MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FROM JOHN F. BLAKE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84-00780R006100150023-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
38
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 25, 2006
Sequence Number:
23
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 25, 1974
Content Type:
MF
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CIA-RDP84-00780R006100150023-6.pdf | 1.42 MB |
Body:
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27
DD/MS 74-2783
MEMORA4NI 1 FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
I(1 74
Attached is a transcript of the question
and answer period of your appearance before the stm'ner
employees on 18 July 1974. I was so Impressed with the
quality of the questions from this group of young people
that I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of the
transcript to the other Deputy Directors.
John F. Blake
Associate Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
Att
Original of Transcript
ADD/M&S:JFB/ms (25 July 74)
Distribution:
Orig - Adse, w/Orig Att
1 - DDI, w/o Att
1 - ER, w/o Att
1 - DD/M&S Chrono
1 - DD/M&S Subject, w/cy of Att
1 - JFB Chrono
1r:v O/ 'F Pages 2, 3
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LD:!I11TISTj.,:ATIV."'+, *':XTa`f"vh?J r 'r C^ Y
DD/M&S 74-2783
Myl1 OR4NThJM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Ed:
1. The Director addressed the "summer only employees" in
the auditorium on 18 July 1974, following which there was a
question and answer period. Arrangements were made to record
the event.
2. I have just looked at the transcript of the question
and answer period and an impressed with the awareness of this
group of young people based on the questions put forth.. The
thought crosses my mind that you might be interested in the
types of questions asked of the Director.
John r Blake
Associate Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
Att
Copy of Transcript
ADD/M&S:JFB/ms (25 July 74)
Distribution:
Orig Ej 1 - Adse, w/Att
1 - DD/M$S Chrono
1 - DD/MEjS Subject', w/cy of Att
1 - JFB Chrono
nn~nnr~nr
Annrnvarl Pnr Pala- cn Qtut ICO/Q1 C'IA Qnn0 A
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MmKOR FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
D/M S 74-2783
Bill:
1. The Director addressed the "summer only employees" in
the auditorium on 18 July 1974, following which there was a
question and answer period. Arrangements were made to record
the event.
2. I have just looked at the transcript of the question
and answer period and am impressed with the awareness of this
group of young people based on the questions put forth. The
thought crosses my mind that you might be interested in the
types of questions asked of the Director.
John F. Blake
Associate Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
Att
Copy of Transcript
ADD/M$S:JFB/ms (25 July 74)
Distribution:
Orig E 1 - Adse, w/Att
1 - DD/M$S Chrono
1 - DD/M&S Subject, w/cy of Att
1 - JFB Chrono
'nn74nonn
Annrnvarl For RAIAaSP 9nnn/nPt,~ti ' ("I Dr1Di2A
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DD/M$S 74-2783
M 4OR! FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
:1. The Director addressed the "summer only employees" in
the auditorium on 18 July 1974, following which there was a
question and answer period. Arrangements were made to record
the event.
2. 1 have just looked at the transcript of the question
and answer period and am impressed with the awareness of this
group of young people based on the questions put forth. The
thought crosses my mind that you might be interested in the
types of questions asked of the Director.
John F. Blake
Associate Deputy Director
for
Management and Services
Att
Copy of Transcript
ADD/M&S:JFB/ms (25 July 74)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Adse, w/Att
1 - DD/M&S Chrono
1 - DD/M&S Subject, w/cy of Att-~
1 - JFB Chrono
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18 July 19 74
DCI Speech to Summer Employees
Questions and Answers Session
DCI: Can we have some questions? And these things are just
designed to pick up your words, not to penetrate you with a ray or anything.
[Laughter.
Yes?
Q: I guess you're familiar with Ambassador Martin's policy of
answering Congressional queries and things like that on what he's doing
out in Vietnam. Now I know that your personal policy with Congress (on)
answering their inquiries is one of, you know, total candor and -- But
what I was wondering is that if they allow Ambassador Martin to stay in
the position that he is, you know, and when he replies to Congress, or at
least advises his people at home to reply to Congress, you know, without
being totally candid, then don't you believe that the Central Intelligence
Agency, if they did not have a Director that was as candid as you are with
Congress, would be in sore need of more oversight by Congress? If they
had someone like Martin, let's say.
DCI: Well I think Ambassador Martin's -- The quotation that
we're familiar with was his comment in a cable which managed to leak out
of the State Department which said that his people should not - that the State
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Department should not give an honest answer to Senator Kennedy, I. believe
it was. That's an unfortunate phrase in a long cable. And what he was
basically saying in that cable was that the State Department should give a
short answer to Senator Kennedy's questions because he, Ambassador Martin,
at the time felt that any long and complex answer would be twisted in some
way by the Congressional staff involved.
I think the larger question of how to deal with Congress is
one that has been worked out here in the Agency a long time ago. Essentially
it runs on three levels. With respect to some things we have to be public
in our answer -- we have to give answers which are made available to the
public. There are some things, for instance, where the United States makes
decisions in public that other nations make in private. And if you're going
to contribute to an American decision you have to, in some fashion, make
your information public.
Now, we've done that. We've collected very delicate intelli-
gence about a new generation of Soviet missiles. You've all read this
information in the newspapers. It came from very sensitive sources
originally, but we separated off the sources from the information itself
because it's of great importance to our people that they understand the
problems that are facing them abroad; otherwise, they will not take the
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action necessary in forms of votes in the Congress and appropriations
to defend ourselves against these things. So these matters were made
available in public.
I think tomorrow they're releasing some testimony that I
gave down before Senator Proxmire on the economies of the Soviet Union
and of China. These were brought together here -- they were put together
with very complicated information, added together. I gave the testimony
privately but the material is going to be published in the next day or two.
It's going to have a couple of deletions -- I don't think there were any
expletives, but there are going to be a couple of deletion and (of matter)
that has to be secure but the basic information has to be made public.
(And) the second level of the Agency's relationship with
Congress is to give the Congress our classified information about the rest
of the world -- what do we think is going on in Cyprus, what do we think
is going on in the Soviet Union, and so forth. Now, these are given in
executive session; they're handled as classified matters. We send our
daily publication up to the Hill to a couple of our Committees -- they're
made available to Senators and Congressmen up there.
The third level of information is information about our
activities, about our operations, and we have a very small number of -
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Senators and Congressmen chosen by the Congress, not by us -- they didn't
get any clearances; they got their clearance when they were elected and
appointed -- and there are no secrets from those few Senators and Congress-
men. They can know the name of the agent; they can know how much we're
spending, how much we're spending on this program; they can know the
details of some operation some place, because it's important that they have
an awareness of what the Agency is doing in order to fulfill their responsibility
to exert an oversight, an overview, of what we're doing and to tap us on the
shoulder if they think we're doing wrong.
Now those three levels of reporting have been worked out
years ago. We're just trying to do it. I don't think it really fits - runs
across Ambassador Martin's concept, because I think that our line has
been to be responsive to our small Committees, to be responsive about
substantive intelligence to the rest of the Congress and to take our chances
of its being abused and to be public only where we really have to be
because we get into political problems and difficulties when we do. But
I think that the Agency does have to be responsive to Congress and it has
to be responsive to the people. I think when the taxpayers put the kind of
money they do into intelligence they do it so that they can help the Americans
make decisions about their future. And the decisions are not just made by
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the President and the National Security Council; they're made by the Congress
as well and they're made by the people. So we have to give the results of our
Intelligence to all three of those customers, in a sense, and we only have to
adjust the way we do it in order to protect the sources and methods that are
involved.
Yes?
Q: Were you aware of the affairs that were taking place on Cyprus
before it occured, and did the United States Government know what was going
to happen?
DCI: Were we aware of the events on Cyprus before they happened
and did the Government know what was going to happen? We knew that there
had been some problems in Cyprus that were building up to some kind of a
serious problem. Archbishop Makarios had been trying to get the - had
raised the subject of withdrawing the Greek officers from the Cypriot National
Guard units there -- and there were about 600-odd officers there that he
wanted to reduce down to 100. The Greeks didn't like it. We knew they
didn't like it. They were resisting it. I don't -- We are not part of the
plot or anything like that, and I think we found out that Mr. Samson, which
is hardly an old Greek name, but anyway, Mr. Samson became President
when it was announced publicly. So we knew -- And this frequently
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happens with coups around the world, that you can identify the political
forces working which are obviously leading to some kind of problem. You
may not know of the particular plot, because there's an old principle that
the coup that's known about doesn't happen because somebody goes in and
stops it from happening.
Q: Did your intelligence tell you that the Greeks were directly
involved and that they - that the Greeks (defected), it wasn't just an internal
problem --
DCI: We are quite well informed of the degree of Greek involve-
ment. [Laughter. ]
Yes?
Q: You say that the public has a right to know about things that
happen in the Agency - -
DCI: Not in. They have a right to know the results of the Agency's
activities.
Q: Well, I'm just curious. It seems in the past that the things
that the people learn about the Agency have all (been), I don't know, kind of
in a bad light in the press -- (the) recent book that has come out; there's
been a movie just made that more or less spoofs the Agency. [Laughter. ]
And I was just wondering whether the Agency is doing anything to -- well, I
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know they are -- to improve its image, (but) whether they could use possibly
something like TV to have an informative show or (maybe a) -- [Laughter. ]
(Anyway, to) really improve and let people know what actually is going on
(here).
DCI: Well, that's a very good question. It's quite a dilemma, quite
frankly, as to how to handle this problem because if we run a very successful
operation some place and get some very important intelligence out of it, we
may be able to let the intelligence be known without identifying the source,
and we do that. But if it's a success we certainly will try to keep a secret
the fact how we got that information.
Unfortunately, sometimes we mess up, you know, sometime s
we make mistakes and get in troubles abroad and those come to light,
publicly. So the impression one gets by reading the paper is that.it's just
a series of disasters. And you know and I know that there's a lot of success
hidden underneath there but you don't hear much about that. President
Kennedy and some of the other Presidents have mentioned this about the
Agency.
As for a public image, I think the public relations position
we've taken I think is valid, which is that we will respond to public
inquiries to the extent we possibly can but that we're not going to conduct
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an active, agressive public relations program. And the reason for that is
that I think we can respond. I give a certain number of speeches. We have
people come here to the Agency all the time. We have high school students,
we have college groups, we have people come here from a variety of places
and they get a general idea of what the Agency's about. They don't learn
about our specific operations, but it does, hopefully, reassure them as to
what the Agency's really doing and what kind of a place it is. But I don't
think that we need the CIA (in) peace and war on Sunday night TV because
I think people would get cynical about us in a hurry and think we were trying
to conduct some flimflam operation on them. And maybe we get too much
free publicity out of the various James Bond shows and so forth. But I think
the best way is if we do our work well, if we do make the results of our work
available to the people, to the press, to the extent possible, to the Congress,
then that's about as much public relations as we really need in that sense.
And gradually an appreciation of the importance of the Agency will come about.
In a funny way Dr. Ellsberg helped us by leaking the Pentagon
Papers, which pointed out that the Agency was very seriously trying to come
out to an accurate assessment of what was going on in Southeast Asia and
that it wasn't the same assessment that was held by some. of the other parts
of the Government. And the fact is, we were intellectually honest in trying
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to answer the question in a straightforward way, and I think people,
particularly the academic community has this view of the Agency and
particularly its analysis function in this regard. I think the thing that a
lot of people are upset about the Agency was in our action programs,
our paramilitary action, political action abroad. The fact is that that
work we do where the National Security Council tells us, and we don't
do it on our own. I think this is pretty generally understood at this time.
Unfortunately, the things that seemed both necessary and desirable
during the 1950s and 1960s do not seem necessary or desirable in the
1970s. And as a result, in the 1970s we're not doing them but we're
getting an awful lot of publicity about what we did do in the 1950s and
1960s, and we get a little trouble out of that one.
Yes?
Q: How and why did the CIA become tied in with the Watergate?
DCI: How what?
Q: How and why did the CIA become tied in, you know. .....
[Laughter. ]
DCI: Both how and why. Why? Because we got a specific request
from a White House official to help in two regards. One,'we got a specific
request from Mr. Ehrlichman to give Mr. Howard Hunt some help in some
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activities that he was going to do. We gave him the wig -- it was not a red
wig and our technical people insist that it darn well was not ill-fitting; it was
well-fitted [Laughter] -- and we gave him a couple of other gadgets. He then
asked us for some more help. He asked us for a secretary; he asked us for -
to run a letter box for him a telephone answering service. And it was our
people at the working level who said: "This doesn't sound like our business;
that doesn't sound like the thing CIA ought to be in" -- and they're the ones
who raised the question up the line. And we cut off the relationship in that
regard at the end of August 1971.
The second request made was to write a psychological profile
of Dr. Ellsberg. We do this sort of thing and, frankly, do it very well
on some foreign leaders. We don't normally do it on Americans, and we
ain't going to do no more. [Laughter. ] But at that time a White House
official asked us to do it. The people who did it felt a little uncomfortable
about doing it. They provided the results to the White House. And that's
the why of it.
Those were the two ways in which CIA was actually involved
in Watergate. There were a couple of other efforts made to get us to do
things. There was an effort made to get us to pay the bail for Mr. Hunt.
There were some other efforts to get us to hold up investigations, but CIA
said no to those.
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Does that mean that CIA followed Mr. Ehrlichman's request
without finding out what Mr. Hunt wanted?
DCI: Well, Mr. Ehrlichman said, "Would you give him some help? "
Mr. Hunt came out to the building and said: "Here's what I'd like. I'd like
enough just so I can get in to interview somebody and get out without his
knowing who I am. Can I have the wig and can I have a couple of things
like that? " But then after that he came back and asked for a little more -- a
camera and things like that. And then, you know, gradually we sort of felt
it was getting a little much and we said no.
Yes?
Q: How big is the Agency's budget? [Laughter.]
DCI: Since I won't tell that to most Congressmen, I've taken the
position I can't tell it to most of our employees. The reason I won't tell
it is that I've said it's up to Congress whether we should publish this; that
I can't say that it would be any great enormous disaster if the figure came
out, but I can say that if you then follow it over several years you can develop
(the) trend lines, that you will inevitably get into an argument about why did
it go up, what is it made of, how much do you spend on this kind of thing,
how much do you spend on that kind of thing, and you will very shortly be
in the business of exposing a lot of material which there is no good reason
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to expose. The Congressmen on the Appropriation Committee, on our
Committees of the Appropriations - Subcommittees of the Appropriation
Committee know in great detail what these budgets are -- and, as I say,
there are no secrets from them -- but I don't think they can go beyond
that.
Yes?
Q: I was wondering if you personally knew whether - or how
you felt about whether President Nixon is really afraid of the power of the
CIA? [Laughter. ]
DCI: I don't think there's much to that story. That's Mr. Col.son's
story and I confess I have not quite understood Mr. Colson's series of
allegations. He apparently made them, or somebody made them, to Senator
Baker. Senator Baker felt he had to investigate them. We had, as you've
seen - perhaps seen, an exchange of letters with Senator Baker on the
subject in which we certainly tried to respond to every legitimate kind of a
question that he was interested in about these things. There was no shadow
of proof of any involvement along that line or anything of that nature, and I
just find it very difficult to understand what those allegations are all about.
Q: Do you think he's just trying to get the President off the hook
by blaming this on the CIA?
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DCI: I have no idea what he's doing.
Yes?
Q: Was CIA's refusal to help Ehrlichman in this Watergate
burglary, was this the main reason or a significant reason for removal
of Mr. Helms?
DCI: I don't think so, no. I think Mr. Helms was more or less
planning to leave about that time anyway. I don't - - You know, obviously
it says on the commission over my desk that I serve at the pleasure of the
President for the time being, so --
Q: I've seen the inscription on your main wall as you walk in the
door, and that doesn't sound too appropriate either.
DCI: Which one?
Q: The one right here on your main entrance. It says something
about "you shall know the truth and it shall set you free. "
DCI: We have to find the truth. We have to find the truth, that's
the whole idea of the intelligence business, is to try to find it.
Yes?
Q: ..... to continue. When Ehrlichman came here asking for
that thing, was it assumed or did he say who and why hp wanted them?
I mean (that would be) the second or third time he came back.
- _4 Qf 806' 00150023-6
DCI: Well, Ehrlichman only came once. Ehrlichman only mentioned
it once. And he asked if we could help Hunt. Hunt came back. two or three
times. He explained that he was interested in doing some investigations work,
and then it began to look as though we were going to get involved in the
investigations work and so we said no.
Q: He never said, you know --
DCI: He never said what he was going to do, no.
Q: ..... Mr. Ehrlichman (and it) was in the position to get such
things?
DCI: Mr. Ehrlichman asked us to help Mr. Hunt, and we did. We
shouldn't have but we did. I mean both Mr. Schlesinger and I have said it
was a mistake, which it was, but -- And we aren't going to do it again,
that's for sure. But the fact is, we did it.
Yes?
Q: I understand that CIA and IT&T helped wreck Chile's economy.
How did that happen?
DCI: The question: I understand that CIA and the ITT helped wreck
Chile's economy. The answer was that President Allende largely wrecked
Chile's economy. [Laughter. ] President Allende was a`Marxist, a very
strong believer, and he insisted on a variety of actions down there, which
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1 51 1 --US-e-
had disastrous economic effects. CIA was hoping to see a new president
but in 1976 in the elections. We had nothing to do with the coup or the
truckers' strike that led to the military coup there. As I say, we would
have been glad to see a new president but through the election process.
Yes?
In your talk you mentioned information (that) .... in the next
10 to 20 years. Would you elaborate on that?
DCI: It's right here today. In terms. of the volume of words that
come in, the volume of press coverage, the kinds of information we get
from all over the world, from some of our technical coverage, some of
our technical machinery that collects things that is just incredible in its
volume nowadays and it's going no where but up, and very rapidly.
Yes?
Q: Do you consider Marchetti's new book to be a defeat for the
Agency, and how does that affect the constitionality of the Secrecy
Agreement?
DCI: Do you consider it a what to the Agency?
Q: A defeat for the Agency.
DCI: We obviously didn't win them all. Well, it's a defeat in the
sense that he left obviously very bitter about the Agency. And, you know,
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whether we might have handled him a little better and not had him so hostile,
I don't know -- it's hard to say. It's easy to say afterwards we should have,
but it's hard to tell at the time.
I think that his book - most of his book we had no problem with.
And there have been a lot of people who have written critical books about CIA
that we've cleared or that we've asked them to change a few names or a few
details just so they won't highlight some of our operations or activities. We
tried to negotiate with Mr. Marchetti in this regard and he refused to
negotiate in any way. For instance we would ask him: "Look, don't say that
the man did this particular job in Tanzania, just say East Africa, and then go
ahead and say all the rest of it, that it was a terrible thing to do and all the
rest -- that's no problem. But don't pinpoint it to that one country. " That's
hypothetical but it's that kind of a thing. And he refused to do it.
The trial court said that the Secrecy Agreement is constitutional
and the enforcement of it through a civil injunction is constitutional. Our
difference lies in a number of the items in the book that the judge said we
did not prove were classified, largely because we didn't have a piece of paper
here that said it was classified. Well, the various kinds of relationships
we have with agents and people of that nature around the world we normally
sort of - we stamp it Secret, we keep it secret, but we don't have a little
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statement that says that the relationship with a spy is - quote - "classified" -
unquote. And unfortunately, the judge rather expected us to have that kind
of a piece of paper. We're appealing, saying that that's kind of an unreason-
able position on his part to take and that we did prove that the matters all
were classified. But that's what the appeal's all about.
Yes?
Q: How long do you predict Madame Peron will stay in office?
DCI: How long - Madame Peron? Not too long. Our estimate is
that this is a transitional situation.
Yes?
Q: Were you surprised when President Nixon offered the nuclear
assistance to Egypt and Israel?
DCI: Not particularly. We don't always get in on that kind of an
offer, because it's a policy decision. The pros and cons of it are pretty
clear. We have given a lot of reporting to the White House on various kinds
of things and the relationships and the ambitions and where the Egyptians
and the Israelis stand today on their technology and all that sort of thing.
But what they decided to do from day to day is a policy decision, not an
assessment problem. It's our job to give the assessment and their job to
decide what to do. And in that one, I don't know whether somebody knew
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that they were thinking about it or not. I mean I didn't particularly, but
there are a lot of things around here I don't know about. If they don't,
you know, raise any particular problem, they go on very efficiently without
me -- sometimes I'm tempted to think more efficiently.
Yes?
Q: Do you. think there's a problem of overclassification of
material in the Agency?
DCI: Sure. Yes. The question was, is there a problem of over-
classification of material? Yes. I don't know how to solve it. We exhort
people and we try to do things but it's terribly tempting for everybody just
to stamp the thing Secret. At one point I said that there wasn't a secretary
in the building that had a Confidential stamp in her drawer, just had a Secret.
But I think they have Confidential ones now. And we have been pushing hard
on this use of the Administrative - Internal Use Only -- things that, I
guarantee you, five years ago were Secret. But the basic answer is, yes,
there is too much classification.
Yes?
Q: This is a rather minor question, I'm sure. But I was
wondering if you were aware of the sexual discrimination in the summer
.employment and where placement of people -- [Laughter and applause. ]
I've been told that --
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DCI: The question is, are you aware of sexual discrimination in
the placement of summer employees?
Q: I've been told that some girls have requested placement in
the Security Division to go around and change locks, and the department
itself has requested girls, and they've always been turned down. And
I've talked to some of the males that do go around and change the locks,
and I asked them, "Is there anything a girl can do? " and they said no.
And they said, "What are you doing? " I said, "I have a (cushy) job of
looking through files." And I was wondering if you were aware of this
discrimination --
DCI: I don't know about it but I'll look into it. [Laughter. Applause.
Yes?
Q: Does the Agency provide technical assistance to the FBI?
DCI: Yes, sometimes. There is some new legislation on that matter
that we have to be very careful on. There is a law that we will not give any
technical assistance to any police or law enforcement other than the FBI.
We can give it to the FBI. We are not allowed to give any to the law enforce-
ment assistance administration, and there are a couple of tricks on - You
know, there are some changes in the law that are involved. But we do not
ourselves participate in any domestic activity of the FBI's. If we develop a
T
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new widget, it may be that the FBI would like to have the widget. They
can go buy the widget from some place, they can benefit from our expertise
in developing it but we won't have anybody along, we won't be doing it on a
domestic activity.
Yes?
Q: Is it part of my need-to-know and your availability to mention
or comment about the resignation or, rather, (some) resignation of the
former Director of Security, Mr. Osborn?
DCI: Well, Mr. Osborn was going to retire at the end of June.
to
We had a problem of -- which turned out/be a nonproblem, quite frankly --
and we - he decided to advance his retirement. He did advance it. Since
that time I have awarded him a Distinguished Intelligence Medal, which he
richly deserved for his performance in the Agency over the years. And
concerned.
(to the FBI)?
DCI:
like that.
He retired under no bad odor whatsoever, as far as I'm
..... what the papers claimed (were) falsified documents
No, he wasn't involved in falsification of documents or anything
How much cooperation is there between the FBI and the CIA?
DCI: Quite a lot. You know, obviously we have two different worlds
to work on - - I mean, we work abroad and they work here. But I've talked
on a number of occasions to Mr. Kelley and we have a. going: relationship..
If we get information abroad about some problem of internal security or
counterintelligence in America, we will pass it to the FBI. We won't go
out and follow up the case here in America -- we'll just pass it to the FBI.
If they get something involving some foreigner that's active and going back
to some place or other, they'll let us know. We don't normally do much
about Americans abroad but in some cases we have a relationship with the
local intelligence service or security service in another country and the
FBI may ask us to pass a word to that service for them, and we do it.
There's a certain amount of collaboration but they're very serious about
the legal restraints on their role, and we are too -- we're not going to get
involved in their business. It's two different agencies having different
responsibilities but working together. The FBI is a member of the United
States Intelligence Board and shows up at our meetings every week.
Yes?
Q: There was just recently an article that was.posted on the
board here in Headquarters that was out of Playboy. It was in reference
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to your career. And I believe there was an article similar to that in a
New York Times Magazine of last year sometime. I was just curious as
to what your reaction was to that and where that man might have gotten
his information.
DCI: Well, I wouldn't quite call it flattering. It's a free press
and, you know, the best reaction to that situation is "if you can't stand
the heat, stay out of the kitchen.
So, where he got his information? From a variety of public
sources, talking to people who know something about me or don't, or who
have (their) ideas about me. [Laughter.] That's where he got it. I'm not
going to follow it up.
There were posters downtown on the billboards a year or so
ago too. I don't know who put those up and I particularly told the Security
Office I didn't want them to try and find out who put them ((out)).
Q: Is it true that the average woman is a GS-7 and the average
man is a GS-10? [Laughter. ] And secondly, how many women are GS-17
or 18 and what is being done about the lack of women?
DCI: Well, that's a good question. Did you all hear it? [Laughter. ]
That the average woman is a GS-7 and the average man a GS-10, and how
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many.women are there in the senior grades and what is being done about
it. I don't know about the average grades. I wouldn't be a bit surprised
if it were something like that.
In terms of average grade of women the Agency probably is
a little better off than many other agencies. Partly because of this
intellectual challenge that we have here we have a lot of professional
women working here who do get up to the 12, 13 level. I confess they
don't get much beyond that, or not very many of them do. There is an 18;
there are at least -- I think there are about two 17 -- I've forgotten;
something like that. One 17; there are several 16's, you know. But it's
a pretty small number and it hasn't grown in the past few years.
What is being done about it is that about three months ago I
had all the middle managers here, of the Agency, here in this auditorium.
I made each office report to me, on an annual basis now, how many people
they have in each grade, and how many are women and how many are black
and how many others, and how many are - various kinds of things, a whole
variety of personnel kinds of controls. And I've said, all right, you put
your goals for next year down too, and they all did it some months ago,
their goals for the end of this year. And I think the Office of Personnel
owes me an account as to how well people did as of through last year. And
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if people didn't meet their goals or lost ground on it, I'm going to tap the
heads of those offices on the shoulder and tell them to do a little better
next time. And I caught some offices that didn't have any goals at all --
they were quite happy with where they were -- [Laughter. ] And I said
that wasn't satisfactory; they would darn well have to have some goals.
So that's what we're going to do about it. We obviously have
to do better. I don't think that this Agency is much better or much worse
than most of the rest of American society but I think many of us just woke
up here recently and realized that the women have not had a fair shake
around here for a long time and it's time they start getting one and they
better get one.
Yes?
Q: Commenting on that question over there concerning the article
in Playboy. Would you like to react to a comment on Project Phoenix or
to tell your side of the story?
DCI: Sure. Sure. The question was about Project Phoenix in
Vietnam. In Vietnam there was a very strange kind of war because the
enemy was fighting what I call a peoples' war, trying to capture the
population and pull it out from under the government so that the government
would collapse. They darn near succeeded.
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In the mid-'60 s the situation in Vietnam was very serious
indeed. The Communists held most of the country outside the towns and
some of the towns were pretty shaky indeed. There had been a certain
amount of attention to the need for the government, with American support,
to fight a peoples' war as well, to try to get the people to support the govern-
ment. But not very much was done about it for a long time, until about 1967
when Ambassador Komer went over and formed a new organizational
structure in the American Government to support a program in the Viet-
namese Government of pacification. Pacification consisted of eight programs.
The first was a program of local territorial security, what
amounts to National Guard units in different villages and hamlets.
The second was a program of self-defense, peoples' self-defense.
This amounted to handing out weapons to the people in the towns and villages
to help defend themselves. And the government had some reservations about
whether to do this in the early stages but President Thieu decided he would,
and they handed out something like a half a million guns. Now you don't give
guns away to people that you think are going to shoot you. But they did give
away half a million guns; they didn't lose very many of the guns. The people
who received the guns didn't fight very hard but at least they had something
to do and they were politically identified with the government as a result.
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A third program was organizing local elections to make the
villages work and elect their own leadership.
A fourth was a program of public information so that the people
in the villages would know what's going on a little better -- radios, posters,
things like that, teams to explain things.
A fifth program was a program of getting people to come back
to the government's side from the Communist side and be' received and
decently handled and resettled. And about 200 thousand of them did that.
A sixth program was a program of helping the refugees,
resettling them, and after awhile helping them go back to their original area,
giving them some money, some grubstake, to get started again.
A seventh program was a program of helping the local villages
with development projects -- building bridges, building school houses and letting the people in the local village decide what they wanted to do, how
they wanted to build the - how they wanted to spend the money.
And the eighth program was called Phoenix. And the Phoenix
program was an attempt to identify who the members of the Communist
apparatus were and who the members of the Communist terror groups were
who were within the population exerting pressure and control over the people
from within the population. It was a question of identifying them, of police
work to capture them.
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Now, the program did involve the business of trying to
regularize a very dirty fight that had gone on there for quite a while,
because in the mid-'60s it was a very brutal situation with a lot of people
fighting for their lives and they weren't very careful about what they did.
But the Phoenix Program tried to get some order into that. It set up,
for instance, time limits in which people could be held without trial,
which had not existed before. It set up time limits for the kinds of punish-
ment-people should get, which had not existed before. It set up standards
for what is a Communist leader, because there was no sense in going
around and bothering the people who were being terrorized -- you were
after the main people on the other side. And in the course of this they had
to count who was captured, who had rallied and come over to the govern-
ment -- and about, oh, eight or ten - eight thousand a year came over from
the leadership of the Communists in the rallying program and were received.
And even if they had committed a terrorist crime they were taken care of.
and allowed to resettle as free people on the government's side. There
were a lot of them who were captured and were held in prisons and processed,
and there were a certain number of them killed.
Most of the ones killed, since they were leaders on the Com-
munist side,were killed in various combat actions that took place. When an
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attack took place on a village at night, a ccuple of people would be killed
on each side, and in the morning you'd go out and see who the people were
and, yes, it was that committee man on the local Communist Party group;
so that would be counted as a member of the apparatus who was no longer
there and he had been killed. Now, unfortunately, the publicity of it is that
over several years about 20 thousand people were killed, the great majority
of them killed in this kind of combat action by military forces. There were
a few abuses, there's no question about it. There were more abuses earlier
in the '60s than there were later in the '60s. The Phoenix Program was to
try to make it work in a decent manner. It didn't succeed a hundred percent
but it tried to contribute to both the betterment and the need to contest the
Communist apparatus.
Yes?
Q: (Do you think) the Agency's overstaffed?
DCI: That's a very complicated question. No, I don't, basically.
I think, however, that that's something you have to look at every day. I
think that the Agency's strength -- Today we're facing a lot of new demands
that we didn't have some years ago, things like narcotics, terrorism,
economic intelligence, stuff like that. On the other hand, there's some things
that we did do years ago that we don't do much of now -- things like
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paramilitary activity, some of that stuff, that we don't do so much of.
So there's a -- It's a changing base all the time.
Yes?
Q: As summer employees, we're lucky enough to have this talk
with you but I'm going to go back to the office and talk to my father this
afternoon. They'll be amazed that I was able to get, you know, an official
answer --
DCI: They can get official answers, I assure you. I talk to people,
or the other people and the other Deputy Directors and so forth talk to
people. We talk to training courses. I talk to different offices, gather
the whole office together -- I've forgotten which ones right now, but the
Offices of Security, the Office of Technical Services, various others.
I have gathered together and talked to Office of Current Intelligence, various
others; try to go through the Agency. I also try to get down and eat in the
cafeteria once every -- well, it used to be once a week but I haven't done
very well lately. It's once every two weeks or so with about three or four
people picked up from an office, preferably younger, junior, just so I'll
know what they're thinking about and worried about.
I agree with you, you have to communicate -- that's part of
the chore. And it's something. that you absolutely must do if you're going
to run an American organization.
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It's (so) strange that the CIA seems like the only part of the
Government (is) where you can work there 20 years and say, "I don't know
what's going on!" [Laughter. ]
DCI: Well you know what's going on in general terms and you know
what's going on in your own (chore). The secrecy requirements do require
that we can't just have one great fund of knowledge that we all know about.
Even Mr. Marchetti doesn't know a few things [Laughter] and I'm glad he
didn't, because they would be in the book now.
Yes?
Q: Just to ask one more question about Marchetti. Ten years
from now if I was to work for the Agency and publish rather sensitive
material, would you - after the Marchetti affair, would you help the
publicity of my book by taking me to court? [Laughter. ] Or would you --
DCI: That's a good question.. The question was, did we help -
essentially, did we help Mr. Marchetti with publicity? I think in a way
we did, but at the same time I really didn't find anything else we could do.
Q: Will you continue to do that with other books if they do come
DCI: I'm afraid we have to. You see, the law says that I am
responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from
30
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unauthorized disclosure. Now, I've got to do something about that. The
law says I have to, and I have to do something about it. I obviously have
to do it within the law. What I do is go to court. I take such action as I
can within the law. But I have to do something.
One more.
Q: I understand there's a book being published by a former agent -
DCI: Oh God, another one! [Laughter. ]
Q: I believe his name is Agee [sp? ]
DCI: Oh, yeah.
Q: I was wondering what you're doing in an attempt to find out
what's in this book (and can't you) control what's being released?
DCI: Well, Mr. Agee is in England, unfortunately, and so there's
really not very much we can do about it. We're informed by various friends
as to sort of where he is and what he's doing, but there's not very much we
can do about it at the moment. I have some ideas for some changes in our
laws that will make things a little more serious on some of these cases, but
at the moment there's not really very much we can do about it. And I noticed
in one of the stories about Mr. Agee that he said that he was going to stay
out of this country until after his book was published because he doesn't
want the same injunctionthat Mr. Marchetti got. So outside of that, I don't
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know. I'm going to try to make ourselves in a little better position but at
the moment it's kind of tough.
Q: ..... the same way?
DCI: I'll hope to have some recommendations on that subject for
the Congress. I have talked to a series of Congressmen and Senators on
this subject. But it does take some legislative action and I'm?not sure
we'll get it.
Well, let me thank you for the chance to talk to you all today.
I hope that your summer here is a pleasant and interesting one. I hope we
may have exposed a little bit of what American intelligence is all about
these days to you. We didn't give you very many details. I don't think some
of you we gave the most stimulating intellectual chores you were ever faced
f
with [Laughter] but I think ifyou stick around a bit you'll have more in the
So we're delighted to have had you. We appreciate the support
that you, particularly, have given your parents for their work here, because
we know that people don't work here just on their own, it's - we have a
relationship with whole families because the family has to be understanding
and supportive of what the family member is doing here. ? So we thank you for
that, we thank you for this summer's work and we'll hope to see you again in
the future. Thank you. [Applause. ]
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