MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN W. COFFEY (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1972
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-0078OR004700020001-0
CIA INTE USE ONLY DDS _ ::~'
..optic
MEMORANDUM FOR: John W. Coffey, Deputy'Director for Support
Attached herewith are several past MAG papers that
touch on the problem of esprit within the Agency as related
to personnel management. In case you are not aware of these
past papers, we thought they might provide a useful insight
into what MAG has written in the past on this general sub-
ject.
We are working on a paper that will deal specifically
with the problem of esprit as it exists today within the
Agency. We will forward it as soon as it is completed.
STAT
Co-Chairmen, Management Advisory
Group
Attachments:
As stated
STAT
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For Release 2006/10:~''GIIRfi~CSO6-00780R004700020001-0
11 August 1977.
SUBJECT Proposed Agency Survey on Youth and
Communication Issues
1. The attached memorandum, prepared by the Psycho-
logical Services Staff, OMS, will serve to introduce our
research interests and plans on the "Youth Issue" in the
Agency. At the request of the DDS, this memorandum was
forwarded to the Executive-Director Comptroller. Colonel
White has directed us to undertake the proposed research.
2. Although the "Communication Issue" in which MAG
has expressed especial interest is not referenced in the
memorandum, it is our intention to fully explore the
dimensions of this issue with our respondents. I'm sure
the Human Resources Study Group would welcome advice and
inputs, from 'MAG re the design, conduct, and use of the
proposed research.
 Approved For Release 2006/1CCC)F!M ?$4r$g7 ~004700020001-0
1 June 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Support
THROUGH : Director of Medical Services
SUBJECT Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"
]. A recent survey of 191 well-known business and
industrial concerns asked whether or not recent graduates
.are found to be different after employment than their counter--
parts of a few years ago. While some reported little or no
difference, most did, stating that today's graduates are more
concerned about social. problems, more anxious to have early
responsibility, want more challenge, and are more likely to.
question operating policy and practice. (See Attachment 1)
TI14E magazine (May 24) quotes the board chairtan of a major
corporation as saying that while it is easy to hire top-ranking
challenging, decision-making jobs for its bright young recruits'
and back their involvement in social causes if it expects to
students in today's tight job market, industry must invent
keep them. A social scientist recently described attitude
changes in today's youth as "irreversible" and concluded that
the marketplace must find.ways to adapt.
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C'o1h;t-r;. r. .
SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"
2. Within the Agency, rumblings from both articulate
young Agency professionals and from their superiors in-
management suggest that the Agency is by no means unaffected
by these trends. While concern has mounted recently, a
survey demonstrated wide-spread .perception of change at
least as long as two years ago. In a survey conducted by
the Psychological Services Staff, OMS, of job-related
attitudes of Agency officers who had been on board five
and ten years, opinions as to both the capability and.the
motivation of young professionals were sought.* While
83% of those surveyed agree that "Young professionals
.entering the Agency today are as capable as those who
entered when I did", only 56% felt that they are as motivated
(i.e., committed to their work) "as those who entered when
I did." More significantly, only 22% felt that the Agency
is doing a good job of managing the young professionals who
have recently entered on duty. Today, discussion about the
changing attitudes of youth in the Agency abounds, with little,
agreement as to. the implications, and even less about what, if
anything, the Agency should do about them.
A Survey of Job-Related Attitudes of Five- and Ten-Year
Agency Officers, OMS/PSS/RD, January 1970.
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 Approved For Release 2006/1C7Jq 'y 1 7t${0R004700020001-0
SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"
3. The Human Resources Study Group, taking note of
these concerns, has discussed the. question of whether or not
a systematic research effort could address itself in any
meaningful. way to those concerns. The answer is yes, if
what is needed (and we think it is) is an attempt to define
the problem,, framing it in questions like these:
a. How representative are the views being currently
expressed by an articulate few? Of whom are they
representative? Does the "Silent Majority" have
similar views, or contrasting ones? How strongly
are they held?
b. '.If we can identify common viewpoints on
significant issues among young Agency professionals
(whether they are like or unlike those .of the articulate
few), do these really differ-in a crucial way from those
held by their seniors in management positions?
c. If some real differences between views of
"youth" in the Agency and "management", are identified,
what are the implications for such issues as the Agency's
ability to continue to attract and hold "good" people,
develop identification with the Agency's mission,
Organized by DIM at the direction of the DDS in October 1970.
Charged with the task of studying needs and recommending
research in the human resources area. .-Currently composed of
representatives of OP, OS, OTR, and OMS; chaired by C/PSS/OMS.
^ (^j,T L? ~ fP~A~.~u~70!'11"fnnA-000nQ-
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CO L
NiIDEN-7 *
SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"
stimulate desire to produce, inspire career commitment?
4. Not-all of these questions are equally researchable,
"b"
of course. Those in "a" are relatively easy to tackle,
somewhat less so, "c" much tougher. Clearly, a "profile of
attitudes" derived from a standard opinion survey approach,
while a useful first step, would not carry us very far. We
need to know more about which attitudes make a difference
in the way people respond--to their jobs, to managerial
approaches, to the decision to cast their lot with the. Agency
or look elsewhere. While the methodology for research aimed
at these questions cannot be spelled out in detail at this
stage, it would obviously involve some combination of focused
depth interviewing, questionnaires, and probably other instru-
ments designed to tease out and measure perceptual/attitudinal
dimensions. The Research Branch of the Psychological Services
Staff believes that the technology for such studies is within
its capabilities. Attachment 2 illustrates one possibly useful
.approach.
5. To proceed in the direction indicated, the following
sequence of events is suggested as appropriate:
a. Agreement of top management that research in this
area is desirable. Obviously, such an undertaking would
be pointless unless seen by management as relevant to
 Approved For Release 2006/a0/16 CIA-RD.P84-00780R004700020001-0
SUBJECT: Research Possibilities on the "Youth Issue"
their concerns. We seek and welcome input and guidance
from top management on the problems meriting central focus.
b. Expansion of the Study Group to include represent-
atives of all Directorates. While we feel that, as repre-
sentatives of the Support Directorate we are in a position
to be aware of the Agency-wide concerns, input from repre-
sentatives specifically appointed by the Directors of
other components is highly desirable.
c. Designation of the Psychological Services Staff,
OMS, as the action arm for the design and implementation
of the study.
6. Given approval of the above, the next steps would be:
a. Talks between the expanded Study Group and a variety
of individuals from both "youth" and "management" in order
to define the dimensions for which measurement is desired;
b. A definition of "youth", in terms of both age and
position, and a definition of "management" in terms of both;
c. An outline of the proposed study, to be submitted
for approval to top management, before proceeding.'
STAT
.Chairman, Human Resources Study Group
.2 Attachments
as stated above
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ATTACHMENT 1
SUBJECT: How Today`s Graduates are Different*
The twenty-fifth annual survey of policy and practice
in the employment of college and university graduates in
business and industry involved 193. well-known companies.
Respondents to this year's survey were asked to indicate
ways in which new graduates are found-to be different after
employment when compared to their counterparts of a few
years ago. A total of 110 companies replied. Their responses
are summarized below, :
32 They are not really a new breed. We see very
little difference.
30 More concerned about social problems - Concerned
about social goals of the company ?- More
interested in community betterment.
28 Overestimate potential - IT-upatient with progress -
- Expect too much responsibility too soon.
23 Desire early responsibility - Want to supervise
immediately - Want rapid advancement More
demanding and aggressive.
22 --Want more challenge -- Ask for more meaningful
assignments - Want relevant work.
22 More eager to criticize .-.Often question operating
policy - Unimpressed by protocol -.Less acceptance
of tradition.
21 More restless --'Less patient.
'16 Better educated - Better qualified More able
to take responsibility - More knowledge in
special field.
from "Trends in Employment of College and University
Graduates in Business and Industry, 1971", Frank S.
Endicott, Director of Placement, Northwestern University,
Evanston, Illinois
No. Companies
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SUBJECT: Now Today's Graduates are Different
More interested in continued education.
5 Less concerned about dress and behavior.
Illustrative statements:
"Graduates view the corporation as having more than
just a profit responsibility to stockholders. They see
industry playing a major role in developing hard-core
and minority groups, using corporate profits to better
society. This concern is beginning to display itself
among some of the recently hired engineers."
"They are more concerned with the commitment their
corporation has made to resolving social problems. They
also are more interested in becoming involved on their
own than college graduates were in earlier years."
"More impatient for promotion and salary increases.
Less regard for established procedures and policies.
"New graduates are less hesitant to question authority
and work procedures. Many seem more anxious than their
predecessors for immediate recognition and job responsi-
bility. They are more competitive, more interested in
social implications and less impressed by the size of
the organization."
"Today's graduate is more curious and inquisitive.
He is more apt to question things relating to this field
and not accept them as they are. This may create friction
in supervisor-employee relations."
he recent graduate appears to desire more freedom
in his work and a voice in management decisions."
"They are more. likely to express their opinions long
before they.really have the maturity to express judgment.
However, their comments on occasion show bright sparks
of potential. This may be part of the maturing process."
"They want responsibility faster and are willing to
---rock the boat a little to get their jobs done. We need
?ntore of this type to keep us from getting lethargic."
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SUBJECT: How Today's Graduates are Different
"Other than a little different mode of dress and
possibly a more awareness of social, economic, and
ecological problems, the "new breed" does not behave
much differently."
"New breed or otherwise, we find them anxious and
eager."
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ATTACH NIENT 2
To illustrate the sort of research approach we envision
as applicable to the "Youth Issue" we provide in this attach--
ment a specific example of a problem and a methodology. A
rather new and indirect method of evaluating the differences
(if any) between the values and philosophies of young and
more senior Agency officers is a method called the multiple-
cue judgment task. In this task, groups of young and more
senior officers would be asked to judge several hypothetical
"candidates" for Agency employment in terms of their overall
suitability for an Agency career. Information about each
hypothetical candidate on a number of dimensions would be
presented to each officer. For example, one candidate might
be described as follows:
Profile of Candidate 1: Personal Qualities
l ---- I~~ 1 (-----
High
Low General
Intelligence/
Substantive
Ability
Co? mitnierit
to the Agency's
Mission
1XII
Desire for _Eagerness to
Meaningful 'fork Within
Responsibility the Chain of
of Candidate Command
The task of.each officer would be to subjectively weight this
combination of personal qualities in order to arrive at a
judgment of the overall desirability of the candidate for a
career with the Agency. Other "candidates", possessing quite
different degrees of these same personal qualities, would also
he rated by each judge. (The specific personal qualities cited
in this example are used for illustrative purposes only;
preliminary inquiry would be necessary to determine what
dimensions are most relevant for research of this type.)
Based upon an officer's ratings of a number of such
hypothetical candidates, statistical analysis (involving
multiple regression technique) would reveal which personal
qualities he weights most heavily and how he weights them in
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arriving at a judgment of an individual's overall suitability
for an Agency career. The picture that emerges for a given
officer would be a practical and potentially meaningful ii.;age
of the type of individual he believes the Agency should
attract.
Comparisons of the responses of groups of junior and
more senior Agency officers to this technique could provide
insights as to areas of agreement and conflict in basic
philosophies.
This multiple-cue judgment technique has certain advan-
tages over more conventional techniques of measurement. It
offers an indirect measure of the relative importance assigned
to various factors in a practical and realistic manner.
People are not required to provide general answers to abstract
questions, they are instead asked to make specific judgments
about potentially real people using any type of intuitive
(or rational) approach they wish. Subsequent statistical
analysis reveals the actual basis of their decisions in a
mariner which can he informative to both the individual making
the judgments and to the organization of which he is a part.
While difficult to anticipate the specific results of the
type of research described above, it is not difficult to
imagine that such research would hold implications for policies
and practices in recruitment, selection, training----especially
management training, performance appraisal, and career manage-
ment, to name but the more obvious.
 Approved For Release 2006110/16-'- tlA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT: Short-Term Measures to Maintain Employee
Morale in Periods of Austerity
REFERENCE: MAG Memorandum "Maximizing Program and
Manpower Productivity," 11 November 1971
1. In discussions accompanying the preparation of
referent memorandum, MAG also considered the immediate
potential threat to employee morale posed by current budget
and personnel reductions. While we believe a broader
long-term approach toward maximizing program and manpower
productivity is required, short-term measures may help to
2. Such steps as those outlined below, stressing
improved communication and expanded use of non-pay
incentives, can play a significant role in improving
employee performance and reducing negativism during
austere periods:
A. Need for Standardization and Coordination
of Personnel Policies. MAG un erstaiTs that a
great deal 6T^leeway in personnel management is
permitted the four Deputy Directors. While this
latitude has some advantages in permitting tailoring
of policies to particular Directorate needs, stan-
dardization and coordination are essential in
extraordinary periods such as those brought on by
BALPA, OPRED and the current cuts. For example,
if there,is no policy precluding promotion consid-
eration, even though promotions cannot be made
effective immediately, all Directorates should be,
urged to continue promotion deliberations so that
the process of. ranking and evaluating personnel will
continue.
B.. Additional Emphasis on Effective Management-
Employee Communication. ParFicu arTyauring austere
periods, Management should make a strong effort to
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insure that employees receive timely and correct
information about financial and personnel management
matters. In the case of the DDP, particular effort
should be made to alert the employees under cover
to major policy decisions and actions of his cover
company or organization. More exposure of Management
to the employee through speaking programs, briefings,
and even written notices would be helpful.
C. Assignments. Qualifications (including
experience and development potential) should dominate
the selection process. Fairness is essential.
D. Retirement. Choice assignments should not
be awarde -1 soon-to-be retired officials. If the
Agency has a moral obligation to ensure eligibility
for retirement, the Agency should find some way to
fulfill that obligation. Release from duty with
compensation until retirement would be a relatively
cheap trade off in many cases, and might even give
some people a better chance at non-Agency jobs by
releasing them at an earlier age. On the other hand,
many of these soon-to-be retired officials may have
the visionary talents required for Agency long-term
planning. If so, they could be removed from the
command channel to a reflective or "RAND-type"
assignment which conceivably could be arranged on
a contract basis.
E. Continuing Consideration of Promotions and
In-Grade Increases. proio ions and in-step
in rc eases s ou oe considered and submitted as in
normal times.
F. Personnel File Notations of Freeze Actions
or Inactions . fin icia entry should e made in
.the personnel file of each employee whose promotion
or in-grade increase has been delayed as a result. of
a freeze. This point is particularly important
if a freeze turns out to be long term.
G. Hiring at Lower Grades. The average grade
at which new employees are bro-Ught in should be
reduced in functional categories where supply and.
 Approved For Release 2006ii't'i8' IA-RDP84-007808004700020001-0
demand permit. With lower starting grades, there
would still be room in the system for some relatively
quick initial promotions, always a boost to morale.
H. Expanded Use of Training. MAG recommends
expanded use o draining as as an' d to motivation
and as a means of improving and developing employee
skills. Many Agency employees would respond
favorably to a policy which actively encouraged more
exposure to the Agency courses which have high
reputations (e.g., Mid-Career, Advanced Intelligence
Seminar, Senior Seminar, and sections of the CT
program). There would be some benefit for selected
employees and the Agency, if certain Directorate
courses were opened to wider Agency participation;
e.g., exposing some DDI and DDS&T analysts to
specialized DDP training. The Agency should be more
aggressive in encouraging career-related training at
outside institutions, as well. However, persons
nearing retirement should be excluded from this
expanded training program.
I. Expansion of Orientation Trip Programs.
ManagemenT-shouldreview its policy an procedures
toward orientation trips. If budgets permit,
expansion of this program could be especially useful
during austere periods when promotions are reduced.
The time between trips for analysts is already too
long, and their duration too short to'be of optimum
use to the analyst or to the Agency.
J. Fair Treatment for Minorities. During
austere periods I par icu ar y important that
minority employees (by race and sex) receive fair
treatment.
THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP
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MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP - Paper No. 3
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Members of the Management Advisory Group have spent many
hours during the past four months, in full group sessions and singularly,
analyzing and considering problems confronting the Agency as it moves
into its twenty-third year. We have reached a consensus on certain of
the essential points and themes which consistently reoccur as principal
matters. In conversations with our peers including the current Mid-Career
course participants, we believe that our consensus views on these essential
points do, in fact, represent a widely-held attitude of the middle-grade
officer in the Agency. Our desire to attempt to articulate these views,
without inhibition, represents our first effort to try to function and to serve
as an advisory group to management.
The Agency needs to develop a more effective system to ensure
career growth, especially of those younger officers with the greatest
potential for leadership. Decisive steps must be taken in order to make
the Agency a "better place to work" in the next decade. MAG findings
parallel the study Attrition II, dated 14 July 1969, which noted that the
heaviest loss of professional personnel is for job-related reasons and
that this loss has been especially acute in the age 40 and below range.
The significance of this is underscored by the fact that the Director of
Personnel feels that for the years ahead the Agency may be facing a
management succession crisis. In fact, the rapid growth of the Agency
in its early years pP 7,,r, tt-4..? regular increase in personnel with a
sufficiently, broad base to permit comparatively fast promotions and
steadily expanding responsibilities, reducing the pressures for long
range career planning. The same is somewhat true today within the
younger directorate, DDS&T. Indeed, this situation began to change
in the early 1960's--by 1964 the personnel strength figure peaked--but
it was not reflected in significant alterations in career development
planning. As we moved into the late 1960's, the situation had worsened.
Confronted with a reduction in manpower, in absolute terms, and a
very tight budgetary situation, steps more than ever are called for in
order to ensure career growth.
SECRET
21 November 1969
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The most precious asset of the Agency is its people. This is
given recognition by the personal personnel management system that
has always been a pride of the Agency. And we should be proud of such
a system. Moreover, lack of job challenge, emphasized by a number
of our younger officers, must be overcome if the Agency is to retain
the dynamism and growth potential needed to meet present and future
responsibilities. Despite a relatively rosy reading by some, uncertain
and slow advancement in responsibility, the lack of opportunity to pursue
professional interest, and slow promotions are factors which have affected
morale.
Statistics provided us with some depressing eye openers. For
the disproportionate distribution between directorates exacerbating the
problem. Similarly, average time in grade--e. g. , in the DDP 68 months
from GS-13 to GS-14; 88 months from GS-14 to GS-15--illustrates the
fact that a man, possibly entering via the CTP, moves through the early
grades rapidly and then smacks head-on into the bulge which exists,
especially in the DDP but also in the DDI and DDS, at the middle levels.
Promotion patterns are significant because advancement of young men
represents the best means of revitalizing an organization from within,
is the best guarantee of broadened responsibility for top-flight officers,
and sets the stage for effective management programming.
We believe the Agency is at a crossroads point and that, with an
eye to meeting the challenge of the 1970's groundwork must be laid to:
(1) encourage the development of a sound management succession
program; (2) assist supervisors in formally identifying and weeding out
of the chain of command and promotion personnel who have topped out;
(3) facilitate promotions and increase job responsibilities; and (4) combine
the personal security features of the Civil Service system with a recog-
nition of the need for a shorter career base. To make such a system work
will require some rather significant changes in the modus operandi of the
Agency toward career development and, incidentally, will require more
candor on the part of supervisors and managers. We are mindful that
the various levels of senior management, to differing degrees, are aware
of these problems although they may not sense the extent of concern in
the middle ranks. Pockets of sheer enlightenment have been found in our
probings. The Director or Personnel, for example, has descibed his- /
management succession study and plans in most relevant terms.
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-0078OR0047 0020001-0
6.CT
Several proposals are forwarded with this memorandum which
illustrate specific ways in which MAG members believe steps could be
made to achieve some of the initiatives needed in personnel management
and career development. These include accelerated promotions, the
establishment of a "comers list, " and a selective program 'of involuntary
retirement. These proposals interrelate and are designed to provide a
package approach to the problem.
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16 PBO-0078OR004700020001-0
CAREER DEVELOPMENT
It is essential to implement with all due speed a career
development program for the Agency's most able younger officers,rt
in a planned and orderly way. The anticipated increase in regular
retirements over the next few years--possibly accompanied by
limited involuntary retirement--will produce headroom at the top.
This will not, however, adequately solve the problem for the middle-
grade and younger officers of high ability. Time-in-grade continues
to weigh too heavily in consideration for promotion of junior and
middle-grade Agency officers, and the dissatisfaction of these officers
is very real. They are reacting to their own considerable difficulty
in moving ahead in this Agency due in part to external factors, e. g. ,
limitation on the number of super-grade positions in the Agency,
budgetary ceilings, masses of personnel grouped in the middle
grades, and the general sense of movement that younger people
experience elsewhere in our society both in and outside the public
sector.
The new professional officer has particular concern in two
areas: first, he learns that young interns in other Government
branches move from Grade GS-07 to GS-11 or GS-12 more or less
automatically- -and at a faster rate than young Agency officers; and
secondly, he quickly hears about seemingly never-ending "humps"
or long time-in-grade averages beyond GS-11 or GS-12 and is
depressed about his own career prospects. He can personally
believe and perhaps has been told by senior officers that he could
do a better job than some officers of higher grade who have topped
out, but this is little consolation when he sees his advancement
blocked. It is simply not enough to tell an individual, even
repeatedly, that he has a career with CIA and then apply an ad hoc
approach to his assignments and rate of promotion.
The two proposals which follow are designed to overcome the
blockage in the middle grades so that young officers can have a
greater sense of confidence in their future career growth.
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1. Accelerated Promotions. MAG would like to
outline a proposal calling for the establishment of an
accelerated promotion schedule. Each career service
would reserve a percentage of its promotion quota for
outstanding officers with only minimum regard for time-
in-grade. This would introduce a system for rapid
advancement of the most promising younger officers.
The following table illustrates in general how this might
be accomplished, recognizing it may vary from directorate
to directorate.
Percentage of
Promotion Category Time-in-Grade Requirements Slots Reserved
GS-12 to GS-13 1 year or less 25%
GS-13 to GS-14 2 years or less 25%
GS-14 to GS-15 3 years or less 25%
GS-15 to GS-16 4 years or less 25%
2. Comers List. Promising junior and middle grade
officers, usually under age 40, would be identified fairly
early in their careers and given positions of increased
responsibility as part of a mutually-discussed career growth
plan. Some Agency offices actually have such a list though
it is an informal one. The number of "comers" could be
specified, such in each directorate at GS-15 or
below, although the figure should probably be less in the
smaller directorates. (Many of those on the "Comers List"
-------------------------------------------------------------------
*The principle of flexibility would have to be borne in mind in carrying
out such a program. Take, for example, the high-performing individual
in GS-13 who has slightly over two years in grade at the time the program
is instituted. He should probably be compensated with promotion at that
time or the time of the next panel meeting six months or a year later.
The significance of the accelerated promotion proposal is that it lays
down a set of impersonal criteria which would have to be followed and
it commits the Agency to the principle that the accelerated advancement
of highly qualified younger officers should be encouraged. This would
be a.significant step in restoring dynamism to the Agency's personnel
profile.
5
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would find themselves a recipient of an accelerated
promotion.) Excellent young officers who are identified
as "comers" would be given special attention and moved
into positions designed to forward their career development
and to prepare them for leadership roles in management.
In this process, certain officers who have "topped out"
might be moved out of direct line jobs.
Directorates would administer this program by
submitting periodic reports on its "Comers List" personnel
to an Agency coordinating authority, such as the Executive
Director-Comptroller. Such a monitoring program would
be designed to ensure that appropriate planning for career
growth of the "comers" is instituted and maintained. In
addition to being given positions of increased responsibility,
those on the "Comers List" would receive added opportunities
for internal and external training.'
*As these personnel assumed new positions of responsibility, they would
be put through an intensive program of management training. In this they
should be joined by other personnel, also expanding their management
skills, as part of a general effort to overcome deficiencies in management
training evident at various supervisory levels in the Agency.
6
SECRET
- Annrr , rl Fnr Ralaacp ~M~l (u I1 ('IA D'nDQA nn-70nonne~nnnnnnn
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0
SELECTIVE INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT PROGRAM
The Agency faces an externally directed reduction in personnel
strength which cannot be met solely through attrition. There is a
concomitant need to open up assignment and promotional opportunities
in order to attract, retain, and develop the young careerists of today
for the challenge of the 1970's and beyond. As a step towards solving
the problem this paper outlines a limited program of involuntary retire-
ments as one credible solution available to management.
The Director of Central Intelligence has discretionary authority
to terminate the employment of any employee of the Agency under
section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. It
is recommended that, using this authority, the Agency undertake a
limited program of involuntary retirement involving individuals under
the two Federal Staff retirement systems applicable to Agency employees.
The CIA Retirement Act and the Civil Service retirement system
have identical age and length of service requirements for involuntary
retirement. Employees separated without cause are eligible for an
immediate annuity if they have completed 25 years of service, or if
they are at least 50 years of age, 20 years of service (under the CIA
Retirement Act, ten years with the Agency and five qualifying), In
addition, annuities have been substantially increased as a result of
recent liberalizations in, the Civil Service law. Legislation is now pend-
ing before the Congress to make comparable adjustments for the CIA
retirement system. As a general rule:
a. After 30 years of service, assuming one year sick
leave credit, the basic annuity is 62 percent of high three
salary under the CIA system and 59. 25 percent under the
Civil Service system.
b. Generally for the first three years of retirement,
when Federal income taxes are not applicable, net income
from a basic annuity, based on 30 years service and one
year sick leave credit, approximates the employees net
tako-honit pay, iftcr I odc,ral :nil irtatci irlcu.in tax and
retirement deductions. Further, the purchasing value of
this retirement income is substantially preserved by virtue
of built in adjustments to meet increases in cost-of-living,
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0
SEC.
We recognize the fact that the Agency is a people-oriented organi-
zation. We heartily endorse this approach to the extent it clearly serves
the best interests of the Agency and is not overly protective of the few to
the detriment of the many. The continued retention of an employee who
no longer performs with the effectiveness once expected and currently
needed is clearly not in the long-term interest of the Agency when it
impairs the development of promising young officers whose career com-
mitment is essential. It is hoped that the problem facing the Agency
with respect to ceiling reduction and the unblocking of developmental and
promotional opportunities can be met through proper attrition, other
programmatic efforts, and accelerated voluntary retirements as the
result of liberalizations in retirement laws. To the extent that it is not,
we propose the initiation of an involuntary retirement program using
the following parameters:
a. On an Agency-wide basis identify employees 55 and
over and those with 30 years of service, regardless of age,
who would be entitled to an immediate annuity of not less
than 60 percent of "average basic salary. "
b. Rank the identified employees according to time-in-
grade without promotion.
c. Establish groupings of ranked employees by specific
time-in-grade criteria, e. g. , GS-15's--ten or more years
in grade; GS-14's--eight years in grade; GS-13's--six years
in grade. .
d. Establish the number of separations to be effected
under the program.''` Assign quotas to each directorate and
appropriate indepFx:Ent office groupings. Provide rank/
grouping data and projected annuity information on employees
in the zone of consideration.
*Scope of program. It is recommended that the program be implemented
on a pilot basis with total separations not to exceed the difference between
authorized strength and the projected number by which the Agency would
otherwise be overstrength over the time involved (considering such factors
as attrition, other programmatic reductions, and anticipated voluntary
retirement).
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0
S r CRE
e. Directorates and independent office groupings would
nominate, according to quota, employees in the zone of
consideration for involuntary retirement. Nominations
would be submitted to the Director, with the Director of
Personnel's accompanying recommendation on any request
for exception on compassionate or other established grounds.
Exceptions approved by the Director would require a replace-
ment nominee from the proposing Directorate or independent
office grouping.
It is recognized that involuntary separation is an emotionally difficult
task and should only be taken after management has exhausted all other
suitable efforts to overcome the problem the Agency faces. It is most
important, therefore, that promotional assignment opportunities created
as a result of involuntary retirement vacancies not be wasted. Hopefully,
follow-on promotions and assignments will be made along the lines recom-
mended elsewhere in this paper to meet the overall developmental needs
of the Agency.
We believe that the approach recommended above, if accompanied
with dignity and compassion and without a pejorative air, could begin a
pipeline toward early retirement. Its effect should be felt within a year
of inception. Applied equally across the several senior grades, it might
stay the desirable officers from opting out early if he sees a true thinning
of the ranks of his competition for promotion. The ultimate judgments
on who would go and who would be encouraged to remain would clearly
have to be made on a directorate-wide level if it is not to become the 701
program revisited.
We believe that the credibility of the proposed involuntary retire-
ment program depends heavily upon the effective use of the Agency's legal
authorities and capacity for initiative and innovation to assist affected
employees in preparing for and establishing themselves in a second career.
We believe that a responsive program in this connection would, at a minimum,
include sabbaticals. (academic, relocational, or vocational) and resourceful
out-placement.
SECRET
 ADMINISTRATIVE/INTEIZVAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-0078OR004700020001-0
4 August 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director - Comptroller
The lack of effective communications between',individuals,
components, or directorates can handicap the intelligence
analyst, technician, case officer and manager alike. Lateral
communication sometimes is viewed as unnecessary and contrary
to "need to know" compartmentation. However, the younger
officer especially has sought his counterpart in other parts
of the Agency with benefit to both intelligence production and
operations. The difficulty of defining the lateral communication
"problem" was emphasized in MAG's discussions. Some MAG members
felt that the problem.was essentially that people did not know
with whom to communicate. Others felt that the real problem
was to establish effective communication between people who
already know of their mutual existence and concerns. MAG
considered the subject and attempted to identify successful
communications techniques employed by some in the Agency which
could be used by others.
The most common approach to effective communications
involves personal relationships and usually takes the form of
knowing key people or components knowledgeable about a parti-
cular area. These interrelationships depend'very much upon
personalities, mutual respect, personal needs and inadequacies.
Much of this communication is on an informal basis but can be
formalized. The situation of learning only too late about
pertinent work or capabilities of people could be alleviated
by a more organized way to identify key people in a directorate
or division whom one could contact for overall direction or
information.. Certain people in any directorate seem to have
this capability either through innate ability or their function
in the organization structure which gives them an overall view
of office personnel and activities. These points of contact
should be more clearly identified for all. Another useful mech-
anism enhancing communication with the appropriate,people is
the use of a functional directory such as the one published by
OCS.
ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For R~~a~~~{~(~1~~~-IO~R?x'00020001-0
SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications
An additional method of effective communication has been
used in times of crisis, for example, by OCI. A task force is
set up to ensure that all interested parties are in touch and
contributing necessary information. People with specialized
interest and knowledge in a particular country or problem are
identified and a roster is made with names, phone numbers, and
special area of expertise. Such a roster probably would include
names of economic, political, military, scientific, estimative,
and operational specialists. On any given problem, then, these
people are ready and available.. Sometimes meetings involving
all of the people on the task force are set up so that all
have a chance to exchange ideas and discuss probable events
and implications. Modification of this concept might be
workable even in the absence of a crisis. Lists of people
with specialized interest or knowledge could be assembled
and fed into a computer and made available to interested
individuals.
The concept of a roster of personnel with specialized
knowledge can even be extended. Practical implementation
would involve providing a cross-indexed computer tabulation
which identifies specific subjects and knowledgeable individuals
or Agency components. It is envisioned that this data bank
would reflect more than just those "experts" in a particular
field. Rather, it would, to a manageable level of detail,
truly reflect the activity within the Agency. This data bank
would be updated regularly as "expertise" is, developed within
a given office or division. Younger officers who have not yet
learned how to work the informal communications channels would
benefit greatly by being able to tap this data bank. An
important aspect of this question relates to a certain amount
of middle management "inertia" which is believed to exist
within the Agency. Many managers seem reluctant to search for
outside expertise almost to the point of discouraging the use
of the informal communications paths. If a data bank such as
discussed above-is to be beneficial its use must be encouraged
from the top down to overcome this management inertia at
whatever level it exists. Finally, security can be maintained;
a valid case can be made for not making the details of the
entire data bank available. At the office level an individual
can act as the interface between the officers in the division
and the data bank. Such an individual having the need to know
ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For FV9 IA~ ~A) kEI !-WDW4]1Ut R?64'00020001-0
and aware of the information needs of personnel in his
division can query the data bank to identify the experts
in other offices or to identify other components where :At
related work is being carried out. Further, this individual
being knowledgeable of the activity within his office would
be responsible for ensuring that his part of the data bank
is current.
The Agency spends a good deal of money each year sending
,.people to conferences and seminars. The knowledge we collect-
ively have in the Agency also is significant but unfortunately
we seldom utilize the specialized knowledge our own people
have to inform each other. Perhaps twice a year groups of
interested individuals (compiled and available from the
computer) could get together in a conference or seminar
environment. The agenda should be flexible but include pre-
sentations and discussion from people with differing kinds
of specialized knowledge (whether it's all of the French
experts, groups of computer people or all those who worry
about space or missile problems). Even though on a working
basis many of us are in regular or informal contact with our
counterpart in other parts of the Agency we seldom take time
for a thorough and thought-provoking session. The organization
of the meeting could be a cooperative venture with the agenda
and participants worked out by the Directorates and the
mechanics by the Office of Training..
Other means contributing to effective lateral communica-
tions are participation in training classes such as the DDS&T
Career Development Course and all inter-directorate courses
(Mid Career, Intelligence and World Affairs, Advanced Intelli-
gence Seminar, and Senior Seminar). These courses serve to
demonstrate positive implications of lateral communication
between operational and analytical components. One of the
most helpful fallouts from these sessions is the contacts
made with people from other components and directorates.
Similar experiences can be gained in attending in-house
seminars and technical working sessions such as the recent
Human Factors Seminar and the working groups under the R&D
technical coordinating committee.
MAG believes that lateral communication should be
encouraged by management. While many intelligence officers
ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For R 4 iYl? /49E,6fk-rK' IbC~t~6R@'bl'l }0020001-0
SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications
will communicate on their own once they know with whom to get in
touch, others must be encouraged as they are encouraged by their
managers in other respects. Managers should make it clear from
the outset of an employee's assignment that they support lateral
communication and that the officer is expected to keep:in touch
with his counterparts in other components and directorates.
Management Advisory Group
ADMINISTRATIVE/INTERNAL USE ONLY
AnnrhyP-r1 Fn F2plpacc ong/ o/1Fi . (1-a-: nPRd_f1f17f2f1R(1(1 n n55hnhj_Yt
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780R00470o02b001-0
SECfET
Following specific examples point up the problems caused
by arbitrary, rigid or overly-compartmented Agency practices
and policies:
a) DDS&T has vacancies for qualified personnel.
Agency Barriers Leading to Personnel Dissatisfaction
~-'and Ine iciency:
to DDS&T. However there is no movement from DDP to
DDS&T, and DDS&T is obliged to recruit outside the Agency.
c) A female, college graduate has spent one year
in RID/DDP. She believes she is under-utilized. She
informally learned that a DDP area desk is looking for a
CE/CI analyst and considers her eminently qualified.
However she is refused permission to leave RID until she
has spent a full two year apprenticeship.
Conclusion: Mobility within or between Directorates
should a encouraged. Each of the above examples, and
many others that might be cited, deserve] a better
solution. One way of improving mobility would be to
establish an Agency "Want Ad" publication, circulated
,periodically to all employees.
%;K Training of Supervisors in Personnel Management:
Personnel management is considered to be a prime area of
weakness. Often, too much time is spent by supervisors on
suhstant.ve matters and too little attention is paid to
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780R004700020001-0
personnel management. The problem begins immediately when
an officer is appointed as a supervisor for the first time.
No adequate program currently exists to prepare the officer
as a supervisor (mid-career course and managerial grid, while
useful in their own right, are clearly not enough). When..:
person becomes a supervisor, and periodically thereafter, he
should be given a course specifically tailored to his new
duties. Other frequent courses or seminars should be
established on specific areas such as the fitness report,
counselling of subordinates, regularly reviewing each employee's
career prospects, etc.
A related concept is the instituting of career planning
and development for Agency personnel who have formal training
in science or engineering. The loyalties of scientists and
engineers tend to lie more strongly,with their profession than
with an employer. A management development program would be
a useful tool for retaining scientific talent and developing
professional ties to intelligence among those retained.
Such a program would include external and internal training,
,.,and rotation of assignments.
Mandatory Retirement
There is a widely held belief among middle management
that in many parts of the Agency today's senior officers were
also the senior officers in the late 1940's and early 1950's.
There is a general impression, in part justified and in part
exaggerated, that this group has become over the years self-
protective and resistant to change. Because they are social
as well as professional colleagues they shy away from
criticizing each other or weeding themselves out. This has
set a style in personnel management for the Agency as a whole.
There is a reluctance, from an arguably humane point of view,
to destroy or undermine the careers of people who have given
long service to the Agency. This manifests itself in an
unwillingness to put unpleasant personnel evaluations on paper.
Another perceived indication of self-protectiveness is the
.virtualrabsence of lateral entry into the Agency at the upper
levels.
Statements from senior officers that their experience
is invaluable, or that middle management is not in general
ready to take their places merely begs the question: if
middle management has inadequate opportunity to get the experi-
ence and responsibility offered only by the senior jobs, how
can they be ready to replace today's senior officers?
lough this impression of self-protectionism is, not entirely
 Approved For Releaset2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780R004700Q 0001-0
justified there are certain measures which might be taken
to dispel widespread unfavorable notions on this subject:
foremost and specifically, it is felt that retirement
waivers for those in GS-17 and below who have reached the
age of 60 should not be granted. Another measure which
could be applied in selected cases is the encouragement of
early retirement. Those who cannot or will not retire and
who are no longer pulling their weight could be shunted out
of important jobs.
4. Senior Register Concept
This is the creation of a senior register list so that
"topping out" personnel may be removed from the promotion
acid advancement mainstream. Personnel in the senior register
list would still be eligible for promotion but on a restricted
basis. (This has been expanded into a separate paper.)
There is a widespread notion that a more ambitious Agency
public relations program should be launched, so that the gap
may be narrowed between the public view of the Agency as a
sinister, uncontrolled and bumbling organization and the view
from inside the government (especially the users of our product)
that the Agency represents objectivity, reliability and
integrity.
Recruitment Profile
There is a need for greater recruitment of blacks and
..J related minorities, if the Agency is to maintain its
Q)' epresentivity in terms of the changes taking place in
x American society. Correspondingly there is a need for greater
n+11 or fn hl i shmentit
rNu
t +.,1,1 i
1,
t --P "
an
s
me
recruitmen
Young people--individuals who would be most effective in
7. Other MAG Forums
The MAG concept is felt to be creative and healthy. Other
MAG forums in various of the directorates and offices, especially'
in the CT program, should be formed. 11
There should be . a. consolidation of the various Agency
ADP organizations into a single organization. This should
SMUT
 Approved For Release22006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780R0047000,~0001-0
0 U.-
provide the following-.advantages.
1) Similar task areas can be consolidated.
2) Coordination of hardware acquisition and
utilization would be guaranteed.
3) Better and fewer software systems could be
developed rather than several of the same type.
4) Responsibility vested in a single point
should result in better control and review of ADP
activities by higher non-ADP management.
5) A single grade structure and a wide variety
of computer work would create an attractive environment
in which to work. Career planning, training, and hiring
could be improved.
9. The CT Program
There are perceivable problems in the CT program--inability
to recruit the top level college graduates; the question of
drawing mainly from internals for recruits into the CT program;
overselling of the CT program to new recruits; not giving CT
course graduates sufficient responsibility soon enough; the
question of an internship or probationary period for incoming
CT's; and the general question of the unworkability of the
present-CT program whereby recruits are taken into the program
as trainees without reference to the requirements of the
particular jobs they will eventually be fulfilling.
 Approved For Release >200t$ 199}1 Pl :sGIAsRbP84-OOPM00470,,0020 S e t ember
STA
Notes on Personnel Policy and Social Norms ~A
Preface
The following is a sketch of some ideas on personnel policy in
the Agency discussed as an aspect of social norms developed during the
early years of the organization.
You may find these notions somewhat far-out; however, they
interest me because I think that personnel policy decision making
is very much bound up with the social system of the Agency. Future
policy changes should be based on a thorough awareness of the social
system, yet some of the social norms inhibit discussion of' this
emotionally loaded subject.
Please assume the usual caveats about limited, exposure, lack
of knowledge, etc. I am painfully aware of the problems of viewing
the world through Commo's little:cknothole and generalizing there-
from. Also please view what may seem like extreme statements as
assertions for discussion, written in haste, not as fine-honed.
positions.
Introductory Assertions
Personnel policy in this Agency is like a man with certain types
of serious diseases.` He will surely die an untimely death unless an
early detection is made, and a long term recovery program implemented.
The unfortunate part is that he feels well and functions successfully
on a day-to-day basis. Only a few twinges occasionally remind him
of impending disaster, and he prefers to put them out of his mind.
He can't face up to., the discipline required in his recovery program,
and probably doesn't really believe he can die. He's been too
valuable to his family & community. Surely someone will save him
without his having to change his habits and style of life!
The habits and life styles of the Agency were developed in the
years of its birth and early childhood, and. have been lovingly
nurtured since then. But, like some children who were protected and
sheltered during the years of growth, fail to adjust to the realities
of life--the Agency has failed to adjust to realities of organizational
size.
Specifically, the Agency is characterized by:
Gutless management (paternalistic'management?)
Avoidance of conflict (i.e. self-evaluation and criticism)
Protectionism of the first order
Egocentric attitudes r (not discussed in this paper)
Genesis
In many parts of the Agency, the senior officers today are the
same group who were senior in the late 40's and early 50's. As young
officers during the war and afterwards attending the birth of a new
organization, a certain comradorie bound them together. As a group
they, in a'fashon, "grew up and,matured together." During the
 beginning of this period; the organization was quite small, and a club,!
or family atmosphere dominated. This nucleus today constitutes an
organizational "in-group", whose inter-relationships have a long
hi story.
It seems to me that the dominant characteristic of management
leadership by this group is "avoidance of conflict". This character-
istic manifests itself most clearly in personnel management. There
is much evidence that this group shares a social norm which avoids
punitive or critical evaluation of peers. The problem is that,
because of their shared history, many in the management structure are,,
social peers, but are not organizational peers. A basic conflict
is thus set up. For long-term vitality organizational peers must
be critically judged and separated according to ability. Social
peers avoid this like the plague because it is too threatening. In
the Agency the social norms have dominated.
Results
This has resulted inpaternalistic management where many undesirable
.management practices are allowed to flourish.
The in-group looks after its own, witness the dance of musical
chairs as senior officers pass jobs around to each other.
New blood is inhibited because allowing them entrance would
imply critical evaluation and downgrading. This is threatening
because it upsets the happy in-group family and exposes the evaluators
themselves to such a possibility.
The unwillingness to face up to the realities of management
responsibilities subtly affects many facets of personnel policy in
the Agency.
Fitness Reports: Have you ever seen a bad one? Perhaps, but not
many. We all know of people in supervisory and senior management
jobs who are incompetent, worn out, obsolete., or ineffective. Yet
I would wager that their fitness reports speak in glowing terms of
their mature judgement, high effectiveness, dedication, and probably
have overall ratings of Strong or above.
I know of one career panel who recently reviewed GS-11 's for
promotion. Of the 40 persons on the list, all had an overall rating
of Strong, all had favorable narrative comments, and none had a
significant criticism or weakness cited. Surely this was not
actually the case.
It is rumored (and I have had nothing but confirmation from
senior officers with whom I have discussed it,) that the great
majority of GS-16's and above recei Outstandi s reports--
the result a "in-group's" self-protection as they have risen
together. Is it any wonder that the norms set by these leaders have
propagated down to the lowest levels to render fitness reports
unusuable as a management tool? If you don't believe this, talk to
someone who has attempted to write a-bad fitness report. It's almost
like trying to fire someone. The resistance of the system is
tremendous. For that matter, have you ever been able to get,construct-
ive criticism of Your own work?
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 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-00780RD04700020001-0
Thus, in my opinion the universal dissatisfaction with the
failure report can be directly traced to, and is caused by, senior
management themselves.- They set the examples by which others follow.
As long as the "in-group" won't openly and honestly judge themselves,
no one else will or indeed be allowed to.
The social norm of conflict avoidence has effects in other areas.
As peer groups avoid self evaluation like the plague, their norms`
are passed down through the organization. Often promotions seem to
be made on a.mechanistic-defendable basis, rather than on a hard
evaluation of capability.
The retirement system is a typical example of.a "solution"
which failed to take into account the social norms of the organization.
The present system assures us only that these. individuals with
alternatives will leave--probably the best people. The ones you
would like to leave have no alternatives and the system can't force
them to leave. (Question: Should it?) Other systems do not leave
the choice to individuals.
Understanding the social system of the Agency might lead us to
better solutions to personnel problems. I for one, think that it
would be impossible to change the existing norms except over a very
long period. Therefore, they simply must be taken into account.
Fitness Reports
If management won't officially criticize, why not require formal
but unofficial criticism in a document confined to supervisor-subordinate.
First, individuals could get some decent feedback on their performance
and act on it. Second, it would be a start on establishing a norm
that said its allrIght, even important to criticize and give a balanced
picture of a man's performance. Maybe someday the "fitness report" and
the Critique would be combined.
Retirement
If you buy the assertions in this paper, then it says a lot for
the workability and acceptability of the "passed over-no promotion,
but not forced to retire policy" i.e.: the senior registr we have
talked about before., First and most importantly, it wou d unblock
slots.
Second, it would clearly communicate management intentions to
the senior registry group. Because of no-feedback, complimentary
fitness reports, etc. there is no telling how many of the "in-effect-
ives" are laboring under the impression that promotions are "just
another year or so ahead". It is likely that faced with the fact of
nonadvancement, many would face reality, and make a change.
Thi rd, i t too, would be another step in the direction' of example
setting--that management courage in the personnel area is acceptable,
and indeed required for'organizational health.
STAT
lqb~j
12 September
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-0078OROQ4p3Q 0QOCI}'E0G I S T x
(9
MAG PAPERS
Tab A A Note on Communication
Tab B Effective Lateral Communications
Tab C Dissemination of Information
Tab D Revised Headquarters' Notice on MAG
Tab E Personnel Development Program
Tab F Improving the Role of Training in Personnel Management
Tab G Revision of Fitness Report System
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-0078OR004700020001-0
 CIA INTERNAL USE
Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-R 00780R004700020001-0
ADMINISTRATIVE
I Executive Registry
3 ba
/d _6
15 August 1972
Over the years Agency officers of every age, grade, job
description, and component have reliably identified "communica-
tion" as either a barrier to organizational effectiveness or
a major personal concern. Expressions of dissatisfaction with
communication have been amply recorded in special Agency-wide
attitude studies, countless IG surveys, papers of young officer
groups, managerial grid critiques, and numerous other documents.
Yet, we question whether the expression of this consensus has
been instrumental in effecting meaningful change. Saying com-
munication is a problem tells us very little about communication
and still less about the problem. Paradoxically, simply saying
communication is a problem is in itself a problem. It deludes
us into believing we know what's wrong, dissuades us from doing
a more systematic diagnosis of what people really mean, and
disposes us to general and ineffectual remedies. What is need-
ed, in our view, is insistence on greater precision in defining
what is meant by communication as a problem. By adopting a
more critical point of view with regard to the oft-heard issue
of communication, all those who deal in diagnosing and pre-
scribing for organizational ills will be rendered a potentially
far more valuable service to the Agency.
Until we develop more precise conceptualizations of the,
varieties of Agency communication activities, and evaluate the
Agency experience in relation to them, we will not be in a
position to deal most effectively with the "communication"
issue.
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For Release 2006/10/16: CIA-RDP84-0078OR004700020001-0
TAB
 ..Approved Fop ~pjrg a{ 'ilt j YQt#?IDRE4-gQg8Q 700020001-0
4 August 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director - Comptroller
SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications
The lack of effective communications between individuals,
components, or directorates can handicap the intelligence
analyst, technician, case officer and manager alike. Lateral
communication sometimes is viewed as unnecessary and contrary
to "need to know" compartmentation. However, the younger
officer especially has sought his counterpart in other parts
of the Agency with benefit to both intelligence production and
operations. The difficulty of defining the lateral communication
"problem" was emphasized in MAG's discussions. Some MAG members
felt that the problem was essentially that people did not know
with whom to communicate. Others felt that the real problem
was to establish effective communication between people who
already know of their mutual existence and concerns. MAG
considered the subject and attempted to identify successful
communications techniques employed by some in the Agency which
could be used by others.
The most common approach to effective communications
involves personal relationships and usually takes the form of
knowing key people or components knowledgeable about a parti-
cular area. These interrelationships depend very much upon
personalities, mutual respect, personal needs and inadequacies.
Much of this communication is on an informal basis but can be
formalized. The situation of learning only too late about
pertinent work or capabilities of people could be alleviated
by a more organized way to identify key people in a directorate
or division whom one could contact for overall direction or
information. Certain people in any directorate seem to have
this capability either through innate ability or their function
in the organization structure which gives them an overall view
of office personnel and activities. These points of contact
should be more clearly identified for all. Another useful mech-
anism enhancing communication with the appropriate people is
the use of a functional directory such as the one published by
OCS.
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SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications
An additional method of effective communication has been
used in times of crisis, for example, by OCI. A task force is
set up to ensure that all interested parties are in touch and
contributing necessary information. People with specialized
interest and knowledge in a particular country or problem are
identified and a roster is made with names, phone numbers, and
special area of expertise. Such a roster probably would include
names of economic, political, military, scientific, estimative,
and operational specialists. On any given problem, then, these
people are ready and available. Sometimes meetings involving
all of the people on the task force are set up so that all
have a chance to exchange ideas and discuss probable events
and implications. Modification of this concept might be
workable even in the absence of a crisis. Lists of people
with specialized interest or knowledge could be assembled
and fed into a computer and made available to interested
individuals.
The concept of a roster of personnel with specialized
knowledge can even be extended. Practical implementation
would involve providing a cross-indexed computer tabulation
which identifies specific subjects and knowledgeable individuals
or Agency components. It is envisioned that this data bank
would reflect more than just those "experts" in a particular
field. Rather, it would, to a manageable level of detail,
truly reflect the activity within the Agency. This data bank
would be updated regularly as "expertise" is developed within
a given office or division. Younger officers who have not yet
learned how to work the informal communications channels would
benefit greatly by being able to tap this data bank. An
important aspect of this question relates to a certain amount
of middle management "inertia" which is believed to exist
within the Agency. Many managers seem reluctant to search for
outside expertise almost to the point of discouraging the use
of the informal communications paths. If a data bank such as
discussed above is to be beneficial its use must be encouraged
from the top down to overcome this management inertia at
whatever level it.exists. Finally, security can be maintained;
a valid case can be made for not making the details of the
entire data bank available. At the office level an individual
can act as the interface between the officers in the division
and the data bank. Such an individual having the need to know
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ILLEGIB
SUBJECT: Effective Lateral Communications
and aware of the information needs of personnel in his
division can query the data bank to. identify the experts
in other offices or to identify other components where
related work is being carried out. Further, this individual
being knowledgeable of the activity within his office would
be responsible for ensuring that his part of the data bank
is current.
The Agency spends a good deal of money each year sending
people to conferences and seminars. The knowledge we collect-
ively have in the Agency also is significant but unfortunately
we seldom utilize the specialized knowledge our own people
have to inform each other. Perhaps twice a year groups of
interested individuals (compiled and available from the
computer) could get together in a conference or seminar
environment. The agenda should be flexible but include pre-
sentations and discussion from people with differing kinds
of specialized knowledge (whether it's all of the French
experts, groups of computer people or all those who worry
about space or missile problems). Even though on a working
basis many of us are in regular or informal contact with our
counterpart in other parts of the Agency we seldom take time
for a thorough and thought-provoking session. The organization
of the meeting could be a cooperative venture with the agenda
and participants worked out by the Directorates and the
mechanics by the Office of Training.
Other means contributing to effective lateral communica-
tions are participation in training classes such as the DDS&T
Career Development Course and all inter-directorate courses
(Mid Career, Intelligence and World Affairs, Advanced Intelli-
gence Seminar, and Senior Seminar). These courses serve to
demonstrate positive implications of lateral communication
between operational and analytical components. One of the
most helpful fallouts from these sessions is the contacts
made with people from other components and directorates.
Similar experiences can be gained in attending in-house
seminars and technical working sessions such as the recent
Human Factors Seminar and the working groups under the R&D
technical coordinating committee.
MAG believes that lateral communication should be
encouraged by management. While many intelligence officers
3 -
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will communicate on their own once they know with whom to get in
touch, others must be encouraged as they are encouraged by their
managers in other respects. Managers should make it clear from
the outset of an employee's assignment that they support lateral
communication and that the officer is expected to keep in touch
with his counterparts in other components and directorates. The
Executive Director's recent memorandum on Country Seminars, which
MAG saw when in the final stages of preparing this report, is an
excellent example of management support for lateral communications.
Management Advisory Group
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 SS.~ QQNNI~
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
SUBJECT Dissemination of Information
1. As MAG made clear in. an earlier memorandum on the
Allegations and Answers series, we believe that continued
experimentation in internal communications is worthwhile.
In general, MAG believes that the various efforts to pass
information down from the top are worthwhile and have been
well-received, particularly by offices and staffs somewhat
isolated from the mainstream. There is an articulate minor-
ity, however, which views many of the notices and bulletin;
with a degree of skepticism and sees them as vehicles to
propagate an Agency "line." This adverse reaction by some
of our professionals, coupled with a certain uneasiness on
our part about some of the recent releases, prompted NAG to
re-examine the whole issue. We recognize that any single
information vehicle, no matter how carefully designed, would
probably be criticized by some. Nonetheless, NN..AG feels that
a compromise can be achieved which could make such communi-
cations acceptable and useful to a larger number in the
Agency.
2. Toward this end, MAG recommends:
A. That all information efforts (employee bulletins,
notices, "Allegations and Answers," and the like) which con-
tain factual information on controversial issues (drugs,
assassinations, ITT and Chile, the Marchetti case and so forth)
should be issued from one central point regardless of which
office originates and drafts them. The same format, whether
a notice or bulletin or whatever, should be used in all cases.
B. That one central coordinating point should be
established (preferably the Office of the Executive Director/
Comptroller) where all drafts are examined and reviewed before
publication. The Executive Director should sign off on all
notices to give a sense of continuity.
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Ci
C. That a statement of purpose should in every case
be included under the title. The statement would make clear
whether the information was intended for internal use only,
for selective use outside the Agency, or for any other purpose.
D. That the information should be presented in as
straightforward a fashion as possible (somewhat like the CIB).
The notices should contain as much background and current
factual material as security considerations permit and, when
possible, should delve more deeply into a subject. Of the
notices issued thus far, the ones on the Marchetti case best
met the above criteria. If only superficial and ambiguous'
treatment can be given a topic, then it. should not be issued.
3. MAG again offers its services, if time permits, to
serve as a sounding board for further issuances prior to
distribution.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
SUBJECT Revised Headquarters' Notice on MAG
The Management Advisory Group
1. In June 1969, the Director established the Manage-
ment Advisory Group (MAG) to provide an additional vehicle
for advice and assistance to upper Agency Management. MAG
reports to the Director via the Executive Director. This
vertical communication on Agency-wide issues is outside of
formal channels but in no way replaces command and staff
assistance available to the Director.
2. MAG has no formal production responsibilities.
Its primary purpose is to identify and make recommendations
about issues and problems arising out of the Agency's organi-
zation and practices. Although the large majority of the MAG
effort relates to self-generated topics, the group does con-
sider topics of current interest to management. In addition,
MAG welcomes and has acted on suggestions from individuals.
Some of the matters addressed by MAG have included personnel
policies (fitness reports, promotion rates, and retirement
procedures), management training for supervisors, the need
for better communications between management and all employees
(e.g., the State of the Agency Message), minority employment,
and the duplication of some functions. between directorates.
3. MAG is composed of fourteen officers who serve a
one-year tour. There are three members selected from each
directorate and two from the DCI area. The members are chosen
from the age group 30 to 45 and from GS.grades 12 through 16.
Members have had experience in Agency-wide issues and activities
or strong interest in these areas. The group meets for one all-
day session and one or more evening sessions per month. MAG is
free to request any speaker or written material pertinent to its
work.
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4. 'MAG 'solicits the views and suggestions of Agency
employees. MAG is not the appropriate body to hear specific
personal employee grievances since there are grievance pro-
cedures already available. Rather, MAG seeks ideas which
would improve the quality of the Agency's performance by
affecting its personnel, its structure and methods of operation,
or its external relations. An employee wishing to make a sug-
gestion should send it to MAG, 7D-59, Headquarters, or contact
a MAG member from his directorate. All contributions and their
authorship will be kept confidential to the extent that the
contributor desires.
5. Anyone interested in membership on MAG or anyone
interested in contacting MAG members from his directorate can
obtain additional information from his component administra-
tive of f icers.
6. Operating officials and supervisors are urged to cir-
culate this notice among their employees.
STAT
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Executive Registry
3 7O /
1 November 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT Personnel Development Program
General
1. The Management Advisory Group views the Personnel
Development Program memorandum submitted by the Office of
Personnel as an excellent first step in a long, overdue
systematic approach to executive and personnel development.
The Program is extremely ambitious but is vitally important
to developing personnel to meet the future needs of the
Agency. The plan, for the first time, will force management
to make projections regarding headroom, will require com-
ponents to program personnel to move upward to fill vacancies,
and should ensure that the personnel have been adequately pre-
pared so that they will be ready to move into the increasingly
responsible positions.
2. This plan, or any similar plan, will undoubtedly have
many "bugs," but these will best be handled as they arise
since it is impossible to see them all now. To ensure that
they are so identified and that action is taken to correct
them, it is imperative that the Program retain considerable
flexibility for future amendment. It is even more important,
if the Program is to be more than a show piece for the Civil
Service Commission, that top level management make clear its
commitment to the Program, and that this commitment be sus-
tained over time.
Probable Effectiveness
3. Given the full support of upper level management,
there does not appear to be any reason to doubt that the
Personnel Development Program should be reasonably effective.
At a minimum, the Program has the merit of instituting a sys-
tematic process through which promising officers can be.identi-
fied and, hopefully, better prepared for their prospective up-
ward movement within the Agency. The major advantage of this
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approach is. the establishment of procedures to replace what
is now largely an ad hoc process. In short, the Program
forces present management to consider more formally the very
important question of an individual's -- and by extension,
the Agency's -- future development..
4. The effectiveness of the Program will be enhanced by
the development of a mechanism of impartial review and evalu-
ation of personnel designed to reduce the effect of person-
alities on the advancement ladder. A panel system, such as
the Clandestine Services', should ensure that personnel are
selected because of merit and potential rather than by being
a member of an "old boys' club." Each component or office
will, of course, have to develop its own method of selection
but efforts must be made to ensure that the cry of "cronyism"
cannot be attached to the process.
5. While the overall reaction to the Program is favorable,
it may have certain built-in problems, some of them stemming
from the early identification of "comers." The danger of
"elitism" exists along with its potential effect on overall
Agency morale. The existence of such "comer" rosters could
not be kept secret and there could be the problem of how those
not on the list.reacted. Favoritism and arbitrariness are
.charges that could arise due to the Program. This possible
drawback should be attenuated, but perhaps not removed, by the
issuance of explanations about the Program and its purpose as
required by the memorandum.
6. A related problem might be described as the "self-
fulfilling prophecy dilemma." That is, once management has
gone on record as tapping an individual as a "comer," there
could arise a tendency to push that person along regardless
of his or her actual performance. Otherwise, it might re-
flect "badly" on someone's initial choice. There is no iron-
clad way around this potential problem except to be aware
that it exists. Some sort of continuing review will aid in
keeping excesses of this type to a minimum.
Probable Acceptance
7. As is the case with any major change, it is assumed
that there will be some initial resistance to the acceptance
of such a wide ranging revision in the system of vertical move-
ment within the Agency. To be really effective, the Program
must have the strongest support possible from the highest
levels of the Agency so that there is no question. as to the
need for all to accept the Program and to work for its proper
implementation. When the Program is fully explained and its
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benefits to the individual, management, and the Agency are
made clear, the chances of the Program being completely ac-
cepted seem promising.
8. Some managers will, however, doubtless see the
Program as infringing on their individual perogative. Thus,
there might be the tendency in some quarters to make a "best
effort" approach without any real commitment to the purpose
of the Program. This can only be avoided by continuing pres-
sure by top management to see that the Program is implemented
in good faith. Flexibility within the Program should also
serve to enhance its acceptability. Lower level acceptance
of the Program would rest largely on how it is presented and
implemented. The nature and purpose should be made clear to
lower level officers. Otherwise, misapprehension and sus-
picion will tend to surface.
Reasonableness of the Effort
9. The effort which will be required to organize and
manage such a Program would appear, on the surface, to be
monumental. In practice, however, throughout the components
there are various official or ad hoc mechanisms in existence
which serve to select "comers" and or plan for personnel de-
velopment. Many of these systems probably can be converted
for use in the Program. A great deal of work will be required
initially but once the Program is in-operation, its maintenance
should be easily manageable. Although the Program creates more
bureaucratic paper work, career development and the identifica-
tion and training of promising individuals are the life blood
of the Agency's future. To make these tasks more systematic
and coherent is worth additional effort. It is ironic that
this effort comes so late in the Agency's development.
Individual Comments
10. While the Program is described as one for personnel
development, the memorandum appears to be devoted almost en-
tirely to executive development. It is unclear whether the
many Agency employees who do not possess executive potential
but are excellent officers who need to develop other strengths
will be included in the Program. Their career development re-
quires augmentation by specialized training or assignments to
better prepare them to perform their important but non-
managerial tasks. Additionally, the. proposed Program does not
take into account employees until they have reached the GS-11
level. For many employees, this is too far along in their
career to be very effective. .
11. Personnel planning.of the magnitude suggested by the.
Program requires much tighter controls over retirement. During
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the Youth Survey last spring, many young professionals argued
that supervisors were not giving more responsibility or en-
couragement to "comers" because this might hasten their own
retirement. "Prolong one's career by becoming indispensable!"
The suggestion was made that a.stricter age/service retirement
program might encourage officers to train comers as their
"proteges."
12. In some people's minds, the two-headed retirement pro-
gram of the Agency hampers personnel planning. Declining over-
seas slots impedes those shooting for the more attractive Agency
plan in preparing for their own retirement. At the same time,
sympathetic managers may opt for the man needing one more tour
over the man with superior skills in filling overseas slots.
Thus again the "comer" is thwarted.
13. Accurate or not, many young professionals speak of
"crony' from A v y.bright
young back-
ground has stated that he was very much impressed with those at
his level, but equally distressed with the substantive knowledge
and managerial skills of those above him. He blamed this on
what he perceived as an "old boys' club" atmosphere allowing
division chiefs to bring in outsiders to senior management slots
regardless of their qualifications.
14. The proposed Program appears to be really two ambitious
programs in one: an executive development program and an execu-
tive replacement program. The distinction between these two is
that an executive development program would be for CIA employees,
whereas an executive replacement program should be of wider
scope. An "Executive Candidates Roster" should include non-
Agency and non-Government personnel. Not only is this desirable
to prevent inbreeding, but it is representative of the current
status in DD/S&T where the Deputy Director and the majority of
the office directors had substantial careers prior to Agency
employment.
15. The Program appears to reflect a 9-1 approach that
would be improved with provision for more input from the indi-
viduals who comprise the rosters, at whatever grade level. A
modification to PMMP Forms 2, 4, and 5 that would include an-
employee's plan for himself, such as a rotational assignment.
outside his immediate parent organization, a sabbatical year,
specific courses, etc., would ameliorate this problem. Lacking
this, there may be too strong a tendency for managers to
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 perpetuate their'own 'images --- and to impose their own preju-
dices -- in a manner that will in the long run tend to defeat
the admirable goals of the whole Program.
Management Advisory Group
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
SUBJECT Improving the Role of Training
in Personnel Management
I. MAG believes that training is a key tool in preparing
Agency personnel both for their immediate responsibilities and
for their long-term career goals. At the present time, we
think that management is not effectively utilizing that tool.
Without a basic and continuing commitment to training on the
part of management, the Agency's training programs-will inevit-
ably fall short of their objectives. We question whether there
is such a commitment amongst management within the Agency today.
Our concern stems from a belief that the Agency is specifically
remiss in the following:
A. fully utilizing programs available through
Agency and other U.S. Government facilities
B. encouraging a continuing dialogue between
components and the Office of Training to facilitate
the development of new courses or the refinement of
current. programs
C. developing plans and allocating resources for
training as an integral part of personnel management
and career development
D. exploring new training requirements in opera-
tional, analytical and managerial areas evolving from
changing Agency missions and the impact of "the
computer and systems revolution." The latter has
created urgent needs for broader understanding of the
applications of systems analysis and evaluation,
program review, opportunities for multidiscipline
team applications, and so forth.
MAG therefore recommends fundamental changes in the
concept of "training officer," management's role at all levels,
and the role of the office of Training (OTR).
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II. The Role of the Training Officer
The training officer (TO), who must be aware both of
operational needs and training programs available, is the con-
tinuing link between the various components and OTR. Frequently,
however, a component personnel or support officer has "trair_ing"
added to his other responsibilities and thus has little time to
devote to the immediate and developmental needs of component
personnel. A survey of component training officers in 1968 pro-
duced the following profile (based on a questionnaire sent to 47
TOs, with 44 responding):
The average TO is a male GS-13 with over ten years
Agency service, and is in his forties. He spends 25% or less
of his time in training duties. Grades ranged from GS-08 to
GS-15 (currently there is one GS-07 TO). Time on board extended
from only eight months to over twenty years. The. duration of
their TO "training" is an annual one-day briefing given by OTR.
A. The directorate (senior) training officer should
be an OTR careerist -- a practice followed is the past.
He should be slotted in an administrative staff position
and directly involved in personnel management and career
development planning. He should meet regularly with all
training officers in his directorate. He should take the
TO training course outlined in D.
B. Component TOs should also be slotted at the ad-
ministrative staff level, including those who have the
TO designation as a collateral responsibility. From
that vantage point, the TOs could survey the immediate
and developmental needs of the component generally and
could effectively contribute to plans for relating
training to personnel management and developmental
planning procedures. In recognition of the fact that
most non-routine training requests arise at the employee
and first-line supervisory levels, the TOs should be in
a. position to know both the advantages to be gained and
the exigencies of policy and funding governing subse-
quent action.
C. TOs should be encouraged actively to fulfill
their training role, even when this is a collateral one.
Similarly, management should ensure that they have suf-
ficient time to so act. In some cases, an OTR careerist
should be assigned to component TO slots._. All TOs --
senior and component -- should be required to take the
training program outlined below.
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D. The training program, to be developed by OTR,
should include orientation to:
1. OTR organization and courses
3. OTR resources for providing factual and
evaluative data on non-Agency courses
4. OTR resources for lecture and course
development and review, instructor training, OTR
support for component training, and so forth
5. principles of course development and
evaluation
6. development of component training policies
E. Regular meetings -- at least quarterly -- should
be held by supervisors and component TOs in each directorate
with appropriate OTR personnel.
III. Management Role
Management has been inconsistent and ambivalent in its
attitude towards training as an integral part of developing ef-
fective officers. A case in point is the Intelligence and World
Affairs course, required for all new professionals within their
first eighteen months in the Agency. Despite this statutory
requirement, only about 500 of Agency professionals are ever
enrolled, and many take the course after several years on board.
Budgetary restrictions have prevented professionals from re-
ceiving needed and valuable external training -- restrictions
that more effective planning may have averted. Imaginative
training policies have been developed by CRS and OL and should
be explored in terms of broader applicability.
A. Mandatory component training policies should be
established. These policies should include: realistic
assessments of the kinds of training recommended and
courses available for all personnel as they progress
upward; consideration of rotational assignments.and
academic sabbaticals; TDY familiarization.trips where
applicable; budgetary considerations. The policies
should be coordinated with the senior TO and.OTR., They
must be flexible, and should be reviewed annually by the
component supervisors and TOs. The results of this re-
view, particularly recommendations for further action,
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should be'forwarded to the appropriate Deputy Director
and the DTR.
B. Implementation of the recommendations on selection,
utilization, and training of TOs.
C. Supervisors, in conjunction with component TOs,
should be specifically charged with disseminating informa-
tion on training opportunities on a regular basis.
The ability of OTR to respond to Agency needs depends
upon effective communications between that office and users.
This brings us full-circle -- back to the training officer.
The newly-instituted Board of Visitors hopefully will serve as
a bridge, critically assessing component needs and OTR's capa-
bilities. But the Board cannot replace the working-level con-
tacts between components and the appropriate elements of OTR
for developing critical inputs into improving the role of
training in personnel management and, indeed, overall Agency
effectiveness.
A. develop the TO training course outline
B. expand the present capacity for course and
curriculum development and evaluation. OTR can play
a greater role in improving component training, in-
cluding support for the development of courses in col-
laboration with outside contractors.
C. expand the dialogue with component chiefs and
TOs to keep abreast of changing Agency training needs.
Component training policies should surface new needs,
and OTR must be flexible and innovative in responding.
One recent positive example was OTR's role in designing
the one-day seminar on "New Directions in CIA's Support
STATINTL of U.S. International Economic Policy."
D. use of regulatory power and I sponsibility con-
tained in which give OTR
the right to sign off on Agency training expenditures.
Resort to these powers should encourage components to under-
take careful study of training as it relates to immediate
and long-range needs for personnel management and career
development. The DTR's position as Chairman of the Training
Selection Board, responsible directly to the Executive
Director/Comptroller, enables him to encourage utilization
of senior-level external training opportunities as part of
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an overall development plan rather than as a temporary
and convenient means of disposing of unwanted senior
officers.
E. maximum exploitation of OTR's control of the
Information Sciences Center to educate appropriate ele-
ments of the Agency in the diverse applications of infor-
mation science and computer technology.
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