THE CHINA-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000100380001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 20, 1959
• Content Type: IM

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Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100380001-4
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Copy No._
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR-GM-59-3
20 November 1959
THE CHINA-INDIA BORDER DISPUTE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100380001-4
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and counter-protests were filed but without a final determination.
Nilang Area (See Map Inset B): The largest area in dispute is north of
Nilang, a small semipermanently inhabited village located about 20 miles south
of the water-divide passes. In 1956, a Chinese patrol advanced within a short
distance of the village, causing an Indian protest to be lodged. Between
Nilang and the passes are two small summer settlements and high pastures
suitable for seasonal grazing. Indian maps mark the border along the passes
on the line of water parting, whereas Chinese maps show a line running
northwest-southeast just north of Nilang village. The uncertain status of the
area is reflected on older maps of India (and the recent 1957 London Times
Atlas) produced by the British and on US-produced maps, which show a border
approximately in agreement with Chinese maps. The Indians maintain that a
meeting between British and Tibetan officials in 1926 produced considerable
evidence of past Indian ownership of this area.
Bare Hoti Area (See Map Inset B): The Bare Hoti area (called Wu-je by the
Chinese) is a small upland pasture a few miles southeast of the Niti Pass.
Despite its small size and apparent insignificance, numerous notes have been
exchanged between India and Thins since 1954 over its ownership; since then,
both Chinese and Indian patrols have alternately occupied the Bars Hoti area.
Initially the Chinese actions may have been of a, probing nature designed to
ascertain the extent of Indian surveillance of the frontier and to test Indian
reaction to Chinese advances. The Indians hold the position that the border
follows the major water divide, thus placing the Niti, Tunjun, and Shalshal
Passes on the border; the Chinese view presumably is that the border runs
south from the Niti Pass through the Chor Hoti Pass, which is located several
miles south and west of the Indian line. Curiously, however, their maps
showing the boundary delineation agree with the Indian maps. Part of the
trouble arises from the nature of the water divide, which is relatively
inconspicuous, with no high peaks or difficult passes marking its crest.
Such features do exist along the Chinese-claimed border.
CIA-RDP84 -0atavstegiontittutobtiniAtrative control into the hills; and, until
PrAtish maps continued to show either a boundary
drawn at the line separating hill tribes from the plains dwellers (which is in
accord with most Chinese maps) or no boundary at all. Not until 1943-44 did the
British begin a serious effort to "make good" their McMahon Line. Outposts were
established and administration extended to SOME areas, but sizable areas in the
north and northwest remained unadministered. After 1947 the Government of India
slowly extended its control; airstrips were built to supply outlying valleys; and
more recently, roads have been constructed linking the plains with the adminis-
trative headquarters of the Kameng and Subansiri Divisions. In 1954, India was
able to install a pro-India abbot at the important Towang Monastery, thus reducing
Lhasa's religious ties with the area. Concurrently the Chinese occupation of
Tibet resulted in improved communications within Tibet and in an extension of
Chinese military and civil control to areas adjacent to the McMahon Line. After
the March 1959 uprising in Tibet, several Indian posts were moved to the border
vicinity (Longju outpost was occupied in April). The following August, Chinese
patrols engaged Indian patrols at Longju and Khinzemane.
Assam-Tibet Sector
The dispute over India's North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in Assam involves
an area of about 26,000 square miles inhabited by roughly 500,000 to 800,000
primitive hill tribesmen. Physically, the area consists of a belt of steep hill
and mountain terrain 50 to 100 miles wide rising sharply from the Brahmaputra
plains to the crest of the Great Himalaya and associated ranges, which coincide
with the McMahon Line. The Chinese-claimed border generally runs along the
southern margin of the hills. This is by far the most difficult of the
Himalayan areas to penetrate from the plains. Heavy rains continue from June
through October; dense, tangled forests choke the valleys and cover much of
the hill country; landslides are common and earthquakes are not infrequent.
Several tribal groups at various cultural levels inhabit the area; most of them
are isolated and have little outside contact beyond petty trade with one another
or with Tibet and Assam. Although a few of the more northerly groups --
particularly in the northwestern part of the Kameng Division -- have close ethnic
and cultural ties with Tibet, most of the hill tribes appear to have little
kinship with either the Assamese plains dwellers or the Tibetans.
The crux of the Sino-Indian dispute over the NEPA area concerns the
validity of the tripartite 1914 Simla Convention -- which was signed by Great
Britain and Tibet but not by China -- and the appended convention map upon
which the Tibet-India border (McMahon Line) was drawn. The primary purpose of
the convention was to clarify Tibet's relationships with India (Great Britain)
and China. India points out that subsequent Chinese protests over the Simla
agreement were concerned with these relationships -- particularly the delimitation
of Inner and Outer Tibet -- not with the McMahon Line. Chou En-lai, however,
claims the McMahon Line to be "illegal" since China did not sign or ratify the
Simla Convention. He maintains that Tibet was then and is still part of China
and cites old maps to support the Chinese claims.
With the possible exception of the Towang area, the greater part of the
NEFA territory appears to have had no administration in times past from India,
Tibet, or China. Before 1900 the British had made pacts with the various hill
tribes designed to keep them from raiding the plains dwellers; but civil adminis-
tration of the area was left largely unattended. Later, because of Tibetan and
Chinese activity along the frontier, several survey and military expeditions were
sent into the hills (1911-1913). These expeditions led to the recommendation
that the Great Himalaya crest be proposed as a border between Tibet and India
(the McMahon Line). The Great Himalaya Range, however, is not in all cases the
line of water parting. Despite the drawing of the McMahon Line, almost nothing
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Related Border Problems
The undefined status of almost all of the China-India frontier and the
wording of recent Chinese pronouncements suggest the possibility that other
areas may eventually be disputed. Nepal also is currently concerned, since
its 550-mile border with Tibet is undefined and since some minor differences
in the boundary alignment may appear on Chinese- and Indian-produced maps.
Furthermore, Chinese maps have shown parts of Bhutan -- primarily in the
southeast -- as belonging to Tibet. Recent interference with Bhutanese couriers
and officials in charge of tiny Bhutanese exclaves in western Tibet suggests the
possibility of future problems.
At the western end of the China-India frontier, disputes have arisen between
Pakistan and Chinaover theirboundaryin the tiny mountain state of Hunza. Chinese
claims to Bunco are of long standing, dating at least to the early nineteenth
century; Hunza, on the other hand, maintained counterclaims in Sinkiang and the
Upper Yarkand area. Traditionally, gifts were exchanged between the Mir (ruler)
of Hunza and the principal Chinese official in Kashgar. In 1935, following more
active Chinese interest in Hunza, British officials persuaded the Mir to abandon
most of his claims and end the exchange of gifts. Although at one time both
Nationalist- and Communist-produced Chinese maps showed all of Hunza as part
of China, recent Chinese maps indicate claims to "only" parts of eastern Bursa.
The area is small (about 675 square miles according to the Survey of Pakistan
Political Map) but includes the potentially strategic Khunjerab and Parpik
Passes leading east to Sinkiang. Particularly troublesome is the grazing area
east of the Shimshal Pass, near Darband (Darwaza), which the Mir still claims.
This interpretation is supported by Pakistani maps. Despite recently increased
Chinese activity here, the Hunzakuts still continue to use the pastures near
Darband.
Prospects for Future Settlement
Maps of various dates and by different authorities have been used by both
China and India to support their versions of the border alignment. These maps,
however, merely reflect the lack of border surveys and the absence of boundary
markers, and reveal the poorly mapped nature of some frontier sections, which
leaves in doubt the exact location of water divides and mountain crestlines.
As indicated by the exchanges between Prime Minister Nehru and Chou En-lai,
Indian and British maps could be used to support both Indian and Chinese claims;
and, conversely, some Chinese maps could be cited to support either position.
To further confuse the issue from the point of view of the United States interest
in the problem, maps produced by the US Government have not in all cases been
consistent in their treatment of the border; at present the border delineation
on official US maps differs in places from that on both Indian and Chinese maps.
Neither India nor China can make an entirely open-and-shut case for its
position on all disputed areas. Aside from the onerous task of evaluating the
relative validity of Chinese and Indian claims, negotiations over many of the
disputed areas will be hampered and confused by the lack of basic surveys and
accurate maps. The complexity of these problems coupled with the lack of basic
information suggests that any final settlement of the border will neither be
soon nor easily accomplished.
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Approved For Release 2000/09/03 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000100380001-4