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December 9, 2016
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August 15, 2001
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August 1, 1974
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Approved For Re4ease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 The Washington Merrry-Go-Round CIAA By Jack Anderson The Central Intelligence Agency has admitted in tin ex- traordinary private letter to Sen. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) tht the agency has penetrated the police forces of friendly foreign countries. The remarkable confession by CIA Director William Colby came in the course of a discreet' but intensive lobbying effort to keep alive U.S. support for for- eign police programs. Colby told Fulbright that the "relationships" built up with policemen through these pro- grams had been highly useful in "obtaining foreign Intelli- gence" from foreign constabu- laries. The friendly foreign cops, like national police everywhere, are privy to their nation's darkest secrets. And while Colby does not say so, our government sources tell us the foreigners are not above trading a national secret or two for a little CIA cash. Colby, in his message to Ful- bright, delicately skirts the mat- ter of corrupting foreign police, conceding only that the liaisons bring the CIA vital Information on "illicit narcotics traffic, in- ternational terrorism and hi,' jacking." HS/HC- q 0 mite Using Foreign Colby's 'covert lobbying was directed against a bill by Sen. James Abourezk (D-S.D.) that would kill U.S. aid to foreign po- lice and prison operations. The measure was drafted after shocking abuses were disclosed in South Vietnamese prisons constructed with the U.S. tax- payers' funds. The CIA director, who as a top U.S. hand in Vietnam saw the abuses first hand, said, never- theless, that the Abourezk measure would "appear to re- strict activities ... by the CIA." The main cutback would be in "obtaining foreign intelligence information" from friendly espi- onage services and agents "within national police forces.. ," Colby went on. Some of the agents .in foreign police forces, Colby indicated, had been developed during "specialized training and other support" given by the CIA- Colby's lobbying proved?effee- tive. In secret session, the com- mittee permitted the CIA to go on supporting foreign police op- erations. Insiders suspect that Colby's effort to. defeat the Abourezk provision was actually aimed at preserving the 'International Police 'Academy, an institution bfondayAagmrt I9, I974 According to government at- torneys, the use of taxpayers', money for such private activi- ties is against regulations. Boor- stin claims it is common prac- tice for universities to allow scholars use of students, re- searchers and office space. ' Boorstin, director of the-', Smithsonian Museum of History & Technology, used two of the museum's historian research- ers. Peter Marzio and Louis Gorr, to work on the book. They alternately shared the duties over a three-year period. Their salaries, while on the project, totaled more than $35,000.1 also helped the enterprising':' -prize-winner. She typed away on his handwritten manuscript' for the better part of a year.. In' addition, some $15,000 in fed- eral funds was spent to convert a conference room into a pri- vate library for the prestigious author. Boorstin.conceded that none` 7 of his royalties will be used to reimburse the U.S. trea;;uy. He. told my reporter Ed Tr; peon that hedivided his work day be- " tween his book and museum matters, and'that his project had the approval of the Smiths} - nian. or R hearta of as the lTh8 '"CIA-RDP84-00499R001 MMUM d"`a'n` . According to Victor Marchetti and John Marks, authors of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelli- gence," the agency has funded training of foreign police at the academy and recruited spies there. Colby himself wrote to Al)our ezk last January that the acad- emy, ostensibly run by the State Department, had "called on us in the past for some support for their program. But," he added, "all such support has been ter- minated." We also reported last Septem. ber that the CIA was Involved in a Texas bomb school where the academy trained foreign police- men ? on explosive devices. A State Department official later admitted the CIA provided "guest lecturers" for the course, )which has now been moved to Edgewood Arsenal, Md. Footnote: Both the CIA and the academy any no CIA funds are now going,into the school. Colby has also personally said support by the CIA for the school has been terminated. History Lesson-Famed histo- rian Daniel Boorstin used some $65,000 in government employ- ees' time and federal facilities to help him write his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "The Amer. leans - The Democratic Experi- Approved For lease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499 1000130001-1 t f V rc (Cr-~ ~c I tt Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499001000130001-1 W- T .Layer to iiestr By Jack Anderrson Former presidential aide Charles Colson once considered firing a high-voltage Buck Rog- ers-style cannon at the White House-to erase the taped con- versations of Richard Nixon. Such a mission. impossible would have wiped out the evi- dence on the White House tapes which led to Mr. Nix-on's resig- nation. Colson, however, con- tends he never seriously pon- dered putting the scheme into action. Despite this denial, Colson did meet twice with an indus-. trial research consultant, Gor- don Novel, and discussed the possibility of using an experi- mental "degaussing cannon" to fire a gigantic magnetic pulse at the White House tape storage room. A rough design of the ray gun, named after a 'magnetic measurement, was even drawn up. "Novel talked about driving by the White House and de- sultant "no encouragement." Novel, however, obviously thought he had a'mandate from Colson. He journeyed to El Paso, Tex., and spoke with Jack Prentice, innovative research and design chief for Jetco, Inc. Jetco already was marketing a 'metal detector using. "degauss- jug" principles. Prentice told Novel, and con- firmed to us, that he had built a prototype cannon and could construct an operational one for $25,000 to $30,000. Prentice be- lieved that because the tapes belonged to the President, there would be no crime in erasing them if Colson, acting for the President, okayed it. The Jetco specialist drew up a simple plan for the "degaussing cannon," using capacitors, a switch, a parabolic reflector and a special heat resistant coil. The electronic artillery piece stroy huge quantities of other taped 'material and scramble all computer "memories" in its path. One part of the scheme was to bombard the CIA-and the irre. sistible jolt of magnetism might blot out priceless files of Rus- sian and Chinese agents and other espionage and security matters. In his report to Colson, Novel said hiding in the heavy woods near the CIA, or "degaussing" the tapes from the tank-van while they were in transport, of- fered a better chance of success than 'magnetically bombarding Watergate committee which. Colson surmised, would leak it. Then he and Novel would reveal the tape was fraudulent and the hoax would tend to discredit the whole case against Mr. Nixon. Colson said it was true he dis- cussed this idea. "Wouldn't that be a great gaga" his statement said. Baker's Bombshell-Bobby Baker, the former Senate aide who went to prison in a cele- brated scandal of the early 1960s, has completed more than half of a book that will embar- rass some present senators. Now a successful business- man, Baker insists he isn't writ- ing a cruel hook about those who condemned hi'm. Indeed, the book will contain many warm anecdotes about promi- nent political figures. But the book will charge that Sen. Barry Goldwater (It-Ariz.), now the Senate's "Mr. Clean," twisted arms for political'funds. when he was the Republican Senate campaign chairman. Baker will chide the present apostle of political reform, Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) for voting consistently against reform in. times past. Baker also will point out that Sen. Carl Curtis (R-Neb.), who saw no great wrong in President Nixon's conduct, lashed out' against the Democrats involved in the comparatively small-po- tatoes Baker case. The former Senate bey won- der hopes to publish his book af- ter the din of Watergate dies down. 0 1974, United Feature SyndlcAe the CIA or the White House from a plane. But as Novel recalls it, he and Colson 'mutually decided not to pursue the plan because of its danger to national security tapes and computers near the targettapes. Colson scoffs at the idea that the 'magnetic beam ever came that close to development. "I laughed at it," he said. "It was a could be housed in a van, or mounted in a light plane or heli- copter. On March 21, Novel wrote Col- son that he would "forward by hand courier the known facts on the El Paso erasure 'matter," the code name for the "degausser." Shortly thereafter, the indus- trial consultant flew to Wash- ington again and talked to one of this area's best known elec- tronics men, Allan Bell, presi- dent of Dektor Counterintelli- gence and Security. Bell threw cold water on the mission, call- ing it "iffy" and "impractical." At its best, advised Bell, the bizarre device would obliterate a few layers of tape, leaving the rest intact. At worst, it would de- magnetizing all the tapes," Col- son told us from prison through friends. "It was something that he said would, fire three blo.cks." Novel, whb is also an electron- ics expert, told us he was Visiting Colson in March on an unre- lated legal matter when the talk turned to the tapes. Colson, he said, told film, tapes at the White House and the CIA "could cause the President grief." Novel mentioned the "degaussing cannon" and Col- son urged him to look into it Colson insists he gave the con- 1_l rolinson NRe IN ~AooN?- 44 -- Say little bit of comic relief." But Mr. Nixon 'might have had fears Colson would be a sucker for just such farout ideas. In the transcripts, Nixon said Colson "loves the action . . Colson would do anything." Footnote: Colson and Novel also discussed a caper to patch H. R. Haldeman's voice onto a tape along with an actor who would imitate. President Nixon and make false confessions. The fake tape would be sent with a phony authenticating note from an allegedly disgruntled Secret Service man to the Senate ~ r~~it^saod Iaiteis "M - the ~at~ral setting for a4s0122 1j34O$9ROl1OOlQflt Approved Fo elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049WO01000130001-1 A 14 Thursday ' Aura 09,1074 THE WASHINGTON POST a1dernans 'estnaony, aye Conflict The Watergate special, q prosecutor's office would,,' . not comment yesterday about ,the possibility of any,': future perjury charges be- ing filed against Haldeman for his Senate testimony about the June 23 meeting. However,, it is known the prosecutors re-examined the"' testimony after the Presi 'dent released the June.23:; transcripts Monday. In the first meeting of the day on June 23, Haldeman relayed to the President what he said was a sugges-.., .tion from former White House counsel John W. Dean III and-forme Attot4 ney General John N. Mitch- ell that the CIA he told to block an FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in, By Timothy S. Robinson Washington Poet 6t6(1 Wrltet The tape transcripts re- Before the, senate Water- leased Monday by President gate committee, Haldeman of his June 23, 1972, described the President's Nixon conversations with former concern over the possibility. It is clear throughout the White House chief of staff that. the FBI investigation H. R. (Bob) Haldeman are in, transcript that Haldeman:; might' uncover, CIA opera President werewor? direct conflict with lialde- tions and said that was wh and the direct y and that the FBI would or. sworn testimony F the President ordered him , ried be, about those meetings before > to contact the CIA.""I be- able to trace funds to the two Senate committees have that the action 'l took Nixon re-election committee In summing up the June with the CIA was proper, ac- and to t4ie involvement of 23 meetings in, May,: 1973, cording to the President's Nixon campaign aides,,, testimony before the Senate instructions. and clearly in " rather than being concerned Appropriations Subcommit-' the national interest," ? about any "national secu- tee that was investigating al- Haldeman told- the Senate city" interests. leged CIA involvement in Watergate committee, on ? Once, early in the conver- the Watergate affair, Halde-' July 30, 1973. sation, President Nixon man testified under, oath By contrast, the taped mentioned that the invests that: 1 . June 23, 1972, conversations gation of #orri'er White; "We had' only very show that Haldeman and, the House consultant and ex- sketchy knowledge, of what President discussed details CIA employee E. ? Howard .4 and who' were involved in of FBI information about Hunt in the Watergate case the Watergate affair. We the Watergate break-in and "Will uncover a lot of things. had no reason to believe " that the President approved You open that scab there'd a that anyone In the White ,. Haldeman's suggestion that -hell of a lot of-things and - House was involved find no; he call the CIA as part of ?-a we feel that it would be reason, therefore; ? to seek, cover-up of the involvement, very detrimental to have any cover-up of the Water of Nixon aides in the Waterii this thing go any further. ?1 gate investigation from the', gate affair. This involves the Cubans, White Ho'Ose" Willfully lying under oath, , Hunt and a lot of hanky- At another point ' in ? tests, before a Senate committee" panky that we have nothing mony before the, same constitutes perjury? punisha- to do with ourselves.. panel, :Haldeman said," "We ble by a jail term of up to, Then, 10 pages later in the did this in the full belief five years and a $10,000 fine. transcript, the President that we were acting in the Haldeman has not been added, almost in passing, national interest and with; charged with perjury In con- that Haldeman should tell.4 no intent or .-desire to 'lm- nection with his testimony,- the CIA! "Look, the problem"O. pede or cover 'up? any is, ' about the meetings with the. is that this will open the., ,pects of the Watergate in. President, but does face whole, the whole Bay of': vestigatioh, itself. three perjury counts in the Pigs thing and,the President Watergate cover-up case for just feels that, ah, withqut his testimony': before the going into the details Senate Watergate commit don't, don't lie to them to LHs/1Ic3d For Release 2 ~"`h1 T11~#ie31Oe 4 MOAU 4. , 8tg is n0 a say Watergate defendants. this is a comedy ;of errors, 1,-j Approved Fcelease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049,W01000130001-1 without getting into It, the President believes that it is going to open up the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again." As a result of that meet-' - ing, With those two fleeting -? references to the CIA, -, Haldeman met with CIA of- ficials with what he told the Senate Appropriations Sub- committee \vas a "five-fold" purpose: "One, to ascertain whether there had been any .;CIA involvement in the } Watergate affair; "Two, to ascertain whether the relation- be- 'tween. some of. the Water- gate participants and the Bay of Pigs was a matter of concern to CIA; "Three, to inform the CIA. of an FBI request for guid- knee regarding some aspects of the Watergate i'nvestiga- tion because of the posstbil- ity of CIA Involvement, di- rectly or indirectly; I could 1nter)cct there that this re quest had been made known - by John Dean, counsel to the President, and had been, transmitted by me to, the'l President immediately upon being told of it by Johns, Dean: The President, as a ` result of that, told me toi,. meet with (CiA) Director' (Richard) Helms and (CIA' Deputy Director) General ', (Vernon) Walters and John;-. ia,hrltet-man to--get into this matter as I am laying it out here. "The fourth Purpose WAS to discuss White House cone cern regarding possible dis- closure of non-Watergate-re lated covert CIA operations ' or other national security. activities, not related to --Watergate, that had been undertaken previously by some of the Watergate prin??. ciples (sic). "Fifth, to request General Walters to meet with acting Director, Gi%y of the 'FBI to express these concerns and to coordinate with the FBI."' so that the FBI's area of in- vestiaation of the suspects, be expanded into unrelated some of the individuals who matters which 'could' lead4to had also been involved in 4 Haldeman testified fur- ther that he did not recall any discussion at any time of a suggestion to involve," -'the CIA in Watergate mat- ter except as he described in his testimony. "In summary, the meeting,` of June 23 with the CIA was .,held at the President's re- ,-quest In the interest of na-" tioxial security," Haldeman told the senators. Haldeman testified in much the same way before the Senate Watergate com- mittee. Ile referred the corn- mittee to the statement he had made before the Senate. Appropriations Subcommit- tee as one containing "considerable detail' 'on his account of the meeting with CIA officials and the reason for it. In addition, he testified:::. , .. the meeting, one of the 1purposes of the meeting, as ' assigned to the by the Presi-',s dent on the morning of the 23d ... in addition to ascer-k taining whether there- was any CIA involvement, whe-" thher there was any CIA. .'.concern about earlier activi- `ties of people who had been arrested at Watergate, was to tell the CIA directors' that the FBI had expressed concern that as to whether ;,there was CIA Involvement or any impingement." Haldeman further testi- fied that "the question raised was not solely `the question of whether the CIA had been involved In the Watergate break-in but also whether the Investigation of 9 Haldeman said before the"" Watergate committee he could not recall either the President or himself discuss ing the problem of a connec- tion between the "Mexican , . money"--a campaign; contri- bution that Investigators traced to convicted Water- gate burglar, Bernard Bark- `'Vr's Miami bank account- and the CIA. According to, the June 23`,, tape transcript, however, - k .the President and Haldeman ,specifically discussed that money in - detail, and ex? pressed their concern over it being ,traced to the cAm ?.' :; aignr, the Watergate break-in, ,which was to be thorough and total, could - possibly impinge upon the activities totally unrelated; to Water- gate and related to national security aNi to covert CIA Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Rj ase 2001/08/22 CIA; RDP84-00499RQ1000130001-1 THE WASHINGTON POST, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7,. 1974 Walter Pincus The Continuing Cover-up It is hard to believe, but a close reading' of the President's Monday statement and the released, edited transcr'pts of the June 23, 1972, White House tapes indicates that a desperate, last-ditch attempt to cover up is still, going on. . In hi' statement, Mr. Nixon said that when he listened to the June 23 tapes this past May, "I did not realize the ex- tent of the implications which these conversations might now appear to have," although he "recognized that these [tapes] presented potential prob- lems." That is not a true statement: He knew they were serious and so acted. On May 5, 1974, Special Prosecutor Leon .lawo.rski and two deputies, Philip Locovaro and Richard Ben-Ven- iste, went to the White House to talk with the President's lawyers. They had earlier subpoenaed 64 additional White House tapes, and the President's law- yers had moved in court to quash that subpoena. That day, Jaworski declared to Mr. Nixon's lawyers that if the mat- ter were litigated further, he would have to disclose in court that the The writer is executive editor of The New Republic. Watergate grand jury-had named Mr. Nixon is a co-conspirator, since his best ar^,:ment, to get the tapes, was that the ' involved discussions among conspi).. ?)rs. In such a situation, Ja- worski said, he would maintain that executive privilege could not success- fully h ~isserted. Jaw,, ski added that he did not want to take that course - that he wanted to avoid having tc reveal that the Pres- ident had been named a co-conspirator. Rather, he suggested the matter could be settled out of. court if the White House provided 19 specified tapes, al- most a'.` of which were among the 64 already subpoenaed. The next day, May 6, the President's lawyers went to court and asked for a delay. 1-ater it was learned that after Jaworsk,, left the White House, on May 5, the President requested that his aide, Steve Bull, begin supplying, him with tapes on the Jaworski priority list. . The President listened to tapes on May 5 and 6. Among the tapes he heard, by his own admission, were those of June 23, 1972. On May 7, the President's lawyers went into court to announce that a compromise could not be reached - that the requested tapes ,would not be turned over voluntarily. Why di4 the President turn Jaworski down? Clearly because he realized the. damaging nature of the discussions and not because he failed to "realize the extent of the Implications." The President's latest pronounce- ment h-is other misleading aspects. He restates the proposition, contained in his May 22, 1973, statement that "shortly after the Watergate break-in I became concerned about the possibil- ity that the FBI investigation might lead to the exposure either of unre- lated covert activities of the CIA or of sensitive national security matters." A reading of the transcript, shows that statement to be questionable. The transcript shows the idea of using the CIA to stop the FBI was apparently suggested by John. Mitchell with no concern at all for either real CIA oper- ations nr national security. From the start, tie purpose was to prevent the FBI from discovering that money' which went to a Watergate burglar originated with the Nixon campaign committee. In fact, before national se- curity was even mentioned the Presi- dent showed concern that continued' FBI investigation of Watergate would lead to former White House aide' E. Howard Hunt and thereafter "open that. scab - there's a hell of a lot of t things and we just feel it would be detrimental to have this thing go any further." What things would open up? "This Involves these Cubans, Hunt hane a lot of hanky-panky nothing to do with ourselves," says the President. The only "hanky-panky" ^^ known to date that Hunt and the Cu.. bans had been Involved in prior tu, Watergate was the break-in at the of- pproved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved Fo;$elease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00491001000130001-1 face of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist - an event which Mr. Nixon has main- tained up to now he only learned of in March 1973. On Monday, the President said his May 22, 1973, statement was "based on my recollection at the time-some 11 months later-plus documentary mate- rials and relevant public testimony of those irvolved." In fact, just one week before the President's May 22, 1973, statement, testimony by CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters before the Senate Armed Services Committee had been released, outlining the events of June 23, 1972. Walters declared he had been told it was "the President's wish" that the FBI investigation be halted with the five men already in jail and that for the FBI to pursue an inquiry into the Mexican money would "lead to higher ups." Walters' testimony and his memorandum of the June 23 White House meeting were available to re- fresh the President's memory. Rather than using that material, the Presi- dent, or May 22, 1973, used the inaccu- rate story that served as the basis for misleading testimony by his chief aide, H. R. Haldeman. The President even presented the public with an illusory gesture when he stated he would "voluntarily fur- nish to the Senate everything from these types that Judge Sirica rules should go to the Special Prosecutor." The judge is limited to turning over only Watergate-related material while the House Judiciary Committee and, most probably, the. Senate will want tapes that go beyond-to the abuse-of- power allegations contained in the House committee's Article II of im- peachment. The President made two final points in his Monday, statement. He noted that the CIA made an "extensive check" and determined that its covert operattens would not be uncovered. Al- though the President failed to note It, this fact had been revealed by the CIA "A close reading of the President's statement and the tape transcripts indi- cates that a desperate, last ditch attempt to cover up, is still going on." Director, Richard Helms, to the acting FBI Director, Patrick Gray, on June 22, 1972, the day before the President's intervention. The President also said that on July 6, 1972, he had told Gray to "press ahead vigorously" with his FBI investigation. Again the President did not note that, by July 6, the Nixon! re-election committee had destroyed,, the records of cash payments to Water- gate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy and that two committee employees, Jeb Stuart Magruder and Herbert Porter, had worked out a false story to explain the cash that Liddy had been given. In short, the two week delay gained by the CIA ploy had permitted the cover up to get well under way. The June 23 transcripts also show.' that Mr. Nixon's final point-that "the'{ evidence (must) be looked at in its en tirety"-is also misleading. The Presi- dent contended on Monday that "when all the facts were brought to my atten- tion I insisted on a full investigation", and prosecution of those guilty." In fact, the new transcripts show that all the facts known at that time were presented to him; he was told, for ex- ample, that his campaign chairman, ;g John Mitchell, knew about Watergate; I that Hunt and,Liddy were involved; that it was financed by his re-election committee. At that moment he blocked rather than "insisted on a full investi- gation." His policy was cover-up. "We won't second guess Mitchell and the rest," he .told Haldeman on June 23, 1972. And as for cleaning house and finding out for himself what occurred, the Presi- _'.ent said, "I'm not going to get that nvolve! .. 1' To which Haldeman re- iponded, "No, sir, we don't want you Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 lease 2 - P84-0049ap01000130001-1 THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1974 2 Americans Held in Calcutta Jail for Cave ' a Year in Bizarre Case d tho By BERNARD WEINRAUB Special to The New York Times CALCUTTA, India, Aug. 5 -Two young Americans, who have been in a Calcutta prison for more than a year, are on a hunger strike in 'advance of a trial that has stirred tensions between the United States and India. The case,-which has. politi- cal overtones, is to be heard within the next few weeks, and involves allegations,that . the two men were spies. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and United States Ambassa- dor Daniel P. Moynihan are now involved in the tangled. case. The defendants are 27- year-old Richard W. Harcos, an Army veteran, and An- thony A. Fletcher, 30, a grad- uate of San Francisco State. The men, who lived in San Francisco, have listed their occupations as taxi drivers. Both deny the spying allega- tions, and lawyers in the case say that they were seek- ing to smuggle out narcotics and that suspicions of espio- nage are unfounded. Allegations Unspecified To American officials, the detention of the men for ,nearly 16 months in a bleak jail is a source of deepening anger. "These guys have been held this long without a trial, without charges against them," said one seniorAmeri- can official. "It's an outrage." Indian officials decline to discuss the specific allega- tions against the two prison- ers, but have made it clear that the men face charges under the Official Secrets Act, a measure that deals with spying, conspiracy and acts "prejudicial to the safe- ty or interests of,the state." This week a Calcutta judge is to rule on a defense plea that the trial be held in open court. Virtually all cases un- der the official Secrets Act are closed. If found guilty, the two men would probably .face a' 14-year prison sen- tence. They have. been on a hun- ger strike since June 'in pro- test against their detention and in an effort to open the trial to the public. They have lost about 20 pounds each and are being forced-fed through nasal tubes. Facts Are Bizarre The known facts of the case are bizarre. At about 3 AM, on April 26, 1973, In- dian security men seized Mr. Harcos, who was swimming in a prohibited area" of the King George dock along Cal- cutta's Hooghly River. He was carrying scuba diving equipment. His companion, Mr. Fletcher, was later ar- rested at the Waverly Hotel in downtown Calcutta. According to persons in- volved in the case, Mr. Har- cos initially insisted that he had been merely taking a swim. This was repeated for months, to the disbelief of Indians and American con- sular officials who visited the Americans in jail. "No one g goes swimming in the middle swimming in a prohibited of the night in the Hooghly area, is also unclear, because it's hot," said one R tl Leonard Boudin long-time resident of Calcut- ta. The Jamaican, whose cit- izenship is unclear, is a:, popular figure and a hab-- itut of the Calcutta docks. - What complicates the case. is the delicacy of India's re- lations with the ' United States and the Government's sensitivity-Americans call it.; - ,"obsession"-to alleged Cen- tral Intelligence Agency ac- tivities, especially in north- -.-east India. Moreover, some Indians and Americans say officials in Calcutta, the capital of. the politically volatile state of West Bengal, are fearful of dropping the case because it would leave them open to charges -of being pro-Amer-. ican. One Indian lawyer in tht case said that it had political overtones because "it might. be useful to show that the Americans are doing harm to India." But some sources in- dicated that Mrs. Gandhi had grown concerned about the treatment of the prisoners '. -and had discussed the'possi-' bility of placing them under:. house arrest until the case is resolved. American officials say pri- vately and angrily that middle-level Indian officials in New' Delhi, as well as the West Bengal government, were largely unhelpful and even cut off consufir access to the prisoners from April to June. Officials in Calcutta American official. the civil liberties lawyer, has established only after Mr. involved himself in Mr. Moynihan met India's For- Lawyers say the two were Fletcher's defense. ' A col- eign Secretary, Kewal Singh, seeking to smuggle narcotics, and brought up the case in ? league, Dolores A.? Donovan ' mid-June. ? apparently hashish, out of of San Francisco, has spent, India by fixing a plastic bag more than a week here, meet- "Before then we made re- to the hull of a ship. Law- ing the defendants, consular. quests that weren't answered yers say that the two failed oficials and lawyers. Tao and we got no indication at to admit the scheme because' prominent Indian lawyers all that they were trying to are defending Mr. Fletcher, expedite the case," said one of a fear that India's nar- and another is working for official in Calcutta. cotics laws are as stiff as Currently, an American of- - Mr. Harcos. '.ficial meets the, two prison- those in Turkey or Iran. A further murky element In fact, India's laws are. in the case was he arrest, : ers three times a week and of gives them news magazines, . a cident i n r the i l ild d f rtl ft lati h , n ore g y m - , . s y a e re ve , an o ers who plead guilty to nar- two men linked to Mr. Mar- paperback books, soap and cotis violations are generally' cos and Mr. Fletcher. 4' ; -cigarettes. The two live to- fined $75 to $200 and .or- ,the Chinese owner re `-gether in a cell, about 20 feet by 50 feet. `They seem dared 'to leave the country.' cutta hotel whop was said to ?' to be fairly cheerful, not de- spondent," said one official. pproved For Release 2001/08/22,a aKDP84-00499RO0100flt '1 the jailers treat On the other an , Official Secrets Act is a stern measure that places the, burden squarely upon a de- fendant to prove his inno- cence. The law says that a,i defendant "may be convicted if, from the circumstances of the case or his conduct or, his known character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prej- udicial to the, safety or in- terests of the state." Americans have been ar-. rested before under the act; an American engineer was in prison here about tert days for taking photographs 'of the Howrah Bridge during. the Bangladesh war. But. it could' not be recalled when. an American had been in prison this long in India or placed on trial under the act. Evidence Also Unclear` Why it took the defendants more than a year to change, their story remains unclear, although one Indian lawyer in the case said that a prison-, er has only 14 days to make a statement to the police before the judicial process. begins. Nevertheless, the de-' fendants told American con- sular officials for months that Mr. Harcos had been merely taking a swim. The specific evidence ainst the two, beyond' a Jack Anderson Appro r$arleas 1/08/22 IFNA-RTP84-004 000130 Vietnam. ar: e noie o~1e Ten years ago, the Gtilf of Tonkin incident led to massive U.S. involvement in an unwanted war in Vietnam. Did the Central Intelligence Agency play a hidden role in that incident? We have now pieced together part of the story, together with other CIA exploits In Vietnam, from Intelligence memos and old Vietnam hands, including an bx-CIA officer, John Kelly, who has agreed to break his long silence. It is a fascinating story, some. ,times hilarious, sometimes deadly grim. At the time of Tonkin, the CIA.was already deeply involved in a vast undercover operation known mysteriously as Op-34-A. Memos show that the CIA, working secretly with the Saigon government and U.S. armed forces, kidnaped North Vietnamese fisher- men to recruit them as spies, landed rubber-boat crews on the North Vietnamese coast to blow up bridges, .parachuted agents into the Communist hack- country and engaged in other clandestine activities. Although U.S. forces weren't supposed to partici- pate in open combat, a favorite Op-34-A sport was to send dark-painted U.S. patrol boats to bombard Communist-held Islands off the Vietnam coast. This sometimes led to shootouts between U.S. and North Vietnamese gunboats. The incidents, according to one Pentagon memo, were regarded as acceptable risks. The public wasn't told about these naval engage- ments until the late President Lyndon Johnson chose to make an issue of the August 2, 1964, attack on U.S. destroyers In the Gulf of Tnnkin. Then, is :anme paring to draw North Vietnamese gunboats away ' ` ^ : ? ~, ? ~: '` j ? ,l,r:., .~?y .i 1 from an Op-34-A operation when the celebrated io- cident occurred. ?' After the United States was drawn openly into " the war, the CIA brass settled into a .handsome 'dwelling next to the Italian embassy in Saigon. In- stead of CIA, one of its units adopted the intials peeping back. He spotted a telescope' lens aimed SOG-short for "Special Operations Group." at secret maps on the' CIA walls. With all the drama In long interviews with my associate Les Whitten, the irreverent. John Kelly, now an investigative of a TV slapstick spy episode, his superior ordered reporter for CBS News in New York City, remem-' the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been hers the SOG as a sort of "Catch 22" outfit forever completed before another agent, missing the sun- goofing up but occasionally achieving' a triumph. bight, tore down the boards. The SOG, of course, was obsessed with secrecy. Meanwhile, a 'terse 'security directive was issued It operated fleets of black-painted planes, jeeps, by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were trucks and PT boats, Even the SOG's gates were almost killed during a rebellion because their auto- sometimes painted black. It didn't take the Vietna-' mobile was a "Rebel," a 1967. American 'Motors mese,`.South and North alike, long to identify black as model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around the CIA-SOG color. The black gates, therefore, may as the world to remove' the "Rebel" insignia from their well have been emblazoned with the CIA seal. cars, Kelly was told. On one occasion,. the CIA's secret Identification When Kelly first arrived In Saigon under super_ was found scribbled on a latrine. wall. in a Saigon secret orders, he was greeted at Tansonhut airport bar. Among the obscene inscriptions, a horrified by, a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and a CIA officer saw the equation, "CAS equals SOG hiouthful of flashing gold teeth.. He turned out to*,' equals CIA." CAS means "Controlled American a be the official CIA greeter, who would have been Source," a euphemism for 'a CIA agent. In great hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around alarm, the CIA officer dispatched two majors and the airport. a team of enlisted men to comb the men's rooms of At SOG headquarters, Kelly found the CIA brass Saigon in search of similar security violations hidden In wtizzy. One. of his superiors had just been identi- amid the graffiti. / fied by French and West German -intelligence as The CIA brass went to such lengths to maintain i the naked American on vacation at the famous L'lle secrecy that they held their most important confer-, du -Levant nudist camp off the toast of France. The ences in a huge transparent box, constructed of CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity inch-thick clear plastic walls resting on plastic beams, . the moment. he left the nudist camp for Saigon., with a transparent plastic door, at the U.S. embassy. , One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the One day, a CIA officer, peeping at the Italian :North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA'radio transmit- embassy across the way, discovered the, Italians ter,. which was disguised as a militant Vietnamese -VTr ~T7~;_- ~~ -!Approved For Release46041a8f22 : CtA-RdP84 OO49 UQ1OPG ',30001=1- - Approved For3elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$8.001000130001-1 peeping back. He spotted a telescope lens aimed: nationalist 'underground station. To increase its at secret maps on the CIA walls. With all the drama Hooper rating, the CIA dropped tens of thousands of a TV slapstick spy episode, his superior ordered of plastic transistor radios in styrofoam boxes on the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been -North Vietnam. The' radios were locked upon a? completed before another agent, missing the sun- single frequency, so those who retrieved the radios light, tore down the boards. could listen only to the dIA station. Meanwhile, a terse security directive was issued To reach the, Vietcong, whose jungle hiding places by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were were difficult to locate for parachute droppings, almost killed during a rebellion because their auto- ; the CIA strategists planned to'bait the styrofoam ' mobile was a "Rebel," a 1967 American 'Motors radio boxes with food and float then down the model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around Mekong River network. The hungry guerillas, it was the world to remove the "Rebel" Insignia from their suggested, would fish the food-laden radios out of cars, Kelly was told,. the river. The plan was finally abandoned, however, When Kelly first arrived in Saigon under super-, because the CIA could find no foolproof flow charts secret orders, he was greeted at Tansbnhut airport ' for the Mekong. At last report, there were still two by a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and a warehouses full of the little black radios. mouthful of flashing gold teeth. He turned out to' The CIA, however, had Its occasional successes. he the official CIA greeter, who would have been It was able to determine, for example, that 33,000 hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around Saigon officials,, from clerks to cabinet officers, the airport. ? were ' active Vietcong agents or Vietcong sympathiz- ers. More dramatically, the SOG units equipped At SOG headquarters, Kelly found the CIA brass South Vietnamese troops with Vietcong-style black i in a.tizzy. One of his superiors had just been identi- pajamas. The disguised troops were able to crash Lied by French and West German intelligence as into a'North Vietnamese'encampment, firing machine the naked American on vacation at the famous L'Ile guns and tossing grenades. du Levant nudist camp off the toast of France. The But the notorious Phoenix program, an assassina- CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity tion scheme run by present. CIA director William, the moment he left the nudist camp for Saigon. Colby, was less effetive. A report to the U.S.. em- One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the hazy revealed that the program as only one per v North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA radio transmit- ? . ter, which '~'Apfb ii4dlF6raR t; 2 #i30 2 t'I DF'? "~9+ 4141Q.1 A Approved For$elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499$001000130001-1 Colby Against' Declassfying Speedup Associated Press CIA chief William E. Colby yesterday said congressional efforts to speed the declassifi- cation of government docu- ments would endanger the country's intelligence opera- tions. "I would find it very diffi- cult ... to urge a foreign intel- ligence service or a strate- gically placed individual in a foreign government or a for- eign country to cooperate with this agency and to provide in- formation in confidence if the law of this country required that such information be made available to the public two years later," Colby told a House Government Opera- tions subcommittee. The subcommittee is consid- ering amendments to the Free- dom of Information Act that would require all documents labeled secret and confidential to be declassified within two years. ' FII S/HC- C, O THE WASHINGTON POST Friday] August 201974 A6 ...R ed For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08,(~~? I D84-004 %QRO Oo1,p0043009 ((,,JJ ~~,e orte~j ro jj'"'ro ~CC??Y From Interference in Greece U.S. Said to der C.I.A. To Curtail Role in Greece Continued From Page 1, Col. 3 ures about two years ago, a high American official said. The operative closest to Gen- eral Ioannides was said to have been Peter Koromilas, a Greek- American who also went by the name of Korom. An Amer- ican official said Mr. Koromi- las had been sent to Athens to confer with General Ioannides shortly before the July 15 coup In Cyprus, which was headed by.Greek officers. 'Papadopoulos Is My Boy' James M. Potts, the agency's station chief in Athens from) 1968 to 1972, was described asi having been on close terms' throughout his stay there with Mr. Papadopoulos. Air. Potts was listed as a political officer in the American Embassy. lie served earlier inl Athens from 1960 to 1964 as, deputy station chief of the intelligence agency. A State Department official' said that when Mr. Potts left Athens in August, 1972, his. farewell party was attended hyl virtually every member of thei American) Th ilit nta j . ary u e By DAVID BINDER m Spcchl lo'rhe New S'ork Times Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca! seeing who was present, turned WASHINGTON, Aug. 1--TheIGreece said that the C.I.A. and walked out, the source said, Central Intelligence Agency has' continued to maintain about 60t after which he sent a cablegram reportedly been instructed by full-time operatives in Greece to Washington protesting Mr. top officials of the Nixon Ad-Ed that some had been there Po~r's acsoa had adopted a ministration not to interfere in 15 years or longer. I chMr. attitude toward the) the Internal affairs of Greece the agency, the specialist Athens junta and was appalled nor to play favorites among) said, had close contact not only that the C.T.A. station chief Greek politicians, with George Papadopoulos, the would Ite iVetaa cpar position cone These orders, according to Greek colonel who,led the 1967 American Ambassador had well-placed officials, reflect the coup, but also with his suc- taken. current thinking of Secretary cessor, Brig. Gen. Demetrios State Department officials of State Kissinger and of the Ioannides. who have served in Greecei Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Papadopoulos, who was commented in background in-, (William E. Colby-that Amer deposed last November, was ; torviews on what they de- Greek political l ic.ans should keep out of the among many ,politics of other countries as and military figures who re -, much as possible. The C.I.A. ceived personal subsidies over is said to have been deeply in- many years. from the intelli- volved in Greek politics for 25 gence agency, two United States years. officials said. Another source I Until the last few weeks of the said Mr. Papadopoulos had Athens military junta, accord- received money from the thing to high American officials agency since 1952. "Ile helped King Constantine The CIA stopped its sub- and to Greek sources, American buy Center Union Deputies so operatives remained quite close sidies for Greek political fig- that the George Papandreou to the men in power in Greece. Continued 1 Government Mr. Maury, 61, left agency A United States specialist on Con Page 3,Column somewhat more than a year ago and is now Assistant Secre- in the past by the Central Intel- ligence Agency in Greek affairs. One of them mentioned John M. Maury, the agency's sta- tion chief in Athens from 1962 to 1968. "Maury worked on behalf of the palace in 1965," the offi- tary of Defense for Congres- sional Relations. Although genorally leaning) to Greek conservative politi- cians, the agency flirted briefly with the variant in Greek poli- tics offered by George Papan- dreou and his Harvard-educated son, Andreas, in the early nine' teen-sixties, a ,former Greek. official said. "In the beginning, say about 1962 or '63, the C.I.A. used) Andreas as an agent, as a re-1 source and supported him," the Greek said, "His buddy was Campbell," he added, referring to Laughlin A. Campbell, the C.I.A. station chief from 1959 to 1962. Agent Reassigned After Protest In his 1970 book, "Democ- racy at Gunpoint," Andreas Pa- pandreou describes a scene in 1961 in which he had an alter- cation with Mr. Campbell. Now retired and living In, Washington, Mr. Campbell de- clined clined to talk with a reporter about his Greek service. A knowledgeable Greek said that Stavit Milton, an opera- tive who objected Ito the "cozy" relationship between the agency and the junta leaders over the last seven years, was moved out of Greece and sent to Iran and later to the Far East. Mr. Milton was described as one of numerous Greek-Amer- icans recruited by the, agency in the early days of'its',opera- tions in Greece. Another' was said to be Thomas H. Karames- sines, a 57-year-old New Yorker who served in Athens from 1947 to 1948, during the Greek struggle against Com- munist insurgents, then again as station chief, from 1951 to 1953. Mr. Karamessines rose to be head of the agency's clandes- tine services before his retire- nment, recently. The Central Intelligence Agency also used enterprises of Thomas A. Pappas, the 75-year- old Greek-American industrial- ist, as a cover for nts opera-; tions in Greece, according to the Greek source. A spokesmen at the head- quarters of the agency, in Langley, Va., said he had no general comment on the allega- tions. He did say, however, that C.I.A. agents follow orders ap- proved at the highest level in Washington. roved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA RYpP881;0gJM?0)R00 THE NE AUGUST 2, 1974 Approved For$elease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499W01000130001-1 United PreslnoernatIonaJ CIA Director William E. Colby has war nod Congress that permit- -tinL the Pentagon to go ahead with a major naval and air buildup on an Indian Ocean island almost certain- ly will provoke the Soviet Union to follow suit. Colby's warning was delivered at a closed session of a Senate Armed Services sabeommittee July 11. A "sanitized" version with classified material eliminated was inserted in yesterday's Congressional Record by Stuart Symington, D-Mo. The subcommittee was consider- ing a S29 rni:iion Pentagon request for fun.~s to deepen the harbor, in- sta,i sl;on,. facilities and construct a I2,GG0-:err.,; B52-capable runway on the Bri ish-owned island of Diego Garcia where the United States now has minimal facilities. _4~n CS Saturday, August 3, 1974 Colby assured the subcommitte that the Soviet presence in the In- dian Ocean, while it has grown slowly, is still minuscule and presents no real threat to Western interests. He said Moscow assigns a lower military priority to the Indian Ocean than to the United States, China, Europe or the Middle East. Nevertheless, he said, the Soviets do appear to feel they must compete with the United States in every area to maintain . their superpower status. As a result, they have matched the two crisis buildups of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean of recent years-during the India-Pakistan and Middle East wars-and they can be expected to follow the same pattern if Washington decrees a permanent U.S. base on Diego Gar- cia. proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84=00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Rel s'e 2001/08/22 :-CIA-RDP84-00499R0Q1000130001-1 Castro Says CIA Is. Nixon Bane Associated Press MIAMI, Fla,-Cuban Prime.Minister Fidel Cas. tro said that CIA-trained agents have been more ef- fective iri ieopardizintt the President of the United States than in overthrow- ing his government in Cuba. In a nationwide brdzd- cast Friday,. Castro said. "Mercenaries 'trained by the CIA in espionage, sab- otage and subversion were. employed to spy and rob ?docume:nts at the head 'quarters of the Demo cratic Party of the United States . . "This action, and the scandal it has occasioned, the complications which it originated, demonstrate that the CIA and its mer- cenaries were much more capable of ruining the presidency of the United States than defeating the Cuban revolution." Approved For Rirlease'2001/08/22,: CIA-RDP84'-0O499R001000130001-1 Approved ForBlease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-f 049 - 1-1 roved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-004 9R00100IM001-1 PARADE ? JULY 21, 1974 o - ro sa. a ro o n:a, a mrc~rrd erase 2001/08/22: CIA ro a ro ro , as ro fu 0 - a < o o'aa ' m o L) 1 a- Q d ffD o o > rD w N ro n (p ro y w O n 't3 ro n o Y a- J ro n = o, Z7 3 0 C ~1 CL M Ln 3 p _ to 7 ru C3 ^*3 ~ro 78 ?~o 0, n a 0 w as M m m D = c w w to I o '. w e -i 0 n -< Q _c O > fD CD sxa- b-.C a o- Z) -'o i? v' w, 9 ~ 0 >(D - 0 X- CL T -, ro (o p~ a o e o? a rn. < .c ? ? pro w rrv K * 0 aC (D C 0 d o O M ro O. . -t _ Ci. x to (30 3 0 2 FD' Cr ? =' c m o 0- CL " n (D :c M-0 N O O rt ~ w CD ro ::' ,.. a ro 0?.o < n ([D ro to .,, o a 7{ a a O' w ,i ~ o aU ro u. iD '"s~ ro. ~ro ro ~~ w 3 n *ao c ro 0 CL m Iran ~, o (D (D n o-o~n ~ ="O 0 v a. ? =j. c phi c n. o -. o a m 0 ? 0 0 -, 0 ro CJ4 n I g o w 0 0 ((DD ~ a n 0 w o m oas r0 0 7c' ?*cro a'(~o CL u wroro'ro a w > (o cr d =, (D 3 3 Ia RDP84-00499QP01 000130001 -1 ao F6 oa Q. -, w g o /gyp-pr8v;pco'Fgr~lSlease 2001/08/22: CI} -FaP84-a499R00,1000130001-1 n o o o. C1. O 0, ~. 70 -< f1 I 2L m ?- ~. '. ao n ro tea r CL ? 0- :E 3 > (D ?fl -? -~ m m C m 7 " O a s 0" 5' w w "F;r IeQe&6OtlM I -g[ 4 X04 , ~0~ F~3~O1 13) a m S O tra n m ' 11 m o C(D O?? to a a z -= Q 0 { = o 11 O ID ' C is umn FD (SD C ?' ; ?,~ ~ y ff C c N P*,.' ~, ? roG, O. ~. Mv~i o0a " cu 'O 7 a 7 q' M Q 0 a O' O CL -, m m 'a 'w 0. m m S G ,..,, O . O c ?a -. C. oaa4?C C o fm1 ~?(7^ ~,~Q,m (n w __? 3 m O (D-m yio n S~'Z O, , - Ca 0 0 - O O ' ? d w ' C ti " . . C. -00 r. ? ~ fl. n S .. ? a O '< t7 s d zx G D O po ,< S 9 Q q 'C" S 7 o 7 w O m m m M (D 0 0 r < 0 F O p 3 9 a ^? 7 O 3 an EL- S a f. a m -?? m n m C '0 0 vi N d. m eD O O S m ,Y m C m p in ~n y m O .; m O _ -^ Ga (D p S S O cr cT '' 7' m r- O ? m m - m - m S =0 3 . ~' ~ a D ? o m ? g? < o O. ??e x' "' L. ^ a .il tr.n n n rr.. KRL111 V ail af.d )il Ill I 44 _ li tratiott operation arld of the procedure arva'i." I he 111:ptlt?aittoll is that 11(1111 for developing, r.:rruiting,?and hand- Pekin; arid Mo'ceoww are. swarming ling an agent arc in some cases over- with CIA etr'.t anti that no state se- elahorate and in ether;: overainlplifiefl, but Generally tiny are accurate. Tile account of the position acid operation of the CIA field station, cataloguing many of the pioblvins faced by it CIA officer serving ovcr3eas, will be new to most readers and might even be instructive for foreign-service offi- cers and foreign correspondents who thought they knew all there was to know. Add to this a text liberally salted with footnotes-most of them fascinating anecdotes in their own right-and the result is an interesting and readable book. Unfortunately, the large quantities of good information in Without Cloak or Dagger serve as a vehicle for an equal amount of misinforma- tion on the Agency, more misinfor- mation, in fact, than all that's been produced by the movies, television shows, or publications that Mr. Cope- land complains of. Moreover, the mis- information is presented very author- itatively, with no hint to enable the uninitiated to distinguish the true from the false. His intent, in a great many instances, is clearly to mislead the reader and give a totally false impression of Agency capabilities and performance. In describing field operations, Mr. Copeland stresses their defensive nature, stating, with a certain candor, that "the mission of the CIA station is ... to stay out of trouble." Most of the sixty or so stations around the world have, lid says, no more than two or three case officers," and, ideal- ly, a case officer is responsible for no more than one operation. Contrasted with this low-profile view of the CIA .overseas are his assertions of an ink- pressive amount of successful activ- ity. Ile c'-aims that "over the years, there have been literally thousands .of CIA agents in the U.S.S.R., Red China, Cuba and other communist cr,;t is safe front ihere. 'File facts &-i I was c~.pnsec to t ielkh were vastly ditierent. In the days be- fore I began to worry about becoru- ing an old whore nhyself, I -served for several years at it station with considerably more Iran three case officers. During one particularly hec- tic sunlnler, I met regularly with and handled no fewer than twenty agents, one of them with an additional five subagents. My workload had been expanded by taking on landholding chores for sonic operations of my colleagues who were on home leave, but the average load for case officers is, I suspect, closer to twenty than to one. Even after I had achieved the relative luxury of handling only one fairly high-level agent, I continued to manage four or five other agents in support of my operation and other station operations, aril I considered myself underemployed at the time. It's embarrassing to admit that China was my primary target and all my best efforts resulted in not one penetration of the Chinese military, party, or government above the vil- lage level. The other case officers at the station were similarly unsuccess. ful, as had been every other case of- ficer who had worked on the target for time previous twenty years. We consoled ourselves only with the knowledge that our colleagues in the units working against the U.S.S.R., with more personnel and more mon- ey and, presumably, more urgency, would have fared just as miserably but for the greater tendency of Rus- sians to defect. Their one outstand- ing agent was riot developed through any positive effort on their part; lie had sought them out.. Early in the book, Mr. Copeland describes the CIA's arrest and phys- ical elimination of a headquarters employee who had served for years as an agent for the Russians. If lie * Mr. Copelan+l corrects it popular m2.5cl1nc"oi.on I,y eXrtt_tilling that staff CiA smplr.yerg are almost never de:!g- nated as agents, in the sense that F61 expects anyone to believe this story, it tn'!'it have occtllr'ed to him tih;it hr' is confessing to a role as accessory to an administrative murder. The who %%ould Lake tile ly of ordering it. Aimiul1"ll the I'Itoenix ltrograrli, it wholc?a ie a53a1~=intltiun of k- y in;tu'gt:rlt leaders in 1`it tnanl, was directed by t{-en Autbassador William Colby, i*- r; as , carried out principally by the ~'ictn;tnlese them- selves, not by CIA +Itlicers. Phoenix had the fall approv.ll of Iiighrr au thority, so the burden of Agency re- slmnsiflility was rniniulal. It wa not at all equivalent to the secret liqui- dation of one renegade Staff employee in the haseinent of the Langley head- quarters. If this incident had really happened, it would be foolhardy in the extreme for anyone involved ever to mention it; a second execution would be far more likely than the first was. IIE MOST iNIAG1NAt;t1'E invention lof the whole book is time cabal, or inner circle of Agency old-timers, who pop up to illustrate a point now and then. Known only by exotic names like "Mother," "Kingfish," "Dojo," and "Lady Win(lemere," they go on about the business of mak- ing the Agency run, regardless of changes in adrr.iniaration or policy. Time last three of thiuc mentioned, on the basis of their described respon- sibilities, appear to be no more than specialists in a single unit that sup- ports operations without getting di- redly involved in their execution or command; these positions would not account for the importance or influ- ence Mr. Copeland ascribes to them. Mother is the eminence grist. Like the otlkers, lie was present at the birth of the Agency, and, faced with the frustration of wondering what de- cisions the Congress was making for the ff.ature of the fledgling Central Intelligence Group; lie characteris- tically suggested, "Penetration be- gins at home," thus showing that in- t.ragovernmental spying was not an invention of time Joint Chiefs. It was also Mother who fabricated it corn- plete epiona-e operation in those + ., t v days jti ?.t to expose the gullibil- ity of it unit competing with Iris for influence in the new Agency. In intelligence an agent is someone, use- CIA has no police powers,, let alone in spite of his early start and un- ally a foreign flat* ~,r 1 lir^e~ gvt r ct 1`~ l t of inaneuver, Mother information or pi t0~1ViI~1Ft I~g4~!. as lb}ta84?1 ~I~f~$=t1~~~200t1~dd~~-~ The staff employee: who contacts and (I tioner as well . ieae are no (ou It some tow never made it, to the top, reels him, and ' in general 1land1 s his plenty of officers, young and old, but he enjoys a certain amount of w -_-- +r e _ 1.___ - -.. .. 4i__-- ..OL.--91 ...1,.. 1n n .rev nnl nnlnnntnv entlnv ne 1w.-id of the APen- IL I "r~:1 ry;:,, cil'.lrtitcrtt?rrori-t ?.!IIort, it huge riotisly, Litt I doubt [!):it ,inyone with ttitrI i :-i lr, from I';tigeite Mk(;ai. co 1 itllerizcd data hurl~- storinrc k? 'I e nee rti ri tl e t t ri , rncrl ? clrlr ins; Iht- gground information I'Vinililions 01 ii+gelicy 6t, 110, 1 lyAl (04 $ 10Qi l or ~~Ir rtrv(tr. pel.uns, both American and foreign, with it, or prcci-ely tvlurt their re- This t:al ' t h?eirit: clludity of absw Who could conceivably become in- lationship with i\]r. (;oi,rlaml is. Un- hite righlrle pt:rvadcs "/'hr .tmeri- volved in terrorist activity, as well as like the gene al run of Walter Mittys can Currtliliun, a lenl'tlty I???. ay on millions store who could not. Mother who claim to have some. intimate re- the evils that aiCntu eiriy the com:ell- is, of course, an imaginary character, lationsilip with the CIA, Miles Cope- tration of power, and on the copse- but, aside from that, there is no way land clearly has one, but neither lie quest need for_Anoeciclms to redis- for an outsider to judge the truth of nor the Agency is going, to define it cover the basic lia monies of a sini- the Agency's so-called counterterror- voluntarily. In the foreword, Mr. pler?, more cormnunitaiian existellcet ist .activities. It is not legally autho- Copeland says, "1 must slake it clear, as a way of exercising their in(livid- rized to keep files on American cit- however, that no one at CIA ... or ualisnl, reducing alienation, and izens. The significant thing is that any other official agency has `cleared' thereby finding freedom. the author wants his readers to be- this book or in any other way in]- The steps by which this quintes. licve it is doing?so. plied approval of my writing it." In sential New Frontieisman has come The CIA may well become the early November of last year, I wrote to appropriate the rhetoric of tl1.e world's most powerful government a letter to Angus Thuerrner, assistant National Review are not spelled out, agency, according to Mr. Copeland, to director William Colby, asking and that is a great pity. From all his because it has access to the most several very specific questions about fulminations against inflation ("a tax knowledge. Removing the dangers the clearance of a magazine article on the citizenry"), the "bureaucratic inherent in a powerful government that appears, in somewhat different spirit," and."coercii,n," are Ave to in- agency, he adds, is not a matter of form, as chapter nine, of the book. fer a repudiation of Goodwin's ear- decreasing the power, but of ensur- Mr. Thuermer's reply was unequiv- her commitments? It is hard to say: ing that those who exercise it are ocal. "All Agency employees," lie in a single page he suggests the na- incorruptible and truly responsive to said, "sign secrecy agreements, and tionalization of the major sources of public interest. "CIA officials believe the federal courts have determined capital and that "economic relation- that their agency is already incorrup- that the secrecy agreements are en- ships should be decentralized," the tible and ... as responsive to public forceable contracts." The actual re- two seemingly contradictory impera- interest as any other agency" Inter- view of manuscripts is a security tives to be reconciled by employing estingly enough, lie does not claim function, and on that basis lie de- "the new technologies of control." anywhere that the Agency is respon- clinecl to answer my questions, but if Goodwin locates much of the re- sive to higher authority. On the con- the mail who sits next to the director sponsibility for the alienation of con- trary, lie gives examples where it has of Central Intelligence' admits he had temporary Americans in the domina- specifically been unresponsive and the machinery to stop publication tion by large bureaucracies of the implies that it will continue to be so of this book and didn't, that should economic life of the nation. Much of in cases where higher authority is in be approval enough for anyone. ^ this argument is made with copious conflict with its own particular view recourse to quotations from St. Paul of the public interest. and Nietzsche, Jeffer,on, Marx, and The overall picture that emerges so on (but sparingly from John Ken- from this book is of a Central Intel- neth Galbraith, whose analysis Good- ligence Agency enormously compe- ~~~~win's most resembles). It is an argu- tent, frighteningly ruthless, spectac- Inent displaying so many of the fur- ularly successful, terribly powerful, 7 '~~ 1~f1~$~~]`~T~:iS nishings of Goodwin's well-furnished and absolutely trustworthy, the sort mind that the reader may wonder if of ideal government organization by Nelson W. Polshy he has stumbled upon the intellectual that only a fool or a charlatan would equivalent of a garage sale. tamper with. The author has com- The American Condition, by Rich- The message of The American posed it presentation that could com- and N. Goodwin, Doubleday, $10. Condition is unremittingly grim- pletely revamp the Agency's image. even in a potentially cvliimsical nio- It. has been apparent that ever Eli SiNCF, Richard Goodwin en- nlent when Goodwin Spins out a fable since his clays as executive director, 1'I:.I tered public life, in the early about how cooking caused the fall of William Colby has been trying to 1960s, a certain moral regency has loan., Moreover, as the testament of renovate his organization's image. surrounded his every move, whether a man formerly engaged feverishly h- The impression he wanted to project, it was coining stirring phrases for as a political activist, it is thorough- Z'3 us a friend of mine put it, seemed to Presidential speeches ("Alliance For going in its rejection of politics. The he "something like it cross between Progress," "'l'ime Great Society"), role of politics in America, as Good- General Motors and the League of keeping the "authorized" account of will sees it, is not to advance lmlnan Women Voters." There is an ors- the Kennedy assassination within dignity, or even to share sonic good- inous implication in this book that, guidelines set out by the family, ies around, but principally to prevent by improving the Agency's image, mortal clashes between powerful Colby intends to enllr cc its r Nelson IF. rt,l.,r+l?, n ,o/itiral srit?ntict nttr' I-it this is not I 1N'rove~d'br R~t~~;t~Q~F~41~d~it:t,~2IrA~Fi~RP44~101~0 and inde iendence as w(. ,ossl ale, as c uri lc 1.850x, force ley, fnliltrrrrin. Ills /or(lrcntning hook of A great many people are going to essays is emit/etl Political 1'rumisca (0.r/veil and not politics (ll;cldes the issue." takeitout Clak or Daaeer se- Ur+hrrr.iy Prncsi_ The rinestint- is_ rrinrh of ApprAov~eedrFor eleaase12001y/018/22 : CIA- P84-0049' D0 0 01 0001-1 By Martha Angle Star-News Staff Writer The Central Intelligence Agency had more extensive contacts with the Watergate burglars than it has previ- ously acknowledged and failed to divulge all it knew to federal investigators, ac- cording to a Senate Water- gate committee staff report. A minority staff report released today was pre- pared at the direction of Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., committee vice chairman. It appears to raise more questions than it answers about the full ex- tent of the CIA role in the Watergate case and in the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psy- chiatrist. CIA Director William E. Colby protested that the Baker report "implies that there is reason to believe the agency and its officers and employes had prior knowledge of and were wit- tingly involved in the break- ins and the cover-up." Such conclusions, Colby said in a letter to Baker, are "unjustifiable." ACTUALLY, the Baker report draws no conclusions but rather emphasizes the difficulties the staff encoun- tered in obtaining access to data sought from the CIA. It also is peppered with dele- tions demanded by the CIA to protect classified materi- al. The repor stops far short of the sweeping allegations which former White House special counsel Charles W.. Colson made to a private investigator last month. In discussionswiti inves- tigator Richard ' . Bast, Colson charged that the CIA "deliberately assisted and helped carry out" the Ells- berg burglary, knew in ad- vance of the plan to break gaged in one h - lY ON THE BASIS of closed- door testimony and a re- view of some 700 documents supplied by the CIA, the committee probers reported that: 0 The Washington public relations firm, Robert Mul- len & Co., which Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. joined after retir- ing from the CIA in 1970, was actually a front for the agency and provided a "cover" for CIA operatives in Europe and Asia. 0 Robert Bennett, presi- dent of Mullen & Co. and son of Sen. Wallace Ben- nett, R-Utah, "reported de- tailed knowledge of the Watergate incident to his CIA case officer" on July 10, 1972, less than a month after the break-in, but the information was not relayed to the FBI. ? A March 1, 1973, memo by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of CIA's "central cover staff," notes that "Bennett felt he could handle the Ervin Committee if the Agency could handle Hunt," ac- cording to the Senate re- port. The memo also said Bennett was "feeding stories" to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, who was "suitably grate- ful" and was "protecting Bennett and Mullen & Co." 0 The CIA has acknowledg- ed paying one-half of Ben- nett's attorney's fee for his grand jury appearance. 0 As early as June 1972 the CIA knew one of its paid operatives, Lee R. Penning- ton Jr., "had entered the James. McCord residence shortly after the Watergate break-in and destroyed documents which might show a link between, McCord and the CIA." 0 When the FBI inquired about a "Pennington" in August 1972, the CIA fur- nished information about a former employe with a simi- For F46tel e2.U1 8Y22 o C Information about the "real" Pennington was pro- vided to the Watergate com- mittee in February 1974 only after a low-echelon CIA employe protested an order to remove the inateri- al from the CIA's Water- gate files to prevent its dis- closure. The unnamed "personnel security officer #1" inform- ed his superiors, according to closed-door Senate testi- mony, that "up to this time we have never removed, tampered with, obliterated, destroyed or done anything to any Watergate docu- ments and we can't be caught in that kind of bind now." The employe also said he "didn't cross the Potomac on his way to work in the morning and the agency could do without its own L. Patrick Gray." This was a reference to the former act- ing FBI director who was told to "deep six" docu- ments from Hunt's White House safe and subsequent- ly did destroy them. 0 Tape recordings of room and telephone conversa- tions by top CIA officials were destroyed on orders of former CIA Director Rich- ard Helms approximately a week after he received a NEARLY one-fourth of the 43-page Baker report is devoted to an account of the assistance furnished Hunt, by the CIA prior to the Sept. 3, 1971, break-in at the of- fice of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's former psy- chiatrist, by members of the White House "plumb=:; ers" team. The report says "docu- and conflicting testi- ments mony of CIA personnel" raise questions about "whether the CIA had ad- vance knowledge of the Fielding break-in," al- though the agency today again denied any such prior knowledge. The Senate staff report notes that CIA assistance to Hunt - which including the furnishing of false identi- fication papers, a voice changer, wig, camera, tape recorder and the like - was not terminated until Aug. 27; 1971, one week before the break-in. ? Although top agency offi- cials have testified publicly that the tie with Hunt was, severed because he was making unreasonable de- mands on the CIA, the staff. report suggests the real. reason may have been that', agency officials became suspicious of Hunt's inten-; tions. HUNT, AND "plumber" letter from Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield ask- ing that no evidence rela- tive 'to Watergate be de- stroyed. Among the telephone tape transcripts destroyed were! conversations with Presi- dent Nixon 'and former White House aides H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehr- lichman, according to the report. Helms and his secretary have testified these were not-related to Watergate. G. Gordon Liddy had enter- ed Fielding's office to "case" the burglary job, and had taken photos with the camera provided by the CIA. The film was de- veloped by the agency and reviewed before it was re- turned to Hunt. "One CIA official who re- viewed the film admitted he found the photographs 'intriguing' and recognized them to be of 'southern California,"' the staff re- port said. The official ordered a blow-up of one l;oto, which turned out to -RDP,e9F~ 13000 hbbw Dr. Fielding's name in the parking lot next to his office, the report said. Approved For @olease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004996001000130001-1 "Another CIA official has testified that he speculated that they were 'casing' photographs," the report said. The contents of the photos were reported to then-Deputy CIA Director Robert Cushman, according to this official. Cushman has denied receiving such a report, the committee staff said. The CIA, in a series of comments aimed at rebut- ting various portions of the report, said today that at the time the photos were de- veloped, "the name of Dr. Fielding had no meaning to the agency personnel in- volved. " THE COMMITTEE staff report said that although public CIA testimony has claimed the agency had no contact "whatsoever" with Hunt after Aug. 31, 1971, the Senate investigation reveal- ed at least a half-dozen later contacts going up to the spring of 1972. In the period between March and May of 1972, the report said, Hunt contacted the CIA's External Employ- ment Assistance Branch and "approached several active CIA personnel" seek- ing a "retired lock-picker," an "entry man" and other operatives. In March 1972, Hunt con- tacted Eugenio Martinez, a former full-time CIA em- ploye then on retainer to the agency, who reported the contact to his CIA case offi- cer. (Martinez subsequent- ly joined the Watergate bur- glars and now is on trial in the Ellsberg case). Somewhat cryptically, Martinez informed the CIA station chief in Miami that Hunt was employed by the White House "and asked the chief of station if he was sure he had been appraised of all agency activities in the Miami area." THE STATION chief, ac- cording to the Senate re- port, sent a letter to CIA headquarters here and was told in reply that Hunt was on "domestic White House business of an unknown na- ture and that the chief of station should 'cool it,"' the staff report said. "It is not explained why Hunt, who had 'used' the CIA, was not of more inter- est to the agency, especially when he was contacting a current operative, Mar- tinez," the report said. . . "The (Miami) chief of station was confounded as to why he was not told to terminate the Martinez relationship if the CIA headquarters suspected the involvement of Hunt in political activities," the re- port added. The Senate probe, con- ducted by Minority Counsel Fred D. Thompson and two of his assistant counsels, Howard S. Lieben_Sood and Michael J. Madigan, was initiated last November and completed by March of this year. Ever since then, the Watergate committee has been attempting to per- suade the CIA to declassify documents on which the re- port largely is based. The final version was "sanitized" by the agency, which also put out its own rebuttal comments simul- taneously with the release of the staff report. THE BAKER report in- cludes an eight-page list of "action desirable to com- plete the Watergate-related CIA investigation" Baker said he will recommend that the suggestions "be carefully undertaken" by congressional committees responsible for "oversight" of CIA. Among items requested by the Watergate staff --- but not provided by the CIA were an agency file on "Mr. Edward," (Hunt) which in- cliided all materials on the technical assistance pro- vided Hunt by the CIA. The CIA rebuttal document said the Watergate committee "already possesses the rele- _ vant material" from this file. The committee also sought, unsuccessfully, to gain access to a five-inch reel of tape labeled "McCord incident" and dated June 18-19, 1972, which did not turn up until March 1, 1974. "It is not known what is contained in this tape, but its importance is obvious," the staff said. The agency e Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0 ant 0..4 Q1~ w' ant already been provided to the committee. H$/IIC- Approved Fo Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499,,001000130001-1 A?18 W hingfon Starl~ews Wednesday, July 10, 1974 CIA Bid To Hush' Critic Told By Michael Sniffen Associated Press "Ok The CIA tried to lure an ex-agent who has written an expose of its operations back to the United States by interfering in his marriage, according to an American Civil Liberties Union law- yer. Melvin L. Wulf, an ACLU lawyer who has correspond- ed with former deep-cover agent Philip B. F. Agee, said, "CIA tried to interfere in the settlement of the separation' proceedings with his wife, to make it dif- ficult to reach a settle- ment." Wulf said the CIA wanted. Agee, who is in Great Brit- ain, to return to the United States where the agency could go into court in an ef- fort to prevent disclosure in his book of secret informa- tion. In a telephone interview Monday Wulf said that John Greaney, assistant general counsel of CIA, had talked to Agee's wife. "I CONFRONTED him with the charge that CIA was trying to make trouble in this domestic matter to lure Agee back," Wulf said. Wulf said CIA tried unsuccessfully to persuade Mrs. Agee not to let their children visit Agee. Greaney refused to com- ment on Wulf's remarks. Agee has told associates that he was involved in the assassination of locally em- ployed CIA agents, known in the agency as contract employes, the New York Times reported yesterday. . Agee told friends that the assassinations were not official CIA policy, but rath- er local options taken in the field, according to the Times. The Times said that Agee related at least one incident involving the use of a truck to run over a recently utilized local CIA operative whose mission had been completed. WULF is representing two other former intelli- gence officers, Victor Mar- chetti and John Marks, in a court battle with the CIA over publication of secret information in a book they have published. The CIA filed civil suit against them, forcing deletions in the book. Agee said-in an interview he has completed a 220,000- word book on the CIA's Latin American operations. Wulf said the book will be published by Penguin in Great Britain in the fall and that Penguin is seeking an American publisher. proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004998001000130001-1 Approved For*&leas~p200t10a122 IA-RDP'$4-00499W01000130001-1 SEN. IIOWARD 11. BAKER JR. ... probes CIA involvement Baker to Say, CIA Helped. flu ut Get .Job By Laurence Stern Wasb4ir?t0n Post Staff Writer Testimony indicating that a Central intelligence Agency official recom- mended the employment of Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. by a Washington public relations firm which has served as a CIA "cover" will be released today by Sen. [Toward H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.). The public relations firm is Robert Mullen & Co., whose relationship with the CIA. forms a central theme of the Baker report cleared by the CIA for release last weekend. Hunt was recommended to the Mul- len firm at the time of his retirement from the agency in 1970 by a CIA offi- cial identified as Frank O'Malley. There have been unsubstantiated alle- gations in the case that Hunt was re- commended to Mullen by former CIA Director Richard M. TIclms. Beth the CIA and officials of the their mutual ties, which included pro viding a corporate cover for CIA oper- atives In Mullen & Co. offices in Singa- pore and Amsterdam. Sources who have examined the re- port say it provides no conclusive links tween the CIA and the original b e Watergate break-in such as have been hinted by former White House aide Charles Colson and by Baker. However, -it includes documentation In the farm of three CIA memoranda' D84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved Folease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049901000130001-1 A8 Tuesday, July 2,1974 THE WASHINGTON POST .: Baker to Issue Report ermate te which point to covert effogts by offi- , cials of the agency to minimize its in- {-.volvement in the Watergate investiga- :tion. F.. There is also some evidence that Robert F. Bennett, president-of Mullen x.: and son of Sen. Wallace F. Bennet (R- Utah), was tipped off prior to the Watergate burglary that a White House llreak-in team was targeting Me- Govern campaign headquarters for a apolitical intelligence raid. a Bennett has privately acknowledged that he was given advance knowledge of the operations of the burglary team. But it was unknown whether he passed this information on to the CIA. . The memos upon which Baker drew In the preparation of his report were drafted by Erie W. Eisenstadt, chief of the central cover staff for the CIA's clandestine directorate; Martin J. Lu- kasky, Bennett's "case officer" within ;.. the agency, and subordinates of former CIA security director Howard Osborn, who recently took an early retirement ;:. from the CIA. The Eisenstadt and Lukasky memos recount the CIA's relationships with ,,,.Mullen & Co. and recount claims by Bennett that he planted unfavorable stories in Newsweek and The Washing- ton Post dealing with White House aides, including Colson. The object of these stories, the Baker report will in- was to draw attention away' dicate, from CIA involvement in the Water- gate case. draft version of Baker's report. ? The Michigan Democrat Is said to be in contact with the CIA's con- gressional liaison office on an almost day-to-day basis as new allegations have arisen suggesting new involve- the agency in the Water- by Baker, suggests that the former CIA security director provided mis- leading Information to the FBI on the identity of a former federal investiga- tor who helped Watergate burglar James W. McCord Jr.'s wife destroy CIA. records at their home immedi- ately after her husband's arrest in the Watergate break-in case. - Osborn's retirement, according to one official familiar with the handling of the case, was an outgrowth of the tnternai memorandum prepared in Osborn's office which resulted in the transmission of misleading informa- tion to the FBI. - Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), who has reviewed a draft of the Baker re- port, said Sunday on the CBS pro- gram "Face the Nation" (WTOP) that it contained "no bombshells." Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Service Intelligence Subcommittee, has taken testimony from CIA officials on a number of allegations mad. in the gate scandal. Some of Baker's colleagues on the Senate Watergate committee, of which the served as co-chairman, have charged that Baker has sought to im- plicate the CIA in the scandal to di- vert attention from the White House role in the break-in and ensuing cover- up. The report also questions why photo- graphs found in the CIA file t ken by members of the White House " pIgmb- era team during the Ellsberg break-in were not turned over to the FBI, even though agency officials were aware of their evidentiary significance. By and large, the Baker report reaches no definite conclusions but it suggests continued investigation of the relationships between the CIA and Watergate and names prospective wit- nesses to be examined. The Senate Watergate committee has gone out of existence but will issue its final report next week. Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84=O0499R001000130001-1 Editorials A-14 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049Q 001000130001-1 TUESDAY, JULY 2, 1974 Opinion Vic Gold: Ou Th Lest CIA 'Plot' Former White House aide Charles W. on the line. The way Colson did last Colson has developed a detailed theory week. - which he says is generally shared by And let me tell you, gentlemen, when President Nixon - that the Central Chuck Colson runs a CIA conspiracy Intelligence Agency is implicated in the theory up his greased flagpole, folks Chu Watergate scandals to a far greater ex- stop, right up and with - Nck News Pecs dent hi tent than has ever been disclosed. - And the way he tells it, the Old News report self. A Man was fairly quaking over the possi- Jim Garrison, Mark Lane, Norm bility that the CIA might succeed in a Presid; ent where needs are you? you now, when your major putsch to take over White House President operations. ma- i - All you true believers in the omn NIXON, said Colson, is "convinced levolence of the Central Intelligence Ag ency are you ready for another Con the CIA is in this up to their eyeballs." spiracy Theory? Good, because this one Sound familiar, Jim/Mark/Norm? Why, line is wild. Almost as wild as the one Norm fit's rom raone c oicall f yy a left winget straight was handing out last year about the the John F. Kennedy assassination. Ex- mystisry of Marilyn Monr oe' s death. ceps, Mark, whereas you titled your Yes, indeed, there's a fresh CIA plot book on that subject. "Rush to Judg- just waiting to be stirred. One that cries ?ment," I think what we have here is out for experienced hands. You've all more like "Rush Away from Judg- been the route, from How-the-CIA- meat." Killed-John-Kennedy to How-the-CIA- It's as if'they sat around the White Caused-Hurricane-Agnes" So it figures House one afternoon, the Old Man and that if Chuck Colson and Howard Baker Chuck, and thought: The liberal media are going anywhere with their theory of want a scapegoat for Watergate. O.K., How-the-CIA-Is-Responsible-for-Water- give 'em the CIA. But what could the gate, they could use your help. CIA have in mind, getting "up to their "eyeballs" in this sort of mess? THAT'S SEN. Howard Baker, of Well, says Colson, the Pcourse, who was Sam Ervin's sidekick theory is "thewere coming in President's en to last summer during the Senate Water- spy and t"th wanted coming get enough to gate hearings. Baker has been trying to to Wash- the White House so they could get what sell his CIA's- -the-One line around d Washh- they wanted." ington for the past six months, but with And what do they want? That's where wre counting on you, Tn/Mhek/ no success. He says it's because the CIA A won't cooperate. If you ask me, though, Norm. counting, you our, im/M ckn Chuck Ji in /Mark/ Norm, it's because the Ten- only . so car elaborating a CIA con nessee senator "animals talking in sh para- go on ng spiracy. Beyond a certain point, he ales. Stuff Stuff about s "animals crashing lacks your experience filling in outland- ish in the forest," and the like. ish details about such things..That is, in Now, Jim, you know, from your ex- explaining to the American people that perience gulling the voters of New Or- what the CIA really wants - in league leans (until they finally tired of your with its allies, the FBI, the Pentagon, act), that talking in parables isn't the those Texas oil millionaires, Burt Lan- way to get a good conspiracy theory caster, Kirk Douglas and the rest of the going. No, to sell a CIA scenario that cast from "Seven Days in May" -- is people will listen to, a man's got to lay it absolute power. Nothing less. pproved For Release 2001/08/22 CIA-RDP84-00499RO01000130001-1 Approved Foilease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049*01000130001-1 tti..-c_ /1`7 CIA Mieged By Richard M. Cohen Washington Post Staff Writer The lawyer for Watergate conspirators Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez re- vealed yesterday that the two had previously engaged in a series of illegal activities for the Central Intelligence Agency, ineludin~ .a "penetration" of the Radio City Music Hall by Barker in proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84=00499R0O1000130001-1 By the 1947 act of Congress that created it, the CIA is forbidden to engage in do- mestic intelligence operations. However, the agency is per- mitted to conduct domestic operations to protect its for.11 eign activities - a loophole j that could cover the alleged, Miami break-ins by Barker. Those break-ins' and those at the Watergate and at' th< office of ' Ellsberg's psychia- trist are just a few to have gained public attention. Some, such as the illegal entry into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, involved the use of CIA equip. ment and facilities. Others, such as the break-ins at Chile- an government offices here and New York in 1971 and 1972 remain unexplained and no agency role has ever been; proven. In addition, antiwar groups have frequently complained of break-ins, somtimes alleg- ing government attempts to obtain information. None of See BREAK-INS, A12, Col. 2 about the propriety of this," the spokesman said. the mid-1960s. The Radio City Music Hall entry, the lawyer said, was ap- parently a "CIA "training ses- sion" to see if Barker could ac- complish his mission satsfac- torily. Other missions, the law- yer said, included the burglary of the Miami home of a boat crew member who was making trips for the CIA to Cuba and' a similar break-in of a Miami business office. The lawyer, Daniel Schultz, revealed sonic of Barker's and iVlrirtinca,' pass CIA errapades during opening arguments for it trial, along; with former presidential wide; John D. 1' hrlichman and Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, on charges stemming from the 1971 break-in of Daniel Ells. berg's psychiatrist's office. A CIA spokesman said yes. tcrday the agency would not comment on Schultz's state- ment because . the matter is now before the court. "Our le- gal guys are very Concerned Approved For tease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-004991000130001-1 Break-ins Sponsored by CIA Laid -to 2 Ellsherg Defendants BREAK-INS, From Al these claims has been stantiated." also were among five men ar- source said, Martinez engaged rested in the Watergate of- in the activities that Schultz sub- fices of the Democratic Na- mentioned in court yesterday Schultz refused to expand upon his courtroom remarks other than to say that addi- tional details would be made public as the trial pro- gressed. Nevertheless, it was the sec- end time in a week that a re- port of a CIA role in the Watergate affair has come to public attention. Earlier this week, a Wash- ington-based former private octective, Richard Bast, said former presidential aide Charles Colson suspected that the CIA planned both the Watergate break-in and the entry of Ellsberg's psychia- trist's office, and that Presi- tdent Nixon, to an - extent, shared Colson's suspicions of the agency. Bast said he interviewed Colson on two occasions be- fore Colson was sentenced a week ago to a one-to-three-year jail term and a $5,000 fine for attempting to influence the outcome of the EllsbQrg trial by leaking derogatory informa- tion about Ellsberg to the press. Colson, according to Bast) also said that Senate Water- gate committee investigators were informed of the times and places of at least 300 other break-ins conducted by Martinez. 1,3enat.e committee sources have denied they have such information. Neither Barker nor Marti- nez has made any secret of their past work for the CIA, which the two have said was limited to operations against the regime of Fidel Castro in tional Committee and were -destrucion of foreign prop- subsequently convicted of bur- erty, possession and distribu- glary. tion of firearms, and falsifica- Barker, a bespectacled un- tion of income tax returns to dercover operative, was born hide the CIA as a source of in- in Havana and gr^w up both come. in the United States and Cuba. As for Barker, his entry into He was a captain in World the Radio City Music Hall, the War II in the Army Air Corps source said, was a CIA test to and was shot down over Ger- see if he could accomplish the many where he was held pris- mission successfully and re- oner for 17 months. In the late tain details of what he had 1950s, he joined the Castro seen. The break-in site was the guerilla movement but he be- theater's "monitoring office", came disillusioned and fled to which contained closed-circuit Miami in 1959. television cameras. When Thereafter, Barker worked Barker returned from his mis- against Castro and is said to sion, he was debriefed to see have been one of the organiz- if he had actually been in the ers of the Bay of Pigs inva- room. sion. From that time, until The source close to Barker, 1966, Barker worked for the said that Barker presumed the CIA. Until his arrest at the Radio City Music Hall break, Watergate, he ran a real es- in was a training operation be tate agency in Miami, cause of the 'nature of the, Like Barker, Martinez origi- questioning he underwent nally worked for Castro but upon his return. later turned against him. He, The source said the illegal too, participated in the Bay of entry into the Miami home of Pigs invasion, later worked for a crew member of a boat used the CIA and joined Barker's. in forays against Cuba was or- real estate firm as a salesman. dered because the 'man was According to an informed suspected of talking about the, source, Barker and Martinez Cuban operations-"not keep- met during the planning and ing security.' The other Mi- execution of the Bay of Pigs ami 'break-in Schultz men- invasion and later worked for tioned yesterday was also con the CIA in operations directed netted to the CIA's Cuban op- against the Castro regime. erations, the source said. Martinez, according to the Barker, for one, has ac- source, was the captain of a knowledged his participation boat used by the CIA to ferry in anti-Castro activities, main- supplies and personnel to taining before the Senate Cuba and to take refugees Watergate Committee that he back to Florida. Martinez, ac- believed the Watergate break, this source, partici- in was ordered to determine if pated in occasional raids the Democrats were receiving against the Castro regime. ' money from the Castro re- 'Cuba. Barker and Martinez' In these capacities, the gime. 'Approved r or Release 2001/08/22': CIA-RDP84 0049'9R001000130001-1 Approved For lease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499J01000130001-1 tUa hin9tonStarllcws Thursday, July 4, 1974 dears of CIA On Blown Latin Cover Disclosed Associated Press A disgruntled Central Intelligence Agency operative in Latin America passed information to a Soviet KGB agent two years ago that the CIA says threatened its Western Hemisphere operations, an informed official, source says. The agency's concern of compromised operations were relayed to the Senate Watergate committee in closed session, according to a committee minority staff report issued earlier this week by Sen. Howard Baker, The source said last night that the CIA agent talked with a known agent of the KGB, or (Soviet) Committee of State Security, in 1972 and that the revelations he is believed to have made were considered very serious by the CIA. The 1GB is in charge of Soviet internal security and foreign intelligence. The source said the CIA agent "has not defected in the classical sense. He has not gone physically to the other side, but he has certainly quit." It could not be learned what information he gave the KGB. THE CIA man was "despondent," "disgruntled" with the agency and "in his cups" at the time of his outpouring to the Soviets, the New York Times quoted sources as saying. The agent now is believed writing a book about his knowledge of the CIA,. the source said. The Baker report said the committee learned of the CIA's concern from the CIA's deputy director of plans. Baker's report, devoted to possible CIA involvement in Watergate, said that the agency had described the, affair for the committee but that description was de. leted from his public report at agency request. THE AFFAIR came to Baker's attention 'throulgh " what lie called a mysterious reference in a CIA memo ", to a "WH flap." The memo was written July 10, 1972 by Robert Bennett of the Washington office of Robert Mullen & Co., an international public relations firm then under contract to provide cover for CIA agents abroad. The Mullen firm hired convicted Watergate burglar., E. Howard Hunt in 1970 after he left the CIA and be-, Core he went to work for the White House as a consult- . ant. According to the Baker report, Bennett's memo to ": his CIA case officer, Martin Lukasky, in 1972, reported letailed knowledge of the Watergate incident which had occurred the previous month. Baker wrote that the Bennett memo "suggests that the agency might have to level with Mullen about the 'WH flap.' The CIA told Baker that reference was to a Western Hemisphere flap, but Baker wrote that Bennett' thought the reference concerned a-"White House .lap." THE AGENCY, however, was reluctant to tell Ben- nett that WH stood for "Western Hemisphere" because it did not want to Jet on that it knew of the contact be- tween its agent and the Russians, the Times quoted ane source as saying. Former CIA director Richard Helms told a Senate committee last year that on June 23, 1972 White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman asked CIA to keep the FBI from delving into some Mexican angles of the Watergate affair which might disclose CIA's opera- tions there. The .source suggested that the disgruntled agent's book might trigger another court battle similar to that ;? being waged by the agency over publication of the', book "CIA and the Cult of ?Intelligence,".by former~? intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John Marks. The-agency brought. a civil suit to gain 339 deletions; from that book before publication. This effort was based on oaths of secrecy that the authors. took. proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 i HS/HC- .Approved For.&Iease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$01000130001-1 A 10 Wednesday. July 3;1974 THE WASHINGTON POST Few Conchisio Baker-ur on CL By Laurence Stern Washington Post staIC Writer Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) once likened the role of the Central Intelli- gence Agency in the Water- gate scandal to "animals crashing around in the for- est-you can hear therm but you can't see them." ' This Aesopian image still fits notwithstanding Baker's release yesterday of a 43- page report which is rich in insinuation, long on foot- notes but short on substan- tive findings, Baker drew the bottom line on his case involving the agency in a letter Mon- day to CIA Director. )William E. Colby. Neither the report, nor the decision to release it, said Baker, "shouldbe vestigation, all ill coniicc- Lion with Bennetth's various Activities. The CIA, in commenting on these allusions, said: ' "The testimony of agency witnesses indicates that the, i agency had not, interest or involvetnient in any of the afforementioned activities of Mr. Bennett and no cvi- ccnce tor"the contrary has been made available to the agency." The theory of CIA involve- ment in the Watergate case 'stems from President Nixon who said on May 22, 1973, that within , a few days of the Watergate arrests "I was ad- vised that there was a possibil- ity of CIA involvement in some way.", Acting on. this suspicion he viewed as an indication that either the committee or I have reached conclusions in this area of investigation," If anything, the Baker rc port strongly suggests that some CIA officials engaged in cover-up maneuvers de- signed to minimize the agen. cy's exposure in the Water- gate investigation. ? Baker did , unearth the case of Lee }t. Pennington Jr., a $250=a-month CIA con- tract employee who ac- knowledged that he wit- nessed the destruction of Watergate burglar James W. McCord Jr.'s records by his wife at their home after Mc- Cord's arrest in Watergate. CIA's then-Director of Se- curity Howard Osborn, no longer with the agency, fed files oiv a different Penning- ton to the FBI when agents made inquiries about the in- cident - presumably ' 'to throw the bureau off the track. Columnist Jack An- derson reported the incident several months ago.. A central figure in the re- port is Washington public relations executive Robert F. Bennett of Robert Mul- len & Co., which, has pro- vided "cover" for CIA oper- atives in two of its overseas offices. The report claims that on July 10,' 1972, Bennett re- ported "detailed knowledge of the Watergate incident to his CIA case officer." This, conforms with Baker's gen- era) suspicion ' that . the agency knew far more about' the circumstances of the' break-in than it has ever' admitted. Bennett took 'issue with] the. report yesterday. "What, I reported to the CIA at the' time," he said, "was what' News Analysis I had already told the U.S..j~i attorney. I didn't know ally thing about the break-in. I i reported'my speculation that Howard hunt had been)j involved. I find it astonish ing to see this characterised as `detailed knowledge'." Sprinkled through one portion of the report are ref- erences to Howard Hughes, 'y Clifford Irving, Dita Beard' and the Chappaquiddick in issued instructions, shortly af- break-in and the elaborate and ',than a national' security tar- ter tlic arrest or the but glary costly cover-up campaign get of the White House. x team, which delayed for more which ensued. The strongest indication than two weeks the F I's in One of the byproducts of that the CIA has emerged vestigation of the laundering the Baker report, however, from the Baker inquiry ol Nixon re-election funds was to impugn the national without serious bruises was through a Mexican bank ac- security rationale by which given yesterday by CIA,-0i- count. The President puhhcly White T[ouse officials have rector Colby. acknowledged that his fears or repeatedly justified the bur= In a dune 28 letter-'to exposure ofcovert CIA opera- glary of the office of Daniel Baker, Colby warned tlial;' if tions were, after all, un- Ellsherg's psychiatrist, Dr. the report were made public founded. Lewis Fielding. in the form it was then pres- Baker, however, has been ', Quoting from closed ses- ' ented to him, "l may feel it pressing for months after evi- Sion testimony by CIA gypsy -necessary to take an aphl'o- dence that the CIA war- impli- chiatri.c advisers, the report ' nriate public position to;'as- cated in, or had advance - says E. Howard I-Iunt Jr. ' sure that the conclusions knowledge of, the Watergate and G. Gordon Liddy Jr. of 1i'i-om my investigation #nd " " plumbers the results of other investi- break-in and bugging. Critical the White House colleagues on the Senate unit said they wanted to rations are also known." Watergate committee, of "try Ellsberg in public" and But after the report 'yeas' which Baker was co-chairman, render him "the object of released yesterday Colhy have charged his objective pity as a broken man." said se dire, a step as. open was to divert attention from This . testimony tends to confrontation with a mm- the role of top White House support the view; that Ells- berv of the Senate would" be officials in approving the berg was a, political rather unnecessary. HS/HC-C~ proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved Felease 2001/08/22 :1A-RDP84-004001000130001-1 sport Critical' -Of Ct Baker Hints Agency Knew Of Break-in By Lawrence Meyer Although the report raises "questions" about the involve- lnent of the CIA in the Water- gate and Ellsberg break-ins,. Baker said in a letter to pres- ent CIA Director William L Colby that was also released yesterday, "Neither the select committee's decision to make this report a part of our pub- lic record nor the contents of the report should be viewed as any indication that either the committee or I have reached conclusions in this area of in- vestigation." The report by Baker, vice chairman of the Senate select Watergate committee, is the long-awaited product of sev- eral months of investigation Q. ,,,~. concTuete primarily by the the CiA in that connection are already known. At the request of the White house and with the permis- ~ sion of CIA Director Richard' 17.. Helms, Ilunt was supplied: with a wig, voice alteration de- vices, fake glasses, falsified' identification, a miniature 1 camera and other gear. f The report recalls that be-I fore the Lllsberg break-in, theI CIA developed photographs for ITunt that lie had made outside the Beverly hills', Calif., offices of Dr. Lewis! Fielding, Ellsberg's psychia- trist. i "Not only was the film de- veloped, however, but it was. reviewed by CIA supervisory officials before it was re- turned to Hunt,"' the report states. "One CIA official who reviewed the film admitted that he found the photographs 'intriguing' and recognized them to be of 'Southern Cali.- 'fornia.' He then ordered one of the photographs blown up. The blowup revealed Dr.. Fielding's name in the park- ing lot next to his office, An- other CIA official has testi- fied that he speculated that they w c r e `casing' photo- graphs." According to the report,, recent testimony" showed thatithe CIA official who re- viewed the photographs "immediately" reported their contents to Deputy CIA Direc- tor Robert Cushman and leis assistant. The report says Cushman and his assistant de- l nied ever having been told oL Republican minority staff of the Senate Watergate commiL- ee. Although the report is im illicitly critical of the CIA, it does not radically alter what is already known about the general outlines of the plan- fling and implementation of t Washington Post Staff Writer The Central Intelligence Agency may have known in advance of plans for break- fns at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and the Democratic N a t i o n a l C o m in l t t e e's Watergate headquarters, a report re- leased yesterday by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R- Tenn.) suggests. Baker's report, accompanied by CIA comments and denials, provides a rare,.if incomplete, glimpse Into the activities of the CIA that are, by design, normally secret. Among other things, the re- port describes how the CIA used a Washington public rela- tions firm as a, cover for agents operating abroad, as- serts that the', CIA destroyed its own records in direct con fliet with.a Senate request to keep them intact, asserts that a CIA operative may have been a."domestic agent" in vi- olation of the agency's charter and recounts how one CIA cm ployce fought Within the agency against withholding in formation from the -Senate committee and other congres? atonal committees. The report recites several instances in which it says CIA personnel whom the commit- tee staff sought to interview were not made available `ay the CIA. In addition, the re- port lists several' other in- stances in which it says, the CIA either ignored, resisted or refused requests for i o -ma- tion and documents - w the Lllsberg and watersa break-ins. Remarks by the CIA accompanying the 43-page re- port reject the suggestion that the agency knew in advance about either of the two burg laries. The CIA.?also disagrees with a,`number of allegations in the report that it has not made in- formation available to the committee. In addition, the re- port contains numerous dele- tions of names and descrip- uest of re h q e tions, made at t the CIA on the grounds of na- ;the photographs by anyone, tioual security. The report asserts, and the One of the central figures CIA denies, -zhat it was only who is named in the report is . when these photographs were convicted Watergate conspira- developed that assistance to tor E. Howard Hunt Jr., a for- Hunt by the agency was termi- mer CIA agent who continued nated. According to the CIA, to seek assistance from the 1"The decision to cut off sup- CIA even after he left the port to Hunt was made agency in 1970, face of escalating . In three of the six areas and was not based upon the that, the report discusses,' development of the photo, Hunt emerges as a principll graphs." actor. These areas include the The report also challenges activities of Robert It. Mullen "previous public CIA testi- and Co., a Washington public mony" that claimed that the relations firm; the provid- CIA had no contact with Hunt ing of technical services by at all after Aug. 31, 1971. The the CIA that Hunt used for Ellsberg break-in occurred the Ellsberg break-in, and the Sept. 3, 1971. .An. According to the report, - a t th ,....., F -- e a.o..,...h +...,.... r Le5 auVUt, spil.'ator., Eugon o +, who was recruited by hunt fur documents indicate that Hunt i and Hunt's approaches to the Ellsberg And Watergate 11 had extensive contact with the CIA after" Aug. 31, 1971, that, break }ns, cr,,,,+ ni nvoti a "laree role" - in I H$/HC- 9r-t) was completed in November; In introducing the sebtion on Hunt and his receipt of technical support from the CIA in connection with the Plisberg break-in, the report states, "In light of the facts and circumstances developed through the documents and conflicting testimony' of CIAi personnel adduced by this committee ... the question ar- ises as to whether the CIA' had advance knowledge of the Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiat-' rist) break-in. ' The report asserts that the committee gatEerdd "a wealth of conflicting testimony among CIA officials" when it investigated the Lllsberg break-in. I Approved For.,OIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499&01000130001-1 1971, and that Hunt had other contacts with the CIA. According to the report, IItlnt and his fellow Watergate conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy, who is now on trial on federal charges arising from the >lls- bcrg break-in, told a CIA psy- chiatrist that they wanted to " 'try Ellsberg in public, rend- er him 'the object of pity as a broken man' and' be able to refer to Ell sberg's 'Oedipal complex.' " The report says Aunt asked the CIA psychiatrist not to re- veal Hunt's discussion of the profile to anyone else at the CIA. But the psychiatrist, ac- cording to the report, was "extremely concerned about Hunt's presence and remarks" and reported them to his CIA, superiors, The report says the committee has asked to see memorandums of the psychia- trist and his superiors, but the request was refused. In addition, the report states, the psychiatrist "also periors that Hunt was in Mi- ami in early 1972. The re- sponse from the CIA to Marti- nez's superiors, according to the report, was that hurt was involved in domestic White House business and to `}cool it." summaries of agency logs of conversations held within the CIA, but "it is-impossible to determine who was taped in many of the room conversa- tions. In this regard, even the CIA's analysis does not pro- vide this vital infornintion. Attempts to examine somcl'['here are several references CIA reports concerning Marti- j to a 'Mr. X. The CIA has not licz by the committee have been frustrated by the CIA, I hn ronnid nvenrl c produced the actual logs for our examination. However, we were informed that there are gai)s III Me .v~;~. "Because of. hunt's close ref-In this regard, the report ationship with Martinez at ajalso cites a struggle within the time when Martinez was a paid CIA operative, the basic question arises as to whether the CIA was aware of Hunt's activities early in 1972 when he was recruiting Cubans to assist in the Watergate break- in," the report States. In response, the CIA as- serts, "There is no evidence within CIA that the agency possessed any knowledge of Aunt's recruitment of individ- uals to assist in the Watergate or any other break-in." was given the name of Dr. The report also discusses Fielding as Ellsberg's psychia? the destruction of records by trist , .." the CIA about one week after "While Director Helms has the agency received a letter denied that he was ever- told from Senate Majority Leader that Hunt was involved in the Mike MasnficlJ (D-Mont.) in CIA's Lllsberg profile ore- January, 1973, asking that ject," the report asserts, it is "evidentiary materials" he re- not without significance that tamed. the time period during which Helms, the report ? asserts, the CIA psychiatrist was brief. ordered that tapes of c:onver- ing his superiors of his con- sations held within offices at terns regarding Hunt wes CIA headquarters be de- circa Aug. 20, 1971 - a week stroyed. In addition, the. re- Prior to the' developing of port states, "on Helms' in- Hunt's film of iniriguintf struction, his secretary de- photographs\of medical offices stroyed his transcriptions of in Southern California which both telephone and room eon- impressed at least one CIA, of versations" that may have in- ficial as 'casing' photographs." eluded conversations with The CIA responded to the President Nixon, White House report that at the time it de- chief of sta:f I-I.It: (Bob) veloped the photographs for Haldeman top Presidential Hunt, Fielding's name had no domestic adviser John D. Elirl- meaning to the agency person- ichman and other White nel Involved. In addition, the House officials. CIA , stated, "Ambassador Ilelrns and his secretary Helms (helms is now ambassa- have testified that the conver- dor to Iran) has testified that sations did not pertain to he had no knowledge of E. Watergate, the report sates, Howard Hunt's role in the pro- adding, "Unfortunately, any files. The former director of means of corroboration is no security for CIA has testified longer available." that he was never advised of 'rwo facts about the destruc- Ilunt's role- in the profiles. tion are "clear," according: to Further, there is no other the report. "T irst, the only agency official who had other destruction for which knowledge of both the provi? the CIA ha's any record was stoning of Hunt and Runt's in- on Jan, 21, 7972, when tapes volvement In ~ the preparation for 1964 and 1965 were of the Ellsberg profile." destroyed .. and ' s?:.condly, The section of the report never before had there been a dealing'with Eugenio Martinez destruction of all axisting asserts that Martinez,Ap1dO deFbr Release 2001/08/ ,operative, alerted his CIA su- The, committee obtained CIA over whether it would produce information concern- ing Lee R. Pennington, a CIA operative who assisted the wife of Watergate consirator James W.,McCord Jr.-a former CIA employee-in destroying pa- pers at her home shortly after the Watergate break-in. The Pennington information may have been "extremely sensitive" for two reasons, the report states-first, because the CIA misled the FBI when it earlier tried to investigate Pennington by diverting the FBI to another man named Pennington; and second be- cause Pennington may have been a "domestic agent," oper- ating in the United States in violation of the CIA charter, which generally limits the agency to intelligence activi ties abroad. Muilcn and Co., and Hunt's' employer until shortly after. the Watergate break-in. Mullen and Co. was used as a "front" for'CIA agents over- seas. Bennett, according to the report, kept his CIA contact informed of his efforts to give information to interested par- ties in an effort to avoid in---, volving the Mullen firm in news stories and legal actions, stemming from the Watergate break-in. The report asserts that Ben- nett "funneled" information to Edward Bennett Williams, ;i then a lawyer for the Demo- National Committee and': cratic The Washington Post, through' another Washington lawyer, Hobart Taylor. Williams said yesterday that he never received any infor- mation directly from Bennett and was not aware that infor- received from Taylor- mation which Bennett ? said was "useless"-had come from.,, Bennett. Bennett confirmed that he had never met Williams. "The description of what I did with accurate characterization," ply don't. know where to start with ? regard to this report."' The report does not make,' clear what domestic activities Pennington may have been in- volved in, although the repay contains a passing reference to a CIA file on columnist Jack Anderson. The report'states that an un- named CIA personnel officer became concerned that thF CIA was trying to withhold in- formation about Pennington from the Senate Watergate committee. The report says this personnel officer testified in closed session before the, committee that he told'a~supe- rior, " 'Up to this time we have never removed, tamp- ered with, obliterated, de- stroyed or done anything to any Watergate documents, and we can't be caught in that kind of bind now. We will not do it.' " Subsequently, the report states, the personnel officer "prevailed and. the informa- tion was made available to this - and other appropriate congressional committees." The report also discusses 21xeQ6iA 4RDP84-064"FWO nett, president of Robert Ii?' Ya.?I Approved Fot&Iease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499. 01000130001-1 search into human behavior patterns is repu~,.nant to many people. It smacks of 19184, even if, as Gittinget firmly maintains, no assessments are made of American subjects. Although Gittingcr asserts that he and his firm were not in- volved in any way, only three years ago CIA psychiatrists used many of the same techniques to prepare a psychiatric profile on Daniel Ellsbcrg, an American citizen. For its part, the CIA's official position is that "we don 7t have anything to say about alleged or real relationships with outside groups." Nevertheless, it is pos- sible to piece together the story from Gittinger's initial comments and from statements by other sources familiar with the CIA-sponsored research. The CIA apparently first became in- . volved in funding outside psychological research during the early Fifties when its personnel were instrumental in setting up a New York foundation called the Human -Ecology Fund. According to a source who worked there, the Fund was virtually a C[A "proprietary," i.e., a sup- posedly private organization which is, in reality, controlled by the CIA. This same source recalls that while the Fund received some money from universities and legitimate foundations, most of its operating capital flowed in through the same. kind of dummy foundations that served as CIA funding conduits for the National Student Association and sim- ilar groups (as exposed by Ramparts magazine in 1967). The Human Ecology Fund's main pur- pose was to promote academic research into human behavior. Some of this re- search was of no interest to the CIA, but was, from the agency's point of view, worthwhile because it provided the fund with a "cover." What most interested ~(~~vv~ v dr that could tip off 9 Nak~il4 i hIr might be induced For the last 20 years, the CIA has been using ostensibly private organizations to carry out personality studies of po- tential and actual espionage agents, ac- cording to several psychologists who have been directly involved. John W. Gittinger acknowledges that his own Washington-based firm, Psychological Assessment Associates, inc., is almost totally dependent on CIA contracts; he describes the work as "indirect assess- ment -- how you cv nl~rste people by watching them from a distance." At first, Gittinger talked relatively freely in a short telephone interview, em- phasizing that none of the studies have been targeted against American citizens. But two days later when a reporter came to his Connecticut Avenue oflices at his invitation, he said the CIA had for- bidden him to discuss Psychological Assessment's relationship with that agency. "I was given no explanation," said an obviously disturbed Gittinger. "I'm ha proud u of > rFil)~i f stb explain it." ' Gittinger is quite disturbed that publication of his connection with the CIA might damage his professional reputation. "Are we tarred by a brush because we worked for the CIA?" he asks. "I'm proud of it." lie sees no eth- ical problems in "looking for people's weaknesses," if it helps the CIA obtain valuable information. He adds that for a long time, most Americans thought this was a useful process. Now, at 56 years old, after nearly 25 years of working for and with the CIA, Gittinger is faced with a switch in the rules: Journalists are now willing, and even eager, to write about matters that the John Gittingers of America feel affect the "national security." And as much as he would like to justify his work, given these circumstances, the CIA insists that he keep silent. Yet in 1974, with memories still fresh of abuses carried out in the name of eMF,: qb + rei l5att5 i a~-`t 4. Approved. Folease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049%'01000130001-1 into becoming a spy: behavior that could show that all alreadv recruited agent was nett telling the trial h-, or behavior that might he exploited in making sure that a spy staved under firm CIA control. The Fund also provided a "legitimate basis lo'approarh;anyone in the academic community anywhere in the world," said two former colleagues. Also, that while recipients of hund grants were never asked to do anything but legitimate psy- chological research, American profes- sors were sometimes not informed (and foreigners never were) that they were working with CIA funds. In 196(1, for example, Dr. Herbert Kclman of Ilarvard University received a Human Ecology grant of $IOIX) to help publish it hook he was editing called Inrernarional Behavior, He did not learn until seven years later -- and then hy ac- cident --- that the money had come from it CIA-supported group. Among those who never found out that their work was funded by the CIA were European scien- tists whodid extensive studies on alcohol. "We financed them quite legitimately the way any foundation would," states a former employee. Even those American psychologists, who were - as intelligence professionals say - "witting" to the CIA's involve- metal, found it a "comfort-producing ar- rangement" to deal with a foundation instead of the agency itself, one source said. lie also recalls that Fund psy- chologists sometimes traveled overseas to make secret psychological assess- ments of foreign leaders, accompanied by CIA operatives who used the Human Ecology Fund as a cover. The Human Ecology Fund was dis- banded in the mid-Sixties, Several of its former employees - including John Git- linger - had already started to work for Psychological Assessment Associates, the consulting firm that Gittinger and two other ex-CIA psychologists had founded in 1957. Gittingcr denies that the company was started at the agency's request or that it is under CIA control, although he admits that most of its busi- ness comes from agency contracts. Un- like the Human Ecology Fund, Psycho- logical Assessment is 'a profit-making corporation, and it has tried - not too successfully in recent years - to sell its services to private companies, especially those with overseas operations.. Working under contract to the CIA's Clandestine Services, the firm has mainly applied the Gittinger-invented Personality Assessment System to es- pionage work, Gittinger's work is based on his own largely intuitive theory of human personality, namely that "most individuhl behavior may be regarded as an attempt on the part of the person to minirnire the significance of his weaknesses " He has written that his sys- tem "makes possible the assessment of fundamental discrepancies between the surface personality and the underlying personality structure - discrepancies that produce tension, conflict and anxiety." While few in the psychological community accept Gittingcr spremisesor even a ire familiar with his work, the CIA has obviously been impressed with its possibilities for evaluating the person- alities of foreigners and identifying their strengths and weaknesses. Gittingcr states that his company has done extensive research for the CIA to develop psychological tests free of cul- tural biases. This has, of course, neces- sitated work with foreign control groups who apparently had no knowledge that they were being tested for the benefit of the CIA. Gittinger admits that "we didn't get fair in terms of culture-free tests" but slates that he land his associates have been more successful in developing a system to train people (CIA field operatives) in making useful observations about foreigners' behavior. (iitlinger believes that he has come tip with a "formula" that can turn seemingly superficial observations into relatively ac- curate assessments of personality and moliv;dion. While he would not explain what data are plugged into his "formula," another source familiar with his work says that the trick is for an observer to note variables how a person knots his tic, combs his hair and ties his shoelaces - that somehow correlate with other nonohservable traits like honesty and dependability. Gittingcr says the system can he used to give a "pretty good guess" about a person's vulnerabilities and to answer questions like, "What will some- one do if he gets drunk?" or "Is he more interested in women than money?" At a time when U.S. satellitesand other electronic spying devices collect virtually all the nccessa'ry military intelligence on the Soviet Union and China (the only countries that even potentially pose a threat to the United States), secret studies of European alcoholics and Asian schiz- ophrenics 'seem at best anachronistic vestiges of the Cold War. It is difficult to conceive how the "national security" would he affected if word got out that certain behavior traits show a person is lying or has a weakness for women. If the work has any validity, it should be exposed to outside scrutiny. Even today, when Gittinger asserts that all the firm's researchers are aware of Psychological Assessment's CIA ties, there still is an unwarranted and un- needed degree of deception by not publicly stating that the work is for the CIA, and not informing everyone who comes in contact with the firm of that fact. There is just no longer any reason why an agency that is supposed to be primarily concerned with coordinating foreign intelligence should subsidi;e companies like Psychological Associates within the United States or use such a } company with outwardly legitimate tics to the academic community to provide cover for CIA work overseas. The writer is a Washington-based free- lancer and co-author with Victor Afar- eherti of '71re CIA and the Cult of In- telligence' (Knopf, I974L Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Central Intelligence Agency Peace Promises Oversold Ex--Intelligence Official Says By Marilyn Berger fort to obtain Western tech- WasiSinIton ost Staff writer..., nology and consumer goods, In the aftermath of the is seeking, is peaceful coex- Moscow summit, 'a leading istence--in Moscow's lexi- analyst of Soviet affairs has con the avoidance of war, expressed concern that the the support of world revolu promise of e generation a d to tionary forces, the, shrinking peace is being oversold of capitalist resources and rather as a than an the "class struggle." accomplishment people a hope. "Detente," according to The Soviet Union, mean- Cline, "is defined by most while, maintains its goals of Americans as peace, stabil- expanding its economic and ity, international coopera- political power in the world, tion, tolerance and conver- he 'said. ? gence. The Soviets, according to "One of the things that Ray S' Cline, the former .di- rector of intelligence and re- search at the State Depart- ment, "use the circus and theater'' of summitry in their own world strategy of peace- ful coexistence. Richard Nixon appears to be using It to make domestic political gains. "The admihistration is confusing the American peo- ple' because it is talking about the prolonged reduc- tion of international tension and a generation of peace. In the American view this means an absence of con- flict, but in the Soviet view it means only no nuclear war while the 'class strug- gle' continues economically and politically around he time. I believe we tend to ig- world." nore ideology completely, The Soviet Union, Cline just as we refused to believe Mld,, believes that the what Hitler said about Ger- "correlation of forces" in the world-especially the weakening of the United States as a result of its in- ternal economic ; and politi- cal problems-will inevi- tably lead to the victory of Soviet power. Cline was the chief of the analytical staffs on the So- viet Union and China in the Numerous outstanding go- cards. U.S. commitment to NA , vietologists have been mak- "The kind of peaceful that there will be a with- ingthe same points in schol- coexistence and detente drawal of U.S. forces ant a any journals, books and, which we do in fact hive, a lessenialg'of economic coop and later deputy director of control system would feel so the CIA before he went to threatened it would destroy the State Department. those contacts. Therefore He is now director of stud- our concept of detente can ies at the Georgetown Uni- continue only so long as it versity Center for Strategic doesn't succeed." ' Studies. President Nixon's descrip- Cline said the experts in tion of _a web of relation- government are well aware ships drawing the Soviet THE WASHINGTON POST bothers me,". he said, "is that we've got ourselves pretty well convinced that basic formulations of na- tional, purpose don't mean `I think the cautionary aspects of this ex- pertinent in the diplomatic approach to- ward the Soviet Union ... may have been submerged in the need for domestic political triumph.' purposes, He has, Cline said, "identified himself with peaceful coexistence of a kind which will permit the gradual growth of what be calls the socialist world, without serious danger of war with the United States, the only adversary the Rus- sians fear:" Cline's concern is, first of all, that the American peo- ple be made aware of 'what is going on. "There is a need for what these days we call `consciousness raising', lie said. They should be urged, he said, "to focus on, the eco- nomic and politicdl conflict which continues, and not be misled by diplomatic spec- taculars." The Soviets he stressed, "have shown no interest in creating any web of rela- tionships because they fear the penetration of Soviet so- ciety by hostile Western ide- ology." Instead, he said, they point to this desire for a "web of relationships" as ,demonstrating American weakness. Cline's prescription for dealing with the Soviets en- tails first of all understand- ing what we are about. The United States, he said, should remain strong mili- tarily, preserving its deter- rent "whatever it costs." It should trade with the Soviet Union, but on non- concessional terms. He has no objection to granting most-favored-nation status, which would only put the Soviets on a par with other nations. But he thinks cred- its should be limited only to those deals that would be economically beneficial to the United lStates. "We should take care not to export our most advanced technology but to trade the products of that technology for Soviet raw materials," Cline said. Finally, "we should make no large, long-term invest- ments in capital unless there is no other opportu- nity for the development of those same resources," he said. This would mean that we should avoid investments in developing things such as Siberian oil and natural gas because of the uncertainties of long-term access to the products. "We should offer conces- sions in limited fields," Cline said, "if and when, through quiet diplomacy, we can make progress in open- 'ing Soviet society to foreign contacts, which is, after all, what we have advertised de- tente diplomacy is all about." ical statements are not sim- mer U.S. Ambassador to the ple blueprints for future ac-, Soviet Union Foy Kohler tion, but they mean some- and others. thing." He noted that after the He said. "This problem 1972 Moscow summit meet- hs been around a long ing Soviet spokesmen said many in the 1930s." Cline made his rather pes- simistic remarks during a lengthy interview in his of- fice' in the quiet of a fourth -of July weekend. The paradox, he said, "is. that if detente were really to succeed in our sense of the world , of opening mean- ingful contacts inside Soviet society, the Soviet internal Monday, Jul 8, 1974 A'3 revolutionary forces wher- ever they are." At this point Cline pulled out a recent article from the influential Soviet journal Problems of Peace and So- cialism to make his point. It said: "Peaceful coexistence is a specific international form of class confrontation, linked to the peoples' stru;- gle not only for peace but also, for the " revolutionary transformation of society, to the strengthening of the,so- cialist community and to mass actions against imperi- alism." It is Cline's view that the American people must be educated about the Soviet perception of what is hap- pening. Cline quoted from a recent monograph by for- view the U.S. policy of de- tente as reflecting a change of heart but as a policy, forced upon it by what the Soviets call "the social, eco- nomic and ultimately, mili- tary power of the Soviet Un- ion and the socialist coun- tries." The quote continues: "The standard Soviet line has been, and continues to be, that `the real alignment of forces in the world, arena' has shifted against the United States." Exaggerated hopes from summitry, Cline said, "create an illusion that tends to divide and confuse and produce apathy. not only at home but among our allies." ' In Europe, he said, there of what is happening and Union into a detente that is is "fear that a new Soviet- are reporting fully on the irreversible:, in Cline's view, American relationship will Soviet policy and attitudes. is thus probably not in the lead to a diminution_ of the TO Cline saiy ."I think the cautionary, ?as .ects of +1i#1; experiment in the rlinln- ing pressure on them to en- ter into long-term under- o ch a .. v app Soviet Union-=and toward result of the education in in neutralize them politically China.:-may have been, silk ternational affairs he gave and strategically anR, e~ n merged in t$e need for do- Nikita Khrushcbev during sooner, provide opporttlni- mestic political, triumph." the Cuban missile crisis in ties for united front gove`n- These were strong words 1962," Cline said. ments, 'getting Communist coming from Cline, who has The basic outlines of pies- parties into power through refused to let himself be ent Soviet strategy, Cline the `parliamentary road . to quoted on government pol- said, was decided at that socialism'." icy since he resigned?from time. A very high Soviet Cline noted that this al- the State Department nine leader came 'to the United most happened in. France months ago. At that time it States shortly after that cri- and could very likely occur was clear that he was con- sis and told an American of- in Italy within the year. cerned that the problems of ficial that there would never Thus the Soviet Union, Watergate were interfering again be a conflict on those Cline said, is using the at-, in the orderly; process of unequal terms. The Soviet mospherics of summitry for conducting foreign policy. leaders decided then to have its own ends. "Just as the Cline admitted : that there no more missile gaps, on Chinese sa the 'Peking was some irony in the fact land or sea. It was then that summit of 1 772 in the same that Mr. Nixon was now us- Moscow started investing in terms as a thousand years ing cooperation with the So- 'Its big missile -build-up to- ago they saw the arrival of viets when he had built his ward a parity of forces with delegations from tributary early political career in the, the United States. states to bear gifts to the 1940s and 1950s on Cold War "What we've had since, emperor=first kowtowing rhetoric and virulent anti- but without the hoopla sur- nine times-the Russians; communism, rounding :detente," Cline with a different psychology, Summit conferences like . said, "is the successful de- out of their sense of insecu- the one just completed, terrence of nuclear war. Ev- 'rity,. take pride that Nixon Cline said, tend to create an eryone has struggled since was coming to seek a modus atmosphere of improved re- then on how to translate vivendi with their now pow- lations, but they also create this into international coop- erful state-and that when the illusion that the Soviet eration and understanding- problems build up in, the TT-ion and the United States our concept of detente as Middle East they can sum- share theAp i'vstdarssoOrRel@@I t2OOi1Y(~$~2~ou eIR 1-1 seeking detente, sion of continuecT, ' flitter -' Sovieoi~n ''91 Actually, Cline said, what struggle based on class and chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is the Soviet Union, in an ef- the need to support world using summitry for his own Approved For please 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499Q#01000130001-1 E. Howard Hunt Jr. gave a detailed, first-person ac- count' yesterday' of~ how White House officials sat in .a basement office at the Executive Mansion in 1971' and cooly plotted a bur- glary designed to discredit' one of President Nixon's po- litical opponents. . Hunt, already convicted in the original Watergate case, testified under a grant of immunity from fur- ther prosecution that the burglary was planned with CIA assistance obtained by former presidential assist- ant John D. Ehrlichman. Although Hunt's testi- mony did not implicate Ehr.- lichman in a crime -- and, according'to one defense attorney, will not - the day. began with the Watergate special prosecutor's office vowing to prove Ehrlich- man guilty of conpiracy, lying to the FBI an,` three counts of perjury. Ehrlichman and .is co- defendants - G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio z. Martinez -- are under i. dietrnent on charges arising from the 1971 burglar, of tho office of Daniel Elisberg's psychiatrist. ? Hunt and four other men have been n::ned as unin- dicted cocons;Mirators in the case. HUNT'S ICY RE''ERVE broke down orty occasional- ly; as when U.S. District Judge Gerh: a d A. Gesell interrupted to ask pointed. questions, anti Hunt :_ppear- ed extremely uncomfortable when. forced to read a memorandum hehad writ- ten in which he discussed a. plan to "destroy" Daniel Ellsberg. Under questioning by Asst. Special Prosecutor Charles Breyer, he was "tentatively" hired on July 6, 1971 by Charles W. Col- son. Colson called him back the following day because "as he said it, he wanted to run me past John Ehrlich- man:" The three men met for several minutes, he said, an Colson introduced Hunt as the man "of whom we've been speaking .. . about matters we've been discussing." One of those "matters," a, response to a question by Gesell indicated, was an investigation Ehrlichman and Colson ordered into the Chappaquiddick accident of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass. However, Hunt continued, he was soon as- signed to an already started investigation of Ellsberg. This project, Hunt said Colson told him, "would have to be carried out on a non-traceable basis; that is, my connection with the White House was not to be known." Hunt said he told Colson, he would need certain items for disguise, and asked if ei- ther the Secret Service or FBI could help. Colson told. .him the project was "too sensitive," he said, and sug- gested.that Hunt contact some of his old CIA compa- triots on a "man-to-man" hasis. HUNT SAID he countered that this would be impossi- ble, but told Colson "that calls from the White House to the Central Intelligence Agency were almost im- mediately acted upon." When ,he met with Gen. he arranged for a CIA.' Robert Cushman, then. psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard' deputy director of the CIA, Malloy, to meet with the on July 22, he said, he plumbers. He told Malloy, learned that on July 7, the he said, that he wanted an day of his meeting with adequate job done. Ehrlichman, Ehrlichman Asked by Gesell if he had had personally called Cush- mentioned the reason for man to request the assist- the profile, Hunt reluctantly ante. said he had suggested to With his false identifica- Malloy that "if he (Ells- tion, a wig and other CIA berg) couldn't be tried in items in hand, Hunt said, he court, it would be a fine was put in touch with the idea to try him in ;the, three men with whom he press." Malloy, Hunt testi- would work on the unit later' fied, said he would have to known as the "plumbers". pass the request on to two Egil Krogh Jr., Ehrlich of his superiors. mart's chief assistant; At this point, in early Au- R. Young, and Liddy. gust, Hunt said,, the idea of David Hunt, Krogh, Young, Col- the burglary came, to him. son and Felipe DeDiego are, 'Because of Fielding's refus and be- at the unindicted coconspir- al cause, to e of the cooperate, inadequate CIA atr list. profile, "it seemed to me, at Around Around the time he-joined least, that a bag. job was in the White House staff, Hunt order. said, he and Colson ex- Hunt said the original changed concern that the. idea was for him and Liddy indictment charging Ells-, to carry out the burglary ber they and assrociate' aalone, but Krogh and Young they gave e the Pentagon. on Papers to the press that vetoed the idea. "Because spring was "loosely drawn" of our connection with the, and "faulty." White House, a plausible' They were afraid that denial would have to be, maintained",if the burglars and be "martyrized," hnhd were caught, he said. andd beg be and Colson " He therefore called upon ,. said, and an Cold and close friends in the agreed that t that would be Miami area ... who might H .'unfortunate." unted how Ells- called upon to perform a.- berge's recont psychiatrist, Dr. - patriotic service." Lewis J. Fielding - who BARKER, he said, was preceded Hunt to the stand given reason to believe that yesterday had th infor- "this was :a White House provide vide the e FBI with inf ; operation." mation about Ellsberg. Therefore, Hunt said, he ar- The first job, Hunt cretin-~ r.-' ranged for the CIA to-do a ueTh was to do job, a "vuine psychiatric "profile" on ability and feasibility Ellsberg. .., study" of Fielding 's office BUT THE PROFILE was -- in other words, case they . joint. . "superficial," he said, and . Barry-Kalb HS/HC- Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049.9 R001000130001-1 Approved Forelease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499W01000130001-1 I "too I 15 Ing The Ellsberg break-in began as a carefully nur- tured operation supported by the CIA and ended as a crude, unsuccessful bur- glary, according to testi- mony offered to the jury in the plumbers trial. Among the witnesses in the first day of testimony Friday were Dr. Lewis Fielding - Daniel Ells- berg's psychiatrist and the victim of the illegal search - and one of its principal planners, E. Howard Hunt Jr. In his opening statement, Assistant Special Water- .gate Prosecutor William H. Merrill said the Sept. 3, 1971, break-in "was the will- fully arrogant act of men who took the law into their own hands because they thought they were above the law." IN FLAT unemotional terms, the prosecutor said the four defendants were guilty of a crime "against one of our most cherished rights," the right to be free from an unlawful search. The four defendants are John D. Ehrlichman, until last spring among the clos- est of President Nixon's inner circle; and convicted Watergate conspirators G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L. Baker and Eugenio R. Mar- [SIiiC- 9- Approved tinez. They are accused of violating Fielding's rights. A lawyer for Ehrlichman told the jury his client never approved anything illegal. A lawyer for Liddy said the onetime FBI agent believed he acted with the authority of the President. An attorney for Martinez and Barker said the break- in was nothing more than an extension of more than 10 years of clandestine work for the CIA in the minds of his clients. Merrill told the jury of six men and six women that as late as three or four days before the break-in at Field- ings's office, Ehrlichman discussed plans for the operation by phone with two of the White House plumb- ers, David Young and Egil Krogh Jr. HE SAID the government will offer testimony show- ing that Ehrlichman, after being assured the operation could not be traced to the White House, said, "Okay, let me know what they find, there." on the Fieding break-in and asked Young if he knew about the plot in advance. Young, Merrill said, replied. "Well yes, I knew of it in advance and so did you . . . and there are Washington Star-lien s Sunday, /une 30, 1974 The prosecutor said fur- ther that one March 27, 1973, Ehrlichman asked Young to bring him the files memos ' in the files that show this." Later, Merrill declared, Ehrlichman told Young that he had removed those docu- ments from the files. Mer- rill said Young will testify 'about his meetings with Agency prior to the Field- Ehrlichman and that copies', ing office break-in. One, he of the documents, whichj, said, was a "penetration" Young made without Ehr- of the Radio City Music-, lichman's knowledge, wilV;, Hall in New York City be introduced at the trial. Henry H. Jones, one of Ehrlichman's attorneys, countered that Young had framed Ehrlichman "to save, his own neck." He said the defense would show that Young somehow had altered the documents to implicate Ehrlichman. "Nothing in his life would ever suggest that he (Ehr- lichman) would do anything to violate the law, the spirit or the letter of the Constitu- tion," Jones said. "He would not trample on any- one's rights." LIDDY'S attorney, Peter L. Maroulis, defended his clients as "an authorized officer of the president of the United States" who "merely took' his orders from others." "Approval for this project came through the lips of Young and Krogh," Maroulis said. "They pro- vided him with cash funds. He didn't know where the money came from." Attorney Daniel E. show that Barker and Mar- tinez took part in the bur- glary "solely for the pur- pose of intelligence' gather- ing relating to'this purport- ed traitor.". Schultz told the court that the two Cuban-American" defendants participated in a, series of illegal activities; which Schultz sail was carried out as CIA test to see if Barker could accom- plish such a mission suc- cessfully. HUNT TESTIFIED he was hired July 7, 1971, on the recommendation of for- mer White House Special Counsel Charles W. Colson and the approval of Ehr- lichman. Merrill said Ehr- lichman was "keenly aware and interested" in Hunt's 21 years as a covert CIA agent. Within a few weeks, Hunt said, he had joined the, White House plumbers, a White House investigative unit set up to close leaks of national security informa- tion to the new media. r Hunt said a decision was made t obtain psychological information about Ellsbcrg, in part because of White House fears that he would, become a national martyr. Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon papers study of the Vietnam war to the press, was at the time the subject of federal prosecu- tion. Schultz said Barker and Martinez were -told that Ellsberg was a traitor and For Release 2001108/22 : C h.FWFb8dal 99 OG GD0130001-1 legitmate operation. The evidence Schultz said, will Approved FoIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499,01000130001-1 W4-rN ,V G roa s r# rr F?, do y a, 7c f. Carl T. i owana: / __A ors ~ Hr 4" d-% CZ " Errf I Once again, in banner headlines, we are slapped with the theory that the Watergate burglary and the Ellsberg break-in were part of a plot conceived and executed by the cloak-and-dagger boys of the Central Intelligence Agency. This time we get a really wild fourth- hand versi ;, where reporters are told by a for ?~ ",private eye, Richard L. Bast, who a1: ~.gedly was told by former White House aide Charles Colson, that President Nixon felt the CIA was even scheming to "get something" on the White House. This "hook the spooks" theorizing may be swallowed whole by some of those Americans who believe that the CIA is a government unto itself, with far-flung agents who murder unfriendly politicians, organize coups, rig foreign elections and topple democratic re- gimes in favor of dictatorships - all without the President, the secretary of State or other American officials either approving or knowing anything about it. The CIA has engaged in all the activi- ties mentioned above, but you can wager that the overall CIA actions had the sanction of whomever was Presi- dent -- or of top officials giving approv- al in the President's behalf. LOOKING AT ALL the Watergate evi- dence, I became convinced months ago that the CIA was more deeply involved than the public or the Congress knew. In my column of May 11, 1973, I told of a conversation, in which former CIA Director Richard Helms casually men- tioned to me that minutes after the bur- glars were seized inside the Watergate someone at CIA awakened him to tell him of the arrests. I raised the question of why anyone at CIA would awaken the director in the wee hours just to inform of what at the time seemed to be "a third-rate bur- glary" . - unless the caller knew of potential serious embarrassment to CIA. As far as I can determine, none of the investigating units has bothered to ask Helms who telephoned him. Or why any- one would feel compelled to awaken the CIA director because of that burglary, u+ny~~y r dru,~+n y the Watergate and Ellsberg burglaries was still providing disguises and other help to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a leader of the Watergate burglary and accused of being'a principal in the Ellsberg break- in. But we have testimony that CIA cooperation was requested by the White House, and this seems to shoot holes in, the theory that the CIA was out to sub- vert the President and make the White House bend to its will. COLSON HAS denied telling Bast that President Nixon thought of firing cur- rent CIA Director William E. Colby because of the President's suspicion that CIA was up to some dirt in the Water- gate and Ellsberg matters. It wouldn't have made sense anyhow. Helms, not Colby, was CIA boss at the time of, and long after, the Watergate burglary. During four and a half years in gov- ernment I- got- to know Richard Helms pretty wel. I ound him to be a profes- sional whose integrity I never saw cause to question. I can conceive of Helms agreeing, under pressure from the White House, to cooperate with Hunt and his crew, or with the White House plumbers, out of a belief that they really might be uncover- ing information vital to national securi- I can't believe that Helms would ty. knowingly make CIA part of burglaries designed simply to serve the partisan political interest of the party in power. I find it beyond either acceptance or speculation that Helms would use the CIA, or let it be used, to undermine the President and his White House staff. Either Colson got suckered by the President, or Bast got suckered. by Col- son, or the press got taken in by all of them. There is reason to ask a lot more questions about the CIA's involvement, for it appears that the CIA was used and abused in a shocking way. But there is no evidence of any substance that the whole dirty business was a CIA plot, with Richard Nixon targeted as a major HS/HC- W d I p`p w l~ 't n CIA 84-00499R001000130001:1 Approved Frelease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$RR001000130001-1 fSIHCproved CIA 9s Accus Associated Press The Central Intelligence Agency requested-last year that a public relations firm which had employed one of, the original Watergate con- spirators not disclose that it provided cover for CIA agents abroad, according to an informed official source. On Feb. 28, 1973, then-CIA director James R. Schles- inger met with a represen- tative of Robert R. Mullen & Co., an international pub- lic relations firm, the source said last night. "Schlesinger told them to keep their. mouths shut . about their relation with the CIA, because several peo- ple overseas as Mullen representatives were CIA people," the source said. special investigations - or plumbers - unit. Earlier this week, private investigator Richard L. Bast said that former White House special counsel Charles W. Colson had told him that the Mullen firm was a CIA front and that the Mullen firm was direct- THE MULLEN firm em- ployed E. Howard Hunt Jr., the convicted Watergate break-in conspirator, after he left the CIA and at least parttime while he was a member of the White House agency files turned over to the Mullen firm for use in planting cover stories. ABC said the Mullen firm planted an erroneous story in the March 5 edition of 'Newsweek magazine as- serting that Colson was in charge of political dirty tricks during the.1972 presi- dential campaign. It was learned that the CIA was prepared to deny having had any hand in the New- sweek story. THE CIA's purpose in.,, planting stories, ABC said, was to divert newsmen from discovery of its rela- tionship to the Mullen firm and to a law firm, which ABC also said was under contract to provide cover for CIA agents. A major concern was that newsmen would trace CIA connection to Paul L. 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Id N a) a) cd cif 0 ri cu .-r .1wo 6.4 o d cd O0 i) CT a,.~ aocd P4 Z: lw a 0 R -P En CT'.B P F, ~. ..U+ O 44 w a) '~ 0-0 vi w P, O r+ p 0 m0 O " F. oca m U a "w F+ `~ W v3 ~ .a .x ?~ n w +-. O Z c+ bA a) .- rLy Cd a) U of m O" 0 sco-rcl v,?+., O n5 iu cda)?3a) 04 Os o 0 r:4 r4 d) al u Its rn o ci vs u) IV b~o2 A'a~2sW ++ a) O- 0 w C tw vi v 4) W u +. rn cv a ~+ ro 08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 that they seemed to be genuinely incapa- John Kennedy learned the dismal les- bl- of drawing the distinction between s"- in the Bay of Pigs 13 years ago that FF3L Bib 8 eSC ? 049g~,in6Q@1?V0* 1 tends to operate an carrying out e sleazy sche es within its own narrow world of assump- theWhite House-CREEP Politburo. Lions and political theology. The atmos- :tent these things naturally come book. But there won't be a de- of the week that was, leading up signation. And it's not a book of ences." dson's subject is an important he plans to have the manuscript ~d by March 1. "I've got to try to readable and interesting," he sd. "I may 'move out of here just to get away from the tCle- lA HOWAR's novel Making Ends )ut a Washington woman "getting ter," will be published by Ran- ise next year. It's reported that House paid a $100,000 advance. other publishers were in on the with one of them offering a ivance. Howar, who had the final sill be working with an old friend' om House, Bob Loomis, one of editors. Cl that Silbert knew the answer to question-Colby might have suc- in willfully concealing informa- m a government prosecutor in a criminal case. -gate must indeed have brought a anguish to the CIA. For the White in trying to put the Watergate on the agency's back, used some same techniques that have been Dd by the CIA in its own opera- 'here'was the diffuse charter of al security" through. which the rouse operatives sought to stall investigation of Nixon campaign trough Mexico, to arrange for co- aoffs of the Watergate suspects, to .nate a cover story that the Water- rglary was a CIA operation, and so agency was, in effect, being tar- s a decoy by the president's office vas dipping into thq classic black irty tricks. and his Cuban proteges, then. in of the Committee for the Re-Elec- -he President (CREEP) weexe~~ so in- 1. in the ways of their alrfdf'1s yied gley, the Clandestine Services, As an example of what they call the "clandestine mentality" John Marks and Victor Marchetti cite this exchange be- fore a federal grand jury between Hunt and Assistant U.S. Attorney Silbert. Sil- bert has asked whether Hunt was aware that he had participated in "what might commonly be referred to as illegal activi- ties:' HUNT: I have no recollection of any, no, sir." SILBERT: What about clandestine activities? HUNT: Yes, sir. SILBERT: All right. What about that? ? HUNT: I'm not quibbling, but there's quite a difference between some- thing that's illegal and something that's clandestine. SILBERT: Well, in your terminology, would the entry into Dr. Fielding's (Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist) office have been clandestine, illegal, nei- ther or both? HUNT: I would simply call it an entry operation conducted under the aus- pices of competent authority. These are the values of the appar- atchik, which had become pervasive among the sad young men of the Nixon White House. It is the moral code of the black side of most espionage services as well as, we must reluctantly conclude, the top side of the CIA. Congress has had the chance to bite at the apple and run the risk of corrupting its own innocence. But no one was willing to take on a confrontation with executive authority. No one even was able to formu- late the right questions other than those bearing on the extrication of the CIA from Watergate. And so the function of oversight contin- ues to be abdicated to daily journalists and writers of books. It is not an alto- gether fruitful alternative. Books rarely generate legislation. Daily journalists are not equipped to penetrate the rein- forced armor of secrecy by which CIA is, shielded from public scrutiny. Leaks from within are self-serving. What passes for candor by top CIA offi- cials in the congressional hearing room is the frankness of the schoolboy standing' before the brained canary and denying 'all, with his sling shot in his back pocket. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence is a welcome addition to the body of litera- ture which constitutes the only form of genuine oversight being currently prac- ticed. Both Marchetti and Marks are for- mer practitioners 'of the intelligence trade and were privy to some of its se- phere of the clandestine shop is conspira- . torial, paranoic and action=prone. It reeks with suspicion of social and politi- cal change on the loft. Marks and Marchetti take us through the sometimes familiar, sometimes new, sometimes deleted catalogue of covert in- terventions and patterns of secret propri- etorships and domestic activities, which have flourished in a vacuum of resound- ing public indifference since the agency became a major. instrument.of executive power in the early 1950s. The book represents a triumph of de- termination by its authors, the publishing house of Knopf and the American Civil Liberties Union, which defended the manuscript against a partially successful effort to censor it. Melvin L. Wulf, legal director of the ACLU, notes in the intro- duction that co-author Marchetti was the first American writer to be served with an official censorship order issued by a United States court. His case, along with that of Marks, raises two interesting constitutional issues: (1) the power of the government to abridge by a contractial oath of secrecy, the First Amendment rights of govern- ment employes; and (2) the authority of an executive agency'to classify information by, mere post facto declarations that it is classified. In the battle of the book the CIA was able to produce no proof that much of the material it wanted to excise was in fact classified. At this point in the still-pending appel- late court fight the government has pre- vailed on the first. question and the au- thors prevailed on the second issue. One of the consequences of the Mar- chetti-Marks case is that William Colby has asked for new authority to bring crim- inal charges against any government em- ployee authorized to receive classified information. The proposed legislation .also would empower the CIA. director to .define 'what is classified-thereby cir- cumventing`the district court's ruling in the matter of Marchetti and Marks. An indicator of the quality of that judg ment is that when the CIA's original 339 deletions in the manuscript were submit- ted to a test of classification they were reduced to 168 by negotiation and then to 27 by judicial review. Unfortunately the book went to press before the judge's fi- nal decision and so The Cult of Intelli- gence is adorned throughout with that tal- ismanic word of our time-(deleted)--to tantalize the curious and bolster the sales. If the Colby proposal were in effect at the time Marchetti and Marks had under- of their manuscript Metier have been writ- analyst against the dirty tricks boys. 3 J7 "A ten. Both would probably be in jail. . 0 Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499800, p0130001-1 By Laurence Stern chological Assessments is w... woicton post staff writer unlike most , other busi- At first glance the inte- nesses. From the time of its rior of the room on the incorporation in 1965, its fourth floor of the Van Ness principal source of funding has been the Central Intelli- . -'rac e ha s wh ch building looks like the many dozens of private consulting firms scattered in their smartly appointed quarters throughout Washington. . The neat lettering on the door says: "Psychoiogical Assessments Associates, Inc." Admission is gained by. pushing A. buzzer and wait- ing for someone to unlock the. door from the inside. But Waltc.r P. Pasternak, the operating head of PsY- ,chological -Assessments, is not anxious to see unsche- duled visitors. ,we have no- thing to say," hc +nlrf a visit- , .. i i gence Agency, Pasternak does not Want to talk about. ,,We could never have ex- isted without this support," acknowledges the firm's re- tiring president, John W. Gittinger, who founded it with two other former CIA psychologists after they left full-time employment with' the agency. Gittinger is less reluctant to talk because he is disasso. ciating himself from Psy- chological Assessments on July 1 and is proud of the work it has' ddne as well as -- o iu ~.;a ......... .... _.._ ing repo t gry tones, ,moving im.medi-? the CIA, to which he is still ately toward the door. . personally under contract as The reason for Pastor-, a consultant. b? o n an o oak's reticence is that Psy- The company w It covers the study of bra 4 . inwashing techniques ,)y for- eign intelligence organiza- tion^ that was carried nit by a New Y'urk-haled prede- called the .human i:r'ology? Fund. It also prisvides training to CIA employees for asess- ing the credibility of foreign intelligence informants. "It's 'a question of trying to un- is lying or telling the truth when he conies through the door and s,'iys he wants to 'give you information;" Git- i . tinger explain. c:. The heginuii;r; of the psy- chological a ..,. .menu. pru- gram, Gittinger elated, goes back to the early 1950s :'when former (':A director. Allen W. 'Dulles souuiit ncu- 'rosurgical treatment for his son, Allen M., who was seri- ously injured in Korc,;, from ,.a New York neurologist, Dr.. ,dlarold G. Wolfe. HS/HC, woo , Dulles became interested in Wolfe's research into Chi- nese 'indoctrination of cap- tured American pilots dur- ing the Korean war. CIA be- gan financing the research work through first the Soci- ety for the Investigation of Human Ecology, with which Wolfe was associated, and then the Human Ecology Fund,' according to Git- tinger. Both operated a 'private research organization with headquarters in New York and with branches overseas. "This whole project was Allen Dulles' baby," Git- tinger explained. "It, grew out of his son's injury in Ko- rca." ? . Because of the growing controversy over CIA' fi- nancing of private organiza- tions in the mid-1960s, the TIIE WASI?IINGTON. POST Friday; Juno. 21, 1974 scure and perhaps unjusti- fied mention in the case of former White House special counsel Charles Colson, who pleaded guilty on June 6 to an obstruction of goat. 2g charge growing out of his role in the Daniel Ellsberg. break-in case. Colson had asked the of- fice of the Watergate special prosecutor to provide "docu- ments or records concerning the psychological profile of Dr Ellsberg compiled by Psychological Assessments, Inc., for the CIA." Gittinger heatedly denies any, association with the Ellsberg, profile or, indeed, any involvement with the White House on Watergate or national security matters. "It's an absolute, positive lie," said the 57-year-old psy- chologist of Colson's impli- cation of the company's in., volvement... in the 1971 "plumbers' " break-in of . Or. Lewis Fielding's office Jwn Los Angeles. Fielding Was 4 Ellsberg's psychiatrist. A CIA spokesman said yesterday the . agency will not comment, on whether it h has financial or operational relationships with Psycho. j logical Assessments. The CIA has a policy of ? saying nothing about its links with:g U.S. domestic concerns. ` Gittinger acknowledges', that the company oehind the unobtrusive door at 4301 1 Connenticut Ave. NW has conducted training pro- grams for CIA_ operatives abroad and performed psy- .i chological evaluations for overseas employees of American firms with for- I eign-based offices or subsidi- aries. The rubic of 'psychological' assessments "' covers a variety, of services which both, the m firm and Gittinger, in`.' hiss'' private consoling: role, have ,provided the CIA.,' sure that the``'.'agency was pany almost wholly depend- funding activities, of U.S ent on its CIA contracts. 'based student, labor, jour- Ina emphasized that' the nalistic and cultural organ- company has never taken a izations. government or private- eon-The Human Ecology Vund tract which involved :the was spared public mention "assessment" of an Ameri- during the furor over'. clan- can citizen. "We do abso- destine CIA financing. It lutely no domestic advis- folded quietly after Git- . ing," Gittinger said. 'We tinger moved to Washington ` have' never been asked to. to start Psychological As- evaluate an American." sessments Associates Inc. ? Gittinger and the' twb' Current programs, by other ex-CIA founders- of'' PAA, said. Gittinger, are FAA, Robert E. Goodnow, strongly pointed toward So and Samuel B. Lyerly; have' viet, Chinese and Arab cui-. ended their active associa-? tural training. He declined tion with the company. ?It' to discuss the specific na- was understood that the? ture of the. programs or ' new operating group is seek- whether PAA : carried out ing to divest itself of the such programs for foreign. CIA financial sponsorship; intelligence or. security or- , "I am very proud of what' ganizations. I have done for the agency Thti'i commercial side of,. over along period of time-in?- PAA's activities-screening the assessments field," said Human Ecology Fund was foreign employees of ?Ameri- - Gittinger. "There is nothing abandoned. The 'controversy can firms-has shrunk in re-',. I am ashamed of, nothing I, was touched off by ? disclo- cent years, making the com-, have to hide." Approved For Release 2001705127:--CIA7-RDP84=004998001 0O1'~060`Y= Approved For ReFe 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049980 Q1p0130001-1 By Laurence Stern w..whIupton Post staff Writer At first glance the into rior of the room on the fourth floor of the Van Noss Shopping Center office building looks like the many dozens of private consulting firms scattered in their smartly appointed quarters throughout Washington. The neat lettering on the door . says: "Psychological Assessments Associates, Inc." Admission is gained by pushing a. buzzer and wait- ing for someone to unlock the door from the inside. But Waltr_r P. Pasternak, the operating head of Psy- chological Assessments, is not anxious to see uiische- duled visitors. "We have no- thing to say," hcc,, told a visit- ing reporter in tt?rse and an- gry tones, moving immedi- ately toward the door. i The reason for Paster- nak's reticence? is that Psy- TIIE WASHINGTON. POST Friday; June 21,1994 A .q i ola~l ssessm,e eration chological Assessments is scure and perhaps unjusti- unlike most . other busi- Pied mention in the case of nesses. From the time of its former White House special incorporation in 1965, its counsel Charles Colson, who principal source of funding pleaded guilty on June 6 to has been the Central Intelli- an obstruction of iuQti--* gence Agency, which is .what, charge growing out of his Pasternak does not want to role in the Daniel Ellsberg talk about. break-in case. "We could never have ex- Colson had asked the of- isted without this support," fice of the Watergate special acknowledges the firm's re- prosecutor to provide "docu- tiring president, Jnhn W. ments or records concerning Gittinger, who founded it the psychological profile of with two other former CIA Dr. Ellsberg compiled by psychologists after they left Psychological Assessments, full-time 'employmciit with. Inc., for the CIA." the agency. Gittinger heatedly denies Gittinger is less reluctant any- association with the to, talk because he is disasso- Ellsberg. profile or, indeed, elating. himself from Psy- any involvement with the ehological Assessments on- White House on Watergate July 1 and is proud of the or national security matters, work it has, ddne as well as "It's an absolute, positive his long years of service to lie," said the 57-year-old psy- the CIA, to which he is still chologist of Colson's impli- personally under contract as ? cation of the company's in-, a consultant. " volvement, in the 1971 The company won an ob- "plumbers' " break-in of. Dr. Lewis Fielding's office in' Los Angeles. Fielding was { E1lsberg's psychiatrist. A CIA spokesman said yesterday the . agency will not comment. on whether it has financial or operational relationships with Psycho- 4 logical Assessments. The CIA has a policy of saying'', nothing about its links with U.S. domestic concerns. Gittinger -acknowledges 31 that the company oehind?' the unobtrusive door it 4301 Connenticut Ave. NW has conducted training pro- grams for CIA operatives abroad and performed psy- i chological evaluations' for overseas employees of American firms with for eign-based offices or subsidi- aries. The rubic of "psychological' assessments "' covers a variety 11 .of services which both, the .,I firm and Gittinger; in his' private consoling; role,. have a It covers the study of bra- Dulles became interested sure that the' 'agency was pany almost wholly depehd- s? Inwashing techniques by for. in Wolfe's research into Chi- funding activities of 'U.S.- ent on its CIA contracts. eign intelligence erqioiza- nese 'indoctrination of cap- based student, labor, tion; that was carried out jour- Ile emphasized that' the by a New York-based predc Lured American pilots dur- nalistic and cultural organ- company has never taken a cessor organization to PAA; ing the Korean war. CIA be- izations. government or private-con- called theiluman Ecology gan financing the research The Human Ecology Fund ,". tract which involved he Fund. work through first the Soci was spared public mention "assessment" of an Ameri- It also provides training ety for the Investigation of during the furor. over clan- can citizen. "We do abso- to CIA employees for asess- Human Ecology, with which destine CIA financing. It lutely no domestic advis- ing the credibility of foreign Wolfe was associated, and folded quietly after Git-.. ing," Gittinger said. 'We intelligence informants, "It's then the Human Ecology tinger moved to Washington' have ' never been asked to. a question of trying to un-' Fund,' according to Git- to start Psychological As-.. evaluate an American." derstand whether someone tinger. sessments Associates Inc. ' Gittinger and the' two is lying or telling the: truth Both operated a . private Current programs, by other ex-CIA founders- of'" when he comes through the research organization with PAA, said Gittinger, ' are ' PAA, Robert E. Goodnow door and says he wa-its to headquarters in New York strongly pointed toward So-, and Samuel B. Lyerly, have' 'give you information," Git- and with branches overseas, vict, Chinese and Arab cut- ended their active associa-. i'tinger cxpla:3ncd. "This whole project was tural training. He declined . tion with the company. 'It' The beginning of the psy- Allen Dulles' baby," Git- to discuss the specific na- was understood that the,. chological assel?sment pro- tinger explained. "It, grew Lure of the programs or ' new operating group is seek- gram, Git.t.inger related, out of his son's injury in Ko- whether PAA; carried out ing to divest itself of the goes back to the early 1950s rca." such programs for foreign CIA financial sponsorship: when former CCA Director. Because of the growing intelligence or security or- ' "I am very proud of what Allen W. 'Dulles sought ncu- controversy over CIA, fi- ganizations. I have done for the agency, *'rosurgical treatment for his nancing of private organiza- Th%~ commercial side of over along period of time-in-" son, Allen M., who was scri- tions In the mid-1960s, the PAA's activities-screening ,. the assessments field," said . ously injures] in Korea, from Human Ecology Fund was foreign employees of ?Ameri- ? Gittinger. "There is nothing ,,a New York neurologist, Dr. abandoned. The 'controversy can firms-has shrunk In re , I am ashamed of, nothing I' IIarold G. Wolfe. was touched off by, disclo- , cent years, making the com- . have to hide." HS/HC- V0, Approved For Release 2001/0&/22-- CTA-RDP84--00499R601'60013000"1-1 with him. The residents . of this coastal community have been "bitter" toward the famed painter, his wife said, since the Olson farmhouse had become a tourist attrac- tion. "I he;] a' hard time con- vincing Andrew to come back to Cushing this sum- mer," said Mrs. Wyeth, "and we are thinking of leaving permanently." The Olson farmhouse had been purchased by Jdseph E. Levine, the movie prod- ucer, through his foundation and had been turned into a museum. The museum was opened to the public in 1971, but local residents since en have strongly objected it because of the summer traffic It generated. Towns- people said it made their ru- ral roads "Hollywood free- ways." The Olson farmhouse, in the background of Andrew Wyeth's "Christina's World," may be moved from Cush. ing, Maine, to a tourist site in New Jersey.. Levine said the famed farmhouse may be moved to Waterloo Village, a restored pre-revolutionary town in Stanhope, N.J. He said the owners of. the New Jersey tourist attraction had made him an offer to move the house there. Levine said there should be no problem, moving the farmhouse to New Jersey. "They moved London Bridge to Arizona, didn't they?" he observed. One Cushing r e s i d e n t termed the Wyeth reaction "paranoid" since the Wyeth family always had sought anonymity while summering here. "The thing they always appreciated most was that they could come in here and just be regular people in the town -with no one coming down their driveway and bothering them," said the resident, who asked not to be identified. "I know that I and a lot of ether people here have pro- tected Andy by lying and telling tourists we didn't know where he lived." Gavett and the CIA: `Routine' Clearance, By Miclutel Kernan Nervous legal advisers fo the American Broadcasting Company managed to hold up a controversial Dick Ca- vett show about the. Central Intelligence Agency long enough to thwart national press prescreening, Cavett T id yesterday in New York. The 90-minute program - scheduled to be aired at 11:30 tonight (Channel 7- WMAL) - features debate between Victor Marchetti, co-author of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," and two former CIA offi- cials. "The legal department kept wanting to know if the show was balanced," Cavett said, "and I kept telling them that that was the whole point of it: It was a debate of the pros and cons." Three months ago ABC- TV refused a Cavett talk show involving several radi- cal leader of the '60s but later rescheduled it with an added 12 minutes of com- ment by some conservatives as "balance." And Tuesday, when the new show was be- ing taped, ABC legal ex- peiis were on hand. "They said they thought it was okay," noted Cavett, "but they wanted to talk to some higher-ups first. But the higher-ups were at lunch - why didn't they watch it themselves if they were worried? - and finally they managed to diddle around Media over the participants seemed jovial enough. One question was whether the CIA liquidates used up agents, as claimed by a Mar- chetti source from Latin America. After listening to Marchetti's second hand version of how a man died in a fake truck accident just after being retired from the CIA, Cline denied that liqui- dation was CIA policy. Another issue was the ex- tent to which the Soriei KGB may have penetrated the CIA, and Marchetti, challenged to name the high CIA official he believed to be a double agent, refused to divulge it for TV. stuff" which they said ac- counted for only a tiny per- centage of agency work. Cline, asked if President Nixon and Henry Kissinger would have made good spies, did say that both men ap- pear inclined toward the co- vert and secret and that Kis- singer probably would have liked to be the CIA director. The Marchetti book was the subject of a landmark ruling in U.S. District Court this spring. Although 339 de- letions had been made by the CIA bi tore publication, the court restored all but 27 of the excisions. The deleted sections were not discussed on the TV show. Cavett said he does not plan more controversial until it was too late for a town University-. Though changes about the purpose screening." considerable tension was of CIA, Cavett added, with A belated screening was generated during the show, the ex-agents pooh-poohing held yesterday for the New Cavett said, when it was all this cloak-and da- er ture. Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000 30001-1 York press, according to Herbert Wurth of the pub- licity department. Wurth added that the show would go on as taped, that there were no serious problems, that getting legal clearance on shows of this nature was "a routine matter." The two ex-CIA men were Robert Komer, former am- bassador to Turkey, head of the Vietnam pacification project and now a Rand Corp. consultant, and Ray Cline, now executive direc- tor of studies for the Center for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies at George- angry, b r u s h o: Lenya, Weill's wi Grete Keller wo such haunting W, as "Surabaya Job "The Bilbao So. -much alive, but it until two years ag American adaptati chael Feingold of itself was introduc Yale Repertory Ti ney's is America look at Feingold' End." A yarn about gangsters and the Army, the attitude cal throughout at nale, like all of I bert's, is ironical] so that the title is Inevitably, Ameri think of "Guys an that amalgam of E nyon characters dents so neatly gether by Jo Swei Burrows and Frani Not surprisingl and Dolls" is infini rior, but this does that "Happy End" appreciated and Brecht assigned I line to his secrete beth Hauptmann, gether they claim ain to t. Jon of i t 3-a, ailos..of eago gangland setti for Mis late' III-Hi er,&~aaralle sistibl RiWf gangst and tii "Guys a pear un "Happy Army h early in `Tne ce Shaw's "Major % Agprqvgd Raleasg 2W U d 2 C1 -RM (O pR 1 opa' S p pp Grp w y ro r; w'~'~#i ro~! re M m 0 O o m r9 ._ .; ro m C "~h' . G p P. .+? 2 Arts -! '''y n M n A. Dq rt~a Oq w .,~. t'* 'd y N ~D C `~ y S7' m n ~. aq o ~' n' p o v, o b . y D CA o o p p w y p m 7 P. r-. ro y '?+. O fOD rt W .rt"? y O O O O ~. w O ti O. ,a, d G (D m N wq i3 y ? 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For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84,-a0499R001000130001-1 CIA Seeks New Power to Halt Leaks By Laurence Stern Washington Pont Stnlf writer Legislation that would sig- nificantly broaden the govern- ment's power to bring crimi- nal sanctions against employ- ees or government contrac- tors for disclosure of intelli- gence secrets is being circu- lated within the Nixon admin- istration. The measure, proposed by Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby, could also empower him to seek injunctions against news media to prevent them from publishing material he consid. ers harmful to the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Colby's draft would give the CIA director more statutory muscle to define national se- curity secrets and punish transgressors than ever be- fore.' Its appearance comes against a background of court battles on national security secrecy is- sues ranging from the Ells- berg case to the book, "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," written by former government intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John Marks. The book, the first to be pub- lished in the United States af- ter pre-publication censorship by the federal government, went on sale yesterday. Had Colby's proposal been law a year earlier the book might well have never seen the light of day and the two authors would have been sub- ject to 10-year prison sen- tences and. $loAipp'Cf 'ed Fo 14 rrednesday, Junne 26, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST 1CIA. Seeks Power To end Data Leas Under existing law, how- ever, the best the CIA was able to do was invoke the se- crecy oaths signed by both men as grounds for a civil ac- tion requiring them to submit their manuscripts in advance for government clearance. The government won the first round in the courts when the binding nature of the se- crecy oaths was upheld. But Marks and Marchetti chal- lenged the CIA's demand. on scone 350 deletions in the man- useript. After adjudication of their countersuit before U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr., in Alexandria, the number of deletions was re- duced to 27. tion by Colby and four CIA deputy directors that material in the hook was classified. He asked the CIA to demonstrate in each instance the basis for classification. Much of the trial was held in a closed courtroom. Under Colby's proposed amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA? director would be empowered to determine the ground rules for classification under a gen- eral grant of responsibility for protecting "intelligence sources and methods." The Colby proposal would exempt news media from the criminal provisions of the law. But the draft language could, according to informed offi- cials, enable the CIA director to trigger injunctive action by the Attorney General against ,,,any person" - presumably including journalists - before or after an act of disclosure. In the Pentagon Papers case, several Supreme Court justices, particularly Thur- good Marshall, cited the ab- sence of any statutes to sup- port the government's effort tYrt?Y WILLIAM E. COLBY ... proposes bill to prevent publication. of the Vietnam documents. Colby's proposal would strengthen the government's hand in this re- spect. Colby 'submitted the draft measure to the Office of Man agement and Budget to circu- late through the bureaucracy for comment before it is intro- duced in Congress. In a trans. mittalletter to OMB Director Roy L. Ash, Colby observed that in "recent times, seri- out damage to our foreign intelligence effort has re- sulted from unauthorized dis- closure of information related to intelligence sources and methods." He did not specify what that damage was. CIA, From Al Bryan required the agency . ____nJ th m e asser- e Approvec,LFor Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001=t MO 'CID "I, ryo O r P. d y CD w :A O CD D rD o b,0 0 w S:I w r ID ron O o y' w. S '7, U b u Q V D r a.? F7 e?' 0 "?. rD 0 '?"' 0 ai C C o 'd t~tss r. r!~~ C/] n e+ n C ~r P w a r`+D p b 7?w CD rD ru p G R M ro fD 0 Q t N rD 0 nA y'0 (D r' r+ ID ?y 0 CD 7 n ? w ~? o ?, ro m et CD `D m o o~~ CD ~s? `? .~T' by Gpmoo' a w`~ G Q,a a ofl ~v ~;-aaa .~ro ~. o ?' w ,.y w W M O 0- C r?r. ro C W(D r.~ f.. ro ..~?hy nai ~awrDw(-R7?C"w CCy~?aGtn'opy O,Q C V' Cn7 [~ O :3 n- a n r: w ro ',p y ro ro ro .+"'+C ro 0 le r* ~ '~_ was f ~~~ O O D' ,NO y ]d N m .0 0 S" ? 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O cn (n Crl `gyp (D O O n ( .C ? a?a El 4. ? .-.a O r< O ..j ? ro ro 7a'.,a ,-+? ?t~7 (D ro ti a4 y~' ?.~? erg Q jDYa. to C- O (n Y(n in ro~ D (D CD ro CD roa+ D ti a? CD p O m (D El M ((D r N ro r(DD M M (D w a. a O OD ro, ro m W, M ? n n a CA u `p w . a .r m y o % (n'~ `"' M ti ~~ -OQ (-D a w ro ,y O ? -f .y ro?ro? 'Caoa?~m Wroro( ate?a a.. ro " 'CS 'xy '+ aq R. a' ro M ? N .?+ (O t0. ro ro .d a...'CS ro (D n..=:pa t=]ms o (D ~.-~ G~ w y Wi ro as to ,y O: p ~ ry b w m ? y ' ~r lled b States in addition to serving as Secretary of ceives more publicity ll? ~"Rkkyy R lea Zq 1~@ / t f,{ (~ Ql4t 0( }MQQOTAsident's principal foreign -A Long Look Behind the Classified Curtain Approved For RwIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499RU.01000130001-1 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, D. C., Monday, March 11, 1974 A-3 Lired CIA Q 4 dies - s United Press International The Central Intelligence Agency fired Watergate burglar Bernard Barker in the mid-1960s because he was involved with "gambling and criminal ele- ments," according to former CIA Direc- tor Richard Helms. Barker is the .Ivan who worked for E. Howard Hunt Jr. during the Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion. In the spring of 1971 he recruited, at Hunt's request, the Cuban burglary team that broke into the Los Angeles office of Daniel Ellsberg's psy- chiatrist and subsequently was caught in the Watergate break-in. Helms' testimony, given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee behind closed doors on Feb. 7, was made public yesterday. The hearings were to con- firm Helms' appointment as ambassa- dor to Iran. BARKER'S attorney, Daniel F. Schultz, promptly refuted Helms' de- scription of why Barker was terminated by the CIA. "Mr, Helms' testimony is inconsistent with official information we have re- ceived from the CIA. It is categorically denied'by Mr. Barker and is simply not true," Schultz said in an interview with UPI. Helms' statement on Barker appeared to conflict with Barker's own account of his relations with the CIA given in sworn testimony before the Srenate Wa- tergate committee May 24, 31/2 months after Helms spoke to the Foreign Rela- tions Committee. Helms told the committee about Bar- ker: "During the Bay of Pigs he was one of the Cuban derivatives who was involved in that operation and it is my recollec- tion that all lines with him on the part of the agency were eliminated some time in the middle sixties. "AS A MATTER of fact we found out he was involved in certain gambling and criminal elements and we didn't like the cut of his jib and we cut him off." Barker, testifying to the special Sen- ate Watergate committee, said he left the CIA immediately after the end of the Bay of Pigs American operation against Cuba in April 1961. CIA spokesmen said it would be "diffi- cult" to find out exactly when Barker left the agency or the circumstances., uS/HC- 9 (D roved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84=O0499R001000130001-1 vuess Who s Irying to ;AR 1974 Annrnvcrl For Qnlaha a 9nn1/nR/22 ? r-IA_RDP84- nAQQpnninnni inn 1_1 L U :J enry I ns E:: - " L . ~ ~~ ..: !~~ By Tad Szulc . Who's Who and What's Happening in the Spy Business -A Long Look Behind the Classified Curtain O ne day it is the controversy over the the CIA should be made more accountable to Central Intelligence Agency's role in proper Congressional committees as is, for Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept example, the Atomic Energy Commission, CIA skulduggery in a remote province in whose work also is secret. Yet there is no Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission . other nation where key intelligence officials that quite a few American newsmen have are as easily identifiable as in the United' been operating as CIA informants abroad. States and where the head of intelligence is Or the discovery that the agency has been publicly and extensively questioned by the secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Col- legislature-never mind how thoroughly orado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregtt- -as William Egan Colby, the new CIA Di- lars at hidden camps in Greece while bank- rector, was last year. And it is not all that rolling colonels on the ruling Greek junta hard for investig.:tivc reporters to track and financing famous European statesmen down some CIA actions, much to the and contriving to overthrow the Libyan re- agency's annoyance. In Britain, the Official gime. Secrets Act would make this impossible. In The CIA, it would seem, just cannot stay France, the top-secret Service du Territoire out of the headlines, which is a commentary would prevent it. So would Israel's Shin Bet,, on the agency itself and on the contradictions with the assistance of official censorship. In in our society. Thougli it obviously is one of Communist countries, exposure of the se- the most secretive agencies in the United curity services is unthinkable. States government, the CIA probably re- Unsatisfactory as it is to these appalled by ceives more publicity than any Washington the CIA's excesses, the exposure. that does bureaucracy except for the White 1-louse, exist in our democratic society clearly is a Most of this publicity is negative, sometimes plus. Last year's discovery of the abortive indignant, often' sensationalist, and fre- 1970 White I louse plan for domestic intel- quently lopsided. The CIA's track record in ligence (Tom I fusion, its author, praised the the 27 years of its operations largely accounts CIA for its cooperative spirit in engineering for this lavish yet unwanted coverage-it's it) underscored the importance of such expo- done everything from stealing the text of sure. So did disclosures of the CIA-run Op- Khrushchev's secret Kremlin speech de- eration Phoenix in Vietnam set up for mur- nouncing Stalin and the-Bay of Pigs, to over- dering suspected Viet Cong agents. We are throwing foreign regimes, to running the highly sensitized to the role of intelligence Laos "Clandestine Army," and possibly out- agencies here and abroad. But so strange is fitting the Watergate "Plumbers"-but it is our morality that we usually tend to accept our endless fascination with espionage and the national security need for building better- cloak-and-dagger stories that makes readers and better nuclear arsenals but flinch indig- unfailingly- receptive to stories and books nantly at the notion of American involve- about the CIA. ment in global intelligence operations. On a more serious level, however, our This is where the contradictions of our interest underlines the important point that a society coins in. I loswever, the reality is that secret agency cannot function in utter se- effective foreign policy depends not only on Crecy in what still is a reasonably open soci- classical political awd economic diplomacy, et)'- The CiA is the subject of continued but also on military deterrents and the Public scrutiny and debate-Ewen if the availability of solid intelligence. To abolish scrutiny is superficial and the debate seldom our intelligence services would be tan- well informed, and even if it is true that the. tamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament, agency has been allowed to run wild and something not seriously proposed here. We uncontrolled. There is a growing view must live with the reality that the CI.\ and a 1c c n n t ?lb~',ence bureaucrat and ad- r d by the l~ C~?t ie f i LfRqea tqs Qc4 f~ e~ ~; tlrt =cnQP ;gQ4f}~~IIR0~ i lS~ ~ es 7. his long career as a clan- uperspy? the Soviet KGB's external operations. Ilaving said all these things, I should add that despite all the publicity about the CIA and company, the function of intelligence in the modern age is not always understood by the public or, for that matter, by our top policymakers. In fact, the entire American intelligence apparatus-not just the CIA-is undergoing a major institutional crisis. This crisis results in fairly equal parts from the profound politic, t and technological changes affecting the world in the 1970s (perhaps not fully comprehended by the intelligence peo- ple themsel'es) and from the style of foreign policy as conducted by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. What is at-issue now is the effectiveness of our intelligence machinery and the question of whether it is helped or hurt by Kissinger's decision to he the de facto chief intelligence officer of the United States in addition to serving as Secretary of State and the President's principal foreign policy advisor. First, however, let's briefly look at the United States intelligence establishment. n theory, the intelligence community is h unified body presided over by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), which is directly responsible to the National Security Council at the White I-louse and consequently to the President. The US113 is headed by the Director of the CIA, who also acts as Director of Central intelligence and, again in theory, as chief of the intelligence community. William Colby replaced Richard Ilelms in this twin-post last Sep- tember (there was a fiwc-month interregnum during which James M. Schlesinger man- aged to shake up the community quite con- sid'rably before moving on to he Secretary of Defense), but there are no indications so far that Colby carries much more weight with the Nixon-kissinger White f louse than did I1c?lnts. Ilelms, now Ambassador to Iran, was in Bleep disfavor with Kissinger. .,],he White I louse tends to regard Colby as continued Approved For'ftIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499 01000130001-1 destine operator) who meets ICissinger-'s Sp,.- Sclopment of \iultipl(' 1 ndep c ndent y xhere the intclligcnce community's current cial requirements. So it is hard to think of hargeted Reentry Vehicle (M I R\`) internal crisis appears in its most acute form. Colby as the read chief of the intelligence warheads. (These are multiple warheads, To be meaningful, strategic and tactical in- community in the sense that .\lien Dulles usually three, carried by indisidual ballistic telligencc must be properly evaluated and was when he was CIA director from 1953 to iiiissiles. Fach can be guided separately to its interpreted. The National Security Agency 1961. There seem to be no giants nowadays assigned and very precise target.) Develop- and. the National Reconnaissance Office in the spying business. It has been touched ing .\fIR\' was a major American nuclear produce and supple the raw intelligence for by the age of mediocrity too. breakthrough, and for the last five years tttc CIA, DIA, and INIZ. But the ('IA, 1)I:\ The other agencies forming the USCi3 are enormous cffurt has gone into monitoring (and the individual militaryinlclligcncc scy- S i ov et tests to determine whether the Rus- the Defense Intelligence Agency supposedly the spokesman fort hu Pentagon, sians have it too. The American defense but not always in mint' with the intelligence posture and disarmament negotiating stance experts of the Office of the Secretary of Dc- depend on this knowledge. The intelligence fence or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Na- cunumrnity believes that the Soviet Union Na- tional Security Agency (NSA), specializing \tiRVCt1" last dear, but is uncertain just in highly sophisticated electronic and tech- note precise the Soviet targeting system is. nological intelligence gathering; the State This information is the raw strategic intel- Department's smallish but excellent Bureau ligence that NRO and NSA feed to the 'IA of Intelligence and Research (INIZ), mainly and the DI:A-and ultimately to the USI13 concerned with analyzing political and and the White I louse-for evaluation and economic intelligence; the Atomic Energy interpretation. \S--\ also provides the intel- Commission (AEC), which has its own ligcncc community with a fantastic wealth of intelligence-processing capability in the nu- clectronie intelligence-FLINT in the pro- clear field; the Federal Bureau of Invcstiga- fessional jargon-in addition to data on Lion, contributing counterespionage funs- Soviet or Chinese military deployments and tions; and the Treasury Department, a fairly developments. NSA listening posts around recent addition, which is'involved in intel- the world eavesdrop on practically all the ligence operations against narcotics traffic nun-:\merican (not only Comnutnist) mili- and which also runs the Secret Service. tary radio, microwave, telex, and telephone Below the USIB, but connected witls the traffic. They intercept conversations among .major intelligence agencies, are such Soviet MIG pilots; routine conununications specialized organizations as the National Re- either in clear language or in code (one of connaissance Office (NRO), the most secret NSA's crucial functions is code-breaking as of them all. NRO's existence has been one of well as code-making) involving Warsaw Pact the intelligence community's best kept se- military units, Chinese, North Vietnamese, crets. Its mission is to coordinate the so- North Korean, and other Communist de- called "overhead" reconnaissance conducted tachmcnts; and just about everything of po- by Samos spy-in-the-sky satellites and tential interest to the United States that can high-flying planes like the SR-71, the sue- ? be overheard or copied. "Phis work is done cessor to the famous U-2. The :\ir Force from secret land bases ranging from Ethiopia runs NRO with special funds-some esti- and the Indiaml Iimalayas to Turkey and the mates are that NRO spends $1.5 billion an- Aleutian Islands are well as from FLINT nually, about a fifth of the total United ships (the Pueblo, captured by North Korea, States intelligence budget-and it is believed was one) and FLINT aircraft flying all over that the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the world. NSA-equipped and manned air- currently.J:unes W. Plummer, is its im- craft directed secret ground penetrating op- mediate boss. Overhead reconnaissance is orations in Laos and Cambodia, and pre absolutely essential for the monitoring of sumably do so now in other critical areas military deployments by potential advcr_ --the Middle East is probably one. It may saries: The Samos satellite, for example, is one day be NSA's function to interrupt the the so-called "means of national verification" worldwide United States military com- for the 1972 Soviet-American nuclear con- munications network with a message pre- trol agreements. It insures that the Russians ceded by the code word CRITIC (which are not cheating on the antiballistic missile automatically gives it absolute priority over (AB\I) limitations or exceeding the number all other traffic) to alert the White blouse, the of land- or submarine-based missiles under North American Defense Command in Col- the temporary accord on offensive strategic orado, and the Strategic Air Command in weapons. The Samos, with its high- Omaha that enemy missiles or bombers have precision photography, keeps Washington been launched-or are about to be-against posted on every new missile site and type of the United States. The extra few seconds weapon deployed by the Soviet L'nion. such a warning would provide before, say, a 'Thanks to the Samos we know that the Soviet first strike would allow the United vices), and IN R also collect aitd produce in- telligence they obtain through non- electronic means. Each agency plays a dual role and each has its own analyses, opinions, and biases. I?:ach tries to influence policy, often for self-serving reasons. The Cl:, for example, is barred by statute from formulat- ing policies, but the CIA obviously holds policy views and subtly, if not always suc- cessfully, tries to influence national decision-making processes. During the latter part of the Vietnam war, for example, the agency continually warned against military over optimism and against underestimating North Vietnamese and Viet Cong power: The CIA urged realism in "Vietnamization policies. On the other hand, it miscalculated the advantages of getting rid of prince Noro- dorn Sihanouk in Cambodia because it minimized the potential of the rebel Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The .-Administration ac- cepted the CI.\'s Cambodia opinions with results that ai'e less than felicitous. As will be seen, the CIA also had views on strategic negotiations that &`fered from those of other members of the intelligence community. It played an important role in helping to un- dermine the Socialist regime in Chile-this included strong policy views in favdr of doing so-in addition to carrying out White House instructions in this area. In other words, the CI.\ never simply cranked out. intelligence without adding policy views. The DIA, whose generals and admirals are concerned with the fortunes of the mili- tary profession, often seems to have a vested interest in "worst case" interpretations of intelligence daia. Put simply, military analysts tend to suspect the worst concern- ing the potential enemy's intentions because that justifies requests for bigger budgets and appropriations for new weapons systems. Politically, "worst case" conclusions may bring trade-offs. In 1969, for instance, the Pentagon's insistence that the Russians had "MIRVed" (the CIA accurately concluded that they hadn't yet) forced Nixon and Kis- singer to "buy it off": They promised ap- propriations for new weapons systems so that the military establishment would sup- port the SALT I negotiations with the Rus- sians. And so on. Soviets are busily building their strength. States to respond with a second strike front raditionally, the general idea always has And the Russians, of course, have their own Minuteman missiles in North Dakota, been that the intelligence community, version of the Samos to keep us honest. Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines with all its various resources, would pre- NRO experts work closely with the huge cruising tender the oceans, and S:\C 13?-52 sent the president wit}) a{treed estimates on National Security Agency (believed- to C ill- lxnnbcrs on permanent airborne alert. everything from Soviet nuclear advances to ploy more than 20,000 civilian and military But since a nuclear holocaust is not goner- I lanoi's intentions in Vietnam, Laos, or specialists), both in actual overhead recon- ally anticipated, the value of strategicintel- Cambodia; the likelihood of a Soviet- I' E, 9Ru A~X` cj,anccs of a new lticidlc naissancc and in the PI?i' tii6dfi"I~IE=I r;r --;tnr;nn n} tin,?u?r ;ulcanc'es 111 the tie- IiC 1 ll 1 15 S C IlI ` Sur\'It 11 power of the oont-inued Socialist regime in Cl, ,'I 001, t t n; 1 i 1 1t~t hat they consider his , on %alo -` ~ ~ A-t0?0 O { A t~tt'l ii )Tintclligence and his situations of concern to ~nlice3 8 r ; estimators ' r When the CIA truly was Washington's than having the ()f f ice of National 1?stinlates practice of eliminating top intelligence peo- pre-eminent intelligence organ, its Office of approving all the reports as it did in this past. plc from the decision-making process. They National Estimates prepared the so-called Kissinger and his staff have direct access to say that under the new system, the intclli- National lnfeiligence Estimates (Nils) on the National Intelligence Officers when gencecomniulity, including Central Intelli- behalf ofthe entire intelligence community., work is in progress, so Kissinger can better gence Director Colby, has no idea What hap- although other agencies' dissenting views control the process of intelligennce, pens to the intelligence product, such as the were duly noted. By and large, however, the This is the most important structural and National Intelligence officers' contrillution, NiE.s were fairly sacrosanct. political change to affect the intelligence once it is fed into the \\ hire I louse machin- But in June 1973, when Kissinger was the community sine(' I Iclnts was shipped to Iran 'ery. President's chief of staff for foreign affairs, early in 1973. Schlesinger's short reign at the Even in Dick I lelms' day, old-timers say, the Office of National Estimates was CIA Langley headquarters produced some the Director of Central Intelligence- rarely abolished. John W. I-Iuizenga, the Chief of superficial changes: The staff was cut by had a chance to defend his wicwwsat the White National Estimates, was forced into prema- nearly tell percent; scores of old-line I louse because National Security Council ture retirement by Schlesinger. The changes "romantics" in the Clandestine' Services meetings were increasingly infrequent and were based on reorganization plans for the were retired (I?I. I loward I-hunt was retired there was no other forum where he could. intelligence community that Schlesinger, by Reims in 1970); the agency was reilr- speak. out. In his latter years IIclnts had then head of the Office of Budget and Man- ganized along more modern and efficient virtually no direct access to Nixon, while agement, prepared.for the White I louse in lines; and the importance of electronic intcl- Kissinger made no bones about his low opin- No'ember 1971. The new estimating sys- ligence was emphasized by bringing Pen- ion of ti-k CIA boss. Colby, as far as it is tern turned out to be more responsive to the tagon "overhead" reconnaissance experts to known, is not faring much better with the special needs of the Nixon-Kissing; r White Schlesinger's seventh-floor executive Suite at White I louse. For example, when Kissinger I louse, and this is very much part of what is Langley. and Schlesinger ordered the worldwide happening to the intelligence conunutlity. But the really significant change in the United' States military alert during last Instead of a permanent estimates body, intelligence community's structure carte October's \lidcastcrisis, Colby was not con- Colby, acting as Director of Central lnielli With Kissinger's decision to atomize it and stilted beforehand. I le simply was sunt- gence, set up a corps of so-called National therefore bring it under his own tight con- moned after the decision was made and in- Intelligence Officers drawn f roil the CIA trop. Kissinger wanted to break the fre- formed of it. . and :other agencies to work on specific intcl- qucntly artificial consensus of estimates and CIA officials also think that Kissinger ligence projects. This staff has the logistic encourage a direct flow of intelligence from often ignores agency views and estimates in support of the whole intelligence comma- the various agencies to his own office in the favor of opinions more to his pragmatic }ik- pity. It'is headed by George Carver; desig- \\'hitc I louse ?., here he and his. National ing. This, they say, is what happens when nated as Chief National Intelligence Officer, Security Council staff made the final esti- CIA and military intelligence differ consid- who operates directly under Colby With mates and evaluations. erably. The 1969 MIRV controversy was three deputies and approximately 30 Na- This naturally led to a major contro- the first instance of it. Later the White tional Intelligence Officers, although this versy '-all academic one, since Kissinger had House tilinimized Cl.- warnings that the figure probably will increase as the corps the last word-between Kissinger and the Viet Cong was much stronger in Vietnam develops. Carver is a C1:\ veteran and a traditionalists in the intelligence conlmu_ than the LS Command in Saigon claimed V'ietnanl expert. He first caught Kissinger's nity. In brief, the opposing positions -were and that pacification was far from successful. eye because lie represented the CIA on the these: Kissinger believed that the agreed na- Kissinger., CIA people say, never requested Vietnam Task Force, an interagency group, tional estimates were the lowest common the agency's opinion on the soundness of the and occasionally on the National Security denominator reached by agencies that often Dl:A plan to snatch American war prisoners Council. In practice, Colby and Carver as- disagreed on interpretation of data=in his from tile. Sontay camp in North Vietnam 'sign a specific project-it could be Arab at- own words, he had to fight his wa)? through (the camp was empty when the raiders titudes on oil or the likelihood of a North "Talmudic" documents to find their real landed). No questions, they say, were put to Vietnamese offensive in 1974---to a National meaning; the traditionalists' view was that the intelligence community wwlien the Ad-' Intelligence Officer, who pulls together all Kissinger was disrupting an orderly intelli- ministration decided on the Cambodian in- the necessary intelligence resources to pro- gence procedure in favor of his own biases,. vasion in 1970 (the military insisted they duce a report submitted to Colby and then to that lie wanted interpretations to fit his pre- knew where to find the elusive COSV'N the National Security Council, which means conceived policy opinions. intelligence command of the Vict Cong inside Canl- I lenry Kissinger wearing the hat of Special corm unity' veterans complain that Kis- bodia; it has not been located to this day). No Presidential .\ssist,tnt and/or chairman of singer and his people now use the intelli- questions were put to the intelligence conl- the top-secret "40 Committee" in the NSC gence product capriciously and unproles_ Infinity whet, the \\ hite I louse decided to :l.,a.- . 4.- 1 6:e:s':I~e,,.~r 'J L' William Hyland, firrectorof'the State William CullY, 1)irrctorof the Central Vice:ldurirat l'iment de J or.r, Du,uior 1.reutenaru Genent1 Le,.is:lllrn, Urrrc- Il.,nnr ,n, ,,/?c Rrn'rau of I17trlll7ll'11Cearp -bttelliru?nce Anencv (f_11):._ _ ._ _ _.of the Ih nse 1)c:purtmcnt's 1)e[cute for f the National Security A?{rcnc y oontinu'CU., support the South \AP rPsYMrFs r e, Mill tSQttcSifs$/3~z"3C i'-1117. P1 . IT Q~it99 8p9iQa1j Q~ l~filstimators.:\nlericans Laos in 1971 to sever the I to Chi \linh Trail room number in the Executive Office Build- think, however, that the Russians are far (the operation failed). CIA people \ycnxler ing where the group met. Britain has a simi- behind us in electronic intelligence even \vhy Kissinger neycrordered the intelligence lar body known as the "20 Conlrnittce," but though they, too, have equipment like over- coniniunity to prepare studies on all these its name is a product of British whimsicality. head satellites. plans before deciding to carry them out. Since the British group was tilled by msi- Experts say that the KGB's internal de- Colby, a lifetime clandestine operator (he ers the "double-cross committee," its chick fenses are strong. It is doubtful that the CIA fought behind enemy lines in France and translated the Roman numerals "N\" into ever really penetrated it, although there was Norway as a Voting (YS officer in World the designation "20" for their outfit. the case of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a senior War It, then made a C1:\ career in Vietnam The "40 Committee" decisions nttist be KGB officer wvho allegedly served British as station chief and later as chief of the patio- personally approved by the president. Its and American intelligence for years as a cation program with ambassadorial rank), agenda and the frequency of its meetings are double agent. Despite claims here,. it re- still chairs the USIB as i)ircctor of Central secret, but it is assumed that all large-scale plains unclear what precisely Penkowsky In(elligence-USIB now is mainly con- operations (its distinct fro ml ongoing stand- really did for the West. Because it is both a cerned with evaluating Soviet military and and activities) are reviewed there. ']'his was domestic security service (in the FBI sense) political strength. But Colby's power has thecase, it is said, wviththeCl:\'s clandestine and an international intelligence agency like been considerably eroded in Comparison army in Laos and with Operation Phoenix in the Ci:A, the KGB obviously is hard to pene- with that held by his CIA predecessors. Vietnam. But it also is known that between trace. CIA Director Colby made this point Individual intelligence agencies now are 1970 and 1973 the "40 Committee" has con- indirectly when lie told a Congressional increasingly in rivalry with one another (the cerned itself on a number of occasions with committee in executive session late last year difference is that in the past natural rivalries the Chilean situation before and after the that he was spending much of his time trying were discouraged by the White House; now election of Salvador Allende, the late presi- to penetrate the Soviet Communist party. they seen to be encouraged) for tlic attention dent, as well as with such recondite matters It is presumed to be among the "40 Corn- of Henry Kissinger and thus the President. as whether the Norwegian government nlittcc" functions to supervise secret intclli- 'To put it simply, Kissinger, who distrusts all would grant concessions to American oil gence agreements with friendly countries. bureaucracies including the intelligence firms. In the case of. Norway, US Such agreements exist we:ith Britain, Canada, community, devised a series of sophisticated policymakers felt that normal diplomatic Australia, South Africa, and Israel, among. rno^es to weaken the intelligence apparatus pressures were inadequate and that intelli- others. The CIA and the British MI-6 occa- so that he could become the chief interpreter gence resources were required. It is not clear sionally exchange agents when it is conven- and arbiter of the intelligence product just how the CIA went about this assign- ient for one service to work under the cover emanating from each agency. ment. Likewise, the CIA's role in an abortive of the other, but the principal aim of the Kissinger continues to control the Na- attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime agreements is the exchange of intelligence. A tional Security Council-he retains his post some time in 1971 has not been fully secret British-American intelligence group of \\-hite House Special Assistant fin? Na_ explained-in fact, the whole operation re- thus functions at the British Embassy in. tional Security Affairs despite his new post mains an official secret. Flowever, responsi- Washington. There are extremely close tics as Secretary of State-and this preserves his ble sources claim the CIA was instructed to with Canada; recent'published reports said coijtrol of the cvaluationof intelligence. This eliminate the radical government of Colonel that Canadian intelligence personnel worked is probably the most powerful function in Quadaffi when lie threatened to nationalize hand in hand with the CI.-\ here and in Ot- the formulation of foreign policy, which can U S oil companies. Given the scope of taww?a. Finally, there is an intelligence ex- be 'evolved only on the basis of evaluated United States interests, there is no limit ? change agreement within the North Atlantic knowledge. 'p'lat is what intelligence is all to the situations the "40 Committee" may, Treaty Organization, but this is a more Jim- about. The Secretary of State has no such be drawn into. ited arrangement because of what the CIA statutory power; traditionally he is a con- Odd as it may sound, the "40 Committee" sees as the dapgers of leaks to the Soviets. surner of intelligence. During Nixon's first under Kissinger early realized that Soviet term William P. Rogers simply relied on his leaders should have a better understanding ~espite budget and personnel cuts, in- own intelligence and Research Bureau-and of the United States. The function of the ternal divisions, rivalries, and frustra- there are regrets at the State Department -American intelligence community is, by clef- tions, the United States intelligence cotll- that lie did not study that first-rate product inition, to ferret out knowledge about the munity is a formidable empire. It is believed sufficiently-but Kissinger, wearing his Soviet Union, but sophisticated thinkers to employ around 100,000 people in all the many hats, is both chief producer and chief here concluded that awesome policy errors agencies (not counting the FBI) and its an consumer of the ti ?.al intelligence available to in the Kremlin can be avoided if the Russians nual budget is some,,vhere between $6 billion the United States government. 1 pis CIA de- knew more about American attitudes and and $7 billion, the bulk of the money going tractors call him the "super case officer" in potential reactions It would be an exagg?era_ to the expensive technological operations in the intelligence community, tion to suggest that the CIA is engaged in the National Security Agency and the Na- educating the KGB (although a peculiar rap- tional Reconnaissance Office.:A]though the issinger also has _a handle on major port between them exists in certain fields CIA is overseen by special Congressional intelligence decisions through his such as security at the time of Nixon's Mos- appropriations subcommittees, its budget- chairmanship of the "-10 Committee" in the cow visit and 13rcrlincv's Washington trip), ing, like that of the NSA, Di:\, and NRO, National Security Council. This is princi- but the intelligence community clearly was does not appear on the books. Instead, the pally a policy body-tlhe intelligence delighted some years ago when the Soviet Office of Budget and Management hides it in community, the Defense, State, and Justice Academy of Sciences organized its "US:\" appropriations for other government agen- departments are represented on it-that institute under Gyorgi Arbatot, a specialist tics. Sometimes agencies like the Agency for makes broad decisions in the field of intelli- on American affairs. The assumption. here is International Development spend their own gence and instructs the appropriate agencies that the new institute is performing a politi- fund's on the CIA's behalf, as Was done in to carry them out through their own means. cal intelligence function in conjunction with Laos and Vietnam, to be paid back later. Its panic is derived from the nunibcir of the the KGB and.the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The intelligence community, especially 1969 NSC nternoranduni that set it up in its Speaking of the KGB, which is the CIA's the CIA, also works through innumerable present form. Earlier, the Committee was principal opponent in intelligence wars, the fronts, often supposed businesses, and known as "5412," a memorandum number private assessment here is that the Soiiet channels funds for political operations dating back to the Eisenhower .-\dministra- service has been improving over the years, through labor and cultural groups. At the tioti, and during tic ppEiamed(F ?>niRBLelsWi2llM)1'0g/92!1f QtY4' OP84 OO4 9RQO-4t0OlZMG1waiI war the CIA owned at oontin. . )cast two airlines-Air America Inc. ( versitics for st raduate studies in various V c,~r~'s uo an, either, that the CIA operating) and Soutlr~gprgNecffft?I" Qg"1 Q1 8112 :CIA-RDP84-00499 a hts~ c~ l~ ~6 ed in covert political (being sold). It also had contracts .?ith sev- Traditionally, the CIA has been run by action everywhere in the world. The latest .oral bona ftdc US carriers. Southern :Air men from the clandestine services. The most example of such activities concerned the 'T'ra'nsport carried out a number of secret notable CIA director . ith this background CIA agent in northeastern Thailand who operations in the Caribbean in recent years. was Allen Dulles, probably the best intelli- faked a letter to the Bangkok government The CI.\ still charters Southeast Air Trans- gence operator the OSS had in Europe dui- from a guerrilla. leader proposing negotia- port planes to such agencies as AID to bring ing the war. Richard I Iclms ran the clandes- tions. This was a classical example of the Latin American students and professionals tine services before rising to the director- "disinformation" technique, intended to to the US for conferences and other meetings ship. William Colby served briefly as deputy embarrass the guerrilla leader with his fol- sponsored by the US government. In 1964 a director for plans (the "dirty tricks" division) lowers and thus weaken the subs ersive special company was set up in Miami to after his return from Vietnam and before movement, But the' new Thai government recruit Cuban pilots, veterans of the Bay of being named Director last year. As CIA Di- took a dim view of the CIA's involvement in Pigs,?for secret operations in the Congo. In rector and Director of Central Intelligence, domestic politics and a scandal developed, earlier years the CIA subsidized the Na- Colby, a 54-year-old 'self-effacing but tough especially because the American Ambas- tional Students' Association, Radio Free man, is backstopped by I,icutenanrGeneral sador, Robert Kintner, has a CIA back- 1.?urope and Radio Liberty, the Congress for Vernon (Dick) \V'alters, the Deputy 1)irec- ground himself. Intelligence specialists here, Cultural Freedom, and a series of related tor of Intelligence. Walters, an extraord'i- think, the lctteryriting agent exceeded his magazines here and in Western F'urope. AI- nary linguist, spent much of his Arny career authority-and did a sloppy job to boot= though the CIA is barred by law from as it military or defense attache overseas, but and this episode already has resulted in the operating in the Utfitcd States (except at its he is not considered an expert on either recall of 13. I ]ugh "boyar, the chrcf of the big Virginia headquarters), the agency still analysis or clandestine operations. It was CIA station in Thailand, and has compli- maintains covert offices in Miami, New Walters's lot, however, to be drawn into the cared our diplomatic relations with the York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and \Vatergate cover-up controversy when the Thais. Charleston, South Carolina. Cl.\ officials White I louse tried to get the CIA to take the The Thailand incident also served to say these offices support foreign operations blame for the "Plumbers" and pay their underscore the extent to which the CIA op- and, among other functions, help to debrief salaries after they went to prison. crates abroad in conjunction with local'se- interesting travelers returning from-abroad. Schlesinger and Colby reorganized the curity services. In exchange for intelligence But in the course of Watergate investigations CIA structure to 'a considerable extent. The or whatever special fasors it desires from it developed that Langley headquarters as old plans Department (DDP) was renamed local police or counterinsurgency forces well as the CIA offices in Miami and San Directorate for Operations (DDO), absorb- (often for reasons having nothing to do'vvith, Francisco provided logistic suplxart for the ing the scientific and technical (I ivisions. It is the interests of the host country), the CIA White F-louse "Plumbers." One employee, headed by William Nelson, a clandestine may pi'ovide them with training or special to fact, still was on the CIA payroll when he services veteran from the Far East, who took. equipment. Thailand, .'here the United was arrested at the Watergate office building Colby's former job. Colby, not being a pro- States has vast interests and where there is a in June 1972. fessional estimator, has kept on Richard local insurgency problem, is a case in point. Basically, the CIA is divided into two 'Lehmann, a highly respected official, as But it also has been argued that this system main departments: operations and analysis. Deputy Director for Current intelligence has resulted in indirect CIA support for There are experts in Washington who hold (DDT), Lehmann works with George Carver police forces in politically repressive gov- the CIA analysis branch in extremely high in the new National Intelligence Officers' ernments from Latin America to Asia and esteem, but tend to be skeptical of the system. Major General Daniel O. Graham, Africa. Last year, responding to Congres- operators. The two departments are often at brought from the Pentagon by Schlesinger, sional pressures, the CIA promised to end its odds politically: the operators often dismiss is in charge of "overhead" intelligence, his ' secret. programs of actually training foreign the estimators as "eggheads" while the speciality. Ile works directly with Colby, , police forces. analysts think of the operators as a wild but he feels strongly that military intelli- bunch. This situation is changing as more Bence at the Pentagon should become more made the point earlier that there are and more old-timers, mostly OSS veterans, sophisticated so that it would not lose influ- I no giants in the United States intelligence retire, a new generation of agents and encc to the civilian agencies. community. This may be partly due to analysts enters the CIA ranks, and the needs CIA officials say' that the new electronic Henry Kissinger's forceful personality-he of intelligence, especially in electronic intel- intcl)igence systems have cut down the overshadows other figures in the intelligence ligence, change along with the rest of the agency's clandestine work through agents. establishment. And the recent quick turn- world. But there also are stresses inside the After all, enormous resources are earmarked over in top intelligence jobs has Icff the clandestine services. "Action" officers-the for worldwide eavesdropping and celestial community in flux and uncertainty, aggra- "black" operators and paramilitary special- reconnaissance. But, they hasten to add, the vated by the Kissinger-imposed strictures on ists-are more gung-ho than what the CIA' CIA has not lost its capabilities in this field. its modus operandi. -calls covert political operatives, and this, It retains its paramilitary organization. At the CIA, for example, William Colby too, leads to internal disagreements. Many agents are involved in the new still is new in his job and judgments are being Top specialists in their fields still are hired government-aide operations against the reserved as to his efficiency and the value of from the outside-the CIA has experts on traffic in narcotics and against international his innovations. The swain concern in the everything from \\'est African culture to terrorists. The agency, in fact, seeks to pro- CIA is that he assert his independence to- Filipino tribal myths and the effects of the ject an image of concentration in these areas. ward the White I louse, particularly in the Humboldt Current on fisheries in the More recently, the CIA was 'asked by the area of estimates. Thus far his public image Pacific-bct the basic recruitment is mainly new Federal Energy Office to monitor the has not been bad. 1 le is available to testify front colleges and universities. The decision movements of oil tankers throughout the before Congressional committees much whether a recruit should be assigned to oper- world to determine shipping patterns during more frequently than I ]elms did-late last ations or analysis is usually made during an the energy crisis. Dccpiy involved in the year he appeared before two separate sub- initial stage at the CIA's "basic training corporate affairs of the oil industry, the CIA committees to discuss the CIA's involve- school on Glebe Road in Virginia. Recruits is believed to be the only government agency nteut (or, as he claims, non-involvemci.t) in selected for operations are assigned to ai to have been able to compile a list of joint the Chilean situation. Ile has testified on tough course at a special school known as' ventures in the petroleum industry. This is a Watergate as often as he was called. -"The Farm," near Yorktown, Virginia. top-secret document both frdm the view- In the State Department, the new man in Promising analysts n 8J d ~b4 tl~~le1 3e- 200440$fi22d CI RD 3004991 O1 Uh3OCkOrk{q is William I lyland, a former CIA official, :14+f pr.9, t~s~c~[~ ea , Qtt~ l'1Qf it~ ccq]Aitr PP Tpqc 9 D1000130001-1 on Soviet affairs, and a Kissinger protege. shackled by the White Ilouse in the intdlec- Iie worked for Kissinger in the planning tual dimension of its work. Being a bureauc- section of the National Security Council racy, it cannot function as efficiently as it staff. But he has been in his new post only since last December. The Defense Intelligence Agency, a 5,000-man operation, is headed by Vice Admiral Vincent P.?dePoix, an austere man who has held his job since early 1973. The National Security Agency has a new Direc- tor in Air Force Lieutenant General Lewis Allen who was brought to the CIA from the DIA last year by Dr. Schlesinger, then ap- pointed to head the NSA.,I le is another top specialist in "overhead" intelligence. Both dePoix and Allen are career military intelli- gence officers with highly technical back- grounds. They are little known outside the professional intelligence community. Few Washingtonians recognize Admiral dePoix or General Allen on the rare occasions when either comes to lunch (lostntown. It is probably too early to assess whether Kissingei's domination of the American in- tclligcnce operation is good for the country. But there are thoughtful intelligence specialists who have serious reservations about it. Experienced intelligence people see a danger in the dual role Kissinger is deter- mined to play: Ile may be tempted to inter- pret intclligcitce data to ft his policy con- cepts.:l'liey think lie did so last year when he apparently; ignored CIA and 1NR warnings should when it believes (rightly or wrongly) that fundamental concepts of the use of intel- ligence are being violated at the top of the Administration. This is something that Henry Kissinger, whatever hat lie may be wearing, is bound todiscover sooner or later. This is not to say, of course, that every bureaucracy should not be shaken up period- ically. The perpetuation of old habits leads to sloppiness and opposition to new ideas. Quite possibly, the real change will come when the new generation of intelligence specialists replaces the "old spies" who still think in terms-of World War 11, the OSS, and the Cold War. Be that as it may, enor- mous care must be exercised to prevent the intelligence product from being misused politically, as often appears to be the case at this juncture, to satisfy grandiose policy. concepts politically useful to the White House or the new State Department under Kissinger. The tendency still is too strong to shoot the bearer of ill tidings-cat-efully con- structed policies are not challenged by cold cyidencc. Soviet cheating on the detente, a sacred Nixon achievement, must not be ig- nored to prevent the detente from collaps- ing.. ']'his -is the principal example. Where may be others. The object, then, is to make professional intelligence a respected servant of that the Egyptians and the Syrians were ac- policy. :And a final Word: The surest Way to tively planning an attack on.Israel because of demoralize the intelligence coniinunity is to his conviction that the Soviets would not try to involve it, as the Nixon Administra- abet an operation that would endanger the Lion tried to do, in such nefarious doings as detente they had worked out with him. Watergate and its coyer-ups. ^ This, CIA people think, was a classic exam- ple of how a statesman can become the intel- lectual prisoner of his own ideas. Finally, there is the notion that to be use- ful, intelligence must be totally detached from the policy-making Process. This con- cept of intelligence independence was a cor- nerstone of the legislation that created the CIA in 1947. Yet Kissinger seems deter- mined to weld together the functions of intel- ligence and policy formulation, perhaps dis- regarding the profound difference between capabilities and intent of hostile parties. To differentiate between theta is., after all, the principal function of sophisticated intelli- gence. Kissinger's technique, possibly a plausible one under the existing system of government in Washington, is simply to throw specific hard questions at the intelli- gence people, receive the answers, and then make his own judgments. The question, therefore, is whether American intelligence is more effective than before-in the most professional sense of the word. Allowing for the fact that it may still be premature to tender hard judgmnents- the intelligence community, after all, is in flux, there seems to be growing evidence that the present period is bound to be transi- tional because it does not satisfy the emerg- ing policy needs. Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001-000 130001-1 r ,fey Trig n Camp By John McKelway Star-News Staff Wrier Before the country reluctantly turned to gas rationing, any number of schemes were tried to reduce long lines of automobiles at gas stations. THE ODD-EVEN, plan, tried for a time in the Washington area, was dropped because federal officials had underestimated the large numbers of odds who turned out in greater num- bens than ever before. Some had never purchased any gas before but felt it was their duty to do so. On even days, many motorists with even tags simply ran out of gas because they could find no lines to wait in. They were hauled away and were furious. THEN CAME the "Maryland plan." It lasted two days and four meetings. Under this arrangement, persons of certain religious beliefs were to re- ceive gas alphabetically. Thus, the Anabapists had a whole day to fill up and were followed each passing day by Buddhists, Catholics, Dunkards and Episcopalians. The Zoroastrians, however, object- ed. THE MARYLAND plan, forgotten even as church attendance climbed was superceded by the "Alexandria Approach," based primarily on the weight of each driver. All those over 150 pounds could get gas Monday through Wednesday. Stations were open for the rest of the week to those who were lighter at the time they entered the pump area. E1/ In tv I This daused the big station strike when operators refused to physically weigh people. Lines were longer than ever before and many sent their little children rolling into stations behind the wheel. There was widespread di- eting. NEXT, THE "Washington Agree- ment" was attempted. It looked good for awhile. Dreamed up by 87 persons , who worked in the District Building, the arrangement stated that anyone in Maryland with a busted car clock could get gas in Northern Virginia if he, or she, took the Beltway and only on Sunday. Virginia motorists could, at the same time, receive a half-tank in Maryland once they proved their, glove compartment had been stuck for over six months. District motorists, meanwhile, were limited to two gallons if they signed an affidavit saying they would get out the vote once the mayor de- cided to run. (This was canceled early one morn- ing when an energy czar said it vio- lated the Hatch Act.) Administration spokesmen tried for a time to take to the tube and say "there is no gas shortage." But no one, oddly enough, would swallow the line. TRIED BUT dropped, for one rea- son or another, were several other plans. Distribution by height and col- or of eyes never even got off the ground. Three gallons per child was unpopular. One that permitted a full tank to those whose ancestors fought in the Battle of Bladensburg never seemed to interest much of anybody. learning to live with it when the coun- try ran out of water. But that's another story. ed For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-R0P84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Rel-aa 2001/08/22.: CIA-RDP84-00499R0011r0~00130001-1 'ASK ME ABOUT THE CIA INVOLVEMENT IN WATERGATE ! GOON... ASK 110 WI1AT ABOUT THE CIA INVOLVEMENT IN I`M AFRAID I'M NOT AT rs-WATEROATE?w LIBERTY TO ANSWER . THATI BY Oliphant for the Denver Post THE WASHINGTON POST, SATURDAY, MARCH 30, 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08122 : CIA-RDP84=OO499R001000130001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 .-A8 Tuesday, March S. 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST Around the Nation CIA's Trims is Books Defended by Colby William Colby, director of the C e n t r it l Intelligence Agency, testified yesterday that there are items in a book manuscript about the agency "which are very serious in- deed" and would imperil na- tional security if published. Colby was the final witness in a case involving the book about the CIA written by Vic- tor Marchetti and John D. Marks. The CIA wants 162 passages deleted before the book is published this spring. Judge Bryan fixed March 18 for final arguments in the case. Before Colby testified, co- author Marks was cross- examined in closed session about his testimony Friday. The gist of it was that much of the material he provided, for the book he learned after, he resigned as a State Depart- ment employee. Irwin Goldbloom, deputy as sistant attorney general who, is the Chief federal lawyer in the case, had said in advance that Colby'.,, testimony prob- ably would be taken in secret. However, he appeared in public-session at the trial be- fore Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in U.S. District Court in Alexandria. Most of the testi- mony at the 21/a-day trial has been taken with the public and press excluded. CIA Cuts in Book William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified that some parts of a book about the agency "are very serious in- deed" and would endanger national security if published. Appearing in an open court session in Alexandria, Colby was the final witness in the case involving a book by. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, from which the CIA wants some 162., pages trimmed. U.S. District Court Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. fixed. March 18 for final arguments, in the case. tr for pickup HS/HC- Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Re ear In endIy Co:es By John M. Taylor Perhaps it is no more than coincidence that Thailand was the setting for the CIA's most recent debacle - the fabrication of a letter last December in which a Thai insurgent leader purported to offer the government a cease-fire in return for a degree of regional autonomy. Because the letter in question was dispatched by registered mail, it was easily traced back to the CIA officer who had sent it. The CIA letter represented a type of crude deception which might have been attempted anywhere, but somehow the Thai locale seems appropriate. For Thailand is typical of a handful of countries around the world in which the CIA has operated much like a sov- ereign state. In "friendly" host countries such as Thailand, the agency is able to achieve a freedom of operation to which it could not aspire in a neutral or hostile envi- ronment. What was to have been accomplished by this bogus letter, which eventually found its way to the prime minister of Thailand? The presumed rationale is that receipt of such a presumptuous offer from an insurgent leader would awaken the Thais to the insurgent threat along their borders. No matter that this was a domestic problem, one with which the government had been coping more or less adequately for some 15 years. No matter that, since October, Thailand had operated under a government highly sensitive to anything smacking of interference in its internal af- fairs. BUT SENSITIVITY to changes in political climate never has been a hallmark of CIA operations. Much as soliders are accused of preparing for the last war, so do intelligence organizations such as CIA seemingly dwell in the political milieu of yesteryear. The agen- cy's vintage years were the 1950s and 1960s, when containment of communism was a by- word and, in budgetary terms, CIA was one of the sacred cows of official Washington. Its recruiters operated on virtually every cam- pus in the nation, and this writer was among those who succumbed to the lure of romance plus public service. In its operations abroad, the agency's rep- resentatives often ride roughshod over the resident American ambassador, who is nomi- nally the ranking U.S. official in his country of residence. One may ask why the ambassa- -dor, from his position of supposed authority, cannot prevent such abuses as the CIA letter. probably have little or no experience in the bureaucratic infighting required to make one's views prevail in Washington. He will find that both the CIA and Defense compo- nents of his mission have independent report- ing channels. And whether he is a political or a career appointee, the ambassador can rare- ly count upon the hard-nosed backing in Washington that his colleagues enjoy. The State Department has long been a patsy in. the Washington power structure, and an ambassador's "support" at home sometimes consists of two or three senior Foreign Serv- ice Officers who aspire to his job. In his country of residence, an ambassador enjoys certain distinct perks (perquisites). He rides around town with a flag on his fend- er and is a member of the best clubs. But more often than not, by the time he arrives his CIA counterpart has been in residence for several years. The CIA man perhaps has helped quash legal proceedings when the prime minister's son was in that traffic acci= dent at Harvard, and flew in duty-free cham- pagne when the interior minister's daughter finally got married. When Washington finally approved those helicopters which the defense attache had been working on for a year, it was the CIA man who modestly advised a few key officials that he was hoping for some good news on those choppers. ABOUT THE TIME that the ambassador begins to wonder about who is running the mission his wife comes down with acute ap- pendicitis. There are no commercial flights that day, but the CIA man waves his wand and a plane materializes out of thin air. It doesn't seem to have any of the usual mark-' ings, but at the airport no questions are asked. It is in this context that one should view Ambassador William Kintner's problems in Bangkok. As diplomatic incidents go, the af- fair of the CIA letter is the type of brouhaha that will blow over in time; already refer- ences to it are buried in the inside pages of our papers. But some nagging questions lin- ger. Does anyone really believe that the spu- fious letter was the brainchild of a junior offi- cer who dispatched it without the knowledge of his superiors? Those to whom this sounds plausible should have no trouble at all with Rose Mary Wood's story about that tape re- corder. The New York Times recently editorialized that "the senior members of Congress have ... failed to exercise any real independent scrutiny of the CIA." The lesson of the CIA 'letter is that control of the agency in the field is no more effective than that which is nomi- nally exercised in Washington. In addition to the background to which he THE FACT IS THAT AN ambassador - be alludes in this article, John M. Taylor is a he a career official or a political appointee - former Foreign Service officer who writes faces real han caps in his, rod mi n frequently on stom ternational and A~vgg~~RDP 99f1 0 41 After all, his primacy within the overseas mission has been underscored by a succes- sion of White House directives dating from the Kennedy administration. Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 A-$ WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, D. C, Friday, March 1, 1974 C/A BOOK SUIT Secrecy Is Where Ong Can find It By Mary Ellen Perry Star-News Staff Writer A high-ranking official of the Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged in testimony yesterday he did not check to see if material he censored as being top secret in a draft of a book about the CIA had already become public knowledge. Harold L. Brownman, deputy director for manage- ment and services, was one of four deputy directors tes- tifying for the CIA in the first day of a suit brought against the federal agency by two authors of a pending book entitled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." AUTHORS Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks are suing in U.S. District Court in Alexandria for relief from an injunc- tion, issued before they wrote the book, barring them from publishing it without first getting clear- ance from the CIA. They are being represent- ed by the American Civil Liberties Union, which says. the action is the first of its kind in CIA history. Their co-plaintiff is the Now York publishing firm of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., which wants to print the 514-page manuscript. intact; without the 163 deletions 11 : ordered by the CIA. THE NON-JURY trial will turn on three issues: Whether the CIA can prove, the censored portions' should be classified; whether they consist of in- formation Marchetti learned while a CIA em- ploye, and whether the in- formation already is in the public domain. Even if the CIA should prove the information should be classified, it could still be published if the authors proved Mar- chetti .learned it after leav- ing the CIA or it was al- ready a matter of public record. Marks is a former State Department employe. "DID YOU find out if any speeches by CIA officials or congressmen or any press reports had been made pub- lic in regard to the informa- tion contained in the dele- tions you made?" Knopf attorney Floyd Abrams asked Brownman. "No, I did not," Brown- man replied. He and the other deputy directors, Carl E. Duckett, William E. Nelson and Edward Proctor, testified they used guidelines in Executive Order 11652, their own experience, re- views of CIA records and their own personal judg- ment in recommending deletions of information ",they considered classified, Duckett said the guide- lines "tell what would be damaging to national secu- rity or injurious to the con- duct of American foreign relations" if revealed. MUCH OF THEIR testi mony was closed to the pub- lic and the press after Jus- tice Department attorneys told Bryan it would involve recital of "classified infor- mation." .Marks described the manuscript as being "an across-the-board critique of the covert activities of the CIA." He said the deleted portions described the' CIA's "bumbling inefficien- cy. They make a lot of mis- takes, then hide behind na- tional security," he said. Marks said he and Mar- chetti were "paper shuf- flers" in their respective jobs, "but we shuffled a lot of important papers." Both are free-lance writ- ers now. The injunction was issued in April 1972 by U.S. Dis- trict Court Judge Albert V. Bryan, who Is now hearing the suit. proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved ForIease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049901000130001-1 Four CIA., Officials Defend Censorship. "N Marchetti hook By Laurence Stern Washington Post staff writer In a closed federal court ~' room guarded 'by U.S. mar- ",'shals, four deputy. directors of ''the Central Intelligence R-,"Agency yesterday defended national security, censorship of " a book by two former intelli- ,I.gence officials. U.S. District Court Judge '^ A lbert V. Bryan Jr. cleared the Alexandria courtroom for their testimony which touched on 162 deletions ordered by the CIA on grounds that the material divulges highly 'sensi- tive intelligence secrets. Attorneys for the authors, former CIA analyst Victor L. Marchetti and former State Department intelligence offi- cer John D. Marks, are chal- ;longing the classification pro- cedures of the CIA on grounds that the censorship action was improper and capricious. Marchetti and Marks are su- ing the respective heads of -their former agencies, CIA Di- rector William E. Colby and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, to restore all dele- tions from their manuscript, "The CIA and the Cult of In- telligence," scheduled for pub- lication this spring by Alfred A. Knopf Jr. Colby has said that, the court test is crucial to his stat- utory role as a,protector of na- tional security sources and sc- ei-ets. Should the CIA lose the case. Colby has ordered legis lation dratted for submission to Congress which would im- pose new criminal penalties on former CIA employees who divulge what the government deems to be classified mate- rial. Attorneys for the two au thors contend that the issues in the battle of the book touch on the First Amendment ques- tions that were raised in the' Pentagon Papers case. In the. current trial, however, the is-, by the CIA to the Marchetti- Marks manuscript. It was to defend its position on this point that the govern- ment marshaled the rare gath ering outside of headquarters of top intelligence officials in the Alexandria court room: CIA Deputy Directors Willidm Nelson for operations, Carl Duckett for science and tech- nology, Edward Proctor for in- telligence and Harold L. Brownman for management and services. The thrust of their com- bined testimony, it was under- stood, was that each decided on the basis of his particular expertise that portions of the manuscript violated security classifications. This was the procedure that was described as "capricious" by attorneys for the two au- thors, who requested that the documents and classification standards be produced to jus- tify the deletions. CIA Director' Colby is ex- pected to testify, also in cam- era, at today's session., To re- but CIA testimony, the two au- thors offered the testimony - also also behind closed doors-of. former National Security Council staffer Morton Halpe- rin, who was an expert witness in the Pentagon Papers case.' The case, which is expected to be argued for a week, is an outgrowth of the government's first effort to impose pre-pub- lication restraint in the courts on national, security grounds. In the Pentagon papers case, which the government lost, the Justice Department went to court after publication of the Vietnam study had begun in The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers.. .sue at hand is t e validity-of, the security sta deEpr FJeTease 7 In arguing for the book's publisher, Knopf, New York attorney Floyd Abrams said a question in' the case is "whether Knopf's right to pub- lish can properly be deemed less extensive than was that of The New York Times in the Pentagon papers case." The government won the first round in'the Battle of the book in 1972 when Judge Bryan enjoined Marchetti from publishing classified ma- terial gathered during his 14 years of CIA employment without prior agency clear- ance. ,When the manuscript was completed last fall Marchetti and Marks submitted it, under the terms of the injunction, for CIA review. Initially the CIA ordered ,more than 300 deletions. After negotiation the number was reduced to .225. By yesterday the government was seeking to strike 162 passages. ? ? Should: the government pre- vail on .the. remaining. points, Knopf .reportedly . intends to publish the.. manuscript with the. deleted. passages! marked h" "Deleted T[ E WASFIINGTON POST 8 Friday, Match 1,1974 A2 61A-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For4&9Ieasse?2001/08122 CIA',-RDP84-o04 . .A.ia. Fa6.28.GTUN POST pwSo ID w ~~?NiiC]ro W w~~~ a p N ru F;&n Mm r M n V M aOQ w rpx e-4 p m .' ?On 0+ r ~7Q rn M $ r ro O R~ m ~ O w ~, , Q { m p m. M"a ~mOR.Q DfDOQ0 ~?tSwo eC1 H `? y Cj w . ? CJ A. ~, p , .w m o, r. ~r 0 ? ~~.rr~.s'~~rr'.~~5'-y 4'C n.Ga.Q'ro.roH'.~ innnmq.m Ps w y M. m w O P. rr m C M vs CL O r w . p m .~ 2 !?i 5 - w R? O. ~ ,n. r `Dro~a~iP^'~.pmm~.yt7@droo~? Op~9 oaa~o~hy Cn w y'xo m Yt~~~ m o wro c o,w e O `U CYO rsM n r+.0 C v,RU CD pn ro 0. R % tf K m rnm ID 0 CD w M H FL 14 ';' y eyo,rmiaw`"iamoZmy co ~pCna a.g &A ciC ~!9C) j A. m .. m m Fi. R..- O N vi].i O ] O c* co m Dn ~-4'~ ' O~ ID c w w a m ro p~m~ro m~cOD Or0 ?co 0-4 p o ro m " ~! G C m w Y E 1 nbd~Cp `1.w d (~P O D5' !7 CCD G ' ~' ~?'' O G m - ar ~ e , M o 1 -0*E yp 0 t: 0 m y; a ro FD o o r. . m w y'C to ~? rF % (IDD ro O m - . 10 m 0Q 0 CD p7 G my H ro Wpm 41 ro 9f4 ~* w " VIp ~ ~ '-:4 n g H ro N ~ CL .: - l y..~p n ~P rye 0 .ro a. ~:a~ M.;.''.~? L 0 HS/HC- J" ' v w ?- r-r ...' y ID ? N N. N w y a.. Q CD N ~i cn . VD, ~'~ - HS3 m m P? Fy F O G R , n .' _ y H G' M m D V L1 k3 Fn (n 'T a 'J l9 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 CIS-1 ~ 8a-on"daaR6bfjod i30O 1_i Approved For Rjase 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499RQQ1000130001-1 LETTERS.. TO THE EDITOR: The CIA Denies Charges The Washington Post's story about the National Caucus of Labor Commit- tees (of Feb. 17, 1974) could leave the impression with some of your readers that the CIA, through its refusal to comment, indeed 'might be involved in . the, kinds of activities the NCLC alleges. a domestic organization, so he should ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation ,rather than CIA for information about it. While it appeared self-evident that the NCLC charges are only twisted fan- tasy, your circulation of them forces. CIA to deny them flatly as false. W. E. COLBY, Director, Oentra9 Intelllsence Asener Washington. tVAStf/A)Glb POST Wti,la. 19 'Ph /s7L/ I-IS/HC- ~;4 0 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00 00130001-1 NBC Challenges CIA NEW YORK (AP) - NBC News has reported that the Central Intelligence Agency destroyed tapes made fol- lowing the Watergate break-in affair after Senate. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield asked that any Watergate evidence be saved. On Tape DestrUction, destruction of the tapes was a routine matter. "There was nothing deliberate about this in the sense of destroying a damaging tape :,,.or anything like that." NBC said the CIA denies deliberate destruction of any Watergate evidence. But the CIA tapes were de- stroyed Jan. 18, 1973, the day after the CIA acknowl- edged receipt of a letter from Mansfield to various agencies asking that any Watergate materials be saved, NBC said last night. CIA Director William E. Colby said Tuesday the in- telligence agency had de- stroyed all but one of its tape recordings made dur- ing the Watergate affair. However, Colby said the NBC said it was told by a CIA spokesman that Mans- field's letter arrived Jan. 22 -four days too late. "Nevertheless, by check- ing Senate Mansfield's of- fice, we were able to find a receipt for the letter signed by the CIA on the 17th, the day before the tapes' de- struction," said NBC corre- spondent Carl Stern. "Informed of that, the CIA withdrew its earlier statements and now says only that it will try diligent- ly to pin down what hap- pened," Stern reported. - NBC said the destroyed CIA tapes were recorded in the month following the Watergate break-in and involved then CIA Director Richard Helms, his deputy Vernon Walters, acting FBI Director Patrick L. Gray, former White House domes- tic adviser John D. Ehrlich- man, ex-White House coun- sel John W. Dean III, "and possibly even, the Presi- dent." #W/?:. .3/ 94N /9' /1 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0Qj,000130001-1 'CIA. been ~i~ad Only I. Tape on Walergcete Colby said last night that the CIA can find only one tape recording bearing on the Wa- tergate affair and that it has destroyed all its other tapes from that period. 1 In a telephone Interview, Colby said, "Sen. (Howard) Baker asked us If there were any other tapes that bore on the subject. And we don't have any other on this subject at the moment. We had periodic .destruction of our tapes." (In . a separate interview with United Press Internation- al, Colby denied a CBS News By Michael J. Sniffen Associated Press CIA, director William E. tion on June 22, 1971, between ' 1, Colby said that the one tape %,- the agency has that fits Bak- kor'e requoat Is of a conver.n quested any CIA tapes bearing on the Watergate affair. He said the CIA had been cooperating fully. telephone Interview he had re- report that the agency had de- stroyed tapes considered vital to the Watergate 'probe. He said there was no indication any had ever existed.) Baker,, the Tennessee Re- publican who is vice chairman of the Senate 'Watergate com- mittee, confirmed in another E. Howard Hunt Jr., of the White House special Investiga- tions-or plumbers-unjt, and Marine Gen. Robert E. Cush- man, then deputy director of the CIA. The transcript of that tape has been entered into the 1'ec ord of the Senate Watergate committee. He said the agen- cy would supply Baker with the tape Itself. "Anything we own he can have," Colby said. But, Colby ? said, "Over the last 15 years, we have made tapes but periodically ' they were torn tip the way' you tear ' up old notes or old checks after income tax time. And we have not made, any tapes In' the past year." He said the Cushman-Hunt tape, made by Cushman in his own office, "survived normal procedures of destruction be- cause It was put In 'a separate drawer somehow." In the tape transcript, Hunt asked Cushman to sup- ply him two things: "flash alias documentation . and some. degree of 'physical dis- guise for a one-time o)p-in and but." ved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Rejoase 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499RQQ1000130001-1 X9 By Martha Angle St u-NcwvSt:dl1Vriler The Central Intelligence Agency has destroyed all of its tape recordings of tele- phone conversations and office meetings except for the tape already made pub- lic in hearings of the Senate Watergate committee. CIA Director William, Colby said last night the agency destroyed the tapes sometime after January 1973, when it discontinued a "10 or 15" year practice of taping "selected" phone calls and meetings. Destruction of the CIA tapes came to light when Republican Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., asked for the tape recording of a mid-1971 conversation be- tween convicted Watergate' burglar E. Howard Hunt Jr. and Marine Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., then deputy, director of the CIA. BAKER ALSO asked Col- by for any other CIA tapes which might have a bearing on the Watergate investiga- tion. "When I first talked with Sen. Baker on Saturday, I wasn't sure whether we had any other tapes or not," Colby said last night. "I checked and found that we didn't." A transcript of the Hunt- Cushman conversation was introduced into evidence during the Senate Water- gate hearings last year and in the past several months Baker has been conducting' his own investigation into the CIA's role in Watergate- related activities. jIS/HC- J J Two of the seven men captured on June 17, 1972, in Watergate - Hunt and James W. McCord - were retired CIA employes, while three others - Eugenio Martinez, Bernard L. Bar- ker and Frank Sturgis - had at various times been under contract with the agency. false identification papers and a speech alteration de- vice, from the CIA in 1971 while working with the White House "plumbers" unit which broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Unlike the automatic voice-activated White House system which record- ed President Nixon's phone calls and meetings, the CIA taping was done on a to his office. Colby said the agency has .already turned over masses of documents to the Water- gate committee, the Special Prosecutor's Office and congressional; committees which exercise "oversight" functions regarding the CIA. , The CIA director said he is now preparing answers to other requests by Baker for information. Baker declined "selective" basis on man- to say exactly what data he devices, Colby said. He said the tapes "were periodically destroyed, and about a year ago I decided I didn't want to use the sys- tem any longer and it was discontinued." Colby, who became CIA director in September, was executive director of the agency when the decision was made a year ago to halt the taping. He said James R. Schlesinger, then CIA director and now secre- tary of defense, agreed with the decision. is seeking from the CIA except to say it included information about "agency contacts with any and all of the Watergate types." IINGTON STAR-NEWS D.C., Wednesday, 1anuary30, 1974 U, AFTER THE taping was discontinued, Colby said, all tapes on file at the CIA were destroyed. The Associated Press quoted Colby as saying the Hunt-Cushman tape "sur? vived normal procedures of destruction because it was put in a separate drawer. somehow." Cushman made HUNT RECEIVED a va-, the tape when Hunt came Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0'0499R001000130001-1 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, D. C., Sunday, January 27, 1974 Author~ The CIA has lost another round in its bid to put a gag on a former agency official who has written a critical and revealing book about U.S. intelligence practices. Victor Marchetti, the former CIA official, is pre- paring a legal challenge of some 135 deletions CIA and State Department censors have insisted be removed from his book, and he is under permanent court or- der to publish nothing with- out first clearing it with the agency. But the government failed last week in a secret at- tempt to persuade the judge in the case, Albert V. Bryan Jr., of the federal district court in AAlexandria, to punish Marchetti for a se- ries of CIA leaks in recent weeks. GOVERNMENT lawyers, in a letter to the judge clas- sified and stamped "Top Secret," invited Bryaan to cite Marchetti for contempt of court for five alleged vio-. lations of the injunction. Only one of the citations directly involved Marchetti at all: AA Canadian televi. Rou sion interview late last year in which Marchetti alleged that German Chancellor Willie Brandt once received CIA political funds in the early cold war era. The other four instancces had no direct connection with Marchetti at all. They included articles in Harpers Magazine and the New York Times describing ear- lier government attempts to censor the Marchetti book, and two articles in the Lon- don Sunday Telegraph and the Washington Post de- scribing hitherto unpub- lished intelligence opera- tions. THE JUDGE yesterday informed all the parties that he had no intention of begin- ning a contempt proceeding aganst Marchetti simply on the ggovernment's say so, and he suggested that as things now stand Marchetti would be free to reveal any- thing he wants to, since he obeyed earlier requiire- ments that any manuscript he wrote he submitted for prior censorship. -OSWALD JOHNSTON J Approved For Release 2001/08/22 CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved ForJease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499#01000130001-1 mid-1971 conversation be. e cres and en p meetings, the CIA tween convicted Watergate calls burglar E. Howard Hunt Jr. taping "selective" was basis done on on a man- and Marine Gen. Robert E. ually operated recording Cushman Jr., then deputy devices, Colby said. director of the CIA. He said the tapes "were BAKER ALSO asked Col- periodically destroyed, and by for any other CIA tapes about a year ago I decided I which might have a bearing didn't want to use the sys- on the Watergate investiga- tern any longer and it was tion. discontinued." "When I first talked with '1'ne Associated Press Sen. Baker on Saturday, I quoted Colby as saying the wasn't sure whether we had Hunt-Cushman tape "sur- any other tapes or note" vivcd normal procedures of Colby said last night. I destruction because it,was checked and found that we put in a separate drawer didn't." somehow." Cushman made A transcript of the Hunt- the tape when Hunt came Cushman conversation was, to his office. introduced into evidence - - , during the Senate Water- Colby said the agency has gate hearings last year and already turned over masses in the past several months of documents to the Water- Baker has been conducting gate committee, the Special his own investigation into Prosecutor's' Office and the CIA's role in Watergate- congressional committees related activities. which exercise "oversight" Two of the seven men functions regarding the e co By Martha Angle Star-News Staff Waiter The Central Intelligence Agency has destroyed all of its tape recordings of tele- phone conversations and office meetings except for the tape already made pub- lic in hearings of the Senate Watergate committee: CIA Director William Colby said last night the agency destroyed the tapes sometime after January 1973, when it discontinued a "10 or 15" year practice of taping "selected" phone calls and meetings. Destruction of the CIA tapes came to light when Republican Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., asked for the tape recording of.a G3 s Watergate - Hunt and James W. McCord - were retired CIA employes, while . three others - Eugenio' Martinez, Bernard L. Bar- ker and Frank Sturgis - had at various times been under contract with the agency. HUNT RECEIVED a va- riety of materials, including false identification papers and a speech alteration de- vice, from the CIA in 1971 while working with the White House "plumbers unit which broke into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Unlike the automatic House system which record- hone s d Pidt Nixon' captured on June 17, 1972, in CIA. ~"~ For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 'f HS/HC- proved yj o Approved For ,Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499LR001000130001-1 d ~wrK P .C 1 11 '?'~ Q o'd .? v,'a to a q rmn t:$ o f tr' ~...5~ w n o w?. ro C 9 ID N fn 0 10 _.'I 0 Y.? 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(wL w~ w. ;amgm. ro.r a. a c or R?m0 onv; ''~ o o ? mi tr m ?t ] 1 m omm co rom $ ac w ~-3 om i, No m 7a m ~~cwo r mr~i~p rnC]m ?HA.1 nWwa~% w re ~. pym' .rowA~ G?C" m C"'offpc(DM0~~w'?m~i~m.0 o ~,+ co EA ro y A? ~~r7{/~tNrtDq~rt,O~0C7~y?mr'~ ~~o~_~G~?O*po,~?.w~rrp (~D ti row's mm~ o~wuom~+oo`? ~omrnwo rt~N ou c o o w r n mouT ~rtmc1 ... ~rt w e ~ H o- cyNaorCr ~~ rod.. v Y~cn m mtd mCL .4 m9mn d 0 m ~'o~,trw om?~ . ro m~ Rm O%n m mrn d4 r ?e A ;~ m+~ : ro ro H y w r. 7r C) `. ~? O `~ N ro~ W O M C m O ro' y "3 '& " rn.~"Y'.~'O tic?tcmDw O wC]w? Goya m ?,: ~~f~rOi~,%~??y~'' o~p=yro ?.1 ' w ~ "'? N A+ rt O O' O rD a iC . e+. t9 . as o a m m o, rt h o C o p 'C w C7 y w ~. W ro n~~ w pros 5 G N ro w o '~ d C to (D DD . 10 S Ni CZ ~~ % d r.a ?rt' ?!o dam w~ .p "'gym w ?-~ ~o .~? + ?-(a r ?y O ~ N r~-D' "?m7 -'T' v, ai 'C1 `7 w ?^ ab to H to (D (D p o ~~ p m v ?v Cj~~ cn, 0 "'H~ ?. ?o ? m ?? s o~ o ro rt (b CPm ZI ro C. ro w Q H M :l m 0 tr '.p. ?~a '~i ' r~i. R. to . w`~m ~w r'w'JG m o c a rtc w e g~ . 0 0 mcr~ g ~tw? ooa t w ro ? m ? rY w o? o Cy yrt y r+ ~ CY Q w w ?o _ .9 ?arta rt o' o co3m a p m m V w 00 ro A w a d] `" 'y w o?~ w b9 a o C m m m rt vwi w m G. rGD raD 13. p. ?~?? r~ m N n 0 N [D p o n y .~' ?C m r+ m o eC 7e' m ~n .y ro ,.-., G rt Cr os o' ,o, +~ rmn w o Cn p, w A ~, c ow.-maq~w.~ cn tv,w0 ro ?ro n . 0.o v n + -i0 rt E2. r"o ~a(~? :`~bwm o ~?o. w w p E a' o e o ~' or 0~1~ase 2001/08/22` MeRD MO04g9 QQ 40C704's0 01-1 icy" is pondered by Stcv Dedijer, a Spook the Spooks? By C. L. Sulzberger MILAN, Italy--The role of intelli- gence in modern societies is now in- creasingly questioned as the result of scandals, wiretappings, failures to evaluate correctly what special serv- ices report, or inexcusable political interventions like the recent C.I.A. case in Thailand. Thus, in the United States and France, there have been flamboyant bugging incidents which threaten to topple leading officials. Greece's own central intelligence agency, K.Y.P., has allegedly been at, the heart of two suc- cessive putsches. And Israel's highly expert spook apparatus produced cor- rect information that war was coming last October-yet the Government ig- nored these warnings. Many security organizations have acquired unsavory reputations. Both Britain's secret intelligence service (viz., Kim Philby) and the Soviet serv- ices (viz., Colonels Penkovsky and FOREIGN AFFAIRS Popov) have been demonstrably pene- trated-by their adversaries. Moreover, the ancient business of intelligence has been totally revolu- tionized by technological revolutions. The computer plays an enormous role in analyzing the information of spies and special agents. And electronic eavesdropping plus space satellite pho- tography combine to open brand new fields of espionage, fields that remain closed to small, poor, underdeveloped countries. Indeed, it is increasingly obvious that pooled intelligence among allies is sensible even for rich and powerful nations. A former French Minister of Defense wonders whether France (whose intelligence services have been smudged with scandal) requires such agencies in peacetime. He says: "France is not an important enough country to require a peace ,time intelligence service anyway. All it needs is to have good relations with its allies and enough of a new intelligence service to be able to func- tion should there .be a serious threat of war." Yugoslav-born Swedish citizen now on the faculty of Lund University, Swe- den. Dedijer has special expertise since he admits having worked successively for jthe Soviet N.K.V.D. (now M.G.B.), the American O.S.S. (precursor of the C.I.A.), then in "intelligence activities" for Yugoslavia-before moving to it Swedish ivory tower. Mr. Dedijer reaches the novel con- clusion that courses in "intelligence" should be given in universities-where everything from hotel management to embalming is now taught. He says that despite a broad literature of case his- tories and spy novels, there are "very few systematic social studies" on the subject. Yet there exists a contradic- tion between "the need to democratize intelligence and to control it on the one hand, and its secrecy and illegal- ity requirements on the other." He points out that mass media and other groups "are making intelligence questions objects of public debate and political problems," adding: "The de- mands for the democratization of in- telligence policy and its control are being raised." He suggests examina- tion of the following: trot of the intelligence production sys- tem, management system and policy system necessary, desirable ahd pos- sible? What does intelligence cost us? How many are engaged in it, who and where are they and how selected? What is the return on our investment in intelligence? How much waste and abuse is involved: Is the intelligence community subverting our basic na- tional values and quality of our life?" ' Mr. Dedijer concludes: "We are learning that intelligence is too im- portant to be left to professional in- telligencers. Intelligence, as all other key functions and institutions, has to be on tap but not on top of society." He believes: "The basic intelligence goal for individual countries is chang- ing from intelligence for national ex- istence and security to intelligence for national growth and development." There is much to be said for his fresh approach to a field hitherto cloaked in dark suspicion and speckled with gaudy romance. Surely, for a sub= ject so vital to contemporary societies, there should be public discussion and even intellectual courses examining the needs and methods of what used to be an unmentionable trade. t pproved For Release 2001/08/22 :.CIA-RDP, TO F r se.2001 /08/22 : -CIAF4RQR84e60At99R00ION 1 x001=1 icy" is pondered by StevalrDedijer, a Yugoslav-born Swedish citizen now on Spook the Spooks? By C L. Sulzberger MILAN, Italy--The role of intelli- gence in modern societies is now in- creasingly questioned as the result of scandals, wiretappings, failures to ,evaluate correctly what special serv- ,ices report, or inexcusable political 'interventions like the recent C.I.A. case in Thailand. . Thus, . in the United States and France, there ' have been ? flamboyant i bugging incidents which threaten to topple leading officials. Greece's own central intelligence agency, K.Y.P., has allegedly been at the heart of two suc- L cessive putsches. And Israel's highly -expert spook apparatus produced cor- .rect information that war was coming last October-yet the Government ig- nored these warnings. Many security organizations have acquired unsavory reputations. Both - Britain's secret intelligence service (viz., Kim Philby) and the Sbviet serv- ices (viz., Colonels Penkovsky and FOREIGN AFFAIRS Popov) have been demonstrably pene- trated by their adversaries. Moreover, the ancient business of intelligence has been totally revolu- tionized by . technological revolutions. The computer plays an enormous role in analyzing the information of spies and special agents. And electronic eavesdropping plus space satellite pho- tography combine to open brand new fields of espionage, fields that remain closed to small, poor, underdeveloped countries. Indeed, it is increasingly obvious that pooled intelligence among allies is sensible even for rich and powerful nations. A former French Minister of Defense wonders whether France (whose intelligence services have been smudged with scandal) requires such agencies in peacetime. He says: "France is not an important enough country to require a peace - ,time intelligence service anyway. All it needs is to have good relations with its allies and enough of a new :-.intelligence service to be able to func- tion should there .be a serious threat of War." the faculty of Lund University, Swe- den. Dedijer has special expertise since he admits having worked successively for the Soviet N.K.V.D. (now M,G.B.), the American O.S.S. (precursor of the C.I.A.), then in "intelligence activities" for Yugoslavia-before moving to a Swedish ivory tower. Mr. Dedijer reaches the novel con- that courses in "intelligence" . ? . clusion should be given in universities-where everything from' hotel management to embalming is now taught. He says that despite a broad literature of case his- tories and spy novels, there are "very few systematic social studies" on the subject. Yet there exists a contradic- tion between "the need to democratize intelligence and to control it on the one hand, and its secrecy and illegal- ity ;-' requirements on the other." He points but that mass media and other groups "are making intelligence questions objects of public debate and political problems," adding: "The de- mands for the democratization of in- telligence policy and its control are being raised." He suggests examina- tion of the following: "Is a wider and greater public con- trol of the intelligence production sys- tem, management system and policy system necessary, desirable ahd pos- sible? What does intelligence cost us? How many are engaged in it, who and where are they and how selected? What is the return on our investment in intelligence? How much waste and abuse is involved: Is the intelligence community subverting our basic na- tional values and quality of our life?" ' Mr. Dedijer concludes: "We are learning that intelligence is too im- portant to be left to professional in- telligencers. Intelligence, as all other key functions and institutions, has to be on tap but not on top of society.", He believes: "The basic intelligence. goal for individual countries is chang- ing from intelligence for national ex- istence and security to intelligence for national growth and development." There is much to be said for his fresh approach to a field hitherto cloaked in dark suspicion and speckled with gaudy romance. Surely, for a sub= ject so vital to contemporary societies, there should be public discussion and even intellectual courses examining the needs and methdds of what used to. be an unmentionable trade. Approved For Release 2001/08/22:;;C Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004998001000130001-1 ByTan;rayArbuckle A lanky Texan, Phil Star-News s,,c,al Cormapmknt Buechler, an old U.S. AID ,hand in Laos has been ap- LONG CHENG, North' pointed AID area coordina- Laos ... Over the last-fewi tor and will be the chief weeks, the United States has withdrawn almost all of its paramilitary personnel and closed down virtually, officials and defence at- I all of its paramilitary opera- tache personnel far outnwn- . tions from this high, moun- ber CIA personnel. joint American and Mao AN AMERICAN AID nerve center for 11 years of official and his wife, who is the war in north Laos. a . trained nurse, have The Central Intelligence moved their house to Long Agency which ran these Cheng to help the Meo lead- operations is now in the er, Vang Pao, with econom- process of handing over its functions to the U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment and to the military attache's office of the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, the Lao capital. The windowless rock- walled rooms, with special combination locks on their. doors, which once housed the paramilitary headquar- ters are now taken over by -AID. Instead of shotguns and other weapons, there are trays of official papers. U.S. OFFICIALS, hung with webbing festooned with hand grenades, smoke canisters and water bottles, packing Browning automat- ic pistols on their hips and Colt AR 15 submachineguns slung across their chests, are a thing of the past. Talk at the soldiers' mess no longer centers on heli- AID is gradually tak- ing over the compound and is programming. The CIA handled both mil- itary and civilian affairs at Long Cheng but now respon- sibility is split with civilian affairs going to AID and military affairs to the at- tache's office. The dozen attache personnel at Long Cheng, however, don't ex pect to be there long. They are likely to leave Laos- either by the start of the new U.S. fiscal year begin- ning July 1st or within 60 days of a Laos coalition government formed, which-,' ever happens first , All that remains of the onetime U.S. combat pres- ence of about 30 men is an American supervisor, an American administrative officer and two case officers who handle the Thai irregu- lar forces still in Long Cheng. borne assaults behind ene-, But they too should be my lines, the latest U.S. Air; gone before July 1st. The Force errors or shotup U.S. aircraft limping onto Long Cheng's air strip. Instead it focuses on new medical dis- pensaries, a hospital, a new gas station and a chicken farm to provide the Meo with protein. ' Thais are already down to less than half their previous strength. The impact is most ob- vious at the last brothel, once staffed by,' 45 girls imported from the Mekong -River towns. It did a roar- ing trade. Now there are only 21 girls and the brothel keeper says business is poor. U.S. officials say they have gone ahead with the Laos withdrawal even thou- gh hope for a new govern. ment is far from formed. Billions of U.S. tax dollars- were spent here and about 800 Americans were killed in the Laos fighting, mostly in downed aircraft, but, at least 24 were lost in ground action with the Lao forces and 80 more in South- Viet . nam-based ground opera- tions against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in South Laos. Although 'the U.S. para- military forces are gone, some of them and the bulk of U.S.air power are just across the border in Thai- land 30 minutes away. It. could be employed swiftly by President Nixon if, new' fighting started ends. _ __,_ WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, D. C., Tuesday, January 22, 1974 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004998001000130001-1 By Tammy Arbuckle A lanky Texan, Phil Buechler, an old U.S. AID 'handein Laos has been ap- LONG CHENG, North. pointd AID area coordina- Laos . . . Over the last.fewl tor and will be the chief weeks, the United States i American here. has withdrawn almost all of its paramilitary personnel and closed down virtually, all of its paramilitary opera- tions from this high moun- tain valley which was the joint American and Mao nerve center for 11 years of the war in north Laos. The Central Intelligence Agency which ran these operations is now in the process of handing over its functions to the U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment and to the military attache's office of the U.S. embassy in Vientiane, the Lao capital. The windowless rock. walled rooms, with special combination locks on their. doors, which once housed the paramilitary headquar- ters are now taken over by .AID. Instead of shotguns and other weapons, there are trays of official papers. U.S. OFFICIALS, hung with webbing festooned with hand grenades, smoke canisters and water bottles, packing Browning automat- ic pistols on. their hips and Colt AR 15 submachineguns slung across their chests, are a thing of the past. , Talk at the soldiers' mess no longer centers on heli- borne assaults behind ene- my lines, the latest U.S. Air Force errors or shotup U.S. aircraft limping onto Long Cheng's air strip. Instead it focuses on new medical dis- pensaries, a hospital, a new gas station and a chicken farm to provide the Meo with protein. AID is gradually tak- ing over the compound and officials, and defence at- tache personnel far outn-uh- ber CIA personnel. AN AKPIERICAN AID official and his wife, who is a trained nurse, have ,moved their house to Long Cheng to help the Meo lead- er, Vang Pao, with econom- ic programming. The CIA handled both mil- itary and civilian affairs at Long Cheng but now respon- sibility is split with civilian affairs going to AID and military affairs to the at- tache's office. The dozen attache personnel at Long Cheng, however, don't ex pect to be there long. They are likely to leave Laos- either by the start of the new U.S. fiscal year begin= ping July 1st or within 60 days of a Laos coalition government formed, which-.' ever happens first . All that remains of the onetime U.S. combat pres- ence of about 30 men is an American supervisor, an American administrative officer and two case officers who handle the Thai irregu- lar forces still in Long Cheng. But they too should be gone before July 1st. The Thais are already down to less than half their previous strength. The impact is most ob- vious at the last brothel, mported fromthe4Mekong River towns. It did a roar- ing trade. Now there are only 21 girls and. the brothel keeper says business is poor. U.S. officials say they have gone ahead with the Laos withdrawal even thou- gh hope for a new govern- ment is far from formed. Billions of U.S. tax dollars' were spent here and about 800 Americans were killed in t ie Laos fighting, mostly in downed aircraft, but, at least 24 were lost in ground action with the Lao forces and 80 more in South_Viet;, nam-based ground opera- tions against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in South Laos. Although the U.S. para- military forces are gone, some of them and the bulk of U.S..air. power are just across the border in Thai, land 30 minutes away. It could be employed swiftly by President Nixon if new fighting started ends. _ WASHINGTON STARNEWS Washington, 0. C., Tuesday, January 22, 1974 HS/HC- /i f i' Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499RQQ000130001-1 THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1974 L -j 1" . (Z.- ai Relations Expected to Survive C.I.A. Blow'._; By JAMES F. CLARITY Special Lo The Now York 'rimes BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 20 -The admitted interference of the Central Intelligence Agency in an internal Thai affair does not mean, in the view of knowl- edgeable Western diplomats, that the C.I.A. has garroted it- self with its own cloak in this country, but that it has at least pinked itself with its own dag- ger. The incident, which stirred vigorous student protests in a country where students are the most influential political force, left Thai-American relations frayed, but not tattered, the diplomats say. The affair focused new at- tention an the large American presence, mostly military, in Thailand. It also marred the en- trance on the scene of a new United States Ambassador, Wil- liam R. Kintner, and forced the interim Government here to dis- entangle itself from another problem in the midst of the dif- ficulties it has been trying to solve since it replaced the mili- tary regime deposed in a stu- dent uprising in October. In the view of some analysts here, the C.I.A. affair was an embarrassment to almost every- one concerned, including the of- fice boy whose registration of, an ersatz letter led to the blow- ing of the cover. The plot itself seemed simple enough. An agent of the Amer- ican intelligence agency, not identified but sent home ear- lier this month, composed a letter purportedly from an in- ,surgent leader asking to discuss ,a cease-fire with the Govern- ment. The purpose of the letter, ac- cording to Ambassador Kintner, I the Central Intelligence Agency was to produce dissension and defections among the insur- gents who have been fighting the Bangkok Government for years. The registered letter found its way-how is not clear -to the offices of an English- language Bangkok newspaper, The Nation. The paper traced it to the C.I.A. and published it, the ambassador admitted the American involvement and the scandal was under way. In the succeeding two weeks, Dr. Kintner has apologized for the incident several times, in- cluding personal apologies to King Phumiphol Aduldet and Premier Sanya Dharmasakti, and said he had taken meas- ures to prevent American offi- cials from meddling in Thai- land's internal affairs. The stu- dent organizations, which had first demanded the total ouster of the C.I.A. and the recall of Dr. Kintner to Washington, have not reacted to the Bang- kok Government's relatively mild reprimand to the United States and the ambassador last Thursday. Dr. Kintner, who was person- ally vulnerable to the student criticsm because he worked for for two years during the Ko- rean war, said in a recent inter- view that the incident caused "chagrin" among Thai officials. It also, the ambassador said, reflected a "patronizing atti- tude" that he has found among some of his embassy staff mem- bers-not necessarily members of the intelligence agency - toward the Thais. The employe who patronized, whose attitude the ambassador describes as "Look, Charlie, we'll show you how to do it," will be trans- ferred, the ambassador indi-' cated. The furor over the letter has had a number of other effects. It has prompted the Gov- ernment to say that it is re- examining the extent of Central Intelligence Agency operations here. In the process of saying this, the Government has ac- knowledged that the American intelligence organization pro- vides it with various kinds of help in internal security, coun- terintelligence, counterinsur- gency and narcotics-control programs. The United States attitude toward this kind of help, as indicated by the ambassador and other competent diplomats ~? here, is that in future the This assistance they ask for. 0 No Thai officials seriously pect the Central Intelligend,p 4 Agency to stop operating hett, They concede that a total b,ati would be foolish, as the agents d would only continue to operate in mufti. There are now i"rr f Thailand, American officialg say, 50 operating agents sufl- ported by 100 clerical and com= munications assistants. Ambassador Kintner, an out+ spoken man who has divided his professional life betweepr the Army and the academic ? world, says Thai-American rc- lations have survived the ih-; cident. He shrugs off questions.. whether it has caused friction between 'him and the intelD,, gence agency chiefs in Wash? ington. Acknowledging that the in-, cident took place without lus. knowledge after he becani~ ambassador two months agog Dr. Kintner said of the present. structure at the embassy her tii: . "I have full authority from th;gd President-and the Secretary qf; State." ES /HC- 94 proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For R&ease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499RO1000130001-1 CAA to but Operations in Thailand By David Binder went a fake letter purport- New York Trig News service in g to be lla peace leader, offer from The Central Intelligence in ception was revealed, stir- Tha land will operations an outcry in Thailand ly reduced, soon be s according sharp, b s- against the CIA, the United re to States and Ambassador Wil- U.S, officials. liam R. Kintner. The CIA has been con- ducting a sizable counterin- surgency program against Communist guerrillas in Thailand for almost 10 years. But last month an agency operative stationed in a provincial town in Thailand sent to the Bangkok govern- SA7"KAA41 ,q SAN 197'4 HS/IIC- ~ f'p THE WASHINGTON offi- cials said that Kintner is preparing recommenda- tions that would greatly lim- it CIA operations in Thai- land. The agency now is said to have 150 operatives .in Thailand, most in the counterinsurgency pro- gram, and the rest combat- ing narcotics traffickers from Burma. The officials said Kintner had planned a reduction of intelligence operations be- fore the incident, as part of a general readjustment of U.S. policy toward the new Thai government, which came to power last October.' But big demonstrations against U.S. policy in three major cities - Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Udon - during the last two weeks and demands by the govern- ment of Premier Sanya Dharmasakti have impelled the ambassador to plan greater reductions, the offi- cials reported. . THE WASHINGTON offi- cials said that during a rou- tine staff discussion con- ducted by the CIA station intelligence officers at the provincial town of Sakon Nakhon thought the idea was a good one. The official said the CIA agent wrote the letter with- out telling his Thai col- leagues and sent it to San- ya, with copies going to several Bangkok newspa- pers. Evidently, the fake letter was designed to un- dermine morale in the Communist insurgent move- ment and cause defections. chief in Bangkok, Bernardo The letter was exposed in Hugh Tovar," the idea was the first week of January, floated" of manufacturing and the agent was hastily fake letters purporting to be sent out of the country. peace offers to Premier Sanya from a Thai Commu- nist leader. "The idea was shot down at the meeting," one official said. Nonetheless, one CIA- agent who was assigned to advise Thai military and Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001'000130001-1 r Approved For Rise 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R rO00130001-1 THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JAkUARY 18, 1974 Thailand Officially Chides U.S.:1 Over C.I.A. Interference There By JAMES F. :CLARITY Special to The New York Times BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 17 !.-Thailand ' expressed official 'dissatisfaction to the United ..States today over the admitted interference by the Central In- ,telligence. Agency in Thai af- fairs. A Foreign Ministry statement was. the first official reaction to the. scandal, which erupted hero nearly two week ago altar it was disclosed ,that a C,LA., agent had sent Premier Sanya Dharmasaktl a letter purporting to be from an in- surgent leader seeking peace with the Government. The in- cident caused vigorous protests from student organizations, the most influential political force here since the ouster of the, military government in Novem- ber. the general behavior of C.I.A. units inside Thaila d and their demand. that` the U ited States stop all ac'tions of 'interference in the internal affairs of Thai- land." . ` Dr. Kintner, who admitted the C.I.A. plot and apologized for it last week, was said by the ministry to have assured the Premier ; again -today. that he.. would do everything A o prevent any action of interfer- ence in Thailand's internal af- fairs from happening again" The statement said Thailand was examining the American agency's connections with Thai agencies, but it. did not indicate whether the Government planned, any. further action.: There was a widespread opinion among Western diplomats that unless the student organiza- tions .'refused to, accept, the Government's' handling of 'the issue in the statement today, the matter would be allowed to fade away. ' Ambassador Kintner, in an interview after he visited the Premier and the Foreign Minis- : ter, Charunphan Issarangkun na Ayuthaya, said that the letter had caused chagrin among Thai officials but that senior offi- cials had assured him that they wanted ? relations . to remain. cordial. The ministry statement said Dr. .Kintner had assured the Premier that the agent respon- sible-.for'.the, plot had been.sent back` to the United States and' that the C.I.A; office in the, northern town of Sakon Nak hon, where the plot was born,' had been closed. ?::In.the interview Dr. Kintner, a one-time C.I.A. employe who becalpe Ambassador two months ago, said that the plot had been stupidly conceived and ex- ecuted. Its purpose, he said, was to produce . dissension among the leaders of insurgent I groups. The Foreign Ministry. said that Ambassador William R. Kintner', ;,at': 'his request, met with Premier Sanya and was told 'of "the dissatisfaction of ,students. and the; people with the event that had happened as well ' as the dissa'tifaction of the Thai people, in general with LES/HC- 940 pproved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499RO01 000130001 -1 Approved For RAlise 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499RQi000130001-1 Poster 01ace More Into The dig u~d A Commentary 'By Nicholas" von Hof /uiicen Les Aspin, the young Wisconsin Democrat who is proving there is useful work for a member of Congress if he wants to do it,.has learned that contracts for Air America', the CIA's transparently phony airline, have doubled to more than $41 million. It is assumed by those ,who study the outfit's murky doings the money. will be spent encouraging our mercenaries to muck around-Laos anew. '. Our government disguises what we' are shipping into Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam with the same care .=the Russians use in hiding their military expenditures so only a spy or a detective can hope to know the truth. Not only do we appropriate munitions under such cate- gories as Food; for. Peace but since the Pentagon places the dollar value on our war shipments, they can` con- coal enormous amounts by assessing tanks at $1 apiece and airplanes at $5 a throw. The Pentagon has told Aspin that the inventory of what we're sending is classified,' and therefore not available to the unstable, national security risks 'whom the voters send to Con- gress. Nevertheless, by the end of Fiscal;Year 74, next July that is, our military costs in that part of the world will -running at above $4 billion a year. This necessarily' .means violating the Paris ceasefire agreements which' confine us to resupplying ~de'pleted stocks. We are also breaking our word by introducing a new combat plane, gloriously and. honorably named :Tiger II 'Freedom .I'lghters. . Asked about this stepped-up bomb procurement for Southeast Asia, Air Force Gen. Jonas Blank explained everything, by saying, "The- requirement to accelerate production occurred as a'result of the March 26, 1974, Secretary of Defense guidance which tasked the Air Force to protect a Southeast Asia contingency capabil- -In short, it appears 'we are returning to our old win- ning, formula of guns and military advisers, of which it is now believed we, have 20,000 sneaking about those dear, old familiar palms. Thus, instead of using our decisive leverage to make him abide by it, we are apparently egging Thieu on to; forget the Paris agree- f - , ments which were supposed to be our tickets out o that bog. Some moderates or liberals or whatever you want to call. the wishy-washies in Congress seem to be content to vote the money for the destruction of the Paris agree- - .. ments in return for keeping our.people out of the fight lug and because you .don't want the Reds to' take over, do you? Of course, the Reds are going to take over any- way, only it will be longer and more costly. They've got most of Cambodia now and they're going to get the rest of it soon enough. ? . Ultimately, they'll get. General 'Chieu also. because We know that a corrupt, inflation-wracked,' debilitated South Vietnam can't win without our armed interven- tion. tion. We already have our Secretary of Defense get- ting us acclimated to the thought again, and there is the memory of Dr. Kissinger saying, "'I wanted to bomb the daylights out of Hanoi, but Congress wouldn't let me." It looks like the boys regard the Paris agree- ments as a. truce to buy time to 'get' the peaceniks off their backs. The justification for what we're doing is that the North Vietnamese are 'doing the same thing. Doubt- less they .are. But if they-win, they, get the other half of ; their country. What. do we get if we win? Honor? The President's told-us we already have that. The satisfac- tion of keeping the Reds out of -Saigon? Well, what's wrong with these Reds? .They're' far less obnoxious than the ones in Moscow or Peking and being fewer in number and poorer in resources,' are 'much less of a threat. Even if we don't go back there with the big birds but try to buy the victory this time, all we are going to get for it is a' big debt., This isn't 1955 or 1965, and we, can't afford it anymore. Our inflation rate is running 10 ;per-, and if we. have to pay for three wars in Indochina and another one in the Middle.East, it simply isn't going to natter who wins. We will lose. 0 1374, The Waahtnston Post/King Features 6rndtcsts . ~ TKE, , VASrIN.G.'10N POST Friday. Jan. 18.19174 xS/HC- 9 / . proved For Release 2001/08/22 CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved FoIease 2001/0$/22: CIA-RDP84-0049 Thursday, JJan.17, 1474 THE WASIZI]GTON POSTS Wh1at Is the' U.S. Doing in, Thailand?, AN EXTRAORDINARY instance of American over- reaching has just come to light in Thailand. It involves the CIA, an agency so habituated-at least in Thailand-to acting like a sovereign state that it seems to have been unable to adjust to the winds of Thai change. It seems that a CIA agent sent a letter to the new prime minister, who came to power last fall replac- ing the generals identified with a close military link to the United States, Signing the name of a Communist insurgent leader in Sakhon Nakhon province, the agent sounded out the prime minister on his interest in open- ing talks with the insurgents. The letter's internal in- consistencies struck Thai officials, they now say. Since it had been sent by registered mail, it was easily traced to the CIA office in a particular province. The government then evidently leaked the story to the Thai press, which gave it a play worthy of the outrageousness of the event itself. "Really bad," the prime minister summed up. The newly posted American ambassador, William R. Kintner, was forced to acknowledge and apologize for this "regrettable and unauthorized initiative." "No Amer-. lean official is to be involved in any activity which could be interpreted as interference in Thai internal affairs," he announced. Yet this hardly, puts the matter- to rest. Is it more believable that the agent. was acting on his own or that, unmasked, his operation-whatever its purpose-was simply repudiated? Since CIA activi- ties in Thailand are ;supposed to,be confined to provid- ing technical intelligence assistance ,to Thais, how is It' that the CIA appears to have set up?what the That press calls "operation units in various areas"? The CIA's in discretion "demonstrates to the people that the United States is involved in the fight to suppress the Commu- nist terrorists," the Bangkok radio noted, and thus it compromises the Thai government -claim that the insur- gents, but not the government, lack independence and sovereignty. How could the CIA be insensitive .to the what is said to be, a foreign-supported insurgency? The most troubling aspect of this incident, however,: goes beyond the damage that may have been done. to U.S.-Thai relations. Just how deeply is the United States "involved in the fight to suppress the Communist ter- rorists," in' the Bangkok radio's words? A Senate staff report issued last June stated that there were 545 Ameri- cans working in Thai counter-insurgency within the U.S.-Military Assistance Command. But if, ,as the Thai counter-insurgency 'chief now says, "it has especially been the principle of [his program] that the fight to suppress the Communists is the Thai people's affair," then what'are all those Americans doing, whether they are inside or outside the CIA? The new Thai leadership, by publicizing and protesting the affair of the letter, indicates its own decision to put some nationalistic dis- tance between itself and Thailand's former American patrons. This is an understandable choice flowing from the winding down of the American role in all of Indo- The, Thais, who live there, are adjusting. But we china. Americans still have questions of our own to ask about any residual counter-insurgency role. It sounds too much Approved F U.S. INTELLIGENCE SEES HANOI PUSH But Timing of Offensive Is a Matter of Estimates, Public and.,Private By LESLIE H. GELB Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Jan. 13-Fif- ?teen.years after the first Ameri- can combat troops ,entered South Vietnam, the American Intelligence 'community Is tell- ing the President that the ques- tion is still when-not whether -North Vietnam is going to launch a major. offensive against the South. , According to Intelligence sources and Administration of- ficials, the formal position of the intelligence community, as embodied in a policy paper, is that the chances are slightly less than 50-50 that Hanoi will strike in a big way in the next six months. But the informal positions of Intelligence analysts - in the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department - vary significantly on both sides from that formal posture. In fact, most intelligence officers believe that the odds are not slightly but significantly less than 50-50 that North Vietnam will mount a big offensive in this dry season in Vietnam. Hedging Is Protective It is not unusual for the Intelligence community. or the bureaucracy 'generally to dis- play official caution in a formal position paper and then a greater degree of candor In private briefings of senior offi- cials. Because political leaders have often blamed past policy failures on "faulty intelligence,' analysts tend to protect them- selves from , becoming the "scapegoats" by hedging their predictions in written docu- ments... As a result," the informal briefings of senior officials by analysts-the more unvarnished presentations-tend to. assume greater importance than formal papers. ~r,, _. ,:w?.v,,:.. elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0040AR001000130001-1 til In the case of Vietnam Intel- ligence, the two key men are william E. Colby, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. and George A. Carver Jr., itr chief national intelli- gence officer. Mr. Colby head- ed American political pacifica- tion programs in South Viet- nam from 1969 to 1971; Mr. Carver was known as the "father of the hamlet-evalua- tion system," a method of meassuring the progress of pacification. Both were widely considered controversial figures over the years in the development of United States policy toward South Vietnam. One analyst re- marked, however, that "even though we recognize their past histories in Vietnam, I think that they're trying to be intel- lectually fair -on the current estimates." Several Intelligence special- ists say 'that they are denied access to key pieces of intel!li- gence, namely the content of conversations between Secre'- tary of State Kissinger and {: such foreign leaders as Leonid 1. Breshnev, Chou En-lei and Le Due Tho. "It's hard to make guesses about what Hanoi is going to ;do without having some -idea of what those guys are telling Kissinger," an analyst ' said- referring to the Soviet Commu- nist party leader, thei Chinese Premier and Hanoi's chief ne- gotiator -"about whether or not Moscow and Peking would help Hanoi out in resupplying an all-out offensive." Of `Sensitive' Conversations . In an interview, Mr. Colby confirmed this, but he went on to say: "Kissinger keeps me in- formed on' his 'conversations with foreign leaders, but I don't get a full formal debriefing. I on't pass this down to the analysts, except on rare occa- sions. These conversations are very sensitive. I myself factor them into the formal estimates of the intelligence community." The prevailing judgment 'of recent months of intelligence- estimating about Vietnam, Ad- ,ministration and intelligence analysts '.say, Is that both Ha- not and -Saigon are still,unwill- Ing -to risk the compromises necessary for a political settle" ment and that Hanoi's continu- ing objective is to gain control "of South Vietnam by. force., oved For Release 2001/08/_? r'M/ Y HS/HC- 1 d'O I;.>.:. _?.,,:r.:.,.,E:~., Last September, the "Intel- ligence services, in a national- intelligence-estimate policy pa- per, predicted that the chances were better than " even that Hanoi would open a full-scale offensive in the dry season be- ginning this month; then in December that estimate was updated and the odds reversed. Following is a composite view of the explanations of analysts for the shift. Does Hanoi think that Mos- cow an Peking will support a renewed ' offensive? Probably not, the analysts say, noting that Mr. Carver believes prob- ably yes. Do Hanoi leaders ex- 'pect that President Nixon would be able politically to re- sume the bombing of North Will Saigon` force Hanoi's hand by launching a major at- tack In the South? A strong but positive no. Who has the upper hand in Hanoi's Politburo, the hawks or the doves? On balance, the intelligence, com- munity believes the doves now P revail, Mr. carver is -said to old the opposite view. Approved ForV4dIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049901000130001.-1. Srll.ttl-t H. Loory Press Credibility Sunday, In. 13, 1974 And Journalist-Spies in the old days - the pre-Watergate days - when even small deceptions by the government, once revealed, were considered scandalous, the rev- elation that the Central Intelligence Agency was using American foreign correspondents as spies would have provoked an uproar. ' Remember the furore in 1967 when Ramparts magazine disclosed the CIA's infiltration of foundations, labor unions and student organizations? In contrast, there has been only muted criticism in the wake of the disclosure a few weeks ago that the CIA had on its payroll overseas some three dozen- Americans who were either working as foreign correspondents or masquerad- ing In such positions as a cover. William E Colby, director of the' agency, has already promised that five of those operatives working full time The writer, a?,journalism profs.+- sor at Ohio State University, was a' Moscow correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. He ,later served as White House cor- respondent for the Los Angeles Times. for general-circulation news-gathering organizations as well as for the CIA will be "phased out" of their spying roles. But he has also made the explicit decision to maintain contractual rela- tionships with newsmen working for specialized publications or as freelance reporters. Colby apparently draws a distinction between larger news-gathering organi- zations and smaller ones, between gen-` eral-circulation organizations and trade publications. .Foreigner9 do not make such nice distinctions; to them, an American newsman is ah American newsman. Why should anyone believe that Colby has indeed removed the stigma of spying from American Jour- nalists overseas?: The News Business Putting aside the credibility problem of the American government, obvious in these Watergate-dominated days, consider the status of Soviet foreign correspondents: '.ire Soviet Union's leadership repeatedly denies that any Soviet newsmen working overseas are government agents. It claims that,So- viet newsmen are simply gatherers and interpreters of news for the bene- fit of the reading public in the Soviet Union. The claim, of course is laughable, and no American. official talking to a Tass, Izvestia or Pravda correspondent in Washington is naive enough to think he is dealing with a bona fide re- porter. For ~ this reason, Soviet news- men'do not have an easy time with of- ficials in countries outside the socialist bloc. American newsmen have a far easier time of it abroad. They develop sources and uncover news because their reputation for freedom, fairness and nonentanglement with their,own government. has been respected over the years. Only in Moscow-and per- haps in. Peking, where this writer has " had no experience-are American newsmen treated as government agents. For years, American newsmen ' ; in the Soviet capital laughed off alle- gations of spying out of the feeling that the Russians were only applying the same standards to foreign news- men that they used for their own. the Russians have had the last . laugh.+ The CIA does not deny the news re- ports of Its entanglement with the American press. "We cannot comment on covert activities," an agency spokes- man said in virtual confirmation. TIIE WASHINGTON POST ~Hs/HC- c~l'p Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved ForQelease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 p01000130001-1 Nor would the agency comment o6, Colby's plan for disentanglement In, the future. That plan-to fire some but keep other newsmen-does -hot go far' enough. American newsmen abroad as well as at home. must. remain free of,, their government to act as a distant:, early-warning system in reporting problems and progress that might af. fect this country's interests abroad. Newsmen often do a better job of re- porting than either covert CIA agents` or overt members of the diplomatic corps. That lesson was brought home to me 15 years ago in Czechoslovakia. Just out of graduate school, I had gone there as a freelance writer and had obtained interviews with Czech offi-. cials responsible for the country's tele- vision system and the youth move- ment. I also visited coal mines and steel mills in a part of Moravia gener-.: ally off limits to Americans. Before I wrote my stories, I tried ' to check my information with American diplomats. The result of my effort-made only a few years after William N. Oatis, an Associated Press correspondent work- ing in Prague, had been jailed as a spy-was terrifying. The embassy officer led me to a se- cure room behind a door as heavy as a .bank, vault's. When I started talking, he began taking notes rapidly and then questioned me closely. "What else did you learn? What else did they tell you?. What else did you see?" The officer grilled me until I re- "The plan-to fire some but keep other newsmen on the CIA payroll- does not go far enough." American newsmen abroad as well as at home must remain free of their government." fused to say more, Then he said: "You correspondents can find out a lot more than we diplomats because we simply cannot get access to the same people or travel as much." Uirittingty,'Y?had become an agent, of my government rather than a repre- sentative of the American people. Now I could see how the Czechs might have n:istmderstood Oatis' role even if he were not, as charged, a CIA employee. When I left the embassy that after. noon, it was with the fear that I was in far greater danger 'abroad from my own government than Irony a govern- ment which still, at that time, had a statue of Stalin looking down on the capital. American newsmen must not be compromised in the same manner that so many-too many-officials, bureau. crats and military'men have been cor- rupted in recent years. The public and Congress should demand that the CIA break all contractual relationships with bona fide newsmen. Beyond that, publishers maintaining foreign bu- reaus should seek out and discipline any employees with dual relationships. Anything less makes the news busi- ness the handmaiden of the govern- ment and that cannot be tolerated. Otherwise, the free flow- of news from overseas-so important to public awareness-will be seriously jeopard- ized. ? Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For Rase 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499ROO 000730001-1 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, January 11, 1974 CIA PLANS a study - comparing U.S. and Russian naval strength in the Mediterranean. Navy chief Adm. Zumwalt has warned repeat- edly of the Soviet buildup there. Some top civil- ian analysts concede that if the two fleets had started shooting amid the Mideast crisis, a U.S. Victory might have been in doubt. Main reason: the Russians' antiship missile. Approved For Release 2001/08/22 CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001300014 Approved For ease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499UO1000130001-1 A 16 Thursday.JaR 10, 19,74 THE `WASIIINGTON POST U.S. Re 'o e y Weighed plot to Kill Csfro in '65 NEW YORK, Jan. 9 (AP)- Dominican Republic in April, says the United States during President Lyndon Johnson's administration planned a sec- ond invasion of Cuba com- bined with an effort to assas- sinate Premier Fidel Castro. The plan had to be canceled, Szulc said in an article to be published in the Jan. 17 ';s- quire magazine, when rebellion unexpectedly erupted in the 1965, and Johnson sent troops to that country. Szulc, a former diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times, said the operation was planned by the Central Intelligence Agency, "presum- ably acting with President Lyndon Johnson's authority unless it was another do-it- yourself undertaking." He wrote: "The new invasion was to be on a smaller scale than the Bay of Pigs. The scenario was to bring ashore some 750 armed Cubans at the crucial moment when Castro would be dead and inevitable chaos had de- veloped . . . "The existence of the assas- sination plot, hatched by the CIA in Paris and Madrid, was disclosed by the Cuban gov- ernment in March, 1966, after the designated gunman-a bearded Cuban physician and former Cuban revolutionary army major named Rolando Cubela-was arrested in Ha- vana following investigations by Castro's counterintelligence agents, who had become sus- picious, of him." Szulc said that although the Cuban government revealed the assassination plot, it never reported the invasion plan, probably because it didn't know much about it. HS/HC- Op roved For Release 2001/08/22 CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved For.Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$8001000130001-1 WASF NGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, 0. C., Wednesday, January 9, 1974 By ROBIN ADAMS SLOAN Q: Is there a link between Watergate's E. Howard Hunt and the JFK-Wallace shootings? - N.N., Monroe, La. A: There's no actual evidence, but Gore Vidal, writing in The New York Review of Books, threw another log on the conspiracy fire by noting the following: Oswald visited Mexico City in 1963 when Hunt was acting; chief of the CIA there. Hunt's 1972 novel "The Coven" was about the Vanes rich, young, handsome and much like Jack and Jackie. Hardly flattering, the novel was in line with Hunt's expressed hatred of JFK, whom he blamed for deserting the Cubans fighting Castro at the Bay of Pigs. Lee Harvey Oswald's "at tempt" to kill rightist Gen. Edwin Walker before actually killing JFK coincides, says Vidal, with Arthur Bremer's "intention" to kill Nixon before actually shooting Wallace. Vidal cites Hunt's 50-odd highly imaginative works of fiction. Ile says perhaps it is only a coin- cidence that the comic-book-and-pornography- reading Bremer suddenly began to keep a diary that is almost a work of art. Vidal contends that Bremer, like Oswald and Sirhan, was set up as a patsy to deflect attention from the true right- wing conspirators. He finds it coincidentally odd that Oswald, Srrhan, and Bremer all kept diaries. He notes that Bremer's was written by someone with talent. 1Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 FRANK GETI EI N E. Howard Hunt Jr., the right-wing burglar, got himself sprung out of the pokey last week with a ploy the ingenuity of which was precisely appropriate for a clash between the murky twilight: world in which Hunt has operated most of his professional life as spy, dirty-tricks man, surrepti- tious insurrectionary, elec- tronic eaves-dropper and burglar, and the sunlit world of American justice. One of the field supervi- sors of the Watergate break-in, Hunt confessed and was tucked away by Judge Sirica for 30 months to eight years, a remarka- bly lenient sentence for a convicted criminal whose target was not a dry clean- er's or a liquor store, not even a bank, but the Repub- lic itself, As of last week, he is out roaming the streets once more, free, as his reaction- ary admirers never tire of asserting of pettier crimi- nals paroled or freed on appeal, to do it again. Hunt is free because he has asked the U.S. Court of Appeals here to allow him to change his original plea of guilty to one of not guilty and to decree a new trial on that new plea. The basic reason behind his change of heart as to his own guilt, according to his lawyers, is the contention that im- proper actions by the U.S. government prejudiced his original trial, making jus- tice impossible. The improper actions by the government cited by Hunt's lawyers are the tak- ing of documents from Hunt's White House safe' and the destruction of them by L. Patrick Gray III, then acting head of the FBI, now practicing law in New Lon- don, Conn., in spite of his attitude toward the destruc- tion of evidence, an attitude one would have thought unseemly in an officer of the court. Hunt's friends are famil- iar enough with the tech- nique of criminals charging governmental improprieties and going scot-free. Tradi- tionally, the right has de- nounced the technique when employed by Mafiosi and other undesirables. More recently, the right has de- nounced the technique when employed by such victims of apparent government con- spiracy as the Berrigan brothers and Dr. Ellsberg. It will be interesting to see how much protest the right .generates over Hunt's use of the same ploy. It is not, however, quite the same ploy, although it looks it. * The difference is this: When the government be- haved improperly in the Berrigan affair that caused Henry Kissinger to fear for his virtue at the hands of sex-starved nuns, as he deli- cately put it, the government was clearly the enemy of the Berrigans, so much so as to employ a criminal as informer, quite possibly as agent-provocateur to some degree. When the government behaved improperly in the prosecution of Dr. Ellsberg, again the government was the declared enemy of the doctor, of his psychiatrist and of normal American justice, going so far as to burglarize the psychia- trist's office and to dangle an attractive appointment before the presiding judge at Ellsbcrg's trial. When the government behaved improperly toward Hunt, however, the govern- ment was not Hunt's ene- my, but his friend, his em- ployer, his partner and, he confidently if mistakenly M70130001-1 expected, his protector of last resort. That's quite a difference. It is true enough that dis- tinctions can and certainly will be made between the U.S. government and the Committee to Re-Elect the President. The two things were, in theory, separate entities. On the other hand, an old disreputable like Hunt, aft- er two decades of carrying on for the CIA in the style made familiar to all through his novels, may be excused for confusing the two things, for assuming the CREEPs were a mere cov- er, a surface organization of the sort he was long famil- iar with, created as a base for his dirty tricks on behalf of the government. He may be excused the more when we recall that so many of his encounters took place in the White House with people who were top presidential aides and that the papers on the destruction of which he bases his appeal were in the White House and handled by White House personnel. If Hunt beats the rap on the grounds that the govern- ment that hired him as a burglar was subsequently improper in its dealings with him, the course of jus- tice will have no alternative but to go on, in criminal terms, to Gray, the man who destroyed the papers, to the men who gave Gray the papers to destroy and to the man in whose interest they were destroyed. All of this is merely one of many similar reasons that the Watergate affair will not be over in a hurry and that in the matter of the impeachment the House of Representatives would be seriously derelict in its du- ties to rush to judgment, to "vote it up or vote it down" before all the evidence is in. WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January 9, 1974 ,pproved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499RO01 000130001 -1 Approved For elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 001000130001-1 CIA.-Daub es Air America Asia Awards. Assoblated Prene 1 Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said yesterday that defense con- tracts for Air America, which has done work for the Central .Intelligence Agency in Indo china, more than doubled last year to a total of $41.4 million. "Apparently, unknown to the American public, the CIA- has taken up some. of the slack created- by orix military " with `drawal," said "Aspin, a former Pentagon e~or;omic adviser:. "Without a doubt," he said', "the,. contracts ? reflect sub- stantial .U.S. involvement ? in the 'Southeast'' Asia war, and that's the last thing we want." Aspin said nearly all con tracts were for Air America operations out of Thailand or for maintenance work on planes based in Thailand. The CIA and Air America had no comment. Aspin said the $41.4 million in contracts, compared with $17.7 million the year' before, moved Air America's parent company; Pacific Corp., up to the 91st in the ranking of dc?.i .tense contractors.,, Wednesday, Jan. 9,1974 THE WASHINGTON, POST For the Record! ? U.S. Ambassador Wil- liam R. Kintner told Thai newsmen that the CIA agent who mailed the government a phony, cease-fire offer has left Thailand after "appropriate disciplinary ac?/' tion," ? Police In Maseru, Leso- tho, announced that opposi- tion leader Shakane Mok- hele had surrendered follow- ing what was reported as a coup attempt in the African kingdom,. ? Carlos Altamirano, leader of Chile's banned So- cialist Party and first on the most-wanted list of the rul- ing junta, is now living in Havana, Cuba. ? The United States and Panama have agreed on a' set of principles for the drawing up of, a new Pana- ma Canal Treaty, according to Panamanian and U.S. sources quoted by Reuter. From staff reports and news dispatches S. Envoy Called s -J. Agent for 'CIA BUENOS ~1II?ES, Jan, 8 (AP) The new U.S. ambassa? dor to Argentina, who has yet t o arrive at his ,' post, was ac- cused today of being a nicm= bcr of the Central Intelligence Agency. Robert C. Hill was named ambassadoi- by President Nixon last December, to re- place .Iohn Davis Lodge, who resigned, El Descanhisado, a weekly news magazine linked .,to the IeflisL faction , of Life ruling Pcroni8L movement, made the charge. proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 ;a C5 ~-+proyQi~i roO~ tin O pp~i~n CL ro "D WWI 23 CD' ~na%+ Cc~abd vvtD~`"ro^yo '~rys> 27 ~dY n? 0 ~y 'C.~'w?QprjGtyN?0Cob IADrLc *w . o Cl) ro' o? ro. o ro ? w ~_. CD mr o~ rrov~ oa~~,a?sx ~~.. rAP4 ~:3 o w n ,ro oro o n o ti o o y ~~ n a to 0 orA 0'0 .w{i,proo~ CAI CD > CD > roc c?- c M I ro Go' Oro., Er 0 C) .10 .ray ? ~ ~ w o, cih O aw. ~ ro C?' C1..~~ n 0 r-' r?1? O CD ~^? ?~ CD P w c o ro gowA)CDDAR C ~ O 0 D 4 C w?roe D Q'G CD ~ w fD `0 O+ w ti 0.0 0 T (D 0 (nyA :?+ N (D c-n to .?y K .0 0 awro CD M ~ Ww boa. 0 w ? 0 ~. w oon 00- ono. CD M 1 0 ~? CD . = I - -. 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Approved For WA4ease 2001/08122 : CIA-RDP84-00499iWO1000130001-1 WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS A-11 Washington, D. C., Saturday, January 5, 1974 CIA Chief ftars Dole CehsOs By Lesley Oelsner two weeks ago at the. re- compromise of certain cur- New York TimriNeewiService quest of the publisher and rently active intelligence The director of the Cen- the authors of a book about sources and intelligence- tral Intelligence Agency has the CIA. The agency is gathering operations which :told a federal judge that trying to censor the book. ': would cause serious harm "highly classified" intelli- The publisher and the to the national defense in- gence information might be authors contended that they terests of the United States "leaked" to the public if the needed the opinions and and will seriously disrupt agency complied with the ..advice of experts on securi-' the conduct of this country's judge's recent order to ty matters in order to pre- foreign relations. make that information pare their lawsuit contest- Melvin L. Wulf of the available to a limited group ing the censorship attempt. American -Civil Liberties of security experts. William E. Colby, the CIA Union, attorney for the two One of those experts - director, made his assertion authors - Victor L. Mar- the only one named specifi- in a three-page affidavit chetti and John Marks - cally in the judge's order - submitted to the court and Floyd Abrams, lawyer is Morton H. Halperin, a Wednesday along with a for Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., former consultant to the motion by the government publishers, said today they National Security Council -asking Bryan to reconsider expect to.file written an- andia former deputy assist- his ruling. swers to the court early A next week opposing the t d Halperin's telephone was tapped for 21 months in 1969-71, while he was an as- sistant to Henry A. Kissin- ger on the NSC and after- ward, as part of a wiretap operation that President Nixon said later was an at- tempt to stop leaks of secret information to the press. Kissinger has said that the conversations overheard on Halperin's phone "'never cast any doubt" on Halper-. in's "loyalty or discretion." ion i not men Colby Halperin by name. Nor did government's motion. he amplify upon his "con- The book in question is ti- cern," as he phrased it, tled "The CIA And The Cult other than to say that he. Of Intelligence," and was was "personally knowledge- - - completed last summer- by able of many incidents of Marchetti, a former CIA leaked privileged or classi employe. And Marks, a fled information - for ex- former State Department ample, the publication of, employe. But because of testimony before a grand Y earlier court rulings stem- jury investigating the Wa- ? ming from litigation started tergate break-in.' by the government, Mar- chetti was forced to submit HE ASKED for a private the manuscript to, the CIA hearing before Bryan, "in for approval before' he could order to explain the basis of send it to his publisher. THE JUDGE, Albert V. my concern." Bryan Jr. of the U.S. Dis- He said in his affidavit THE CIA specified 22S trict Court in Alexandria, that disclosure of the infor- portions that, it said, should Va., had issued' the order oration would "result in the ,be cut from the book. Ac HS/HC- 9so,t cording to Marks, the dele- tions generally include the examples cited by the au- thors to back up their con- clusions about the agency. He cited the agency's role in the 1970 elections in Chile, the payment of CIA money to foreign leaders, and the agency's use of "fake" companies as fronts. Two weeks ago, at the request of the authors and the publisher, Bryan or- dered the government to give them certain docu- ments to back up its conten- tion that the portions should be censored. He also ordered the gov- ernment to begin immediate security clearance proce- dures for Halperin and a "reasonable number" of other experts to be named by the authors and publish-. er so the experts could see, the entire manuscript, in- ` cluding the deleted por- tions, as well as the docu- ments. The government is con- testing both orders, al- though, as Colby put it, the "aspect" that left him "gravely concerned" was the fact that the material would be made available not only to the plaintiffs' and their attorneys but to their expert witnesses." Approved For Release 2001) Approved For&Iease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004951001000130001-1 Head of CIA Enters Book Court Fight By Laurence Stern Wft 1Ifl tonPoatStaff Writer Central Intelligence Agency' Director William E. Colby has intervened directly in a court battle over a book manuscript that he said would compro- mise highly sensitive intelli gence sources and operations. The CIA director, in an affi- davit filed Wednesday in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, offered to testify in private before Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. in support of the govern- ment's efforts to prevent pub- lication of 225 deletions or. dered by the agency on secu- rity grounds. Colby asserted that the dis- closures in the manuscript by two former government intel. ligence officers would "cause ..Prious harm to the national defense interests of the tions." . The authors of the manu- script, former CIA analyst Victor L. Marchetti and for- mer State Department intelli- gence official John D. Marks, are challenging the basis of the CIA's security deletions. This could lead to a new legal battle on the issues of govern- mental secrecy powers that were thrashed out in the Pen- tagon Papers trial,, which was decided by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the government has asked Bryan to reconsider his Dec. 21 ruling requiring the CIA to produce documents supporting its classification of the 225 offending items in the Marchetti-Marks manuscript, entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." Attorneys for the govern. ment also asked Bryan to re- consider his order that attor- neys for the publisher, Knopf, and expert witnesses on, classi- fication be given ,access to the manuscript, which 'the CIA has classified "Top Secret-Sen- sitive." In his affidavit, Colby said of the Bryan ruling; "Prgduction 'ofag HS/HC- acwday, JA 5,1974 THE WASHINGTON .POST Colby Bids. Court Prevent CIA D Dis do sure ofata COLBY, From Al documents'as ordered by the court causes additional diffi- culties for the Central Intelli- gence Agency. These addi- tional documents will in most cases contain further classi- fied information and in many cases are of a highly sensitive nature.... -`Compliance with both as- pects of the court's order ex . poses additional highly classi- fied information not only to plaintiffs and their attorneys but to their expert witnesses." The one expert witness to be qualified under Bryan's Dec. 21 decision was former National Security Council staf- fer Morton Halperin, who served as part of the defense team for Daniel Ellsberg in his California trial. Halperin is also currently suing Secre- tary of State Henry A. Kis- singer for damages in the tap- ing of his telephone from 1969 WILLIAM E. COLBY .. sees "serious harm" Earlier this year columnist Jack Anderson published tran- scripts of grand jury proceed- ings in the Watergate investi. gation. The government brought Its case against Marchetti in copy of a book outline he had submitted to several New York publishers. It dealt .with covert intelligence operations. The government : was granted an injunction to' pre- vent Marchetti from pulblish- ing, without prior review by the agency, classified mateT=ia1 J. gathered during CIA service. The injunction was upheld 1y the U.S. Fourth Circuit Curt of Appeals. After Marchetti, in collabo- ration with Marks, completed the manuscript and submitted it for CIA review the two authors went ahead with 'a le- gal challenge of the 225 dele- tions ordered by the agency. T, +hnir rhrllenue of the se- are seeking to invoke, the S u standard applied by the preme Court in the Pentagon Papers case - whether publi- cation would "surely result in direct, immediate and irrepar- able injury to the nation or its people." But the case has not yet April, 1972, after obtaining aImoved on to this issue. to 1971. In requesting the secret hearing before Bryan on the, reconsideration issue, Colby cited the language of the 1947 National Security Act, which. provides that "the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting in- telligence sources and me- thods from unauthorized dis- closure." The CIA director also said he is "personally knowledge- able of many Incidents of leaked privileged or classified information, for example, the' publication of ? testimony be- fore a grand jury investigating the Watergate break-in." FsrRPleace 2nn rust " IA-RDP84-00499RO01 000130001 -1 ~Appro\For Release ~l '., ,, 01/08/22"; C,IA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved Fo?lease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$0,001000130001-1 Taylor Branch Taylor Branch, former- ly on the staff of The Washington Monthly, is a contributing editor of Harper's. In which the CIA bypasses the First Amendment in order to hide a bugged house cat IRNOLD TOYNBEE, renowned as a spokesman for intelligent decency in the world, has written that the American CIA has surpassed Soviet Communism as the most powerful sinister force on earth. "Wherever there is trouble, vio- lence, suffering, tragedy," he says, "the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA had a hand in it." This view has been widely accepted in the United States, but it had no political weight until the Watergate scandal introduced the manipulative techniques of the CIA into Ameri- can politics. Many commentators have ex- pressed the opinion that the Watergate intrigues have raised the possibility of the CIA's under- cover, totalitarian methods coming home to our shores to destroy our democratic traditions. We were given a reprieve, they say, because the amateurs of CREEP had not yet learned the deft skills by which the CIA arranges the destiny of a foreign country. The most recent evidence suggests that all this is nonsense. Victor Marchetti, who spent fourteen years as a CIA executive before resign- ing in 1969, describes Watergate as fairly typi- cal of an Agency operation, exposed when the fates caused a security guard to stumble over foul-ups normal to a covert mission. The officials in charge of CREEP apparently shared the illu- sions that lie at the heart of the Agency-that the politics of a country can be guided by tap- ping the phone of a Larry O'Brien or a Spencer Oliver, or by employing someone like Donald Segretti to write fake letters and hire women to run nude in front of Muskie headquarters. One bit of Watergate testimony with the ring of truth is that the Gemstone information was sion-from the practical, amoral viewpoint of the clandestine operative-is vintage Agency material. Like Watergate, the CIA is dangerous not be- cause of its diamond-hard efficiency but be- cause of the principles it violates. The Agency is good at bribes-it pumped $20 million into the 1964 elections in Chile-and it can super- vise mercenary armies in backward countries like Laos. These things are terrible enough, but none too subtle or difficult, and Marchetti be- lieves that the everyday operations of the Agency give the lie to the myth of its deadly professionalism. The CIA does not leave dark messages written in blood. During his entire career, Marchetti says that he never came across a single "termination mission" by or against a career CIA agent. An agent is not a daredevil but a handler of knaves-he is E. Howard Hunt directing the freedom-loving Cubans from across the street. The CIA's chief weapons are not the martini-olive bug or the cyanide dart gun; instead, agents spend most of their time with memos, and on a real action mission they are most likely to be equipped with nothing more than bribe money. The CIA's fearsome reputation is its best pro- tection against the meddlesome notions of out- siders. No one dares move against Leviathan. There has never been any serious move in the media to curb the Agency, and the Congress has been so cowed by the covert operatives that it has been too scared even to set up a committee on the CIA. The old codgers on the informal "oversight" committees have professF'd not to want to know anything that might compromist, "essential1 useless." The stu~~ppidit of the mis- the national securityp. Approves For Release 200-1/08%22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 Approved Foi' (ease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 Q01000130001-1 N 1972, VICTOR MARCHETTI proposed to write a book that would make a mockery of the CIA myths and expose its operatives as bureaucrats with delusions, dangerous in spite of themselves, living off an undeserved reputation for derring- do. Only if the Agency were made human, he believed, could anything ever be done about Arnold Toynbee's nightmare. Apparently this idea struck a sensitive spot somewhere in the CIA, for the Agency stole a copy of Marchetti's book outline from a New York publishing house. The agents retired to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and scoured the law for a way to keep the book from seeing the light of day. They found one. In April 1972, the U.S. government sought and obtained a ermanent court order en'oinin p agreement not to reveal secrets, and the govern- "One bit of ment successfully contended that such a contract overrides Marchetti's First Amendment rights. This is a new twist in the effort to protect offi- cial secrets, overlooked in the Ellsberg case. The Justice Department briefs are loaded with the lore of corporate trade secrets-citing prece- dents like Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prod- ucts-as if Marchetti had threatened to let loose the magic ingredient in Coca-Cola. Lying behind all the questions of CIA spying and se- curity, this rather unorthodox contract approach to secrecy carries with it a potential for wide- spread application against dissenting govern- ment employees. g Less intelligence than ever "Victor Marchetti, his agents, servants, ern- g ployees and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with him" from disclosing any information, "factual, fictional or otherwise," without the prior consent of the CIA. The order was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court declined to re- view the case. If Marchetti now speaks out from his classified mind, lie faces instant imprison- ment for contempt of court-no juries, not even a show trial. Marchetti, outspooked and outlawyered in round one, vowed to go on. After signing a con- tract with Alfred A. Knopf for a critical, non- fiction hook on the CIA, he took on a coauthor -John Marks, a thirty-year-old ex-Foreign Ser- vice officer-and drafted a 500-page manu- script. It was dutifully handed over to the Agen. cy in August 1973, and the authors tried rea- soning together with the CIA censors, hoping to avoid the Ellsberg dilemma of keeping quiet or risking jail. But the book came back from the scissors shop riddled with 339 national-security deletions, excising more than a fifth of the text. As a new legal challenge to the censorship begins, all the parties to the case have pulled out their Sunday rhetoric. For the ACLU lawyers who represent the authors, it is the first legally sustained exercise of prior restraint on national- security grounds in the history of the United States, a pernicious (but almost unnoticed) re- versal of the decision in the New York Times case on the Pentagon Papers. For the CIA, the principle at hand is nothing less than the gov- ernment's right to conduct its business without internal subversion. If people like Marchetti are allowed to blab incontinently about matters of state, the government's executive arm will be paralyzed and Washington will degenerate into a giant ADA meeting. The Justice Department, representing the VER ITS TWENTY-SIX-YEAR history, partly by idesign n and partly by failure, the CIA has come to specialize in foreign manipulations rather than intelligence. Classical espionage against the Russians and the Chinese has pro- duced one of the driest wells in spy history. According to Marchetti, the CIA has been unable to penetrate the governments of the major Cold War opponents. The warring spy camps have bad to content themselves by striking public-re- lations blows against one another. When Kim Philby defected to the Russians in 1963, after twenty years as a double agent in Britain, the KGB held elaborate press conferences and rushed his memoirs into print to thrill the world with Soviet spy power. The CIA said his book was phony-double agents do not keep journals of their perfidy-and- most experts agree that Philby's activities did not hurt the British or help the Russians very much. Still, the CIA smarted under the publicity barrage, and it soon trotted out one Col. Oleg Penkovsky, claiming Agency, sees the anctit41 -eon a is as A1/08/22: real issue. Marcheli ?1 fs, CIA- anyone else dealing with classified material- got his job only after signing it contractual Watergate testimony with the ring of truth is that the Gemstone infor- mation was `es- sentially use- less.' The stu- pidity of the mission is vin- tage CIA material." Taylor, Branch ME CENSORS OF BUMBLEDOM that he had been, ;t as valuable as Philby. Lion papers ' the analysts-the Clandestine Fo r6Vb,d~R'O4 art 0$1t)08/2fds ClaRISP,&1r,8O OB GM ?&W (gaodestly known proudly that Penkovsky had helped the U.S. detect Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962. Soon, Penkovsky's carefully recorded memoirs were on the best-seller lists, and it didn't matter that many experts doubted their authenticity, sus- pecting that the colonel had gotten more than a little editorial assistance at Langley. Marchetti's revelations on this matter are clipped from the book, but he has written elsewhere that Penkov- sky was a British agent who provided no infor- mation whatever on the installation of the mis- siles in Cuba-the Agency detected them from aerial photographs. Penkovsky was preoccupied with other matters, such as insisting that he wear the full colonel's uniform of whichever Western intelligence outfit was debriefing him. Other than the Cuban missile crisis, the CIA (created out of the Pearl Harbor, if- we-had-only-known syndrome) has not anticipated a single one of the many outbreaks of war and armed confrontation in the past twenty-five years. Now the CIA has become marginal to even the detection of future missile crises, for it has given the Pentagon control of the satellites that provide the crucial security information on weapon and troop movements. What special intelligence there is in the world seems largely boring and of little consequence. In 1964 the Agency learned that the American Embassy in Moscow had been bugged from top to bottom since 1952. For twelve years at the height of the Cold War, the KGB had access to every se- cret message within the embassy and to the ca- ble exchanges with Washington-with little evi- dent advantage. The great powers are too big and cumbrous to move with much subtlety. While the intelligence value of. the CIA has been whittled down continuously-until Henry Kissinger now scorns the calculations and posi- as the Plans Division) has mushroomed in size and importance. Marchetti and Marks assert that fully two-thirds of the CIA's money and manpower are devoted to covert activities in the form of dirty tricks and paramilitary operations. This fact, along with the organization charts and the budget figures that support it, was originally censored from the book; but the CIA relented when Marchetti and his lawyers pointed out that Sen. William Proxmire had already ferreted out the information and put it in the Congres- sional Record. that MARCIIETTI-MARKS MANUSCRIPT Shows that the CIA has trimmed away its intelli- gence functions so completely that it can now justify its existence only on the basis of the clandestine jujitsu it tries to practice on foreign governments-the bribes, the coups, the surgi- cal removal of unfriendly political strains abroad. Such a specialty is just fine with the covert types who run the Agency, but they know that it is precisely these covert operations that have made the CIA vulnerable to public criticism as the symbol of sinister and undemocratic pre- occupations within the American government. Harry Truman, whose administration created the CIA in 1947, stated repeatedly that the Agen- cy was intended to be the centralized intelli- gence branch of government, not a squad of secret D-Day operatives. Recently a whole chorus of foreign-policy heavies like Nicholas deB. Katzenbach have picked up Truman's theme and argued that the Agency should be confined to its statutory duty "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security." They point out that the legal basis for all the James Bond stuff is extremely tenuous. Approved ForIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499W01000130001-1 e rising that was to follow the Bay of Pigs opera- tion. The agents set up shop on Great Swan Is- land, a tiny spot in the Caribbean made entirely of guano and infested with three-foot lizards. While the front men vainly sought to protect the unlikely cover story that the new station on the deserted guano island was an independent venture on the part of profit-minded entrepre- neurs-changing around the phony corporate charter, fending off small landing parties of Honduran students who came to denounce the CIA presence and to claim the island as Hon- duran soil-the intrepid CIA technicians went on the air to drum up the spirit of Cuban revolt. Three days after the invasion had failed, Radio Swan was still issuing orders to nonexistent troops. Even a year after the invasion, the sta- tion-renamed "Radio Americas" under the new leadership of the "Vanguard Service Cor- poration"-had not given up. It exhorted free- dom-loving Cubans to tie up communications by taking receivers off hooks in phone booths, and to subvert the Cuban economy by breaking enough bottles to create a beer shortage. The Marchetti-Marks manuscript is full of anecdotes fit for the Marx brothers or Maxwell Smart-secret projects to float balloons over Communist countries, dropping forged leaflets that promote the democratic alternative; fake letters to sow confusion within the French stu- Cats, rabbits, and snake oil dent movement; agents scrambling for enough The Marchetti-Marks revelations would provide more grist for the Katzenbach position, which is anathema at Langley. Telling the CIA to stick with information-gathering is like telling the vigilantes of the Klan to put away their hoods and nooses in favor of due process of law. To survive and prosper, the CIA must con- vince the public that it is employing all its pro- fessional wizardry to sniff out future Pearl Har- bors. And it must keep the President thinking that in political emergencies, when men of ac- tion must discard the niceties of constitutional theory, the CIA will respond with piano-wire efficiency. Now come Marchetti and Marks to say that the Agency is out of the Pearl Harbor business, having abandoned it to the diplomats and the satellite people at the Pentagon. More- over, they say, the CIA's covert missions are short on piano wire and long on giddy P. T. Barnum schemes fit for a Donald Segretti. The CIA would much rather be subjected to a dozen books by the usual liberal critics-attributing every suspicious automobile accident, Bolivian coup, and Republican election to the deadly genius of its agents--than suffer from one in- side book like Marchetti's, which exposes a clandestine circus behind the awe-inspiring curtain of secrecy. V IIE MATERIALS FOR RIDICULE have long been available, but writers have been so se- duced by Agency folklore that they have glided over the absurd to focus on the imaginary agent with the garrote in the wings. In The Invisible Government, David Wise and Thomas Ross de- scribe the Agency's incredible clandestine feat of setting up a CIA radio station, under elaborate cover, to encourage and direct the popular up. Benny Goodman records to satisfy the longings of an informant. Marchetti says that the most ludicrous incidents have been censored to pro- tect the security of the twilight-zone devices in- vented in the CIA lab. "I'll give you one exam- ple that they took out," he said, "because I can't imagine that the Agency could stand the publicity of putting me in jail for revealing it. We spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and several years to develop a bugging device that could be surgically implanted inside the body of an ordinary house pet. The idea was finally scuttled when someone realized that we couldn't control the animal's movements to put it within range of sensitive conversations, even if we could somehow place a wired cat or clog in the household of a target person. Many of the Agency projects are like that-pitifully silly." HE SECRET MYTHS SWIRLING around the 1JAgency have enabled it to go a long way on the intricate logic of Rube Goldberg. At the height of the Cold War, the Agency faced the problem of containing Communism everywhere. To do so, reasoned the head spooks, it would be helpful if the American people believed that Approved For Release 2001/08/?'o~It~up''b3~`~~t 1fl~In st measures. To stimulate that belief, it would be helpful if the government could point to tan- "In 1964 the Agency learned that the Amer- ican Embassy in Moscow had been bugged fo: twelve years. The KGB had had access to every secret message within the embassy- with little evi- dent advantage Approved For elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 01000130001-1 Bible evidence that the Communist party was able, for in seeking to censor the book the CIA making gains right here at home. That might is reduced to naked trust-this material must be accomplished if the CIA could show that many be kept within the confines of the government, demented citizens were reading the official news- they say, for reasons so secret we cannot re- paper of the American Communist party, which veal them. It is reminiscent of the old Hubert in turn could be done if the CIA subsidized The Humphrey, telling the voters that they would Daily Worker to keep it alive. By this reason- support the President if they only knew what he ing, CIA operatives were put to work concocting knew about Vietnam, which, unfortunately, was several thousand phony names and addresses classified. In a pinch, secrecy becomes a mask, for new, nonexistent "subscribers" to The Daily completing the circle of its uses. The snake oil Worker. The CIA sent the taxpayers' money to merchant's greatest secret was not the ingre- the apostles of Moscow so that the Cold War dients of his potions-anything would do-but agencies of government could point to the bulg- the gullibility of the people in his audience and ing circulation of The Daily Worker to support their need to believe that the good doctor could their demands for bigger anti-Communist na- sweep away their real and imagined ills. tional-security budgets. The same aura of secrecy that makes outsid- ers fear the Agency like death has a powerful Top secrets everyone knows influence on the operatives inside the CIA. Mar- chetti and Marks have written a chapter called FIE POLITICAL MESSAGE of the Marchetti- "The Clandestine Mentality," whose basic point Marks manuscript confirms and supports the is that secrecy creates a whole. culture, and that themes of several recent books critical of the the trappings of clandestine work infuse the CIA, but it is much more offensive to the Agency most mundane undertaking with the significance than the others-largely because of Marchetti's of a spy thriller. It grips the brain. An agent high position at the CIA. Although much of the who makes his calls from a phone booth, decked material in the Marchetti-Marks book is avail- out in a disguise and a code name, can't help able in newspapers and in the CIA books, the feeling the buzz of importance-even if he is Agency censored it anyway, on the ground that calling to check on his subscription to The Daily Marchetti's former status would authenticate Worker. It is a private glow similar to that ex- what is now only rumor. The authors estimate perienced by liberal Democrats who take pre- that about a quarter of the stricken facts are al- cautions against the possibility that their phones ready on the public record. might be tapped. Paranoia is the twin brother There is a reference in the manuscript, right of the clandestine mentality. after several pages that have been decimated by The CIA is a pioneer in the organized use of CIA censors, to "the CIA's ties with foreign polit- secrecy, and in this role it reflects a general ical leaders." The obvious inference to be drawn condition of American culture. Government se- is that the authors had identified foreign lead- crecy is a measure of status and prestige for its ers with past or present CIA connections, and officials, and its symbols-the security clear- several sources have identified this kind of ma- ance, the locked briefcase, the top secret-sensi- terial as the most explosive in the book-the tive discussions, the magic references to the na- Agency's best case for secrecy by prior restraint. tional security-are highly coveted. They are While it is impossible to evaluate this claim signs of high authority, like the Freudian ter- without knowing precisely what has been cut, minology of the psychiatrist and the computer- one can make an educated guess after scanning laden tomes of the urbanologist. These signs can the public literature on the CIA and talking with be the mark of genuine and vitally needed skills - reporters, ex-agents, and others who specialize -if the Agency's secrets protect the explosive in intelligence. I have done so, and it appears techniques of master operatives, if the multi- likely that the Agency is close to political lead- variable systems analysis of the urbanologist is ers in Jordan, Greece, Iran, Ethiopia, Taiwan, required for genuine insights into the plight of and West Germany. In general, the Agency the cities--but they can also be the smokescreen probably has political ties wherever it has oper- for professional shamanism. Secrecy provides ated in the past-Laos, Vietnam, Bolivia, Gua- not only a badge of importance but a meal temala-and also in the smaller countries of ticket. We pay for what we do not understand, Latin America and Africa, where a little bribe because we hunger for an expert. money can be effective enough for the spooks Anyone who has lost the faith, like Marchetti to throw their weight around. All this seems and Marks, poses an enormous threat to those hardly surprising or fraught with peril for the who traffic in mysteries and hidden talents-like national security. And, as Marchetti tells it, a renegade magician who shows the public Agency ties to a foreign government do not where his colle ue t their V zts. The au- necessarily mean that we run the country. They thoApMf~ev&?f, ~~ (lr?~I!~oll~ei-R~rz49~~~414A141Q~$R~Aan~ of our agents into the open than the Agency finds comfort- gets to have lunch with a foreign official occa- sionally, much the way, a nAme ane nS gut g tx08/2? henAMarchet 00 a9 eenjolnc uOfromOw rit~ng to bend the ear of a Senator from time to time his book without censorship, one CIA official was after making a political contribution. quoted as giving thanks for the injunction be- cause the revelations would have "blown us out of the water" in many places around the world. UT FAIRNESS DEMANDS that we suppress (The official was CIA director William Colby.) boredom and consider the Agency's view. He could have meant this in the way the Fan- After all, the entire national-security apparatus Tani story made future operations difficult in of the United States, the Justice Department, the Italy, or he could have been focusing on a sec- ACLU, a major publishing house, and the federal and kind of exposure in the book-Marchetti's courts are all burning up legal pads trying to plans to identify CIA "cover" organizations in hash out whether this material should be for- and out of the United States. The Agency wants bidden in the name of military security. Should to avoid more troubles like the 1.967 scandal Victor Marchetti, by virtue of having sat in the that exposed the National Student Association highest councils of spy headquarters, be allowed as a CIA front. The Agency's proprietary fronts to declare authoritatively that foreign leaders are detailed in a chapter that was mutilated in are, or have been, tainted by American intelli- the first round of censorship. Rocky Mountain gence? What if the minister loses his job as a Air, of Arizona, was identified in a magazine result, and the CIA is cut off from its leverage article by Marchetti as a CIA domestic airline, and information? The subtle minds at Langley but this does not appear in the book and has would say that the cooperative ministers of the apparently fallen under the knife. future will refuse to associate with the CIA for Agency airlines and corporate covers evoke fear of later being exposed. the stale air of yesteryear, for, despite the CIA's Marchetti replies that the book does not re- predictions of dire rumblings in the foreign un- veal the names of classical spies, citizens of "un- dcrworld, the revelations of the past have had friendly" countries who slip their military se- little impact beyond a brief period of media crets to a CIA agent. Ile says that the book will interest. But the CIA contends that all these little cause embarrassment, but that no exposed con- covert fronts make up a vital collective enter- tacts will be rubbed out by the Soviet KGB or prise for clandestine use against our enemies. anyone else, and no wars will break out. The Agency officials have sworn that blowing more case of Amintore Fanfani supports his point. covers like NSA "would cause grave and irrep- In May 1973, Seymour Hersh wrote a story in arable damage to the national security," and the New York Times about Graham Martin, therefore must be censored. now Ambassador to South Vietnam, and his ef- forts to get the CIA to support Fanfani's wing of the Christian Democrat party in Italy. This oc- curred in 1970, when Martin was Ambassador Done in by the Princeton men to Italy, and Fanfani, a former Italian premier, ARCFIETTI VIEWS THE CASE with just as was trying to take over the government again much passion as the various lawyers and during one of Italy's periodic crises. Fanfani, a government officials, but in much earthier fash- conservative, figured that $1 million from the ion. He sees himself as the target of a personal CIA would go a long way toward keeping the vendetta by the Old Boy network that has al- left-wingers out of power, and he made his pitch ways run the agency. The upper reaches of the to Martin in secret meetings. CIA are completely dominated by Ivy League There is a hole in the Marchetti-Marks manu- WASPS, most of whom got started in the oss script where I assume the details of this story during the war. William Colby, the current di- once were. The Agency censored it, because it rector, is fully in the tradition-an oss opera- reveals Fanfani's ties to the CIA; but the censors tive who continued his work with the Agency, had to leave in the reference to the Hersh story, personally designing the Phoenix assassination which is quite thorough. The revelations in the program in Vietnam and virtually every other Times caused some minor repercussions in Italy covert operation on his turf, Southeast Asia, ris- but didn't make any noise in the dark passage- ing to the top because he conducted every mis- ways of international espionage. If the censored sion with the skillful good grace of a man who anecdotes of foreigners' ties to the CIA are as appreciates fine wine. A real'Princeton man, say tame as this one, the government would have a those who meet him. tough time demonstrating a grave threat to the Marchetti, on the other hand, went to Penn national security. Actually, the point of the dis- State and describes himself as "the cousin of cussion in the book manuscript is that the Times bulldozer drivers." He joined the Agency in initially balked at running the story because the 1955 and worked his way up to the executive editors thought it wasn't newsworthy-a basic suites on the seventh floor of the CIA building. yawner from baA~O e i t20 108 1 w ffl_ i6 _ ~~ 0 _ihe barrass our new envoy t~ieu s republic, top brass, sitting in on CIA po icy meetings, a "The CIA would rather be sub- jected to a dozen: books by the usual liberals criticizing its deadly genius than suffer from one inside book like Mar- chetti's, which exposes a clan- destine circus." Approved For`'R'6Iease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-004901000130001-1 hawk on Vietnam, a general analyst of good military preparedness by threatening the loss of reputation on strategic matters, a lover of lives or jeopardizing vital military secrets. The things covert. As he describes it, he began to Department lawyers warned of horrible calami- fall away from the CIA spirit when he saw first ties if the Times were allowed to publish more hand that the directors and assistant directors top-secret cables by the Old Boys, but the Court were much more interested in dreaming up surveyed the ramparts of freedom after the first clandestine operations, the cloak-and-dagger batch of papers had appeared in the Times and stuff, than they were in the production and anal- detected little damage. The government stum- ysis of intelligence. The Agency is still marked bled miserably, and the precedent looked use- by a split between the analysts and the opera- ful to Marchetti. tives, with thinly concealed contempt on both Then the Department failed to convict Ells- sides. Marchetti shared the analysts' view that berg of espionage, or anything else, and the the clandestine types, like F. Howard ("Eduar- cause of secrecy seemed hopeless. When the CIA do") Hunt, had read too many spy novels and lawyers brought the Marchetti problem over to worn too many disguises-that they found the the Justice Department, two flimsy weapons Agency a playground for their covert fantasies. seemed available to shut him up. They could (Any CIA operator, on the other hand, lets you seek an injunction before a judge on the same know quickly that the analysts are pale-faced grounds they had tried against the New York bookworms who "don't do anything" and might Times, but the courts had proved to be attached as well be in the State Department.) Marchetti to the First Amendment. The second unpromis- half expected these traditional jealousies to be ing avenue was the old reliable: criminal deter- ironed out at the top, but he found that the rence. They could threaten to prosecute Mar- operatives were in control, too busy hatching chetti for espionage if he persisted. They knew plots to care much about position papers. He from their Ellsberg preparations, however, that began to "lose effectiveness," he says, when, in conviction would be difficult. Marchetti might executive meetings, he started questioning the want to take his case before a jury, whose mem- wisdom and purpose of clandestine schemes- hers might be too secure or too unsophisticated which, in the CIA, is somewhat like casting to perceive a grave threat to the national secur- doubt on the humanity of football in the heat of ity. Besides, a threat is not as permanent as an a pep rally, injunction; and if it ever lost credibility, Mar- chetti would be free to publish and the govern- ment would be left with only a long shot at a IIATEVER THE FINAL OUTCOME in the post facto remedy in a criminal trial. The se- courts, the lawyers in the Justice Depart- crets would already be out. ment deserve some credit within the profession Whoever hit upon the contract approach, for staging one of the most imaginative legal based on Marchetti's secrecy agreement, comebacks in recent history. Charged by the brought about a Newtonian advance in the pros- Nixon Administration with the task of protect- pects for quiet, discreet government. It was a ing the government against conspirators and fivefold stroke of genius. tattlers, the Department assembled a truly dis- (1) It fuzzed up First Amendment objections mal record. Scores of left-wing conspirators to prior restraint. The government sued to en- were brought to trial without a single convic- join Marchetti from breaching his contractual tion, and the prosecutors became successful obligation not to reveal classified information. only when the charge toward security turned in- Federal officials submit to other limitations on ward. John Dean and Jeb Magruder have been their First Amendment rights as a condition of convicted of conspiracy; John Mitchell is employment, such as the Hatch Act prohibition squirming under a mound of conspiracy evi- against political activity, and this is merely an- dence. Prosecutors who failed miserably against other limitation-sanctified in writing. hippies and malcontents have been so lethal (2) The government did not have to show against their colleagues in the surrounding of- that the material would do substantial damage flees that eminences like Richard Kleindienst, to the national defense, because the terms of the Will Wilson, and Robert Mardian have fled, contract refer only to classified material. Not hoping to get out of range. many things clearly injure military prepared. In the midst of all this came the loss in the ness, but everything can be classified. Pentagon Papers case. The Justices ruled that it (3) With these two new advantages, the gov- is possible for the government to obtain a re- ernment could seek prior restraint before a straining order against a newspaper-that the judge instead of conviction before a jury. The First Amendment is not an absolute guarantee justice Department does not like juries. Also, of the right to publish national-security infor- th hear~i gg t 1 ,,~p3J~~{ n camera, a se- mat~pt4l-4Ci~rrn~~{~~~Cf~neC~-8jr~e`@t~l~abbt(s~'Sissified secrets, heavy burden of proof, showing that the infor- with no reporters to ask fresh questions. mation is overwhelmingly likely to harm U.S. (4) The contract question made the issue more complicate,p i lF6*q~14gaog0dl/Oj pldnin 1npagifodoy$ iiirrpt "If the govern and toning down publicity. The focus shifted from big sexy matters of secrecy and national defense to the question of whether Marchetti would honor his own written word. (5) The contract injunction, if sustained, has enormous value for application in other agen- cies of the government where secrecy agree- ments are required. Already, the addition of Marks to the case puts the State Department and its mandatory oath under the secrecy blan- ket. Conceivably, the Justice Department could obtain an injunction against anyone, in or out of government, who has signed a secrecy oath and is suspected of leaking classified material. This would not be of much use against isolated, unanticipated leaks to the press, but it would be a potent weapon against known dissenters with a lot on their minds. Even a casual leak would be much more dangerous for those un- der injunction, for it would pose the risk of be- ing jailed instantly for contempt of court. Amendment position-no prior restraint at al , 1 under any circumstances. If they fail again there, which is likely, they will argue that the secrecy oaths are valid only if the secret ma- terial is properly classified-that is, if its re- lease would plainly and seriously injure the. mil- itary defense. The government lawyers are confident that they won't have to get into the First Amend- ment morass, as they expect the district court to reaffirm its decision that the secrecy oath elim- inates the civil liberties question: "In the opin- ion of the Court the contract takes the case out of the scope of the First Amendment; and, to the extent the First Amendment is involved, the contract constitutes a waiver of the defendant's rights thereunder." It's much simpler for the courts to look at things this way, the attorneys say, and if they can make this argument wash again, the Justice Department will leave behind a legacy of secrecy protection that President Nixon would be proud of. It would be a victory for zipper-lipped government snatched from the IIE SE OMINOUS RAMIFICATIONS of the Mar- ashes of the Ellsberg case, achieved quietly hetti i precedent have sent the ACLU lawyers while the public is preoccupied with Nixon's Vc diving for their 1984 quotes and their best sanity and his character flaws-something that speeches on the Bill of Rights. They fear that the Administration could pass on to future Pres- their fortunes might be reversed from the "peo- idents, who would no doubt welcome the new ples' right to know" victories of the Pentagon secrecy guarantee, since classified material Papers case, and they see the specter of a gov- looks much dearer from the inside. ernment whose employees have to get a note If the government wins again, the case will signed by an Old Boy before they can speak abound with new ironies. Marchetti and Marks their mind. They know that the power to control will have unwittingly helped create the legal classified information and punish national-se- tools to make a vassal of every government em- curity critics would be selectively enforced. ployee who enters the sacred chambers of na- Lyndon Johnson, Ted Sorensen, and Bill Bundy tional security. In effect, Americans might then would still be able to make "appropriate usage" become divided into two basic types-those of state secrets in their memoirs without fear of sufficiently gulled by the state's alleged need for injunction. (LBJ quoted extensively from the privacy to sign its contract of omerta, and top-secret Pentagon Papers before they were 'those who refuse. The robots of the first group released; but instead of being tried for espi- would run the government, protected by the onage, like Ellsberg, he received an estimated courts against the public. They would tend to $1.5 million for The Vantage Point.) Every become more cynical about the old principles spring at budget time, the Pentagon would still of the Republic, while the second group would leak startling new intelligence and tricolor lose interest in the government itself. Mesmer- graphs showing that the collective Russian nu- ized by clandestine fantasies, the courts would clear n issile is longer and more explosive than presumably consider the First Amendment in- ours-and the generals will get bigger budgets, operative in national- security matters such as not an injunction. By carefully exploiting the the CIA's bugged house pets. The Agency would new legal power of the secrecy contract, the gov- be left free, in the name of military defense, to ernment might be able to revive the absurd, dis- expand its covert missions in the global fringes credited classification system-using the power of the Third World-the only places where, es- of judges' robes to bring back the old days, pecially to the bombed peasants of Southeast when the function of a classified leak was to Asia, it is clearly no joke. The CIA is drawn to serve the government and when dissent was of- the Third World like a lonely derelict to a porn ficially approved. shop, where the salve for dreams is cheap and Staring into this libertarian's horror, the ACLU available. Instead of puncturing the myth of the has pulled out all the stops in seeking to reverse CIA's awesome powers, Marchetti and Marks the Marchetti defeat. The publisher, Knopf, has may ultimately find themselves and their secrecy joined Marchetti and Marks to bring a little oaths being used to reinforce the Agency's poi- more First Am*dpm*e~dopbrt4R&Ga 2&d1,IO&22iCFMll &4-00499ROO 1000130001-10 ment wins its case, Marchetti and Marks will have unwitting- ly helped create the legal tools to make a vas- sal of every government em- ployee who enters the sa- cred chambers of national security." HARPER'S MAGAZINI JANUARY 1974 HS/Hc- g fO )9 7 Approved For Rise 2 ? 14DP84 ged out folder. file folder. CASE FILE CHARGE-OUT CARD 0 of char .O o0iton9i' y,lnereturned 1FORAUMGNO. 119 WHICHCMAAKAP 1)"SE " or Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1 (7)