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December 22, 2016
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July 27, 2009
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October 28, 1982
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Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893ROO0100020001-8 Directorate of Intelligence MASTER FILE COPY 00 ~J~Il1T OR MARK ON i Secret Secret GI TR 82-002 28 October 1982 Terrorism Review 319 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893ROO0100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Secret Terrorism Review F- Organize for Terrorism (OGI) OGI) ALA) (OGI) 25X1 25X1 -25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1- 25X1 Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Secret Terrorism Review F Overview International terrorism is affecting US security interests even in cases in which terrorist operations do not directly involve Americans. F 25X1 US relations with Turkey, for instance, have been adversely affected by a campaign conducted by two Armenian terrorist groups that has claimed the lives of more than 20 Turkish nationals abroad. Two recent attacks, in the greater Los Angeles and Boston areas, have resulted in strong Turkish pressure on Washing- ton. The Turks have messed for increased protection for their diplomatic personnel and for information on Armenian terrorist organizations. The Turks also have implied that US negligence permitted ASALA terrorists to leave West Beirut with the Palestinian fighters. 25X1 The attention focused on Armenian terrorism has also strained Turkish relations with other NATO states, thus inhibiting NATO harmony. Public sentiment in some areas of Western Europe tends to sympathize with Armenian grievances, which have been highlighted by publicity given the terrorism problem, and is mistrustful of the military government in Ankara 25X1 A second example involves US interests in the Middle East, which often have been affected by terrorism. Several rejectionist Palestinian terrorist organizations, which are outside the PLO umbrella, have conducted terrorist operations to provoke the Israelis, to oppose US policy, and to undermine the moderate wing of the PLO and moderate Arab regimes. The attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London in June, conducted by the bitterly anti-PLO Black June Organization, triggered the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and resulted in serious Another recent illustration of the indirect impact of international terrorism on US security interests was the Cichonero terrorist seizure of over 100 hostages in Honduras in mid-September. the terrorists sought to use the operation to press the Honduran Government to loosen its ties with the United States. We believe subsequent terrorist attacks with the same objective are likely in Honduras as long as the government cooperates with US security programs in Central America. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Moderate Palestinian Elements in West Germany and West Berlin Organize for Terrorism moderate Palestinians in West Germany and West Berlin have organized new terrorist groups for operations against US, Israeli, Syrian, and Gulf state targets as a result of the mass killings in September at the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. Many of these Palestinian moderates in West Germa- ny lost relatives during the fighting in Beirut; some lost their entire families to the subsequent massacres at Palestinian camps. This has deepened their desperation and their conviction that diplomacy will not provide early solutions to Palestinian problems. This perception is reinforced by the belief of many Palestinians that other Arabs had not supported them in Lebanon. Many responsible and heretofore moderate Palestinians are now discuss- ing the possibility of starting a campaign of violence in Western Europe. The objects of the campaign would be to exact vengeance against those they consider responsible for the events in Lebanon and to keep the Palestinian problem at the forefront of the world political agenda. arrangements regarding organization, operational techniques, logistics, tar- gets, and financial support are being implemented. By early October, groups of Palestinians in West Germa- ny and West Berlin had formed three-man cells capable of carrying out terrorist operations. Usin weapons obtained in East Berlin, the terrorists plan hit-and-run attacks rather than the 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 more complicated and logistically difficult hostage or kidnaping operations, and initial attacks are likely to be centered in West Berlin. Al- though the status of the logistic support of these militants is not clear, it seems likely that they will be able to obtain the necessary weapons. With careful planning, hit-and-run assassination operations, espe- cially against multiple targets, will be difficult for local security forces to prevent. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Terrorism and the Spanish National Elections 25X1 25X1 Major Spanish terrorist groups have stepped up at- October in eight different provinces, because of the tacks in the final days prior to the 28 October national similarity of a defused bomb to those previously used elections in an effort to provoke military intervention. by GRAPO The Basque separatist organization, Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), and the terrorist arm of the now illegal Reconstituted Communist Party of Spain, the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), have been responsible for several assassinations, bombings, and grenade attacks (see chronology). Dis- contented military officers point to this surge of violence as an indication that Spain's young demo- cratic system cannot maintain order. These attitudes play into the hands of both ETA and GRAPO, which we believe seek to provoke military intervention in the elections or even a military takeover. ETA and GRAPO believe either of these actions would increase their popular support. Despite increased counterterrorist efforts, we antici- pate more terrorist violence prior to the election. Although we believe that the pains antiterrorist police will be able to prevent any large- scale operation by ETA or GRAPO, small-scale attacks will probably continue unabated, particularly in areas outside Madrid, and will increase preelection Spanish counterterrorist efforts against ETA have met with considerable success within the past month. In San Sebastion a command unit leader, Fernando Barrio Olano, was killed and other ETA members, arms, ammunition, and documents were seized. On 20 September ETA was also stung by the voluntary dissolution of the VII Assembly, an ETA subunit that renounced violence in favor of participatory democra- cy. Although ETA formed an VIII Assembly to continue armed resistance, the new group was hard hit by the 12 October arrest of its leader Jesus Abriskita Korta in France, traditionally an area of sanctuary for Spanish Basque guerrillas. Despite these disruptions, ETA continues to conduct assassi- nations, bombings, and rocket-grenade attacks. tensions. Despite the arrest of three members on 15 October, GRAPO maintains the tempo of minor terrorist ac- tions throughout Spain, to promote an "active boy- cott" of the elections. Spanish police credit GRAPO with the majority of 11 bombings, which occurred 17 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Venezuela: Bandera Roja Setback) A joint operation by Venezuelan military and intelli- gence forces in the eastern part of the country has crippled the last remaining insurgent group, the Ban- dera Roja (Red Flag). The antiguerrilla campaign during the week of 4 October reportedly resulted in 23 deaths-one-third of the estimated strength of the insurgents. Carlos Betancourt established the Bandera Roja in 1969, when he broke with the Cuban-sponsored Revo- lutionary Left Movement (MIR) because it had re- nounced violence in order to become a legal political party. Recurring fragmentation over the years has hampered the group's efforts to mount large-scale terrorism. Since 1978 the most active component has been the Americo Silva Front, which has concentrated on acquiring equipment and engaging in small-scale bank robberies, kidnapings, and harassment. Al- though the group has generally avoided the kinds of indiscriminate violence that would alienate the public, it has not gained any popular base of support. gence and Prevention had been closing in on the insurgents since early this year. In April, security forces arrested Bandera Roja's principal leader, Gabriel Puerta Ayonte, and some of his followers. The element of surprise, together with a rare instance of effective coordination among the armed forces and security services, was primarily responsible for the highly successful operation this month. Cleanup oper- ations in the area were still under way 10 days later, as the Army attempted to round up remnants of the group. 25X1 25X1 Reactions in Venezuela have followed predictable lines. Both the ruling Social Christians and the other major party, Democratic Action, congratulated the government and reaffirmed opposition to the insur- gent movement.' Parties to the left, however, have raised questions of human rights violations. Respond- ing to these allegations, the government and the Chamber of Deputies have named a commission to investigate the incident. The Bandera Roja has been dealt perhaps a fatal blow. With only a few guerrillas left in the field, isolated acts of terrorism are still possible, but the return of any notable insurgency would probably require a seriously deteriorating economy and in- creased foreign and domestic support, none of which appears likely Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Bolivian-Italian Cooperation Against TerrorismF__-] Italian security authorities traveled to the Western Hemisphere early in October and, in collaboration with Bolivian security authorities, brought back for trial a rightist terrorist suspect wanted for involve- ment in the August 1980 bombing of the Bologna railway station-an attack that killed 85 people and injured 200, the largest number of casualties caused by a single terrorist incident in Europe since World War II. In an apparent effort to avoid the lengthy extradition process, the Bolivian Government of President Her- man Siles Zuazo-installed on 10 October-expelled the Italian rightwing terrorist suspect Pierluigi Pagliai, who had enjoyed the protection of the previ- ous military regime. After being wounded and arrest- ed in La Paz, Pagliai was tranported to Rome on an Alitalia DC-10, which the Italian Ministry of the Interior had requisitioned and dispatched to Bolivia with Italian secret service officials and police on board. These officials had also hoped to return with another terrorist wanted for the Bologna bombing, Stefano Delle Chiaie,' but he escaped capture. Neither Bolivian nor Italian authorities are eager to take public credit for this operation, which could create diplomatic and political problems for both governments. Pagliai's lawyer has already demanded an inquiry into whether the arrest violated interna- tional law and Italy's 1890 extradition treaty with Bolivia. Italian authorities suspect Pagliai and Delle Chiaie of being members of an Italian rightist group known as the National Vanguard, one of the numerous Italian rightist groups whose terrorist activities seldom re- ceive as much publicity as those of the Red Brigades, Front Line, and lesser leftist groups. Rightist tactics in Italy-as well as in other European countries- differ from those of the left; rightist terrorists often bomb targets with no apparent object except to cause as much damage as possible. These groups have shown an utter disregard for victims, who normally have no significant connection with the political scene. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Iq Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 ll Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Secret Statistical Overview Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982 6 1 6 6 6 8 8 10 7 58 11 12 11 13 9 35 13 13 2 119 Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students 8 5 3 9 2 5 7 2 3 44 Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks 1981 and 1982 Car bomb in Baghdad killed 2, wounded 130; Ankara airport attack killed 9, wounded 70. Assassination and bombing in Greece killed 2, wounded 70; bombing in Central African Republic killed 4. wounded 100. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Chronology ? 23 September 1982 Colombia 25X1 25X1 25X1 the National Liberation Army (ELN) was responsible for the attack on the Israeli Ambassador's residence in Bogota and not the M-19 group terrorist activities. Libyans residing abroad. or face reprisal. The threat is similar to one Qadhafi made in 1980, which preceded an 18-month campaign that resulted in the assassination of at least 12 7 October 1982 Libya Qadhafi issues a public warning to dissident exiles to cease oppositionist activities leading members of the dissident movement are primary targets. The sweeping call for all Libyan citizens to initiate attacks could lead to random killings not specifically authorized by the government. Recent information that the ELN has rejected the amnesty negotiations indicates ELN will continue its urban Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 8 October 1982 Spain ETA claims credit for two assassinations in the Basque country, and Spanish authorities believe the group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) is responsible for the attempted assassination of a policeman in Bilbao membe 25X1 9 October 1982 Spain In Irun, ETA claims responsibility for the assassination of a retired Civil Guard West Germany In Frankfurt, a bomb concealed inside a fire extinguisher explodes under a vehicle parked in the US Army housing area. Although no group claimed credit for the at- tack, the type of device is similar to those used by Revolutionary Cells in early at- tacks against US military facilities in West Germany. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 future hostage situations. Honduras Members of the Honduran Cobra counterterrorist unit raid a safehouse on-the outskirts of San Pedro Sula, freeing the 16-year-old daughter of prominent Honduran businessman Jorge Larach and killing three of her captors. The daughter has been held for 44 days by terrorists demanding $10 million ransom. The Cobras, whose ability to mount such an operation was in doubt during the re- cent Chamber of Commerce incident, may use this raid to press for intervention in Mexico The Honduran Embassy in Mexico City is briefly occupied by approximately 14 members of the PST Youth Cichonero Brigade who were protesting Honduran collaboration with the United States in "harassment" of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. After obtaining attention from the media, the group withdraws, threatening similar protests in the future. 25X1 Marquina: Spain ETA is probably responsible for the wounding of two Civil Guard officers when a remote-controlled bomb explodes under the truck in which they are riding in ETA "revolutionary taxes" continue to be targets of ETA. Spain In Irun, ETA claims responsibility for the bombing of a bank. Banks failing to pay this group is affiliated with the French group of. the same name. Canada In Canada, a dynamite bomb estimated to weigh 600 pounds explodes outside Litton Systems of Canada causing eight injuries and considerable property damage. A group called Direct Action subsequently claimed credit for the attack in a confessor letter, which outlined the group's opposition to nuclear weapons. Litton produces cruise missile components. We cannot determine at this time if nade and machinegun attack on Civil Guard Headquarters in Navarra. Spain One civilian is killed and two Civil Guard officers wounded in an ETA rocket-gre- Spain ETA probably is responsible for the rocket-grenade attack on the official residence of the government delegate in Vitoria in the Basque country. Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Secret 17 October 1982 Spain We believe both the First of October Antifacist Resistance Group (GRAPO) and ETA are involved in 11 bomb attacks in eight Spanish cities. Targets include f 1 ._/`P'___ I-I?.?l_J 11 25X1 Baader-Meinhof gang members in Stammheim Prison in October 1977. 18 October 1982 West Germany Four automobiles belonging to US military personnel in a US Army housing area in Frankfurt are the targets of arson. An anonymous group claiming solidarity with the Red Army Faction (RAF) takes credit for the attack in a confessor letter. The group claims the attacks are to commemorate the suicides of prominent Spain ETA claims credit for 21 attacks throughout Basque country, causing considerable property damage and wounding three. These attacks coincide with the campaign visit of Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8 Approved For Release 2009/07/27: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100020001-8