIA operations"
when he laid down guido-
lines 11 days after the
Watergate breal:-in designed
to confine the FP,I's inquir-
ies to "personalities already
arrested ~or directly under
suspicion."
this was the gist of four-
pagc merorandum submit-
ted yesterday by CIA Direc-
tor William L. Colby to Scn.
Stuart Symington (D-MoJ,
acting chairman of the Scu-
ate Armed Service
Committee.
Colby's memo was in-
tended to clear up wl]at; he
described as "recent specu-
lation in t3]e press and else-
where" over an , apparent
conflict between a June 23,
1972, memo from Helms to
his ~lepu'ty, Gen. Vernon
1Valters, and testimony by
IIelms to five congressional
committees and 'federal
ZVatergate prosecutors.
'CI]is conflict was first
mentioned-altl]ou;_;h Zi?ith-
out. any spcclfic reference to
I-Ielms-b;;r former ~i'at, r-
gate Special Yrosecutar :ir-
~chibald Cox in an appcsn'-
ance last week before the
Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee. Cos said he had evi-
dence that a major witness
in the Watergate inquiry
had ,sharply contradicted his
testimony in a memorandum
that had come to the attcu-
tion of the prosecuting staff.
The newly surfaced 1972
m,cmo instructed Walters
that "we (the CT,~) still ad-
here to the request that
they (the T'BI) confine t]]em-
sclves to the personalities
ah?eady arrested or directly
under suspicion and that
they desist from expending
this investigation into other
areas which may Well, even-
tually, rtut afoul of our oper?
a 1.10115."
Rut [Ich]ls and \Valtcrs
have repeatedly testified
that they told White IIouse
officials and former P'BI
Acting Director 1.. I'atriclc
Gray III that the ZV`atcrrat-c
investigation illltcxico
Would not jcop:~~d~rc any
C l:\ actlVttle5.
Colby's memo l.o Syming?
ton ailudecJ to a strong
sansc of susl)iciuu witl]in
t.'lc Cl.\ ot~cr the prospec-
t.ive 1~BI invest-igation of the
11"atergatc scandal's i~Icxi-
can connection.
IIe cited as one'ingrcdient
of the CIA's concern Gray's
p^rsistence -despite rcpeat-
ocl denials by I-3clms - "in
queryin, the Agency about
possible CTA involvement in
the Watergate incident."
IIe also recalled that the
i~'BT refused to inform ti]c
CiA on June 22, 1.972, of the
status of its investiill have to forget me forcibly,
rubbing me of j' the blackboard.
My heart uxxs inexhaustible.
Pablo Neruda, 19041973
In Santiago the generals are executing people. In
~? Santiago the generals say they haven't killed as many '
-~ as the refugees say they have. In Santiago They are
burning books, Marx, ]Viso Tse-tuug and the Marxist ? '.
Neruda, Chile's Nobel Laureate. Rub him off the black- .
board, not dead a week from cancer or other causes.
In Santiago they warehouse the political prisoners.
In Washington the new government is recognized and
the denials flow. After three years of using every eco-
nomic lever to destroy the Chilean government, they '
tell us it wasn't a CIA hitman whose machine gun
chaffered the teeth out of Allende's skull. But hard on
those assertions we have Howard Hunt, the 20-year CIA
-man, giving us an on-camera demonstration . of the
kind of people that agency hires, pramotes and com-
mends. If Howard Hunt told you the CIA didn't have
anything to do with Watergate in Washington or mur-
der and incarceration in Chile, would you believe him?
P'or the first time, t:he Ervin hearings have given
us a chance to judge (CIA personnel. Recently we've
seen hunt, and last summer, another retired CIA career
~r~an, J.rmcs W. McCord, was on t9ze stand displaying his
kind of incompetence and deficient judgment. is that
whole place, into which it is estimated we put sonze-
thin~; Like ~6 bullion a year, stocked with such people? ~
have we armed and paid for an army of marauding
simpletons who know how to plot cheeseball coup d'etats
but are so out of contact with reality they think a major
party candidate for fhe presidency could be on Fidel
Castro's payroll? It's possible, since they have made a .
career of putting major party politicians i~n other
.countries on their payrol~a.
i
. ?
I3S/HC- ~J ~a
Nor does it seem to get better further up the line in
'the agency. The CIA's new boss, William E. Colby,
distinguished himself in Vietnam as an architect of the
Phoenix program of political assassination and midnight
arrest. The society he helped build is one even a
Russian might nave difficulty adjusting to.
A generation ago CIA monkeyshines may have made
some sense. Perhaps in 1953 overthrowing Premier
Mohammed Mosadeg~h of Iran did save the oil for us
and perhaps it was worth it if you think we must do
such things to survive. But Allende's downfall isn't
going to save the American copper mines or ITT's in-
vestments. The nationalization of American interests in
Chile was voted for unanimously by the Chilean eon-
gress. The generals can't stay in power and hand them
back to their former stockholders in New York.
Chilean democracy may never be restored, but
neither will we; is another anti-American dictator like
Peron in Argentina preferable to an Allende? A William
Corby or a Howard Hunt may have what they think is
a rational answer to that question; a Henry Kissinger
may tell us what's done is done, the generals are in
power, and we have no more right to meddle in their
internal affairs than we have to pass the Jackson amend-
ment and meddle in Russia's.
The rest of us may ponder whether we ,are caught up
in a gangbustering, nonfdealogical careening around the
world. Wo send killers into Cuba to get Castro, and
perhaps ho sends them back to got Kennedy. Brezhnev
comes here and campaigns for Nixon. We give him
wheat and campaign for him in Russia; which gives
us title to help Thieu lack up 200,000 political prison-
ers, and the Chilean generals bomb the Moneda Palace.
A CIA world with Solzhenitsyn suppressed in Russian
and Neruda burnt in Santiago, rubbed off the black-
board.- But he won't be, and you don't have to be an
idealist to know that. At night they hand-copy the
forbidden texts in Russia; now they'll go into the moun-
tains, into the Andes, to do the same with Neruda.
pp 1973, Thy Wsahinston Poet/H1nR Fs~tiura ~sndie~b
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A-6
~r
1NA,SNdPJG?t~Fl S7A(8-N~i/S
Washington, D. C., friday, September 21, 1973
~~ta
` fact, commit suicide or
whether he was shot down
The State Department is
formally denying as "ab-
surd" the claim of Salvador
Allende's widow that the
CIA secretly financed polit-
ical opponents of the late
Chilean president's regime,
which was overthrown in a
military coup-last week.
Earlier, the department's
ranking official in Latin
American affairs had pro-
voked a .spate of rumors.
over Mrs. Allende's charges
by refusing to discuss them
in a public congressional
hearing yesterday.
Assistant Secretary of
State Jack D. Kubisch oth-
erwise went to great lengths
to deny any i1.S. responsi-
bility for the coup, either
through political or military
intervention or through
economic pressures. He was
testifying before a House
Foreign Affairs subcommit-
tee.
WHEN CONFRONTED
with Mrs. Allende's
charges, which were broad-
cast yesterday through a
New York Times interview,
Kubisch said the question
was too sensitive to be dis-
cussed in public and was
better reserved for a
closed-door session.
When reporters pointed
out to him after the hearing
that his refusal to discuss
the question left open an
implication that the United
States, in fact, had helped
anti-Allende groups, Ku-
bischsaid this was not what
he intended to imply. But he
6~` 2
_~
again refused to discuss the
matter.
Later, the State Depart-
ment issued .through its
press office a specific deni-
al of Mrs. Allende's charge
that the CIA helped finance
dissident Chilean truck
owners whose nationwide
strike during the summer
brought the country to the
brink of chaos, helping to
set the stage for the coup.
e The administration has
no precise knowledge.;
whether Allende did, in ,
by his captors, as some of ',
his supporters have
claimed.
? The administration has
not yet made a formal deci-
sion to establish diplomatic
relations with the new gov- `
ernment, but the likelihood
is that the decision will be
made soon
. ~ The administration had'
'received "some reports of a;
confidential nature" con-'
corning claims by the junta
that large quantities of So `
viet block arms had been
stockpiled by Allende sup-
porters before the coup.
In discussing the reported
stockpiling by Chilean left-
ists of East European arms,
for example, Kubisch re- .
fused to go further than his'
hint that the State Depart- .
ment had received intelli-
gence reports about those
stockpiles. He offered to .
expand on the subject be-
hind closed doors.
KUBISCH TOOK special
pains to deny the claim of ,
many liberal commentators
that U.S. economic policies
forced political chaos on the
Allende regime by denying
international loans to the
faltering Chilean economy. ~.
"There was no hidden
blockade" of Chile, Kubisch
declared. "The fault was.
internal."
Kubisch noted that previ-
ously committed Agency for
International Development
and Food for Peace loans
"SUCH SUGGESTIONS
are absurd," the depart-
ment disclaimer said. "The
United States played no
part, financial or otherwise,
in that strike or in the other
stoppages or protests
mounted by the opposition
to Allende"
In his testimony yester-
day, Kubisch was otherwise
sweeping in his denials of
U.S. involvement. He also
denied that Washington had
any specific foreknowledge
of the coup, but he admit-
ted that officials here have
been expecting some such
move by the Chilean mili-
tary for several months.
Denials had been issued
repeatedly by government
press officials over the past
week, but Kubisch's state-
ment at a hearing on the
Chile coup marked the first
time that a responsible gov-
ernment official has made
these points publicly.
Touching on a variety of
questions raised since the
overthrow of President Sal-
vador Allende and his vio-
lent death, Kubisch said:
continued to the Allende
regime, even though some
~w700 million in U.S. corpo-
rate assets were expropriat-
ed and some $100 million in
international debts were
defaulted.
He noted that internation-
al banks extended some $83
million in loans . to Chile ?
from 1971 to 1973, which he
termed an increase over the
yearly average in pre-Al-
lende days.
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SEGUR/TY THRF.~7' FF.4RED
~~~ ~~G`~$~ ~~ ~~~
xs~xc- y ~'~
IIY Oswald Johnston
star-News Scuff writer
.Victor L. Marchetti, the
one-time CIA agent who lost
a c