CIA ADMITS USING FOREIGN POLICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 175
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

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The Washington Merrry-Go-Round
CIAA
By Jack Anderson
The Central Intelligence
Agency has admitted in tin ex-
traordinary private letter to
Sen. J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) tht
the agency has penetrated the
police forces of friendly foreign
countries.
The remarkable confession by
CIA Director William Colby
came in the course of a discreet'
but intensive lobbying effort to
keep alive U.S. support for for-
eign police programs.
Colby told Fulbright that the
"relationships" built up with
policemen through these pro-
grams had been highly useful
in "obtaining foreign Intelli-
gence" from foreign constabu-
laries.
The friendly foreign cops, like
national police everywhere, are
privy to their nation's darkest
secrets. And while Colby does
not say so, our government
sources tell us the foreigners
are not above trading a national
secret or two for a little CIA
cash.
Colby, in his message to Ful-
bright, delicately skirts the mat-
ter of corrupting foreign police,
conceding only that the liaisons
bring the CIA vital Information
on "illicit narcotics traffic, in-
ternational terrorism and hi,'
jacking."
HS/HC- q 0
mite Using Foreign
Colby's 'covert lobbying was
directed against a bill by Sen.
James Abourezk (D-S.D.) that
would kill U.S. aid to foreign po-
lice and prison operations. The
measure was drafted after
shocking abuses were disclosed
in South Vietnamese prisons
constructed with the U.S. tax-
payers' funds.
The CIA director, who as a top
U.S. hand in Vietnam saw the
abuses first hand, said, never-
theless, that the Abourezk
measure would "appear to re-
strict activities ... by the CIA."
The main cutback would be in
"obtaining foreign intelligence
information" from friendly espi-
onage services and agents
"within national police forces..
," Colby went on.
Some of the agents .in foreign
police forces, Colby indicated,
had been developed during
"specialized training and other
support" given by the CIA-
Colby's lobbying proved?effee-
tive. In secret session, the com-
mittee permitted the CIA to go
on supporting foreign police op-
erations.
Insiders suspect that Colby's
effort to. defeat the Abourezk
provision was actually aimed at
preserving the 'International
Police 'Academy, an institution
bfondayAagmrt I9, I974
According to government at-
torneys,
the use of taxpayers',
money for such private activi-
ties is against regulations. Boor-
stin claims it is common prac-
tice for universities to allow
scholars use of students, re-
searchers
and office space. '
Boorstin, director of the-',
Smithsonian Museum of History
& Technology, used two of the
museum's historian research-
ers. Peter Marzio and Louis
Gorr, to work on the book. They
alternately shared the duties
over a three-year period. Their
salaries, while on the project,
totaled more than $35,000.1
also helped the enterprising':'
-prize-winner. She typed away
on his handwritten manuscript'
for the better part of a year.. In'
addition, some $15,000 in fed-
eral funds was spent to convert
a conference room into a pri-
vate library for the prestigious
author.
Boorstin.conceded that none` 7
of his royalties will be used to
reimburse the U.S. trea;;uy. He.
told my reporter Ed Tr; peon
that hedivided his work day be- "
tween his book and museum
matters, and'that his project
had the approval of the Smiths} -
nian.
or R hearta of as the lTh8 '"CIA-RDP84-00499R001 MMUM d"`a'n`
. According to Victor Marchetti
and John Marks, authors of "The
CIA and the Cult of Intelli-
gence," the agency has funded
training of foreign police at the
academy and recruited spies
there.
Colby himself wrote to Al)our
ezk last January that the acad-
emy, ostensibly run by the State
Department, had "called on us
in the past for some support for
their program. But," he added,
"all such support has been ter-
minated."
We also reported last Septem.
ber that the CIA was Involved in
a Texas bomb school where the
academy trained foreign police-
men ? on explosive devices. A
State Department official later
admitted the CIA provided
"guest lecturers" for the course,
)which has now been moved to
Edgewood Arsenal, Md.
Footnote: Both the CIA and
the academy any no CIA funds
are now going,into the school.
Colby has also personally said
support by the CIA for the
school has been terminated.
History Lesson-Famed histo-
rian Daniel Boorstin used some
$65,000 in government employ-
ees' time and federal facilities
to help him write his Pulitzer
Prize-winning book, "The Amer.
leans - The Democratic Experi-
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W- T
.Layer to iiestr
By Jack Anderrson
Former presidential aide
Charles Colson once considered
firing a high-voltage Buck Rog-
ers-style cannon at the White
House-to erase the taped con-
versations of Richard Nixon.
Such a mission. impossible
would have wiped out the evi-
dence on the White House tapes
which led to Mr. Nix-on's resig-
nation. Colson, however, con-
tends he never seriously pon-
dered putting the scheme into
action.
Despite this denial, Colson
did meet twice with an indus-.
trial research consultant, Gor-
don Novel, and discussed the
possibility of using an experi-
mental "degaussing cannon" to
fire a gigantic magnetic pulse at
the White House tape storage
room. A rough design of the ray
gun, named after a 'magnetic
measurement, was even drawn
up.
"Novel talked about driving
by the White House and de-
sultant "no encouragement."
Novel, however, obviously
thought he had a'mandate from
Colson. He journeyed to El
Paso, Tex., and spoke with Jack
Prentice, innovative research
and design chief for Jetco, Inc.
Jetco already was marketing a
'metal detector using. "degauss-
jug" principles.
Prentice told Novel, and con-
firmed to us, that he had built a
prototype cannon and could
construct an operational one for
$25,000 to $30,000. Prentice be-
lieved that because the tapes
belonged to the President, there
would be no crime in erasing
them if Colson, acting for the
President, okayed it.
The Jetco specialist drew up a
simple plan for the "degaussing
cannon," using capacitors, a
switch, a parabolic reflector
and a special heat resistant coil.
The electronic artillery piece
stroy huge quantities of other
taped 'material and scramble all
computer "memories" in its
path.
One part of the scheme was to
bombard the CIA-and the irre.
sistible jolt of magnetism might
blot out priceless files of Rus-
sian and Chinese agents and
other espionage and security
matters.
In his report to Colson, Novel
said hiding in the heavy woods
near the CIA, or "degaussing"
the tapes from the tank-van
while they were in transport, of-
fered a better chance of success
than 'magnetically bombarding
Watergate committee which.
Colson surmised, would leak it.
Then he and Novel would reveal
the tape was fraudulent and the
hoax would tend to discredit the
whole case against Mr. Nixon.
Colson said it was true he dis-
cussed this idea. "Wouldn't that
be a great gaga" his statement
said.
Baker's Bombshell-Bobby
Baker, the former Senate aide
who went to prison in a cele-
brated scandal of the early
1960s, has completed more than
half of a book that will embar-
rass some present senators.
Now a successful business-
man, Baker insists he isn't writ-
ing a cruel hook about those
who condemned hi'm. Indeed,
the book will contain many
warm anecdotes about promi-
nent political figures.
But the book will charge that
Sen. Barry Goldwater (It-Ariz.),
now the Senate's "Mr. Clean,"
twisted arms for political'funds.
when he was the Republican
Senate campaign chairman.
Baker will chide the present
apostle of political reform, Sen.
Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) for voting
consistently against reform in.
times past.
Baker also will point out that
Sen. Carl Curtis (R-Neb.), who
saw no great wrong in President
Nixon's conduct, lashed out'
against the Democrats involved
in the comparatively small-po-
tatoes Baker case.
The former Senate bey won-
der hopes to publish his book af-
ter the din of Watergate dies
down.
0 1974, United Feature SyndlcAe
the CIA or the White House
from a plane.
But as Novel recalls it, he and
Colson 'mutually decided not to
pursue the plan because of its
danger to national security
tapes and computers near the
targettapes.
Colson scoffs at the idea that
the 'magnetic beam ever came
that close to development. "I
laughed at it," he said. "It was a
could be housed in a van, or
mounted in a light plane or heli-
copter.
On March 21, Novel wrote Col-
son that he would "forward by
hand courier the known facts on
the El Paso erasure 'matter," the
code name for the "degausser."
Shortly thereafter, the indus-
trial consultant flew to Wash-
ington again and talked to one
of this area's best known elec-
tronics men, Allan Bell, presi-
dent of Dektor Counterintelli-
gence and Security. Bell threw
cold water on the mission, call-
ing it "iffy" and "impractical."
At its best, advised Bell, the
bizarre device would obliterate
a few layers of tape, leaving the
rest intact. At worst, it would de-
magnetizing all the tapes," Col-
son told us from prison through
friends. "It was something that
he said would, fire three
blo.cks."
Novel, whb is also an electron-
ics expert, told us he was Visiting Colson in March on an unre-
lated legal matter when the talk
turned to the tapes.
Colson, he said, told film, tapes
at the White House and the CIA
"could cause the President
grief." Novel mentioned the
"degaussing cannon" and Col-
son urged him to look into it
Colson insists he gave the con-
1_l
rolinson
NRe IN
~AooN?-
44
--
Say
little bit of comic relief." But
Mr. Nixon 'might have had fears
Colson would be a sucker for
just such farout ideas. In the
transcripts, Nixon said Colson
"loves the action . . Colson
would do anything."
Footnote: Colson and Novel
also discussed a caper to patch
H. R. Haldeman's voice onto a
tape along with an actor who
would imitate. President Nixon
and make false confessions. The
fake tape would be sent with a
phony authenticating note from
an allegedly disgruntled Secret
Service man to the Senate
~ r~~it^saod Iaiteis "M
- the ~at~ral setting for
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A 14 Thursday ' Aura 09,1074 THE WASHINGTON POST
a1dernans
'estnaony,
aye Conflict
The Watergate special, q
prosecutor's office would,,' .
not comment yesterday
about ,the possibility of any,':
future perjury charges be-
ing filed against Haldeman
for his Senate testimony
about the June 23 meeting.
However,, it is known the
prosecutors re-examined the"'
testimony after the Presi
'dent released the June.23:;
transcripts Monday.
In the first meeting of the
day on June 23, Haldeman
relayed to the President
what he said was a sugges-..,
.tion from former White
House counsel John W.
Dean III and-forme Attot4
ney General John N. Mitch-
ell that the CIA he told to
block an FBI investigation
of the Watergate break-in,
By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Poet 6t6(1 Wrltet
The tape transcripts re- Before the, senate Water-
leased Monday by President gate committee, Haldeman
of his June 23, 1972, described the President's
Nixon
conversations with former
concern over the possibility. It is clear throughout the
White House chief of staff that. the FBI investigation
H. R. (Bob) Haldeman are in, transcript that Haldeman:;
might' uncover, CIA opera President werewor?
direct conflict with lialde- tions and said that was wh and the
direct
y and that the FBI would or.
sworn testimony F the President ordered him , ried be,
about those meetings before > to contact the CIA.""I be- able to trace funds to the
two Senate committees have that the action 'l took Nixon re-election committee
In summing up the June with the CIA was proper, ac- and to t4ie involvement of
23 meetings in, May,: 1973, cording to the President's Nixon campaign aides,,,
testimony before the Senate instructions. and clearly in " rather than being concerned
Appropriations Subcommit-' the national interest," ? about any "national secu-
tee that was investigating al- Haldeman told- the Senate city" interests.
leged CIA involvement in Watergate committee, on ? Once, early in the conver-
the Watergate affair, Halde-' July 30, 1973. sation, President Nixon
man testified under, oath By contrast, the taped mentioned that the invests
that: 1 . June 23, 1972, conversations gation of #orri'er White;
"We had' only very show that Haldeman and, the House consultant and ex-
sketchy knowledge, of what President discussed details CIA employee E. ? Howard .4
and who' were involved in of FBI information about Hunt in the Watergate case
the Watergate affair. We the Watergate break-in and "Will uncover a lot of things.
had no reason to believe " that the President approved You open that scab there'd a
that anyone In the White ,. Haldeman's suggestion that -hell of a lot of-things and -
House was involved find no; he call the CIA as part of ?-a we feel that it would be
reason, therefore; ? to seek, cover-up of the involvement, very detrimental to have
any cover-up of the Water of Nixon aides in the Waterii this thing go any further. ?1
gate investigation from the', gate affair. This involves the Cubans,
White Ho'Ose" Willfully lying under oath, , Hunt and a lot of hanky-
At another point ' in ? tests, before a Senate committee" panky that we have nothing
mony before the, same constitutes perjury? punisha- to do with ourselves..
panel, :Haldeman said," "We ble by a jail term of up to, Then, 10 pages later in the
did this in the full belief five years and a $10,000 fine. transcript, the President
that we were acting in the Haldeman has not been added, almost in passing,
national interest and with; charged with perjury In con- that Haldeman should tell.4
no intent or .-desire to 'lm- nection with his testimony,- the CIA! "Look, the problem"O.
pede or cover 'up? any is, ' about the meetings with the. is that this will open the.,
,pects of the Watergate in. President, but does face whole, the whole Bay of':
vestigatioh, itself. three perjury counts in the Pigs thing and,the President
Watergate cover-up case for just feels that, ah, withqut
his testimony': before the going into the details
Senate Watergate commit don't, don't lie to them to
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a say
Watergate defendants. this is a comedy ;of errors, 1,-j
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without getting into It, the
President believes that it is
going to open up the whole
Bay of Pigs thing up again."
As a result of that meet-'
- ing, With those two fleeting
-? references to the CIA,
-, Haldeman met with CIA of-
ficials with what he told the
Senate Appropriations Sub-
committee \vas a "five-fold"
purpose:
"One, to ascertain
whether there had been any
.;CIA involvement in the }
Watergate affair;
"Two, to ascertain
whether the relation- be-
'tween. some of. the Water-
gate participants and the
Bay of Pigs was a matter of
concern to CIA;
"Three, to inform the CIA.
of an FBI request for guid-
knee regarding some aspects
of the Watergate i'nvestiga-
tion because of the posstbil-
ity of CIA Involvement, di-
rectly or indirectly; I could
1nter)cct there that this re
quest had been made known -
by John Dean, counsel to
the President, and had been, transmitted by me to, the'l
President immediately upon
being told of it by Johns,
Dean: The President, as a `
result of that, told me toi,.
meet with (CiA) Director'
(Richard) Helms and (CIA'
Deputy Director) General
', (Vernon) Walters and John;-.
ia,hrltet-man to--get into this
matter as I am laying it out
here.
"The fourth Purpose WAS
to discuss White House cone
cern regarding possible dis-
closure of non-Watergate-re
lated covert CIA operations '
or other national security.
activities, not related to
--Watergate, that had been
undertaken previously by
some of the Watergate prin??.
ciples (sic).
"Fifth, to request General
Walters to meet with acting
Director, Gi%y of the 'FBI to
express these concerns and
to coordinate with the FBI."'
so that the FBI's area of in-
vestiaation of the suspects,
be expanded into unrelated some of the individuals who
matters which 'could' lead4to had also been involved in 4
Haldeman testified fur-
ther that he did not recall
any discussion at any time
of a suggestion to involve,"
-'the CIA in Watergate mat-
ter except as he described in
his testimony.
"In summary, the meeting,`
of June 23 with the CIA was
.,held at the President's re-
,-quest In the interest of na-"
tioxial security," Haldeman
told the senators.
Haldeman testified in
much the same way before
the Senate Watergate com-
mittee. Ile referred the corn-
mittee to the statement he
had made before the Senate.
Appropriations Subcommit-
tee as one containing
"considerable detail' 'on his
account of the meeting with
CIA officials and the reason
for it.
In addition, he testified:::.
, .. the meeting, one of the
1purposes of the meeting, as '
assigned to the by the Presi-',s
dent on the morning of the
23d ... in addition to ascer-k
taining whether there- was
any CIA involvement, whe-"
thher there was any CIA.
.'.concern about earlier activi-
`ties of people who had been
arrested at Watergate, was
to tell the CIA directors'
that the FBI had expressed
concern that as to whether
;,there was CIA Involvement
or any impingement."
Haldeman further testi-
fied that "the question
raised was not solely `the
question of whether the CIA
had been involved In the
Watergate break-in but also
whether the Investigation of
9 Haldeman said before the""
Watergate committee he
could not recall either the
President or himself discuss
ing the problem of a connec-
tion between the "Mexican , .
money"--a campaign; contri-
bution that Investigators
traced to convicted Water-
gate burglar, Bernard Bark-
`'Vr's Miami bank account-
and the CIA.
According to, the June 23`,,
tape transcript, however, - k
.the President and Haldeman
,specifically discussed that
money in - detail, and ex?
pressed their concern over
it being ,traced to the cAm ?.'
:; aignr,
the Watergate break-in,
,which was to be thorough
and total, could - possibly
impinge upon the activities
totally unrelated; to Water-
gate and related to national
security aNi to covert CIA
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THE WASHINGTON POST, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7,. 1974
Walter Pincus
The Continuing Cover-up
It is hard to believe, but a close
reading' of the President's Monday
statement and the released, edited
transcr'pts of the June 23, 1972, White
House tapes indicates that a desperate,
last-ditch attempt to cover up is still,
going on.
. In hi' statement, Mr. Nixon said that
when he listened to the June 23 tapes
this past May, "I did not realize the ex-
tent of the implications which these
conversations might now appear to
have," although he "recognized that
these [tapes] presented potential prob-
lems." That is not a true statement: He
knew they were serious and so acted.
On May 5, 1974, Special Prosecutor
Leon .lawo.rski and two deputies,
Philip Locovaro and Richard Ben-Ven-
iste, went to the White House to talk
with the President's lawyers. They had
earlier subpoenaed 64 additional White
House tapes, and the President's law-
yers had moved in court to quash that
subpoena. That day, Jaworski declared
to Mr. Nixon's lawyers that if the mat-
ter were litigated further, he would
have to disclose in court that the
The writer is executive editor of The
New Republic.
Watergate grand jury-had named Mr.
Nixon is a co-conspirator, since his
best ar^,:ment, to get the tapes, was
that the ' involved discussions among
conspi).. ?)rs. In such a situation, Ja-
worski said, he would maintain that
executive privilege could not success-
fully h ~isserted.
Jaw,, ski added that he did not want
to take that course - that he wanted
to avoid having tc reveal that the Pres-
ident had been named a co-conspirator.
Rather, he suggested the matter could
be settled out of. court if the White
House provided 19 specified tapes, al-
most a'.` of which were among the 64
already subpoenaed.
The next day, May 6, the President's
lawyers went to court and asked for a
delay. 1-ater it was learned that after
Jaworsk,, left the White House, on May
5, the President requested that his
aide, Steve Bull, begin supplying, him
with tapes on the Jaworski priority
list. .
The President listened to tapes on
May 5 and 6. Among the tapes he
heard, by his own admission, were
those of June 23, 1972. On May 7, the
President's lawyers went into court to
announce that a compromise could not
be reached - that the requested tapes
,would not be turned over voluntarily.
Why di4 the President turn Jaworski
down? Clearly because he realized the.
damaging nature of the discussions
and not because he failed to "realize
the extent of the Implications."
The President's latest pronounce-
ment h-is other misleading aspects. He
restates the proposition, contained in
his May 22, 1973, statement that
"shortly after the Watergate break-in I
became concerned about the possibil-
ity that the FBI investigation might
lead to the exposure either of unre-
lated covert activities of the CIA or of
sensitive national security matters."
A reading of the transcript, shows
that statement to be questionable. The
transcript shows the idea of using the
CIA to stop the FBI was apparently
suggested by John. Mitchell with no
concern at all for either real CIA oper-
ations nr national security. From the
start, tie purpose was to prevent the
FBI from discovering that money'
which went to a Watergate burglar
originated with the Nixon campaign
committee. In fact, before national se-
curity was even mentioned the Presi-
dent showed concern that continued'
FBI investigation of Watergate would
lead to former White House aide' E.
Howard Hunt and thereafter "open
that. scab - there's a hell of a lot of t
things and we just feel it would be
detrimental to have this thing go any
further." What things would open up?
"This Involves these Cubans, Hunt hane
a lot of hanky-panky
nothing to do with ourselves," says the
President. The only "hanky-panky"
^^
known to date that Hunt and the Cu..
bans had been Involved in prior tu,
Watergate was the break-in at the of-
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face of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist -
an event which Mr. Nixon has main-
tained up to now he only learned of in
March 1973.
On Monday, the President said his
May 22, 1973, statement was "based on
my recollection at the time-some 11
months later-plus documentary mate-
rials and relevant public testimony of
those irvolved." In fact, just one week
before the President's May 22, 1973,
statement, testimony by CIA Deputy
Director Vernon Walters before the
Senate Armed Services Committee had
been released, outlining the events of
June 23, 1972. Walters declared he had
been told it was "the President's wish"
that the FBI investigation be halted
with the five men already in jail and
that for the FBI to pursue an inquiry
into the Mexican money would "lead
to higher ups." Walters' testimony and
his memorandum of the June 23 White
House meeting were available to re-
fresh the President's memory. Rather
than using that material, the Presi-
dent, or May 22, 1973, used the inaccu-
rate story that served as the basis for
misleading testimony by his chief aide,
H. R. Haldeman.
The President even presented the
public with an illusory gesture when
he stated he would "voluntarily fur-
nish to the Senate everything from
these types that Judge Sirica rules
should go to the Special Prosecutor."
The judge is limited to turning over
only Watergate-related material while
the House Judiciary Committee and,
most probably, the. Senate will want
tapes that go beyond-to the abuse-of-
power allegations contained in the
House committee's Article II of im-
peachment.
The President made two final points
in his Monday, statement. He noted
that the CIA made an "extensive
check" and determined that its covert
operattens would not be uncovered. Al-
though the President failed to note It,
this fact had been revealed by the CIA
"A close reading of the
President's statement and
the tape transcripts indi-
cates that a desperate, last
ditch attempt to cover up,
is still going on."
Director, Richard Helms, to the acting
FBI Director, Patrick Gray, on June
22, 1972, the day before the President's
intervention. The President also said
that on July 6, 1972, he had told Gray
to "press ahead vigorously" with his
FBI investigation. Again the President
did not note that, by July 6, the Nixon!
re-election committee had destroyed,,
the records of cash payments to Water-
gate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy and
that two committee employees, Jeb
Stuart Magruder and Herbert Porter,
had worked out a false story to explain
the cash that Liddy had been given. In
short, the two week delay gained by
the CIA ploy had permitted the cover
up to get well under way.
The June 23 transcripts also show.'
that Mr. Nixon's final point-that "the'{
evidence (must) be looked at in its en
tirety"-is also misleading. The Presi-
dent contended on Monday that "when
all the facts were brought to my atten-
tion I insisted on a full investigation",
and prosecution of those guilty." In
fact, the new transcripts show that all
the facts known at that time were
presented to him; he was told, for ex-
ample, that his campaign chairman, ;g
John Mitchell, knew about Watergate; I
that Hunt and,Liddy were involved;
that it was financed by his re-election
committee. At that moment he blocked
rather than "insisted on a full investi-
gation."
His policy was cover-up. "We won't
second guess Mitchell and the rest," he
.told Haldeman on June 23, 1972. And
as for cleaning house and finding out
for himself what occurred, the Presi-
_'.ent said, "I'm not going to get that
nvolve! .. 1' To which Haldeman re-
iponded, "No, sir, we don't want you
Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 lease 2 - P84-0049ap01000130001-1
THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1974
2 Americans Held in Calcutta Jail for
Cave ' a Year in Bizarre Case
d tho
By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times
CALCUTTA, India, Aug. 5
-Two young Americans,
who have been in a Calcutta
prison for more than a year,
are on a hunger strike in
'advance of a trial that has
stirred tensions between the
United States and India.
The case,-which has. politi-
cal overtones, is to be heard
within the next few weeks,
and involves allegations,that .
the two men were spies.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
and United States Ambassa-
dor Daniel P. Moynihan are
now involved in the tangled.
case.
The defendants are 27-
year-old Richard W. Harcos,
an Army veteran, and An-
thony A. Fletcher, 30, a grad-
uate of San Francisco State.
The men, who lived in San
Francisco, have listed their
occupations as taxi drivers.
Both deny the spying allega-
tions, and lawyers in the
case say that they were seek-
ing to smuggle out narcotics
and that suspicions of espio-
nage are unfounded.
Allegations Unspecified
To American officials, the
detention of the men for
,nearly 16 months in a bleak
jail is a source of deepening
anger. "These guys have been
held this long without a trial,
without charges against
them," said one seniorAmeri-
can official. "It's an outrage."
Indian officials decline to
discuss the specific allega-
tions against the two prison-
ers, but have made it clear
that the men face charges
under the Official Secrets
Act, a measure that deals
with spying, conspiracy and
acts "prejudicial to the safe-
ty or interests of,the state."
This week a Calcutta judge
is to rule on a defense plea
that the trial be held in open
court. Virtually all cases un-
der the official Secrets Act
are closed. If found guilty,
the two men would probably
.face a' 14-year prison sen-
tence.
They have. been on a hun-
ger strike since June 'in pro-
test against their detention
and in an effort to open the
trial to the public. They have
lost about 20 pounds each
and are being forced-fed
through nasal tubes.
Facts Are Bizarre
The known facts of the
case are bizarre. At about 3
AM, on April 26, 1973, In-
dian security men seized Mr.
Harcos, who was swimming
in a prohibited area" of the
King George dock along Cal-
cutta's Hooghly River. He
was carrying scuba diving
equipment. His companion,
Mr. Fletcher, was later ar-
rested at the Waverly Hotel
in downtown Calcutta.
According to persons in-
volved in the case, Mr. Har-
cos initially insisted that he
had been merely taking a
swim. This was repeated for
months, to the disbelief of
Indians and American con-
sular officials who visited the
Americans in jail. "No one
g
goes swimming in the middle swimming in a prohibited
of the night in the Hooghly area, is also unclear,
because it's hot," said one R tl Leonard Boudin
long-time resident of Calcut-
ta. The Jamaican, whose cit-
izenship is unclear, is a:,
popular figure and a hab--
itut of the Calcutta docks. -
What complicates the case.
is the delicacy of India's re-
lations with the ' United
States and the Government's
sensitivity-Americans call it.;
- ,"obsession"-to alleged Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency ac-
tivities, especially in north-
-.-east India.
Moreover, some Indians
and Americans say officials
in Calcutta, the capital of.
the politically volatile state
of West Bengal, are fearful
of dropping the case because
it would leave them open to
charges -of being pro-Amer-.
ican.
One Indian lawyer in tht
case said that it had political
overtones because "it might.
be useful to show that the
Americans are doing harm to
India." But some sources in-
dicated that Mrs. Gandhi had
grown concerned about the
treatment of the prisoners '.
-and had discussed the'possi-'
bility of placing them under:.
house arrest until the case is
resolved.
American officials say pri-
vately and angrily that
middle-level Indian officials
in New' Delhi, as well as the
West Bengal government,
were largely unhelpful and
even cut off consufir access
to the prisoners from April to
June. Officials in Calcutta
American official. the civil liberties lawyer, has established only after Mr.
involved himself in Mr. Moynihan met India's For-
Lawyers say the two were Fletcher's defense. ' A col- eign Secretary, Kewal Singh,
seeking to smuggle narcotics, and brought up the case in
? league, Dolores A.? Donovan ' mid-June. ?
apparently hashish, out of of San Francisco, has spent,
India by fixing a plastic bag more than a week here, meet- "Before then we made re-
to the hull of a ship. Law- ing the defendants, consular. quests that weren't answered
yers say that the two failed oficials and lawyers. Tao and we got no indication at
to admit the scheme because' prominent Indian lawyers all that they were trying to
are defending Mr. Fletcher, expedite the case," said one
of a fear that India's nar- and another is working for official in Calcutta.
cotics laws are as stiff as Currently, an American of- -
Mr. Harcos. '.ficial meets the, two prison-
those in Turkey or Iran. A further murky element
In fact, India's laws are. in the case was he arrest, : ers three times a week and
of gives them news magazines, . a
cident
i
n
r the i
l
ild
d f
rtl
ft
lati
h
,
n
ore
g
y m
- , . s
y a
e
re
ve
, an
o
ers who plead guilty to nar- two men linked to Mr. Mar- paperback books, soap and
cotis violations are generally' cos and Mr. Fletcher. 4' ; -cigarettes. The two live to-
fined $75 to $200 and .or- ,the Chinese owner re `-gether in a cell, about 20
feet by 50 feet. `They seem
dared 'to leave the country.' cutta hotel whop
was said to ?' to be fairly cheerful, not de-
spondent," said one official.
pproved For Release 2001/08/22,a aKDP84-00499RO0100flt '1 the jailers treat
On the other an ,
Official Secrets Act is a stern
measure that places the,
burden squarely upon a de-
fendant to prove his inno-
cence. The law says that a,i
defendant "may be convicted
if, from the circumstances of
the case or his conduct or,
his known character as
proved, it appears that his
purpose was a purpose prej-
udicial to the, safety or in-
terests of the state."
Americans have been ar-.
rested before under the act;
an American engineer was
in prison here about tert days
for taking photographs 'of
the Howrah Bridge during.
the Bangladesh war. But. it
could' not be recalled when.
an American had been in
prison this long in India or
placed on trial under the act.
Evidence Also Unclear`
Why it took the defendants
more than a year to change,
their story remains unclear,
although one Indian lawyer
in the case said that a prison-,
er has only 14 days to make
a statement to the police
before the judicial process.
begins. Nevertheless, the de-'
fendants told American con-
sular officials for months
that Mr. Harcos had been
merely taking a swim.
The specific evidence
ainst the two, beyond'
a
 Jack Anderson
Appro r$arleas 1/08/22 IFNA-RTP84-004 000130
Vietnam. ar: e noie o~1e
Ten years ago, the Gtilf of Tonkin incident led to
massive U.S. involvement in an unwanted war in
Vietnam. Did the Central Intelligence Agency play
a hidden role in that incident?
We have now pieced together part of the story,
together with other CIA exploits In Vietnam, from
Intelligence memos and old Vietnam hands, including
an bx-CIA officer, John Kelly, who has agreed to
break his long silence. It is a fascinating story, some.
,times hilarious, sometimes deadly grim.
At the time of Tonkin, the CIA.was already deeply
involved in a vast undercover operation known
mysteriously as Op-34-A. Memos show that the CIA,
working secretly with the Saigon government and
U.S. armed forces, kidnaped North Vietnamese fisher-
men to recruit them as spies, landed rubber-boat
crews on the North Vietnamese coast to blow up
bridges, .parachuted agents into the Communist hack-
country and engaged in other clandestine activities.
Although U.S. forces weren't supposed to partici-
pate in open combat, a favorite Op-34-A sport was
to send dark-painted U.S. patrol boats to bombard
Communist-held Islands off the Vietnam coast. This
sometimes led to shootouts between U.S. and North
Vietnamese gunboats. The incidents, according to
one Pentagon memo, were regarded as acceptable
risks.
The public wasn't told about these naval engage-
ments until the late President Lyndon Johnson chose
to make an issue of the August 2, 1964, attack on
U.S. destroyers In the Gulf of Tnnkin. Then, is :anme
paring to draw North Vietnamese gunboats away ' ` ^ : ? ~, ? ~: '` j
? ,l,r:., .~?y .i 1
from an Op-34-A operation when the celebrated io-
cident occurred. ?'
After the United States was drawn openly into "
the war, the CIA brass settled into a .handsome
'dwelling next to the Italian embassy in Saigon. In-
stead of CIA, one of its units adopted the intials peeping back. He spotted a telescope' lens aimed
SOG-short for "Special Operations Group." at secret maps on the' CIA walls. With all the drama
In long interviews with my associate Les Whitten,
the irreverent. John Kelly, now an investigative of a TV slapstick spy episode, his superior ordered
reporter for CBS News in New York City, remem-' the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been
hers the SOG as a sort of "Catch 22" outfit forever completed before another agent, missing the sun-
goofing up but occasionally achieving' a triumph. bight, tore down the boards.
The SOG, of course, was obsessed with secrecy. Meanwhile, a 'terse 'security directive was issued
It operated fleets of black-painted planes, jeeps, by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were
trucks and PT boats, Even the SOG's gates were almost killed during a rebellion because their auto-
sometimes painted black. It didn't take the Vietna-' mobile was a "Rebel," a 1967. American 'Motors
mese,`.South and North alike, long to identify black as model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around
the CIA-SOG color. The black gates, therefore, may as the world to remove' the "Rebel" insignia from their
well have been emblazoned with the CIA seal. cars, Kelly was told.
On one occasion,. the CIA's secret Identification When Kelly first arrived In Saigon under super_
was found scribbled on a latrine. wall. in a Saigon secret orders, he was greeted at Tansonhut airport
bar. Among the obscene inscriptions, a horrified by, a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and a
CIA officer saw the equation, "CAS equals SOG hiouthful of flashing gold teeth.. He turned out to*,'
equals CIA." CAS means "Controlled American a be the official CIA greeter, who would have been
Source," a euphemism for 'a CIA agent. In great hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around
alarm, the CIA officer dispatched two majors and the airport.
a team of enlisted men to comb the men's rooms of At SOG headquarters, Kelly found the CIA brass
Saigon in search of similar security violations hidden In wtizzy. One. of his superiors had just been identi-
amid the graffiti. / fied by French and West German -intelligence as
The CIA brass went to such lengths to maintain i the naked American on vacation at the famous L'lle
secrecy that they held their most important confer-, du -Levant nudist camp off the toast of France. The
ences in a huge transparent box, constructed of CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity
inch-thick clear plastic walls resting on plastic beams, . the moment. he left the nudist camp for Saigon.,
with a transparent plastic door, at the U.S. embassy. , One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the
One day, a CIA officer, peeping at the Italian :North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA'radio transmit-
embassy across the way, discovered the, Italians ter,. which was disguised as a militant Vietnamese
-VTr ~T7~;_- ~~ -!Approved For Release46041a8f22 : CtA-RdP84 OO49 UQ1OPG ',30001=1- -
 Approved For3elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$8.001000130001-1
peeping back. He spotted a telescope lens aimed: nationalist 'underground station. To increase its
at secret maps on the CIA walls. With all the drama Hooper rating, the CIA dropped tens of thousands
of a TV slapstick spy episode, his superior ordered of plastic transistor radios in styrofoam boxes on
the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been -North Vietnam. The' radios were locked upon a?
completed before another agent, missing the sun- single frequency, so those who retrieved the radios
light, tore down the boards. could listen only to the dIA station.
Meanwhile, a terse security directive was issued To reach the, Vietcong, whose jungle hiding places
by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were were difficult to locate for parachute droppings,
almost killed during a rebellion because their auto- ; the CIA strategists planned to'bait the styrofoam
' mobile was a "Rebel," a 1967 American 'Motors radio boxes with food and float then down the
model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around Mekong River network. The hungry guerillas, it was
the world to remove the "Rebel" Insignia from their suggested, would fish the food-laden radios out of
cars, Kelly was told,. the river. The plan was finally abandoned, however,
When Kelly first arrived in Saigon under super-, because the CIA could find no foolproof flow charts
secret orders, he was greeted at Tansbnhut airport ' for the Mekong. At last report, there were still two
by a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and a warehouses full of the little black radios.
mouthful of flashing gold teeth. He turned out to' The CIA, however, had Its occasional successes.
he the official CIA greeter, who would have been It was able to determine, for example, that 33,000
hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around Saigon officials,, from clerks to cabinet officers,
the airport. ? were ' active Vietcong agents or Vietcong sympathiz-
ers. More dramatically, the SOG units equipped
At SOG headquarters, Kelly found the CIA brass South Vietnamese troops with Vietcong-style black
i in a.tizzy. One of his superiors had just been identi- pajamas. The disguised troops were able to crash
Lied by French and West German intelligence as into a'North Vietnamese'encampment, firing machine
the naked American on vacation at the famous L'Ile guns and tossing grenades.
du Levant nudist camp off the toast of France. The But the notorious Phoenix program, an assassina-
CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity tion scheme run by present. CIA director William,
the moment he left the nudist camp for Saigon. Colby, was less effetive. A report to the U.S.. em-
One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the hazy revealed that the program as only one per
v
North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA radio transmit- ? .
ter, which '~'Apfb ii4dlF6raR t; 2 #i30 2 t'I DF'? "~9+ 4141Q.1 A
 Approved For$elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499$001000130001-1
Colby Against'
Declassfying
Speedup
Associated Press
CIA chief William E. Colby
yesterday said congressional
efforts to speed the declassifi-
cation of government docu-
ments would endanger the
country's intelligence opera-
tions.
"I would find it very diffi-
cult ... to urge a foreign intel-
ligence service or a strate-
gically placed individual in a
foreign government or a for-
eign country to cooperate with
this agency and to provide in-
formation in confidence if the
law of this country required
that such information be made
available to the public two
years later," Colby told a
House Government Opera-
tions subcommittee.
The subcommittee is consid-
ering amendments to the Free-
dom of Information Act that
would require all documents
labeled secret and confidential
to be declassified within two
years. '
FII
S/HC- C, O
THE WASHINGTON POST
Friday] August 201974
A6 ...R
ed For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Release 2001/08,(~~? I D84-004 %QRO
Oo1,p0043009
((,,JJ ~~,e orte~j ro jj'"'ro ~CC??Y
From Interference in Greece
U.S. Said to der C.I.A.
To Curtail Role in Greece
Continued From Page 1, Col. 3
ures about two years ago, a
high American official said.
The operative closest to Gen-
eral Ioannides was said to have
been Peter Koromilas, a Greek-
American who also went by
the name of Korom. An Amer-
ican official said Mr. Koromi-
las had been sent to Athens to
confer with General Ioannides
shortly before the July 15 coup
In Cyprus, which was headed
by.Greek officers.
'Papadopoulos Is My Boy'
James M. Potts, the agency's
station chief in Athens from)
1968 to 1972, was described asi
having been on close terms'
throughout his stay there with
Mr. Papadopoulos.
Air. Potts was listed as a
political officer in the American
Embassy. lie served earlier inl
Athens from 1960 to 1964 as,
deputy station chief of the
intelligence agency.
A State Department official'
said that when Mr. Potts left
Athens in August, 1972, his.
farewell party was attended hyl
virtually every member of thei
American)
Th
ilit
nta
j
.
ary
u
e
By DAVID BINDER m
Spcchl lo'rhe New S'ork Times Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca!
seeing who was present, turned
WASHINGTON, Aug. 1--TheIGreece said that the C.I.A. and walked out, the source said,
Central Intelligence Agency has' continued to maintain about 60t after which he sent a cablegram
reportedly been instructed by full-time operatives in Greece to Washington protesting Mr.
top officials of the Nixon Ad-Ed that some had been there Po~r's acsoa had adopted a
ministration not to interfere in 15 years or longer. I chMr. attitude toward the)
the Internal affairs of Greece the agency, the specialist Athens junta and was appalled
nor to play favorites among) said, had close contact not only that the C.T.A. station chief
Greek politicians, with George Papadopoulos, the would Ite iVetaa cpar position cone
These orders, according to Greek colonel who,led the 1967 American Ambassador had
well-placed officials, reflect the coup, but also with his suc- taken.
current thinking of Secretary cessor, Brig. Gen. Demetrios State Department officials
of State Kissinger and of the Ioannides. who have served in Greecei
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Papadopoulos, who was commented in background in-,
(William E. Colby-that Amer deposed last November, was ; torviews on what they de-
Greek political
l ic.ans should keep out of the among many
,politics of other countries as and military figures who re -,
much as possible. The C.I.A. ceived personal subsidies over
is said to have been deeply in- many years. from the intelli-
volved in Greek politics for 25 gence agency, two United States
years. officials said. Another source
I Until the last few weeks of the said Mr. Papadopoulos had
Athens military junta, accord- received money from the
thing to high American officials agency since 1952. "Ile helped King Constantine
The CIA stopped its sub-
and to Greek sources, American buy Center Union Deputies so
operatives remained quite close sidies for Greek political fig- that the George Papandreou
to the men in power in Greece. Continued 1 Government
Mr. Maury, 61, left agency
A United States specialist on Con Page 3,Column somewhat more than a year ago
and is now Assistant Secre-
in the past by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in Greek affairs.
One of them mentioned John
M. Maury, the agency's sta-
tion chief in Athens from 1962
to 1968.
"Maury worked on behalf of
the palace in 1965," the offi-
tary of Defense for Congres-
sional Relations.
Although genorally leaning)
to Greek conservative politi-
cians, the agency flirted briefly
with the variant in Greek poli-
tics offered by George Papan-
dreou and his Harvard-educated
son, Andreas, in the early nine'
teen-sixties, a ,former Greek.
official said.
"In the beginning, say about
1962 or '63, the C.I.A. used)
Andreas as an agent, as a re-1
source and supported him,"
the Greek said, "His buddy was
Campbell," he added, referring
to Laughlin A. Campbell, the
C.I.A. station chief from 1959
to 1962.
Agent Reassigned After Protest
In his 1970 book, "Democ-
racy at Gunpoint," Andreas Pa-
pandreou describes a scene in
1961 in which he had an alter-
cation with Mr. Campbell.
Now retired and living In,
Washington, Mr. Campbell de-
clined clined to talk with a reporter
about his Greek service.
A knowledgeable Greek said
that Stavit Milton, an opera-
tive who objected Ito the "cozy"
relationship between the agency
and the junta leaders over the
last seven years, was moved
out of Greece and sent to Iran
and later to the Far East.
Mr. Milton was described as
one of numerous Greek-Amer-
icans recruited by the, agency
in the early days of'its',opera-
tions in Greece. Another' was
said to be Thomas H. Karames-
sines, a 57-year-old New
Yorker who served in Athens
from 1947 to 1948, during the
Greek struggle against Com-
munist insurgents, then again
as station chief, from 1951 to
1953.
Mr. Karamessines rose to be
head of the agency's clandes-
tine services before his retire-
nment, recently.
The Central Intelligence
Agency also used enterprises of
Thomas A. Pappas, the 75-year-
old Greek-American industrial-
ist, as a cover for nts opera-;
tions in Greece, according to
the Greek source.
A spokesmen at the head-
quarters of the agency, in
Langley, Va., said he had no
general comment on the allega-
tions. He did say, however, that
C.I.A. agents follow orders ap-
proved at the highest level in
Washington.
roved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA RYpP881;0gJM?0)R00
THE NE AUGUST 2, 1974
 Approved For$elease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499W01000130001-1
United PreslnoernatIonaJ
CIA Director William E. Colby
has war nod Congress that permit-
-tinL the Pentagon to go ahead with
a major naval and air buildup on an
Indian Ocean island almost certain-
ly will provoke the Soviet Union to
follow suit.
Colby's warning was delivered at
a closed session of a Senate Armed
Services sabeommittee July 11. A
"sanitized" version with classified
material eliminated was inserted in
yesterday's Congressional Record
by Stuart Symington, D-Mo.
The subcommittee was consider-
ing a S29 rni:iion Pentagon request
for fun.~s to deepen the harbor, in-
sta,i sl;on,. facilities and construct a
I2,GG0-:err.,; B52-capable runway on
the Bri ish-owned island of Diego
Garcia where the United States now
has minimal facilities.
_4~n CS
Saturday, August 3, 1974
Colby assured the subcommitte
that the Soviet presence in the In-
dian Ocean, while it has grown
slowly, is still minuscule and
presents no real threat to Western
interests.
He said Moscow assigns a lower
military priority to the Indian
Ocean than to the United States,
China, Europe or the Middle East.
Nevertheless, he said, the Soviets
do appear to feel they must compete
with the United States in every area
to maintain . their superpower
status.
As a result, they have matched
the two crisis buildups of U.S. naval
forces in the Indian Ocean of recent
years-during the India-Pakistan
and Middle East wars-and they
can be expected to follow the same
pattern if Washington decrees a
permanent U.S. base on Diego Gar-
cia.
proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84=00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Rel s'e 2001/08/22 :-CIA-RDP84-00499R0Q1000130001-1
Castro Says CIA
Is. Nixon Bane
Associated Press
MIAMI, Fla,-Cuban
Prime.Minister Fidel Cas.
tro said that CIA-trained
agents have been more ef-
fective iri ieopardizintt the
President of the United
States than in overthrow-
ing his government in
Cuba.
In a nationwide brdzd-
cast Friday,. Castro said.
"Mercenaries 'trained by
the CIA in espionage, sab-
otage and subversion were.
employed to spy and rob
?docume:nts at the head
'quarters of the Demo
cratic Party of the United
States . .
"This action, and the
scandal it has occasioned,
the complications which it
originated, demonstrate
that the CIA and its mer-
cenaries were much more
capable of ruining the
presidency of the United
States than defeating the
Cuban revolution."
Approved For Rirlease'2001/08/22,: CIA-RDP84'-0O499R001000130001-1
 Approved ForBlease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-f 049 - 1-1
roved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-004 9R00100IM001-1
 PARADE ? JULY 21, 1974
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m eD O O S m ,Y m C m p in ~n y m O
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.il tr.n n n rr.. KRL111 V ail af.d )il Ill I 44 _
li
tratiott operation arld of the procedure arva'i." I he 111:ptlt?aittoll is that 11(1111
for developing, r.:rruiting,?and hand- Pekin; arid Mo'ceoww are. swarming
ling an agent arc in some cases over- with CIA etr'.t anti that no state se-
elahorate and in ether;: overainlplifiefl,
but Generally tiny are accurate. Tile
account of the position acid operation
of the CIA field station, cataloguing
many of the pioblvins faced by it CIA
officer serving ovcr3eas, will be new
to most readers and might even be
instructive for foreign-service offi-
cers and foreign correspondents who
thought they knew all there was to
know. Add to this a text liberally
salted with footnotes-most of them
fascinating anecdotes in their own
right-and the result is an interesting
and readable book.
Unfortunately, the large quantities
of good information in Without
Cloak or Dagger serve as a vehicle
for an equal amount of misinforma-
tion on the Agency, more misinfor-
mation, in fact, than all that's been
produced by the movies, television
shows, or publications that Mr. Cope-
land complains of. Moreover, the mis-
information is presented very author-
itatively, with no hint to enable the
uninitiated to distinguish the true
from the false. His intent, in a great
many instances, is clearly to mislead
the reader and give a totally false
impression of Agency capabilities
and performance.
In describing field operations, Mr.
Copeland stresses their defensive
nature, stating, with a certain candor,
that "the mission of the CIA station
is ... to stay out of trouble." Most
of the sixty or so stations around the
world have, lid says, no more than
two or three case officers," and, ideal-
ly, a case officer is responsible for no
more than one operation. Contrasted
with this low-profile view of the CIA
.overseas are his assertions of an ink-
pressive amount of successful activ-
ity. Ile c'-aims that "over the years,
there have been literally thousands
.of CIA agents in the U.S.S.R., Red
China, Cuba and other communist
cr,;t is safe front ihere.
'File facts &-i I was c~.pnsec to t ielkh
were vastly ditierent. In the days be-
fore I began to worry about becoru-
ing an old whore nhyself, I -served
for several years at it station with
considerably more Iran three case
officers. During one particularly hec-
tic sunlnler, I met regularly with and
handled no fewer than twenty agents,
one of them with an additional five
subagents. My workload had been
expanded by taking on landholding
chores for sonic operations of my
colleagues who were on home leave,
but the average load for case officers
is, I suspect, closer to twenty than to
one. Even after I had achieved the
relative luxury of handling only one
fairly high-level agent, I continued
to manage four or five other agents
in support of my operation and other
station operations, aril I considered
myself underemployed at the time.
It's embarrassing to admit that
China was my primary target and
all my best efforts resulted in not one
penetration of the Chinese military,
party, or government above the vil-
lage level. The other case officers at
the station were similarly unsuccess.
ful, as had been every other case of-
ficer who had worked on the target
for time previous twenty years. We
consoled ourselves only with the
knowledge that our colleagues in the
units working against the U.S.S.R.,
with more personnel and more mon-
ey and, presumably, more urgency,
would have fared just as miserably
but for the greater tendency of Rus-
sians to defect. Their one outstand-
ing agent was riot developed through
any positive effort on their part; lie
had sought them out..
Early in the book, Mr. Copeland
describes the CIA's arrest and phys-
ical elimination of a headquarters
employee who had served for years
as an agent for the Russians. If lie
* Mr. Copelan+l corrects it popular
m2.5cl1nc"oi.on I,y eXrtt_tilling that staff
CiA smplr.yerg are almost never de:!g-
nated as agents, in the sense that F61
expects anyone to believe this story,
it tn'!'it have occtllr'ed to him tih;it hr'
is confessing to a role as accessory
to an administrative murder. The
who %%ould Lake tile
ly of
ordering it. Aimiul1"ll the I'Itoenix
ltrograrli, it wholc?a ie a53a1~=intltiun
of k- y in;tu'gt:rlt leaders in 1`it tnanl,
was directed by t{-en Autbassador
William Colby, i*- r; as , carried out
principally by the ~'ictn;tnlese them-
selves, not by CIA +Itlicers. Phoenix
had the fall approv.ll of Iiighrr au
thority, so the burden of Agency re-
slmnsiflility was rniniulal. It wa not
at all equivalent to the secret liqui-
dation of one renegade Staff employee
in the haseinent of the Langley head-
quarters. If this incident had really
happened, it would be foolhardy in
the extreme for anyone involved ever
to mention it; a second execution
would be far more likely than the
first was.
IIE MOST iNIAG1NAt;t1'E invention
lof the whole book is time cabal, or
inner circle of Agency old-timers,
who pop up to illustrate a point now
and then. Known only by exotic
names like "Mother," "Kingfish,"
"Dojo," and "Lady Win(lemere,"
they go on about the business of mak-
ing the Agency run, regardless of
changes in adrr.iniaration or policy.
Time last three of thiuc mentioned, on
the basis of their described respon-
sibilities, appear to be no more than
specialists in a single unit that sup-
ports operations without getting di-
redly involved in their execution or
command; these positions would not
account for the importance or influ-
ence Mr. Copeland ascribes to them.
Mother is the eminence grist. Like
the otlkers, lie was present at the birth
of the Agency, and, faced with the
frustration of wondering what de-
cisions the Congress was making for
the ff.ature of the fledgling Central
Intelligence Group; lie characteris-
tically suggested, "Penetration be-
gins at home," thus showing that in-
t.ragovernmental spying was not an
invention of time Joint Chiefs. It was
also Mother who fabricated it corn-
plete epiona-e operation in those
+ ., t v days jti ?.t to expose the gullibil-
ity of it unit competing with Iris for
influence in the new Agency.
In intelligence an agent is someone, use- CIA has no police powers,, let alone in spite of his early start and un-
ally a foreign flat* ~,r 1 lir^e~ gvt r ct 1`~ l t of inaneuver, Mother
information or pi t0~1ViI~1Ft I~g4~!. as lb}ta84?1 ~I~f~$=t1~~~200t1~dd~~-~
The staff employee: who contacts and (I tioner as well . ieae are no (ou It some tow never made it, to the top,
reels him, and ' in general 1land1 s his plenty of officers, young and old, but he enjoys a certain amount of
w -_-- +r e _ 1.___ - -.. .. 4i__-- ..OL.--91 ...1,.. 1n n .rev nnl nnlnnntnv entlnv ne 1w.-id of the APen-
 IL I "r~:1
ry;:,, cil'.lrtitcrtt?rrori-t ?.!IIort, it huge riotisly, Litt I doubt [!):it ,inyone with ttitrI i :-i lr, from I';tigeite Mk(;ai.
co 1 itllerizcd data hurl~- storinrc k? 'I e nee rti ri tl e t t ri , rncrl ? clrlr ins; Iht-
gground information I'Vinililions 01 ii+gelicy 6t, 110, 1 lyAl (04 $ 10Qi l or ~~Ir rtrv(tr.
pel.uns, both American and foreign, with it, or prcci-ely tvlurt their re- This t:al ' t h?eirit: clludity of absw
Who could conceivably become in- lationship with i\]r. (;oi,rlaml is. Un- hite righlrle pt:rvadcs "/'hr .tmeri-
volved in terrorist activity, as well as like the gene al run of Walter Mittys can Currtliliun, a lenl'tlty I???. ay on
millions store who could not. Mother who claim to have some. intimate re- the evils that aiCntu eiriy the com:ell-
is, of course, an imaginary character, lationsilip with the CIA, Miles Cope- tration of power, and on the copse-
but, aside from that, there is no way land clearly has one, but neither lie quest need for_Anoeciclms to redis-
for an outsider to judge the truth of nor the Agency is going, to define it cover the basic lia monies of a sini-
the Agency's so-called counterterror- voluntarily. In the foreword, Mr. pler?, more cormnunitaiian existellcet
ist .activities. It is not legally autho- Copeland says, "1 must slake it clear, as a way of exercising their in(livid-
rized to keep files on American cit- however, that no one at CIA ... or ualisnl, reducing alienation, and
izens. The significant thing is that any other official agency has `cleared' thereby finding freedom.
the author wants his readers to be- this book or in any other way in]- The steps by which this quintes.
licve it is doing?so. plied approval of my writing it." In sential New Frontieisman has come
The CIA may well become the early November of last year, I wrote to appropriate the rhetoric of tl1.e
world's most powerful government a letter to Angus Thuerrner, assistant National Review are not spelled out,
agency, according to Mr. Copeland, to director William Colby, asking and that is a great pity. From all his
because it has access to the most several very specific questions about fulminations against inflation ("a tax
knowledge. Removing the dangers the clearance of a magazine article on the citizenry"), the "bureaucratic
inherent in a powerful government that appears, in somewhat different spirit," and."coercii,n," are Ave to in-
agency, he adds, is not a matter of form, as chapter nine, of the book. fer a repudiation of Goodwin's ear-
decreasing the power, but of ensur- Mr. Thuermer's reply was unequiv- her commitments? It is hard to say:
ing that those who exercise it are ocal. "All Agency employees," lie in a single page he suggests the na-
incorruptible and truly responsive to said, "sign secrecy agreements, and tionalization of the major sources of
public interest. "CIA officials believe the federal courts have determined capital and that "economic relation-
that their agency is already incorrup- that the secrecy agreements are en- ships should be decentralized," the
tible and ... as responsive to public forceable contracts." The actual re- two seemingly contradictory impera-
interest as any other agency" Inter- view of manuscripts is a security tives to be reconciled by employing
estingly enough, lie does not claim function, and on that basis lie de- "the new technologies of control."
anywhere that the Agency is respon- clinecl to answer my questions, but if Goodwin locates much of the re-
sive to higher authority. On the con- the mail who sits next to the director sponsibility for the alienation of con-
trary, lie gives examples where it has of Central Intelligence' admits he had temporary Americans in the domina-
specifically been unresponsive and the machinery to stop publication tion by large bureaucracies of the
implies that it will continue to be so of this book and didn't, that should economic life of the nation. Much of
in cases where higher authority is in be approval enough for anyone. ^ this argument is made with copious
conflict with its own particular view recourse to quotations from St. Paul
of the public interest. and Nietzsche, Jeffer,on, Marx, and
The overall picture that emerges so on (but sparingly from John Ken-
from this book is of a Central Intel- neth Galbraith, whose analysis Good-
ligence Agency enormously compe- ~~~~win's most resembles). It is an argu-
tent, frighteningly ruthless, spectac- Inent displaying so many of the fur-
ularly successful, terribly powerful, 7 '~~ 1~f1~$~~]`~T~:iS nishings of Goodwin's well-furnished
and absolutely trustworthy, the sort mind that the reader may wonder if
of ideal government organization by Nelson W. Polshy he has stumbled upon the intellectual
that only a fool or a charlatan would equivalent of a garage sale.
tamper with. The author has com- The American Condition, by Rich- The message of The American
posed it presentation that could com- and N. Goodwin, Doubleday, $10. Condition is unremittingly grim-
pletely revamp the Agency's image. even in a potentially cvliimsical nio-
It. has been apparent that ever Eli SiNCF, Richard Goodwin en- nlent when Goodwin Spins out a fable
since his clays as executive director, 1'I:.I tered public life, in the early about how cooking caused the fall of
William Colby has been trying to 1960s, a certain moral regency has loan., Moreover, as the testament of
renovate his organization's image. surrounded his every move, whether a man formerly engaged feverishly
h-
The impression he wanted to project, it was coining stirring phrases for as a political activist, it is thorough-
Z'3
us a friend of mine put it, seemed to Presidential speeches ("Alliance For going in its rejection of politics. The
he "something like it cross between Progress," "'l'ime Great Society"), role of politics in America, as Good-
General Motors and the League of keeping the "authorized" account of will sees it, is not to advance lmlnan
Women Voters." There is an ors- the Kennedy assassination within dignity, or even to share sonic good-
inous implication in this book that, guidelines set out by the family, ies around, but principally to prevent
by improving the Agency's image, mortal clashes between powerful
Colby intends to enllr cc its r Nelson IF. rt,l.,r+l?, n ,o/itiral srit?ntict nttr' I-it this is not
I 1N'rove~d'br R~t~~;t~Q~F~41~d~it:t,~2IrA~Fi~RP44~101~0
and inde iendence as w(. ,ossl ale, as c uri lc 1.850x, force
ley, fnliltrrrrin. Ills /or(lrcntning hook of
A great many people are going to essays is emit/etl Political 1'rumisca (0.r/veil and not politics (ll;cldes the issue."
takeitout Clak or Daaeer se- Ur+hrrr.iy Prncsi_ The rinestint- is_ rrinrh of
 ApprAov~eedrFor eleaase12001y/018/22 : CIA- P84-0049' D0 0 01 0001-1
By Martha Angle
Star-News Staff Writer
The Central Intelligence
Agency had more extensive
contacts with the Watergate
burglars than it has previ-
ously acknowledged and
failed to divulge all it knew
to federal investigators, ac-
cording to a Senate Water-
gate committee staff report.
A minority staff report
released today was pre-
pared at the direction of
Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr.,
R-Tenn., committee vice
chairman. It appears to
raise more questions than it
answers about the full ex-
tent of the CIA role in the
Watergate case and in the
burglary of the office of
Daniel Ellsberg's psy-
chiatrist.
CIA Director William E.
Colby protested that the
Baker report "implies that
there is reason to believe
the agency and its officers
and employes had prior
knowledge of and were wit-
tingly involved in the break-
ins and the cover-up."
Such conclusions, Colby
said in a letter to Baker,
are "unjustifiable."
ACTUALLY, the Baker
report draws no conclusions
but rather emphasizes the
difficulties the staff encoun-
tered in obtaining access to
data sought from the CIA. It
also is peppered with dele-
tions demanded by the CIA
to protect classified materi-
al.
The repor stops far short
of the sweeping allegations
which former White House
special counsel Charles W..
Colson made to a private
investigator last month.
In discussionswiti inves-
tigator Richard ' . Bast,
Colson charged that the CIA
"deliberately assisted and
helped carry out" the Ells-
berg burglary, knew in ad-
vance of the plan to break
gaged in one h - lY
ON THE BASIS of closed-
door testimony and a re-
view of some 700 documents
supplied by the CIA, the
committee probers reported
that:
0 The Washington public
relations firm, Robert Mul-
len & Co., which Watergate
conspirator E. Howard
Hunt Jr. joined after retir-
ing from the CIA in 1970,
was actually a front for the
agency and provided a
"cover" for CIA operatives
in Europe and Asia.
0 Robert Bennett, presi-
dent of Mullen & Co. and
son of Sen. Wallace Ben-
nett, R-Utah, "reported de-
tailed knowledge of the
Watergate incident to his
CIA case officer" on July
10, 1972, less than a month
after the break-in, but the
information was not relayed
to the FBI.
? A March 1, 1973, memo by
Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of
CIA's "central cover staff,"
notes that "Bennett felt he
could handle the Ervin
Committee if the Agency
could handle Hunt," ac-
cording to the Senate re-
port. The memo also said
Bennett was "feeding
stories" to Washington Post
reporter Bob Woodward,
who was "suitably grate-
ful" and was "protecting
Bennett and Mullen & Co."
0 The CIA has acknowledg-
ed paying one-half of Ben-
nett's attorney's fee for his
grand jury appearance.
0 As early as June 1972 the
CIA knew one of its paid
operatives, Lee R. Penning-
ton Jr., "had entered the
James. McCord residence
shortly after the Watergate
break-in and destroyed
documents which might
show a link between,
McCord and the CIA."
0 When the FBI inquired
about a "Pennington" in
August 1972, the CIA fur-
nished information about a
former employe with a simi-
For F46tel e2.U1 8Y22 o
C Information about the
"real" Pennington was pro-
vided to the Watergate com-
mittee in February 1974
only after a low-echelon
CIA employe protested an
order to remove the inateri-
al from the CIA's Water-
gate files to prevent its dis-
closure.
The unnamed "personnel
security officer #1" inform-
ed his superiors, according
to closed-door Senate testi-
mony, that "up to this time
we have never removed,
tampered with, obliterated,
destroyed or done anything
to any Watergate docu-
ments and we can't be
caught in that kind of bind
now."
The employe also said he
"didn't cross the Potomac
on his way to work in the
morning and the agency
could do without its own L.
Patrick Gray." This was a
reference to the former act-
ing FBI director who was
told to "deep six" docu-
ments from Hunt's White
House safe and subsequent-
ly did destroy them.
0 Tape recordings of room
and telephone conversa-
tions by top CIA officials
were destroyed on orders of
former CIA Director Rich-
ard Helms approximately a
week after he received a
NEARLY one-fourth of
the 43-page Baker report is
devoted to an account of the
assistance furnished Hunt, by the CIA prior to the Sept.
3, 1971, break-in at the of-
fice of Dr. Lewis Fielding,
Ellsberg's former psy-
chiatrist, by members of
the White House "plumb=:;
ers" team.
The report says "docu-
and conflicting testi-
ments
mony of CIA personnel"
raise questions about
"whether the CIA had ad-
vance knowledge of the
Fielding break-in," al-
though the agency today
again denied any such prior
knowledge.
The Senate staff report
notes that CIA assistance to
Hunt - which including the
furnishing of false identi-
fication papers, a voice
changer, wig, camera, tape
recorder and the like - was
not terminated until Aug.
27; 1971, one week before
the break-in. ?
Although top agency offi-
cials have testified publicly
that the tie with Hunt was,
severed because he was
making unreasonable de-
mands on the CIA, the staff.
report suggests the real.
reason may have been that',
agency officials became
suspicious of Hunt's inten-;
tions.
HUNT, AND "plumber"
letter from Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield ask-
ing that no evidence rela-
tive 'to Watergate be de-
stroyed.
Among the telephone tape
transcripts destroyed were!
conversations with Presi-
dent Nixon 'and former
White House aides H. R.
Haldeman and John D. Ehr-
lichman, according to the
report. Helms and his
secretary have testified
these were not-related to
Watergate.
G. Gordon Liddy had enter-
ed Fielding's office to
"case" the burglary job,
and had taken photos with
the camera provided by the
CIA. The film was de-
veloped by the agency and
reviewed before it was re-
turned to Hunt.
"One CIA official who re-
viewed the film admitted he
found the photographs
'intriguing' and recognized
them to be of 'southern
California,"' the staff re-
port said. The official
ordered a blow-up of one
l;oto, which turned out to
-RDP,e9F~ 13000 hbbw Dr. Fielding's name in
the parking lot next to his
office, the report said.
 Approved For @olease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004996001000130001-1
"Another CIA official has
testified that he speculated
that they were 'casing'
photographs," the report
said. The contents of the
photos were reported to
then-Deputy CIA Director
Robert Cushman, according
to this official. Cushman
has denied receiving such a
report, the committee staff
said.
The CIA, in a series of
comments aimed at rebut-
ting various portions of the
report, said today that at
the time the photos were de-
veloped, "the name of Dr.
Fielding had no meaning to
the agency personnel in-
volved. "
THE COMMITTEE staff
report said that although
public CIA testimony has
claimed the agency had no
contact "whatsoever" with
Hunt after Aug. 31, 1971, the
Senate investigation reveal-
ed at least a half-dozen
later contacts going up to
the spring of 1972.
In the period between
March and May of 1972, the
report said, Hunt contacted
the CIA's External Employ-
ment Assistance Branch
and "approached several
active CIA personnel" seek-
ing a "retired lock-picker,"
an "entry man" and other
operatives.
In March 1972, Hunt con-
tacted Eugenio Martinez, a
former full-time CIA em-
ploye then on retainer to the
agency, who reported the
contact to his CIA case offi-
cer. (Martinez subsequent-
ly joined the Watergate bur-
glars and now is on trial in
the Ellsberg case).
Somewhat cryptically,
Martinez informed the CIA
station chief in Miami that
Hunt was employed by the
White House "and asked
the chief of station if he was
sure he had been appraised
of all agency activities in
the Miami area."
THE STATION chief, ac-
cording to the Senate re-
port, sent a letter to CIA
headquarters here and was
told in reply that Hunt was
on "domestic White House
business of an unknown na-
ture and that the chief of
station should 'cool it,"' the
staff report said.
"It is not explained why
Hunt, who had 'used' the
CIA, was not of more inter-
est to the agency, especially
when he was contacting a
current operative, Mar-
tinez," the report said. . .
"The (Miami) chief of
station was confounded as
to why he was not told to
terminate the Martinez
relationship if the CIA
headquarters suspected
the involvement of Hunt in
political activities," the re-
port added.
The Senate probe, con-
ducted by Minority Counsel
Fred D. Thompson and two
of his assistant counsels,
Howard S. Lieben_Sood and
Michael J. Madigan, was
initiated last November and
completed by March of this
year.
Ever since then, the
Watergate committee has
been attempting to per-
suade the CIA to declassify
documents on which the re-
port largely is based. The
final version was
"sanitized" by the agency,
which also put out its own
rebuttal comments simul-
taneously with the release
of the staff report.
THE BAKER report in-
cludes an eight-page list of
"action desirable to com-
plete the Watergate-related
CIA investigation" Baker
said he will recommend
that the suggestions "be
carefully undertaken" by
congressional committees
responsible for "oversight"
of CIA.
Among items requested by
the Watergate staff --- but
not provided by the CIA
were an agency file on "Mr.
Edward," (Hunt) which in-
cliided all materials on the
technical assistance pro-
vided Hunt by the CIA. The
CIA rebuttal document said
the Watergate committee
"already possesses the rele-
_ vant material" from this
file.
The committee also
sought, unsuccessfully, to
gain access to a five-inch
reel of tape labeled
"McCord incident" and
dated June 18-19, 1972,
which did not turn up until
March 1, 1974.
"It is not known what is
contained in this tape, but
its importance is obvious,"
the staff said. The agency
e
Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0 ant
0..4 Q1~ w' ant
already been provided to
the committee.
 H$/IIC-
Approved Fo Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499,,001000130001-1
A?18 W hingfon Starl~ews
Wednesday, July 10, 1974
CIA Bid
To Hush'
Critic Told
By Michael Sniffen
Associated Press
"Ok
The CIA tried to lure an
ex-agent who has written an
expose of its operations
back to the United States by
interfering in his marriage,
according to an American
Civil Liberties Union law-
yer.
Melvin L. Wulf, an ACLU
lawyer who has correspond-
ed with former deep-cover
agent Philip B. F. Agee,
said, "CIA tried to interfere
in the settlement of the
separation' proceedings
with his wife, to make it dif-
ficult to reach a settle-
ment."
Wulf said the CIA wanted.
Agee, who is in Great Brit-
ain, to return to the United
States where the agency
could go into court in an ef-
fort to prevent disclosure in
his book of secret informa-
tion.
In a telephone interview
Monday Wulf said that John
Greaney, assistant general
counsel of CIA, had talked
to Agee's wife.
"I CONFRONTED him
with the charge that CIA
was trying to make trouble
in this domestic matter to
lure Agee back," Wulf said.
Wulf said CIA tried
unsuccessfully to persuade
Mrs. Agee not to let their
children visit Agee.
Greaney refused to com-
ment on Wulf's remarks.
Agee has told associates
that he was involved in the
assassination of locally em-
ployed CIA agents, known
in the agency as contract
employes, the New York
Times reported yesterday.
. Agee told friends that the
assassinations were not
official CIA policy, but rath-
er local options taken in the
field, according to the
Times.
The Times said that Agee
related at least one incident
involving the use of a truck
to run over a recently
utilized local CIA operative
whose mission had been
completed.
WULF is representing
two other former intelli-
gence officers, Victor Mar-
chetti and John Marks, in a
court battle with the CIA
over publication of secret
information in a book they
have published. The CIA
filed civil suit against them,
forcing deletions in the
book.
Agee said-in an interview
he has completed a 220,000-
word book on the CIA's
Latin American operations.
Wulf said the book will be
published by Penguin in
Great Britain in the fall and
that Penguin is seeking an
American publisher.
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 Approved For*&leas~p200t10a122 IA-RDP'$4-00499W01000130001-1
SEN. IIOWARD 11. BAKER JR.
... probes CIA involvement
Baker to Say,
CIA Helped.
flu ut Get .Job
By Laurence Stern
Wasb4ir?t0n Post Staff Writer
Testimony indicating that a Central
intelligence Agency official recom-
mended the employment of Watergate
conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. by a
Washington public relations firm
which has served as a CIA "cover" will
be released today by Sen. [Toward H.
Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.).
The public relations firm is Robert
Mullen & Co., whose relationship with
the CIA. forms a central theme of the
Baker report cleared by the CIA for
release last weekend.
Hunt was recommended to the Mul-
len firm at the time of his retirement
from the agency in 1970 by a CIA offi-
cial identified as Frank O'Malley.
There have been unsubstantiated alle-
gations in the case that Hunt was re-
commended to Mullen by former CIA
Director Richard M. TIclms.
Beth the CIA and officials of the
their mutual ties, which included pro
viding a corporate cover for CIA oper-
atives In Mullen & Co. offices in Singa-
pore and Amsterdam.
Sources who have examined the re-
port say it provides no conclusive links
tween the CIA and the original
b
e
Watergate break-in such as have been
hinted by former White House aide
Charles Colson and by Baker.
However, -it includes documentation
In the farm of three CIA memoranda'
D84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved Folease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049901000130001-1
A8
Tuesday, July 2,1974 THE WASHINGTON POST
.: Baker to Issue Report
ermate te
which point to covert effogts by offi-
, cials of the agency to minimize its in-
{-.volvement in the Watergate investiga-
:tion.
F..
There is also some evidence that
Robert F. Bennett, president-of Mullen
x.: and son of Sen. Wallace F. Bennet (R-
Utah), was tipped off prior to the
Watergate burglary that a White
House llreak-in team was targeting Me-
Govern campaign headquarters for a
apolitical intelligence raid.
a Bennett has privately acknowledged
that he was given advance knowledge
of the operations of the burglary team.
But it was unknown whether he passed
this information on to the CIA. .
The memos upon which Baker drew
In the preparation of his report were
drafted by Erie W. Eisenstadt, chief of
the central cover staff for the CIA's
clandestine directorate; Martin J. Lu-
kasky, Bennett's "case officer" within
;.. the agency, and subordinates of former
CIA security director Howard Osborn,
who recently took an early retirement
;:. from the CIA.
The Eisenstadt and Lukasky memos
recount the CIA's relationships with
,,,.Mullen & Co. and recount claims by
Bennett that he planted unfavorable
stories in Newsweek and The Washing-
ton Post dealing with White House
aides, including Colson. The object of
these stories, the Baker report will in-
was to draw attention away'
dicate,
from CIA involvement in the Water-
gate case.
draft version of Baker's report. ?
The Michigan Democrat Is said to
be in contact with the CIA's con-
gressional liaison office on an almost
day-to-day basis as new allegations
have arisen suggesting new involve-
the agency in the Water-
by Baker, suggests that the former
CIA security director provided mis-
leading Information to the FBI on the
identity of a former federal investiga-
tor who helped Watergate burglar
James W. McCord Jr.'s wife destroy
CIA. records at their home immedi-
ately after her husband's arrest in the
Watergate break-in case.
- Osborn's retirement, according to
one official familiar with the handling
of the case, was an outgrowth of the
tnternai memorandum prepared in
Osborn's office which resulted in the
transmission of misleading informa-
tion to the FBI. -
Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), who
has reviewed a draft of the Baker re-
port, said Sunday on the CBS pro-
gram "Face the Nation" (WTOP) that
it contained "no bombshells." Nedzi,
chairman of the House Armed Service
Intelligence Subcommittee, has taken
testimony from CIA officials on a
number of allegations mad. in the
gate scandal.
Some of Baker's colleagues on the
Senate Watergate committee, of which
the served as co-chairman, have
charged that Baker has sought to im-
plicate the CIA in the scandal to di-
vert attention from the White House
role in the break-in and ensuing cover-
up.
The report also questions why photo-
graphs found in the CIA file t ken by
members of the White House " pIgmb-
era team during the Ellsberg break-in
were not turned over to the FBI, even
though agency officials were aware of
their evidentiary significance.
By and large, the Baker report
reaches no definite conclusions but it
suggests continued investigation of the
relationships between the CIA and
Watergate and names prospective wit-
nesses to be examined.
The Senate Watergate committee
has gone out of existence but will issue
its final report next week.
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 Editorials
A-14 ?
Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049Q 001000130001-1
TUESDAY, JULY 2, 1974
Opinion
Vic Gold:
Ou Th Lest CIA 'Plot'
Former White House aide Charles W. on the line. The way Colson did last
Colson has developed a detailed theory week.
- which he says is generally shared by And let me tell you, gentlemen, when
President Nixon - that the Central Chuck Colson runs a CIA conspiracy
Intelligence Agency is implicated in the theory up his greased flagpole, folks Chu Watergate scandals to a far greater ex- stop, right up and with -
Nck
News Pecs dent hi
tent than has ever been disclosed. - And the way he tells it, the Old
News report self. A Man was fairly quaking over the possi-
Jim Garrison, Mark Lane, Norm bility that the CIA might succeed in a
Presid; ent where needs are you? you now, when your major putsch to take over White House
President operations.
ma-
i
-
All you true believers in the omn
NIXON, said Colson, is "convinced
levolence of the Central Intelligence Ag
ency are you ready for another Con the CIA is in this up to their eyeballs."
spiracy Theory? Good, because this one Sound familiar, Jim/Mark/Norm? Why, line is wild. Almost as wild as the one Norm fit's rom raone c oicall f yy a left winget straight
was handing out last year about the the John F. Kennedy assassination. Ex-
mystisry of Marilyn Monr oe' s death. ceps, Mark, whereas you titled your
Yes, indeed, there's a fresh CIA plot book on that subject. "Rush to Judg-
just waiting to be stirred. One that cries ?ment," I think what we have here is
out for experienced hands. You've all more like "Rush Away from Judg-
been the route, from How-the-CIA- meat."
Killed-John-Kennedy to How-the-CIA- It's as if'they sat around the White
Caused-Hurricane-Agnes" So it figures House one afternoon, the Old Man and
that if Chuck Colson and Howard Baker Chuck, and thought: The liberal media
are going anywhere with their theory of want a scapegoat for Watergate. O.K.,
How-the-CIA-Is-Responsible-for-Water- give 'em the CIA. But what could the
gate, they could use your help. CIA have in mind, getting "up to their
"eyeballs" in this sort of mess?
THAT'S SEN. Howard Baker, of Well, says Colson, the Pcourse, who was Sam Ervin's sidekick theory is "thewere coming in President's
en to
last summer during the Senate Water- spy and t"th wanted coming get enough to
gate hearings. Baker has been trying to to
Wash- the White House so they could get what
sell his CIA's- -the-One line around d Washh- they wanted."
ington for the past six months, but with And what do they want? That's where
wre counting on you, Tn/Mhek/
no success. He says it's because the CIA A
won't cooperate. If you ask me, though, Norm. counting, you our, im/M ckn Chuck Ji in /Mark/ Norm, it's because the Ten- only . so car elaborating a CIA con
nessee senator "animals talking in sh para- go on ng spiracy. Beyond a certain point, he
ales. Stuff Stuff about s "animals crashing lacks your experience filling in outland-
ish in the forest," and the like. ish details about such things..That is, in
Now, Jim, you know, from your ex- explaining to the American people that
perience gulling the voters of New Or- what the CIA really wants - in league
leans (until they finally tired of your with its allies, the FBI, the Pentagon,
act), that talking in parables isn't the those Texas oil millionaires, Burt Lan-
way to get a good conspiracy theory caster, Kirk Douglas and the rest of the
going. No, to sell a CIA scenario that cast from "Seven Days in May" -- is
people will listen to, a man's got to lay it absolute power. Nothing less.
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tti..-c_ /1`7
CIA
Mieged
By Richard M. Cohen
Washington Post Staff Writer
The lawyer for Watergate
conspirators Bernard Barker
and Eugenio Martinez re-
vealed yesterday that the two
had previously engaged in a
series of illegal activities for
the Central Intelligence
Agency, ineludin~ .a
"penetration" of the Radio
City Music Hall by Barker in
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By the 1947 act of Congress
that created it, the CIA is
forbidden to engage in do-
mestic intelligence operations.
However, the agency is per-
mitted to conduct domestic
operations to protect its for.11
eign activities - a loophole j
that could cover the alleged,
Miami break-ins by Barker.
Those break-ins' and those
at the Watergate and at' th<
office of ' Ellsberg's psychia-
trist are just a few to have
gained public attention. Some,
such as the illegal entry into
Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office,
involved the use of CIA equip.
ment and facilities. Others,
such as the break-ins at Chile-
an government offices here
and New York in 1971 and
1972 remain unexplained and
no agency role has ever been;
proven.
In addition, antiwar groups
have frequently complained
of break-ins, somtimes alleg-
ing government attempts to
obtain information. None of
See BREAK-INS, A12, Col. 2
about the propriety of this,"
the spokesman said.
the mid-1960s.
The Radio City Music Hall
entry, the lawyer said, was ap-
parently a "CIA "training ses-
sion" to see if Barker could ac-
complish his mission satsfac-
torily. Other missions, the law-
yer said, included the burglary
of the Miami home of a boat
crew member who was making
trips for the CIA to Cuba and'
a similar break-in of a Miami
business office.
The lawyer, Daniel Schultz,
revealed sonic of Barker's and
iVlrirtinca,' pass CIA errapades
during opening arguments for
i.hr it trial, along; with former
presidential wide; John D.
1' hrlichman and Watergate
conspirator G. Gordon Liddy,
on charges stemming from the
1971 break-in of Daniel Ells.
berg's psychiatrist's office.
A CIA spokesman said yes.
tcrday the agency would not
comment on Schultz's state-
ment because . the matter is
now before the court. "Our le-
gal guys are very Concerned
 Approved For tease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-004991000130001-1
Break-ins Sponsored by CIA
Laid -to 2 Ellsherg Defendants
BREAK-INS, From Al
these claims has been
stantiated."
also were among five men ar- source said, Martinez engaged
rested in the Watergate of- in the activities that Schultz
sub- fices of the Democratic Na- mentioned in court yesterday
Schultz refused to expand
upon his courtroom remarks
other than to say that addi-
tional details would be made
public as the trial pro-
gressed.
Nevertheless, it was the sec-
end time in a week that a re-
port of a CIA role in the
Watergate affair has come to
public attention.
Earlier this week, a Wash-
ington-based former private
octective, Richard Bast, said
former presidential aide
Charles Colson suspected that
the CIA planned both the
Watergate break-in and the
entry of Ellsberg's psychia-
trist's office, and that Presi-
tdent Nixon, to an - extent,
shared Colson's suspicions of
the agency.
Bast said he interviewed
Colson on two occasions be-
fore Colson was sentenced a
week ago to a one-to-three-year
jail term and a $5,000 fine for
attempting to influence the
outcome of the EllsbQrg trial
by leaking derogatory informa-
tion about Ellsberg to the
press.
Colson, according to Bast)
also said that Senate Water-
gate committee investigators
were informed of the times
and places of at least 300
other break-ins conducted by
Martinez. 1,3enat.e committee
sources have denied they have
such information.
Neither Barker nor Marti-
nez has made any secret of
their past work for the CIA,
which the two have said was
limited to operations against
the regime of Fidel Castro in
tional Committee and were -destrucion of foreign prop-
subsequently convicted of bur- erty, possession and distribu-
glary. tion of firearms, and falsifica-
Barker, a bespectacled un- tion of income tax returns to
dercover operative, was born hide the CIA as a source of in-
in Havana and gr^w up both come.
in the United States and Cuba. As for Barker, his entry into
He was a captain in World the Radio City Music Hall, the
War II in the Army Air Corps source said, was a CIA test to
and was shot down over Ger- see if he could accomplish the
many where he was held pris- mission successfully and re-
oner for 17 months. In the late tain details of what he had
1950s, he joined the Castro seen. The break-in site was the
guerilla movement but he be- theater's "monitoring office",
came disillusioned and fled to which contained closed-circuit
Miami in 1959. television cameras. When
Thereafter, Barker worked Barker returned from his mis-
against Castro and is said to sion, he was debriefed to see
have been one of the organiz- if he had actually been in the
ers of the Bay of Pigs inva- room.
sion. From that time, until The source close to Barker,
1966, Barker worked for the said that Barker presumed the
CIA. Until his arrest at the Radio City Music Hall break,
Watergate, he ran a real es- in was a training operation be
tate agency in Miami, cause of the 'nature of the,
Like Barker, Martinez origi- questioning he underwent
nally worked for Castro but upon his return.
later turned against him. He, The source said the illegal
too, participated in the Bay of entry into the Miami home of
Pigs invasion, later worked for a crew member of a boat used
the CIA and joined Barker's. in forays against Cuba was or-
real estate firm as a salesman. dered because the 'man was
According to an informed suspected of talking about the,
source, Barker and Martinez Cuban operations-"not keep-
met during the planning and ing security.' The other Mi-
execution of the Bay of Pigs ami 'break-in Schultz men-
invasion and later worked for tioned yesterday was also con
the CIA in operations directed netted to the CIA's Cuban op-
against the Castro regime. erations, the source said.
Martinez, according to the Barker, for one, has ac-
source, was the captain of a knowledged his participation
boat used by the CIA to ferry in anti-Castro activities, main-
supplies and personnel to taining before the Senate
Cuba and to take refugees Watergate Committee that he
back to Florida. Martinez, ac- believed the Watergate break,
croding.to this source, partici- in was ordered to determine if
pated in occasional raids the Democrats were receiving
against the Castro regime. ' money from the Castro re-
'Cuba. Barker and Martinez' In these capacities, the gime.
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 Approved For lease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499J01000130001-1
tUa hin9tonStarllcws
Thursday, July 4, 1974
dears of CIA
On Blown Latin
Cover Disclosed
Associated Press
A disgruntled Central Intelligence Agency operative
in Latin America passed information to a Soviet KGB
agent two years ago that the CIA says threatened its
Western Hemisphere operations, an informed official,
source says.
The agency's concern of compromised operations
were relayed to the Senate Watergate committee in
closed session, according to a committee minority staff
report issued earlier this week by Sen. Howard Baker,
The source said last night that the CIA agent talked
with a known agent of the KGB, or (Soviet) Committee
of State Security, in 1972 and that the revelations he is
believed to have made were considered very serious
by the CIA. The 1GB is in charge of Soviet internal
security and foreign intelligence.
The source said the CIA agent "has not defected in
the classical sense. He has not gone physically to the
other side, but he has certainly quit." It could not be
learned what information he gave the KGB.
THE CIA man was "despondent," "disgruntled"
with the agency and "in his cups" at the time of his
outpouring to the Soviets, the New York Times quoted
sources as saying.
The agent now is believed to.be writing a book about
his knowledge of the CIA,. the source said. The Baker
report said the committee learned of the CIA's concern
from the CIA's deputy director of plans.
Baker's report, devoted to possible CIA involvement
in Watergate, said that the agency had described the,
affair for the committee but that description was de.
leted from his public report at agency request.
THE AFFAIR came to Baker's attention 'throulgh "
what lie called a mysterious reference in a CIA memo ",
to a "WH flap." The memo was written July 10, 1972 by
Robert Bennett of the Washington office of Robert
Mullen & Co., an international public relations firm
then under contract to provide cover for CIA agents
abroad.
The Mullen firm hired convicted Watergate burglar.,
E. Howard Hunt in 1970 after he left the CIA and be-,
Core he went to work for the White House as a consult- .
ant.
According to the Baker report, Bennett's memo to ":
his CIA case officer, Martin Lukasky, in 1972, reported
letailed knowledge of the Watergate incident which
had occurred the previous month.
Baker wrote that the Bennett memo "suggests that
the agency might have to level with Mullen about the
'WH flap.'
The CIA told Baker that reference was to a Western
Hemisphere flap, but Baker wrote that Bennett'
thought the reference concerned a-"White House
.lap."
THE AGENCY, however, was reluctant to tell Ben-
nett that WH stood for "Western Hemisphere" because
it did not want to Jet on that it knew of the contact be-
tween its agent and the Russians, the Times quoted
ane source as saying.
Former CIA director Richard Helms told a Senate
committee last year that on June 23, 1972 White House
chief of staff H. R. Haldeman asked CIA to keep the
FBI from delving into some Mexican angles of the
Watergate affair which might disclose CIA's opera-
tions there.
The .source suggested that the disgruntled agent's
book might trigger another court battle similar to that
;?
being waged by the agency over publication of the',
book "CIA and the Cult of ?Intelligence,".by former~?
intelligence officers Victor Marchetti and John Marks.
The-agency brought. a civil suit to gain 339 deletions; from that book before publication. This effort was
based on oaths of secrecy that the authors. took.
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i HS/HC-
 .Approved For.&Iease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$01000130001-1
A 10 Wednesday. July 3;1974 THE WASHINGTON POST
Few Conchisio
Baker-ur on CL
By Laurence Stern
Washington Post staIC Writer
Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr.
(R-Tenn.) once likened the
role of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the Water-
gate scandal to "animals
crashing around in the for-
est-you can hear therm but
you can't see them." '
This Aesopian image still
fits notwithstanding Baker's
release yesterday of a 43-
page report which is rich in
insinuation, long on foot-
notes but short on substan-
tive findings,
Baker drew the bottom
line on his case involving
the agency in a letter Mon-
day to CIA Director. )William
E. Colby. Neither the report,
nor the decision to release
it, said Baker, "shouldbe
vestigation, all ill coniicc-
Lion with Bennetth's various
Activities.
The CIA, in commenting
on these allusions, said:
' "The testimony of agency
witnesses indicates that the,
i agency had not, interest or
involvetnient in any of the
afforementioned activities
of Mr. Bennett and no cvi-
ccnce tor"the contrary has
been made available to the
agency."
The theory of CIA involve-
ment in the Watergate case
'stems from President Nixon
who said on May 22, 1973, that
within , a few days of the
Watergate arrests "I was ad-
vised that there was a possibil-
ity of CIA involvement in
some way.",
Acting on. this suspicion he
viewed as an indication that
either the committee or I
have reached conclusions in
this area of investigation,"
If anything, the Baker rc
port strongly suggests that
some CIA officials engaged
in cover-up maneuvers de-
signed to minimize the agen.
cy's exposure in the Water-
gate investigation.
? Baker did , unearth the
case of Lee }t. Pennington
Jr., a $250=a-month CIA con-
tract employee who ac-
knowledged that he wit-
nessed the destruction of
Watergate burglar James W.
McCord Jr.'s records by his
wife at their home after Mc-
Cord's arrest in Watergate.
CIA's then-Director of Se-
curity Howard Osborn, no
longer with the agency, fed
files oiv a different Penning-
ton to the FBI when agents
made inquiries about the in-
cident - presumably ' 'to
throw the bureau off the
track. Columnist Jack An-
derson reported the incident
several months ago..
A central figure in the re-
port is Washington public
relations executive Robert
F. Bennett of Robert Mul-
len & Co., which, has pro-
vided "cover" for CIA oper-
atives in two of its overseas
offices.
The report claims that on
July 10,' 1972, Bennett re-
ported "detailed knowledge
of the Watergate incident to
his CIA case officer." This,
conforms with Baker's gen-
era) suspicion ' that . the
agency knew far more about'
the circumstances of the'
break-in than it has ever'
admitted.
Bennett took 'issue with]
the. report yesterday. "What,
I reported to the CIA at the'
time," he said, "was what'
News Analysis
I had already told the U.S..j~i
attorney. I didn't know ally
thing about the break-in. I i
reported'my speculation
that Howard hunt had been)j
involved. I find it astonish
ing to see this characterised
as `detailed knowledge'."
Sprinkled through one
portion of the report are ref-
erences to Howard Hughes, 'y
Clifford Irving, Dita Beard'
and the Chappaquiddick in
issued instructions, shortly af- break-in and the elaborate and ',than a national' security tar-
ter tlic arrest or the but glary costly cover-up campaign get of the White House. x
team, which delayed for more which ensued. The strongest indication
than two weeks the F I's in One of the byproducts of that the CIA has emerged
vestigation of the laundering the Baker report, however, from the Baker inquiry
ol Nixon re-election funds was to impugn the national without serious bruises was
through a Mexican bank ac- security rationale by which given yesterday by CIA,-0i-
count. The President puhhcly White T[ouse officials have rector Colby.
acknowledged that his fears or repeatedly justified the bur= In a dune 28 letter-'to
exposure ofcovert CIA opera- glary of the office of Daniel Baker, Colby warned tlial;' if
tions were, after all, un- Ellsherg's psychiatrist, Dr. the report were made public
founded. Lewis Fielding. in the form it was then pres-
Baker, however, has been ', Quoting from closed ses- ' ented to him, "l may feel it
pressing for months after evi- Sion testimony by CIA gypsy -necessary to take an aphl'o-
dence that the CIA war- impli- chiatri.c advisers, the report ' nriate public position to;'as-
cated in, or had advance - says E. Howard I-Iunt Jr. ' sure that the conclusions
knowledge of, the Watergate and G. Gordon Liddy Jr. of 1i'i-om my investigation #nd
"
"
plumbers
the results of other investi-
break-in and bugging. Critical the White House
colleagues on the Senate unit said they wanted to rations are also known."
Watergate committee, of "try Ellsberg in public" and But after the report 'yeas'
which Baker was co-chairman, render him "the object of released yesterday Colhy
have charged his objective pity as a broken man." said se dire, a step as. open
was to divert attention from This . testimony tends to confrontation with a mm-
the role of top White House support the view; that Ells- berv of the Senate would" be
officials in approving the berg was a, political rather unnecessary.
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 Approved Felease 2001/08/22 :1A-RDP84-004001000130001-1
sport
Critical'
-Of Ct
Baker Hints
Agency Knew
Of Break-in
By Lawrence Meyer
Although the report raises
"questions" about the involve-
lnent of the CIA in the Water-
gate and Ellsberg break-ins,.
Baker said in a letter to pres-
ent CIA Director William L
Colby that was also released
yesterday, "Neither the select
committee's decision to make
this report a part of our pub-
lic record nor the contents of
the report should be viewed as
any indication that either the
committee or I have reached
conclusions in this area of in-
vestigation."
The report by Baker, vice
chairman of the Senate select
Watergate committee, is the
long-awaited product of sev-
eral months of investigation
Q. ,,,~.
concTuete primarily by the
the CiA in that connection are
already known.
At the request of the White
house and with the permis- ~
sion of CIA Director Richard'
17.. Helms, Ilunt was supplied:
with a wig, voice alteration de-
vices, fake glasses, falsified'
identification, a miniature 1
camera and other gear. f
The report recalls that be-I
fore the Lllsberg break-in, theI
CIA developed photographs
for ITunt that lie had made
outside the Beverly hills',
Calif., offices of Dr. Lewis!
Fielding, Ellsberg's psychia-
trist. i
"Not only was the film de-
veloped, however, but it was.
reviewed by CIA supervisory
officials before it was re-
turned to Hunt,"' the report
states. "One CIA official who
reviewed the film admitted
that he found the photographs
'intriguing' and recognized
them to be of 'Southern Cali.-
'fornia.' He then ordered one
of the photographs blown up.
The blowup revealed Dr..
Fielding's name in the park-
ing lot next to his office, An-
other CIA official has testi-
fied that he speculated that
they w c r e `casing' photo-
graphs."
According to the report,,
recent testimony" showed
thatithe CIA official who re-
viewed the photographs
"immediately" reported their
contents to Deputy CIA Direc-
tor Robert Cushman and leis
assistant. The report says
Cushman and his assistant de-
l nied ever having been told oL
Republican minority staff of
the Senate Watergate commiL-
ee.
Although the report is im
illicitly critical of the CIA, it
does not radically alter what
is already known about the
general outlines of the plan-
fling and implementation of
t
Washington Post Staff Writer The Central Intelligence Agency may have known in
advance of plans for break-
fns at the offices of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist and
the Democratic N a t i o n a l
C o m in l t t e e's Watergate
headquarters, a report re-
leased yesterday by Sen.
Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-
Tenn.) suggests.
Baker's report, accompanied
by CIA comments and denials,
provides a rare,.if incomplete,
glimpse Into the activities of
the CIA that are, by design,
normally secret.
Among other things, the re-
port describes how the CIA
used a Washington public rela-
tions firm as a, cover for
agents operating abroad, as-
serts that the', CIA destroyed
its own records in direct con
fliet with.a Senate request to
keep them intact, asserts that
a CIA operative may have
been a."domestic agent" in vi-
olation of the agency's charter
and recounts how one CIA cm
ployce fought Within the
agency against withholding in
formation from the -Senate
committee and other congres?
atonal committees.
The report recites several
instances in which it says CIA
personnel whom the commit-
tee staff sought to interview
were not made available `ay
the CIA. In addition, the re-
port lists several' other in-
stances in which it says, the
CIA either ignored, resisted or
refused requests for i o -ma-
tion and documents -
w
the Lllsberg and watersa
break-ins. Remarks by the CIA
accompanying the 43-page re-
port reject the suggestion that
the agency knew in advance
about either of the two burg
laries.
The CIA.?also disagrees with
a,`number of allegations in the
report that it has not made in-
formation available to the
committee. In addition, the re-
port contains numerous dele-
tions of names and descrip-
uest of
re
h
q
e
tions, made at t
the CIA on the grounds of na- ;the photographs by anyone,
tioual security. The report asserts, and the
One of the central figures CIA denies, -zhat it was only
who is named in the report is . when these photographs were
convicted Watergate conspira- developed that assistance to
tor E. Howard Hunt Jr., a for- Hunt by the agency was termi-
mer CIA agent who continued nated. According to the CIA,
to seek assistance from the 1"The decision to cut off sup-
CIA even after he left the port to Hunt was made
agency in 1970, face of escalating .
In three of the six areas and was not based upon the
that, the report discusses,' development of the photo,
Hunt emerges as a principll graphs."
actor. These areas include the The report also challenges
activities of Robert It. Mullen "previous public CIA testi-
and Co., a Washington public mony" that claimed that the
relations firm; the provid- CIA had no contact with Hunt
ing of technical services by at all after Aug. 31, 1971. The
the CIA that Hunt used for Ellsberg break-in occurred
the Ellsberg break-in, and the Sept. 3, 1971.
.An. According to the report,
-
a
t
th
,....., F
--
e a.o..,...h +...,....
r
Le5 auVUt,
spil.'ator., Eugon o +,
who was recruited by hunt fur documents indicate that Hunt i and Hunt's approaches to
the Ellsberg And Watergate 11 had extensive contact with the
CIA after" Aug. 31, 1971, that,
break }ns, cr,,,,+ ni nvoti a "laree role" - in
I H$/HC- 9r-t)
was completed in November;
In introducing the sebtion
on Hunt and his receipt of
technical support from the
CIA in connection with the
Plisberg break-in, the report
states, "In light of the facts
and circumstances developed
through the documents and
conflicting testimony' of CIAi
personnel adduced by this
committee ... the question ar-
ises as to whether the CIA'
had advance knowledge of the
Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiat-'
rist) break-in. '
The report asserts that the
committee gatEerdd "a wealth
of conflicting testimony
among CIA officials" when it
investigated the Lllsberg
break-in.
 I
Approved For.,OIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499&01000130001-1
1971, and that Hunt had other
contacts with the CIA.
According to the report,
IItlnt and his fellow Watergate
conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy,
who is now on trial on federal
charges arising from the >lls-
bcrg break-in, told a CIA psy-
chiatrist that they wanted to
" 'try Ellsberg in public, rend-
er him 'the object of pity as a
broken man' and' be able to
refer to Ell sberg's 'Oedipal
complex.' "
The report says Aunt asked
the CIA psychiatrist not to re-
veal Hunt's discussion of the
profile to anyone else at the
CIA. But the psychiatrist, ac-
cording to the report, was
"extremely concerned about
Hunt's presence and remarks"
and reported them to his CIA,
superiors, The report says the
committee has asked to see
memorandums of the psychia-
trist and his superiors, but the
request was refused.
In addition, the report
states, the psychiatrist "also
periors that Hunt was in Mi-
ami in early 1972. The re-
sponse from the CIA to Marti-
nez's superiors, according to
the report, was that hurt was
involved in domestic White
House business and to `}cool
it."
summaries of agency logs of
conversations held within the
CIA, but "it is-impossible to
determine who was taped in
many of the room conversa-
tions. In this regard, even the
CIA's analysis does not pro-
vide this vital infornintion.
Attempts to examine somcl'['here are several references
CIA reports concerning Marti- j to a 'Mr. X. The CIA has not
licz by the committee have
been frustrated by the CIA,
I hn ronnid nvenrl c
produced the actual logs for
our examination. However, we
were informed that there are
gai)s III Me .v~;~.
"Because of. hunt's close ref-In this regard, the report
ationship with Martinez at ajalso cites a struggle within the
time when Martinez was a
paid CIA operative, the basic
question arises as to whether
the CIA was aware of Hunt's
activities early in 1972 when
he was recruiting Cubans to
assist in the Watergate break-
in," the report States.
In response, the CIA as-
serts, "There is no evidence
within CIA that the agency
possessed any knowledge of
Aunt's recruitment of individ-
uals to assist in the Watergate
or any other break-in."
was given the name of Dr. The report also discusses
Fielding as Ellsberg's psychia? the destruction of records by
trist , .." the CIA about one week after
"While Director Helms has the agency received a letter
denied that he was ever- told from Senate Majority Leader
that Hunt was involved in the Mike MasnficlJ (D-Mont.) in
CIA's Lllsberg profile ore- January, 1973, asking that
ject," the report asserts, it is "evidentiary materials" he re-
not without significance that tamed.
the time period during which Helms, the report ? asserts,
the CIA psychiatrist was brief. ordered that tapes of c:onver-
ing his superiors of his con- sations held within offices at
terns regarding Hunt wes CIA headquarters be de-
circa Aug. 20, 1971 - a week stroyed. In addition, the. re-
Prior to the' developing of port states, "on Helms' in-
Hunt's film of iniriguintf struction, his secretary de-
photographs\of medical offices stroyed his transcriptions of
in Southern California which both telephone and room eon-
impressed at least one CIA, of versations" that may have in-
ficial as 'casing' photographs." eluded conversations with
The CIA responded to the President Nixon, White House
report that at the time it de- chief of sta:f I-I.It: (Bob)
veloped the photographs for Haldeman top Presidential
Hunt, Fielding's name had no domestic adviser John D. Elirl-
meaning to the agency person- ichman and other White
nel Involved. In addition, the House officials.
CIA , stated, "Ambassador Ilelrns and his secretary
Helms (helms is now ambassa- have testified that the conver-
dor to Iran) has testified that sations did not pertain to
he had no knowledge of E. Watergate, the report sates,
Howard Hunt's role in the pro- adding, "Unfortunately, any
files. The former director of means of corroboration is no
security for CIA has testified longer available."
that he was never advised of 'rwo facts about the destruc-
Ilunt's role- in the profiles. tion are "clear," according: to
Further, there is no other the report. "T irst, the only
agency official who had other destruction for which
knowledge of both the provi? the CIA ha's any record was
stoning of Hunt and Runt's in- on Jan, 21, 7972, when tapes
volvement In ~ the preparation for 1964 and 1965 were
of the Ellsberg profile." destroyed .. and ' s?:.condly,
The section of the report never before had there been a
dealing'with Eugenio Martinez destruction of all axisting
asserts that Martinez,Ap1dO deFbr Release 2001/08/
,operative, alerted his CIA su- The, committee obtained
CIA over whether it would
produce information concern-
ing Lee R. Pennington, a CIA
operative who assisted the wife
of Watergate consirator James
W.,McCord Jr.-a former CIA
employee-in destroying pa-
pers at her home shortly after
the Watergate break-in.
The Pennington information
may have been "extremely
sensitive" for two reasons, the
report states-first, because
the CIA misled the FBI when
it earlier tried to investigate
Pennington by diverting the
FBI to another man named
Pennington; and second be-
cause Pennington may have
been a "domestic agent," oper-
ating in the United States in
violation of the CIA charter,
which generally limits the
agency to intelligence activi
ties abroad.
Muilcn and Co., and Hunt's'
employer until shortly after.
the Watergate break-in.
Mullen and Co. was used as
a "front" for'CIA agents over-
seas. Bennett, according to the
report, kept his CIA contact
informed of his efforts to give
information to interested par-
ties in an effort to avoid in---,
volving the Mullen firm in
news stories and legal actions,
stemming from the Watergate
break-in.
The report asserts that Ben-
nett "funneled" information to
Edward Bennett Williams, ;i
then a lawyer for the Demo-
National Committee and':
cratic
The Washington Post, through'
another Washington lawyer,
Hobart Taylor.
Williams said yesterday that
he never received any infor-
mation directly from Bennett
and was not aware that infor-
received from Taylor-
mation
which Bennett ? said was "useless"-had come from.,,
Bennett.
Bennett confirmed that he
had never met Williams. "The
description of what I did with
accurate characterization,"
ply don't. know where to start
with ? regard to this report."'
The report does not make,'
clear what domestic activities
Pennington may have been in-
volved in, although the repay
contains a passing reference
to a CIA file on columnist
Jack Anderson.
The report'states that an un-
named CIA personnel officer
became concerned that thF
CIA was trying to withhold in-
formation about Pennington
from the Senate Watergate
committee. The report says
this personnel officer testified
in closed session before the,
committee that he told'a~supe-
rior, " 'Up to this time we
have never removed, tamp-
ered with, obliterated, de-
stroyed or done anything to
any Watergate documents, and
we can't be caught in that
kind of bind now. We will not
do it.' "
Subsequently, the report
states, the personnel officer
"prevailed and. the informa-
tion was made available to
this - and other appropriate
congressional committees."
The report also discusses
21xeQ6iA 4RDP84-064"FWO
nett, president of Robert Ii?'
Ya.?I
 Approved Fot&Iease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499. 01000130001-1
search into human behavior patterns is
repu~,.nant to many people. It smacks
of 19184, even if, as Gittinget firmly
maintains, no assessments are made of
American subjects. Although Gittingcr
asserts that he and his firm were not in-
volved in any way, only three years ago
CIA psychiatrists used many of the same
techniques to prepare a psychiatric
profile on Daniel Ellsbcrg, an American
citizen.
For its part, the CIA's official position
is that "we don 7t have anything to say
about alleged or real relationships with
outside groups." Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to piece together the story from
Gittinger's initial comments and from
statements by other sources familiar
with the CIA-sponsored research.
The CIA apparently first became in- .
volved in funding outside psychological
research during the early Fifties when its
personnel were instrumental in setting
up a New York foundation called the
Human -Ecology Fund. According to a
source who worked there, the Fund was
virtually a C[A "proprietary," i.e., a sup-
posedly private organization which is, in
reality, controlled by the CIA. This same
source recalls that while the Fund
received some money from universities
and legitimate foundations, most of its
operating capital flowed in through the
same. kind of dummy foundations that
served as CIA funding conduits for the
National Student Association and sim-
ilar groups (as exposed by Ramparts
magazine in 1967).
The Human Ecology Fund's main pur-
pose was to promote academic research
into human behavior. Some of this re-
search was of no interest to the CIA, but
was, from the agency's point of view,
worthwhile because it provided the fund
with a "cover." What most interested
~(~~vv~ v dr that could tip off
9 Nak~il4 i hIr might be induced
For the last 20 years, the CIA has been
using ostensibly private organizations
to carry out personality studies of po-
tential and actual espionage agents, ac-
cording to several psychologists who
have been directly involved. John W.
Gittinger acknowledges that his own
Washington-based firm, Psychological
Assessment Associates, inc., is almost
totally dependent on CIA contracts; he
describes the work as "indirect assess-
ment -- how you cv nl~rste people by
watching them from a distance."
At first, Gittinger talked relatively
freely in a short telephone interview, em-
phasizing that none of the studies have
been targeted against American citizens.
But two days later when a reporter came
to his Connecticut Avenue oflices at
his invitation, he said the CIA had for-
bidden him to discuss Psychological
Assessment's relationship with that
agency. "I was given no explanation,"
said an obviously disturbed Gittinger.
"I'm
ha proud u of > rFil)~i f stb
explain it." '
Gittinger is quite disturbed that
publication of his connection with the
CIA might damage his professional
reputation. "Are we tarred by a brush
because we worked for the CIA?" he
asks. "I'm proud of it." lie sees no eth-
ical problems in "looking for people's
weaknesses," if it helps the CIA obtain
valuable information. He adds that for a
long time, most Americans thought this
was a useful process.
Now, at 56 years old, after nearly 25
years of working for and with the CIA,
Gittinger is faced with a switch in the
rules: Journalists are now willing, and
even eager, to write about matters that
the John Gittingers of America feel affect
the "national security." And as much as
he would like to justify his work, given
these circumstances, the CIA insists that
he keep silent.
Yet in 1974, with memories still fresh of
abuses carried out in the name of
eMF,: qb + rei l5att5 i a~-`t 4.
 Approved. Folease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049%'01000130001-1
into becoming a spy: behavior that could
show that all alreadv recruited agent
was nett telling the trial h-, or behavior that
might he exploited in making sure that a
spy staved under firm CIA control.
The Fund also provided a "legitimate
basis lo'approarh;anyone in the academic
community anywhere in the world," said
two former colleagues. Also, that while
recipients of hund grants were never
asked to do anything but legitimate psy-
chological research, American profes-
sors were sometimes not informed (and
foreigners never were) that they were
working with CIA funds.
In 196(1, for example, Dr. Herbert
Kclman of Ilarvard University received a
Human Ecology grant of $IOIX) to help
publish it hook he was editing called
Inrernarional Behavior, He did not learn
until seven years later -- and then hy ac-
cident --- that the money had come from it
CIA-supported group. Among those who
never found out that their work was
funded by the CIA were European scien-
tists whodid extensive studies on alcohol.
"We financed them quite legitimately the
way any foundation would," states a
former employee.
Even those American psychologists,
who were - as intelligence professionals
say - "witting" to the CIA's involve-
metal, found it a "comfort-producing ar-
rangement" to deal with a foundation
instead of the agency itself, one source
said. lie also recalls that Fund psy-
chologists sometimes traveled overseas
to make secret psychological assess-
ments of foreign leaders, accompanied
by CIA operatives who used the Human
Ecology Fund as a cover.
The Human Ecology Fund was dis-
banded in the mid-Sixties, Several of its
former employees - including John Git-
linger - had already started to work for
Psychological Assessment Associates,
the consulting firm that Gittinger and
two other ex-CIA psychologists had
founded in 1957. Gittingcr denies that
the company was started at the agency's
request or that it is under CIA control,
although he admits that most of its busi-
ness comes from agency contracts. Un-
like the Human Ecology Fund, Psycho-
logical Assessment is 'a profit-making
corporation, and it has tried - not too
successfully in recent years - to sell its
services to private companies, especially
those with overseas operations..
Working under contract to the CIA's
Clandestine Services, the firm has
mainly applied the Gittinger-invented
Personality Assessment System to es-
pionage work, Gittinger's work is based
on his own largely intuitive theory of
human personality, namely that "most
individuhl behavior may be regarded
as an attempt on the part of the person
to minirnire the significance of his
weaknesses " He has written that his sys-
tem "makes possible the assessment of
fundamental discrepancies between the
surface personality and the underlying
personality structure - discrepancies
that produce tension, conflict and
anxiety." While few in the psychological
community accept Gittingcr spremisesor
even a ire familiar with his work, the CIA
has obviously been impressed with its
possibilities for evaluating the person-
alities of foreigners and identifying their
strengths and weaknesses.
Gittingcr states that his company has
done extensive research for the CIA to
develop psychological tests free of cul-
tural biases. This has, of course, neces-
sitated work with foreign control groups
who apparently had no knowledge that
they were being tested for the benefit of
the CIA. Gittinger admits that "we didn't
get fair in terms of culture-free tests" but
slates that he land his associates have been
more successful in developing a system
to train people (CIA field operatives)
in making useful observations about
foreigners' behavior.
(iitlinger believes that he has come tip
with a "formula" that can turn seemingly
superficial observations into relatively ac-
curate assessments of personality and
moliv;dion. While he would not explain
what data are plugged into his "formula,"
another source familiar with his work
says that the trick is for an observer to
note variables how a person knots his
tic, combs his hair and ties his shoelaces
- that somehow correlate with other
nonohservable traits like honesty and
dependability. Gittingcr says the system
can he used to give a "pretty good guess"
about a person's vulnerabilities and to
answer questions like, "What will some-
one do if he gets drunk?" or "Is he more
interested in women than money?"
At a time when U.S. satellitesand other
electronic spying devices collect virtually
all the nccessa'ry military intelligence on
the Soviet Union and China (the only
countries that even potentially pose a
threat to the United States), secret studies
of European alcoholics and Asian schiz-
ophrenics 'seem at best anachronistic
vestiges of the Cold War. It is difficult to
conceive how the "national security"
would he affected if word got out that
certain behavior traits show a person is
lying or has a weakness for women. If
the work has any validity, it should be
exposed to outside scrutiny.
Even today, when Gittinger asserts
that all the firm's researchers are aware
of Psychological Assessment's CIA ties,
there still is an unwarranted and un-
needed degree of deception by not
publicly stating that the work is for the
CIA, and not informing everyone who
comes in contact with the firm of that
fact. There is just no longer any reason
why an agency that is supposed to be
primarily concerned with coordinating
foreign intelligence should subsidi;e
companies like Psychological Associates
within the United States or use such a }
company with outwardly legitimate tics
to the academic community to provide
cover for CIA work overseas.
The writer is a Washington-based free-
lancer and co-author with Victor Afar-
eherti of '71re CIA and the Cult of In-
telligence' (Knopf, I974L
Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
Central Intelligence Agency
Peace Promises Oversold
Ex--Intelligence Official Says
By Marilyn Berger fort to obtain Western tech-
WasiSinIton ost Staff writer..., nology and consumer goods,
In the aftermath of the is seeking, is peaceful coex-
Moscow summit, 'a leading istence--in Moscow's lexi-
analyst of Soviet affairs has con the avoidance of war,
expressed concern that the the support of world revolu
promise of e generation a d to tionary forces, the, shrinking
peace is being oversold of capitalist resources and
rather as a than an the "class struggle."
accomplishment people
a hope. "Detente," according to
The Soviet Union, mean- Cline, "is defined by most
while, maintains its goals of Americans as peace, stabil-
expanding its economic and ity, international coopera-
political power in the world, tion, tolerance and conver-
he 'said. ? gence.
The Soviets, according to "One of the things that
Ray S' Cline, the former .di-
rector of intelligence and re-
search at the State Depart-
ment, "use the circus and
theater'' of summitry in their
own world strategy of peace-
ful coexistence. Richard
Nixon appears to be using It
to make domestic political
gains.
"The admihistration is
confusing the American peo-
ple' because it is talking
about the prolonged reduc-
tion of international tension
and a generation of peace.
In the American view this
means an absence of con-
flict, but in the Soviet view
it means only no nuclear
war while the 'class strug-
gle' continues economically
and politically around he time. I believe we tend to ig-
world." nore ideology completely,
The Soviet Union, Cline just as we refused to believe
Mld,, believes that the what Hitler said about Ger-
"correlation of forces" in
the world-especially the
weakening of the United
States as a result of its in-
ternal economic ; and politi-
cal problems-will inevi-
tably lead to the victory of
Soviet power.
Cline was the chief of the
analytical staffs on the So-
viet Union and China in the
Numerous outstanding go- cards. U.S. commitment to NA ,
vietologists have been mak- "The kind of peaceful that there will be a with-
ingthe same points in schol- coexistence and detente drawal of U.S. forces ant a
any journals, books and, which we do in fact hive, a lessenialg'of economic coop
and later deputy director of control system would feel so
the CIA before he went to threatened it would destroy
the State Department. those contacts. Therefore
He is now director of stud- our concept of detente can
ies at the Georgetown Uni- continue only so long as it
versity Center for Strategic doesn't succeed." '
Studies. President Nixon's descrip-
Cline said the experts in tion of _a web of relation-
government are well aware ships drawing the Soviet
THE WASHINGTON POST
bothers me,". he said, "is
that we've got ourselves
pretty well convinced that
basic formulations of na-
tional, purpose don't mean
`I think the cautionary aspects of this ex-
pertinent in the diplomatic approach to-
ward the Soviet Union ... may have been
submerged in the need for domestic political
triumph.'
purposes, He has, Cline said,
"identified himself with
peaceful coexistence of a
kind which will permit the
gradual growth of what be
calls the socialist world,
without serious danger of
war with the United States,
the only adversary the Rus-
sians fear:"
Cline's concern is, first of
all, that the American peo-
ple be made aware of 'what
is going on. "There is a need
for what these days we call
`consciousness raising', lie
said.
They should be urged, he
said, "to focus on, the eco-
nomic and politicdl conflict
which continues, and not be
misled by diplomatic spec-
taculars."
The Soviets he stressed,
"have shown no interest in
creating any web of rela-
tionships because they fear
the penetration of Soviet so-
ciety by hostile Western ide-
ology." Instead, he said,
they point to this desire for
a "web of relationships" as
,demonstrating American
weakness.
Cline's prescription for
dealing with the Soviets en-
tails first of all understand-
ing what we are about. The
United States, he said,
should remain strong mili-
tarily, preserving its deter-
rent "whatever it costs."
It should trade with the
Soviet Union, but on non-
concessional terms. He has
no objection to granting
most-favored-nation status,
which would only put the
Soviets on a par with other
nations. But he thinks cred-
its should be limited only to
those deals that would be
economically beneficial to
the United lStates.
"We should take care not
to export our most advanced
technology but to trade the
products of that technology
for Soviet raw materials,"
Cline said.
Finally, "we should make
no large, long-term invest-
ments in capital unless
there is no other opportu-
nity for the development of
those same resources," he
said. This would mean that
we should avoid investments
in developing things such as
Siberian oil and natural gas
because of the uncertainties
of long-term access to the
products.
"We should offer conces-
sions in limited fields,"
Cline said, "if and when,
through quiet diplomacy, we
can make progress in open-
'ing Soviet society to foreign
contacts, which is, after all,
what we have advertised de-
tente diplomacy is all
about."
ical statements are not sim- mer U.S. Ambassador to the
ple blueprints for future ac-, Soviet Union Foy Kohler
tion, but they mean some- and others.
thing." He noted that after the
He said. "This problem 1972 Moscow summit meet-
hs been around a long ing Soviet spokesmen said
many in the 1930s."
Cline made his rather pes-
simistic remarks during a
lengthy interview in his of-
fice' in the quiet of a fourth
-of July weekend.
The paradox, he said, "is.
that if detente were really
to succeed in our sense of
the world , of opening mean-
ingful contacts inside Soviet
society, the Soviet internal
Monday, Jul 8, 1974
A'3
revolutionary forces wher-
ever they are."
At this point Cline pulled
out a recent article from the
influential Soviet journal
Problems of Peace and So-
cialism to make his point. It
said: "Peaceful coexistence
is a specific international
form of class confrontation,
linked to the peoples' stru;-
gle not only for peace but
also, for the " revolutionary
transformation of society, to
the strengthening of the,so-
cialist community and to
mass actions against imperi-
alism."
It is Cline's view that the
American people must be
educated about the Soviet
perception of what is hap-
pening. Cline quoted from a
recent monograph by for-
view the U.S. policy of de-
tente as reflecting a change
of heart but as a policy,
forced upon it by what the
Soviets call "the social, eco-
nomic and ultimately, mili-
tary power of the Soviet Un-
ion and the socialist coun-
tries."
The quote continues: "The
standard Soviet line has
been, and continues to be,
that `the real alignment of
forces in the world, arena'
has shifted against the
United States."
Exaggerated hopes from
summitry, Cline said,
"create an illusion that
tends to divide and confuse
and produce apathy. not
only at home but among our
allies." '
In Europe, he said, there
of what is happening and Union into a detente that is is "fear that a new Soviet-
are reporting fully on the irreversible:, in Cline's view, American relationship will
Soviet policy and attitudes. is thus probably not in the lead to a diminution_ of the
TO
Cline saiy ."I think
the cautionary, ?as .ects of
+1i#1; experiment in the rlinln-
ing pressure on them to en-
ter into long-term under-
o
ch
a
..
v app
Soviet Union-=and toward result of the education in in neutralize them politically
China.:-may have been, silk ternational affairs he gave and strategically anR, e~ n
merged in t$e need for do- Nikita Khrushcbev during sooner, provide opporttlni-
mestic political, triumph." the Cuban missile crisis in ties for united front gove`n-
These were strong words 1962," Cline said. ments, 'getting Communist
coming from Cline, who has The basic outlines of pies- parties into power through
refused to let himself be ent Soviet strategy, Cline the `parliamentary road . to
quoted on government pol- said, was decided at that socialism'."
icy since he resigned?from time. A very high Soviet Cline noted that this al-
the State Department nine leader came 'to the United most happened in. France
months ago. At that time it States shortly after that cri- and could very likely occur
was clear that he was con- sis and told an American of- in Italy within the year.
cerned that the problems of ficial that there would never Thus the Soviet Union,
Watergate were interfering again be a conflict on those Cline said, is using the at-,
in the orderly; process of unequal terms. The Soviet mospherics of summitry for
conducting foreign policy. leaders decided then to have its own ends. "Just as the
Cline admitted : that there no more missile gaps, on Chinese sa the 'Peking
was some irony in the fact land or sea. It was then that summit of 1 772 in the same
that Mr. Nixon was now us- Moscow started investing in terms as a thousand years
ing cooperation with the So- 'Its big missile -build-up to- ago they saw the arrival of
viets when he had built his ward a parity of forces with delegations from tributary
early political career in the, the United States. states to bear gifts to the
1940s and 1950s on Cold War "What we've had since, emperor=first kowtowing
rhetoric and virulent anti- but without the hoopla sur- nine times-the Russians;
communism, rounding :detente," Cline with a different psychology,
Summit conferences like . said, "is the successful de- out of their sense of insecu-
the one just completed, terrence of nuclear war. Ev- 'rity,. take pride that Nixon
Cline said, tend to create an eryone has struggled since was coming to seek a modus
atmosphere of improved re- then on how to translate vivendi with their now pow-
lations, but they also create this into international coop- erful state-and that when
the illusion that the Soviet eration and understanding- problems build up in, the
TT-ion and the United States our concept of detente as Middle East they can sum-
share theAp i'vstdarssoOrRel@@I t2OOi1Y(~$~2~ou eIR 1-1
seeking detente, sion of continuecT, ' flitter -' Sovieoi~n ''91
Actually, Cline said, what struggle based on class and chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is
the Soviet Union, in an ef- the need to support world using summitry for his own
 Approved For please 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499Q#01000130001-1
E. Howard Hunt Jr. gave
a detailed, first-person ac-
count' yesterday' of~ how
White House officials sat in
.a basement office at the
Executive Mansion in 1971'
and cooly plotted a bur-
glary designed to discredit'
one of President Nixon's po-
litical opponents.
. Hunt, already convicted
in the original Watergate
case, testified under a
grant of immunity from fur-
ther prosecution that the
burglary was planned with
CIA assistance obtained by
former presidential assist-
ant John D. Ehrlichman.
Although Hunt's testi-
mony did not implicate Ehr.-
lichman in a crime -- and,
according'to one defense
attorney, will not - the day.
began with the Watergate
special prosecutor's office
vowing to prove Ehrlich-
man guilty of conpiracy,
lying to the FBI an,` three
counts of perjury.
Ehrlichman and .is co-
defendants - G. Gordon
Liddy, Bernard L. Barker
and Eugenio z. Martinez --
are under i. dietrnent on
charges arising from the
1971 burglar, of tho office
of Daniel Elisberg's
psychiatrist.
? Hunt and four other men
have been n::ned as unin-
dicted cocons;Mirators in the
case.
HUNT'S ICY RE''ERVE
broke down orty occasional-
ly; as when U.S. District
Judge Gerh: a d A. Gesell
interrupted to ask pointed.
questions, anti Hunt :_ppear-
ed extremely uncomfortable
when. forced to read a
memorandum hehad writ-
ten in which he discussed a.
plan to "destroy" Daniel
Ellsberg.
Under questioning by
Asst. Special Prosecutor
Charles Breyer, he was
"tentatively" hired on July
6, 1971 by Charles W. Col-
son. Colson called him back
the following day because
"as he said it, he wanted to
run me past John Ehrlich-
man:" The three men met
for several minutes, he
said, an Colson introduced
Hunt as the man "of whom
we've been speaking .. .
about matters we've been
discussing."
One of those "matters," a,
response to a question by
Gesell indicated, was an
investigation Ehrlichman
and Colson ordered into the
Chappaquiddick accident of
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy,
D-Mass. However, Hunt
continued, he was soon as-
signed to an already started
investigation of Ellsberg.
This project, Hunt said
Colson told him, "would
have to be carried out on a
non-traceable basis; that is,
my connection with the
White House was not to be
known."
Hunt said he told Colson,
he would need certain items
for disguise, and asked if ei-
ther the Secret Service or
FBI could help. Colson told.
.him the project was "too
sensitive," he said, and sug-
gested.that Hunt contact
some of his old CIA compa-
triots on a "man-to-man"
hasis.
HUNT SAID he countered
that this would be impossi-
ble, but told Colson "that
calls from the White House
to the Central Intelligence
Agency were almost im-
mediately acted upon."
When ,he met with Gen. he arranged for a CIA.'
Robert Cushman, then. psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard'
deputy director of the CIA, Malloy, to meet with the
on July 22, he said, he plumbers. He told Malloy,
learned that on July 7, the he said, that he wanted an
day of his meeting with adequate job done.
Ehrlichman, Ehrlichman Asked by Gesell if he had
had personally called Cush- mentioned the reason for
man to request the assist- the profile, Hunt reluctantly
ante. said he had suggested to
With his false identifica- Malloy that "if he (Ells-
tion, a wig and other CIA berg) couldn't be tried in
items in hand, Hunt said, he court, it would be a fine
was put in touch with the idea to try him in ;the,
three men with whom he press." Malloy, Hunt testi-
would work on the unit later' fied, said he would have to
known as the "plumbers". pass the request on to two
Egil Krogh Jr., Ehrlich of his superiors.
mart's chief assistant; At this point, in early Au-
R. Young, and Liddy. gust, Hunt said,, the idea of
David
Hunt, Krogh, Young, Col- the burglary came, to him.
son and Felipe DeDiego are, 'Because of Fielding's refus
and be-
at the unindicted coconspir- al cause, to e of the cooperate, inadequate CIA
atr list. profile, "it seemed to me, at
Around
Around the time he-joined least, that a bag. job was in
the White House staff, Hunt order.
said, he and Colson ex- Hunt said the original
changed concern that the. idea was for him and Liddy
indictment charging Ells-, to carry out the burglary
ber they and assrociate' aalone, but Krogh and Young
they gave e the Pentagon. on
Papers to the press that vetoed the idea. "Because
spring was "loosely drawn" of our connection with the,
and "faulty." White House, a plausible'
They were afraid that denial would have to be,
maintained",if the burglars
and be "martyrized," hnhd were caught, he said.
andd beg be and Colson " He therefore called upon ,.
said, and an Cold and close friends in the
agreed that t that would be Miami area ... who might
H
.'unfortunate." unted how Ells- called upon to perform a.-
berge's recont psychiatrist, Dr. - patriotic service."
Lewis J. Fielding - who BARKER, he said, was
preceded Hunt to the stand given reason to believe that
yesterday had th infor- "this was :a White House
provide vide the e FBI with inf ;
operation."
mation about Ellsberg.
Therefore, Hunt said, he ar- The first job, Hunt cretin-~
r.-'
ranged for the CIA to-do a ueTh was to do job, a "vuine
psychiatric "profile" on ability and feasibility
Ellsberg. .., study" of Fielding 's office
BUT THE PROFILE was -- in other words, case they .
joint. .
"superficial," he said, and . Barry-Kalb
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 Approved Forelease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499W01000130001-1
I "too I 15
Ing
The Ellsberg break-in
began as a carefully nur-
tured operation supported
by the CIA and ended as a
crude, unsuccessful bur-
glary, according to testi-
mony offered to the jury in
the plumbers trial.
Among the witnesses in
the first day of testimony
Friday were Dr. Lewis
Fielding - Daniel Ells-
berg's psychiatrist and the
victim of the illegal search
- and one of its principal
planners, E. Howard Hunt
Jr.
In his opening statement,
Assistant Special Water-
.gate Prosecutor William H.
Merrill said the Sept. 3,
1971, break-in "was the will-
fully arrogant act of men
who took the law into their
own hands because they
thought they were above
the law."
IN FLAT unemotional
terms, the prosecutor said
the four defendants were
guilty of a crime "against
one of our most cherished
rights," the right to be free
from an unlawful search.
The four defendants are
John D. Ehrlichman, until
last spring among the clos-
est of President Nixon's
inner circle; and convicted
Watergate conspirators G.
Gordon Liddy, Bernard L.
Baker and Eugenio R. Mar-
[SIiiC- 9- Approved
tinez. They are accused of
violating Fielding's rights.
A lawyer for Ehrlichman
told the jury his client
never approved anything
illegal. A lawyer for Liddy
said the onetime FBI agent
believed he acted with the
authority of the President.
An attorney for Martinez
and Barker said the break-
in was nothing more than
an extension of more than
10 years of clandestine
work for the CIA in the
minds of his clients.
Merrill told the jury of six
men and six women that as
late as three or four days
before the break-in at Field-
ings's office, Ehrlichman
discussed plans for the
operation by phone with two
of the White House plumb-
ers, David Young and Egil
Krogh Jr.
HE SAID the government
will offer testimony show-
ing that Ehrlichman, after
being assured the operation
could not be traced to the
White House, said, "Okay,
let me know what they find,
there."
on the Fieding break-in and
asked Young if he knew
about the plot in advance.
Young, Merrill said,
replied. "Well yes, I knew
of it in advance and so did
you . . . and there are
Washington Star-lien s
Sunday, /une 30, 1974
The prosecutor said fur-
ther that one March 27,
1973, Ehrlichman asked
Young to bring him the files
memos ' in the files that
show this."
Later, Merrill declared,
Ehrlichman told Young that
he had removed those docu-
ments from the files. Mer-
rill said Young will testify
'about his meetings with Agency prior to the Field-
Ehrlichman and that copies', ing office break-in. One, he
of the documents, whichj, said, was a "penetration"
Young made without Ehr- of the Radio City Music-,
lichman's knowledge, wilV;, Hall in New York City
be introduced at the trial.
Henry H. Jones, one of
Ehrlichman's attorneys,
countered that Young had
framed Ehrlichman "to save,
his own neck." He said the
defense would show that
Young somehow had altered
the documents to implicate
Ehrlichman.
"Nothing in his life would
ever suggest that he (Ehr-
lichman) would do anything
to violate the law, the spirit
or the letter of the Constitu-
tion," Jones said. "He
would not trample on any-
one's rights."
LIDDY'S attorney, Peter
L. Maroulis, defended his
clients as "an authorized
officer of the president of
the United States" who
"merely took' his orders
from others."
"Approval for this project
came through the lips of
Young and Krogh,"
Maroulis said. "They pro-
vided him with cash funds.
He didn't know where the
money came from."
Attorney Daniel E.
show that Barker and Mar-
tinez took part in the bur-
glary "solely for the pur-
pose of intelligence' gather-
ing relating to'this purport-
ed traitor.".
Schultz told the court that
the two Cuban-American"
defendants participated in a,
series of illegal activities;
which Schultz sail was
carried out as CIA test to
see if Barker could accom-
plish such a mission suc-
cessfully.
HUNT TESTIFIED he
was hired July 7, 1971, on
the recommendation of for-
mer White House Special
Counsel Charles W. Colson
and the approval of Ehr-
lichman. Merrill said Ehr-
lichman was "keenly aware
and interested" in Hunt's 21
years as a covert CIA
agent.
Within a few weeks, Hunt
said, he had joined the,
White House plumbers, a
White House investigative
unit set up to close leaks of
national security informa-
tion to the new media. r
Hunt said a decision was
made t obtain psychological
information about Ellsbcrg,
in part because of White
House fears that he would,
become a national martyr.
Ellsberg, who leaked the
Pentagon papers study of
the Vietnam war to the
press, was at the time the
subject of federal prosecu-
tion.
Schultz said Barker and
Martinez were -told that
Ellsberg was a traitor and
For Release 2001108/22 : C h.FWFb8dal 99 OG GD0130001-1
legitmate operation. The
evidence Schultz said, will
 Approved FoIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499,01000130001-1
W4-rN ,V G roa s r# rr
F?, do y a, 7c f.
Carl T. i owana:
/ __A ors ~ Hr 4" d-% CZ " Errf I
Once again, in banner headlines, we
are slapped with the theory that the
Watergate burglary and the Ellsberg
break-in were part of a plot conceived
and executed by the cloak-and-dagger
boys of the Central Intelligence Agency.
This time we get a really wild fourth-
hand versi ;, where reporters are told
by a for ?~ ",private eye, Richard L.
Bast, who a1: ~.gedly was told by former
White House aide Charles Colson, that
President Nixon felt the CIA was even
scheming to "get something" on the
White House.
This "hook the spooks" theorizing
may be swallowed whole by some of
those Americans who believe that the
CIA is a government unto itself, with
far-flung agents who murder unfriendly
politicians, organize coups, rig foreign
elections and topple democratic re-
gimes in favor of dictatorships - all
without the President, the secretary of
State or other American officials either
approving or knowing anything about it.
The CIA has engaged in all the activi-
ties mentioned above, but you can
wager that the overall CIA actions had
the sanction of whomever was Presi-
dent -- or of top officials giving approv-
al in the President's behalf.
LOOKING AT ALL the Watergate evi-
dence, I became convinced months ago
that the CIA was more deeply involved
than the public or the Congress knew. In
my column of May 11, 1973, I told of a
conversation, in which former CIA
Director Richard Helms casually men-
tioned to me that minutes after the bur-
glars were seized inside the Watergate
someone at CIA awakened him to tell
him of the arrests.
I raised the question of why anyone at
CIA would awaken the director in the
wee hours just to inform of what at the
time seemed to be "a third-rate bur-
glary" . - unless the caller knew of
potential serious embarrassment to
CIA.
As far as I can determine, none of the
investigating units has bothered to ask
Helms who telephoned him. Or why any-
one would feel compelled to awaken the
CIA director because of that burglary,
u+ny~~y r dru,~+n y
the Watergate and Ellsberg burglaries
was still providing disguises and other
help to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a leader of
the Watergate burglary and accused of
being'a principal in the Ellsberg break-
in. But we have testimony that CIA
cooperation was requested by the White
House, and this seems to shoot holes in,
the theory that the CIA was out to sub-
vert the President and make the White
House bend to its will.
COLSON HAS denied telling Bast that
President Nixon thought of firing cur-
rent CIA Director William E. Colby because of the President's suspicion that
CIA was up to some dirt in the Water-
gate and Ellsberg matters.
It wouldn't have made sense anyhow.
Helms, not Colby, was CIA boss at the
time of, and long after, the Watergate
burglary.
During four and a half years in gov-
ernment I- got- to know Richard Helms
pretty wel. I ound him to be a profes-
sional whose integrity I never saw
cause to question.
I can conceive of Helms agreeing,
under pressure from the White House,
to cooperate with Hunt and his crew, or
with the White House plumbers, out of a
belief that they really might be uncover-
ing information vital to national securi-
I can't believe that Helms would
ty.
knowingly make CIA part of burglaries
designed simply to serve the partisan
political interest of the party in power.
I find it beyond either acceptance or
speculation that Helms would use the
CIA, or let it be used, to undermine the
President and his White House staff.
Either Colson got suckered by the
President, or Bast got suckered. by Col-
son, or the press got taken in by all of
them.
There is reason to ask a lot more
questions about the CIA's involvement,
for it appears that the CIA was used and
abused in a shocking way. But there is
no evidence of any substance that the
whole dirty business was a CIA plot,
with Richard Nixon targeted as a major
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 Approved Frelease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$RR001000130001-1
fSIHCproved
CIA 9s Accus
Associated Press
The Central Intelligence
Agency requested-last year
that a public relations firm
which had employed one of,
the original Watergate con-
spirators not disclose that it
provided cover for CIA
agents abroad, according to
an informed official source.
On Feb. 28, 1973, then-CIA
director James R. Schles-
inger met with a represen-
tative of Robert R. Mullen
& Co., an international pub-
lic relations firm, the
source said last night.
"Schlesinger told them to
keep their. mouths shut .
about their relation with the
CIA, because several peo-
ple overseas as Mullen
representatives were CIA
people," the source said.
special investigations - or
plumbers - unit.
Earlier this week, private
investigator Richard L.
Bast said that former White
House special counsel
Charles W. Colson had told
him that the Mullen firm
was a CIA front and that
the Mullen firm was direct-
THE MULLEN firm em-
ployed E. Howard Hunt Jr.,
the convicted Watergate
break-in conspirator, after
he left the CIA and at least
parttime while he was a
member of the White House
agency files turned over to
the Mullen firm for use in
planting cover stories.
ABC said the Mullen firm
planted an erroneous story
in the March 5 edition of
'Newsweek magazine as-
serting that Colson was in
charge of political dirty
tricks during the.1972 presi-
dential campaign. It was
learned that the CIA was
prepared to deny having
had any hand in the New-
sweek story.
THE CIA's purpose in.,,
planting stories, ABC said,
was to divert newsmen
from discovery of its rela-
tionship to the Mullen firm
and to a law firm, which
ABC also said was under
contract to provide cover for
CIA agents.
A major concern was that
newsmen would trace CIA
connection to Paul L. O'Bri-
en, a counsel to the Commit-
tee for the Re-election of
the President, ABC Said.
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08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 that they seemed to be genuinely incapa- John Kennedy learned the dismal les-
bl- of drawing the distinction between s"- in the Bay of Pigs 13 years ago that
FF3L Bib 8 eSC ? 049g~,in6Q@1?V0* 1 tends to operate
an carrying out e sleazy sche es within its own narrow world of assump-
theWhite House-CREEP Politburo. Lions and political theology. The atmos-
:tent these things naturally come
book. But there won't be a de-
of the week that was, leading up
signation. And it's not a book of
ences."
dson's subject is an important
he plans to have the manuscript
~d by March 1. "I've got to try to
readable and interesting," he
sd. "I may 'move out of here
just to get away from the tCle-
lA HOWAR's novel Making Ends
)ut a Washington woman "getting
ter," will be published by Ran-
ise next year. It's reported that
House paid a $100,000 advance.
other publishers were in on the
with one of them offering a
ivance. Howar, who had the final
sill be working with an old friend'
om House, Bob Loomis, one of
editors. Cl
that Silbert knew the answer to
question-Colby might have suc-
in willfully concealing informa-
m a government prosecutor in a
criminal case.
-gate must indeed have brought a
anguish to the CIA. For the White
in trying to put the Watergate
on the agency's back, used some
same techniques that have been
Dd by the CIA in its own opera-
'here'was the diffuse charter of
al security" through. which the
rouse operatives sought to stall
investigation of Nixon campaign
trough Mexico, to arrange for co-
aoffs of the Watergate suspects, to
.nate a cover story that the Water-
rglary was a CIA operation, and so
agency was, in effect, being tar-
s a decoy by the president's office
vas dipping into thq classic black
irty tricks.
and his Cuban proteges, then. in
of the Committee for the Re-Elec-
-he President (CREEP) weexe~~ so in-
1. in the ways of their alrfdf'1s yied
gley, the Clandestine Services,
As an example of what they call the
"clandestine mentality" John Marks and
Victor Marchetti cite this exchange be-
fore a federal grand jury between Hunt
and Assistant U.S. Attorney Silbert. Sil-
bert has asked whether Hunt was aware
that he had participated in "what might
commonly be referred to as illegal activi-
ties:'
HUNT: I have no recollection of any,
no, sir."
SILBERT: What about clandestine
activities?
HUNT: Yes, sir.
SILBERT: All right. What about that?
? HUNT: I'm not quibbling, but there's
quite a difference between some-
thing that's illegal and something
that's clandestine.
SILBERT: Well, in your terminology,
would the entry into Dr. Fielding's
(Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist) office
have been clandestine, illegal, nei-
ther or both?
HUNT: I would simply call it an entry
operation conducted under the aus-
pices of competent authority.
These are the values of the appar-
atchik, which had become pervasive
among the sad young men of the Nixon
White House. It is the moral code of the
black side of most espionage services as
well as, we must reluctantly conclude, the
top side of the CIA.
Congress has had the chance to bite at
the apple and run the risk of corrupting
its own innocence. But no one was willing
to take on a confrontation with executive
authority. No one even was able to formu-
late the right questions other than those
bearing on the extrication of the CIA
from Watergate.
And so the function of oversight contin-
ues to be abdicated to daily journalists
and writers of books. It is not an alto-
gether fruitful alternative. Books rarely
generate legislation. Daily journalists
are not equipped to penetrate the rein-
forced armor of secrecy by which CIA is,
shielded from public scrutiny.
Leaks from within are self-serving.
What passes for candor by top CIA offi-
cials in the congressional hearing room is
the frankness of the schoolboy standing'
before the brained canary and denying
'all, with his sling shot in his back pocket.
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence is a
welcome addition to the body of litera-
ture which constitutes the only form of
genuine oversight being currently prac-
ticed. Both Marchetti and Marks are for-
mer practitioners 'of the intelligence
trade and were privy to some of its se-
phere of the clandestine shop is conspira-
. torial, paranoic and action=prone. It
reeks with suspicion of social and politi-
cal change on the loft.
Marks and Marchetti take us through
the sometimes familiar, sometimes new,
sometimes deleted catalogue of covert in-
terventions and patterns of secret propri-
etorships and domestic activities, which
have flourished in a vacuum of resound-
ing public indifference since the agency
became a major. instrument.of executive
power in the early 1950s.
The book represents a triumph of de-
termination by its authors, the publishing
house of Knopf and the American Civil
Liberties Union, which defended the
manuscript against a partially successful
effort to censor it. Melvin L. Wulf, legal
director of the ACLU, notes in the intro-
duction that co-author Marchetti was the
first American writer to be served with an
official censorship order issued by a
United States court.
His case, along with that of Marks,
raises two interesting constitutional
issues: (1) the power of the government to
abridge by a contractial oath of secrecy,
the First Amendment rights of govern-
ment employes; and (2) the authority of an
executive agency'to classify information
by, mere post facto declarations that it
is classified. In the battle of the book
the CIA was able to produce no proof that
much of the material it wanted to excise
was in fact classified.
At this point in the still-pending appel-
late court fight the government has pre-
vailed on the first. question and the au-
thors prevailed on the second issue.
One of the consequences of the Mar-
chetti-Marks case is that William Colby
has asked for new authority to bring crim-
inal charges against any government em-
ployee authorized to receive classified
information. The proposed legislation
.also would empower the CIA. director to
.define 'what is classified-thereby cir-
cumventing`the district court's ruling in
the matter of Marchetti and Marks.
An indicator of the quality of that judg
ment is that when the CIA's original 339
deletions in the manuscript were submit-
ted to a test of classification they were
reduced to 168 by negotiation and then to
27 by judicial review. Unfortunately the
book went to press before the judge's fi-
nal decision and so The Cult of Intelli-
gence is adorned throughout with that tal-
ismanic word of our time-(deleted)--to
tantalize the curious and bolster the
sales.
If the Colby proposal were in effect at
the time Marchetti and Marks had under-
of their manuscript
Metier have been writ-
analyst against the dirty tricks boys.
3 J7 "A
ten. Both would probably be in jail. . 0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499800, p0130001-1
By Laurence Stern chological Assessments is
w... woicton post staff writer unlike most , other busi-
At first glance the inte- nesses. From the time of its
rior of the room on the incorporation in 1965, its
fourth floor of the Van Ness principal source of funding
has been the Central Intelli-
. -'rac
e
ha
s
wh
ch
building looks like the many
dozens of private consulting
firms scattered in their
smartly appointed quarters
throughout Washington.
. The neat lettering on the
door says: "Psychoiogical
Assessments Associates,
Inc." Admission is gained by.
pushing A. buzzer and wait-
ing for someone to unlock
the. door from the inside.
But Waltc.r P. Pasternak,
the operating head of PsY-
,chological -Assessments, is
not anxious to see unsche-
duled visitors. ,we have no-
thing to say," hc +nlrf a visit-
,
..
i
i
gence Agency,
Pasternak does not Want to
talk about.
,,We could never have ex-
isted without this support,"
acknowledges the firm's re-
tiring president, John W.
Gittinger, who founded it
with two other former CIA
psychologists after they left
full-time employment with'
the agency.
Gittinger is less reluctant
to talk because he is disasso.
ciating himself from Psy-
chological Assessments on
July 1 and is proud of the
work it has' ddne as well as
--
o
iu ~.;a ......... .... _.._
ing repo t
gry tones, ,moving im.medi-? the CIA, to which he is still
ately toward the door. . personally under contract as
The reason for Pastor-, a consultant.
b?
o
n an o
oak's reticence is that Psy- The company w
It covers the study of bra
4 . inwashing techniques ,)y
for- eign intelligence organiza-
tion^ that was carried nit
by a New Y'urk-haled prede-
called the .human i:r'ology?
Fund.
It also prisvides training
to CIA employees for asess-
ing the credibility of foreign
intelligence informants. "It's
'a question of trying to un-
is lying or telling the truth
when he conies through the
door and s,'iys he wants to
'give you information;" Git-
i . tinger explain. c:.
The heginuii;r; of the psy-
chological a ..,. .menu. pru-
gram, Gittinger elated,
goes back to the early 1950s
:'when former (':A director.
Allen W. 'Dulles souuiit ncu-
'rosurgical treatment for his
son, Allen M., who was seri-
ously injured in Korc,;, from
,.a New York neurologist, Dr..
,dlarold G. Wolfe.
HS/HC, woo ,
Dulles became interested
in Wolfe's research into Chi-
nese 'indoctrination of cap-
tured American pilots dur-
ing the Korean war. CIA be-
gan financing the research
work through first the Soci-
ety for the Investigation of
Human Ecology, with which
Wolfe was associated, and
then the Human Ecology
Fund,' according to Git-
tinger.
Both operated a 'private
research organization with
headquarters in New York
and with branches overseas.
"This whole project was
Allen Dulles' baby," Git-
tinger explained. "It, grew
out of his son's injury in Ko-
rca." ? .
Because of the growing
controversy over CIA' fi-
nancing of private organiza-
tions in the mid-1960s, the
TIIE WASI?IINGTON. POST Friday; Juno. 21, 1974
scure and perhaps unjusti-
fied mention in the case of
former White House special
counsel Charles Colson, who
pleaded guilty on June 6 to
an obstruction of goat. 2g
charge growing out of his
role in the Daniel Ellsberg.
break-in case.
Colson had asked the of-
fice of the Watergate special
prosecutor to provide "docu-
ments or records concerning
the psychological profile of
Dr Ellsberg compiled by
Psychological Assessments,
Inc., for the CIA."
Gittinger heatedly denies
any, association with the
Ellsberg, profile or, indeed,
any involvement with the
White House on Watergate
or national security matters.
"It's an absolute, positive
lie," said the 57-year-old psy-
chologist of Colson's impli-
cation of the company's in.,
volvement... in the 1971
"plumbers' " break-in of . Or.
Lewis Fielding's office Jwn
Los Angeles. Fielding Was 4
Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
A CIA spokesman said
yesterday the . agency will
not comment, on whether it h
has financial or operational
relationships with Psycho. j
logical Assessments. The
CIA has a policy of ? saying
nothing about its links with:g
U.S. domestic concerns. `
Gittinger acknowledges',
that the company oehind
the unobtrusive door at 4301 1
Connenticut Ave. NW has
conducted training pro-
grams for CIA_ operatives
abroad and performed psy- .i
chological evaluations for
overseas employees of
American firms with for- I
eign-based offices or subsidi-
aries.
The rubic of 'psychological'
assessments "' covers a variety,
of services which both, the m
firm and Gittinger, in`.' hiss''
private consoling: role, have
,provided the CIA.,'
sure that the``'.'agency was pany almost wholly depend-
funding activities, of U.S ent on its CIA contracts.
'based student, labor, jour- Ina emphasized that' the
nalistic and cultural organ- company has never taken a
izations. government or private-
eon-The Human Ecology Vund tract which involved :the
was spared public mention "assessment" of an Ameri-
during the furor over'. clan- can citizen. "We do abso-
destine CIA financing. It lutely no domestic advis-
folded quietly after Git- . ing," Gittinger said. 'We
tinger moved to Washington ` have' never been asked to.
to start Psychological As- evaluate an American."
sessments Associates Inc. ? Gittinger and the' twb'
Current programs, by other ex-CIA founders- of''
PAA, said. Gittinger, are FAA, Robert E. Goodnow,
strongly pointed toward So and Samuel B. Lyerly; have'
viet, Chinese and Arab cui-. ended their active associa-?
tural training. He declined tion with the company. ?It'
to discuss the specific na- was understood that the?
ture of the. programs or ' new operating group is seek-
whether PAA : carried out ing to divest itself of the
such programs for foreign. CIA financial sponsorship;
intelligence or. security or- , "I am very proud of what'
ganizations. I have done for the agency
Thti'i commercial side of,. over along period of time-in?-
PAA's activities-screening the assessments field," said
Human Ecology Fund was foreign employees of ?Ameri- - Gittinger. "There is nothing
abandoned. The 'controversy can firms-has shrunk in re-',. I am ashamed of, nothing I,
was touched off by ? disclo- cent years, making the com-, have to hide."
Approved For Release 2001705127:--CIA7-RDP84=004998001 0O1'~060`Y=
 Approved For ReFe 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049980 Q1p0130001-1
By Laurence Stern
w..whIupton Post staff Writer
At first glance the into
rior of the room on the
fourth floor of the Van Noss
Shopping Center office
building looks like the many
dozens of private consulting
firms scattered in their
smartly appointed quarters
throughout Washington.
The neat lettering on the
door . says: "Psychological
Assessments Associates,
Inc." Admission is gained by
pushing a. buzzer and wait-
ing for someone to unlock
the door from the inside.
But Waltr_r P. Pasternak,
the operating head of Psy-
chological Assessments, is
not anxious to see uiische-
duled visitors. "We have no-
thing to say," hcc,, told a visit-
ing reporter in tt?rse and an-
gry tones, moving immedi-
ately toward the door.
i The reason for Paster-
nak's reticence? is that Psy-
TIIE WASHINGTON. POST Friday; June 21,1994 A .q i
ola~l
ssessm,e
eration
chological Assessments is scure and perhaps unjusti-
unlike most . other busi- Pied mention in the case of
nesses. From the time of its former White House special
incorporation in 1965, its counsel Charles Colson, who
principal source of funding pleaded guilty on June 6 to
has been the Central Intelli- an obstruction of iuQti--*
gence Agency, which is .what, charge growing out of his
Pasternak does not want to role in the Daniel Ellsberg
talk about. break-in case.
"We could never have ex- Colson had asked the of-
isted without this support," fice of the Watergate special
acknowledges the firm's re- prosecutor to provide "docu-
tiring president, Jnhn W. ments or records concerning
Gittinger, who founded it the psychological profile of
with two other former CIA Dr. Ellsberg compiled by
psychologists after they left Psychological Assessments,
full-time 'employmciit with. Inc., for the CIA."
the agency. Gittinger heatedly denies
Gittinger is less reluctant any- association with the
to, talk because he is disasso- Ellsberg. profile or, indeed,
elating. himself from Psy- any involvement with the
ehological Assessments on- White House on Watergate
July 1 and is proud of the or national security matters,
work it has, ddne as well as "It's an absolute, positive
his long years of service to lie," said the 57-year-old psy-
the CIA, to which he is still chologist of Colson's impli-
personally under contract as ? cation of the company's in-,
a consultant. " volvement, in the 1971
The company won an ob- "plumbers' " break-in of. Dr.
Lewis Fielding's office in'
Los Angeles. Fielding was {
E1lsberg's psychiatrist.
A CIA spokesman said
yesterday the . agency will
not comment. on whether it
has financial or operational
relationships with Psycho- 4
logical Assessments. The
CIA has a policy of saying'',
nothing about its links with
U.S. domestic concerns.
Gittinger -acknowledges 31
that the company oehind?'
the unobtrusive door it 4301
Connenticut Ave. NW has
conducted training pro-
grams for CIA operatives
abroad and performed psy- i
chological evaluations' for
overseas employees of
American firms with for
eign-based offices or subsidi-
aries. The rubic of "psychological'
assessments "' covers a variety 11
.of services which both, the .,I
firm and Gittinger; in his'
private consoling; role,. have a
It covers the study of bra- Dulles became interested sure that the' 'agency was pany almost wholly depehd-
s? Inwashing techniques by for.
in Wolfe's research into Chi- funding activities of 'U.S.- ent on its CIA contracts.
eign intelligence erqioiza- nese 'indoctrination of cap- based student, labor, tion; that was carried out jour- Ile emphasized that' the
by a New York-based predc Lured American pilots dur- nalistic and cultural organ- company has never taken a
cessor organization to PAA; ing the Korean war. CIA be- izations. government or private-con-
called theiluman Ecology gan financing the research The Human Ecology Fund ,". tract which involved he
Fund. work through first the Soci was spared public mention "assessment" of an Ameri-
It also provides training ety for the Investigation of during the furor. over clan- can citizen. "We do abso-
to CIA employees for asess- Human Ecology, with which destine CIA financing. It lutely no domestic advis-
ing the credibility of foreign Wolfe was associated, and folded quietly after Git-.. ing," Gittinger said. 'We
intelligence informants, "It's then the Human Ecology tinger moved to Washington' have ' never been asked to.
a question of trying to un-' Fund,' according to Git- to start Psychological As-.. evaluate an American."
derstand whether someone tinger. sessments Associates Inc. ' Gittinger and the' two
is lying or telling the: truth Both operated a . private Current programs, by other ex-CIA founders- of'"
when he comes through the research organization with PAA, said Gittinger, ' are ' PAA, Robert E. Goodnow
door and says he wa-its to headquarters in New York strongly pointed toward So-, and Samuel B. Lyerly, have'
'give you information," Git- and with branches overseas, vict, Chinese and Arab cut- ended their active associa-.
i'tinger cxpla:3ncd. "This whole project was tural training. He declined . tion with the company. 'It'
The beginning of the psy- Allen Dulles' baby," Git- to discuss the specific na- was understood that the,.
chological assel?sment pro- tinger explained. "It, grew Lure of the programs or ' new operating group is seek-
gram, Git.t.inger related, out of his son's injury in Ko- whether PAA; carried out ing to divest itself of the
goes back to the early 1950s rca." such programs for foreign CIA financial sponsorship:
when former CCA Director. Because of the growing intelligence or security or- ' "I am very proud of what
Allen W. 'Dulles sought ncu- controversy over CIA, fi- ganizations. I have done for the agency,
*'rosurgical treatment for his nancing of private organiza- Th%~ commercial side of over along period of time-in-"
son, Allen M., who was scri- tions In the mid-1960s, the PAA's activities-screening ,. the assessments field," said .
ously injures] in Korea, from Human Ecology Fund was foreign employees of ?Ameri- ? Gittinger. "There is nothing
,,a New York neurologist, Dr. abandoned. The 'controversy can firms-has shrunk In re , I am ashamed of, nothing I'
IIarold G. Wolfe. was touched off by, disclo- , cent years, making the com- . have to hide."
HS/HC- V0,
Approved For Release 2001/0&/22-- CTA-RDP84--00499R601'60013000"1-1
 with him.
The residents . of this
coastal community have
been "bitter" toward the
famed painter, his wife said,
since the Olson farmhouse
had become a tourist attrac-
tion.
"I he;] a' hard time con-
vincing Andrew to come
back to Cushing this sum-
mer," said Mrs. Wyeth, "and
we are thinking of leaving
permanently."
The Olson farmhouse had
been purchased by Jdseph
E. Levine, the movie prod-
ucer, through his foundation
and had been turned into a
museum. The museum was
opened to the public in 1971,
but local residents since
en have strongly objected
it because of the summer
traffic It generated. Towns-
people said it made their ru-
ral roads "Hollywood free-
ways."
The Olson farmhouse, in the background of Andrew Wyeth's "Christina's World," may be moved from Cush.
ing, Maine, to a tourist site in New Jersey..
Levine said the famed
farmhouse may be moved to
Waterloo Village, a restored
pre-revolutionary town in
Stanhope, N.J. He said the
owners of. the New Jersey
tourist attraction had made
him an offer to move the
house there.
Levine said there should
be no problem, moving the
farmhouse to New Jersey.
"They moved London
Bridge to Arizona, didn't
they?" he observed.
One Cushing r e s i d e n t
termed the Wyeth reaction
"paranoid" since the Wyeth
family always had sought
anonymity while summering
here.
"The thing they always
appreciated most was that
they could come in here and
just be regular people in the
town -with no one coming
down their driveway and
bothering them," said the
resident, who asked not to
be identified.
"I know that I and a lot of
ether people here have pro-
tected Andy by lying and
telling tourists we didn't
know where he lived."
Gavett and the CIA: `Routine' Clearance,
By Miclutel Kernan
Nervous legal advisers fo
the American Broadcasting
Company managed to hold
up a controversial Dick Ca-
vett show about the. Central
Intelligence Agency long
enough to thwart national
press prescreening, Cavett
T id yesterday in New York.
The 90-minute program -
scheduled to be aired at
11:30 tonight (Channel 7-
WMAL) - features debate
between Victor Marchetti,
co-author of "The CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence,"
and two former CIA offi-
cials.
"The legal department
kept wanting to know if the
show was balanced," Cavett
said, "and I kept telling
them that that was the
whole point of it: It was a
debate of the pros and
cons."
Three months ago ABC-
TV refused a Cavett talk
show involving several radi-
cal leader of the '60s but
later rescheduled it with an
added 12 minutes of com-
ment by some conservatives
as "balance." And Tuesday,
when the new show was be-
ing taped, ABC legal ex-
peiis were on hand.
"They said they thought it
was okay," noted Cavett,
"but they wanted to talk to
some higher-ups first. But
the higher-ups were at lunch
- why didn't they watch it
themselves if they were
worried? - and finally they
managed to diddle around
Media
over the participants
seemed jovial enough.
One question was whether
the CIA liquidates used up
agents, as claimed by a Mar-
chetti source from Latin
America. After listening to
Marchetti's second hand
version of how a man died
in a fake truck accident just
after being retired from the
CIA, Cline denied that liqui-
dation was CIA policy.
Another issue was the ex-
tent to which the Soriei
KGB may have penetrated
the CIA, and Marchetti,
challenged to name the high
CIA official he believed to
be a double agent, refused
to divulge it for TV.
stuff" which they said ac-
counted for only a tiny per-
centage of agency work.
Cline, asked if President
Nixon and Henry Kissinger
would have made good spies,
did say that both men ap-
pear inclined toward the co-
vert and secret and that Kis-
singer probably would have
liked to be the CIA director.
The Marchetti book was
the subject of a landmark
ruling in U.S. District Court
this spring. Although 339 de-
letions had been made by
the CIA bi tore publication,
the court restored all but 27
of the excisions. The deleted
sections were not discussed
on the TV show.
Cavett said he does not
plan more controversial
until it was too late for a town University-. Though changes about the purpose
screening." considerable tension was of CIA, Cavett added, with
A belated screening was generated during the show, the ex-agents pooh-poohing
held yesterday for the New Cavett said, when it was all this cloak-and da- er ture.
Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000 30001-1
York press, according to
Herbert Wurth of the pub-
licity department. Wurth
added that the show would
go on as taped, that there
were no serious problems,
that getting legal clearance
on shows of this nature was
"a routine matter."
The two ex-CIA men were
Robert Komer, former am-
bassador to Turkey, head of
the Vietnam pacification
project and now a Rand
Corp. consultant, and Ray
Cline, now executive direc-
tor of studies for the Center
for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies at George-
angry, b r u s h o:
Lenya, Weill's wi
Grete Keller wo
such haunting W,
as "Surabaya Job
"The Bilbao So.
-much alive, but it
until two years ag
American adaptati
chael Feingold of
itself was introduc
Yale Repertory Ti
ney's is America
look at Feingold'
End."
A yarn about
gangsters and the
Army, the attitude
cal throughout at
nale, like all of I
bert's, is ironical]
so that the title is
Inevitably, Ameri
think of "Guys an
that amalgam of E
nyon characters
dents so neatly
gether by Jo Swei
Burrows and Frani
Not surprisingl and Dolls" is infini
rior, but this does
that "Happy End"
appreciated and
Brecht assigned I
line to his secrete
beth Hauptmann,
gether they claim
ain
to t. Jon of i t
3-a, ailos..of
eago gangland
setti for Mis late'
III-Hi er,&~aaralle
sistibl RiWf
gangst
and tii
"Guys a
pear un
"Happy
Army h
early in `Tne ce
Shaw's "Major
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Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R0.01000130001-1
 Approve. For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84,-a0499R001000130001-1
CIA Seeks
New Power to
Halt Leaks
By Laurence Stern
Washington Pont Stnlf writer
Legislation that would sig-
nificantly broaden the govern-
ment's power to bring crimi-
nal sanctions against employ-
ees or government contrac-
tors for disclosure of intelli-
gence secrets is being circu-
lated within the Nixon admin-
istration.
The measure, proposed by
Central Intelligence Agency
Director William E. Colby,
could also empower him to
seek injunctions against news
media to prevent them from
publishing material he consid.
ers harmful to the protection
of intelligence sources and
methods.
Colby's draft would give the
CIA director more statutory
muscle to define national se-
curity secrets and punish
transgressors than ever be-
fore.'
Its appearance comes against
a background of court battles
on national security secrecy is-
sues ranging from the Ells-
berg case to the book, "CIA
and the Cult of Intelligence,"
written by former government
intelligence officers Victor
Marchetti and John Marks.
The book, the first to be pub-
lished in the United States af-
ter pre-publication censorship
by the federal government,
went on sale yesterday.
Had Colby's proposal been
law a year earlier the book
might well have never seen
the light of day and the two
authors would have been sub-
ject to 10-year prison sen-
tences and. $loAipp'Cf 'ed Fo
14 rrednesday, Junne 26, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST
1CIA. Seeks Power
To end Data Leas
Under existing law, how-
ever, the best the CIA was
able to do was invoke the se-
crecy oaths signed by both
men as grounds for a civil ac-
tion requiring them to submit
their manuscripts in advance
for government clearance.
The government won the
first round in the courts when
the binding nature of the se-
crecy oaths was upheld. But
Marks and Marchetti chal-
lenged the CIA's demand. on
scone 350 deletions in the man-
useript. After adjudication of
their countersuit before U.S.
District Court Judge Albert V.
Bryan Jr., in Alexandria, the
number of deletions was re-
duced to 27.
tion by Colby and four CIA
deputy directors that material
in the hook was classified. He
asked the CIA to demonstrate
in each instance the basis for
classification. Much of the
trial was held in a closed
courtroom.
Under Colby's proposed
amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947, the CIA?
director would be empowered
to determine the ground rules
for classification under a gen-
eral grant of responsibility for
protecting "intelligence
sources and methods."
The Colby proposal would
exempt news media from the
criminal provisions of the law.
But the draft language could,
according to informed offi-
cials, enable the CIA director
to trigger injunctive action by
the Attorney General against
,,,any person" - presumably
including journalists - before
or after an act of disclosure.
In the Pentagon Papers
case, several Supreme Court
justices, particularly Thur-
good Marshall, cited the ab-
sence of any statutes to sup-
port the government's effort
tYrt?Y
WILLIAM E. COLBY
... proposes bill
to prevent publication. of the
Vietnam documents. Colby's
proposal would strengthen the
government's hand in this re-
spect.
Colby 'submitted the draft
measure to the Office of Man
agement and Budget to circu-
late through the bureaucracy
for comment before it is intro-
duced in Congress. In a trans.
mittalletter to OMB Director
Roy L. Ash, Colby observed
that in "recent times, seri-
out damage to our foreign
intelligence effort has re-
sulted from unauthorized dis-
closure of information related
to intelligence sources and
methods."
He did not specify what that
damage was.
CIA, From Al Bryan required the agency
. ____nJ th
m e asser-
e
 Approvec,LFor Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001=t
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n..=:pa t=]ms
o (D ~.-~ G~ w y Wi ro
as to ,y O: p ~
ry b w m ? y ' ~r lled b States in addition to serving as Secretary of
ceives more publicity ll? ~"Rkkyy R lea Zq 1~@ / t f,{ (~ Ql4t 0( }MQQOTAsident's principal foreign
-A Long Look Behind the Classified Curtain
 Approved For RwIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499RU.01000130001-1
WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Monday, March 11, 1974
A-3
Lired CIA
Q 4
dies - s
United Press International
The Central Intelligence Agency fired
Watergate burglar Bernard Barker in
the mid-1960s because he was involved
with "gambling and criminal ele-
ments," according to former CIA Direc-
tor Richard Helms.
Barker is the .Ivan who worked for E.
Howard Hunt Jr. during the Bay of Pigs
Cuban invasion. In the spring of 1971 he
recruited, at Hunt's request, the Cuban
burglary team that broke into the Los
Angeles office of Daniel Ellsberg's psy-
chiatrist and subsequently was caught
in the Watergate break-in.
Helms' testimony, given to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee behind
closed doors on Feb. 7, was made public
yesterday. The hearings were to con-
firm Helms' appointment as ambassa-
dor to Iran.
BARKER'S attorney, Daniel F.
Schultz, promptly refuted Helms' de-
scription of why Barker was terminated
by the CIA.
"Mr, Helms' testimony is inconsistent
with official information we have re-
ceived from the CIA. It is categorically
denied'by Mr. Barker and is simply not
true," Schultz said in an interview with
UPI.
Helms' statement on Barker appeared
to conflict with Barker's own account of
his relations with the CIA given in
sworn testimony before the Srenate Wa-
tergate committee May 24, 31/2 months
after Helms spoke to the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.
Helms told the committee about Bar-
ker:
"During the Bay of Pigs he was one of
the Cuban derivatives who was involved
in that operation and it is my recollec-
tion that all lines with him on the part of
the agency were eliminated some time
in the middle sixties.
"AS A MATTER of fact we found out
he was involved in certain gambling and
criminal elements and we didn't like the
cut of his jib and we cut him off."
Barker, testifying to the special Sen-
ate Watergate committee, said he left
the CIA immediately after the end of the
Bay of Pigs American operation against
Cuba in April 1961.
CIA spokesmen said it would be "diffi-
cult" to find out exactly when Barker
left the agency or the circumstances.,
uS/HC- 9 (D
roved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84=O0499R001000130001-1
 vuess Who s Irying to
;AR 1974
Annrnvcrl For Qnlaha a 9nn1/nR/22 ? r-IA_RDP84- nAQQpnninnni inn 1_1
L U :J
enry
I ns E:: - " L . ~ ~~ ..: !~~
By Tad Szulc .
Who's Who and What's Happening in the Spy Business
-A Long Look Behind the Classified Curtain
O ne day it is the controversy over the the CIA should be made more accountable to
Central Intelligence Agency's role in proper Congressional committees as is, for
Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept example, the Atomic Energy Commission,
CIA skulduggery in a remote province in whose work also is secret. Yet there is no
Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission . other nation where key intelligence officials
that quite a few American newsmen have are as easily identifiable as in the United'
been operating as CIA informants abroad. States and where the head of intelligence is
Or the discovery that the agency has been publicly and extensively questioned by the
secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Col- legislature-never mind how thoroughly
orado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregtt- -as William Egan Colby, the new CIA Di-
lars at hidden camps in Greece while bank- rector, was last year. And it is not all that
rolling colonels on the ruling Greek junta hard for investig.:tivc reporters to track
and financing famous European statesmen down some CIA actions, much to the
and contriving to overthrow the Libyan re- agency's annoyance. In Britain, the Official
gime. Secrets Act would make this impossible. In
The CIA, it would seem, just cannot stay France, the top-secret Service du Territoire
out of the headlines, which is a commentary would prevent it. So would Israel's Shin Bet,,
on the agency itself and on the contradictions with the assistance of official censorship. In
in our society. Thougli it obviously is one of Communist countries, exposure of the se-
the most secretive agencies in the United curity services is unthinkable.
States government, the CIA probably re- Unsatisfactory as it is to these appalled by
ceives more publicity than any Washington the CIA's excesses, the exposure. that does
bureaucracy except for the White 1-louse, exist in our democratic society clearly is a
Most of this publicity is negative, sometimes plus. Last year's discovery of the abortive
indignant, often' sensationalist, and fre- 1970 White I louse plan for domestic intel-
quently lopsided. The CIA's track record in ligence (Tom I fusion, its author, praised the
the 27 years of its operations largely accounts CIA for its cooperative spirit in engineering
for this lavish yet unwanted coverage-it's it) underscored the importance of such expo-
done everything from stealing the text of sure. So did disclosures of the CIA-run Op-
Khrushchev's secret Kremlin speech de- eration Phoenix in Vietnam set up for mur-
nouncing Stalin and the-Bay of Pigs, to over- dering suspected Viet Cong agents. We are
throwing foreign regimes, to running the highly sensitized to the role of intelligence
Laos "Clandestine Army," and possibly out- agencies here and abroad. But so strange is
fitting the Watergate "Plumbers"-but it is our morality that we usually tend to accept
our endless fascination with espionage and the national security need for building better-
cloak-and-dagger stories that makes readers and better nuclear arsenals but flinch indig-
unfailingly- receptive to stories and books nantly at the notion of American involve-
about the CIA. ment in global intelligence operations.
On a more serious level, however, our This is where the contradictions of our
interest underlines the important point that a society coins in. I loswever, the reality is that
secret agency cannot function in utter se- effective foreign policy depends not only on
Crecy in what still is a reasonably open soci- classical political awd economic diplomacy,
et)'- The CiA is the subject of continued but also on military deterrents and the
Public scrutiny and debate-Ewen if the availability of solid intelligence. To abolish
scrutiny is superficial and the debate seldom our intelligence services would be tan-
well informed, and even if it is true that the. tamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament,
agency has been allowed to run wild and something not seriously proposed here. We
uncontrolled. There is a growing view must live with the reality that the CI.\ and a 1c c n n t ?lb~',ence bureaucrat and ad-
r d by the l~ C~?t ie f i LfRqea tqs Qc4 f~ e~ ~; tlrt =cnQP ;gQ4f}~~IIR0~ i lS~ ~ es 7. his long career as a clan-
uperspy?
the Soviet KGB's external operations.
Ilaving said all these things, I should add
that despite all the publicity about the CIA
and company, the function of intelligence in
the modern age is not always understood by
the public or, for that matter, by our top
policymakers. In fact, the entire American
intelligence apparatus-not just the CIA-is
undergoing a major institutional crisis. This
crisis results in fairly equal parts from the
profound politic, t and technological changes
affecting the world in the 1970s (perhaps not
fully comprehended by the intelligence peo-
ple themsel'es) and from the style of foreign
policy as conducted by Richard Nixon and
Henry Kissinger. What is at-issue now is the
effectiveness of our intelligence machinery
and the question of whether it is helped or
hurt by Kissinger's decision to he the de
facto chief intelligence officer of the United
States in addition to serving as Secretary of
State and the President's principal foreign
policy advisor.
First, however, let's briefly look at the
United States intelligence establishment.
n theory, the intelligence community is
h unified body presided over by the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB),
which is directly responsible to the National
Security Council at the White I-louse and
consequently to the President. The US113 is
headed by the Director of the CIA, who also
acts as Director of Central intelligence and,
again in theory, as chief of the intelligence
community. William Colby replaced
Richard Ilelms in this twin-post last Sep-
tember (there was a fiwc-month interregnum
during which James M. Schlesinger man-
aged to shake up the community quite con-
sid'rably before moving on to he Secretary
of Defense), but there are no indications so
far that Colby carries much more weight
with the Nixon-kissinger White f louse than
did I1c?lnts. Ilelms, now Ambassador to
Iran, was in Bleep disfavor with Kissinger.
.,],he White I louse tends to regard Colby as
continued
 Approved For'ftIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499 01000130001-1
destine operator) who meets ICissinger-'s Sp,.- Sclopment of \iultipl(' 1 ndep c ndent y xhere the intclligcnce community's current
cial requirements. So it is hard to think of hargeted Reentry Vehicle (M I R\`) internal crisis appears in its most acute form.
Colby as the read chief of the intelligence warheads. (These are multiple warheads, To be meaningful, strategic and tactical in-
community in the sense that .\lien Dulles usually three, carried by indisidual ballistic telligencc must be properly evaluated and
was when he was CIA director from 1953 to iiiissiles. Fach can be guided separately to its interpreted. The National Security Agency
1961. There seem to be no giants nowadays assigned and very precise target.) Develop- and. the National Reconnaissance Office
in the spying business. It has been touched ing .\fIR\' was a major American nuclear produce and supple the raw intelligence for
by the age of mediocrity too. breakthrough, and for the last five years tttc CIA, DIA, and INIZ. But the ('IA, 1)I:\
The other agencies forming the USCi3 are enormous cffurt has gone into monitoring (and the individual militaryinlclligcncc scy-
S
i
ov
et tests to determine whether the Rus-
the Defense Intelligence Agency
supposedly the spokesman fort hu Pentagon, sians have it too. The American defense
but not always in mint' with the intelligence posture and disarmament negotiating stance
experts of the Office of the Secretary of Dc- depend on this knowledge. The intelligence
fence or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Na- cunumrnity believes that the Soviet Union
Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA), specializing \tiRVCt1" last dear, but is uncertain just
in highly sophisticated electronic and tech- note precise the Soviet targeting system is.
nological intelligence gathering; the State This information is the raw strategic intel-
Department's smallish but excellent Bureau ligence that NRO and NSA feed to the 'IA
of Intelligence and Research (INIZ), mainly and the DI:A-and ultimately to the USI13
concerned with analyzing political and and the White I louse-for evaluation and
economic intelligence; the Atomic Energy interpretation. \S--\ also provides the intel-
Commission (AEC), which has its own ligcncc community with a fantastic wealth of
intelligence-processing capability in the nu- clectronie intelligence-FLINT in the pro-
clear field; the Federal Bureau of Invcstiga- fessional jargon-in addition to data on
Lion, contributing counterespionage funs- Soviet or Chinese military deployments and
tions; and the Treasury Department, a fairly developments. NSA listening posts around
recent addition, which is'involved in intel- the world eavesdrop on practically all the
ligence operations against narcotics traffic nun-:\merican (not only Comnutnist) mili-
and which also runs the Secret Service. tary radio, microwave, telex, and telephone
Below the USIB, but connected witls the traffic. They intercept conversations among
.major intelligence agencies, are such Soviet MIG pilots; routine conununications
specialized organizations as the National Re- either in clear language or in code (one of
connaissance Office (NRO), the most secret NSA's crucial functions is code-breaking as
of them all. NRO's existence has been one of well as code-making) involving Warsaw Pact
the intelligence community's best kept se- military units, Chinese, North Vietnamese,
crets. Its mission is to coordinate the so- North Korean, and other Communist de-
called "overhead" reconnaissance conducted tachmcnts; and just about everything of po-
by Samos spy-in-the-sky satellites and tential interest to the United States that can
high-flying planes like the SR-71, the sue- ? be overheard or copied. "Phis work is done
cessor to the famous U-2. The :\ir Force from secret land bases ranging from Ethiopia
runs NRO with special funds-some esti- and the Indiaml Iimalayas to Turkey and the
mates are that NRO spends $1.5 billion an- Aleutian Islands are well as from FLINT
nually, about a fifth of the total United ships (the Pueblo, captured by North Korea,
States intelligence budget-and it is believed was one) and FLINT aircraft flying all over
that the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the world. NSA-equipped and manned air-
currently.J:unes W. Plummer, is its im- craft directed secret ground penetrating op-
mediate boss. Overhead reconnaissance is orations in Laos and Cambodia, and pre
absolutely essential for the monitoring of sumably do so now in other critical areas
military deployments by potential advcr_ --the Middle East is probably one. It may
saries: The Samos satellite, for example, is one day be NSA's function to interrupt the
the so-called "means of national verification" worldwide United States military com-
for the 1972 Soviet-American nuclear con- munications network with a message pre-
trol agreements. It insures that the Russians ceded by the code word CRITIC (which
are not cheating on the antiballistic missile automatically gives it absolute priority over
(AB\I) limitations or exceeding the number all other traffic) to alert the White blouse, the
of land- or submarine-based missiles under North American Defense Command in Col-
the temporary accord on offensive strategic orado, and the Strategic Air Command in
weapons. The Samos, with its high- Omaha that enemy missiles or bombers have
precision photography, keeps Washington been launched-or are about to be-against
posted on every new missile site and type of the United States. The extra few seconds
weapon deployed by the Soviet L'nion. such a warning would provide before, say, a
'Thanks to the Samos we know that the Soviet first strike would allow the United
vices), and IN R also collect aitd produce in-
telligence they obtain through non-
electronic means. Each agency plays a dual
role and each has its own analyses, opinions,
and biases. I?:ach tries to influence policy,
often for self-serving reasons. The Cl:, for
example, is barred by statute from formulat-
ing policies, but the CIA obviously holds
policy views and subtly, if not always suc-
cessfully, tries to influence national
decision-making processes. During the latter
part of the Vietnam war, for example, the
agency continually warned against military
over optimism and against underestimating
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong power:
The CIA urged realism in "Vietnamization
policies. On the other hand, it miscalculated
the advantages of getting rid of prince Noro-
dorn Sihanouk in Cambodia because it
minimized the potential of the rebel Khmer
Rouge guerrillas. The .-Administration ac-
cepted the CI.\'s Cambodia opinions with
results that ai'e less than felicitous. As will be
seen, the CIA also had views on strategic
negotiations that &`fered from those of other
members of the intelligence community. It
played an important role in helping to un-
dermine the Socialist regime in Chile-this
included strong policy views in favdr of
doing so-in addition to carrying out White
House instructions in this area. In other
words, the CI.\ never simply cranked out.
intelligence without adding policy views.
The DIA, whose generals and admirals
are concerned with the fortunes of the mili-
tary profession, often seems to have a vested
interest in "worst case" interpretations of
intelligence daia. Put simply, military
analysts tend to suspect the worst concern-
ing the potential enemy's intentions because
that justifies requests for bigger budgets and
appropriations for new weapons systems.
Politically, "worst case" conclusions may
bring trade-offs. In 1969, for instance, the
Pentagon's insistence that the Russians had
"MIRVed" (the CIA accurately concluded
that they hadn't yet) forced Nixon and Kis-
singer to "buy it off": They promised ap-
propriations for new weapons systems so
that the military establishment would sup-
port the SALT I negotiations with the Rus-
sians. And so on.
Soviets are busily building their strength. States to respond with a second strike front raditionally, the general idea always has
And the Russians, of course, have their own Minuteman missiles in North Dakota, been that the intelligence community,
version of the Samos to keep us honest. Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines with all its various resources, would pre-
NRO experts work closely with the huge cruising tender the oceans, and S:\C 13?-52 sent the president wit}) a{treed estimates on
National Security Agency (believed- to C ill- lxnnbcrs on permanent airborne alert. everything from Soviet nuclear advances to
ploy more than 20,000 civilian and military But since a nuclear holocaust is not goner- I lanoi's intentions in Vietnam, Laos, or
specialists), both in actual overhead recon- ally anticipated, the value of strategicintel- Cambodia; the likelihood of a Soviet-
I' E, 9Ru A~X` cj,anccs of a new lticidlc
naissancc and in the PI?i' tii6dfi"I~IE=I
r;r --;tnr;nn n} tin,?u?r ;ulcanc'es 111 the tie- IiC 1 ll 1 15 S C IlI ` Sur\'It 11 power of the
oont-inued
 Socialist regime in Cl, ,'I 001, t t n; 1 i 1 1t~t hat they consider his
, on %alo -` ~ ~ A-t0?0 O { A t~tt'l ii )Tintclligence and his
situations of concern to ~nlice3 8 r ; estimators ' r
When the CIA truly was Washington's than having the ()f f ice of National 1?stinlates practice of eliminating top intelligence peo-
pre-eminent intelligence organ, its Office of approving all the reports as it did in this past. plc from the decision-making process. They
National Estimates prepared the so-called Kissinger and his staff have direct access to say that under the new system, the intclli-
National lnfeiligence Estimates (Nils) on the National Intelligence Officers when gencecomniulity, including Central Intelli-
behalf ofthe entire intelligence community., work is in progress, so Kissinger can better gence Director Colby, has no idea What hap-
although other agencies' dissenting views control the process of intelligennce, pens to the intelligence product, such as the
were duly noted. By and large, however, the This is the most important structural and National Intelligence officers' contrillution,
NiE.s were fairly sacrosanct. political change to affect the intelligence once it is fed into the \\ hire I louse machin-
But in June 1973, when Kissinger was the community sine(' I Iclnts was shipped to Iran 'ery.
President's chief of staff for foreign affairs, early in 1973. Schlesinger's short reign at the Even in Dick I lelms' day, old-timers say,
the Office of National Estimates was CIA Langley headquarters produced some the Director of Central Intelligence- rarely
abolished. John W. I-Iuizenga, the Chief of superficial changes: The staff was cut by had a chance to defend his wicwwsat the White
National Estimates, was forced into prema- nearly tell percent; scores of old-line I louse because National Security Council
ture retirement by Schlesinger. The changes "romantics" in the Clandestine' Services meetings were increasingly infrequent and
were based on reorganization plans for the were retired (I?I. I loward I-hunt was retired there was no other forum where he could.
intelligence community that Schlesinger, by Reims in 1970); the agency was reilr- speak. out. In his latter years IIclnts had
then head of the Office of Budget and Man- ganized along more modern and efficient virtually no direct access to Nixon, while
agement, prepared.for the White I louse in lines; and the importance of electronic intcl- Kissinger made no bones about his low opin-
No'ember 1971. The new estimating sys- ligence was emphasized by bringing Pen- ion of ti-k CIA boss. Colby, as far as it is
tern turned out to be more responsive to the tagon "overhead" reconnaissance experts to known, is not faring much better with the
special needs of the Nixon-Kissing; r White Schlesinger's seventh-floor executive Suite at White I louse. For example, when Kissinger
I louse, and this is very much part of what is Langley. and Schlesinger ordered the worldwide
happening to the intelligence conunutlity. But the really significant change in the United' States military alert during last
Instead of a permanent estimates body, intelligence community's structure carte October's \lidcastcrisis, Colby was not con-
Colby, acting as Director of Central lnielli With Kissinger's decision to atomize it and stilted beforehand. I le simply was sunt-
gence, set up a corps of so-called National therefore bring it under his own tight con- moned after the decision was made and in-
Intelligence Officers drawn f roil the CIA trop. Kissinger wanted to break the fre- formed of it. .
and :other agencies to work on specific intcl- qucntly artificial consensus of estimates and CIA officials also think that Kissinger
ligence projects. This staff has the logistic encourage a direct flow of intelligence from often ignores agency views and estimates in
support of the whole intelligence comma- the various agencies to his own office in the favor of opinions more to his pragmatic }ik-
pity. It'is headed by George Carver; desig- \\'hitc I louse ?., here he and his. National ing. This, they say, is what happens when
nated as Chief National Intelligence Officer, Security Council staff made the final esti- CIA and military intelligence differ consid-
who operates directly under Colby With mates and evaluations. erably. The 1969 MIRV controversy was
three deputies and approximately 30 Na- This naturally led to a major contro- the first instance of it. Later the White
tional Intelligence Officers, although this versy '-all academic one, since Kissinger had House tilinimized Cl.- warnings that the
figure probably will increase as the corps the last word-between Kissinger and the Viet Cong was much stronger in Vietnam
develops. Carver is a C1:\ veteran and a traditionalists in the intelligence conlmu_ than the LS Command in Saigon claimed
V'ietnanl expert. He first caught Kissinger's nity. In brief, the opposing positions -were and that pacification was far from successful.
eye because lie represented the CIA on the these: Kissinger believed that the agreed na- Kissinger., CIA people say, never requested
Vietnam Task Force, an interagency group, tional estimates were the lowest common the agency's opinion on the soundness of the
and occasionally on the National Security denominator reached by agencies that often Dl:A plan to snatch American war prisoners
Council. In practice, Colby and Carver as- disagreed on interpretation of data=in his from tile. Sontay camp in North Vietnam
'sign a specific project-it could be Arab at- own words, he had to fight his wa)? through (the camp was empty when the raiders
titudes on oil or the likelihood of a North "Talmudic" documents to find their real landed). No questions, they say, were put to
Vietnamese offensive in 1974---to a National meaning; the traditionalists' view was that the intelligence community wwlien the Ad-'
Intelligence Officer, who pulls together all Kissinger was disrupting an orderly intelli- ministration decided on the Cambodian in-
the necessary intelligence resources to pro- gence procedure in favor of his own biases,. vasion in 1970 (the military insisted they
duce a report submitted to Colby and then to that lie wanted interpretations to fit his pre- knew where to find the elusive COSV'N
the National Security Council, which means conceived policy opinions. intelligence command of the Vict Cong inside Canl-
I lenry Kissinger wearing the hat of Special corm unity' veterans complain that Kis- bodia; it has not been located to this day). No
Presidential .\ssist,tnt and/or chairman of singer and his people now use the intelli- questions were put to the intelligence conl-
the top-secret "40 Committee" in the NSC gence product capriciously and unproles_ Infinity whet, the \\ hite I louse decided to
:l.,a.-
. 4.- 1 6:e:s':I~e,,.~r 'J L'
William Hyland, firrectorof'the State William CullY, 1)irrctorof the Central Vice:ldurirat l'iment de J or.r, Du,uior 1.reutenaru Genent1 Le,.is:lllrn, Urrrc-
Il.,nnr ,n, ,,/?c Rrn'rau of I17trlll7ll'11Cearp -bttelliru?nce Anencv (f_11):._ _ ._ _ _.of the Ih nse 1)c:purtmcnt's 1)e[cute for f the National Security A?{rcnc y
oontinu'CU.,
 support the South \AP rPsYMrFs r e, Mill tSQttcSifs$/3~z"3C i'-1117. P1 . IT Q~it99 8p9iQa1j Q~ l~filstimators.:\nlericans
Laos in 1971 to sever the I to Chi \linh Trail room number in the Executive Office Build- think, however, that the Russians are far
(the operation failed). CIA people \ycnxler ing where the group met. Britain has a simi- behind us in electronic intelligence even
\vhy Kissinger neycrordered the intelligence lar body known as the "20 Conlrnittce," but though they, too, have equipment like over-
coniniunity to prepare studies on all these its name is a product of British whimsicality. head satellites.
plans before deciding to carry them out. Since the British group was tilled by msi- Experts say that the KGB's internal de-
Colby, a lifetime clandestine operator (he ers the "double-cross committee," its chick fenses are strong. It is doubtful that the CIA
fought behind enemy lines in France and translated the Roman numerals "N\" into ever really penetrated it, although there was
Norway as a Voting (YS officer in World the designation "20" for their outfit. the case of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a senior
War It, then made a C1:\ career in Vietnam The "40 Committee" decisions nttist be KGB officer wvho allegedly served British
as station chief and later as chief of the patio- personally approved by the president. Its and American intelligence for years as a
cation program with ambassadorial rank), agenda and the frequency of its meetings are double agent. Despite claims here,. it re-
still chairs the USIB as i)ircctor of Central secret, but it is assumed that all large-scale plains unclear what precisely Penkowsky
In(elligence-USIB now is mainly con- operations (its distinct fro ml ongoing stand- really did for the West. Because it is both a
cerned with evaluating Soviet military and and activities) are reviewed there. ']'his was domestic security service (in the FBI sense)
political strength. But Colby's power has thecase, it is said, wviththeCl:\'s clandestine and an international intelligence agency like
been considerably eroded in Comparison army in Laos and with Operation Phoenix in the Ci:A, the KGB obviously is hard to pene-
with that held by his CIA predecessors. Vietnam. But it also is known that between trace. CIA Director Colby made this point
Individual intelligence agencies now are 1970 and 1973 the "40 Committee" has con- indirectly when lie told a Congressional
increasingly in rivalry with one another (the cerned itself on a number of occasions with committee in executive session late last year
difference is that in the past natural rivalries the Chilean situation before and after the that he was spending much of his time trying
were discouraged by the White House; now election of Salvador Allende, the late presi- to penetrate the Soviet Communist party.
they seen to be encouraged) for tlic attention dent, as well as with such recondite matters It is presumed to be among the "40 Corn-
of Henry Kissinger and thus the President. as whether the Norwegian government nlittcc" functions to supervise secret intclli-
'To put it simply, Kissinger, who distrusts all would grant concessions to American oil gence agreements with friendly countries.
bureaucracies including the intelligence firms. In the case of. Norway, US Such agreements exist we:ith Britain, Canada,
community, devised a series of sophisticated policymakers felt that normal diplomatic Australia, South Africa, and Israel, among.
rno^es to weaken the intelligence apparatus pressures were inadequate and that intelli- others. The CIA and the British MI-6 occa-
so that he could become the chief interpreter gence resources were required. It is not clear sionally exchange agents when it is conven-
and arbiter of the intelligence product just how the CIA went about this assign- ient for one service to work under the cover
emanating from each agency. ment. Likewise, the CIA's role in an abortive of the other, but the principal aim of the
Kissinger continues to control the Na- attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime agreements is the exchange of intelligence. A
tional Security Council-he retains his post some time in 1971 has not been fully secret British-American intelligence group
of \\-hite House Special Assistant fin? Na_ explained-in fact, the whole operation re- thus functions at the British Embassy in.
tional Security Affairs despite his new post mains an official secret. Flowever, responsi- Washington. There are extremely close tics
as Secretary of State-and this preserves his ble sources claim the CIA was instructed to with Canada; recent'published reports said
coijtrol of the cvaluationof intelligence. This eliminate the radical government of Colonel that Canadian intelligence personnel worked
is probably the most powerful function in Quadaffi when lie threatened to nationalize hand in hand with the CI.-\ here and in Ot-
the formulation of foreign policy, which can U S oil companies. Given the scope of taww?a. Finally, there is an intelligence ex-
be 'evolved only on the basis of evaluated United States interests, there is no limit ? change agreement within the North Atlantic
knowledge. 'p'lat is what intelligence is all to the situations the "40 Committee" may, Treaty Organization, but this is a more Jim-
about. The Secretary of State has no such be drawn into. ited arrangement because of what the CIA
statutory power; traditionally he is a con- Odd as it may sound, the "40 Committee" sees as the dapgers of leaks to the Soviets.
surner of intelligence. During Nixon's first under Kissinger early realized that Soviet
term William P. Rogers simply relied on his leaders should have a better understanding ~espite budget and personnel cuts, in-
own intelligence and Research Bureau-and of the United States. The function of the ternal divisions, rivalries, and frustra-
there are regrets at the State Department -American intelligence community is, by clef- tions, the United States intelligence cotll-
that lie did not study that first-rate product inition, to ferret out knowledge about the munity is a formidable empire. It is believed
sufficiently-but Kissinger, wearing his Soviet Union, but sophisticated thinkers to employ around 100,000 people in all the
many hats, is both chief producer and chief here concluded that awesome policy errors agencies (not counting the FBI) and its an
consumer of the ti ?.al intelligence available to in the Kremlin can be avoided if the Russians nual budget is some,,vhere between $6 billion
the United States government. 1 pis CIA de- knew more about American attitudes and and $7 billion, the bulk of the money going
tractors call him the "super case officer" in potential reactions It would be an exagg?era_ to the expensive technological operations in
the intelligence community, tion to suggest that the CIA is engaged in the National Security Agency and the Na-
educating the KGB (although a peculiar rap- tional Reconnaissance Office.:A]though the
issinger also has _a handle on major port between them exists in certain fields CIA is overseen by special Congressional
intelligence decisions through his such as security at the time of Nixon's Mos- appropriations subcommittees, its budget-
chairmanship of the "-10 Committee" in the cow visit and 13rcrlincv's Washington trip), ing, like that of the NSA, Di:\, and NRO,
National Security Council. This is princi- but the intelligence community clearly was does not appear on the books. Instead, the
pally a policy body-tlhe intelligence delighted some years ago when the Soviet Office of Budget and Management hides it in
community, the Defense, State, and Justice Academy of Sciences organized its "US:\" appropriations for other government agen-
departments are represented on it-that institute under Gyorgi Arbatot, a specialist tics. Sometimes agencies like the Agency for
makes broad decisions in the field of intelli- on American affairs. The assumption. here is International Development spend their own
gence and instructs the appropriate agencies that the new institute is performing a politi- fund's on the CIA's behalf, as Was done in
to carry them out through their own means. cal intelligence function in conjunction with Laos and Vietnam, to be paid back later.
Its panic is derived from the nunibcir of the the KGB and.the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The intelligence community, especially
1969 NSC nternoranduni that set it up in its Speaking of the KGB, which is the CIA's the CIA, also works through innumerable
present form. Earlier, the Committee was principal opponent in intelligence wars, the fronts, often supposed businesses, and
known as "5412," a memorandum number private assessment here is that the Soiiet channels funds for political operations
dating back to the Eisenhower .-\dministra- service has been improving over the years, through labor and cultural groups. At the
tioti, and during tic ppEiamed(F ?>niRBLelsWi2llM)1'0g/92!1f QtY4' OP84 OO4 9RQO-4t0OlZMG1waiI war the CIA owned at
oontin. .
 )cast two airlines-Air America Inc. ( versitics for st raduate studies in various V c,~r~'s uo an, either, that the CIA
operating) and Soutlr~gprgNecffft?I" Qg"1 Q1 8112 :CIA-RDP84-00499 a hts~ c~ l~ ~6 ed in covert political
(being sold). It also had contracts .?ith sev- Traditionally, the CIA has been run by action everywhere in the world. The latest
.oral bona ftdc US carriers. Southern :Air men from the clandestine services. The most example of such activities concerned the
'T'ra'nsport carried out a number of secret notable CIA director . ith this background CIA agent in northeastern Thailand who
operations in the Caribbean in recent years. was Allen Dulles, probably the best intelli- faked a letter to the Bangkok government
The CI.\ still charters Southeast Air Trans- gence operator the OSS had in Europe dui- from a guerrilla. leader proposing negotia-
port planes to such agencies as AID to bring ing the war. Richard I Iclms ran the clandes- tions. This was a classical example of the
Latin American students and professionals tine services before rising to the director- "disinformation" technique, intended to
to the US for conferences and other meetings ship. William Colby served briefly as deputy embarrass the guerrilla leader with his fol-
sponsored by the US government. In 1964 a director for plans (the "dirty tricks" division) lowers and thus weaken the subs ersive
special company was set up in Miami to after his return from Vietnam and before movement, But the' new Thai government
recruit Cuban pilots, veterans of the Bay of being named Director last year. As CIA Di- took a dim view of the CIA's involvement in
Pigs,?for secret operations in the Congo. In rector and Director of Central Intelligence, domestic politics and a scandal developed,
earlier years the CIA subsidized the Na- Colby, a 54-year-old 'self-effacing but tough especially because the American Ambas-
tional Students' Association, Radio Free man, is backstopped by I,icutenanrGeneral sador, Robert Kintner, has a CIA back-
1.?urope and Radio Liberty, the Congress for Vernon (Dick) \V'alters, the Deputy 1)irec- ground himself. Intelligence specialists here,
Cultural Freedom, and a series of related tor of Intelligence. Walters, an extraord'i- think, the lctteryriting agent exceeded his
magazines here and in Western F'urope. AI- nary linguist, spent much of his Arny career authority-and did a sloppy job to boot=
though the CIA is barred by law from as it military or defense attache overseas, but and this episode already has resulted in the
operating in the Utfitcd States (except at its he is not considered an expert on either recall of 13. I ]ugh "boyar, the chrcf of the big
Virginia headquarters), the agency still analysis or clandestine operations. It was CIA station in Thailand, and has compli-
maintains covert offices in Miami, New Walters's lot, however, to be drawn into the cared our diplomatic relations with the
York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and \Vatergate cover-up controversy when the Thais.
Charleston, South Carolina. Cl.\ officials White I louse tried to get the CIA to take the The Thailand incident also served to
say these offices support foreign operations blame for the "Plumbers" and pay their underscore the extent to which the CIA op-
and, among other functions, help to debrief salaries after they went to prison. crates abroad in conjunction with local'se-
interesting travelers returning from-abroad. Schlesinger and Colby reorganized the curity services. In exchange for intelligence
But in the course of Watergate investigations CIA structure to 'a considerable extent. The or whatever special fasors it desires from
it developed that Langley headquarters as old plans Department (DDP) was renamed local police or counterinsurgency forces
well as the CIA offices in Miami and San Directorate for Operations (DDO), absorb- (often for reasons having nothing to do'vvith,
Francisco provided logistic suplxart for the ing the scientific and technical (I ivisions. It is the interests of the host country), the CIA
White F-louse "Plumbers." One employee, headed by William Nelson, a clandestine may pi'ovide them with training or special
to fact, still was on the CIA payroll when he services veteran from the Far East, who took. equipment. Thailand, .'here the United
was arrested at the Watergate office building Colby's former job. Colby, not being a pro- States has vast interests and where there is a
in June 1972. fessional estimator, has kept on Richard local insurgency problem, is a case in point.
Basically, the CIA is divided into two 'Lehmann, a highly respected official, as But it also has been argued that this system
main departments: operations and analysis. Deputy Director for Current intelligence has resulted in indirect CIA support for
There are experts in Washington who hold (DDT), Lehmann works with George Carver police forces in politically repressive gov-
the CIA analysis branch in extremely high in the new National Intelligence Officers' ernments from Latin America to Asia and
esteem, but tend to be skeptical of the system. Major General Daniel O. Graham, Africa. Last year, responding to Congres-
operators. The two departments are often at brought from the Pentagon by Schlesinger, sional pressures, the CIA promised to end its
odds politically: the operators often dismiss is in charge of "overhead" intelligence, his ' secret. programs of actually training foreign
the estimators as "eggheads" while the speciality. Ile works directly with Colby, , police forces.
analysts think of the operators as a wild but he feels strongly that military intelli-
bunch. This situation is changing as more Bence at the Pentagon should become more made the point earlier that there are
and more old-timers, mostly OSS veterans, sophisticated so that it would not lose influ- I no giants in the United States intelligence
retire, a new generation of agents and encc to the civilian agencies. community. This may be partly due to
analysts enters the CIA ranks, and the needs CIA officials say' that the new electronic Henry Kissinger's forceful personality-he
of intelligence, especially in electronic intel- intcl)igence systems have cut down the overshadows other figures in the intelligence
ligence, change along with the rest of the agency's clandestine work through agents. establishment. And the recent quick turn-
world. But there also are stresses inside the After all, enormous resources are earmarked over in top intelligence jobs has Icff the
clandestine services. "Action" officers-the for worldwide eavesdropping and celestial community in flux and uncertainty, aggra-
"black" operators and paramilitary special- reconnaissance. But, they hasten to add, the vated by the Kissinger-imposed strictures on
ists-are more gung-ho than what the CIA' CIA has not lost its capabilities in this field. its modus operandi.
-calls covert political operatives, and this, It retains its paramilitary organization. At the CIA, for example, William Colby
too, leads to internal disagreements. Many agents are involved in the new still is new in his job and judgments are being
Top specialists in their fields still are hired government-aide operations against the reserved as to his efficiency and the value of
from the outside-the CIA has experts on traffic in narcotics and against international his innovations. The swain concern in the
everything from \\'est African culture to terrorists. The agency, in fact, seeks to pro- CIA is that he assert his independence to-
Filipino tribal myths and the effects of the ject an image of concentration in these areas. ward the White I louse, particularly in the
Humboldt Current on fisheries in the More recently, the CIA was 'asked by the area of estimates. Thus far his public image
Pacific-bct the basic recruitment is mainly new Federal Energy Office to monitor the has not been bad. 1 le is available to testify
front colleges and universities. The decision movements of oil tankers throughout the before Congressional committees much
whether a recruit should be assigned to oper- world to determine shipping patterns during more frequently than I ]elms did-late last
ations or analysis is usually made during an the energy crisis. Dccpiy involved in the year he appeared before two separate sub-
initial stage at the CIA's "basic training corporate affairs of the oil industry, the CIA committees to discuss the CIA's involve-
school on Glebe Road in Virginia. Recruits is believed to be the only government agency nteut (or, as he claims, non-involvemci.t) in
selected for operations are assigned to ai to have been able to compile a list of joint the Chilean situation. Ile has testified on
tough course at a special school known as' ventures in the petroleum industry. This is a Watergate as often as he was called.
-"The Farm," near Yorktown, Virginia. top-secret document both frdm the view- In the State Department, the new man in
Promising analysts n 8J d ~b4 tl~~le1 3e- 200440$fi22d CI RD 3004991 O1 Uh3OCkOrk{q is William I lyland, a
 former CIA official, :14+f pr.9, t~s~c~[~ ea , Qtt~ l'1Qf it~ ccq]Aitr PP Tpqc 9 D1000130001-1
on Soviet affairs, and a Kissinger protege. shackled by the White Ilouse in the intdlec-
Iie worked for Kissinger in the planning tual dimension of its work. Being a bureauc-
section of the National Security Council racy, it cannot function as efficiently as it
staff. But he has been in his new post only
since last December.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, a
5,000-man operation, is headed by Vice
Admiral Vincent P.?dePoix, an austere man
who has held his job since early 1973. The
National Security Agency has a new Direc-
tor in Air Force Lieutenant General Lewis
Allen who was brought to the CIA from the
DIA last year by Dr. Schlesinger, then ap-
pointed to head the NSA.,I le is another top
specialist in "overhead" intelligence. Both
dePoix and Allen are career military intelli-
gence officers with highly technical back-
grounds. They are little known outside the
professional intelligence community. Few
Washingtonians recognize Admiral dePoix
or General Allen on the rare occasions when
either comes to lunch (lostntown.
It is probably too early to assess whether
Kissingei's domination of the American in-
tclligcnce operation is good for the country.
But there are thoughtful intelligence
specialists who have serious reservations
about it. Experienced intelligence people see
a danger in the dual role Kissinger is deter-
mined to play: Ile may be tempted to inter-
pret intclligcitce data to ft his policy con-
cepts.:l'liey think lie did so last year when he
apparently; ignored CIA and 1NR warnings
should when it believes (rightly or wrongly)
that fundamental concepts of the use of intel-
ligence are being violated at the top of the
Administration. This is something that
Henry Kissinger, whatever hat lie may be
wearing, is bound todiscover sooner or later.
This is not to say, of course, that every
bureaucracy should not be shaken up period-
ically. The perpetuation of old habits leads
to sloppiness and opposition to new ideas.
Quite possibly, the real change will come
when the new generation of intelligence
specialists replaces the "old spies" who still
think in terms-of World War 11, the OSS,
and the Cold War. Be that as it may, enor-
mous care must be exercised to prevent the
intelligence product from being misused
politically, as often appears to be the case at
this juncture, to satisfy grandiose policy.
concepts politically useful to the White
House or the new State Department under
Kissinger. The tendency still is too strong to
shoot the bearer of ill tidings-cat-efully con-
structed policies are not challenged by cold
cyidencc. Soviet cheating on the detente, a
sacred Nixon achievement, must not be ig-
nored to prevent the detente from collaps-
ing.. ']'his -is the principal example. Where
may be others. The object, then, is to make
professional intelligence a respected servant of
that the Egyptians and the Syrians were ac- policy. :And a final Word: The surest Way to
tively planning an attack on.Israel because of demoralize the intelligence coniinunity is to
his conviction that the Soviets would not try to involve it, as the Nixon Administra-
abet an operation that would endanger the Lion tried to do, in such nefarious doings as
detente they had worked out with him. Watergate and its coyer-ups. ^
This, CIA people think, was a classic exam-
ple of how a statesman can become the intel-
lectual prisoner of his own ideas.
Finally, there is the notion that to be use-
ful, intelligence must be totally detached
from the policy-making Process. This con-
cept of intelligence independence was a cor-
nerstone of the legislation that created the
CIA in 1947. Yet Kissinger seems deter-
mined to weld together the functions of intel-
ligence and policy formulation, perhaps dis-
regarding the profound difference between
capabilities and intent of hostile parties. To
differentiate between theta is., after all, the
principal function of sophisticated intelli-
gence. Kissinger's technique, possibly a
plausible one under the existing system of
government in Washington, is simply to
throw specific hard questions at the intelli-
gence people, receive the answers, and then
make his own judgments.
The question, therefore, is whether
American intelligence is more effective than
before-in the most professional sense of the
word. Allowing for the fact that it may still
be premature to tender hard judgmnents-
the intelligence community, after all, is in
flux, there seems to be growing evidence
that the present period is bound to be transi-
tional because it does not satisfy the emerg-
ing policy needs.
Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001-000 130001-1
r ,fey Trig
n
Camp
By John McKelway
Star-News Staff Wrier
Before the country reluctantly
turned to gas rationing, any number
of schemes were tried to reduce long
lines of automobiles at gas stations.
THE ODD-EVEN, plan, tried for a
time in the Washington area, was
dropped because federal officials had
underestimated the large numbers of
odds who turned out in greater num-
bens than ever before. Some had
never purchased any gas before but
felt it was their duty to do so. On
even days, many motorists with even
tags simply ran out of gas because
they could find no lines to wait in.
They were hauled away and were
furious.
THEN CAME the "Maryland
plan." It lasted two days and four
meetings.
Under this arrangement, persons
of certain religious beliefs were to re-
ceive gas alphabetically. Thus, the
Anabapists had a whole day to fill up
and were followed each passing day
by Buddhists, Catholics, Dunkards
and Episcopalians.
The Zoroastrians, however, object-
ed.
THE MARYLAND plan, forgotten
even as church attendance climbed
was superceded by the "Alexandria
Approach," based primarily on the
weight of each driver.
All those over 150 pounds could get
gas Monday through Wednesday.
Stations were open for the rest of the
week to those who were lighter at the
time they entered the pump area.
E1/
In
tv I
This daused the big station strike
when operators refused to physically
weigh people. Lines were longer than
ever before and many sent their little
children rolling into stations behind
the wheel. There was widespread di-
eting.
NEXT, THE "Washington Agree-
ment" was attempted. It looked good
for awhile. Dreamed up by 87 persons ,
who worked in the District Building,
the arrangement stated that anyone
in Maryland with a busted car clock
could get gas in Northern Virginia if
he, or she, took the Beltway and only
on Sunday. Virginia motorists could,
at the same time, receive a half-tank
in Maryland once they proved their,
glove compartment had been stuck
for over six months.
District motorists, meanwhile,
were limited to two gallons if they
signed an affidavit saying they would
get out the vote once the mayor de-
cided to run.
(This was canceled early one morn-
ing when an energy czar said it vio-
lated the Hatch Act.)
Administration spokesmen tried for
a time to take to the tube and say
"there is no gas shortage." But no
one, oddly enough, would swallow the
line.
TRIED BUT dropped, for one rea-
son or another, were several other
plans. Distribution by height and col-
or of eyes never even got off the
ground. Three gallons per child was
unpopular. One that permitted a full
tank to those whose ancestors fought
in the Battle of Bladensburg never
seemed to interest much of anybody.
learning to live with it when the coun-
try ran out of water.
But that's another story.
ed For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-R0P84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Rel-aa 2001/08/22.: CIA-RDP84-00499R0011r0~00130001-1
'ASK ME ABOUT THE CIA INVOLVEMENT
IN WATERGATE !
GOON...
ASK 110
WI1AT ABOUT THE CIA INVOLVEMENT IN I`M AFRAID I'M NOT AT
rs-WATEROATE?w
LIBERTY TO ANSWER .
THATI
BY Oliphant for the Denver Post
THE WASHINGTON POST, SATURDAY, MARCH 30, 1974
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
.-A8
Tuesday, March S. 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST
Around the Nation
CIA's Trims is Books
Defended by Colby
William Colby, director of
the C e n t r it l Intelligence
Agency, testified yesterday
that there are items in a book
manuscript about the agency
"which are very serious in-
deed" and would imperil na-
tional security if published.
Colby was the final witness
in a case involving the book
about the CIA written by Vic-
tor Marchetti and John D.
Marks. The CIA wants 162
passages deleted before the
book is published this spring.
Judge Bryan fixed March 18
for final arguments in the
case.
Before Colby testified, co-
author Marks was cross-
examined in closed session
about his testimony Friday.
The gist of it was that much
of the material he provided,
for the book he learned after,
he resigned as a State Depart-
ment employee.
Irwin Goldbloom, deputy as
sistant attorney general who,
is the Chief federal lawyer in
the case, had said in advance
that Colby'.,, testimony prob-
ably would be taken in secret.
However, he appeared in
public-session at the trial be-
fore Judge Albert V. Bryan
Jr. in U.S. District Court in
Alexandria. Most of the testi-
mony at the 21/a-day trial has
been taken with the public
and press excluded.
CIA Cuts in Book
William Colby, director of
the Central Intelligence
Agency, testified that some
parts of a book about the
agency "are very serious in-
deed" and would endanger
national security if published.
Appearing in an open
court session in Alexandria,
Colby was the final witness
in the case involving a book
by. Victor Marchetti and
John D. Marks, from which
the CIA wants some 162.,
pages trimmed.
U.S. District Court Judge
Albert V. Bryan Jr. fixed.
March 18 for final arguments,
in the case.
tr for pickup
HS/HC- Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Re ear
In endIy Co:es
By John M. Taylor
Perhaps it is no more than coincidence that
Thailand was the setting for the CIA's most
recent debacle - the fabrication of a letter
last December in which a Thai insurgent
leader purported to offer the government a
cease-fire in return for a degree of regional
autonomy. Because the letter in question was
dispatched by registered mail, it was easily
traced back to the CIA officer who had sent
it.
The CIA letter represented a type of crude
deception which might have been attempted
anywhere, but somehow the Thai locale
seems appropriate. For Thailand is typical of
a handful of countries around the world in
which the CIA has operated much like a sov-
ereign state. In "friendly" host countries
such as Thailand, the agency is able to
achieve a freedom of operation to which it
could not aspire in a neutral or hostile envi-
ronment.
What was to have been accomplished by
this bogus letter, which eventually found its
way to the prime minister of Thailand? The
presumed rationale is that receipt of such a
presumptuous offer from an insurgent leader
would awaken the Thais to the insurgent
threat along their borders. No matter that
this was a domestic problem, one with which
the government had been coping more or less
adequately for some 15 years. No matter that,
since October, Thailand had operated under a
government highly sensitive to anything
smacking of interference in its internal af-
fairs.
BUT SENSITIVITY to changes in political
climate never has been a hallmark of CIA
operations. Much as soliders are accused of
preparing for the last war, so do intelligence
organizations such as CIA seemingly dwell in
the political milieu of yesteryear. The agen-
cy's vintage years were the 1950s and 1960s,
when containment of communism was a by-
word and, in budgetary terms, CIA was one
of the sacred cows of official Washington. Its
recruiters operated on virtually every cam-
pus in the nation, and this writer was among
those who succumbed to the lure of romance
plus public service.
In its operations abroad, the agency's rep-
resentatives often ride roughshod over the
resident American ambassador, who is nomi-
nally the ranking U.S. official in his country
of residence. One may ask why the ambassa-
-dor, from his position of supposed authority,
cannot prevent such abuses as the CIA letter.
probably have little or no experience in the
bureaucratic infighting required to make
one's views prevail in Washington. He will
find that both the CIA and Defense compo-
nents of his mission have independent report-
ing channels. And whether he is a political or
a career appointee, the ambassador can rare-
ly count upon the hard-nosed backing in
Washington that his colleagues enjoy. The
State Department has long been a patsy in.
the Washington power structure, and an
ambassador's "support" at home sometimes
consists of two or three senior Foreign Serv-
ice Officers who aspire to his job.
In his country of residence, an ambassador
enjoys certain distinct perks (perquisites).
He rides around town with a flag on his fend-
er and is a member of the best clubs. But
more often than not, by the time he arrives
his CIA counterpart has been in residence for
several years. The CIA man perhaps has
helped quash legal proceedings when the
prime minister's son was in that traffic acci=
dent at Harvard, and flew in duty-free cham-
pagne when the interior minister's daughter
finally got married. When Washington finally
approved those helicopters which the defense
attache had been working on for a year, it
was the CIA man who modestly advised a few
key officials that he was hoping for some
good news on those choppers.
ABOUT THE TIME that the ambassador
begins to wonder about who is running the
mission his wife comes down with acute ap-
pendicitis. There are no commercial flights
that day, but the CIA man waves his wand
and a plane materializes out of thin air. It
doesn't seem to have any of the usual mark-'
ings, but at the airport no questions are
asked.
It is in this context that one should view
Ambassador William Kintner's problems in
Bangkok. As diplomatic incidents go, the af-
fair of the CIA letter is the type of brouhaha
that will blow over in time; already refer-
ences to it are buried in the inside pages of
our papers. But some nagging questions lin-
ger. Does anyone really believe that the spu-
fious letter was the brainchild of a junior offi-
cer who dispatched it without the knowledge
of his superiors? Those to whom this sounds
plausible should have no trouble at all with
Rose Mary Wood's story about that tape re-
corder.
The New York Times recently editorialized
that "the senior members of Congress have
... failed to exercise any real independent
scrutiny of the CIA." The lesson of the CIA
'letter is that control of the agency in the field
is no more effective than that which is nomi-
nally exercised in Washington.
In addition to the background to which he
THE FACT IS THAT AN ambassador - be alludes in this article, John M. Taylor is a
he a career official or a political appointee - former Foreign Service officer who writes
faces real han caps in his, rod mi n frequently on stom ternational and
A~vgg~~RDP 99f1 0 41
After all, his primacy within the overseas
mission has been underscored by a succes-
sion of White House directives dating from
the Kennedy administration.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
A-$ WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C, Friday, March 1, 1974
C/A BOOK SUIT
Secrecy Is Where
Ong Can find It
By Mary Ellen Perry
Star-News Staff Writer
A high-ranking official of
the Central Intelligence
Agency acknowledged in
testimony yesterday he did
not check to see if material
he censored as being top
secret in a draft of a book
about the CIA had already
become public knowledge.
Harold L. Brownman,
deputy director for manage-
ment and services, was one
of four deputy directors tes-
tifying for the CIA in the
first day of a suit brought
against the federal agency
by two authors of a pending
book entitled The CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence."
AUTHORS Victor L.
Marchetti and John D.
Marks are suing in U.S.
District Court in Alexandria
for relief from an injunc-
tion, issued before they
wrote the book, barring
them from publishing it
without first getting clear-
ance from the CIA.
They are being represent-
ed by the American Civil
Liberties Union, which says.
the action is the first of its
kind in CIA history.
Their co-plaintiff is the
Now York publishing firm
of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
which wants to print the
514-page manuscript. intact;
without the 163 deletions 11 :
ordered by the CIA.
THE NON-JURY trial
will turn on three issues:
Whether the CIA can prove,
the censored portions'
should be classified;
whether they consist of in-
formation Marchetti
learned while a CIA em-
ploye, and whether the in-
formation already is in the
public domain.
Even if the CIA should
prove the information
should be classified, it
could still be published if
the authors proved Mar-
chetti .learned it after leav-
ing the CIA or it was al-
ready a matter of public
record. Marks is a former
State Department employe.
"DID YOU find out if any
speeches by CIA officials or
congressmen or any press
reports had been made pub-
lic in regard to the informa-
tion contained in the dele-
tions you made?" Knopf
attorney Floyd Abrams
asked Brownman.
"No, I did not," Brown-
man replied.
He and the other deputy
directors, Carl E. Duckett,
William E. Nelson and
Edward Proctor, testified
they used guidelines in
Executive Order 11652,
their own experience, re-
views of CIA records and
their own personal judg-
ment in recommending
deletions of information
",they considered classified,
Duckett said the guide-
lines "tell what would be
damaging to national secu-
rity or injurious to the con-
duct of American foreign
relations" if revealed.
MUCH OF THEIR testi
mony was closed to the pub-
lic and the press after Jus-
tice Department attorneys
told Bryan it would involve
recital of "classified infor-
mation."
.Marks described the
manuscript as being "an
across-the-board critique of
the covert activities of the
CIA." He said the deleted
portions described the'
CIA's "bumbling inefficien-
cy. They make a lot of mis-
takes, then hide behind na-
tional security," he said.
Marks said he and Mar-
chetti were "paper shuf-
flers" in their respective
jobs, "but we shuffled a lot
of important papers."
Both are free-lance writ-
ers now.
The injunction was issued
in April 1972 by U.S. Dis-
trict Court Judge Albert V.
Bryan, who Is now hearing
the suit.
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 Approved ForIease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-0049901000130001-1
Four CIA., Officials
Defend Censorship.
"N Marchetti hook
By Laurence Stern
Washington Post staff writer
In a closed federal court
~' room guarded 'by U.S. mar-
",'shals, four deputy. directors of
''the Central Intelligence
R-,"Agency yesterday defended
national security, censorship of
" a book by two former intelli-
,I.gence officials.
U.S. District Court Judge
'^ A lbert V. Bryan Jr. cleared
the Alexandria courtroom for
their testimony which touched
on 162 deletions ordered by
the CIA on grounds that the
material divulges highly 'sensi-
tive intelligence secrets.
Attorneys for the authors,
former CIA analyst Victor L.
Marchetti and former State
Department intelligence offi-
cer John D. Marks, are chal-
;longing the classification pro-
cedures of the CIA on grounds
that the censorship action was
improper and capricious.
Marchetti and Marks are su-
ing the respective heads of
-their former agencies, CIA Di-
rector William E. Colby and
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger, to restore all dele-
tions from their manuscript,
"The CIA and the Cult of In-
telligence," scheduled for pub-
lication this spring by Alfred
A. Knopf Jr.
Colby has said that, the
court test is crucial to his stat-
utory role as a,protector of na-
tional security sources and sc-
ei-ets. Should the CIA lose the
case. Colby has ordered legis
lation dratted for submission
to Congress which would im-
pose new criminal penalties
on former CIA employees who
divulge what the government
deems to be classified mate-
rial.
Attorneys for the two au
thors contend that the issues
in the battle of the book touch
on the First Amendment ques-
tions that were raised in the'
Pentagon Papers case. In the.
current trial, however, the is-,
by the CIA to the Marchetti-
Marks manuscript.
It was to defend its position
on this point that the govern-
ment marshaled the rare gath
ering outside of headquarters
of top intelligence officials in
the Alexandria court room:
CIA Deputy Directors Willidm
Nelson for operations, Carl
Duckett for science and tech-
nology, Edward Proctor for in-
telligence and Harold L.
Brownman for management
and services.
The thrust of their com-
bined testimony, it was under-
stood, was that each decided
on the basis of his particular
expertise that portions of the
manuscript violated security
classifications.
This was the procedure that
was described as "capricious"
by attorneys for the two au-
thors, who requested that the
documents and classification
standards be produced to jus-
tify the deletions.
CIA Director' Colby is ex-
pected to testify, also in cam-
era, at today's session., To re-
but CIA testimony, the two au-
thors offered the testimony -
also also behind closed doors-of.
former National Security
Council staffer Morton Halpe-
rin, who was an expert witness
in the Pentagon Papers case.'
The case, which is expected
to be argued for a week, is an
outgrowth of the government's
first effort to impose pre-pub-
lication restraint in the courts
on national, security grounds.
In the Pentagon papers case,
which the government lost,
the Justice Department went
to court after publication of
the Vietnam study had begun
in The New York Times, The
Washington Post and other
newspapers..
.sue at hand is t e validity-of,
the security sta deEpr FJeTease 7
In arguing for the book's
publisher, Knopf, New York
attorney Floyd Abrams said a
question in' the case is
"whether Knopf's right to pub-
lish can properly be deemed
less extensive than was that of
The New York Times in the
Pentagon papers case."
The government won the
first round in'the Battle of the
book in 1972 when Judge
Bryan enjoined Marchetti
from publishing classified ma-
terial gathered during his 14
years of CIA employment
without prior agency clear-
ance.
,When the manuscript was
completed last fall Marchetti
and Marks submitted it, under
the terms of the injunction,
for CIA review.
Initially the CIA ordered
,more than 300 deletions. After
negotiation the number was
reduced to .225. By yesterday
the government was seeking
to strike 162 passages.
? ? Should: the government pre-
vail on .the. remaining. points,
Knopf .reportedly . intends to
publish the.. manuscript with
the. deleted. passages! marked
h"
"Deleted
T[ E WASFIINGTON POST
8 Friday, Match 1,1974
A2
61A-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For4&9Ieasse?2001/08122 CIA',-RDP84-o04
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Approved For Release 2001/08/22 CIS-1 ~ 8a-on"daaR6bfjod i30O 1_i
 Approved For Rjase 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499RQQ1000130001-1
LETTERS.. TO THE EDITOR:
The CIA Denies Charges
The Washington Post's story about
the National Caucus of Labor Commit-
tees (of Feb. 17, 1974) could leave the
impression with some of your readers
that the CIA, through its refusal to
comment, indeed 'might be involved in .
the, kinds of activities the NCLC alleges.
a domestic organization, so he should
ask the Federal Bureau of Investigation
,rather than CIA for information about
it. While it appeared self-evident that
the NCLC charges are only twisted fan-
tasy, your circulation of them forces.
CIA to deny them flatly as false.
W. E. COLBY,
Director, Oentra9 Intelllsence Asener
Washington.
tVAStf/A)Glb POST
Wti,la. 19 'Ph /s7L/
I-IS/HC- ~;4 0
Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R00 00130001-1
NBC Challenges CIA
NEW YORK (AP) - NBC
News has reported that the
Central Intelligence Agency
destroyed tapes made fol-
lowing the Watergate
break-in affair after Senate.
Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield asked that any
Watergate evidence be
saved.
On Tape DestrUction,
destruction of the tapes was
a routine matter. "There
was nothing deliberate
about this in the sense of
destroying a damaging tape
:,,.or anything like that."
NBC said the CIA denies
deliberate destruction of
any Watergate evidence.
But the CIA tapes were de-
stroyed Jan. 18, 1973, the
day after the CIA acknowl-
edged receipt of a letter
from Mansfield to various
agencies asking that any
Watergate materials be
saved, NBC said last night.
CIA Director William E.
Colby said Tuesday the in-
telligence agency had de-
stroyed all but one of its
tape recordings made dur-
ing the Watergate affair.
However, Colby said the
NBC said it was told by a
CIA spokesman that Mans-
field's letter arrived Jan. 22
-four days too late.
"Nevertheless, by check-
ing Senate Mansfield's of-
fice, we were able to find a
receipt for the letter signed
by the CIA on the 17th, the
day before the tapes' de-
struction," said NBC corre-
spondent Carl Stern.
"Informed of that, the
CIA withdrew its earlier
statements and now says
only that it will try diligent-
ly to pin down what hap-
pened," Stern reported. -
NBC said the destroyed
CIA tapes were recorded in
the month following the
Watergate break-in and
involved then CIA Director
Richard Helms, his deputy
Vernon Walters, acting FBI
Director Patrick L. Gray,
former White House domes-
tic adviser John D. Ehrlich-
man, ex-White House coun-
sel John W. Dean III, "and
possibly even, the Presi-
dent."
#W/?:. .3/ 94N /9' /1
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R0Qj,000130001-1
'CIA. been ~i~ad Only I.
Tape on Walergcete
Colby said last night that the
CIA can find only one tape
recording bearing on the Wa-
tergate affair and that it has
destroyed all its other tapes
from that period. 1
In a telephone Interview,
Colby said, "Sen. (Howard)
Baker asked us If there were
any other tapes that bore on
the subject. And we don't have
any other on this subject at
the moment. We had periodic
.destruction of our tapes."
(In . a separate interview
with United Press Internation-
al, Colby denied a CBS News
By Michael J. Sniffen
Associated Press
CIA, director William E. tion on June 22, 1971, between
' 1, Colby said that the one tape
%,- the agency has that fits Bak-
kor'e requoat Is of a conver.n
quested any CIA tapes bearing
on the Watergate affair.
He said the CIA had been
cooperating fully.
telephone Interview he had re-
report that the agency had de-
stroyed tapes considered vital
to the Watergate 'probe. He
said there was no indication
any had ever existed.)
Baker,, the Tennessee Re-
publican who is vice chairman
of the Senate 'Watergate com-
mittee, confirmed in another
E. Howard Hunt Jr., of the
White House special Investiga-
tions-or plumbers-unjt, and
Marine Gen. Robert E. Cush-
man, then deputy director of
the CIA.
The transcript of that tape
has been entered into the 1'ec
ord of the Senate Watergate
committee. He said the agen-
cy would supply Baker with
the tape Itself. "Anything we
own he can have," Colby
said.
But, Colby ? said, "Over the
last 15 years, we have made
tapes but periodically ' they
were torn tip the way' you
tear ' up old notes or old
checks after income tax time.
And we have not made, any
tapes In' the past year."
He said the Cushman-Hunt
tape, made by Cushman in his
own office, "survived normal
procedures of destruction be-
cause It was put In 'a separate
drawer somehow."
In the tape transcript,
Hunt asked Cushman to sup-
ply him two things: "flash
alias documentation . and
some. degree of 'physical dis-
guise for a one-time o)p-in
and but."
ved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved For Rejoase 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499RQQ1000130001-1
X9
By Martha Angle
St u-NcwvSt:dl1Vriler
The Central Intelligence
Agency has destroyed all of
its tape recordings of tele-
phone conversations and
office meetings except for
the tape already made pub-
lic in hearings of the Senate
Watergate committee.
CIA Director William,
Colby said last night the
agency destroyed the tapes
sometime after January
1973, when it discontinued a
"10 or 15" year practice of
taping "selected" phone
calls and meetings.
Destruction of the CIA
tapes came to light when
Republican Sen. Howard H.
Baker Jr., R-Tenn., asked
for the tape recording of a
mid-1971 conversation be-
tween convicted Watergate'
burglar E. Howard Hunt Jr.
and Marine Gen. Robert E.
Cushman Jr., then deputy,
director of the CIA.
BAKER ALSO asked Col-
by for any other CIA tapes
which might have a bearing
on the Watergate investiga-
tion.
"When I first talked with
Sen. Baker on Saturday, I
wasn't sure whether we had
any other tapes or not,"
Colby said last night. "I
checked and found that we
didn't."
A transcript of the Hunt-
Cushman conversation was
introduced into evidence
during the Senate Water-
gate hearings last year and
in the past several months
Baker has been conducting'
his own investigation into
the CIA's role in Watergate-
related activities.
jIS/HC- J J
Two of the seven men
captured on June 17, 1972, in
Watergate - Hunt and
James W. McCord - were
retired CIA employes, while
three others - Eugenio
Martinez, Bernard L. Bar-
ker and Frank Sturgis -
had at various times been
under contract with the
agency.
false identification papers
and a speech alteration de-
vice, from the CIA in 1971
while working with the
White House "plumbers"
unit which broke into the
office of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist.
Unlike the automatic
voice-activated White
House system which record-
ed President Nixon's phone
calls and meetings, the CIA
taping was done on a
to his office.
Colby said the agency has
.already turned over masses
of documents to the Water-
gate committee, the Special
Prosecutor's Office and
congressional; committees
which exercise "oversight"
functions regarding the
CIA. ,
The CIA director said he
is now preparing answers to
other requests by Baker for
information. Baker declined
"selective" basis on man- to say exactly what data he
devices, Colby said.
He said the tapes "were
periodically destroyed, and
about a year ago I decided I
didn't want to use the sys-
tem any longer and it was
discontinued."
Colby, who became CIA
director in September, was
executive director of the
agency when the decision
was made a year ago to
halt the taping. He said
James R. Schlesinger, then
CIA director and now secre-
tary of defense, agreed
with the decision.
is seeking from the CIA
except to say it included
information about "agency
contacts with any and all of
the Watergate types."
IINGTON STAR-NEWS
D.C., Wednesday, 1anuary30, 1974
U,
AFTER THE taping was
discontinued, Colby said, all
tapes on file at the CIA
were destroyed.
The Associated Press
quoted Colby as saying the
Hunt-Cushman tape "sur?
vived normal procedures of
destruction because it was
put in a separate drawer.
somehow." Cushman made
HUNT RECEIVED a va-, the tape when Hunt came
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0'0499R001000130001-1
WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Sunday, January 27, 1974
Author~
The CIA has lost another
round in its bid to put a gag
on a former agency official
who has written a critical
and revealing book about
U.S. intelligence practices.
Victor Marchetti, the
former CIA official, is pre-
paring a legal challenge of
some 135 deletions CIA and
State Department censors
have insisted be removed
from his book, and he is
under permanent court or-
der to publish nothing with-
out first clearing it with the
agency.
But the government failed
last week in a secret at-
tempt to persuade the judge
in the case, Albert V. Bryan
Jr., of the federal district
court in AAlexandria, to
punish Marchetti for a se-
ries of CIA leaks in recent
weeks.
GOVERNMENT lawyers,
in a letter to the judge clas-
sified and stamped "Top
Secret," invited Bryaan to
cite Marchetti for contempt
of court for five alleged vio-.
lations of the injunction.
Only one of the citations
directly involved Marchetti
at all: AA Canadian televi.
Rou
sion interview late last year
in which Marchetti alleged
that German Chancellor
Willie Brandt once received
CIA political funds in the
early cold war era.
The other four instancces
had no direct connection
with Marchetti at all. They
included articles in Harpers
Magazine and the New
York Times describing ear-
lier government attempts to
censor the Marchetti book,
and two articles in the Lon-
don Sunday Telegraph and
the Washington Post de-
scribing hitherto unpub-
lished intelligence opera-
tions.
THE JUDGE yesterday
informed all the parties that
he had no intention of begin-
ning a contempt proceeding
aganst Marchetti simply on
the ggovernment's say so,
and he suggested that as
things now stand Marchetti
would be free to reveal any-
thing he wants to, since he
obeyed earlier requiire-
ments that any manuscript
he wrote he submitted for
prior censorship.
-OSWALD JOHNSTON
J Approved For Release 2001/08/22 CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved ForJease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499#01000130001-1
mid-1971 conversation be. e cres and en p
meetings, the CIA
tween convicted Watergate calls
burglar E. Howard Hunt Jr. taping "selective" was basis done on on a
man-
and Marine Gen. Robert E. ually operated recording
Cushman Jr., then deputy devices, Colby said.
director of the CIA.
He said the tapes "were
BAKER ALSO asked Col- periodically destroyed, and
by for any other CIA tapes about a year ago I decided I
which might have a bearing didn't want to use the sys-
on the Watergate investiga- tern any longer and it was
tion. discontinued."
"When I first talked with '1'ne Associated Press
Sen. Baker on Saturday, I quoted Colby as saying the
wasn't sure whether we had Hunt-Cushman tape "sur-
any other tapes or note" vivcd normal procedures of
Colby said last night. I destruction because it,was
checked and found that we put in a separate drawer
didn't." somehow." Cushman made
A transcript of the Hunt- the tape when Hunt came
Cushman conversation was, to his office.
introduced into evidence - - ,
during the Senate Water- Colby said the agency has
gate hearings last year and already turned over masses
in the past several months of documents to the Water-
Baker has been conducting gate committee, the Special
his own investigation into Prosecutor's' Office and
the CIA's role in Watergate- congressional committees
related activities. which exercise "oversight"
Two of the seven men functions regarding the
e co
By Martha Angle
Star-News Staff Waiter
The Central Intelligence
Agency has destroyed all of
its tape recordings of tele-
phone conversations and
office meetings except for
the tape already made pub-
lic in hearings of the Senate
Watergate committee:
CIA Director William
Colby said last night the
agency destroyed the tapes
sometime after January
1973, when it discontinued a
"10 or 15" year practice of
taping "selected" phone
calls and meetings.
Destruction of the CIA
tapes came to light when
Republican Sen. Howard H.
Baker Jr., R-Tenn., asked
for the tape recording of.a
G3
s
Watergate - Hunt and
James W. McCord - were
retired CIA employes, while .
three others - Eugenio'
Martinez, Bernard L. Bar-
ker and Frank Sturgis -
had at various times been
under contract with the
agency.
HUNT RECEIVED a va-
riety of materials, including
false identification papers
and a speech alteration de-
vice, from the CIA in 1971
while working with the
White House "plumbers
unit which broke into the
office of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist.
Unlike the automatic
House system which record-
hone
s
d Pidt Nixon'
captured on June 17, 1972, in CIA.
~"~ For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
'f HS/HC- proved
yj o
 Approved For ,Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499LR001000130001-1
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 or 0~1~ase 2001/08/22` MeRD MO04g9 QQ 40C704's0 01-1
icy" is pondered by Stcv Dedijer, a
Spook the
Spooks?
By C. L. Sulzberger
MILAN, Italy--The role of intelli-
gence in modern societies is now in-
creasingly questioned as the result of
scandals, wiretappings, failures to
evaluate correctly what special serv-
ices report, or inexcusable political
interventions like the recent C.I.A.
case in Thailand.
Thus, in the United States and
France, there have been flamboyant
bugging incidents which threaten to
topple leading officials. Greece's own
central intelligence agency, K.Y.P., has
allegedly been at, the heart of two suc-
cessive putsches. And Israel's highly
expert spook apparatus produced cor-
rect information that war was coming
last October-yet the Government ig-
nored these warnings.
Many security organizations have
acquired unsavory reputations. Both
Britain's secret intelligence service
(viz., Kim Philby) and the Soviet serv-
ices (viz., Colonels Penkovsky and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Popov) have been demonstrably pene-
trated-by their adversaries.
Moreover, the ancient business of
intelligence has been totally revolu-
tionized by technological revolutions.
The computer plays an enormous role
in analyzing the information of spies
and special agents. And electronic
eavesdropping plus space satellite pho-
tography combine to open brand new
fields of espionage, fields that remain
closed to small, poor, underdeveloped
countries.
Indeed, it is increasingly obvious
that pooled intelligence among allies
is sensible even for rich and powerful
nations. A former French Minister of
Defense wonders whether France
(whose intelligence services have been
smudged with scandal) requires such
agencies in peacetime.
He says: "France is not an important
enough country to require a peace
,time intelligence service anyway. All
it needs is to have good relations
with its allies and enough of a new
intelligence service to be able to func-
tion should there .be a serious threat
of war."
Yugoslav-born Swedish citizen now on
the faculty of Lund University, Swe-
den. Dedijer has special expertise since
he admits having worked successively
for jthe Soviet N.K.V.D. (now M.G.B.),
the American O.S.S. (precursor of the
C.I.A.), then in "intelligence activities"
for Yugoslavia-before moving to it
Swedish ivory tower.
Mr. Dedijer reaches the novel con-
clusion that courses in "intelligence"
should be given in universities-where
everything from hotel management to
embalming is now taught. He says that
despite a broad literature of case his-
tories and spy novels, there are "very
few systematic social studies" on the
subject. Yet there exists a contradic-
tion between "the need to democratize
intelligence and to control it on the
one hand, and its secrecy and illegal-
ity requirements on the other."
He points out that mass media and
other groups "are making intelligence
questions objects of public debate and
political problems," adding: "The de-
mands for the democratization of in-
telligence policy and its control are
being raised." He suggests examina-
tion of the following:
trot of the intelligence production sys-
tem, management system and policy
system necessary, desirable ahd pos-
sible? What does intelligence cost us?
How many are engaged in it, who and
where are they and how selected?
What is the return on our investment
in intelligence? How much waste and
abuse is involved: Is the intelligence
community subverting our basic na-
tional values and quality of our life?"
' Mr. Dedijer concludes: "We are
learning that intelligence is too im-
portant to be left to professional in-
telligencers. Intelligence, as all other
key functions and institutions, has to
be on tap but not on top of society."
He believes: "The basic intelligence
goal for individual countries is chang-
ing from intelligence for national ex-
istence and security to intelligence for
national growth and development."
There is much to be said for his
fresh approach to a field hitherto
cloaked in dark suspicion and speckled
with gaudy romance. Surely, for a sub=
ject so vital to contemporary societies,
there should be public discussion and
even intellectual courses examining
the needs and methods of what used
to be an unmentionable trade.
t
pproved For Release 2001/08/22 :.CIA-RDP,
 TO F r se.2001 /08/22 : -CIAF4RQR84e60At99R00ION 1 x001=1
icy" is pondered by StevalrDedijer, a
Yugoslav-born Swedish citizen now on
Spook the
Spooks?
By C L. Sulzberger
MILAN, Italy--The role of intelli-
gence in modern societies is now in-
creasingly questioned as the result of
scandals, wiretappings, failures to
,evaluate correctly what special serv-
,ices report, or inexcusable political
'interventions like the recent C.I.A.
case in Thailand.
. Thus, . in the United States and
France, there ' have been ? flamboyant
i bugging incidents which threaten to
topple leading officials. Greece's own
central intelligence agency, K.Y.P., has
allegedly been at the heart of two suc-
L cessive putsches. And Israel's highly
-expert spook apparatus produced cor-
.rect information that war was coming
last October-yet the Government ig-
nored these warnings.
Many security organizations have
acquired unsavory reputations. Both -
Britain's secret intelligence service
(viz., Kim Philby) and the Sbviet serv-
ices (viz., Colonels Penkovsky and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Popov) have been demonstrably pene-
trated by their adversaries.
Moreover, the ancient business of
intelligence has been totally revolu-
tionized by . technological revolutions.
The computer plays an enormous role
in analyzing the information of spies
and special agents. And electronic
eavesdropping plus space satellite pho-
tography combine to open brand new
fields of espionage, fields that remain
closed to small, poor, underdeveloped
countries.
Indeed, it is increasingly obvious
that pooled intelligence among allies
is sensible even for rich and powerful
nations. A former French Minister of
Defense wonders whether France
(whose intelligence services have been
smudged with scandal) requires such
agencies in peacetime.
He says: "France is not an important
enough country to require a peace -
,time intelligence service anyway. All
it needs is to have good relations
with its allies and enough of a new
:-.intelligence service to be able to func-
tion should there .be a serious threat
of War."
the faculty of Lund University, Swe-
den. Dedijer has special expertise since
he admits having worked successively
for the Soviet N.K.V.D. (now M,G.B.),
the American O.S.S. (precursor of the
C.I.A.), then in "intelligence activities"
for Yugoslavia-before moving to a
Swedish ivory tower.
Mr. Dedijer reaches the novel con-
that courses in "intelligence" . ? .
clusion
should be given in universities-where
everything from' hotel management to
embalming is now taught. He says that
despite a broad literature of case his-
tories and spy novels, there are "very
few systematic social studies" on the
subject. Yet there exists a contradic-
tion between "the need to democratize
intelligence and to control it on the
one hand, and its secrecy and illegal-
ity ;-'
requirements on the other."
He points but that mass media and
other groups "are making intelligence
questions objects of public debate and
political problems," adding: "The de-
mands for the democratization of in-
telligence policy and its control are
being raised." He suggests examina-
tion of the following:
"Is a wider and greater public con-
trol of the intelligence production sys-
tem, management system and policy
system necessary, desirable ahd pos-
sible? What does intelligence cost us?
How many are engaged in it, who and
where are they and how selected?
What is the return on our investment
in intelligence? How much waste and
abuse is involved: Is the intelligence
community subverting our basic na-
tional values and quality of our life?"
' Mr. Dedijer concludes: "We are
learning that intelligence is too im-
portant to be left to professional in-
telligencers. Intelligence, as all other
key functions and institutions, has to
be on tap but not on top of society.",
He believes: "The basic intelligence.
goal for individual countries is chang-
ing from intelligence for national ex-
istence and security to intelligence for
national growth and development."
There is much to be said for his
fresh approach to a field hitherto
cloaked in dark suspicion and speckled
with gaudy romance. Surely, for a sub=
ject so vital to contemporary societies,
there should be public discussion and
even intellectual courses examining
the needs and methdds of what used
to. be an unmentionable trade.
Approved For Release 2001/08/22:;;C
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004998001000130001-1
ByTan;rayArbuckle A lanky Texan, Phil
Star-News s,,c,al Cormapmknt Buechler, an old U.S. AID
,hand in Laos has been ap-
LONG CHENG, North' pointed AID area coordina-
Laos ... Over the last-fewi tor and will be the chief
weeks, the United States
has withdrawn almost all of
its paramilitary personnel
and closed down virtually, officials and defence at- I
all of its paramilitary opera- tache personnel far outnwn- .
tions from this high, moun- ber CIA personnel.
joint American and Mao AN AMERICAN AID
nerve center for 11 years of official and his wife, who is
the war in north Laos. a . trained nurse, have
The Central Intelligence moved their house to Long
Agency which ran these Cheng to help the Meo lead-
operations is now in the er, Vang Pao, with econom-
process of handing over its
functions to the U.S. Agency
for International Develop-
ment and to the military
attache's office of the U.S.
embassy in Vientiane, the
Lao capital.
The windowless rock-
walled rooms, with special
combination locks on their.
doors, which once housed
the paramilitary headquar-
ters are now taken over by
-AID. Instead of shotguns
and other weapons, there
are trays of official papers.
U.S. OFFICIALS, hung
with webbing festooned
with hand grenades, smoke
canisters and water bottles,
packing Browning automat-
ic pistols on their hips and
Colt AR 15 submachineguns
slung across their chests,
are a thing of the past.
Talk at the soldiers' mess
no longer centers on heli-
AID is gradually tak-
ing over the compound and
is programming.
The CIA handled both mil-
itary and civilian affairs at
Long Cheng but now respon-
sibility is split with civilian
affairs going to AID and
military affairs to the at-
tache's office. The dozen
attache personnel at Long
Cheng, however, don't ex
pect to be there long. They
are likely to leave Laos-
either by the start of the
new U.S. fiscal year begin-
ning July 1st or within 60
days of a Laos coalition
government formed, which-,'
ever happens first ,
All that remains of the
onetime U.S. combat pres-
ence of about 30 men is an
American supervisor, an
American administrative
officer and two case officers
who handle the Thai irregu-
lar forces still in Long
Cheng.
borne assaults behind ene-, But they too should be
my lines, the latest U.S. Air; gone before July 1st. The
Force errors or shotup U.S.
aircraft limping onto Long
Cheng's air strip. Instead it
focuses on new medical dis-
pensaries, a hospital, a new
gas station and a chicken
farm to provide the Meo
with protein. '
Thais are already down to
less than half their previous
strength.
The impact is most ob-
vious at the last brothel,
once staffed by,' 45 girls
imported from the Mekong
-River towns. It did a roar-
ing trade. Now there are
only 21 girls and the brothel
keeper says business is
poor.
U.S. officials say they
have gone ahead with the
Laos withdrawal even thou-
gh hope for a new govern.
ment is far from formed.
Billions of U.S. tax dollars-
were spent here and about
800 Americans were killed in
the Laos fighting, mostly in
downed aircraft, but, at
least 24 were lost in ground
action with the Lao forces
and 80 more in South- Viet .
nam-based ground opera-
tions against the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in South Laos.
Although 'the U.S. para-
military forces are gone,
some of them and the bulk
of U.S.air power are just
across the border in Thai-
land 30 minutes away. It.
could be employed swiftly
by President Nixon if, new'
fighting started ends. _ __,_
WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, January 22, 1974
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004998001000130001-1
By Tammy Arbuckle A lanky Texan, Phil
Buechler, an old U.S. AID
'handein Laos has been ap-
LONG CHENG, North. pointd AID area coordina-
Laos . . . Over the last.fewl tor and will be the chief
weeks, the United States i American here.
has withdrawn almost all of
its paramilitary personnel
and closed down virtually,
all of its paramilitary opera-
tions from this high moun-
tain valley which was the
joint American and Mao
nerve center for 11 years of
the war in north Laos.
The Central Intelligence
Agency which ran these
operations is now in the
process of handing over its
functions to the U.S. Agency
for International Develop-
ment and to the military
attache's office of the U.S.
embassy in Vientiane, the
Lao capital.
The windowless rock.
walled rooms, with special
combination locks on their.
doors, which once housed
the paramilitary headquar-
ters are now taken over by
.AID. Instead of shotguns
and other weapons, there
are trays of official papers.
U.S. OFFICIALS, hung
with webbing festooned
with hand grenades, smoke
canisters and water bottles,
packing Browning automat-
ic pistols on. their hips and
Colt AR 15 submachineguns
slung across their chests,
are a thing of the past. ,
Talk at the soldiers' mess
no longer centers on heli-
borne assaults behind ene-
my lines, the latest U.S. Air
Force errors or shotup U.S.
aircraft limping onto Long
Cheng's air strip. Instead it
focuses on new medical dis-
pensaries, a hospital, a new
gas station and a chicken
farm to provide the Meo
with protein.
AID is gradually tak-
ing over the compound and
officials, and defence at-
tache personnel far outn-uh-
ber CIA personnel.
AN AKPIERICAN AID
official and his wife, who is
a trained nurse, have
,moved their house to Long
Cheng to help the Meo lead-
er, Vang Pao, with econom-
ic programming.
The CIA handled both mil-
itary and civilian affairs at
Long Cheng but now respon-
sibility is split with civilian
affairs going to AID and
military affairs to the at-
tache's office. The dozen
attache personnel at Long
Cheng, however, don't ex
pect to be there long. They
are likely to leave Laos-
either by the start of the
new U.S. fiscal year begin=
ping July 1st or within 60
days of a Laos coalition
government formed, which-.'
ever happens first .
All that remains of the
onetime U.S. combat pres-
ence of about 30 men is an
American supervisor, an
American administrative
officer and two case officers
who handle the Thai irregu-
lar forces still in Long
Cheng.
But they too should be
gone before July 1st. The
Thais are already down to
less than half their previous
strength.
The impact is most ob-
vious at the last brothel,
mported fromthe4Mekong
River towns. It did a roar-
ing trade. Now there are
only 21 girls and. the brothel
keeper says business is
poor.
U.S. officials say they
have gone ahead with the
Laos withdrawal even thou-
gh hope for a new govern-
ment is far from formed.
Billions of U.S. tax dollars'
were spent here and about
800 Americans were killed in
t ie Laos fighting, mostly in
downed aircraft, but, at
least 24 were lost in ground
action with the Lao forces
and 80 more in South_Viet;,
nam-based ground opera-
tions against the Ho Chi
Minh Trail in South Laos.
Although the U.S. para-
military forces are gone,
some of them and the bulk
of U.S..air. power are just
across the border in Thai,
land 30 minutes away. It
could be employed swiftly
by President Nixon if new
fighting started ends. _
WASHINGTON STARNEWS
Washington, 0. C., Tuesday, January 22, 1974
HS/HC- /i f i'
 Approved For Release 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499RQQ000130001-1
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1974
L -j 1" . (Z.- ai Relations Expected to Survive C.I.A. Blow'._;
By JAMES F. CLARITY
Special Lo The Now York 'rimes
BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 20
-The admitted interference of
the Central Intelligence Agency
in an internal Thai affair does
not mean, in the view of knowl-
edgeable Western diplomats,
that the C.I.A. has garroted it-
self with its own cloak in this
country, but that it has at least
pinked itself with its own dag-
ger.
The incident, which stirred
vigorous student protests in a
country where students are the
most influential political force,
left Thai-American relations
frayed, but not tattered, the
diplomats say.
The affair focused new at-
tention an the large American
presence, mostly military, in
Thailand. It also marred the en-
trance on the scene of a new
United States Ambassador, Wil-
liam R. Kintner, and forced the
interim Government here to dis-
entangle itself from another
problem in the midst of the dif-
ficulties it has been trying to
solve since it replaced the mili-
tary regime deposed in a stu-
dent uprising in October.
In the view of some analysts
here, the C.I.A. affair was an
embarrassment to almost every-
one concerned, including the of-
fice boy whose registration of,
an ersatz letter led to the blow-
ing of the cover.
The plot itself seemed simple
enough. An agent of the Amer-
ican intelligence agency, not
identified but sent home ear-
lier this month, composed a
letter purportedly from an in-
,surgent leader asking to discuss
,a cease-fire with the Govern-
ment.
The purpose of the letter, ac-
cording to Ambassador Kintner, I the Central Intelligence Agency
was to produce dissension and
defections among the insur-
gents who have been fighting
the Bangkok Government for
years. The registered letter
found its way-how is not clear
-to the offices of an English-
language Bangkok newspaper,
The Nation. The paper traced it
to the C.I.A. and published it,
the ambassador admitted the
American involvement and the
scandal was under way.
In the succeeding two weeks,
Dr. Kintner has apologized for
the incident several times, in-
cluding personal apologies to
King Phumiphol Aduldet and
Premier Sanya Dharmasakti,
and said he had taken meas-
ures to prevent American offi-
cials from meddling in Thai-
land's internal affairs. The stu-
dent organizations, which had
first demanded the total ouster
of the C.I.A. and the recall of
Dr. Kintner to Washington,
have not reacted to the Bang-
kok Government's relatively
mild reprimand to the United
States and the ambassador last
Thursday.
Dr. Kintner, who was person-
ally vulnerable to the student
criticsm because he worked for
for two years during the Ko-
rean war, said in a recent inter-
view that the incident caused
"chagrin" among Thai officials.
It also, the ambassador said,
reflected a "patronizing atti-
tude" that he has found among
some of his embassy staff mem-
bers-not necessarily members
of the intelligence agency -
toward the Thais. The employe
who patronized, whose attitude
the ambassador describes as
"Look, Charlie, we'll show you
how to do it," will be trans-
ferred, the ambassador indi-'
cated.
The furor over the letter has
had a number of other effects.
It has prompted the Gov-
ernment to say that it is re-
examining the extent of Central
Intelligence Agency operations
here. In the process of saying
this, the Government has ac-
knowledged that the American
intelligence organization pro-
vides it with various kinds of
help in internal security, coun-
terintelligence, counterinsur-
gency and narcotics-control
programs.
The United States attitude
toward this kind of help, as
indicated by the ambassador
and other competent diplomats ~?
here, is that in future the This
assistance they ask for. 0
No Thai officials seriously
pect the Central Intelligend,p 4
Agency to stop operating hett,
They concede that a total b,ati
would be foolish, as the agents d
would only continue to operate
in mufti. There are now i"rr f
Thailand, American officialg
say, 50 operating agents sufl-
ported by 100 clerical and com=
munications assistants.
Ambassador Kintner, an out+
spoken man who has divided
his professional life betweepr
the Army and the academic ?
world, says Thai-American rc-
lations have survived the ih-;
cident. He shrugs off questions..
whether it has caused friction
between 'him and the intelD,,
gence agency chiefs in Wash?
ington.
Acknowledging that the in-,
cident took place without lus.
knowledge after he becani~
ambassador two months agog
Dr. Kintner said of the present.
structure at the embassy her tii: .
"I have full authority from th;gd
President-and the Secretary qf;
State."
ES /HC- 94
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CAA to but Operations in Thailand
By David Binder went a fake letter purport-
New York Trig News service in g to be lla peace
leader, offer from
The Central Intelligence
in ception was revealed, stir-
Tha land will operations an outcry in Thailand
ly reduced, soon be s according sharp, b s- against the CIA, the United
re to States and Ambassador Wil-
U.S, officials. liam R. Kintner.
The CIA has been con-
ducting a sizable counterin-
surgency program against
Communist guerrillas in
Thailand for almost 10
years.
But last month an agency
operative stationed in a
provincial town in Thailand
sent to the Bangkok govern-
SA7"KAA41
,q SAN 197'4
HS/IIC- ~ f'p
THE WASHINGTON offi-
cials said that Kintner is
preparing recommenda-
tions that would greatly lim-
it CIA operations in Thai-
land. The agency now is
said to have 150 operatives
.in Thailand, most in the
counterinsurgency pro-
gram, and the rest combat-
ing narcotics traffickers
from Burma.
The officials said Kintner
had planned a reduction of
intelligence operations be-
fore the incident, as part of
a general readjustment of
U.S. policy toward the new
Thai government, which
came to power last October.'
But big demonstrations
against U.S. policy in three
major cities - Bangkok,
Chiang Mai and Udon -
during the last two weeks
and demands by the govern-
ment of Premier Sanya
Dharmasakti have impelled
the ambassador to plan
greater reductions, the offi-
cials reported. .
THE WASHINGTON offi-
cials said that during a rou-
tine staff discussion con-
ducted by the CIA station
intelligence officers at the
provincial town of Sakon
Nakhon thought the idea
was a good one.
The official said the CIA
agent wrote the letter with-
out telling his Thai col-
leagues and sent it to San-
ya, with copies going to
several Bangkok newspa-
pers. Evidently, the fake
letter was designed to un-
dermine morale in the
Communist insurgent move-
ment and cause defections.
chief in Bangkok, Bernardo The letter was exposed in
Hugh Tovar," the idea was the first week of January,
floated" of manufacturing and the agent was hastily
fake letters purporting to be sent out of the country.
peace offers to Premier
Sanya from a Thai Commu-
nist leader. "The idea was
shot down at the meeting,"
one official said.
Nonetheless, one CIA-
agent who was assigned to
advise Thai military and
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r
 Approved For Rise 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R rO00130001-1
THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JAkUARY 18, 1974
Thailand Officially Chides U.S.:1
Over C.I.A. Interference There
By JAMES F. :CLARITY
Special to The New York Times
BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 17
!.-Thailand ' expressed official
'dissatisfaction to the United
..States today over the admitted
interference by the Central In-
,telligence. Agency in Thai af-
fairs.
A Foreign Ministry statement
was. the first official reaction
to the. scandal, which erupted
hero nearly two week ago
altar it was disclosed ,that a
C,LA., agent had sent Premier
Sanya Dharmasaktl a letter
purporting to be from an in-
surgent leader seeking peace
with the Government. The in-
cident caused vigorous protests
from student organizations, the
most influential political force
here since the ouster of the,
military government in Novem-
ber.
the general behavior of C.I.A.
units inside Thaila d and their
demand. that` the U ited States
stop all ac'tions of 'interference
in the internal affairs of Thai-
land." .
`
Dr. Kintner, who admitted
the C.I.A. plot and apologized
for it last week, was said by
the ministry to have assured
the Premier ; again -today. that
he.. would do everything A o
prevent any action of interfer-
ence in Thailand's internal af-
fairs from happening again"
The statement said Thailand
was examining the American
agency's connections with Thai
agencies, but it. did not indicate
whether the Government
planned, any. further action.:
There was a widespread opinion
among Western diplomats that
unless the student organiza-
tions .'refused to, accept, the
Government's' handling of 'the
issue in the statement today,
the matter would be allowed
to fade away. '
Ambassador Kintner, in an
interview after he visited the
Premier and the Foreign Minis- :
ter, Charunphan Issarangkun na
Ayuthaya, said that the letter
had caused chagrin among Thai
officials but that senior offi-
cials had assured him that they
wanted ? relations . to remain.
cordial.
The ministry statement said
Dr. .Kintner had assured the
Premier that the agent respon-
sible-.for'.the, plot had been.sent
back` to the United States and'
that the C.I.A; office in the,
northern town of Sakon Nak
hon, where the plot was born,'
had been closed.
?::In.the interview Dr. Kintner,
a one-time C.I.A. employe who
becalpe Ambassador two months
ago, said that the plot had been
stupidly conceived and ex-
ecuted. Its purpose, he said,
was to produce . dissension
among the leaders of insurgent I
groups.
The Foreign Ministry. said
that Ambassador William R.
Kintner', ;,at': 'his request, met
with Premier Sanya and was
told 'of "the dissatisfaction of
,students. and the; people with
the event that had happened
as well ' as the dissa'tifaction of
the Thai people, in general with
LES/HC- 940
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 Approved For RAlise 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499RQi000130001-1
Poster
01ace More Into
The dig u~d
A Commentary
'By Nicholas" von Hof /uiicen
Les Aspin, the young Wisconsin Democrat who is
proving there is useful work for a member of Congress
if he wants to do it,.has learned that contracts for Air
America', the CIA's transparently phony airline, have
doubled to more than $41 million. It is assumed by
those ,who study the outfit's murky doings the money.
will be spent encouraging our mercenaries to muck
around-Laos anew.
'. Our government disguises what we' are shipping into
Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam with the same care
.=the Russians use in hiding their military expenditures
so only a spy or a detective can hope to know the truth.
Not only do we appropriate munitions under such cate-
gories as Food; for. Peace but since the Pentagon places
the dollar value on our war shipments, they can` con-
coal enormous amounts by assessing tanks at $1 apiece
and airplanes at $5 a throw. The Pentagon has told
Aspin that the inventory of what we're sending is
classified,' and therefore not available to the unstable,
national security risks 'whom the voters send to Con-
gress.
Nevertheless, by the end of Fiscal;Year 74, next July
that is, our military costs in that part of the world will
-running at above $4 billion a year. This necessarily'
.means violating the Paris ceasefire agreements which'
confine us to resupplying ~de'pleted stocks. We are also
breaking our word by introducing a new combat plane,
gloriously and. honorably named :Tiger II 'Freedom
.I'lghters. .
Asked about this stepped-up bomb procurement for
Southeast Asia, Air Force Gen. Jonas Blank explained
everything, by saying, "The- requirement to accelerate
production occurred as a'result of the March 26, 1974,
Secretary of Defense guidance which tasked the Air
Force to protect a Southeast Asia contingency capabil-
-In short, it appears 'we are returning to our old win-
ning, formula of guns and military advisers, of which
it is now believed we, have 20,000 sneaking about
those dear, old familiar palms. Thus, instead of using
our decisive leverage to make him abide by it, we are
apparently egging Thieu on to; forget the Paris agree-
f
-
,
ments which were supposed to be our tickets out o
that bog.
Some moderates or liberals or whatever you want to
call. the wishy-washies in Congress seem to be content
to vote the money for the destruction of the Paris agree-
-
..
ments in return for keeping our.people out of the fight
lug and because you .don't want the Reds to' take over,
do you? Of course, the Reds are going to take over any-
way, only it will be longer and more costly. They've got
most of Cambodia now and they're going to get the
rest of it soon enough. ? .
Ultimately, they'll get. General 'Chieu also. because
We know that a corrupt, inflation-wracked,' debilitated
South Vietnam can't win without our armed interven-
tion. tion. We already have our Secretary of Defense get-
ting us acclimated to the thought again, and there
is the memory of Dr. Kissinger saying, "'I wanted to
bomb the daylights out of Hanoi, but Congress wouldn't
let me." It looks like the boys regard the Paris agree-
ments as a. truce to buy time to 'get' the peaceniks off
their backs.
The justification for what we're doing is that the
North Vietnamese are 'doing the same thing. Doubt-
less they .are. But if they-win, they, get the other half of ;
their country. What. do we get if we win? Honor? The
President's told-us we already have that. The satisfac-
tion of keeping the Reds out of -Saigon? Well, what's
wrong with these Reds? .They're' far less obnoxious
than the ones in Moscow or Peking and being fewer in
number and poorer in resources,' are 'much less of a
threat.
Even if we don't go back there with the big birds
but try to buy the victory this time, all we are going to
get for it is a' big debt., This isn't 1955 or 1965, and we,
can't afford it anymore. Our inflation rate is running 10
;per- cent.now, and if we. have to pay for three wars in
Indochina and another one in the Middle.East, it simply
isn't going to natter who wins. We will lose.
0 1374, The Waahtnston Post/King Features 6rndtcsts
. ~ TKE, , VASrIN.G.'10N POST
Friday. Jan. 18.19174
xS/HC- 9 / .
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 Approved FoIease 2001/0$/22: CIA-RDP84-0049
Thursday, JJan.17, 1474 THE WASIZI]GTON POSTS
Wh1at Is the' U.S. Doing in, Thailand?,
AN EXTRAORDINARY instance of American over-
reaching has just come to light in Thailand. It
involves the CIA, an agency so habituated-at least in
Thailand-to acting like a sovereign state that it seems
to have been unable to adjust to the winds of Thai
change. It seems that a CIA agent sent a letter to the
new prime minister, who came to power last fall replac-
ing the generals identified with a close military link to
the United States, Signing the name of a Communist
insurgent leader in Sakhon Nakhon province, the agent
sounded out the prime minister on his interest in open-
ing talks with the insurgents. The letter's internal in-
consistencies struck Thai officials, they now say. Since
it had been sent by registered mail, it was easily
traced to the CIA office in a particular province. The
government then evidently leaked the story to the Thai
press, which gave it a play worthy of the outrageousness
of the event itself. "Really bad," the prime minister
summed up.
The newly posted American ambassador, William R.
Kintner, was forced to acknowledge and apologize for
this "regrettable and unauthorized initiative." "No Amer-.
lean official is to be involved in any activity which
could be interpreted as interference in Thai internal
affairs," he announced. Yet this hardly, puts the matter-
to rest. Is it more believable that the agent. was acting
on his own or that, unmasked, his operation-whatever
its purpose-was simply repudiated? Since CIA activi-
ties in Thailand are ;supposed to,be confined to provid-
ing technical intelligence assistance ,to Thais, how is It'
that the CIA appears to have set up?what the That press
calls "operation units in various areas"? The CIA's in
discretion "demonstrates to the people that the United
States is involved in the fight to suppress the Commu-
nist terrorists," the Bangkok radio noted, and thus it
compromises the Thai government -claim that the insur-
gents, but not the government, lack independence and
sovereignty. How could the CIA be insensitive .to the
what is said to be, a foreign-supported insurgency?
The most troubling aspect of this incident, however,:
goes beyond the damage that may have been done. to
U.S.-Thai relations. Just how deeply is the United States
"involved in the fight to suppress the Communist ter-
rorists," in' the Bangkok radio's words? A Senate staff
report issued last June stated that there were 545 Ameri-
cans working in Thai counter-insurgency within the
U.S.-Military Assistance Command. But if, ,as the Thai
counter-insurgency 'chief now says, "it has especially
been the principle of [his program] that the fight to
suppress the Communists is the Thai people's affair,"
then what'are all those Americans doing, whether they
are inside or outside the CIA? The new Thai leadership,
by publicizing and protesting the affair of the letter,
indicates its own decision to put some nationalistic dis-
tance between itself and Thailand's former American
patrons. This is an understandable choice flowing from
the winding down of the American role in all of Indo-
The, Thais, who live there, are adjusting. But we
china.
Americans still have questions of our own to ask about
any residual counter-insurgency role. It sounds too much
 Approved F
U.S. INTELLIGENCE
SEES HANOI PUSH
But Timing of Offensive Is
a Matter of Estimates,
Public and.,Private
By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 13-Fif-
?teen.years after the first Ameri-
can combat troops ,entered
South Vietnam, the American
Intelligence 'community Is tell-
ing the President that the ques-
tion is still when-not whether
-North Vietnam is going to
launch a major. offensive
against the South. ,
According to Intelligence
sources and Administration of-
ficials, the formal position of
the intelligence community, as
embodied in a policy paper, is
that the chances are slightly
less than 50-50 that Hanoi will
strike in a big way in the next
six months.
But the informal positions of
Intelligence analysts - in the
Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency
and the State Department -
vary significantly on both sides
from that formal posture. In
fact, most intelligence officers
believe that the odds are not
slightly but significantly less
than 50-50 that North Vietnam
will mount a big offensive in
this dry season in Vietnam.
Hedging Is Protective
It is not unusual for the
Intelligence community. or the
bureaucracy 'generally to dis-
play official caution in a formal
position paper and then a
greater degree of candor In
private briefings of senior offi-
cials. Because political leaders
have often blamed past policy
failures on "faulty intelligence,'
analysts tend to protect them-
selves from , becoming the
"scapegoats" by hedging their
predictions in written docu-
ments...
As a result," the informal
briefings of senior officials by
analysts-the more unvarnished
presentations-tend to. assume
greater importance than formal
papers. ~r,, _. ,:w?.v,,:..
elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0040AR001000130001-1
til
In the case of Vietnam Intel-
ligence, the two key men are
william E. Colby, the Director
of the Central Intelligence
Agency. and George A. Carver
Jr., itr chief national intelli-
gence officer. Mr. Colby head-
ed American political pacifica-
tion programs in South Viet-
nam from 1969 to 1971; Mr.
Carver was known as the
"father of the hamlet-evalua-
tion system," a method of
meassuring the progress of
pacification.
Both were widely considered
controversial figures over the
years in the development of
United States policy toward
South Vietnam. One analyst re-
marked, however, that "even
though we recognize their past
histories in Vietnam, I think
that they're trying to be intel-
lectually fair -on the current
estimates."
Several Intelligence special-
ists say 'that they are denied
access to key pieces of intel!li-
gence, namely the content of
conversations between Secre'-
tary of State Kissinger and
{: such foreign leaders as Leonid
1. Breshnev, Chou En-lei and Le
Due Tho.
"It's hard to make guesses
about what Hanoi is going to
;do without having some -idea
of what those guys are telling
Kissinger," an analyst ' said-
referring to the Soviet Commu-
nist party leader, thei Chinese
Premier and Hanoi's chief ne-
gotiator -"about whether or
not Moscow and Peking would
help Hanoi out in resupplying
an all-out offensive."
Of `Sensitive' Conversations
. In an interview, Mr. Colby
confirmed this, but he went on
to say: "Kissinger keeps me in-
formed on' his 'conversations
with foreign leaders, but I don't
get a full formal debriefing. I
on't pass this down to the
analysts, except on rare occa-
sions. These conversations are
very sensitive. I myself factor
them into the formal estimates
of the intelligence community."
The prevailing judgment 'of
recent months of intelligence-
estimating about Vietnam, Ad-
,ministration and intelligence
analysts '.say, Is that both Ha-
not and -Saigon are still,unwill-
Ing -to risk the compromises
necessary for a political settle"
ment and that Hanoi's continu-
ing objective is to gain control
"of South Vietnam by. force.,
oved For Release 2001/08/_? r'M/ Y
HS/HC- 1 d'O I;.>.:. _?.,,:r.:.,.,E:~.,
Last September, the "Intel-
ligence services, in a national-
intelligence-estimate policy pa-
per, predicted that the chances
were better than " even that
Hanoi would open a full-scale
offensive in the dry season be-
ginning this month; then in
December that estimate was
updated and the odds reversed.
Following is a composite
view of the explanations of
analysts for the shift.
Does Hanoi think that Mos-
cow an Peking will support a
renewed ' offensive? Probably
not, the analysts say, noting
that Mr. Carver believes prob-
ably yes. Do Hanoi leaders ex-
'pect that President Nixon
would be able politically to re-
sume the bombing of North
Will Saigon` force Hanoi's
hand by launching a major at-
tack In the South? A strong
but positive no. Who has the
upper hand in Hanoi's Politburo,
the hawks or the doves? On
balance, the intelligence, com-
munity believes the doves now
P revail, Mr. carver is -said to
old the opposite view.
 Approved ForV4dIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049901000130001.-1.
Srll.ttl-t H. Loory
Press Credibility
Sunday, In. 13, 1974
And Journalist-Spies
in the old days - the pre-Watergate
days - when even small deceptions
by the government, once revealed,
were considered scandalous, the rev-
elation that the Central Intelligence
Agency was using American foreign
correspondents as spies would have
provoked an uproar. '
Remember the furore in 1967 when
Ramparts magazine disclosed the
CIA's infiltration of foundations, labor
unions and student organizations? In
contrast, there has been only muted
criticism in the wake of the disclosure
a few weeks ago that the CIA had on
its payroll overseas some three dozen-
Americans who were either working as
foreign correspondents or masquerad-
ing In such positions as a cover.
William E Colby, director of the'
agency, has already promised that five
of those operatives working full time
The writer, a?,journalism profs.+-
sor at Ohio State University, was
a' Moscow correspondent for the
New York Herald Tribune. He
,later served as White House cor-
respondent for the Los Angeles
Times.
for general-circulation news-gathering
organizations as well as for the CIA
will be "phased out" of their spying
roles. But he has also made the explicit
decision to maintain contractual rela-
tionships with newsmen working for
specialized publications or as freelance
reporters.
Colby apparently draws a distinction
between larger news-gathering organi-
zations and smaller ones, between gen-`
eral-circulation organizations and
trade publications. .Foreigner9 do not
make such nice distinctions; to them,
an American newsman is ah American
newsman. Why should anyone believe
that Colby has indeed removed the
stigma of spying from American Jour-
nalists overseas?:
The News Business
Putting aside the credibility problem
of the American government, obvious
in these Watergate-dominated days,
consider the status of Soviet foreign
correspondents: '.ire Soviet Union's
leadership repeatedly denies that any
Soviet newsmen working overseas are
government agents. It claims that,So-
viet newsmen are simply gatherers
and interpreters of news for the bene-
fit of the reading public in the Soviet
Union.
The claim, of course is laughable,
and no American. official talking to a
Tass, Izvestia or Pravda correspondent
in Washington is naive enough to
think he is dealing with a bona fide re-
porter. For ~ this reason, Soviet news-
men'do not have an easy time with of-
ficials in countries outside the socialist
bloc.
American newsmen have a far easier
time of it abroad. They develop
sources and uncover news because
their reputation for freedom, fairness
and nonentanglement with their,own
government. has been respected over
the years. Only in Moscow-and per-
haps in. Peking, where this writer has
" had no experience-are American
newsmen treated as government
agents. For years, American newsmen
' ; in the Soviet capital laughed off alle-
gations of spying out of the feeling
that the Russians were only applying
the same standards to foreign news-
men that they used for their own.
the Russians have had the last
. laugh.+
The CIA does not deny the news re-
ports of Its entanglement with the
American press. "We cannot comment
on covert activities," an agency spokes-
man said in virtual confirmation.
TIIE WASHINGTON POST
~Hs/HC- c~l'p Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved ForQelease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 p01000130001-1
Nor would the agency comment o6,
Colby's plan for disentanglement In,
the future. That plan-to fire some but
keep other newsmen-does -hot go far'
enough. American newsmen abroad as
well as at home. must. remain free of,,
their government to act as a distant:,
early-warning system in reporting
problems and progress that might af.
fect this country's interests abroad.
Newsmen often do a better job of re-
porting than either covert CIA agents`
or overt members of the diplomatic
corps.
That lesson was brought home to me
15 years ago in Czechoslovakia. Just
out of graduate school, I had gone
there as a freelance writer and had
obtained interviews with Czech offi-.
cials responsible for the country's tele-
vision system and the youth move-
ment. I also visited coal mines and
steel mills in a part of Moravia gener-.:
ally off limits to Americans. Before I
wrote my stories, I tried ' to check my
information with American diplomats.
The result of my effort-made only a
few years after William N. Oatis, an
Associated Press correspondent work-
ing in Prague, had been jailed as a
spy-was terrifying.
The embassy officer led me to a se-
cure room behind a door as heavy as a
.bank, vault's. When I started talking,
he began taking notes rapidly and then
questioned me closely.
"What else did you learn? What else
did they tell you?. What else did you
see?"
The officer grilled me until I re-
"The plan-to fire some
but keep other newsmen
on the CIA payroll-
does not go far enough."
American newsmen abroad
as well as at home must
remain free of their
government."
fused to say more, Then he said: "You
correspondents can find out a lot more
than we diplomats because we simply
cannot get access to the same people
or travel as much."
Uirittingty,'Y?had become an agent,
of my government rather than a repre-
sentative of the American people. Now
I could see how the Czechs might have
n:istmderstood Oatis' role even if he
were not, as charged, a CIA employee.
When I left the embassy that after.
noon, it was with the fear that I was in
far greater danger 'abroad from my
own government than Irony a govern-
ment which still, at that time, had a
statue of Stalin looking down on the
capital.
American newsmen must not be
compromised in the same manner that
so many-too many-officials, bureau.
crats and military'men have been cor-
rupted in recent years. The public and
Congress should demand that the CIA
break all contractual relationships
with bona fide newsmen. Beyond that,
publishers maintaining foreign bu-
reaus should seek out and discipline
any employees with dual relationships.
Anything less makes the news busi-
ness the handmaiden of the govern-
ment and that cannot be tolerated.
Otherwise, the free flow- of news from
overseas-so important to public
awareness-will be seriously jeopard-
ized. ?
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 Approved For Rase 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499ROO 000730001-1
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, January 11, 1974
CIA PLANS a study - comparing U.S. and
Russian naval strength in the Mediterranean.
Navy chief Adm. Zumwalt has warned repeat-
edly of the Soviet buildup there. Some top civil-
ian analysts concede that if the two fleets had
started shooting amid the Mideast crisis, a
U.S. Victory might have been in doubt. Main
reason: the Russians' antiship missile.
Approved For Release 2001/08/22 CIA-RDP84-00499R0010001300014
 Approved For ease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-00499UO1000130001-1
A 16 Thursday.JaR 10, 19,74 THE `WASIIINGTON POST
U.S. Re 'o e y Weighed
plot to Kill Csfro in '65
NEW YORK, Jan. 9 (AP)- Dominican Republic in April,
says the United States during
President Lyndon Johnson's
administration planned a sec-
ond invasion of Cuba com-
bined with an effort to assas-
sinate Premier Fidel Castro.
The plan had to be canceled,
Szulc said in an article to be
published in the Jan. 17 ';s-
quire magazine, when rebellion
unexpectedly erupted in the
1965, and Johnson sent troops
to that country.
Szulc, a former diplomatic
correspondent for The New
York Times, said the operation
was planned by the Central
Intelligence Agency, "presum-
ably acting with President
Lyndon Johnson's authority
unless it was another do-it-
yourself undertaking." He
wrote:
"The new invasion was to
be on a smaller scale than the
Bay of Pigs. The scenario was
to bring ashore some 750 armed
Cubans at the crucial moment
when Castro would be dead
and inevitable chaos had de-
veloped . . .
"The existence of the assas-
sination plot, hatched by the
CIA in Paris and Madrid, was
disclosed by the Cuban gov-
ernment in March, 1966, after
the designated gunman-a
bearded Cuban physician and
former Cuban revolutionary
army major named Rolando
Cubela-was arrested in Ha-
vana following investigations
by Castro's counterintelligence
agents, who had become sus-
picious, of him."
Szulc said that although the
Cuban government revealed
the assassination plot, it never
reported the invasion plan,
probably because it didn't
know much about it.
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 Approved For.Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$8001000130001-1
WASF NGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, 0. C., Wednesday, January 9, 1974
By ROBIN ADAMS SLOAN
Q: Is there a link between Watergate's E.
Howard Hunt and the JFK-Wallace shootings? -
N.N., Monroe, La.
A: There's no actual evidence, but Gore Vidal,
writing in The New York Review of Books, threw
another log on the conspiracy fire by noting the
following:
Oswald visited Mexico City in 1963 when Hunt
was acting; chief of the CIA there. Hunt's 1972
novel "The Coven" was about the Vanes rich,
young, handsome and much like Jack and Jackie.
Hardly flattering, the novel was in line with
Hunt's expressed hatred of JFK, whom he
blamed for deserting the Cubans fighting Castro
at the Bay of Pigs. Lee Harvey Oswald's "at
tempt" to kill rightist Gen. Edwin Walker before
actually killing JFK coincides, says Vidal, with
Arthur Bremer's "intention" to kill Nixon before
actually shooting Wallace.
Vidal cites Hunt's 50-odd highly imaginative
works of fiction. Ile says perhaps it is only a coin-
cidence that the comic-book-and-pornography-
reading Bremer suddenly began to keep a diary
that is almost a work of art. Vidal contends that
Bremer, like Oswald and Sirhan, was set up as
a patsy to deflect attention from the true right-
wing conspirators. He finds it coincidentally odd
that Oswald, Srrhan, and Bremer all kept diaries.
He notes that Bremer's was written by someone
with talent.
1Approved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 FRANK GETI EI N
E. Howard Hunt Jr., the
right-wing burglar, got
himself sprung out of the
pokey last week with a ploy
the ingenuity of which was
precisely appropriate for a
clash between the murky
twilight: world in which
Hunt has operated most of
his professional life as spy,
dirty-tricks man, surrepti-
tious insurrectionary, elec-
tronic eaves-dropper and
burglar, and the sunlit world
of American justice.
One of the field supervi-
sors of the Watergate
break-in, Hunt confessed
and was tucked away by
Judge Sirica for 30 months
to eight years, a remarka-
bly lenient sentence for a
convicted criminal whose
target was not a dry clean-
er's or a liquor store, not
even a bank, but the Repub-
lic itself,
As of last week, he is out
roaming the streets once
more, free, as his reaction-
ary admirers never tire of
asserting of pettier crimi-
nals paroled or freed on
appeal, to do it again.
Hunt is free because he
has asked the U.S. Court of
Appeals here to allow him
to change his original plea
of guilty to one of not guilty
and to decree a new trial on
that new plea. The basic
reason behind his change of
heart as to his own guilt,
according to his lawyers,
is the contention that im-
proper actions by the U.S.
government prejudiced his
original trial, making jus-
tice impossible.
The improper actions by
the government cited by
Hunt's lawyers are the tak-
ing of documents from
Hunt's White House safe'
and the destruction of them
by L. Patrick Gray III, then
acting head of the FBI, now
practicing law in New Lon-
don, Conn., in spite of his
attitude toward the destruc-
tion of evidence, an attitude
one would have thought
unseemly in an officer of
the court.
Hunt's friends are famil-
iar enough with the tech-
nique of criminals charging
governmental improprieties
and going scot-free. Tradi-
tionally, the right has de-
nounced the technique when
employed by Mafiosi and
other undesirables. More
recently, the right has de-
nounced the technique when
employed by such victims of
apparent government con-
spiracy as the Berrigan
brothers and Dr. Ellsberg.
It will be interesting to see
how much protest the right
.generates over Hunt's use
of the same ploy.
It is not, however, quite
the same ploy, although it
looks it.
*
The difference is this:
When the government be-
haved improperly in the
Berrigan affair that caused
Henry Kissinger to fear for
his virtue at the hands of
sex-starved nuns, as he deli-
cately put it, the government
was clearly the enemy of
the Berrigans, so much so
as to employ a criminal as
informer, quite possibly as
agent-provocateur to some
degree.
When the government
behaved improperly in the
prosecution of Dr. Ellsberg,
again the government was
the declared enemy of the
doctor, of his psychiatrist
and of normal American
justice, going so far as to
burglarize the psychia-
trist's office and to dangle
an attractive appointment
before the presiding judge
at Ellsbcrg's trial.
When the government
behaved improperly toward
Hunt, however, the govern-
ment was not Hunt's ene-
my, but his friend, his em-
ployer, his partner and, he
confidently if mistakenly
M70130001-1
expected, his protector of
last resort.
That's quite a difference.
It is true enough that dis-
tinctions can and certainly
will be made between the
U.S. government and the
Committee to Re-Elect the
President. The two things
were, in theory, separate
entities.
On the other hand, an old
disreputable like Hunt, aft-
er two decades of carrying
on for the CIA in the style
made familiar to all through
his novels, may be excused
for confusing the two
things, for assuming the
CREEPs were a mere cov-
er, a surface organization of
the sort he was long famil-
iar with, created as a base
for his dirty tricks on behalf
of the government.
He may be excused the
more when we recall that so
many of his encounters took
place in the White House
with people who were top
presidential aides and that
the papers on the destruction
of which he bases his appeal
were in the White House and
handled by White House
personnel.
If Hunt beats the rap on
the grounds that the govern-
ment that hired him as a
burglar was subsequently
improper in its dealings
with him, the course of jus-
tice will have no alternative
but to go on, in criminal
terms, to Gray, the man
who destroyed the papers,
to the men who gave Gray
the papers to destroy and to
the man in whose interest
they were destroyed.
All of this is merely one of
many similar reasons that
the Watergate affair will
not be over in a hurry and
that in the matter of the
impeachment the House of
Representatives would be
seriously derelict in its du-
ties to rush to judgment, to
"vote it up or vote it down"
before all the evidence is
in.
WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, January 9, 1974
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 Approved For elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 001000130001-1
CIA.-Daub es
Air America
Asia Awards.
Assoblated Prene 1
Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said
yesterday that defense con-
tracts for Air America, which
has done work for the Central
.Intelligence Agency in Indo
china, more than doubled last
year to a total of $41.4 million.
"Apparently, unknown to the
American public, the CIA- has
taken up some. of the slack
created- by orix military " with
`drawal," said "Aspin, a former
Pentagon e~or;omic adviser:.
"Without a doubt," he said',
"the,. contracts ? reflect sub-
stantial .U.S. involvement ? in
the 'Southeast'' Asia war, and
that's the last thing we want."
Aspin said nearly all con
tracts were for Air America
operations out of Thailand or
for maintenance work on
planes based in Thailand.
The CIA and Air America
had no comment.
Aspin said the $41.4 million
in contracts, compared with
$17.7 million the year' before,
moved Air America's parent
company; Pacific Corp., up to
the 91st in the ranking of dc?.i
.tense contractors.,,
Wednesday, Jan. 9,1974 THE WASHINGTON, POST
For the Record!
? U.S. Ambassador Wil-
liam R. Kintner told Thai
newsmen that the CIA agent
who mailed the government
a phony, cease-fire offer has
left Thailand after
"appropriate disciplinary ac?/'
tion,"
? Police In Maseru, Leso-
tho, announced that opposi-
tion leader Shakane Mok-
hele had surrendered follow-
ing what was reported as a
coup attempt in the African
kingdom,.
? Carlos Altamirano,
leader of Chile's banned So-
cialist Party and first on the
most-wanted list of the rul-
ing junta, is now living in
Havana, Cuba.
? The United States and
Panama have agreed on a'
set of principles for the
drawing up of, a new Pana-
ma Canal Treaty, according
to Panamanian and U.S.
sources quoted by Reuter.
From staff reports and news dispatches
S. Envoy Called s -J.
Agent for 'CIA
BUENOS ~1II?ES, Jan, 8
(AP) The new U.S. ambassa?
dor to Argentina, who has yet
t
o arrive at his
,' post, was ac-
cused today of being a nicm=
bcr of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Robert C. Hill was named
ambassadoi- by President
Nixon last December, to re-
place .Iohn Davis Lodge, who
resigned, El Descanhisado, a
weekly news magazine linked
.,to the IeflisL faction , of Life
ruling Pcroni8L movement,
made the charge.
proved For Release 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
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 Approved For WA4ease 2001/08122 : CIA-RDP84-00499iWO1000130001-1
WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS A-11
Washington, D. C., Saturday, January 5, 1974
CIA Chief ftars
Dole CehsOs
By Lesley Oelsner two weeks ago at the. re- compromise of certain cur-
New York TimriNeewiService quest of the publisher and rently active intelligence
The director of the Cen- the authors of a book about sources and intelligence-
tral Intelligence Agency has the CIA. The agency is gathering operations which
:told a federal judge that trying to censor the book. ': would cause serious harm
"highly classified" intelli- The publisher and the to the national defense in-
gence information might be authors contended that they terests of the United States
"leaked" to the public if the needed the opinions and and will seriously disrupt
agency complied with the ..advice of experts on securi-' the conduct of this country's
judge's recent order to ty matters in order to pre- foreign relations.
make that information pare their lawsuit contest- Melvin L. Wulf of the
available to a limited group ing the censorship attempt. American -Civil Liberties
of security experts. William E. Colby, the CIA Union, attorney for the two
One of those experts - director, made his assertion authors - Victor L. Mar-
the only one named specifi- in a three-page affidavit chetti and John Marks -
cally in the judge's order - submitted to the court and Floyd Abrams, lawyer
is Morton H. Halperin, a Wednesday along with a for Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
former consultant to the motion by the government publishers, said today they
National Security Council -asking Bryan to reconsider expect to.file written an-
andia former deputy assist- his ruling. swers to the court early
A next week opposing the
t
d
Halperin's telephone was
tapped for 21 months in
1969-71, while he was an as-
sistant to Henry A. Kissin-
ger on the NSC and after-
ward, as part of a wiretap
operation that President
Nixon said later was an at-
tempt to stop leaks of secret
information to the press.
Kissinger has said that the
conversations overheard on
Halperin's phone "'never
cast any doubt" on Halper-.
in's "loyalty or discretion."
ion
i not men
Colby
Halperin by name. Nor did government's motion.
he amplify upon his "con- The book in question is ti-
cern," as he phrased it, tled "The CIA And The Cult
other than to say that he. Of Intelligence," and was
was "personally knowledge- - - completed last summer- by
able of many incidents of Marchetti, a former CIA
leaked privileged or classi employe. And Marks, a
fled information - for ex- former State Department
ample, the publication of, employe. But because of
testimony before a grand Y earlier court rulings stem-
jury investigating the Wa- ? ming from litigation started
tergate break-in.' by the government, Mar-
chetti was forced to submit
HE ASKED for a private the manuscript to, the CIA
hearing before Bryan, "in for approval before' he could
order to explain the basis of send it to his publisher.
THE JUDGE, Albert V. my concern."
Bryan Jr. of the U.S. Dis- He said in his affidavit THE CIA specified 22S
trict Court in Alexandria, that disclosure of the infor- portions that, it said, should
Va., had issued' the order oration would "result in the ,be cut from the book. Ac
HS/HC- 9so,t
cording to Marks, the dele-
tions generally include the
examples cited by the au-
thors to back up their con-
clusions about the agency.
He cited the agency's role
in the 1970 elections in
Chile, the payment of CIA
money to foreign leaders,
and the agency's use of
"fake" companies as fronts.
Two weeks ago, at the
request of the authors and
the publisher, Bryan or-
dered the government to
give them certain docu-
ments to back up its conten-
tion that the portions should
be censored.
He also ordered the gov-
ernment to begin immediate
security clearance proce-
dures for Halperin and a
"reasonable number" of
other experts to be named
by the authors and publish-.
er so the experts could see,
the entire manuscript, in- `
cluding the deleted por-
tions, as well as the docu-
ments.
The government is con-
testing both orders, al-
though, as Colby put it, the
"aspect" that left him
"gravely concerned" was
the fact that the material
would be made available
not only to the plaintiffs'
and their attorneys but to
their expert witnesses."
Approved For Release 2001)
 Approved For&Iease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-004951001000130001-1
Head of CIA
Enters Book
Court Fight
By Laurence Stern
Wft 1Ifl tonPoatStaff Writer
Central Intelligence Agency'
Director William E. Colby has
intervened directly in a court
battle over a book manuscript
that he said would compro-
mise highly sensitive intelli
gence sources and operations.
The CIA director, in an affi-
davit filed Wednesday in U.S.
District Court in Alexandria,
offered to testify in private
before Judge Albert V. Bryan
Jr. in support of the govern-
ment's efforts to prevent pub-
lication of 225 deletions or.
dered by the agency on secu-
rity grounds.
Colby asserted that the dis-
closures in the manuscript by
two former government intel.
ligence officers would "cause
..Prious harm to the national
defense interests of the
tions."
. The authors of the manu-
script, former CIA analyst
Victor L. Marchetti and for-
mer State Department intelli-
gence official John D. Marks,
are challenging the basis of
the CIA's security deletions.
This could lead to a new legal
battle on the issues of govern-
mental secrecy powers that
were thrashed out in the Pen-
tagon Papers trial,, which was
decided by the Supreme
Court.
Specifically, the government
has asked Bryan to reconsider
his Dec. 21 ruling requiring
the CIA to produce documents
supporting its classification of
the 225 offending items in the
Marchetti-Marks manuscript,
entitled "The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence."
Attorneys for the govern.
ment also asked Bryan to re-
consider his order that attor-
neys for the publisher, Knopf,
and expert witnesses on, classi-
fication be given ,access to the
manuscript, which 'the CIA
has classified "Top Secret-Sen-
sitive."
In his affidavit, Colby said
of the Bryan ruling;
"Prgduction 'ofag
HS/HC-
acwday, JA 5,1974 THE WASHINGTON .POST
Colby Bids. Court Prevent
CIA D
Dis do sure ofata
COLBY, From Al
documents'as ordered by the
court causes additional diffi-
culties for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. These addi-
tional documents will in most
cases contain further classi-
fied information and in many
cases are of a highly sensitive
nature....
-`Compliance with both as-
pects of the court's order ex .
poses additional highly classi-
fied information not only to
plaintiffs and their attorneys
but to their expert witnesses."
The one expert witness to
be qualified under Bryan's
Dec. 21 decision was former
National Security Council staf-
fer Morton Halperin, who
served as part of the defense
team for Daniel Ellsberg in
his California trial. Halperin
is also currently suing Secre-
tary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer for damages in the tap-
ing of his telephone from 1969
WILLIAM E. COLBY
.. sees "serious harm"
Earlier this year columnist
Jack Anderson published tran-
scripts of grand jury proceed-
ings in the Watergate investi.
gation.
The government brought Its
case against Marchetti in
copy of a book outline he had
submitted to several New
York publishers. It dealt .with
covert intelligence operations.
The government : was
granted an injunction to' pre-
vent Marchetti from pulblish-
ing, without prior review by
the agency, classified mateT=ia1 J.
gathered during CIA service.
The injunction was upheld 1y
the U.S. Fourth Circuit Curt
of Appeals.
After Marchetti, in collabo-
ration with Marks, completed
the manuscript and submitted
it for CIA review the two
authors went ahead with 'a le-
gal challenge of the 225 dele-
tions ordered by the agency.
T, +hnir rhrllenue of the se-
are seeking to invoke, the
S
u
standard applied by the
preme Court in the Pentagon
Papers case - whether publi-
cation would "surely result in
direct, immediate and irrepar-
able injury to the nation or its
people."
But the case has not yet
April, 1972, after obtaining aImoved on to this issue.
to 1971.
In requesting the secret
hearing before Bryan on the,
reconsideration issue, Colby
cited the language of the 1947
National Security Act, which.
provides that "the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting in-
telligence sources and me-
thods from unauthorized dis-
closure."
The CIA director also said
he is "personally knowledge-
able of many Incidents of
leaked privileged or classified
information, for example, the'
publication of ? testimony be-
fore a grand jury investigating
the Watergate break-in."
FsrRPleace 2nn rust " IA-RDP84-00499RO01 000130001 -1
 ~Appro\For Release
~l '., ,,
01/08/22"; C,IA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved Fo?lease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049$0,001000130001-1
Taylor Branch
Taylor Branch, former-
ly on the staff of The
Washington Monthly, is
a contributing editor of
Harper's.
In which the CIA bypasses the First Amendment in order to hide a bugged house cat
IRNOLD TOYNBEE, renowned as a spokesman
for intelligent decency in the world, has
written that the American CIA has surpassed
Soviet Communism as the most powerful sinister
force on earth. "Wherever there is trouble, vio-
lence, suffering, tragedy," he says, "the rest of
us are now quick to suspect the CIA had a hand
in it." This view has been widely accepted in
the United States, but it had no political weight
until the Watergate scandal introduced the
manipulative techniques of the CIA into Ameri-
can politics. Many commentators have ex-
pressed the opinion that the Watergate intrigues
have raised the possibility of the CIA's under-
cover, totalitarian methods coming home to our
shores to destroy our democratic traditions. We
were given a reprieve, they say, because the
amateurs of CREEP had not yet learned the deft
skills by which the CIA arranges the destiny of a
foreign country.
The most recent evidence suggests that all
this is nonsense. Victor Marchetti, who spent
fourteen years as a CIA executive before resign-
ing in 1969, describes Watergate as fairly typi-
cal of an Agency operation, exposed when the
fates caused a security guard to stumble over
foul-ups normal to a covert mission. The officials
in charge of CREEP apparently shared the illu-
sions that lie at the heart of the Agency-that
the politics of a country can be guided by tap-
ping the phone of a Larry O'Brien or a Spencer
Oliver, or by employing someone like Donald
Segretti to write fake letters and hire women
to run nude in front of Muskie headquarters.
One bit of Watergate testimony with the ring
of truth is that the Gemstone information was
sion-from the practical, amoral viewpoint of
the clandestine operative-is vintage Agency
material.
Like Watergate, the CIA is dangerous not be-
cause of its diamond-hard efficiency but be-
cause of the principles it violates. The Agency
is good at bribes-it pumped $20 million into
the 1964 elections in Chile-and it can super-
vise mercenary armies in backward countries
like Laos. These things are terrible enough, but
none too subtle or difficult, and Marchetti be-
lieves that the everyday operations of the
Agency give the lie to the myth of its deadly
professionalism. The CIA does not leave dark
messages written in blood. During his entire
career, Marchetti says that he never came across
a single "termination mission" by or against a
career CIA agent. An agent is not a daredevil
but a handler of knaves-he is E. Howard Hunt
directing the freedom-loving Cubans from
across the street. The CIA's chief weapons are
not the martini-olive bug or the cyanide dart
gun; instead, agents spend most of their time
with memos, and on a real action mission they
are most likely to be equipped with nothing
more than bribe money.
The CIA's fearsome reputation is its best pro-
tection against the meddlesome notions of out-
siders. No one dares move against Leviathan.
There has never been any serious move in the
media to curb the Agency, and the Congress has
been so cowed by the covert operatives that it
has been too scared even to set up a committee
on the CIA. The old codgers on the informal
"oversight" committees have professF'd not to
want to know anything that might compromist,
"essential1 useless." The stu~~ppidit of the mis- the national securityp.
Approves For Release 200-1/08%22: CIA-RDP84-00499R001000130001-1
 Approved Foi' (ease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 Q01000130001-1
N 1972, VICTOR MARCHETTI proposed to write a
book that would make a mockery of the CIA
myths and expose its operatives as bureaucrats
with delusions, dangerous in spite of themselves,
living off an undeserved reputation for derring-
do. Only if the Agency were made human, he
believed, could anything ever be done about
Arnold Toynbee's nightmare.
Apparently this idea struck a sensitive spot
somewhere in the CIA, for the Agency stole a
copy of Marchetti's book outline from a New
York publishing house. The agents retired to
CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and
scoured the law for a way to keep the book from
seeing the light of day. They found one. In
April 1972, the U.S. government sought and
obtained a ermanent court order en'oinin
p
agreement not to reveal secrets, and the govern- "One bit of
ment successfully contended that such a contract
overrides Marchetti's First Amendment rights.
This is a new twist in the effort to protect offi-
cial secrets, overlooked in the Ellsberg case.
The Justice Department briefs are loaded with
the lore of corporate trade secrets-citing prece-
dents like Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prod-
ucts-as if Marchetti had threatened to let
loose the magic ingredient in Coca-Cola. Lying
behind all the questions of CIA spying and se-
curity, this rather unorthodox contract approach
to secrecy carries with it a potential for wide-
spread application against dissenting govern-
ment employees.
g Less intelligence than ever
"Victor Marchetti, his agents, servants, ern- g
ployees and attorneys, and all other persons in
active concert or participation with him" from
disclosing any information, "factual, fictional
or otherwise," without the prior consent of the
CIA. The order was upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court declined to re-
view the case. If Marchetti now speaks out from
his classified mind, lie faces instant imprison-
ment for contempt of court-no juries, not even
a show trial.
Marchetti, outspooked and outlawyered in
round one, vowed to go on. After signing a con-
tract with Alfred A. Knopf for a critical, non-
fiction hook on the CIA, he took on a coauthor
-John Marks, a thirty-year-old ex-Foreign Ser-
vice officer-and drafted a 500-page manu-
script. It was dutifully handed over to the Agen.
cy in August 1973, and the authors tried rea-
soning together with the CIA censors, hoping to
avoid the Ellsberg dilemma of keeping quiet or
risking jail. But the book came back from the
scissors shop riddled with 339 national-security
deletions, excising more than a fifth of the text.
As a new legal challenge to the censorship
begins, all the parties to the case have pulled
out their Sunday rhetoric. For the ACLU lawyers
who represent the authors, it is the first legally
sustained exercise of prior restraint on national-
security grounds in the history of the United
States, a pernicious (but almost unnoticed) re-
versal of the decision in the New York Times
case on the Pentagon Papers. For the CIA, the
principle at hand is nothing less than the gov-
ernment's right to conduct its business without
internal subversion. If people like Marchetti are
allowed to blab incontinently about matters of
state, the government's executive arm will be
paralyzed and Washington will degenerate into
a giant ADA meeting.
The Justice Department, representing the
VER ITS TWENTY-SIX-YEAR history, partly by
idesign n and partly by failure, the CIA has
come to specialize in foreign manipulations
rather than intelligence. Classical espionage
against the Russians and the Chinese has pro-
duced one of the driest wells in spy history.
According to Marchetti, the CIA has been unable
to penetrate the governments of the major Cold
War opponents. The warring spy camps have
bad to content themselves by striking public-re-
lations blows against one another. When Kim
Philby defected to the Russians in 1963, after
twenty years as a double agent in Britain, the
KGB held elaborate press conferences and rushed
his memoirs into print to thrill the world with
Soviet spy power. The CIA said his book was
phony-double agents do not keep journals of
their perfidy-and- most experts agree that
Philby's activities did not hurt the British or
help the Russians very much. Still, the CIA
smarted under the publicity barrage, and it soon
trotted out one Col. Oleg Penkovsky, claiming
Agency, sees the anctit41 -eon a is as A1/08/22: real issue. Marcheli ?1 fs, CIA-
anyone else dealing with classified material-
got his job only after signing it contractual
Watergate
testimony with
the ring of
truth is that the
Gemstone infor-
mation was `es-
sentially use-
less.' The stu-
pidity of the
mission is vin-
tage CIA
material."
 Taylor, Branch
ME CENSORS
OF
BUMBLEDOM
that he had been, ;t as valuable as Philby. Lion papers ' the analysts-the Clandestine
Fo r6Vb,d~R'O4 art 0$1t)08/2fds ClaRISP,&1r,8O OB GM ?&W (gaodestly known
proudly that Penkovsky had helped the U.S.
detect Russian missiles in Cuba in 1962. Soon,
Penkovsky's carefully recorded memoirs were
on the best-seller lists, and it didn't matter that
many experts doubted their authenticity, sus-
pecting that the colonel had gotten more than a
little editorial assistance at Langley. Marchetti's
revelations on this matter are clipped from the
book, but he has written elsewhere that Penkov-
sky was a British agent who provided no infor-
mation whatever on the installation of the mis-
siles in Cuba-the Agency detected them from
aerial photographs. Penkovsky was preoccupied
with other matters, such as insisting that he
wear the full colonel's uniform of whichever
Western intelligence outfit was debriefing him.
Other than the Cuban missile crisis, the CIA
(created out of the Pearl Harbor, if-
we-had-only-known syndrome) has not anticipated a
single one of the many outbreaks of war and
armed confrontation in the past twenty-five
years. Now the CIA has become marginal to even
the detection of future missile crises, for it has
given the Pentagon control of the satellites that
provide the crucial security information on
weapon and troop movements. What special
intelligence there is in the world seems largely
boring and of little consequence. In 1964 the
Agency learned that the American Embassy in
Moscow had been bugged from top to bottom
since 1952. For twelve years at the height of
the Cold War, the KGB had access to every se-
cret message within the embassy and to the ca-
ble exchanges with Washington-with little evi-
dent advantage. The great powers are too big
and cumbrous to move with much subtlety.
While the intelligence value of. the CIA has
been whittled down continuously-until Henry
Kissinger now scorns the calculations and posi-
as the Plans Division) has mushroomed in size
and importance. Marchetti and Marks assert
that fully two-thirds of the CIA's money and
manpower are devoted to covert activities in the
form of dirty tricks and paramilitary operations.
This fact, along with the organization charts and
the budget figures that support it, was originally
censored from the book; but the CIA relented
when Marchetti and his lawyers pointed out that
Sen. William Proxmire had already ferreted
out the information and put it in the Congres-
sional Record.
that MARCIIETTI-MARKS MANUSCRIPT Shows
that the CIA has trimmed away its intelli-
gence functions so completely that it can now
justify its existence only on the basis of the
clandestine jujitsu it tries to practice on foreign
governments-the bribes, the coups, the surgi-
cal removal of unfriendly political strains
abroad. Such a specialty is just fine with the
covert types who run the Agency, but they know
that it is precisely these covert operations that
have made the CIA vulnerable to public criticism
as the symbol of sinister and undemocratic pre-
occupations within the American government.
Harry Truman, whose administration created
the CIA in 1947, stated repeatedly that the Agen-
cy was intended to be the centralized intelli-
gence branch of government, not a squad of
secret D-Day operatives. Recently a whole
chorus of foreign-policy heavies like Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach have picked up Truman's
theme and argued that the Agency should be
confined to its statutory duty "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security." They point out that the legal basis for
all the James Bond stuff is extremely tenuous.
 Approved ForIease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-00499W01000130001-1
e
rising that was to follow the Bay of Pigs opera-
tion. The agents set up shop on Great Swan Is-
land, a tiny spot in the Caribbean made entirely
of guano and infested with three-foot lizards.
While the front men vainly sought to protect
the unlikely cover story that the new station on
the deserted guano island was an independent
venture on the part of profit-minded entrepre-
neurs-changing around the phony corporate
charter, fending off small landing parties of
Honduran students who came to denounce the
CIA presence and to claim the island as Hon-
duran soil-the intrepid CIA technicians went on
the air to drum up the spirit of Cuban revolt.
Three days after the invasion had failed, Radio
Swan was still issuing orders to nonexistent
troops. Even a year after the invasion, the sta-
tion-renamed "Radio Americas" under the
new leadership of the "Vanguard Service Cor-
poration"-had not given up. It exhorted free-
dom-loving Cubans to tie up communications by
taking receivers off hooks in phone booths, and
to subvert the Cuban economy by breaking
enough bottles to create a beer shortage.
The Marchetti-Marks manuscript is full of
anecdotes fit for the Marx brothers or Maxwell
Smart-secret projects to float balloons over
Communist countries, dropping forged leaflets
that promote the democratic alternative; fake
letters to sow confusion within the French stu-
Cats, rabbits, and snake oil dent movement; agents scrambling for enough
The Marchetti-Marks revelations would provide
more grist for the Katzenbach position, which is
anathema at Langley. Telling the CIA to stick
with information-gathering is like telling the
vigilantes of the Klan to put away their hoods
and nooses in favor of due process of law.
To survive and prosper, the CIA must con-
vince the public that it is employing all its pro-
fessional wizardry to sniff out future Pearl Har-
bors. And it must keep the President thinking
that in political emergencies, when men of ac-
tion must discard the niceties of constitutional
theory, the CIA will respond with piano-wire
efficiency. Now come Marchetti and Marks to
say that the Agency is out of the Pearl Harbor
business, having abandoned it to the diplomats
and the satellite people at the Pentagon. More-
over, they say, the CIA's covert missions are
short on piano wire and long on giddy P. T.
Barnum schemes fit for a Donald Segretti. The
CIA would much rather be subjected to a dozen
books by the usual liberal critics-attributing
every suspicious automobile accident, Bolivian
coup, and Republican election to the deadly
genius of its agents--than suffer from one in-
side book like Marchetti's, which exposes a
clandestine circus behind the awe-inspiring
curtain of secrecy.
V IIE MATERIALS FOR RIDICULE have long
been available, but writers have been so se-
duced by Agency folklore that they have glided
over the absurd to focus on the imaginary agent
with the garrote in the wings. In The Invisible
Government, David Wise and Thomas Ross de-
scribe the Agency's incredible clandestine feat
of setting up a CIA radio station, under elaborate
cover, to encourage and direct the popular up.
Benny Goodman records to satisfy the longings
of an informant. Marchetti says that the most
ludicrous incidents have been censored to pro-
tect the security of the twilight-zone devices in-
vented in the CIA lab. "I'll give you one exam-
ple that they took out," he said, "because I
can't imagine that the Agency could stand the
publicity of putting me in jail for revealing it.
We spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and
several years to develop a bugging device that
could be surgically implanted inside the body
of an ordinary house pet. The idea was finally
scuttled when someone realized that we couldn't
control the animal's movements to put it within
range of sensitive conversations, even if we
could somehow place a wired cat or clog in the
household of a target person. Many of the
Agency projects are like that-pitifully silly."
HE SECRET MYTHS SWIRLING around the
1JAgency have enabled it to go a long way on
the intricate logic of Rube Goldberg. At the
height of the Cold War, the Agency faced the
problem of containing Communism everywhere.
To do so, reasoned the head spooks, it would
be helpful if the American people believed that
Approved For Release 2001/08/?'o~It~up''b3~`~~t 1fl~In st
measures. To stimulate that belief, it would be
helpful if the government could point to tan-
"In 1964 the
Agency learned
that the Amer-
ican Embassy in
Moscow had
been bugged fo:
twelve years.
The KGB had
had access to
every secret
message within
the embassy-
with little evi-
dent advantage
 Approved For elease 2001/08/22 : CIA-RDP84-0049 01000130001-1
Bible evidence that the Communist party was able, for in seeking to censor the book the CIA
making gains right here at home. That might is reduced to naked trust-this material must
be accomplished if the CIA could show that many be kept within the confines of the government,
demented citizens were reading the official news- they say, for reasons so secret we cannot re-
paper of the American Communist party, which veal them. It is reminiscent of the old Hubert
in turn could be done if the CIA subsidized The Humphrey, telling the voters that they would
Daily Worker to keep it alive. By this reason- support the President if they only knew what he
ing, CIA operatives were put to work concocting knew about Vietnam, which, unfortunately, was
several thousand phony names and addresses classified. In a pinch, secrecy becomes a mask,
for new, nonexistent "subscribers" to The Daily completing the circle of its uses. The snake oil
Worker. The CIA sent the taxpayers' money to merchant's greatest secret was not the ingre-
the apostles of Moscow so that the Cold War dients of his potions-anything would do-but
agencies of government could point to the bulg- the gullibility of the people in his audience and
ing circulation of The Daily Worker to support their need to believe that the good doctor could
their demands for bigger anti-Communist na- sweep away their real and imagined ills.
tional-security budgets.
The same aura of secrecy that makes outsid-
ers fear the Agency like death has a powerful Top secrets everyone knows
influence on the operatives inside the CIA. Mar-
chetti and Marks have written a chapter called FIE POLITICAL MESSAGE of the Marchetti-
"The Clandestine Mentality," whose basic point Marks manuscript confirms and supports the
is that secrecy creates a whole. culture, and that themes of several recent books critical of the
the trappings of clandestine work infuse the CIA, but it is much more offensive to the Agency
most mundane undertaking with the significance than the others-largely because of Marchetti's
of a spy thriller. It grips the brain. An agent high position at the CIA. Although much of the
who makes his calls from a phone booth, decked material in the Marchetti-Marks book is avail-
out in a disguise and a code name, can't help able in newspapers and in the CIA books, the
feeling the buzz of importance-even if he is Agency censored it anyway, on the ground that
calling to check on his subscription to The Daily Marchetti's former status would authenticate
Worker. It is a private glow similar to that ex- what is now only rumor. The authors estimate
perienced by liberal Democrats who take pre- that about a quarter of the stricken facts are al-
cautions against the possibility that their phones ready on the public record.
might be tapped. Paranoia is the twin brother There is a reference in the manuscript, right
of the clandestine mentality. after several pages that have been decimated by
The CIA is a pioneer in the organized use of CIA censors, to "the CIA's ties with foreign polit-
secrecy, and in this role it reflects a general ical leaders." The obvious inference to be drawn
condition of American culture. Government se- is that the authors had identified foreign lead-
crecy is a measure of status and prestige for its ers with past or present CIA connections, and
officials, and its symbols-the security clear- several sources have identified this kind of ma-
ance, the locked briefcase, the top secret-sensi- terial as the most explosive in the book-the
tive discussions, the magic references to the na- Agency's best case for secrecy by prior restraint.
tional security-are highly coveted. They are While it is impossible to evaluate this claim
signs of high authority, like the Freudian ter- without knowing precisely what has been cut,
minology of the psychiatrist and the computer- one can make an educated guess after scanning
laden tomes of the urbanologist. These signs can the public literature on the CIA and talking with
be the mark of genuine and vitally needed skills - reporters, ex-agents, and others who specialize
-if the Agency's secrets protect the explosive in intelligence. I have done so, and it appears
techniques of master operatives, if the multi- likely that the Agency is close to political lead-
variable systems analysis of the urbanologist is ers in Jordan, Greece, Iran, Ethiopia, Taiwan,
required for genuine insights into the plight of and West Germany. In general, the Agency
the cities--but they can also be the smokescreen probably has political ties wherever it has oper-
for professional shamanism. Secrecy provides ated in the past-Laos, Vietnam, Bolivia, Gua-
not only a badge of importance but a meal temala-and also in the smaller countries of
ticket. We pay for what we do not understand, Latin America and Africa, where a little bribe
because we hunger for an expert. money can be effective enough for the spooks
Anyone who has lost the faith, like Marchetti to throw their weight around. All this seems
and Marks, poses an enormous threat to those hardly surprising or fraught with peril for the
who traffic in mysteries and hidden talents-like national security. And, as Marchetti tells it,
a renegade magician who shows the public Agency ties to a foreign government do not
where his colle ue t their V zts. The au- necessarily mean that we run the country. They
thoApMf~ev&?f, ~~ (lr?~I!~oll~ei-R~rz49~~~414A141Q~$R~Aan~ of our agents
into the open than the Agency finds comfort- gets to have lunch with a foreign official occa-
 sionally, much the way, a nAme ane nS gut g tx08/2? henAMarchet 00 a9 eenjolnc uOfromOw rit~ng
to bend the ear of a Senator from time to time his book without censorship, one CIA official was
after making a political contribution. quoted as giving thanks for the injunction be-
cause the revelations would have "blown us out
of the water" in many places around the world.
UT FAIRNESS DEMANDS that we suppress (The official was CIA director William Colby.)
boredom and consider the Agency's view. He could have meant this in the way the Fan-
After all, the entire national-security apparatus Tani story made future operations difficult in
of the United States, the Justice Department, the Italy, or he could have been focusing on a sec-
ACLU, a major publishing house, and the federal and kind of exposure in the book-Marchetti's
courts are all burning up legal pads trying to plans to identify CIA "cover" organizations in
hash out whether this material should be for- and out of the United States. The Agency wants
bidden in the name of military security. Should to avoid more troubles like the 1.967 scandal
Victor Marchetti, by virtue of having sat in the that exposed the National Student Association
highest councils of spy headquarters, be allowed as a CIA front. The Agency's proprietary fronts
to declare authoritatively that foreign leaders are detailed in a chapter that was mutilated in
are, or have been, tainted by American intelli- the first round of censorship. Rocky Mountain
gence? What if the minister loses his job as a Air, of Arizona, was identified in a magazine
result, and the CIA is cut off from its leverage article by Marchetti as a CIA domestic airline,
and information? The subtle minds at Langley but this does not appear in the book and has
would say that the cooperative ministers of the apparently fallen under the knife.
future will refuse to associate with the CIA for Agency airlines and corporate covers evoke
fear of later being exposed. the stale air of yesteryear, for, despite the CIA's
Marchetti replies that the book does not re- predictions of dire rumblings in the foreign un-
veal the names of classical spies, citizens of "un- dcrworld, the revelations of the past have had
friendly" countries who slip their military se- little impact beyond a brief period of media
crets to a CIA agent. Ile says that the book will interest. But the CIA contends that all these little
cause embarrassment, but that no exposed con- covert fronts make up a vital collective enter-
tacts will be rubbed out by the Soviet KGB or prise for clandestine use against our enemies.
anyone else, and no wars will break out. The Agency officials have sworn that blowing more
case of Amintore Fanfani supports his point. covers like NSA "would cause grave and irrep-
In May 1973, Seymour Hersh wrote a story in arable damage to the national security," and
the New York Times about Graham Martin, therefore must be censored.
now Ambassador to South Vietnam, and his ef-
forts to get the CIA to support Fanfani's wing of
the Christian Democrat party in Italy. This oc-
curred in 1970, when Martin was Ambassador
Done in by the Princeton men
to Italy, and Fanfani, a former Italian premier, ARCFIETTI VIEWS THE CASE with just as
was trying to take over the government again much passion as the various lawyers and
during one of Italy's periodic crises. Fanfani, a government officials, but in much earthier fash-
conservative, figured that $1 million from the ion. He sees himself as the target of a personal
CIA would go a long way toward keeping the vendetta by the Old Boy network that has al-
left-wingers out of power, and he made his pitch ways run the agency. The upper reaches of the
to Martin in secret meetings. CIA are completely dominated by Ivy League
There is a hole in the Marchetti-Marks manu- WASPS, most of whom got started in the oss
script where I assume the details of this story during the war. William Colby, the current di-
once were. The Agency censored it, because it rector, is fully in the tradition-an oss opera-
reveals Fanfani's ties to the CIA; but the censors tive who continued his work with the Agency,
had to leave in the reference to the Hersh story, personally designing the Phoenix assassination
which is quite thorough. The revelations in the program in Vietnam and virtually every other
Times caused some minor repercussions in Italy covert operation on his turf, Southeast Asia, ris-
but didn't make any noise in the dark passage- ing to the top because he conducted every mis-
ways of international espionage. If the censored sion with the skillful good grace of a man who
anecdotes of foreigners' ties to the CIA are as appreciates fine wine. A real'Princeton man, say
tame as this one, the government would have a those who meet him.
tough time demonstrating a grave threat to the Marchetti, on the other hand, went to Penn
national security. Actually, the point of the dis- State and describes himself as "the cousin of
cussion in the book manuscript is that the Times bulldozer drivers." He joined the Agency in
initially balked at running the story because the 1955 and worked his way up to the executive
editors thought it wasn't newsworthy-a basic suites on the seventh floor of the CIA building.
yawner from baA~O e i t20 108 1 w ffl_ i6 _ ~~ 0 _ihe
barrass our new envoy t~ieu s republic, top brass, sitting in on CIA po icy meetings, a
"The CIA would
rather be sub-
jected to a dozen:
books by the
usual liberals
criticizing its
deadly genius
than suffer
from one inside
book like Mar-
chetti's, which
exposes a clan-
destine circus."
 Approved For`'R'6Iease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP84-004901000130001-1
hawk on Vietnam, a general analyst of good military preparedness by threatening the loss of
reputation on strategic matters, a lover of lives or jeopardizing vital military secrets. The
things covert. As he describes it, he began to Department lawyers warned of horrible calami-
fall away from the CIA spirit when he saw first ties if the Times were allowed to publish more
hand that the directors and assistant directors top-secret cables by the Old Boys, but the Court
were much more interested in dreaming up surveyed the ramparts of freedom after the first
clandestine operations, the cloak-and-dagger batch of papers had appeared in the Times and
stuff, than they were in the production and anal- detected little damage. The government stum-
ysis of intelligence. The Agency is still marked bled miserably, and the precedent looked use-
by a split between the analysts and the opera- ful to Marchetti.
tives, with thinly concealed contempt on both Then the Department failed to convict Ells-
sides. Marchetti shared the analysts' view that berg of espionage, or anything else, and the
the clandestine types, like F. Howard ("Eduar- cause of secrecy seemed hopeless. When the CIA
do") Hunt, had read too many spy novels and lawyers brought the Marchetti problem over to
worn too many disguises-that they found the the Justice Department, two flimsy weapons
Agency a playground for their covert fantasies. seemed available to shut him up. They could
(Any CIA operator, on the other hand, lets you seek an injunction before a judge on the same
know quickly that the analysts are pale-faced grounds they had tried against the New York
bookworms who "don't do anything" and might Times, but the courts had proved to be attached
as well be in the State Department.) Marchetti to the First Amendment. The second unpromis-
half expected these traditional jealousies to be ing avenue was the old reliable: criminal deter-
ironed out at the top, but he found that the rence. They could threaten to prosecute Mar-
operatives were in control, too busy hatching chetti for espionage if he persisted. They knew
plots to care much about position papers. He from their Ellsberg preparations, however, that
began to "lose effectiveness," he says, when, in conviction would be difficult. Marchetti might
executive meetings, he started questioning the want to take his case before a jury, whose mem-
wisdom and purpose of clandestine schemes- hers might be too secure or too unsophisticated
which, in the CIA, is somewhat like casting to perceive a grave threat to the national secur-
doubt on the humanity of football in the heat of ity. Besides, a threat is not as permanent as an
a pep rally, injunction; and if it ever lost credibility, Mar-
chetti would be free to publish and the govern-
ment would be left with only a long shot at a
IIATEVER THE FINAL OUTCOME in the post facto remedy in a criminal trial. The se-
courts, the lawyers in the Justice Depart- crets would already be out.
ment deserve some credit within the profession Whoever hit upon the contract approach,
for staging one of the most imaginative legal based on Marchetti's secrecy agreement,
comebacks in recent history. Charged by the brought about a Newtonian advance in the pros-
Nixon Administration with the task of protect- pects for quiet, discreet government. It was a
ing the government against conspirators and fivefold stroke of genius.
tattlers, the Department assembled a truly dis- (1) It fuzzed up First Amendment objections
mal record. Scores of left-wing conspirators to prior restraint. The government sued to en-
were brought to trial without a single convic- join Marchetti from breaching his contractual
tion, and the prosecutors became successful obligation not to reveal classified information.
only when the charge toward security turned in- Federal officials submit to other limitations on
ward. John Dean and Jeb Magruder have been their First Amendment rights as a condition of
convicted of conspiracy; John Mitchell is employment, such as the Hatch Act prohibition
squirming under a mound of conspiracy evi- against political activity, and this is merely an-
dence. Prosecutors who failed miserably against other limitation-sanctified in writing.
hippies and malcontents have been so lethal (2) The government did not have to show
against their colleagues in the surrounding of- that the material would do substantial damage
flees that eminences like Richard Kleindienst, to the national defense, because the terms of the
Will Wilson, and Robert Mardian have fled, contract refer only to classified material. Not
hoping to get out of range. many things clearly injure military prepared.
In the midst of all this came the loss in the ness, but everything can be classified.
Pentagon Papers case. The Justices ruled that it (3) With these two new advantages, the gov-
is possible for the government to obtain a re- ernment could seek prior restraint before a
straining order against a newspaper-that the judge instead of conviction before a jury. The
First Amendment is not an absolute guarantee justice Department does not like juries. Also,
of the right to publish national-security infor- th hear~i gg t 1 ,,~p3J~~{ n camera, a se-
mat~pt4l-4Ci~rrn~~{~~~Cf~neC~-8jr~e`@t~l~abbt(s~'Sissified secrets,
heavy burden of proof, showing that the infor- with no reporters to ask fresh questions.
mation is overwhelmingly likely to harm U.S. (4) The contract question made the issue
 more complicate,p i lF6*q~14gaog0dl/Oj pldnin 1npagifodoy$ iiirrpt "If the govern
and toning down publicity. The focus shifted
from big sexy matters of secrecy and national
defense to the question of whether Marchetti
would honor his own written word.
(5) The contract injunction, if sustained, has
enormous value for application in other agen-
cies of the government where secrecy agree-
ments are required. Already, the addition of
Marks to the case puts the State Department
and its mandatory oath under the secrecy blan-
ket. Conceivably, the Justice Department could
obtain an injunction against anyone, in or out
of government, who has signed a secrecy oath
and is suspected of leaking classified material.
This would not be of much use against isolated,
unanticipated leaks to the press, but it would
be a potent weapon against known dissenters
with a lot on their minds. Even a casual leak
would be much more dangerous for those un-
der injunction, for it would pose the risk of be-
ing jailed instantly for contempt of court.
Amendment position-no prior restraint at al ,
1
under any circumstances. If they fail again
there, which is likely, they will argue that the
secrecy oaths are valid only if the secret ma-
terial is properly classified-that is, if its re-
lease would plainly and seriously injure the. mil-
itary defense.
The government lawyers are confident that
they won't have to get into the First Amend-
ment morass, as they expect the district court to
reaffirm its decision that the secrecy oath elim-
inates the civil liberties question: "In the opin-
ion of the Court the contract takes the case out
of the scope of the First Amendment; and, to
the extent the First Amendment is involved, the
contract constitutes a waiver of the defendant's
rights thereunder." It's much simpler for the
courts to look at things this way, the attorneys
say, and if they can make this argument wash
again, the Justice Department will leave behind
a legacy of secrecy protection that President
Nixon would be proud of. It would be a victory
for zipper-lipped government snatched from the
IIE SE OMINOUS RAMIFICATIONS of the Mar- ashes of the Ellsberg case, achieved quietly
hetti i precedent have sent the ACLU lawyers while the public is preoccupied with Nixon's
Vc
diving for their 1984 quotes and their best sanity and his character flaws-something that
speeches on the Bill of Rights. They fear that the Administration could pass on to future Pres-
their fortunes might be reversed from the "peo- idents, who would no doubt welcome the new
ples' right to know" victories of the Pentagon secrecy guarantee, since classified material
Papers case, and they see the specter of a gov- looks much dearer from the inside.
ernment whose employees have to get a note If the government wins again, the case will
signed by an Old Boy before they can speak abound with new ironies. Marchetti and Marks
their mind. They know that the power to control will have unwittingly helped create the legal
classified information and punish national-se- tools to make a vassal of every government em-
curity critics would be selectively enforced. ployee who enters the sacred chambers of na-
Lyndon Johnson, Ted Sorensen, and Bill Bundy tional security. In effect, Americans might then
would still be able to make "appropriate usage" become divided into two basic types-those
of state secrets in their memoirs without fear of sufficiently gulled by the state's alleged need for
injunction. (LBJ quoted extensively from the privacy to sign its contract of omerta, and
top-secret Pentagon Papers before they were 'those who refuse. The robots of the first group
released; but instead of being tried for espi- would run the government, protected by the
onage, like Ellsberg, he received an estimated courts against the public. They would tend to
$1.5 million for The Vantage Point.) Every become more cynical about the old principles
spring at budget time, the Pentagon would still of the Republic, while the second group would
leak startling new intelligence and tricolor lose interest in the government itself. Mesmer-
graphs showing that the collective Russian nu- ized by clandestine fantasies, the courts would
clear n issile is longer and more explosive than presumably consider the First Amendment in-
ours-and the generals will get bigger budgets, operative in national- security matters such as
not an injunction. By carefully exploiting the the CIA's bugged house pets. The Agency would
new legal power of the secrecy contract, the gov- be left free, in the name of military defense, to
ernment might be able to revive the absurd, dis- expand its covert missions in the global fringes
credited classification system-using the power of the Third World-the only places where, es-
of judges' robes to bring back the old days, pecially to the bombed peasants of Southeast
when the function of a classified leak was to Asia, it is clearly no joke. The CIA is drawn to
serve the government and when dissent was of- the Third World like a lonely derelict to a porn
ficially approved. shop, where the salve for dreams is cheap and
Staring into this libertarian's horror, the ACLU available. Instead of puncturing the myth of the
has pulled out all the stops in seeking to reverse CIA's awesome powers, Marchetti and Marks
the Marchetti defeat. The publisher, Knopf, has may ultimately find themselves and their secrecy
joined Marchetti and Marks to bring a little oaths being used to reinforce the Agency's poi-
more First Am*dpm*e~dopbrt4R&Ga 2&d1,IO&22iCFMll &4-00499ROO 1000130001-10
ment wins its
case, Marchetti
and Marks will
have unwitting-
ly helped create
the legal tools
to make a vas-
sal of every
government em-
ployee who
enters the sa-
cred chambers
of national
security."
HARPER'S MAGAZINI
JANUARY 1974
 HS/Hc- g fO
)9 7
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file folder.
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