THE MALACCA-SINGAPORE STRAITS: PASSAGEWAY OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000 01 0 v4
'ionfid'en~tia
No Foreign Dissern
:
The Malacca -Singapore ts
Passageway of International Concern
Confidential
BGI RP 74-11
February 1974
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically. declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONTENT S
Summary . .
.
Background: The "Nationalization" of the Straits .
3
Factors in the Formulation of "Nationalization"
Military and Strategic .
5
Economic
6
Pollution: The Real Issue?
8
Alternatives to Supertanker Use of Malacca-Singapore
The Lombok-Makasar Straits?
Z3
More Oil From Southeast Asia?
Z5
A Kra Isthmus Canal or Pipeline?
Z6
Outlook 17
Maps :
Map A -- Petroleum Tanker Routes: Persian Gulf to
Japan . . . Following Text
Map B -- The Malacca-Singapore Straits . Following Text
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1974
THE MALACCA-SINGAPORE STRAITS:
PASSAGEWAY OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
Summary
The Malacca and Singapore Straits, long a vital link in
the major maritime trade route between the northern Indian
Ocean and the Pacific, have been given special prominence by
the claim of Indonesia and Malaysia that vessels sailing
through the Straits do so under the right of innocent
passage. Their assertion raises the issue of control over
more than 100 other straits around the world which are less
than 24 miles wide and have traditionally been regarded as
international waterways.
Both Indonesia and Malaysia charge that uncontrolled
use of the Straits by foreign warships is a threat to their
security and that lack of controls over other ship traffic
in the Straits encourages smuggling and illegal immigration.
Indonesia's demand for prior notification of the movement of
all foreign warships through the waterway has gone unheeded
by both the United States and the Soviet Union, the major
naval powers operating in the region.
The threat of pollution by the growing fleet of
supertankers is one of the principal reasons that Indonesia
and Malaysia are pressing for controls. Supertankers now
using the Malacca-Singapore Straits are straining the capa-
city of the narrow, shallow, and congested waterway, and
the risk of accident and accompanying oil spill is high.
Comments and questions may be directed to
of the Office of Basic and Geographic InteZZigence, Co e
Z43, Extension 3057.
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1A
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Although there has as yet been none, a major oil spill from
a supertanker accident could cause millions of dollars worth
of damage to the Straits' ecology, particularly to the
fishing industry. The Straits countries insist that even
with navigational improvements the passage is not safe for
use by ships larger than 200,000 deadweight tons (dwt).
Meanwhile, 250,000-dwt tankers enroute from the Middle East
to Japan continue to sail through the Malacca-Singapore
passageway rather than detour to the longer and more ex-
pensive route via the Lombok and Makasar Straits.
Since it appears Japan must continue to rely on Middle
East oil, the supertanker traffic through the Straits will
continue as long as oil is shipped on tankers of 250,000
dwt or smaller. The touted ship canal or oil pipeline
across Thailand's Kra Isthmus could handle only part of
Japan's Middle East oil, and thus the construction of either
would not eliminate supertankers from the Straits.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
1. The Malacca-Singapore Straits is a chokepoint in
the most direct maritime route between the northern Indian
Ocean and the Pacific (Map A, following text). This 550-
mile waterway, separating West Malaysia and Singapore from
Indonesia, has for centuries been regarded as an international
passageway; however, Indonesia and Malaysia challenge its
international status and threaten to impose controls on ship
traffic that they consider detrimental to their interests.
Such traffic includes warships of both the United States and
the USSR and supertankers that carry the nearly 80 percent of
Japan's crude oil requirements supplied by the Middle East.
During the Middle East crisis in late 1973 movement of a
task force of the U.S. 7th Fleet westward through the
Straits without prior notification to the Indonesian Govern-
ment exacerbated an already sensitive issue in U.S. -
Indonesian relations. Why did Indonesia and Malaysia
"nationalize" the Malacca-Singapore passageway? Was security
their major concern? Were there economic reasons? Or was
the fear of pollution from Japan-bound supertankers the real
reason?
Background: The "Nationalization" of the Straits
2. Prompted largely by Japanese initiatives in the
matter, the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore
issued on 16 November 1971 a joint statement which maintains
that responsibility for safety of navigation in the Straits
rests solely with the Governments of the three Straits countries.
Indonesia and Malaysia contend in the statement that the
Straits are not international waterways; they, therefore,
recognize use of the Straits for international shipping only
in accordance with innocent passage, the principle that
allows only those vessels considered not prejudicial to the
peace, good order, or security of the coastal state to pass
freely through the territorial seas of a foreign state.*
* Indonesia has claimed a 12-mile territorial sea since
Z957, and Malaysia extended her territorial sea to 12 miles
in Z969. A boundary separating the waters of Indonesia
from those of Malaysia in the Malacca Strait, which narrows
to less than 8 miles, was delineated in 2970. A treaty
between Indonesia and Singapore, signed in May 1973,
delineated their boundary in the Singapore Strait -- less
than 6 miles wide at its narrowest point.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Singapore only took note of her neighbors' positions on
sovereignty. Economically dependent on the free flow of
ships through the waterway, she contends that the Straits
are international and that all ships have the right to
free transit.*
3. Indonesia was the leader in promoting the "national-
ization" policy and now regards the Malacca Strait to be
under Indonesian and Malaysian sovereignty without
qualification. Although Indonesia has shown no indication
that she will drop her sovereignty claims in the Strait,
they could be used as a quid pro quo to obtain other rights
at the Third International Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference,
now scheduled to convene in Caracas in June 1974. Indonesia,
for example, might agree to drop her demands for control over
shipping in the Strait if other countries were to accept her
broad claim to sovereignty over all the waters of her
archipelago.** Malaysia, although in general agreement with
Indonesia over the rights of transit in straits used for
international navigation, is probably more willing to drop
her demands for control over all shipping through the Strait.
4. The Malacca-Singapore Straits sovereignty question
exemplifies the issue of sovereignty over all straits that
traditionally have been recognized as international waterways
not subject to control by the coastal states. If a 12-mile
territorial sea is adopted at the LOS Conference, navigation
in more than 100 straits less than 24 miles wide could be
restricted by the coastal states. Straits countries such as
the Philippines, Spain, Morocco, and Greece have supported
Indonesian-Malaysian "nationalization," agreeing that
navigation through the straits should be governed by the
principle of innocent passage, not free transit. The
maritime countries, led by the United States and the USSR,
Unimpeded transit by ships and aircraft through and over
straits used for international navigation.
4* See CIA/BGI RP 74-2, "Indonesia's Archipelago Waters:
Rich, Strategic, and In Dispute," August l973, Confidential
No Foreign Dissem.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
argue that passage (including submerged submarines and
overflights) should continue to be without restrictive
coastal -state controls.
Factors in the Formulation of "Nationalization"
Military and Strate icjcc
5. Recognition of the increased strategic importance of
the Malacca-Singapore Straits was a factor in the
Indonesian-Malaysian "nationalization." The power vacuum
in the Indian Ocean has been filled by the navies of both
the United States and the USSR since the withdrawal of the
British Navy in 1971. Passage of warships of both countries
through the Straits from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean
during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict may have accelerated
the "nationalization" decision. Both Indonesia and Malaysia
view the growing traffic of foreign warships as a threat to
their security and also fear that lack of any control over
traffic in the Strait could encourage smuggling and illegal
immigration. Indonesia, alleging foreign support to Sumatran
rebels during the anti-government rebellions of the 1950's,
is particularly sensitive to the perils of illegal entry
along her Sumatran coast. The Malacca countries initiated
joint naval patrols in the Strait in 1973. Their announced
intention was to prevent seaborne infiltration by subversive
elements and monitor foreign warship traffic as well as to
control piracy and smuggling, to police fishing activities,
and to prevent pollution. They conducted a joint naval
exercise in the Strait in December 1973.
6. Although officials of both Malacca countries have
discussed the imposition of stringent controls on warships
in the Strait, ranging from requiring information on cargoes
to an outright ban, neither country has yet demanded author-
ization for warship passage because their navies lack the
strength to enforce such an edict. Indonesia has, however,
requested prior notification of the passage of all foreign
warships through the Strait. Malaysia, less plagued by
illegal immigration and smuggling than Indonesia, less
inclined to clash with major world powers over the Strait
issue, and more willing to defer the question of sovereignty
until the 1974 LOS meetings, has not requested prior
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
notification. Passage of both U.S. and Soviet warships
from the Pacific to the Middle East in November 1973
without prior notification toughened Indonesia's already
staunch "nationalization" posture.*
Economic
7. Although economic considerations did not play a key
role in the "nationalization" of Malacca,** Malaysian
officials have advanced schemes to make money from its
use by foreign ships. Malaysian politicians have, from
time to time, suggested that fees be imposed on all foreign
ships using the Strait. The Chairman of Pernas (the State
Economic Corporation), unofficially proposed a toll rate
in 1972 that he estimated would earn a yearly revenue of
nearly $150 million for Malaysia and Indonesia. His
proposal would, in effect, penalize those ships that called
at Singapore by assessing smaller fees for ships stopping
at either Indonesian or Malaysian ports, an apparent attempt
to get more shipping business for Malaysia and Indonesia at
Singapore's expense. Indonesian officials have considered
a plan to levy a fee on all supertankers using the Lombok
Strait between Bali and Lombok (Map A). Their efforts to
reroute supertankers larger than 200,000 deadweight tons
(dwt) from a route through Malacca to one through Lombok,
therefore, may in part be economically motivated.
* The United States informally provides Indonesia with
prior notification of U.S. warships sailing through the
Indonesian archipelago. Because the United States con-
siders Malacca to be an international strait, however,
notification is not provided to either Straits country
of U.S. warships sailing only through Malacca.
"The 1958 LOS Convention on the Continental Shelf accorded
coastal states jurisdiction over all resources on and under
the adjacent continental shelf to a water depth of 200
meters. All petroleum deposits in the Straits, therefore,
are already under the unchallenged jurisdiction of the
Straits states.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
8. Neither of these proposals has been officially
endorsed by either government, principally because the
1958 LOS Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone forbids a toll on ships for passage through the
territorial sea. Charges for specific services provided
to ships sailing through the territorial sea can, however,
be levied by the coastal state. Indonesia and Malaysia
want the right to collect revenues from ships using the
Malacca Strait to offset the cost of ensuring navigational
safety and pollution control. Officials from both countries
are probably waiting for adoption of a 12-mile territorial
sea at the 1974 LOS Conference to clarify Malacca's
sovereignty before more strenuously advancing the toll
proposals.
9. Since the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967,
Indonesian officials have advanced a plan to develop Tjilatjap
(Cilacap), on Java's south coast (Map A), as a repair and
bunkering port for merchant ships forced to detour to the
Cape Horn - Lombok Strait route between Europe and the Far
East. The plan has never gotten off the drawing board,
however, and Indonesia may hope that the "nationalization" of
the Malacca-Singapore waterway and the rerouting of super-
tankers larger than 200,000 dwt to a route south of Java and
through the Lombok Strait will revitalize the scheme.
10. In 1971, Malaysian officials announced plans to develop
supertanker repair facilities at Port Kiang (formerly called
Port Swettenham), Malaysia's largest port. Talk of the Port
Kiang proposal has been stilled, however, since a joint
Malaysian-Indonesian announcement released in 1972 dis-
couraged the use of the Straits by supertankers larger than
200,000 dwt. Development of supertanker facilities at Port
Kiang could have taken business away from Singapore and
would have dampened plans by Indonesian officials to develop
Tjilatjap (Cilacap) as a supertanker repair port. Singapore's
ship repair facilities can now accommodate 230,000-dwt tankers,
and a drydock capable of handling 400,000-dwt vessels is
under construction. The decision to construct the facilities
to handle the larger vessels presumably preceded recent
surveys which indicate that vessels in the 400,000-dwt
category may be unable to safely sail through the Malacca-
Singapore passageway (See Paragraph 15).
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Pollution: The Real Issue?
11. Until the mid 1960's, when the supertankers
(200,000-dwt or larger) were first launched, international
tanker traffic was of little concern to states through
whose straits the tankers were sailing. Maneuverability
of the smaller tankers had not been a major problem, and
their drafts were not critical in relation to the depths of
the straits. The Torrey Canyon disaster, although involving
a medium-size tanker, focused attention on the hazard to
the marine environment created by the larger tankers because
of their reduced maneuverability and increased draft.* The
countries flanking the narrow, shallow, and congested
shipping channels of the Malacca-Singapore Straits have
particular reason to fear pollution by supertankers.
12. Malacca Strait, more than 200 miles wide at its
northern end, constricts to no more than 8 miles amid a
cluster of islands in the south (Map B, following text).
Singapore Strait is less than 6 miles wide at its narrowest
point. Shipping channels in Malacca narrow to 2 1/2 miles,
those in Singapore to about 1 mile. Supertankers, with
lengths exceeding 1,000 feet, have limited maneuverability:
the 200,000-tonners require more than 20 minutes and 3 miles
to come to an emergency stop from full speed ahead.
Navigation through such constricted channels, therefore,
must be slow and careful.
13. Channel depth is even more critical than width
in limiting the size of ships that can safely use the Straits.
Depths in the northwestern part of Malacca are everywhere
more than 125 feet, more than adequate for even the largest
supertanker, but in the narrow shipping lanes in the
southeastern part and in the Singapore Strait, depths are in
several places only in the 75 to 80 foot range. Table I
indicates the approximate drafts of today's supertankers
and the minimum depth required for safe passage.
The ZZ9,000-dot Torrey Canyon grounded off the southwest
coast of England in 2967. Some 80,000 tons of oil were
spilled into the sea, much of it washing up onto the nearby
shores of England and France. Damage to all parties, direct
and indirect, was estimated at more than $28 million.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
Tonnage (dwt)
CONFIDENTIAL
Draft (feet)
Minimum Depth
(draft+10%)
150,000
60
66
200,000
62
68.2
250,000
66
72.6
325,000
80**
88
484,000
92
101.2
14. In 1967, the 205,953-dwt Idemitsu Maru became
the first vessel of more than 200,000 dwt to pass through the
Malacca-Singapore Straits. Although her loaded draft of only
58 feet was far less than drafts of vessels now using the
Straits, the ship scraped bottom twice. Coming close on the
heels of the Torrey canyon disaster, the Idemitau Maru incident
clearly illustrated the problems of use of the Straits by
supertankers and the urgent need for surveys to enhance the
safety of the shipping channels. At least one other super-
tanker has since scraped bottom in the Straits.
15. Japan, the major user of the Straits, surveyed
critical shoal areas in 1969. Since "nationalization" in
1971, however, Malaysia and Indonesia have objected to such
unilateral operations, and subsequent surveys have been
conducted by a consortium of Japan and the three littoral
Sixty percent of the tonnage of tankers being built or on
order at the end of 2972 was in the 200,000- to 285,000-dwt
category; another Z7 percent was in even bigger ships. The
largest tanker in service is a 484,000-diet vessel, and at
least one more of this size is being built. Twenty-two
vessels on order will have capacities more than 350,000 dwt.
A 700,000-Conner will be in operation in 2976. A miZZion-
tonner, with 4 detachable tank caissons each with a 250,000-
ton capacity, is the subject of a feasibility study.
Some of the specially designed supertankers of 350,000 dot
now on order draw only 72 feet.
-9-
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
countries. Using survey findings, officials of the four
countries have met to establish a navigation improvement
program, including a traffic separation scheme first proposed
by the UN's Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) in 1967. The latest survey, conducted
in 1972, shows that a depth of at least 23 meters (approxi-
mately 75 feet) can now be assured. While the Straits
countries agree with Japan on the findings of the surveys,
there is disagreement as to the conclusions that can be made
from them. The Japan Ministry of Transport contends that
the Malacca-Singapore sealanes, with a miniumum depth of
75 feet, are safe for use by tankers larger than 200,000 dwt
(no upper tonnage limit specified). Malaysian and Indonesian
officials, on the other hand, argue that the shipping
channels, even with a minimum depth of 75 feet and with
improved navigational aids, are not necessarily safe for
passage by the 200,000-tonners. They continue to request
that supertankers of this class detour to the deeper Lombok
Strait route to the southeast.
16. Most of the more than 35 tankers exceeding 200,000
dwt that currently ply the Middle East - Japan run use the
Malacca-Singapore route. The largest tanker to have sailed
through the Malacca-Singapore Straits is a 276,000-dwt
vessel, which, according to Japanese sources, has made
several fully loaded trips. According to the 3 July 1972
edition of the Japan Petroleum Weekly, two other Japanese
tankers with tonnages more than 250,000 dwt (250,749-dwt and
257,226-dwt) use the Straits.
17. Heavy traffic in the Straits compounds the
likelihood of a supertanker accident. According to the most
recent count of ships, taken by the Singapore Ministry of
Communications over a 4-week period (7 February to 6 March
1973), 4,019 ships sailed through the passage (a rate of
about 53,000 yearly). Table II, based on the Ministry's
survey, categorizes traffic during the 4-week period by
ship size and function and compares the 1973 figures with
the results of a similar survey in 1969.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Ship Size (dwt)
1973
1969
more than 30,000
276*
162
5,000 - 30,000
1,857
2,344
75 - 5,000
1,882
940
under 75
4
177
4,019
3,623
Ship Type
Cargo
2,595
1,961
Tankers and Bulk Carriers
1 ,115
1 ,231
Tugs, Fishing Ships,
Sailing Craft, etc.
38
27
Unclassified
271
404
18. Shipping unquestionably is the largest polluter
of the Malacca-Singapore Straits in view of the paucity of
shore-based pollution sources and diminution of offshore
oil exploration in early 1973.** There has not been a
Of these, 46 are supertankers of more than 180,000 cIvt.
** Seven wells had been drilled in Malacca in 2972, but
results were not encouraging and all exploration activity
had ceased by early 2973. Exploration in the Strait,
however, was expected to resume later in Z973. Because
oil discoveries in the Strait could bring substantial
incomes to the Straits countries, Indonesian and Malaysian
officials have not been as vocal about the pollution
threat from the oil exploration rigs as from the supertankers.
The danger, however, has been officially acknowledged. The
Malaysian Minister of Health wrote an article in 2971
charging that the rigs were a potential source of pollution.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
major oil spill in either strait, but supertankers are
clearly the most likely potential source. A U.S. consulting
firm that did a cost and benefit analysis in 1969-70
of proposed aids to navigation in the Malacca Strait
judged that if supertankers continue to use the Strait
without substantial improvements in navigational
aids, the risk of a serious accident is high. Singapore
has been quiet on the pollution issue despite greater
hazards to navigation in the Singapore Strait than in
Malacca and a higher frequency of minor accidents and oil
spills. Singapore, nonetheless, will probably join with
Malaysia, Indonesia, and other world straits states at
the 1974 LOS Conference to promote new international laws
to compensate coastal states for pollution damage from
ships.
19. Malaysia has been more concerned about pollution
than Indonesia, largely because the shipping lanes hug the
Malaysian coast for much of the length of the Malacca Strait,
and Malaysian waters and shores (including tourist beaches)
would suffer more from an oil spill than those of Sumatra
on the other side (Map B). Malaysia, therefore, has stressed
the pollution issue in asserting her claim to sovereignty
in the Strait. Both Malacca countries are concerned about
the damage to fishing operations that could be caused by a
sizable oil spill in the Strait. Indonesia, in fact,
contends that the Sumatran fishing industry has already been
severely damaged by oil flushed into the Strait by freighters
and tankers. The annual fish catch in the Strait normally
numbers in the hundreds of thousands of pounds.
20. Tides and currents in the Malacca-Singapore Straits
are not strong enough to flush the oil from a large spill
into the open sea. Because none of the littoral countries
has adequate facilities to control an oil spill, damage would
be high. An accident of the magnitude of the Torrey Canyon
could result in a loss of $2,500,000 worth of fish, according
to the cost and benefit analysis mentioned earlier.
21. Concern by Malaysia and Indonesia for ship-borne
pollution has not been limited to that by oil-carrying
vessels. Both countries joined other straits states at the
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
United Nations in 1973 to draft articles to regulate passage
through the straits of nuclear-powered ships or ships
carrying nuclear weapons or any other potentially harmful
material. Although the 1958 LOS Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone defined "innocent
passage" as passage that "is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order, or security of the coastal state,"'-'Malaysia
and Indonesia interpret the term to mean passage that is not
detrimental to the coastal state in any way. By this
definition, "innocent passage" could be applied to deny
entry into the Strait to any vessel carrying cargo or
powered by a fuel that, if leaked, could endanger the local
ecology.
22. Dredging has been proposed by Japan to improve
the navigability of the Malacca-Singapore Straits. Malaysia
and Indonesia object on the grounds that deeper water would
encourage greater use by foreign warships that would threaten
their security and by larger oil tankers that would pollute
their waters and shores. Turbulence in the Strait's waters
created by dredging, moreover, would have a deleterious
effect on sealife. Because massive amounts of silt are
continuously carried into the Malacca Strait by the rivers
of Malaysia and Indonesia, it is unlikely that dredging
operations could significantly increase the depth of the
entire passageway. At best, dredging could remove some small
shoals to ease the passage of ships of the size already
using the Straits.
Alternatives to Supertanker Use of Malacca-Singapore
The Lombok-Makasar Straits?
23. Because of the growing fear of accidents in the
hazardous shipping channels of the Malacca-Singapore Straits,
Indonesia and Malaysia announced in 1972 that the passage
through the Lombok and Makasar Straits is the designated
shipping route for tankers exceeding 200,000 dwt (Map A).
Oil shippers, however, have disregarded the edict. Most
supertankers on the Middle East to Japan run continue to use
the Malacca-Singapore route because it is nearly 1,300
nautical miles shorter than the one through the Lombok and
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Makasar Straits, the only viable alternative.* (The total
mileage between the Middle East and Japan is about 6,800
nautical miles via Malacca-Singapore and 8,100 nautical miles
via Lombok-Makasar). The round trip for a 200,000-dwt vessel
between the Persian Gulf and Japan via Malacca-Singapore
normally takes about 37 days, via Lombok-Makasar, about
42 days. Use of the former route adds one round trip yearly
to a ship's schedule. According to the 3 July 1972 Japan
Petroleum Weekly, if all Japanese tankers larger than 200,000
dwt are forced to use the Lombok-Makasar route for both east-
bound and westbound trips, the added yearly cost to the
Japanese petroleum industry would be 8,100 million yen (about
US $26,000,000).
24. The Lombok-Makasar shipping route, which already
handles annually several thousand cargo ships sailing between
Europe and the Far East around Africa, is far better suited
to accommodate supertanker traffic than the Malacca-Singapore
route. The main Lombok channel, the narrowest section of the
waterway, has a minimum width of 5 1/2 miles and depths
greater than 600 feet in most places. The Makasar Strait is
even broader and its shipping channel equally deep. North of
Sulawesi the route turns northeastward through the deep
Celebes Sea and enters the Pacific south of the Philippines.
Indonesia and Japan agreed in May 1973 to undertake a hydro-
graphic survey of the Lombok-Makasar passage to correct
emplacement of navigational aids; the survey is expected to
get under way early in 1974.
25. The Lombok Strait, like the Malacca-Singapore Straits,
narrows to less than 24 miles and will fall under Indonesian
sovereignty if a 12-mile territorial sea is adopted at the
h
A route between the Middle East and Japan that passes through
the Sunda Strait, between Sumatra and Java, is only about 700
nautical miles longer than through the Malacca-Singapore
Straits (Map A). Although some ships plying the Europe - Far
East route sail through the Sunda Strait, shallows in.the
western Java Sea and a narrow shipping channel with strong
currents in the strait itself makes inadvisable its use by
tankers much larger than 200,000 dwt.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
LOS Conference. Indonesia could also "nationalize" the Lombok
Strait in order to control the use of the Lombok-Makasar
passage by Japan-bound supertankers.
26. Since neither Indonesia nor Malaysia has the naval
strength to block the Malacca Strait, the extent to which
supertankers on the Middle East - Japan run will divert to the
Lombok-Makasar route will depend more on ship size than on
political or military considerations. Tankers in the 200,000-
to 250,000-dwt class will probably continue to use Malacca-
Singapore. Depths in this passage, however, will continue to
force tankers much larger than 250,000 dwt to detour to the
longer but safer Lombok-Makasar route. If Japan phases out
200,000- to 250,000-dwt tankers in favor of larger vessels,
Lombok-Makasar will handle most of the Middle East - Japan
tanker traffic. The recent Japan-Indonesia announcement of
plans to survey the Lombok-Makasar route in 1974 suggests
that Japan anticipates that an increasing number of her
supertankers will be using this route.
More Oil From Southeast Asia?
27. Southeast Asia currently supplies about 16 percent
of Japan's crude oil (43,720,000 tons in 1973), most of it
from Indonesia. Most of the rest is supplied by the Middle
East. Indonesia has argued that an unchallenged international
status for the Malacca-Singapore Straits coupled with better
navigational aids could improve Japan's access to Middle East
oil and adversely affect the competitive edge of Indonesian
oil. Japan, however, already consumes about 77 percent of
Indonesia's oil exports, a figure unlikely to increase in view
of Indonesia's desire to diversify her markets.
28. Japan would like to get more of her oil from
Southeast Asia for three basic reasons: Arab sources are
unreliable, as illustrated by threats in late 1973 to curtail
oil exports to Japan (Arab countries provide about 44 percent
of Japan's oil, Iran about 34 percent); shipping costs for
Southeast Asian oil are far less since Indonesia is only
3,000 miles from Japan while the Middle East is nearly 7,000
miles away; and Southeast Asian oil is low in sulphur, an
important consideration for Japan's pollution-conscious
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
consumers. Even if Southeast Asia were to dramatically
increase its oil production and its allotment to Japan,
however, Middle East oil flowing to Japan probably would
continue to increase because of the rapid escalation of
Japan's fuel consumption.* An increase in Southeast Asian
oil supplies to Japan, therefore, is highly unlikely to
reduce supertanker traffic through the Malacca-Singapore
Straits.
A Kra Isthmus Canal or Pipeline?
29. The construction of either a ship canal or an oil
pipeline across Thailand's Kra Isthmus, projects that have
been discussed by Thai officials for years, would ease the
pressure on Japan's oil supply route from the Middle East
(Map B). A route across the isthmus would be 350 to 450
miles shorter than the Malacca-Singapore Straits route
(depending on the route selected for the canal or pipeline)
and 1,650 to 1,750 miles shorter than the Lombok-Makasar
Straits route. More importantly, construction of a canal
or pipeline would remove the threat of Malaysian or Indonesian
interference with supertanker traffic. It would, however,
give Thailand a measure of control over Japan's oil supply,
a factor to be considered in view of anti-Japanese public
sentiment in Thailand.
30. Both projects would be expensive. The canal in
particular, although seriously considered by the Thai
Government in recent years, may be prohibitively costly and
would probably be unable to accommodate the larger supertankers.
The Thais have talked of a one-way canal for loaded eastbound
vessels up to 500,000 dwt; westbound ships would still use
one of the straits routes. Plans for a canal of this capacity
may be unrealistic, however, since it would require massive
excavation both on the isthmus and offshore. No determination
Japan's oil consumption projections, however, are clouded
by rapid increases in the price of crude and by the unreZi-
ability of the Middle East sources.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
has yet been made whether nuclear explosives can safely be
used for excavation. The canal could be completed in no
less than 8 years if nuclear explosives were used, and
conventional methods would require at least twice that time.
A minimum of 180,000 people reportedly would have to be
resettled if nuclear devices were used.
31. A pipeline, although limited to the transfer of
oil and therefore less versatile than a ship canal, would
be considerably cheaper to construct than a canal and, once
work is begun, could be completed in 3 to 4 years. It would
have a yearly capacity of 110 to 140 million tons of crude
of l . Supertankers up to 500,000 dwt would discharge thei r
cargoes at the western end of the pipeline, and the oil
would be pumped 108 miles to the eastern terminus for reloading
into vessels up to 200,000 dwt, the largest able to negotiate
the shallow approaches.
32. Because oil tankers do not normally call at either
Malaysian or Indonesian ports enroute to Japan, neither
country would suffer if all tanker traffic were diverted to a
Kra route. Such a diversion would, in fact, remove from the
Malacca-Singapore Straits most of the ships that the Straits
countries charge are a threat to the ecology of their waters
and shores. Only Singapore, with an economy heavily reliant
on shipping, would suffer, and even she might in the long run
welcome some relief from the congestion in her harbor. In any
event, the construction of either a canal or pipeline or both
would not eliminate all supertanker traffic from the Malacca-
Singapore Straits. A pipeline could serve only a fraction of
even present Japanese needs, and by the time a canal was
completed, it would probably be far from adequate.
Outlook
33. Indonesia will bargain hard at the 1974 LOS meetings
for international recognition of a "nationalized" Malacca-
Singapore Straits. A strong stand by the maritime nations for
continued international status for the Straits (along with more
than 100 other passages less than 24 miles wide) coupled with
weak Malaysian support for Indonesia may, however, lead to
compromise. Indonesia may drop her demands in exchange for
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
CONFIDENTIAL
some degree of international recognition of her claim to
sovereignty over all the seas within her archipelago. She
will want, at a minimum, the economic rights to all
resources in and under the seas of the archipelago.
Malaysia is less concerned with extending her sovereignty
into the Straits than with alleviating the threat
of pollution to her marine environment. She probably
will be willing to drop her demands for "nationalization"
of the waterway if she is assured of adequate
international provisions -- such as a limit on the
maximum draft of tankers sailing through the passageway --
to minimize the risk of supertanker accidents in the Straits.
Malaysia probably will also demand guaranteed adequate
compensation for any accident.
34. Japan's oil shippers would suffer a large financial
loss if all supertankers larger than 200,000 dwt were rerouted
to the Lombok-Makasar route. They contend that better
navigational aids in the Malacca-Singapore Straits would
ensure a reasonably safe passage of vessels up to at least
250,000 dwt. Most supertankers now on the Middle East-to-
Japan run, therefore, will continue to use the Malacca-Singapore
route, even though Indonesia and Malaysia may continue to
insist that all vessels larger than 200,000 dwt detour to the
Lombok-Makasar route. Neither an increase of Southeast Asian
oil exports to Japan nor construction of a canal or pipeline
across the Kra Isthmus would eliminate supertanker traffic
from the Straits.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 I
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 CIA-RDP84-00825R00.04OOi500014
m` o
cu)
C)
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Aw-magifififtelease 2000/04/18: CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
No Foreign Dissem
Confidential
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4
^ SECRET *+' H CONFIDENTIAL
25X1A
111
11
11
111
XX
PROJECT PROPOSAL
RESEARCH ACTIVITY NOTICE
N
E
I
SUBJECT
PROJECT NUMBER
The Strait of Malacca
61.2691
SUBJECT CODE
REQUESTER 25X1A
REQUESTING OFFICE
State/10
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM TARGET DATE
In 1971, Indonesia and Malaysia announced their intention to
nationalize the Strait of Malacca, one of the most strategic straits December 1973
in the world. Both countries claim that such control is necessary, ANALYST/BRANCH
partly to prevent pollution of the Strait's waters from oil spills
and consequent adverse effects on the livelihood of their nationals GD/F
who live on the Strait's littoral. In contrast, countries such as EST, ANALYST MANHOURS
Japan, the USSR, Great Britain, and the U.S. wish to maintain the
international status of the Strait free of any controls by Indonesia 100
or Malaysia. Nationalization of the Malacca Strait might have far-
reaching implications for international shipping as it might encourage other Strait
countries to undertake similar action. The straits issue will be a key one at the
upcoming Law of the Sea meetings.
To meet the needs of the requester (and others involved in LOS matters) this
Research Paper will focus on the political and economic considerations behind the
nationalizations of the Strait and on the political, military, and economic ramifi-
cations to international shipping if the Strait is nationalized. The basis for local
fears of pollution of the Strait and its contiguous shores by the new super-tankers
also will be discussed. (Much water has flowed through the Strait since publication
of GM 71-4, The Strait of Malacca, two-and-one half years ago. The proposed paper
will have an entirely different focus, consonant with current interests.)
COORDINATION REQUIRED FROM
CD/BI : Can probably use existing maps 25X1A
OTHER CIA: OCI and OER for coordination; CRS is supplying AEGIS run
NON-CIA : State/Office of the Geographer
'to/-73
DATE CHIEF, Geography Division, OBGI DA E Oct73
REPORT RECORD
TITLE
REPORT NUMBER
CIA/BI G
AREA CODE
SUBJECT CODE
PUBLICATION DATE
ANALYST/BRANCH
INITIAL NO. OF COPIES
MANHOURS EXPENDED
CLASSIFICATION
DISTRIBUTION
ANALYST
EDITOR
TYPIST
TS
C
STANDARD
S
U
LIMITED
FORM 'rjQApp~o d gNeC Ae 01Vt9o)04/18 IAi l'$WTbt~825R0003015 14
25X1A
 pE W LL CHECK CLASS CATION TOP AND BOTTOM
x 840
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
FORM NO. A 37 Use previous editions
1-67 G
PREPARE REPLY
RECOMMENDATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
0300150001-4
 A 88&d R6 4tie+0hM+8 f ` IAr-~ $ 46 0&lJd150001-4("
The Malacca-Singapore Straits:
Passageway of International Concern
INTERNAL
No. of Copies
Recipient
Da-,
Hea art~rs
adqu tern 25X1A
Attn
George A. Carver, Jr
D/DCI/NIO.
6F19
Headquarters
CRS/DPSD/DSB/Doc.
1E4810
Headquarters
CRS/ISG
11119
Headquarters
s RS/HRG
2.G40
Headquarters
1 D/BGI
*1 -
*2 -
*-1
*I -
hie?, Developing Nations Division,
C
A T_. -7 m
Headquarters
Approved 6i i elease 20001041.18'.'-' DP84-0 825R0 03001 001-4`
 Approved For Rel a 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00& R000300150001-4
OER/Southeast Asia Division/
International Transportation Branch
4G46
Headquarters
Headquarters
OSR/RA/C
2G17
Headquarters
OSR/RA/U
2G21
Headquarters
1H39
Division, CRS
Acting e , Western
Headquarters
IH18
CRS/.ISG, Far
Approved`F r'-Release 2000/04/18 CIA-RDP84-00825ROI00300150001-4
INTERNAL Cg2L~t-)
25X1A
25X1A
Chief, Economic Branch
Southeast Asia Division
OER
3G44
Headquarters
OCI/EA/SEA
5G23
Headquarters
25X1A
 Approved For Rele3te 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-0082000300150001-4
INTERNAL (Cont.)
v`1
25X1A
25X1A
CIA Operations Center
7F33
Headquarters
NFIC/IB
1S518
Congressional Support Officer
7F36
Headquarters
CIA Librarian
1H1122
Headquarters
Approved-,, Release 20:00/04/18 CIA-RDP84-00825R00030`01500b1-4
 Approved For Reuse 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-008. 5R000300150001-4
EXTERNAL
No. of Copies
Chairman of the NSC
Interagency Task Force on
the Law of the Sea and
Deputy Special Representative
of the President for the
Law of the Sea Conference
Department of State
D/ LOS
4321
V 1
V
Recipient
The Honorable
John Norton Moore
Bernard H.
Department
L/OA
6.420
New State
Oxman
of State
Burdick?'H. Britain
Department of State
S/FW-COA
3214
New State
Myron Nordqui s t
Department of State
D/LOS,
4.321
New State
The Honorable
John R. Stevenson
Special Representative of the
President for the Law of the
Sea Conference
Department of State
D/LOS
4.323
New'State
Otho Eskin
.Department of State
D/LOS
4323
New State
Tucker Scully
Department of State-
`.IO/UNP
6332
New State
Robert D. Hodgson
INR/DRF/RGE
.Department of State
8 744
New State
Ted Heavner.
Department of State
EA/IMS
$315
New` State-
Approve r Release 2( 0/0 118: `+ IA RbP' 4`= 0 258000 0015 0 1`-
 Approved For Releas'e' 2000/04/18: CIA-RDP84-00820000300150001-4
EXTERNAL (Cont.
Chris Chapman
Department of State
EA/RA
4310
New State
Pat Barnett
Department of State
INR/REA
8647
New State
V Charles E. Roh
Department of State
L/EA
6427
New State
David Lambertson
Department of State
EA/RA
4312
New State
RAdm. Max K. MorrisUSN
Department of 'Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
v 1
Representative for LOS Matt
2E97Z
Pentagon
John A. Dugger
Department of Defense
OASD/ISA
5A662
.Pentagon
Col. Vinconte T. Blaz, USiC'
-Department of Defense
JCS/J-5
IE969
Pentagon.
Cdr. C. Paul Ake, JAGC, ,USN
.ICS/J-5
Department of Defense
1E 696
Pentagon
u}`
Captain RobertA Shaid
Assistant Secretary, of Defense-
ISA/East Asia-Pacific
4C836
Pentagon
25X1A
DIA/D14A
MB 937
} is
Pentagon
Director, Defense Inte11ig^ace Agency
DS-4C
Building
Arlington Hall Station`
Director, National Security Agency
dart George G. Meade,,, Maryland
National Indications Center
1E821
64
Pentagon a ..._s, ._
Approved' f=or Release 24'00/04/18: `CIA- DP8=4 00825'Rf 06 300 50001-4
 Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825000300150001-4
EXTERNAL (Cont.)
JCS/NMCC
2D901
PPentagon
v Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence
Department of the Army
2E464
Pentagon
Assistant Chief of Staff-for.Intell
Department._of- the Air Force
4 893-2
Pentagon
~aag+err~ . -
The Honorable
Howard Pollock
Department of Commerce.
Deputy Administrator, NOAA
5802
'Washington, D.C. '20230
Mr. Leigh Ratiner
Federal Energy Office':
Director? ;Office of International
Policy, and Sec.urityr Affairs
7214
Columbia Plaza Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20520
Capt. Paul A. Yost
Department of Transportation
Special Assistant for LOS
to the Chief Counsel, USCG
Nassif Building
400-7th Street,S&'W.
Room 8115
Washington, P.C. 2G290
Jon Hartzell., Director
-Department of the Treasury
Office of Trade Negotiations
5416
Main Treasury Building
Washington, D.C. 20220
Denis Cliff,
National Security Council
368
Executive' "Office-Building
WashingtonD.C. 20.506
John Fox-
Office of .Management and Budget
822S' Executive. Office Building
Washington, D.C. 105"06
The Honorable
John Bus to rud
council, on. Environmental Quality
Room 22
22 7 fr} a F..
Jackson `P1ace, N;A1.
:.. Washington, .. D. C. 2000&.:.
Approve, 'Vor"release 2E 1116 ; CI"~4-f $4 k 8 R 30t 1 it?t '1-
 Approved For Release2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825 00300150001-4
EXTERNAL (Cont.
Ap~rovei cfr Release 2000/0 118
Norman A. Wulf, Rep. on
Law of the Sea
Office of the General Counsel
National Science Foundation
510
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20550
Robert-McManus
Environmental Protection Agency
Director of Ocean Division
Office of International Activities
813
401 M Street, S.. .
Washington, D.C. 20550
Pierce Elliot
Department of Interior
Assistant Solicitor
Division of Energy &
6343
-Washington, D.C.'20240
 Approved For Rellff 6 ~ 1It P80825R000300150001-4
GEOGRAPHY DIVISION Record of Classification Decision
15 February 1974
Date
1. Title of report, study, or map:
The Malacca-Singapore Straits: Passageway of International Concern ect
. or 2. Pr PI 61 I2691and 1'~CIA/BGIoRP 74t11p f:o.:
3. Classification, control, and exempt category:
CONFIDENTIAL/No Foreign Dissem
4.
STATINTL
5. Rationale for classification and exemption:
Discusses sensitive Law of the Sea issues including viewpoints of
foreign governments on specific issues.
6. Sources used in report, study or map which have a bearing on
classification and exemption:
1. A Large number of Cables
qe number o
STATINTL
NOTE: Prepare in triplicate -- one copy
for Branch Project File and two copies
for Division Front Office.
CONTROL or CLASSIFY, according to
content of entries.
Approved For Release 2000/04/18 : CIA-RDP84-00825R000300150001-4