LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JAMES T. LYNN FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00780R006600060002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 18, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
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DD1AR181stry
The Honorable James T. Lynn
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Old. Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20503
File
The following are my comments on the report prepared
by Don Ogilvie and his colleagues. Each of us will have
his own personal views and his own problems with the
paper. In stating my own, I do not want to detract from
the effort and expertise that went into it, especially
against the deadlines imposed. What follows, however,
must necessarily emphasize the problems rather than the
strengths.
In responding to the outline that accompanied the
report, I discuss the full range of topics covered by
the Study Group (Attachment B). Here I wish to concen-
trate on organization and management, the most difficult
and ultimately the most important of the issues we face.
I believe the future structure for American intelli-
gence should rest on the following principles:
--The DCI should have full, easy, and regular
access'to the President and National Security
Council, but should not act as a partisan
political supporter of the Administration.
Two way communication between the DCI and
the President is essential.
.He should be able to provide the President
and the NSC and, to the extent feasible,
the Congress with assessments of foreign
events based on analysis under his control
and independent of the major government
departments.
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--The system that supports him should be
shaped to provide the best possible intelli-
gence; resource allocations, procedures,
and organization should be driven by the
substantive goals set by national needs
for intelligence.
--The DCI should have an established relation-
ship with the Secretaries of State and
Defense that enables them to work efficiently
together.
--The Department of Defense should be assured
that the intelligence capabilities it needs
in wartime will be avilable.
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--In assessing foreign events competition
in analysis should be encouraged. In
collection, duplication should be avoided
except where it greatly increases the
chances of acquiring vital intelligence.
--The Intelligence Community should be
managed with due regard for resource
constraints. (This point is put last for
a reason. Too many studies of intelligence
approach it with a total focus on economy.
Economy is necessary, indeed it is incumbent
on all intelligence managers to make hard
choices to that end, but it should not be
an end in itself. The primary purpose must
be to produce good intelligence).
Effective management of an intelligence organi-
zation built on these principles will depend to a con-
extent on the way it structures the relationship
siderable
between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. My basic
difficulty with the Study Group's report is that it deals
with a number of separate aspects of this problem, but
does not pull them together so as to focus attention
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on a matter of such fundamental importance. In simplest
terms, the DCI is supposedly responsible for "planning
and reviewing all intelligence activities and the allo-
cation of all intelligence resources."
There are several other topics which must be
addressed in any study of Intelligence Community
manageraent that seem to me not fully treated in this
report.
a. I have noted the importance to the DCI
of an independent analytic capability. This
Is crucial to an understanding of the DCI's role.
Without it, no matter what the DCI's paper inde-
pendence, he is the prisoner of departinnental
analysis. With it, he can challenge long-
standing departmental positions and stimulate
new attacks on stubborn problems.
b. The paper gives insufficient emphasis
to the importance of an authoritative and informed
focus in the Executive for preparing the intelli-
gence program and defending the budget before
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Congress. Congress is moving aggressively toward
assuming what are essentially management functions
over intelligence programs. This trend can only
be reversed if the congressional members of the
oversight committees develop confidence in the
Executive both with respect to the intelligence
program and the execution of its budget.
c. The document does not discuss the impor-
tance of maintaining an independent and innovative
capability for developing technology and applying
this technology to technical collection programs.
Against this background, my reaction to the options
developed by the Study Group paper is that they get
ahead of the problem by being too specific on complicated
issues. The fact is we are not yet ready to ask the
President to make a definitive choice on a future
intelligence structure. There is no "one" solution
to the problems that face us, and every change in one
function has repercussions in others that may be impossible
to foresee. The Study Group's options will be extremely
useful in illustrating for the President the range of
choice, but should not be used as a basis for decision.
In my view, we should use them to seek from the President
a general indication of the direction in which he wants
to move. On that basis we can then set in motion detailed
studies of the consequences that will ensue from a given
choice, and can present for him in some detail the choices
he has in reaching that goal.
comments on the Options themselves are derived
by testing them against the principles stated above.
By that standard:
--Option 1, which centralizes control of
national systems under a DCI, cannot meet
Defense's legitimate requirements.
--Option 3 effectively destroys the DCI's
present limited authority, and thereby
rs?alces it impossible for him to be an
effective advocate of independent. intelli-
gence positions at the NSC level.
CON 1 DE TIAL
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with the principles stated. Option 2 in
its present form has serious workability
problems but goes as far as I think we can
go in strengthening the DCI relative to
Defense. Option 4 does not have these
problems but, as it stands, leaves the
--Options 2 and 4 would appear compatible
basic problems
The first question that the President must decide
is whether major change in intelligence organization
is a goal to be sought this year. Congress appears
to be moving in this direction, but I doubt that the
disruption of our effort that would result from major re-
organization would be repaid by the results. I would
propose instead to take the initiative by moving to
achieve better management of the Community in a way
that will not require lengthy Congressional debate.
Option 4 provides a basis for such a move, but I
,-believe it is somewhat too weak for the purpose. For
this reason I suggest a stronger modification.
This proposal, Attachment A, differs from Option
4 more in intent than in substance. It is specifically
aimed at reaching the kind of DCI-SecDef relationship
that I believe essential, but without the traumatic
change in bureaucratic equities required by Option 2.
(On the other hand, it gives no additional muscle to
the DCI). it provides a central mechanism for mana ing
the CoE,awanitti
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first among equals, and substantive issues, where he
is and should be a great deal more. I think it offers
promise for real progress with a minimum of disruption.
While it is true, as the Study Group emphasizes,
that Option 4 '(or the attached modification) could be
carried, out by administrative rather than leaislative
action-, I be.l.ieve that strong confirmatory legislation
will eve;ntu,uall be required if the recommended changes
are to end:,re. The authorities and responsibilities
of our corplex Intelligence Community should not be
left to bursa=ratic conflict and changes in Ad/ministra tic'n .
Executive a-c:: i on could start us on our way to the changes
we think essential, but the ambiguities of the existent
statutes rest be corrected if there is to be any degree
of stability in the new organizational arrangements, and
if the Congress is to stand behind them.
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All of the above is predicated on a decision by
the President to avoid major change this year. If,
however, the President feels that a major reorganization
is required, then I believe we should look to some form
of Option 2. I believe it provides a tentative basis
for planning a proposal, primarily because it seeks a
solution to the central DCI-SecDef problem. Should the
President go that route I would recommend that he give
the de-y rtments and agencies time to consider the detailed
consequences of the Option 2 approach before finally
committing himself to it.
Sincerely,
AV
W. E. Colby
Director
Attacha,,ents :
Attachment A
Attachment B
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Letter to James T. Lynn, Director, OMB
Comments on the report prepared by Don Ogilvie
Distribution:
General Walters
Mr. Duckett
Mr. Proctor
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Blake
General Wilson
Mr. Carver
Dr. Chamberlain
Mr. Warner
Mr. Cary
Mr. Iams
Mr. Parmenter
Mr . rec inridge
Mr. Knoche
Mr. Taylor.
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Option 4, Modified - "Collective Management"
This Option starts from the premise that stronger
management of the Intelligence Community is highly de-
sirable, but that the balance of interests reflected
in the present structure is a realistic one and should
be maintained. It presents a concept for achieving a
degree of collective Management while preserving
__present organizational relationships. It requires a
minimum of legislative change.
SUMMMMARY DESCRIPTION
The DCI would continue to be advisor to the
President, coordinator of the Community, and Director
of CIA. The present structure of Committees and Boards
would be consolidated into two, both chaired by the DCI:
an Executive Committee of the NSC for Intelligence at
the deputy secretary level., responsible for all Community
management and policy matters, and a National Intelligence
Board at the present USIB Principals level, responsible
for substantive production. To enable the DCI to give
more attention to his Community responsibilities he would
be provided with a second deputy.
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PRIMARY CHANGES AND EFFECTS
The DCI's Responsibilities
The DCI would be the President's chief intelligence
advisor, and would remain Director of CIA. With a view
to raising the stature of the job, consideration should
be given to granting him Cabinet rank. He would be
responsible, under the NSC, for the coordination of
national intelligence policy and for the production
of national intelligence. A clear distinction would
be made, however, between his Comiaunity and CIA roles.
To this end, he would be provided with an additional
Deputy, appointed by the President and confirmed by
Congress. The present Deputy would be specifically
responsible for managing the Agency under the DCI; the
other Deputy would be responsible under the DCI for
coordination of the Community. The DCI would have an
Agency office at Langley and a Community office downtown,
where his Community Deputy would be located.
Coordination of National Intelligence
The present structure of boards and cormittees
would be rationalized, on the basic principle that
policy and resource matters requiring a balancing of
departmental interests would be considered collectively
by the senior officers controlling the assets and re-
sources. concerned. A separate forum would be provided
for substantive intelligence issues, on the grounds
that these are inappropriate for policy officers to
adjudicate and that departmental interests are protected
by the right of dissent.
Policy and Resources
For the first of these purposes the DCI would
chair an NSC Executive Committee for Intelligence,
with Deputy Secretaries of State and Defe-__-e as members.
The committee would have under control of its members
all. important intelligence assets, and wc: d act as a
board of directors for national intel 1 i -_:;ce, EXOO `T (1 )
would absorb the functions of NSCIC, EXC- : I ('IRO plus
equivalent resnsibilities for NSA) and USIB
(except national intelligence production'. It would
in addition coordinate policy matters affecting State
and the Communit
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The DCI's Community Deputy would be his alternate
in EXCOM(I) but would not serve as Chairman in his absence.
The IC Staff would be the secretariat of EXCOM(I). The
DCI would carry out his existing responsibilities for the
NFIP (less its tactical.. and departmental components)
with the assistance of the Committee. EXCOM(I) would
have approval authority for the NFIP (CIAP, NRP, CCP,
and some elements of the GDIP) and its decisions would
be binding The DCI would have administrative and resource
authority only over CIA. Present administrative arrange-
ments for the NRP and CCP would be preserved.
Production of National Intelligence
USIB would be reconstituted as a National Intelli-
gence Board, limited by charter to substantive matters,
and advisory to the DCI. The NIO's would act as the DCI's
staff for the NIB. The Board would be chaired by the DCI,
with his Agency Deputy as CIA member. The latter would
serve as Chairman in his absence.
Covert Action
The DCI would be a member of the 40 Committee, but
not its Chairman, with his Agency Deputy as alternate.
Clandestine collection and covert action would remain
assigned to CIA, without change in present arrangements.
Oversight
Withau:t administrative authority over the, Com-munity,
it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG
responsibility except over CIA. This Option assumes
Executive oversight at the NSC or White House level.
Congress
The DC.1 would continue to be the Community spokesman
to Congrers..
!ational/Tactical Problems
EXCU14, 1) wound handle matters relating to the
relationsk a between tactical and national intelligence.
The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical
intelligence budgets of the military services.
C0IN"I iU 'Ni T I,1.
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Detailed Comments
A. "A wises"
1. Guidelines on Propriety
An Executive Order which promulgates a code of
standards for the conduct of intelligence activities,
as proposed, could serve constructive purposes, both
internally and publicly.
2. Executive Branch Oversight
a. I have already taken steps to strengthen
the CIA Inspector-General, in accordance with the
Rockefeller Commission recoriunendat ions. As to
a Community-wide IG, this should depend on the
degree of authority vested in the DCI. Under
Option 1 he could exercise this responsibility.
Under Option 2, 3, and 4 he clearly could not.
h. I believe that the current efforts of
the Congre-ss and the changed attitudes of the
Executive will provide more than enough oversight
over the Corr=_muni i y . The problem of the future
may be to protect the Community from being so
over-overseen as to be hamstrung. If, however,
the President feels that an additional body is
needed, then 'I would only urge that this be made
a responsibility of the National Security Council
Intelligence Committee or of the PFIAB. My preferred
course is Option 4 Modified, which would change
markedly the c aract-er of NSCIC. Moreover, the
missioms of peeve ati.ng abases and improving product
do not mix well. As to PFIAB, I have the same
problem of mixing incompatible func4-ions. Despite
the find .rx:s of .l-,e Rockefeller and " !...=phy Corr ,,ission__ ,
it is doubtful thwt a part-time Boar,.:, even with a
greatly expanded permanent staff, cc u_4ld effectively
engage this problem.
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3. Intelligence Polite Coordination
Intelligence policy coordination should follow
the same lines as Executive oversight, in view of
the NSC's statutory duty of integrating domestic,
foreign, and military policies relating to national
security. This suggests that whatever new coordination
arrangements are necessary should be made through the
NSC' structure, expanding it when and if needed. A
second Intelligence Advisor to the President for this
purpose does not appear politic or advisable. On the
other hand, the DCI should not be involved in matters
concerning domestic affairs. It is unfortunate that
the Study Group's charter did not extend to counter-
intelligence, because it is here that the problem of
intelligence policy coordination is thorniest.
4. The 40 Committee
I believe the 40 Committee should be continued
and strengthened to provide policy approval for
covert action.
B. Intelligence Community Leadership
Illy position on these matters is contained in my basic
letter and the Modified Option 4 appended thereto. The
only other. comment I have is that I strongly support
the Study Group's recommendation that the DCI be relieved
of the responsibility for the tactical intelligence
budget assigned to him by the Presidential Letter of
1971. This is an unworkable arrangement. I believe
the DCI should be responsible for ensuring the integration
of tactical and national systems* but that the armed
services should prePose, defend, and execute their own
budgets for their own tactical, intelligence requirements.
*Including the responsibility to avoid duplication of
national capabilities in tactical systems.
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C. Covert Action
I believe it essential that responsibility for covert
action remain in CIA and remain an integral function of
CIA's Clandestine Service. For the reasons stated in
the Study Group report, separation of clandestine collection % and covert action is a recipe for operational disaster.
D. Manage-went Improvements
I. Ivdgetary and Fiscal Controls
a. As I have stated on numerous occasions, I am
opposed to the publication of any U.S. intelligence
budget figures. I recognize, however, there is need
to .:prove the flow of budget information to those
met-tbers the Congress selects to review the intelli-
gence budget, under appropriate security safeguards.
b. I believe that additional controls by OMB,
particularly on reprogramming, would serve no purpose
whatever in preventing "abuses" or reassuring the
public, Rather, , they would further reduce the ability
of US intelligence to respond to new challenges. If
the purpose is better intelligence, we are already
going in the wrong direction. In the past flexibility
intelligence budget execution has been provided
primarily through informal understandings between
the Executive and key congressmen and senators.
Changes in Congress have largely negated this
flexibility and no adequate alternatives have
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I TThe FY-?76
Appro r?iaticn Bill contains language --moving strongly
in t-1--at dire?oti tin. I believe what is needed is
legislation stabli.shing rules uniquely tailored
to intt-eiiig`-Zce Programs.
2. K'.isceil aneous
a.. In regard to compartmentaticn, I would note
that there is no barrier to provision of any intelli-
gezce to the senior consumer who really needs to know.
The problem. is somewhat more complicated, and I have
a study in progress on how to simplify and rationalize
the present system.
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b. The Study's comments on consumer inter-
action with the intelligence Community and needed
improvements are valid.
c. With respect to a Performance Evaluation
System, we are continuing to develop such a system,
with the advice and cooperation of U SIB and IR2:C,
through the mechanisms of the Key intelligence
Question Evaluation Program.
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e. Lastly, although it does not fall within
the strict definition of the Study Gr'oup's respon-
sibility, I would note yet again the necessity for
better legislation to protect intelligence sources
and methods.
001 fIDEi i 1'iL
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