SOVIET INTERESTS IN ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300AWt oeptial
Soviet Interests
in Antarctic Mineral Resources
Confidential
CIA/BGI RP 74-5
September 1973
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For. Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defence ofthe United States, 'vNithin the meaning of Title
J. sect on 793 and 79-1, of the US Code, as amended.
Th transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Classified by 019641. Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652,'ex-
emption category: 5B(1),(2),(t). Deciassifica-
3ion date impossible to determine.
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . Z
Background . .
Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mineral Resources . . . . . . . . . 4
Exploration Activities and Development
Plans . . . . . . . . . . 4
Evolving Legal and Regulatory Policy 7
Photographs
Figure Z. Amery Ice Shelf Field Camp . . . page 6
Figure 2. Temporary Geological Field Camp . . page 6
Map
Soviet Stations and Exploration
in Antarctica . . . . . . Following Text
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 200J1~%&, fXf P84-00825R000300090001-1
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1973
SOVIET INTERESTS IN ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES
Summary and Conclusions
Despite the relatively large scale scientific and
commercial operations it has undertaken in the Antarctic
and surrounding waters, the USSR has made no attempt to
exploit that continent's mineral resources. The USSR has,
in fact, proposed that all "Antarctic countries" confine
themselves for the coming decade to basic geological re-
search. They have called for a moratorium on the issuance
of commercial prospecting licenses throughout the continent
and seem particularly eager to prevent or delay oil and
gas exploration on the continental shelf. Their longer-
range intent is indicated, however, by the magnitude of
their exploration program, the largest and most explicitly
resource-oriented in Antarctica.
Soviet officials have been generally cooperative in
Antarctic Treaty negotiations and have conformed in the
main to the Treaty's provisions. It is clear, however,
that their Antarctic interests are not exclusively scientific
and that they are not unaware of South Polar economic
considerations. The Soviet whaling and fishing fleet in
Antarctic waters, for instance, is an established commercial
venture with a catch valued in the tens of millions of dollars.
Krill and seal exploitation may also be entering a commercial
stage.
The issue of mineral exploitation will be coming up at the
next Treaty consultative meeting in late 1974 or early 1975.
25X1A
Comments and questions may be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, Co 43,
Extension 225?.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000 ffiDQW1JP84-00825R000300090001-1
Background
1. The Antarctic Treaty, ratified in 1961 and
elaborated at seven subsequent consultative meetings,
has provided the basis for peaceful resolution of a
variety of contentious issues.* However, Treaty ne-
gotiators deliberately avoided the sticky issue of
exploitation of mineral resources in order not to
offend the sensitivities of certain countries with
territorial claims, particularly Argentina and Chile.
In 1970 for the first time the subject of mineral
exploitation was raised unofficially at a Treaty
cunsultative meeting because of concern over expressions
of interest in the Antarctic by commercial firms. More
recently, at the 1972 consultative meeting in New Zealand,
formal discussions were begun on this issue. A widely
supported proposal to place a moratorium on mineral ex-
ploitation failed, with the result that members could
agree only to study the problem and discuss it again at
the next meeting in late 1974 or early 1975.
2. Soviet policy before the 1959 Antarctic Treaty
Conference, like that of the United States, was one of
nonrecognition of territorial claims and reservation of
rights to freedom of research anywhere in Antarctica.
During the Treaty negotiations the USSR took a generally
constructive attitude, although they tried -- unsuccessfully to broaden the Treaty by extending its applicability to a
larger part of the southern ocean and by expanding
negotiations to include all interested countries.
3. Since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, Soviet
commentaries have expressed great satisfaction with it,
particularly with the provisions for scientific cooperation
and use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only. At
subsequent consultative meetings they have been most in-
terested in pragmatic issues such as improving communication
for weather reporting, and have advocated strict adherence
to Treaty language in negotiating and drafting recommendations.
* Original parties: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR, United
Kingdom, United States; acceding parties: Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Romania.
-2-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 200eaf4~A,DP84-00825R000300090001-1
4. Soviet Antarctic operations are on a larger scale
than those of any country other than the United States. The
Soviet effort exceeds even that of the United States in
certain respects, especially in the amount of marine re-
search, the number of year-round stations, and the number
of wintering scientists and technicians. Overall, the
Soviet program is characterized by the high ratio of
research to support personnel, an emphasis on practical
application of all research, and the achievement of sub-
stantial results at a relatively low cost.
5. The 1971-75 Soviet plan for Antarctic research notes
that the work of the first 15 years concentrated on the
general nature of Antarctica, and that future work will
focus on specific problems-and on the practical uses of the
area. Emphasis will be on geological and geophysical
surveys and mapping; on oceanic, atmospheric, and solar-
terrestrial processes; and on marine biological resources,
animal life, and human acclimatization. Basic data collection
for environmental forecasting will also be continued.
6. To implement this expanded program the USSR in 1971
added a new year-round station, Leningradskaya, and began
construction of a second, Russkaya, in the 1972-73 austral
summer. Their seven stations will completely ring the
continent (see map, following text). They have also initiated
a "geophysical polygon" project, which will ultimately include
34 automatic geomagnetic stations, and have significantly
increased shipboard and field programs. The planned addition
of heavy aircraft to improve intercontinental logistics has
not yet occurred, although the number of light aircraft and
helicopters for intracontinental support has grown from 5 to
10 since 1970.
Economic Interests
7. Present Soviet commercial activities are limited
to exploiting the biological resources of Antarctic waters.
Whaling operations, begun by the USSR in 1946, are estimated
to have a gross value of 30 to 40 million dollars. As
whaling has declined, the USSR has undertaken large
experimental programs for catching fish, krill, and seals.
-3-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000 OIDQWIJDP84-00825R000300090001-1
The Appendix describes these programs in greater detail
since they provide insights into Soviet interpretation
of treaty responsibilities in relation to economic activities.
Mineral Resources: Exploration Activities and Development
Plans
8. Geological research, including as an explicit goal
the discovery of mineral resources, has been an important
component of each Soviet Antarctic Expedition. The 5-year
plan, 1971-75, states that the present geological task is
to map the continent on the basis of geological, gravimetric,
and magnetic surveys in order to determine its mineral-
resource potential.
9. Commentaries by leading Soviet geologists invariably
contain references to Antarctica's rich mineral resources and
to the inevitability of eventual exploitation. At the con-
clusion of the most recent expedition in May 1973 the leading
Soviet Antarctic geologist announced the discovery of a very
large and high quality iron ore deposit which he claimed
"confirms forecasts about the potential mineral wealth of
the continent." He stated also that the 30-meter-thick ice
overburden "is no obstacle to modern mining technology."
Frequently remarks such as these are tempered by an estimate
that commercial exploitation will not begin for another 10
or 20 years. One Soviet writer makes the claim that the
Soviet.system of planning, transportation, and mobilizing
labor and capital would give the USSR a decisive advantage
over Western nations in future Antarctic mineral exploitation.
10. Intentions and capabilities are revealed also by
examination of Soviet geological activities. During their
18 annual expeditions the Soviets have carried out geological
and geophysical surveys over most of the major exposed rock
areas of East Antarctica. Most of this work has taken place
in the mountains of Queen Maud Land and Enderby Land and
around the Amery Ice Shelf (see map, following text). In
addition, the assignment of exchange scientists to the
programs of other nations and the recent construction of
new stations has given the Soviets the opportunity to
conduct geological work in nearly all areas of Antarctica.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
11. The Soviet explorations in East Antarctica have
resulted in discovery of a number of mineral occurrences.
No deposits have been found of quantity or quality high
enough to overcome the present costs of extraction imposed
by the Antarctic's unique environment. The attached map
locates the most significant of these occurrences, which
range from minute concentrations of molybdenum to large
deposits of coal and iron. The most noteworthy may be an
iron ore deposit to the south of the Amery Ice Shelf which
reportedly extends for 120 kilometers, measures over 1,000
meters in thickness, and contains up to 42 percent iron.
12. Geological research at sea has also been carried
out during nearly every expedition, integrated with other
scientific programs during cruises of the expedition's
research vessels. The cumulative result has been the
aquisition of perhaps as many as 1,000 bottom samples and
cores and some tens of thousands of kilometers of magnetic
gravity, and seismic profiles along ship tracks to the
continent and along its coasts. The Soviets have also
agreed to provide funding to enable them to participate in
deep drilling aboard the U.S. ship GZomar Challenger.
13. In most years before 1971 the Soviet geological
program on land was carried out by a detachment of 4 to 10
geologists and geographers supported by a flight crew with
2 or 3 small aircraft. Soviet summary reports at the end
of each field season typically recorded completion of
geological surveys over an area of 50,000 to 100,000
square kilometers, with detailed inspection of several
hundred rock outcrops and collection of as many as 4,000
rock samples. The geological work was closely integrated
with seismographic, gravimetric, aerial photographic,
geodetic, and aerial magnetic and mapping surveys.
14. This level of effort has been considerably
expanded. under the new 5-year plan. Each of the last
two expeditions, which operated during the summer season
in the Amery Ice Shelf area, has included a large field
party of aviators, geologists, geophysicists, and aerial
photographers, totaling over 100 persons (see Figures 1 and 2).
This extensive field program is scheduled to continue during
the 1973-74 season.
- 5 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2019MRDP84-00825R000300090001-1
Figure 1. Amery Ice Shelf Field Camp (1973). Temporary support base for geolog-
ical-geophysical activities during summers of 1971-72, 1972-73, and 1973-74.
Figure 2. Temporary geological field camp. MI-4 helicopter provides mobility in
the field.
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 20ffIEtj!AADP84-00825R000300090001-1
15. The amount of aircraft support allocated to
Soviet geologists probably exceeds that provided to
geologists by any other country, including the United States.
During the 1969-70 season, with three aircraft in the
Antarctic, the Soviets managed to allocate 400 flight hours
in support of geological/geophysical field parties. Air
support to the most recent expedition, primarily for support
to field parties, was augmented by the addition of four
helicopters and three twin prop IL-14 aircraft.
16. This high-quality field program is further
enhanced by a strong research staff in the USSR. The
leaders and often all geologists on field expeditions are
members of the Scientific Research Institute of Geology
of the Arctic (NIIGA) in Leningrad. NIIGA employs about
400 scientists and technicians and is the world's largest
organization specializing in polar geological research.
Approximately 20 NIIGA geologists are believed to work full
time on the Antarctic area.
Mineral Resources: Evolving Legal and Regulatory Policy
17. The general outline of Soviet policy on a future
legal regime for Antarctic mineral exploitation can be
gleaned from various pronouncements on the Antarctic Treaty
and from journal articles about the resource problem. Until
very recently the most detailed public statement on the
subject was made in a 1971 article entitled "Theoretical
Problems of Conservation of Antarctic Resources Under
International Law" by V.A. Chichvarin, who apparently works
in the Treaty Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
He stated that national territorial claims have no validity
in relation to Antarctic resources, nor can exploitation
be justified on the basis of "finders keepers." He observed
that legal specialists of the socialist countries view the
Antarctic as an international zone with " . . . unimpeded
access to the Treaty region, including utilization of its
natural resources, for all nations (and not only Treaty
members) on the basis of international cooperation . 11
Conversely, he states that no government, on the pretext of
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2001/M~?j& fAPP84-00825R000300090001-1
conserving any of these resources, has the right to
undertake unilateral or collective actions aimed at
preventing another country from using them. He further
suggests that the legal status of Antarctic resources
should be entrusted to all countries of the world, and
alludes to a possible role for the UN.
18. This Soviet writer, as well as others, claims
that conservation considerations will have an important
bearing on future exploitation of minerals. He goes so
far as to suggest that a future consultative meeting of
the Treaty may need to consider worldwide regulations of
pollution sources that affect the Antarctic. This public
emphasis stands in some contrast with Soviet practice,
which thus far has evidenced little noticeable concern for
conservation measures in the Antarctic. The public stance
may thus be simply a propaganda exercise but it could also
be an attempt to lay the groundwork for future objections
to any resource exploitation by other countries.
19. Solomon Slevich, a prominent Soviet Antarctic
publicist, in a 1968 article on inspection and control in
the Antarctic, commented on the subject of possible. sanctions
to be applied against an offending nation in the event of
disagreement over future mining operations. He ridicules
compulsion as being contrary to the spirit of cooperation
fostered by the Treaty. Rather, he claims that the Treaty
principle of unanimity allows only negotiation and conciliation
for settlement of disputes.
20. The USSR did not contribute substantially to dis-
cussions of the mineral resource problem at the sixth and
seventh consultative meetings of the Treaty. At the sixth
meeting, in 1970, the Soviet representatives said they had
no instructions but that in any case the USSR had no problem
in this area because its mining enterprises were state-owned
and thus would not be in a position to take troublesome
initiatives. Essentially the same position was taken in
1972, with the added element that the USSR was willing to
accept a moratorium on exploitation at least until the
next consultative meeting in 1974 or 1975.
21. The most recent and probably the most authoritative
information on Soviet mineral resource policies was revealed
during a June 1973 conference of Treaty members in Norway,
- 8.-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000eM,%p4P84-00825R000300090001-1
held to allow interested countries to exchange unofficial
views and develop information on this topic in advance of
the upcoming eighth consultative meeting. A Soviet paper
stated that prospecting and exploitation of useful minerals
would clearly not be profitable in the next two or three
decades and that consequently there is no urgency for
discussion of specific regulations on an exploitation
regime. The Soviet author proposed instead that for the
next decade or so the Treaty nations should continue a
general program of scientific geological exploration on
which to base future decisions. He claimed that mineral
exploitation or even commercial exploration at this time
would violate the spirit of the Treaty. The issuance of
prospecting licenses to individual firms and citizens
would in fact "torpedo" the Treaty by:
a. aggravating territorial claims problems;
b. hampering scientific investigation,
because private firms do not publish
data for competitive reasons;
c. polluting the environment and violating
the ecological balance of the continent
regardless of regulations imposed;
d. transforming the Antarctic from a continent
of science into an arena of business.
22. The Soviet desire for a moratorium on exploitation
is generally shared by the other Treaty countries. Their
desire to extend the proposed moratorium to commercial
exploration as well is firmly shared by only Chile and
Argentina, both countries with meager exploration capabilities.
The Soviet concern appears to be related mainly to potential
exploration by Western firms for oil and gas on the continental
shelf. They may thus be attempting to gain time to develop
their own capabilities in this area.
23. Although they do not wish to negotiate specific
regulations covering mineral exploitation at the present
time, Soviet statements indicate that their position on this
subject is consistent with that taken on previous occasions.
That is, any licensing function should be delegated neither
to the national governments of exploiting firms nor to
governments claiming Antarctic territory. Rather, any
licensing system should be purely international, residing in
a multilateral organization that might be associated with
consultative meetings of Treaty nations.
ONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/C44/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/(CIQX9P.IDEMR10284-00825R000300090001-1
APPENDIX
Biological Resources
1. Soviet economic interest in Antarctica began with
whaling in 1946, nearly a decade before the USSR joined
the pre-IGY research program. In spite of their relatively
late entry into the whaling industry, they have increased
their share of the internationally agreed quota until the
USSR now accounts for about half the total Antarctic catch.
At present they operate 3 factory ships and about 35 catcher
vessels. The gross value of the catch from this operation
is estimated to be on the order of 30 to 40 million dollars.
2. As the whale population has declined from
overexploitation, the Soviets have initiated a large
experimental program for catching fish, krill, and seals.
The latest 5-year plan for the Antarctic, in accordance
with its emphasis on practical benefits, includes a Soviet
"Interdepartmental Expedition in the Southern Ocean," which
will operate through 1975. The purpose was announced to be
the locating of fishing areas and improvement of fishing
techniques.
3. The success of this fisheries research program
was indicated by a Soviet decision in 1967 to begin regular
commercial operations. Fishing fleets, each consisting of
as many as 10 large stern trawlers, now routinely operate
in the Scotia Sea northeast of the tip of the Antarctic
Peninsula, and south of New Zealand. In 1968 and 1970 the
USSR unsuccessully attempted to buy or lease the abandoned
British whaling station on South Georgia Island as a base
for part of these operations. The institutionalization of
these operations was formalized in 1972 by establishment
of the Antarctica Fishing Association within one of the
four Soviet Fishing Directorates.
4. Commentary in Soviet journals makes clear that the
Antarctic Treaty, because it fosters cooperative scientific
activities, is considered an aid rather than a hindrance to
commercial exploitation of biological resources in Antarctic
waters. The Treaty provision for exchange of information,
which might be considered a disadvantage in competitive
- 10-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 200W"#IbEWP84-00825R000300090001-1
fishing activities, has posed no problem for the USSR
since proprietary information on size and type of catches
in the Antarctic is withheld in the same manner as it is
in other fishing regions of the world. Although research
publications and news reports contain some information on
marine activities, USSR information reports exchanged under
the Treaty do not include data on fishery research ships
and trawlers or on other research vessels that are not
part of their regular Antarctic expedition.
5. An attempt by several countries during the sixth
consultative meeting in 1970 to improve the exchange of
information about research vessels was strongly resisted
by the USSR on the incorrect grounds that the information
was already being provided. A recommendation on exchange
of information on oceanic research was subsequently adopted,
but has resulted in no improvement in Soviet reporting
practices. In a similar vein, the USSR has failed thus far
to report its seal catches as required by the agreed measures
on flora and fauna.
.- 11
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 CONFIDENTIAL
South Georgia
(Claimed by
U.K. & Arg.)
Falkland Is.
(U.K.)
USSR 0Arg.
$Arg.
(Bellingshausen) ~- ,,OArg.
US (Palmer) 00,
J V V 1 1
AMERICA
Peter I
Island
South Sandwich Is,
_ (Claimed by
U.K. & Arg.)
Soviet Mineral Discoveries
Be Beryl Gr Graphite
Mi Mica Fe Iron
Q Quartz C Coal
Mo Molybdenum
Soviet station
US station
Other stations
Major area of Soviet exploration
CONFIDENTIAL
Ann rn 1 1 F^ '?ReIease 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
Kilometers
Classified by 019641
Exempt Item general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
Exemption category 58 (1),121,(3)
Oeclessillcation data impossible to determine
Approved Fs8VF@t tfddg : PE.RVt0M0 `ittIC1
 Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
Confidential
Confidential
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R0003000Idential
Soviet Interests
in Antarctic Mineral Resources
Confidential
CIA/BGI RP 74-5
September 1973
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 200
NlALRDP84-00825R000300090001-1
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . Z
Background . . .
Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mineral Resources . . . . . . . . . 4
Exploration Activities and Development
Plans . . . . . . . . . . 4
Evolving Legal and Regulatory Policy 7
Photographs
Figure Z. Amery Ice Shelf Field Camp . . . page 6
Figure 2. Temporary Geological Field Camp . . page 6
Map
Soviet Stations and Exploration
in Antarctica. . . . . . . Following Text
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 204OMf19EOt4RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1973
SOVIET INTERESTS IN ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES
Summary and Conclusions
Despite the relatively large scale scientific and
commercial operations it has undertaken in the Antarctic
and surrounding waters, the USSR has made no attempt to
exploit that continent's mineral resources. The USSR has,
in fact, proposed that all "Antarctic countries" confine
themselves for the coming decade to basic geological re-
search. They have called for a moratorium on the issuance
of commercial prospecting licenses throughout the continent
and seem particularly eager to prevent or delay oil and
gas exploration on the continental shelf. Their longer-
range intent is indicated, however, by the magnitude of
their exploration program, the largest and most explicitly
resource-oriented in Antarctica.
Soviet officials have been generally cooperative in
Antarctic Treaty negotiations and have conformed in the
main to the Treaty's provisions. It is clear, however,
that their Antarctic interests are not exclusively scientific
and that they are not unaware of South Polar economic
considerations. The Soviet whaling and fishing fleet in
Antarctic waters, for instance, is an established commercial
venture with a catch valued in the tens of millions of dollars.
Krill and seal exploitation may also be entering a commercial
stage.
The issue of mineral exploitation will be coming up at the
next Treaty consultative meeting in late 1974 or early 1975.
25X1A
Comments and questions may be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic InteZZigence, Co e ,
Extension 2257.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000@DN*IRVP84-00825R000300090001-1
Background
1. The Antarctic Treaty, ratified in 1961 and
elaborated at seven subsequent consultative meetings,
has provided the basis for peaceful resolution of a
variety of contentious issues.* However, Treaty ne-
gotiators deliberately avoided the sticky issue of
exploitation of mineral resources in order not to
offend the sensitivities of certain countries with
territorial claims, particularly Argentina and Chile.
In 1970 for the first time the subject of mineral
exploitation was raised unofficially at a Treaty
cunsultative meeting because of concern over expressions
of interest in the Antarctic by commercial firms. More
recently, at the 1972 consultative meeting in New Zealand,
formal discussions were begun on this issue. A widely
supported proposal to place a moratorium on mineral ex-
ploitation failed, with the result that members could
agree only to study the problem and discuss it again at
the next meeting in late 1974 or early 1975.
2. Soviet policy before the 1959 Antarctic Treaty
Conference, like that of the United States, was one of
nonrecognition of territorial claims and reservation of
rights to freedom of research anywhere in Antarctica.
During the Treaty negotiations the USSR took a generally
constructive attitude, although they tried -- unsuccessfully to broaden the Treaty by extending its applicability to a
larger part of the southern ocean and by expanding
negotiations to include all interested countries.
3. Since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, Soviet
commentaries have expressed great satisfaction with it,
particularly with the provisions for scientific cooperation
and use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only. At
subsequent consultative meetings they have been most in-
terested in pragmatic issues such as improving communication
for weather reporting, and have advocated strict adherence
to Treaty language in negotiating and drafting recommendations.
* Original parties: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR, United
Kingdom, United States; acceding parties: Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Romania.
- 2.-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000( t4i%DiMiitDP84-00825R000300090001-1
4. Soviet Antarctic operations are on a larger scale
than those of any country other than the United States. The
Soviet effort exceeds even that.of the United States in
certain respects, especially in the amount of marine re-
search, the number of year-round stations, and the number
of wintering scientists and technicians. Overall, the
Soviet program is characterized by the high ratio of
research to support personnel, an emphasis on practical
application of all research, and the achievement of sub-
stantial results at a relatively low cost.
5. The 1971-75 Soviet plan for Antarctic research notes
that the work of the first 15 years concentrated on the
general nature of Antarctica, and that future work will
focus on specific problems-and on the practical uses of the
area. Emphasis will be on geological and geophysical
surveys and mapping; on oceanic, atmospheric, and solar-
terrestrial processes; and on marine biological resources,
animal life, and human acclimatization. Basic data collection
for environmental forecasting will also be continued.
6. To implement this expanded program the USSR in 1971
added a new year-round station, Leningradskaya, and began
construction of a second, Russkaya, in the 1972-73 austral
summer. Their seven stations will completely ring the
continent (see map, following text). They have also initiated
a "geophysical polygon" project, which will ultimately include
34 automatic geomagnetic stations, and have significantly
increased shipboard and field programs. The planned addition
of heavy aircraft to improve intercontinental logistics has
not yet occurred, although the number of light aircraft and
helicopters for intracontinental support has grown from 5 to
10 since 1970.
Economic Interests
7. Present Soviet commercial activities are limited
to exploiting the biological resources of Antarctic waters.
Whaling operations, begun by the USSR in 1946, are estimated
to have a gross value of 30 to 40 million dollars. As
whaling has declined, the USSR has undertaken large
experimental programs for catching fish, krill, and seals.
-3-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/0IDMt#RO.P84-00825R000300090001-1
The Appendix describes these programs in greater detail
since they provide insights into Soviet interpretation
of treaty responsibilities in relation to economic activities.
Mineral Resources: Exploration Activities and Development
Plans
8. Geological research, including as an explicit goal
the discovery of mineral resources, has been an important
component of each Soviet Antarctic Expedition. The 5-year
plan, 1971-75, states that the present geological task is
to map the continent on the basis of geological, gravimetric,
and magnetic surveys in order to determine its mineral-
resource potential.
9. Commentaries by leading Soviet geologists invariably
contain references to Antarctica's rich mineral resources and
to the inevitability of eventual exploitation. At the con-
clusion of the most recent expedition in May 1973 the leading
Soviet Antarctic geologist announced the discovery of a very
large and high quality iron ore deposit which he claimed
"confirms forecasts about the potential mineral wealth of
the continent." He stated also that the 30-meter-thick ice
overburden "is no obstacle to modern mining technology."
Frequently remarks such as these are tempered by an estimate
that commercial exploitation will not begin for another 10
or 20 years. One Soviet writer makes the claim that the
Soviet system of planning, transportation, and mobilizing
labor and capital would give the USSR a decisive advantage
over Western nations in future Antarctic mineral exploitation.
10. Intentions and capabilities are revealed also by
examination of Soviet geological activities. During their
18 annual expeditions the Soviets have carried out geological
and geophysical surveys over most of the major exposed rock
areas of East Antarctica. Most of this work has taken place
in the mountains of Queen Maud Land and Enderby Land and
around the Amery Ice Shelf (see map, following text). In
addition, the assignment of exchange scientists to the
programs of other nations and the recent construction of
new stations has given the Soviets the opportunity to
conduct geological work in nearly all areas of Antarctica.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000 &MIQDtt IRDP84-00825R000300090001-1
11. The Soviet explorations in East Antarctica have
resulted in discovery of a number of mineral occurrences.
No deposits have been found of quantity or quality high
enough to overcome the present costs of extraction imposed
by the Antarctic's unique environment. The attached map
locates the most significant of these occurrences, which
range from minute concentrations of molybdenum to large
deposits of coal and iron. The most noteworthy may be an
iron ore deposit to the south of the Amery Ice Shelf which
reportedly extends for 120 kilometers, measures over 1,000
meters in thickness, and contains up to 42 percent iron.
12. Geological research at sea has also been carried
out during nearly every expedition, integrated with other
scientific programs during cruises of the expedition's
research vessels. The cumulative result has been the
aquisition of perhaps as many as 1,000 bottom samples and
cores and some tens of thousands of kilometers of magnetic,
gravity, and seismic profiles along ship tracks to the
continent and along its coasts. The Soviets have also
agreed to provide funding to enable them to participate in
deep drilling aboard the U.S. ship GZomar ChaZZenger.
13. In most years before 1971 the Soviet geological
program on land was carried out by a detachment of 4 to 10
geologists and geographers supported by a flight crew with
2 or 3 small aircraft. Soviet summary reports at the end
of each field season typically recorded completion of
geological surveys over an area of 50,000 to 100,000
square kilometers, with detailed inspection of several
hundred rock outcrops and collection of as many as 4,000
rock samples. The geological work was closely integrated
with seismographic, gravimetric, aerial photographic,
geodetic, and aerial magnetic and mapping surveys.
14. This level of effort has been considerably
expanded under the new 5-year plan. Each of the last
two expeditions, which operated during the summer season
in the Amery Ice Shelf area, has included a large field
party of aviators, geologists, geophysicists, and aerial
photographers, totaling over 100 persons (see Figures 1 and 2).
This extensive field program is scheduled to continue during
the 1973-74 season.
- 5 -
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000Wt4i1DES 4RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
15. The amount of aircraft support allocated to
Soviet geologists probably exceeds that provided. to
geologists by any other country, including the United States.
During the 1969-70 season, with three aircraft in the
Antarctic, the Soviets managed to allocate 400 flight hours
in support of geological/geophysical field parties. Air
support to the most recent expedition, primarily for support
to field parties, was augmented by the addition of four
helicopters and three twin prop IL-14 aircraft.
16. This high-quality field program is further
enhanced by a strong research staff in the USSR. The
leaders and often all geologists on field expeditions are
members of the Scientific Research Institute of Geology
of the Arctic (NIIGA) in Leningrad. NIIGA employs about
400 scientists and technicians and is the world s -largest
organization specializing in polar geological research.
Approximately 20 NIIGA geologists are believed to work full
time on the Antarctic area.
Mineral Resources: Evolving Legal and Regulatory Policy
17. The general outline of Soviet policy on a future
legal regime for Antarctic mineral exploitation can be
gleaned from various pronouncements on the Antarctic Treaty
and from journal articles about the resource problem. Until
very recently the most detailed public statement on the
subject was made in a 1971 article entitled "Theoretical
Problems of Conservation of Antarctic Resources Under
International Law" by V.A. Chichvarin, who apparently works
in the Treaty Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
He stated that national territorial claims have no validity
in relation to Antarctic resources, nor can exploitation
be justified on the basis of "finders keepers." He observed
that legal specialists of the socialist countries view the
Antarctic as an international zone with . . unimpeded
access to the Treaty region, including utilization of its
natural resources, for all nations (and not only Treaty
members) on the basis of international cooperation . . . "
Conversely, he states that no government, on the pretext of
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000Mf4plb P84-00825R000300090001-1
conserving any of these resources, has the right to
undertake unilateral or collective actions aimed at
preventing another country from using them. He further
suggests that the legal status of Antarctic resources
should be entrusted to all countries of the world, and
alludes to a possible role for the UN.
18. This Soviet writer, as well as others, claims
that conservation considerations will have an important
bearing on future exploitation of minerals. He goes so
far as to suggest that a future consultative meeting of
the Treaty may need to consider worldwide regulations of
pollution sources that affect the Antarctic. This public
emphasis stands in some contrast with Soviet practice,
which thus far has evidenced little noticeable concern for
conservation measures in the Antarctic. The public stance
may thus be simply a propaganda exercise but it could also
be an attempt to lay the groundwork for future objections
to any resource exploitation by other countries.
19. Solomon Slevich, a prominent Soviet Antarctic
publicist, in a 1968 article on inspection and control in
the Antarctic, commented on the subject of possible sanctions
to be applied against an offending nation in the event of
disagreement over future mining operations. He ridicules
compulsion as being contrary to the spirit of cooperation
fostered by the Treaty. Rather, he claims that the Treaty
principle of unanimity allows only negotiation and conciliation
for settlement of disputes.
20. The USSR did not contribute substantially to dis-
cussions of the mineral resource problem at the sixth and
seventh consultative meetings of the Treaty. At the sixth
meeting, in 1970, the Soviet representatives said they had
no instructions but that in any case the USSR had no problem
in this area because its mining enterprises were state-owned
and thus would not be in a position to take troublesome
initiatives. Essentially the same position was taken in
1972, with the added element that the USSR was willing to
accept a moratorium on exploitation at least until the
next consultative meeting in 1974 or 1975.
21. The most recent and probably the most authoritative
information on Soviet mineral resource policies was revealed
during a June 1973 conference of Treaty members in Norway,
- 8.-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000 Qpib PAPP84-00825R000300090001-1
held to allow interested countries to exchange unofficial
views and develop information on this topic in advance of
the upcoming eighth consultative meeting. A Soviet paper
stated that prospecting and exploitation of useful minerals
would clearly not be profitable in the next two or three
decades and that consequently there is no urgency for
discussion of specific regulations on an exploitation
regime. The Soviet author proposed instead that for the
next decade or so the Treaty nations should continue a
general program of scientific geological exploration on
which to base future decisions. He claimed that mineral
exploitation or even commercial exploration at this time
would violate the spirit of the Treaty. The issuance of
prospecting licenses to individual firms and citizens
would in fact "torpedo" the Treaty by:
a. aggravating territorial claims problems;
b. hampering scientific investigation,
because private firms do not publish
data for competitive reasons;
c. polluting the environment and violating
the ecological balance of the continent
regardless of regulations imposed;
d. transforming the Antarctic from a continent
of science into an arena of business.
22. The Soviet desire for a moratorium on exploitation
is generally shared by the other Treaty countries. Their
desire to extend the proposed moratorium to commercial
exploration as well is firmly shared by only Chile and
Argentina, both countries with meager exploration capabilities.
The Soviet concern appears to be related mainly to potential
exploration by Western firms for oil and gas on the continental
shelf. They may thus be attempting to gain time to develop
their own capabilities in this area.
23. Although they do not wish to negotiate specific
regulations covering mineral exploitation at the present
time, Soviet statements indicate that their position on this
subject is consistent with that taken on previous occasions.
That is, any licensing function should be delegated neither
to the national governments of exploiting firms nor to
governments claiming Antarctic territory. Rather, any
licensing system should be purely international, residing in
a multilateral organization that might be associated with
consultative meetings of Treaty nations.
-9-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/(Dt4F1M8P1W 84-00825R000300090001-1
APPENDIX
Biological Resources
1. Soviet economic interest in Antarctica began with
whaling in 1946, nearly a decade before the USSR joined
the pre-IGY research program. In spite of their relatively
late entry into the whaling industry, they have increased
their share of the internationally agreed quota until the
USSR now accounts for about half the total Antarctic catch.
At present they operate 3 factory ships and about 35 catcher
vessels. The gross value of the catch from this operation
is estimated to be on the order of 30 to 40 million dollars.
2. As the whale population has declined from
overexploitation, the Soviets have initiated a large
experimental program for catching fish, krill, and seals.
The latest 5-year plan for the Antarctic, in accordance
with its emphasis on practical benefits, includes a Soviet
"Interdepartmental Expedition in the Southern Ocean," which
will operate through 1975. The purpose was announced to be
the locating of fishing areas and improvement of fishing
techniques.
3. The success of this fisheries research program
was indicated by a Soviet decision in 1967 to begin regular
commercial operations. Fishing fleets, each consisting of
as many as 10 large stern trawlers, now routinely operate
in the Scotia Sea northeast of the tip of the Antarctic
Peninsula, and south of New Zealand. In 1968 and 1970 the
USSR unsuccessully attempted to buy or lease the abandoned
British whaling station on South Georgia Island as a base
for part of these operations. The institutionalization of
these operations was formalized in 1972 by establishment
of the Antarctica Fishing Association within one of the
four Soviet Fishing Directorates.
4. Commentary in Soviet journals makes clear that the
Antarctic Treaty, because it fosters cooperative scientific
activities, is considered an aid rather than a hindrance to
commercial exploitation of biological resources in Antarctic
waters. The Treaty provision for exchange of information,
which might be considered a disadvantage in competitive
-10-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000pID4JI P84-00825R000300090001-1
fishing activities, has posed no problem for the USSR
since proprietary information on size and type of catches
in the Antarctic is withheld in the same manner as it is
in other fishing regions of the world. Although research
publications and news reports contain some information on
marine activities, USSR information reports exchanged under
the Treaty do not include data on fishery research ships
and trawlers or on other research vessels that are not
part of their regular Antarctic expedition.
5. An attempt by several countries during the sixth
consultative meeting in 1970 to improve the exchange of
information about research vessels was strongly resisted
by the USSR on the incorrect grounds that the information
was already being provided. A recommendation on exchange
of information on oceanic research was subsequently adopted,
but has resulted in no improvement in Soviet reporting
practices. In a similar vein, the USSR has failed thus far
to report its seal catches as required by the agreed measures
on flora and fauna.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
Confidential
Confidential
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 'Approved For Release 2000104f'18~. 1~A} 6P84*P8ORO=G9MQP4 Interests
in Antarctic Mineral Resources
Disseminated 12 Qctgber 1473
Title of Itc=m,ort;
Soviet Interest in Antarctic Mineral Ifte sources
Date
20 Se: atember 1973
Itr ~o~ t: 1I Project: No. C1re.ification Control
3bA:%'( TIt. 1 [ ) cold lUl ~ 4 7 z z f s l ; i j...1 TD1 T CL BY Ol _--
Name of Roqur.st er Nafrie of Ana st Branch
Into r re cy~(' > r J.ttec on Ai,'-aret:i.c^ 01), i)
IIJTEflNAI,
1 -Vernon A. IJalters, DDCI, 7E12, HQ
1 - O/DDI, 7E1+1+, }IQ (Attn:
1 - CRS/DPSD/DSB/Dac, iE1+810, HQ
2 - CRS/ISG, 11119, HQ
2 - IRS/HMG, 2GIE0, IIQ
1. - OD/IAS, 3N110, 25X1 A
1 - OD/OER, 4r-i8, IIQ
I - OD/OSR, 3G00, IIQ
1 - OD/OCI, 71'21+, HQ
1 - OD/BGI
1 - OCh/NISD/OBGI
2 - OCh/CD/OBGI
2 - OCh/MLD/OBGI
7 - OCh/GD/OBGI
3 - OCh/GD/X/OBGI
1 - OSI/PSED, 5F25, HQ
3 - NPIC/I13, 15518,
1 - Archives, Bldg.
25X1A
25X1A
TIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Release 20 W04119 ;~cA DP84-00825R000300090001-1
EXTY'1i1' AL
DIA
2 -
25X1A
Dep. Dir. for Scientific & Tech. Intelligence
Dci'ense Intelligence Agency
Pentagon (Rm IE864)
Wash., D. C. 20301
DoD
1-Hr. Harris B. Stone
Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Department of Defense
Pentagon (Rm 413525)
Wash., D. C. 20301
1 - Cdr. Don Walsh
Office of Assist. Sec. Navy (R&D)
Department of Defense
Pentagon (Pm 4D'(41)
Wash., D. C. 20301
1 - Cdr. Kelsey B. Goodman
OASD/ISA
Department of Defense
Pentagon (r 4B748)
Wash., D. C. 20301
2 - SCI/SA
Rm. 7824A
Department of State (Attn: Robert Yoder)
1 - INR/DFR/RGE
Rm 8744
Department of State
1 - INR/DRR/RES
Rm 7813
Department of State (Attn: Kenneth A. Kerst)
1 - ACDA/HEA
Rm 4929
Department of State (Attn: Evan T. Sage)
NSF
U- 1 - Capt. James E. leg
Chief, Polar Planning & Coordination Staff
Rm 620 -D
N on rcienci. Foundation
Approved-or elease 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
2 -
 - Approved For Release 2000/04/11 gc .t t:1A- 84-00825R000300090001-1
EXERN/:L (Continued)
1 - Martin Procl;ni h
Office of the Science Advisor
Department of Interior
Rnn 5201+, GSA Bldg.
19th & F. Sts ., N. W.
Wash., D. C. 2021F1*
1 - Uzuited States Geological Survey
Topographic Division
Rm 6211-3, GSA Bldg. h 19th .,rDE ? C . J26241+ W .
1 United States Geological Survey
Office of Plans and Program Development
International Activities Branch
Rm 1013, GSA Bldg.
19th & F. Sts., N. W.
Wash., D. C. 2021+1+
N
1 - Office of Naval Research
Naval Research Group, Earth Science Division
Arctic Programs
Ba1._ston Center Tower
800 Quincy St.
Arlington, Va. (Attn: R. K. McGregor)
1 - Naval Intelligence Command
Naval Intel. Support Center
Science and Tech. Department
Rm S1.33
1+301 Suitland Rd.
Suitland, Maryland
1 - Office of the Oceanographer
Assist. Chief of Staff for Oceanographic Analysis
Hof fYnan Bldg. (Idn 8S23)
21+61 Eisenhower Blvd.
Alexandria, Va. (Attn: James Q. Tierney)
-3-
Approved For Release 2000/04/' 9,;,Q #,-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
fill
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Rel sse 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-008 R000300090001-1
GEOGRAPHY DIVISION Record of Classification Decision
19 S tember 1973
(Date)
1. Title of report, study, or map: S X (X ( (~Xl (7(X~(?I i( X~( X9(~(~(
Soviet Interest in Antarctic Mineral Resources
2. Project Ro. and Report No. or Map No.: 69.1361/7 (Pt. II) RP 71E/5
3. Classification, control, and exempt category: CONFIDENTIAL E(3)
4. Name of classifier: OBGI/GD/X
25X1A
5. Rationale for classification.and exemption:
Disclosure of CIA interest in the subject would probably cause
damage to United States relations with the USSR in the Antarctic.
6. Sources used in report, study or map which have a bearing on
classification and exemption:
Photograph, Fig. 2y was obtained from a private citizen on the
understanding that his cooperation with-CIA would be protected.
NOTE: Prepare in triplicate -- one copy
for Branch-Project File and two copies
for Division Front Office.
CONTROL or CLASSIFY, according to
content of entries.
UPON f IDE 4 IAL E _ ThFDET CL BY 019641
Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300090001-1
 Approved For Rase 2000/04/113 C3%KDP84-0W 06M@@Jab10-1
ME "M -
SUBJECT
PROJECT PROPOSAL
RESEARCH ACTIVITY NOTICE
Soviet Interests and Policies Regarding Antarctic
Mineral Resources
REQUESTER
Interagency Committee on Antarctica
A paper on this subject was furnished to a committee
of the Antarctic Policy Group in June 1973 as a contribution
to an interagency study on Antarctic mineral policy. We
propose adding a small amount of new material and a summary
and conclusion section to round it out for broader dissem-
ination as a Research Paper. A map and perhaps two
photographs will also be added.
COORDINATION REQUIRED FROM
CD/BI : map
OTHER CIA: none
NON-CIA : none
69.1361/7
Part II
August 1973
GD/X
25X1A
Ac ing
X XwXK Xxl mxx*) ) xxxxxXXXXX XXX ICHIEF, Special Research Branch DATJ9July73
REPORT NUMBER
CIA/BI G
MANHOURS EXPENDED
TYPIST TS C STANDARD
EDITOR
ANALYST MI ED
Approved For Release
SUBJECT CODE PUBLICATION DATE (ANALYST/BRANCH
FORM 2594 E (3) IMPDET CL BY 019641 CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET ,,,