TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Terrorism
Review
GI TR 83-014
7 July 1983
Copy 4 7 8
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Secret
3 Highlights
Terrorism
Review F
(OGI)
25X1
Perspective-The Palestinian Split and International Terrorism) 25X1
The Fatah Rebellion:
The Background and the Players
(OGI)
Future Terrorism
(OGI)
17 Italian Terrorists Target Prisons
(OGI)
19 Reverberations From a Skyjacki g
The Politics of Counterterrorism
(OGI)
23 Argentina: Status of the Monteneros
(ALA)
Peru: Terrorist Activity in Lima
(OGI)
Special Analysis-Rightist Terrorism in Spain
(EURA)
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Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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Terrorism
ReviewF-
Perspective The Palestinian Split and International Terrorism
25X1
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The rebellion within Fatah-the dominant PLO group-means, in our view, a
greater possibility of Palestinian terrorism directed against American interests.
The mutiny against Arafat's leadership and policies has opened the PLO to
rejectionist, anti-American forces including Syria, Libya, Iran, and radical
Palestinian groups. It has undermined the authority of Arafat and his associates
who have kept a lid on anti-US terrorism and reduced the influence of Arab
moderates.
The tide clearly is running against continuation of the moratorium on international
terrorism by PLO-affiliated groups, which had been imposed in the mid-1970s to
facilitate a political settlement in the Middle East. One of the issues dividing
Fatah is Arafat's strategy of following the diplomatic track. Emboldened by
defiance of Arafat's authority and encouraged by such radical elements as Syria
and Libya, Palestinian groups already prone to violence are now beyond the 25X1
discipline of the moderate PLO leadership. former
Black September planner Abu Da'ud has thrown in with anti-Arafat forces. He
describes himself as head of "foreign operations," which, given Abu Da'ud's
involvement in Palestinian terrorism in the past, may point to resumption of
attacks outside the Middle East. 25X1
Increased influence in the PLO by radical groups and rejectionist states puts
American interests at greater risk to terrorist attack.
Syria has put together a terrorist network with headquarters in Damascus to
conduct operations in Lebanon designed to undermine PLO and Arab moderates
and inhibit implementation of the troop-withdrawal agreement.
One of the PLO-affiliated groups
heavily involved is Black June, which was responsible for assassinating PLO
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a Syrian surrogate. Another group
prominent in this Syrian strategy is the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Secret
GI TR 83-014
7 July 1983
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Secret
Syria also is encouraging Libyan and Iranian support to Fatah rebels and
rejectionist groups. The Libyans heavily fund the PFLP-GC
coordinated in Damascus appears, moreover, to include splinter Lebanese Shia
groups who also receive financial assistance and operational direction from Iranian
.intelligence officers in Lebanon.
In order to shore up his position, Arafat himself might authorize terrorist attacks
to appeal to hardliners. Unverified information indicates Fatah was involved in a
harassing attack against the multinational peacekeeping force (MNF) in March
and preparations for another in April. Because MNF forces shield Palestinian
civilians remaining in Beirut, we suspect Palestinian terrorists will refrain from
conducting large-scale attacks against the MNF. In Europe, however, Palestinian
infrastructures that could support terrorist operations are in place
For the near term, we believe fissures in Fatah and radical attempts to take over
effective control of the PLO make terrorist attacks against US interests in the
Middle East more likely. In the longer term, our reading at this juncture is that
moderate forces in the PLO who had enforced the moratorium on terrorism will
suffer a loss of influence. While prominent moderate personalities, including
Arafat himself, may survive, their authority will be diminished, making the
successor PLO more radical and more likely to countenance international
terrorism to achieve its goals.
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Highlights
Alert List Threat Level in Middle East Remains High. We believe that US nationals and fa-
cilities in the Middle East continue to be at high risk of terrorist attack.
Sandinista Assassins Target Contra Leaders. The powerful bomb that exploded in
downtown San Jose on 29 June prematurely detonated. It had been intended for
use against Eden Pastora or other leaders of the anti-Sandinista organization
ARDE, according to Costa Rican authorities. One of the perpetrators, identified
as a naturalized Nicaraguan and probable Sandinista agent, was killed in the
explosion. Costa Rican security officials fear the incident may be the beginning of
an intensified terrorist campaign by Managua against the anti-Sandinistas.
Terrorism in French Territories. The Revolutionary Caribbean Alliance-a
proindependence group responsible for the late May terrorist bombings in
Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana-has claimed responsibility for four
3 Secret
GI TR 83-014
7 July 1983
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recent bomb attacks in Paris. Several bomb threats have been made in the French
Antilles recently, including one against the US Consul General in Martinique.
Although the callers may not have been associated with the Alliance, and no
bombs were found, this raises the possibility that the recent surge in terrorist
activities in the three overseas departments may be extended to US personnel or
facilities.
numerous bombs have been placed
in and around Pretoria. Although the South African Police maintains that there is
no indication that terrorists are targeting diplomatic facilities or personnel, the US
Embassy there is adjacent to police headquarters, and bombs have been found at
police facilities outside Pretoria.
Probable Increase in Attacks Against Haitian Government. On 4 June 1983, a US
Court acquitted Hector Riobe Brigade activist Joel Deeb for his alleged involve-
ment in a raid mounted in Haiti during which an American tourist was wounded.
We believe the acquittal will be viewed by the Haitian exile community as
vindication and may result in increased antiregime activity.
Significant Developments Americans Held Hostage. Two Americans and three Europeans were taken
hostage by southern Sudanese rebels in Boma National Park in far southwest
Sudan on 27 June. The rebels demanded a ransom, military uniforms, and that a
political statement be broadcast on VOA and BBC by 6 July or the hostages would
be shot. One of the rebel leaders has been linked to Libya and has made broadcasts
on Radio-Libya. The rebels have claimed that they came from Ethiopia.
New Group Claims Turin Assassination. The newly formed Red Brigades (BR)
splinter, Common Organization for the Liberation of Prisoners (COLP), claimed
responsibility for the assassination of the Turin Chief State Prosecutor Bruno
Caccia, who was gunned down by masked men in a passing car on 26 June 1983.
COLP has promised an explanation for the attack; however, the most obvious
motivation may be the arrest of top BR leader Pietro Vanzi, announced on
23 June. We note the BR has recently threatened to avenge terrorist prosecutions,
and Caccia had played a key role in dismantling the BR and Prima Linea groups
in Piedmont.
Terrorist Elected to Italian Parliament. Toni Negri-founder of the extremist
group Autonomia and an important ideological influence in the Red Brigades-
was elected to the Italian parliament in the 26-27 June national elections. Negri,
who is in prison, is.now eligible for release on grounds of parliamentary immunity.
We believe Italian terrorists will interpret Negri's election as indicating broad
public support for'terrorist operations, and a surge in terrorism may follow.
Negri's success is likely to prompt other groups to explore ways of exploiting legal
political procedures to obtain publicity and legitimacy for their radical objectives.
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French Counterterrorism Effort in Trouble. Public disclosures of illegal procedures
and alleged coverups by members of France's elite counterterrorist squad, the
GIGN, may have seriously eroded public confidence in the French counterterror-
ism effort. A French court has ruled that the GIGN arrests of three Irish terrorists
in Vincennes on 28 August 1982-touted as the first major success in Mitterrand's
"war on terrorism"-were procedurally illegal. The release of the terrorists was
followed by court-ordered prosecution of two of the arresting gendarmerie officers
for perjury. Rumors that the Secretary of State for Public Security is assembling a
new counterterrorism staff have also reflected negatively on the counterterrorism
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Secret
The Fatah Rebellion:
The Background and the Players
possible terrorist fallout.
The mutiny among Fatah forces, initially an intra-
PLO matter, rapidly encompassed Syria, Libya, and
radical non-PLO groups. This article is intended to
help readers of the Terrorism Review better under-
stand the rebellion, the lineup of players, and the
Background
The rebellion in the Bekaa Valley in early May was
precipitated by Arafat's decision to solidify his control
over Palestinian forces there by installing loyalists in
senior military positions. His strategy backfired when
the loyalists were emphatically rejected by Palestinian
troops because of their poor performance during
Israel's incursion into Lebanon last year. Arafat's
refusal to revoke these appointments, coupled with his
authoritarian style of leadership and his perceived
lack of consultations with prominent Fatah cadre on
policy and strategy issues, resulted in the insurrection.
The mutiny was able to take hold and spread because
some rebel demands enjoy broad support within Fa-
tah. Since losing his Beirut headquarters, moreover,
Arafat has been unable to exert the same degree of
control over radical PLO elements that he had in the
25X1
'25X1
bly interpreted by leftists as a message from Arafat
that any actions threatening moderate control of the
Tensions between moderate and militant Palestinians
have been brewing for years. Fatah leftists have long
suspected that Arafat had a hand in the assassinations
of a prominent leftist, Majid Abu Sharara, in 1981
.and a top PLO military officer, Sa'd al-Sayil (Abu
Walid), in 1982. Underlying differences were brought
to a head by Arafat's attempts to negotiate a Palestin-
ian settlement with King Hussein. Fatah's mutilation
and execution of five Black June members in the
Bekaa in May also heightened tensions. The BJO
members were reportedly planning to assassinate
moderate PLO leaders, but their execution was proba-
25X1 PLO would not go unanswered.
Secret 25X1
GI TR 83-014
7 July 1983
The Players
The two main leaders of the mutiny are Col. Said 25X1
Muragha (Abu Musa), a respected Fatah military
commander, and leftist Fatah politician Muhammad
Nimr Saleh (Abu Salih).
former Black September leader, 25X1
Muhammad Da'ud Awda (Abu Da'ud) is secretly
working on behalf of the rebels and is in charge of
their security and foreign operations. The leaders
have received support from Libya, Syria, militant
Palestinians, and various PLO groups, who seek to
exploit the situation to advance their own interest.
Libya has provided arms and ammunition to the
dissidents through the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and
has moved its military contingent, which was sta-
tioned on the Syrian-Lebanese border, into the Bekaa
Syrian involvement has been central to the rebellion
against Arafat.
Syria initially urged Black .
June members in the Bekaa, who were subsequently
caught and executed by Fatah, to take action against
mainline PLO leaders. Black June, a renegade, non-
PLO group committed to destroying Arafat and the
moderate PLO, has been used by Syria in the past in
Various PLO groups have indicated their support for
the Fatah dissidents, including the PFLP-GC, Saiqa,
the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (FLP). Two larger PLO
groups, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
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The Fatah Rebellion: The Lineup
PLO groups Fatah: The established moderate leader-
ship, including Khalil al- Wazir and
Salah Khalaf, is supporting Arafat, as
are a significant number of Fatah mem-
bers.
Arab Liberation Front (ALF): A small
Iraqi surrogate group, with most of its
members in Baghdad, will support Ara-
fat as long as Iraq does.
Arab States Iraq: Has publicly supported Arafat's
leadership.
Saudi Arabia: Continues to financially
and politically support Arafat's leader-
ship.
Fatah: Abu Musa, a respected military com-
mander and Fatah political leftist, Abu Saleh,
are the two leaders of the Fatah mutiny. They
have been joined by other respected military
personalities such as Abu Raad, and an unknown
number of Fatah members in the Bekaa Valley.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GC): This Syrian-
directed and Libyan-funded group has provided
the most direct support to the leftists of all the
PLO groups. Undoubtedly at Syrian behest, the
group has given material and military support
and has served to keep tensions high in the Bekaa.
Saiqa: Another Syrian surrogate group that will
provide whatever support Syria commands.
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)-. A small, ardently
rejectionist group that supports the ideology and
demands of the Fatah leftists.
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP).
Another small radical group closely aligned with
DFLP and the PFLP because of its Marxist
ideology. The group provides limited political and
military support to the dissidents.
Black June Organization: (BJO) This radical
Palestinian group receives support from Syria
and Iraq and has devoted itself to destroying the
moderate PLO. The group has formed operation-
al ties with both the PFLP-GC and Saiqa and has
members in the Bekaa.
Abu Da'ud: A former Black September leader,
Abu Da'ud is reportedly secretly working with
the rebels as chief of "security and foreign
operations." Abu Da'ud's expertise and terrorist
contacts would significantly augment the rebels'
capability for carrying out terrorist operations.
Syria: Has indirectly fomented and fueled the
mutiny to serve its own foreign policy interests.
Ammunition and weapons have reportedly been
given to the rebels as well as logistic support.
Libya: has provided significant financial, mili-
tary, and political support.
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP)-. A Marxist group and
the second-largest PLO group after Fa-
tah. The leadership has publicly support-
ed Arafat, but some of the group's
members have joined the rebels and
privately share sympathy for some of the
rebels' demands.
Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP,1 This Marxist-Leninist
group has generally supported' mainline
PLO policies in the past. Like the PFLP
it has publicly supported Arafat but
would realign itself with the dissidents if
it believed that to be in its best interests.
The group is closely aligned with
Moscow.
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Palestine (DFLP) and the PFLP, have publicly come
out in support of Arafat, although some of their
members have joined the rebels and many others
share some dissident views. Though neither of these
two groups would like to see the PLO under Syrian
domination, it is unlikely that they would risk an open
confrontation with Syria on the issue of Arafat's
25X1 leadership.
Implications for Terrorism
The mutiny of Fatah forces has thus far been confined
developing tensions within the Palestinian communi-
ties in Kuwait and the Yemen Arab Republic. If
Arafat is unable to reintegrate the leftists, they will
to the Bekaa, though there has been
probably attempt to form a separate radical Palestin-
ian block under Syrian and Libyan tutelage, which
would significantly increase the international terrorist
threat.
In the wake of the Fatah split, the Syrians have
established terrorist networks in Beirut to be used in
staging operations in Lebanon, including attacks
25X1 against US Marines in the multinational peacekeep-
ing force and against Lebanese politicians]
Musa and Black June leader Abu Nidal are collabo-
rating in the planning of terrorist operations in Leba-
Terrorist attacks may also spill over into the European
arena as groups and factions jockey for power. Arafat
may have to countenance some of these attacks; he
may even feel obliged to lift his ban on international
terrorism in order to reestablish unity within the
PLO, though we consider this less likely at this
juncture. In any case, we believe that the PLO is
shifting to a more militant posture, which is likely to
contribute to an escalation of terrorist operations,
including attacks outside the Middle East.
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Italy: The Likely Shane
of Future Terrorism
The following article is based onl I a
cable from the US Embassy in Rome dated 13 June
1983 and entitled "Italian Terrorism: Down but Not
Out. " The material in the cable has been somewhat
shortened and modified, but every effort has been
made to faithfully reflect the views and judgments of
the author in Rome.
Terrorism in Decline
Five years after the kidnaping and murder of former
Prime Minister Aldo Moro, Italian terrorists are in
desperate shape. After having been a primary topic of
writing, conversation, and speechmaking for almost a
decade, terrorism is no longer at the center of atten-
tion of the Italian people, politicians, and media. This
has been the result of a recent, profound downturn in
terrorist activity.
The student uprisings of 1968 introduced a steep
upward trend in the number of terrorist acts in Italy.
A decade later the number of terrorist acts was still
rising but so, now, was the number of police successes.
Then in 1981-82 the number of terrorists arrested and
jailed rose sharply while the number of major terrorist
acts dropped off. There was very little terrorist activi-
ty during the winter of 1982, as the national attention
shifted to courtrooms across the land where acrimoni-
ous debates were taking place between arrested ter-
rorists who had decided to turn state's evidence and
those who remained committed to the terrorist cause.
More Terrorists in Prison
At the end of May 1983 more than 1,800 Italian
terrorists were behind bars, a thousand more than
three years previously. More than two-thirds of the
imprisoned terrorists were home-grown ` leftists,
chiefly from the Red Brigades (708) and Prima Linea
(290). These two groups suffered disproportionately
' Compared with domestic terrorists, foreign terrorists have never
been much of a problem in Italy.
from the government's improved concentration of
force and efficiency and from its success in exploiting
the avalanche of captured terrorists who took advan-
tage of temporary laws authorizing sharply reduced
sentences for those who "repented" and cooperated
with the police.
Less is known about Italian rightwing terrorists,
whose bombing of the Bologna railroad station in
1980 caused 86 deaths (making it the most lethal
terrorist act in modern Italian history) and catapulted
rightist extremism onto the center stage of public
attention. Although the police have not cracked the
Bologna bombing, they have been active, wounding
and capturing one of the two most wanted rightwing
Italian terrorists in Bolivia late in 1982 (he later died
from the wounds). The rightists have claimed credit
for few terrorist acts lately, perhaps because almost
500 of them were in prison at the end of May.
What the Authorities Think
Antiterrorist authorities claim that at their high point
in the late 1970s the Red Brigades and Prima Linea
alone totaled about 3,500 active members; today they
can count on hardly more than a couple hundred
loyalists outside prison. The police believe (although
they lack firm evidence) that most of these loyalists
are scattered, disorganized, and dispirited. The cur-
rent lack of public concern about terrorism mainly
reflects this drop in the fortunes of these two premier
leftist terrorist groups.
Complacency is hardly justified, however, while 226
leftist and 78 rightist terrorists-including many ac-
cused of murder-remain on the government's wanted
lists. Moreover, past police estimates of the strength
of Italian terrorist groups have repeatedly been signif-
icantly low. In addition to those on wanted lists, there
must undoubtedly be others never identified or freshly
recruited.
Secret
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Decadence
During the four-month period February through
May, there were only three terrorist acts that could be
classified as attempted murders; only one succeeded.
One of the failures, the 3 May shooting of Socialist
labor lawyer Gino Giugni, was instructive in that it
demonstrated how low Italian leftist terrorism has
sunk from the professionalism of the Red Brigades at
its peak.
The classic Red Brigades terrorist actions, whether
kneecappings, kidnapings, or assassinations, had cer-
tain characteristics in common:
? The nature and timing of each action were intensely
symbolic.
? The carefully chosen victims were highly visible,
politically significant, and ideologically antipathetic
to the Red Brigades.
? The actions were usually linked to popular
grievances.
Thus, Moro was the ultimate political magician, able
on behalf of Christian Democratic governments to
conciliate opposing forces-even the Communists-
while Giugni was closely identified with the recent
labor-management accord that brought credit to the
Fanfani government. Moro was kidnaped on a day of
great importance to the future of the government
coalition of that time, while Giugni was shot as
preparations for new national elections began.
Yet, the attack on Giugni was like a bad photocopy of
a classic Red Brigade action. The large team that
kidnaped Moro blew away his five bodyguards in an
impressive display of orchestrated precision. The
young woman who shot Giugni fired seven times from
close range but, owing to her precarious perch on the
back of a moving motor scooter, only wounded him
slightly. Aside from the driver of the scooter, she
apparently had no accomplices.
Down but Not Out
The lower levels of terrorist activity and increasing
evidence of terrorist incompetence are happy develop-
ments. Nevertheless, it is too soon to assume that the
three attacks in four months are "the final flicks of
the serpent's tail," as some Italian commentators have
written. In rolling up thousands of terrorists and
mountains of arms, the police scored successes im-
pressive to the public and devastating to the terrorist
organizations. In themselves, however, these successes
will not necessarily deter a resurgence in terrorist
activity. Italy is not home free yet.
Those who doubt that terrorism will again become an
important factor in Italy usually have in mind the
renaissance of the Red Brigades or the emergence of
new but similar groups with highly structured and
centralized organizations whose objective is radical
change or at least destabilization of the political
system. The skeptics point out that the terrorists of
the 1970s clearly failed to achieve that objective. In
fact, the recognition that they would fail, which
crystallized after the technically perfect but pragmat-
ically unsuccessful Aldo Moro operation, was a major
cause of the subsequent factionalization of the Red
Brigades and contributed importantly to its decline.
Moreover, the level of social discontent today is in no
way comparable to that of 1968, when a series of
street disturbances of escalating violence led thou-
sands of young dissident Italians down the path
toward terrorism.
Two Disturbing Possibilities
We agree with the skeptics. The days of the Red
Brigades and similar organizations are essentially
over in Italy. Yet, we can envisage other, equally
worrisome forms of terrorism emerging in the 1980s.
For example, the type of terrorism associated with
West Germany's Revolutionary Cells (RZ) has never
taken root in Italy, but sentiments that could support
it exist here. The West German authorities find these
terrorists very hard to neutralize because they operate
in tiny groups, often almost spontaneously, and appar-
ently without central coordination or much logistic
support.
The RZ motivation may be described as a protest
against economic deprivation in a mature industrial
society. While less grandiose than, say, that of the
Red Brigades, this motivation is not without potential
appeal in Italy. Moreover, it need only appeal to a
handful of people at the beginning-the Red Brigades
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started with 50 stalwarts in 1970, Prima Linea with
only 20 in 1976. Even at the height of their influence,
moreover, the leftist terrorist organizations were wild-
ly unpopular, according to public opinion polls. Lack
of widespread support would not prevent a loosely knit
organization like the RZ from arising on Italian soil
on the basis of frustration felt by only a tiny minority
of Italian dissidents.
Perhaps more dangerous from the official US view-
point would be the development of terrorism inspired
by opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, recent propaganda from Red Brigade and
other leftist terrorist sources has indicated they are
trying to attract support by identifying themselves
with the presumably large number of politically non-
violent Italians who harbor antinuclear and antimili-
tary sentiments. These efforts have met little but
apathy. Even the much-publicized scheduled deploy-
ment of cruise missiles in Comiso, Sicily, has not
attracted much local opposition. The group of rather
disorganized antinuclear pickets there is composed
largely of foreigners.
If classic-Italian terrorism is in eclipse and the shape
of Italian terrorism to come is not yet visible, the
reservoir of potential terrorists is large and obvious. A
considerable number of younger Italians have re-
ceived some sort of higher education but have not
been able to find jobs that would permit them to live
according to their heightened expectations-in fact,
many can find no jobs at all. It is not unlikely that
some of them will end up lashing out with violence
against their society or against the larger Western
system of which their society is a part. How they
frame this violence will determine the nature of
Italian terrorism during the rest of the 1980s.
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Secret
Italian Terrorists Target Prisons
The release of imprisoned terrorist leaders, in our
view, has become the top priority among Italian
The latest arrests of Italian terrorists.throughout Italy
have led to the discovery by Italian authorities of a
newly formed Red Brigade (BR) splinter, Common
Organization for the Liberation of Prisoners (COLP).
Plans and documents found in safehouses indicate .
that the new group is targeting several prisons where
Italian terrorists are being held. The Italian carabi-
nieri believe COLP is led by imprisoned BR leader
Giovanni Senzani but have no information regarding
the size and strength of this group.
Prisons appear to be high-priority targets of other
Italian terrorist groups as well. Tapes found 11 May
in Rome in an Armed Proletarian Power (APP)
safehouse included detailed terrorist interrogation of a
prison guard, later slain, concerning Rebibia Prison,
its structure, physical plant, and personnel move-
ments. In another safehouse, authorities found plans
for an attack on a Florence prison holding terrorists.
Arrests in Milan of the Walter Alasia BR Column
leader Roberto Adamoli and four column members on
6-7 June led to a safehouse containing plans of various
prisons. Adamoli had recently publicly identified per-
sonnel of the penitentiary system-especially the head
of San Vittore Prison, which holds several BR mem-
bers-as targets of his group
Italian terrorists apparently have recognized the ne-
cessity of joining forces to liberate jailed terrorist
leaders in order to provide cadre for a resurgence of
Italian terrorism. BR and Prima Linea (PL) terrorists
who have escaped from prisons have been in contact
regarding prison operations. Italian police suspect
that PL member Massino Carfara, who mastermind-
ed a jailbreak from Ronconi Prison in January 1982,
probably provided detailed information regarding the
prison to BR contacts before his rearrest in April.
Police also believe PL terrorist Luigi Rapisanda,
arrested on 2 June, was in contact with BR member
Federica Meroni, who had escaped from Ronconi
Prison; Meroni is known to have links to COLP and is
suspected of having had links to the Rome BR column
before her arrest on 1 June. 25X1
Attempts by BR columns to reorganize have been
hampered by the lack of effective leadership. Most of
the recently arrested members of various BR splinters
have been either support personnel or new, previously
unidentified members, none of whom has exhibited
the ability to plan or conduct successful terrorist
attacks. Italian terrorists apparently believe their best
hope-at least in the short term-is to free their
jailed comrades. 25X1
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Reverberations From a Skyjacking
The Politics of Counterterrorism
The recent hijacking of a Chinese airliner to South
Korea was resolved smoothly, after precedent-setting
negotiations between representatives of the govern-
ments concerned. The principles of the 1971 Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Hijacking were
upheld. The South Koreans extracted a modest ges-
ture of recognition from the Chinese but apparently
gained little permanent benefit from the affair.
Among interested onlookers, Taipei suffered another
minor humiliation, while P'yongyang ultimately
found its interests preserved. Some loose ends remain;
in particular, the fate of the skyjackers has yet to be
decided.
Background
On 5 May 1983, six Chinese citizens hijacked a
Chinese Civil Aviation Administration (CAAC) air-
liner en route from Shenyang to Shanghai with 105
passengers and crew. After shooting their way into the
cockpit of the aging British-made Trident and wound-
ing two crewmen who offered resistance, the hijackers
forced the pilot to fly toward Seoul. Once across the
Demilitarized Zone, the aircraft was escorted by
South Korean fighters to a landing at a US military
base. The hijackers demanded to meet the Taiwan
Ambassador and to be flown to Taiwan, but after
several hours of negotiations with US and South
Korean officials, they released the passengers and
surrendered. It was the first successful international
hijacking of a CAAC flight.
In the absence of direct communications links be-
tween the Governments of China and South Korea,
US and Japanese diplomats were used to establish
contacts that culminated in unprecedented direct
negotiations between the South Korean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and an official CAAC delega-
tion that came to Seoul on 7 May. The Chinese
officials in the delegation, headed by CAAC Director
Shen Tu, who has ministerial rank, were the first to
set foot in Seoul since the Korean War. After several
days of negotiations, the South Korean Government,
which is a signatory of the Hague Convention, agreed
to repatriate the plane and passengers but elected to
keep the skyjackers, promising to prosecute them
under South Korean laws-as the convention permits.
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Both Beijing and Seoul had good reasons to work out
a quick and smooth resolution, even if it meant
operating through a kind of temporary international
short-circuit. Beijing wanted to limit the damage to
its international image and get the plane, passengers,
and skyjackers back. Seoul wanted to maximize the
profit from this unexpected opportunity, especially in
terms of obtaining evidence of tacit recognition by
China and of discomfiting North Korea. Both sides
achieved most of their goals, but partly at the expense
of their respective allies, North Korea and Taiwan.
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Hope in Seoul
By engaging in some modest brinksmanship during
the negotiations with the CAAC delegation, the
South Koreans extracted from the Chinese a modest
gesture of official recognition in the form of a written
statement signed by the leaders of both negotiating
teams under their official titles. Seoul is hoping,
however, that the negotiations will eventually lead to
broader bilateral contacts. So far, except for some
polite words of appreciation and some forbearance in
propaganda forums, Beijing has shown no evidence of
cooperating. For example, Beijing recently refused
visas to South Korean citizens who wanted to attend
two UN-sponsored conferences in China. According
to the US Embassy in Seoul, when the South Korean
Ambassador to the United Nations. complained about
this to a Chinese diplomat in New York, he was only
given a pro forma explanation. On this occasion as
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well as others, the US Embassy added, the South
Koreans have made it clear to the Chinese that this
issue could affect what happens to the skyjackers.
Frustration in Taipei
The Taiwan Government has been fiercely lobbying
for the immediate release of the skyjackers-even
though it-is also a signatory to the Hague Convention.
Taipei holds that the skyjackers are freedom-seeking
heroes who should not be prosecuted, but instead sent
immediately to Taiwan where their propaganda value
can be exploited. That might have little impact,
according to US observers in Taipei, who report that
the Taiwanese are generally apathetic about defec-
tions, which they regard as "mainlander shows." To
the embarrassment of the government, public gather-
ings supporting the skyjackers have been only sparsely
attended.
The South Koreans have kept Taiwanese officials at
arm's length, For weeks,
Ithe South Korean MFA
refused to allow Taiwanese diplomats to meet the
skyjackers, and Taipei's Ambassador Hsueh Yu-ch'i
was unable to secure an audience with South Korean
Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk to discuss the matter.
Although the South Koreans denied they had changed
their attitudes toward China and Taiwan, Ambassa-
dor Hsueh has described the South Koreans as imple-
menting a de facto two-China policy.
Taipei has now given up trying to
dissuade the South Koreans from trying the skyjack-
ers. Instead, it is pressing fora speedy trial, in the
hope that soon after the trial the skyjackers will be
released and allowed to go to Taiwan.
Anxiety in P'yongyang
On. 17, May the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced
that Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian would visit
P'yongyang in late May. The timing of the announce-
ment, only days after the resolution of.the hijacking,
coupled with repeated unsolicited denials by' Chinese
officials that the trip had anything to do with the
hijacking, suggested that Beijing had in fact initiated
the visit to reassure P'yopngyang about China's con-
tacts with South Korea
the Chinese Government quietly hosted a visit by Kim
Chong-il, the son of North Korean leader Kim Il-
song. In another action reflecting discreet support of
his position as the successor to Kim 11-song, the
Chinese also recently published excerpts from the
younger Kim's treatise on Marxism-Leninism
What Will Befall the Skyjackers?
The written agreement signed by the representatives
of China and South Korea on 10 May does not
mention what is to become of the skyjackers. Publicly,
officially, and repeatedly, however, South Korean
officials have promised to put the skyjackers on trial
and to punish them for their criminal actions before
considering their requests for asylum in Taiwan.
Originally,
the government had
planned to get the whole matter over with quickly by
holding the trial early in June. There was great
difference of opinion within the government, however,
over what sentences the skyjackers should receive.
According to a senior MFA official, the sentiment in
some military and Ministry of Justice circles, reflect-
ing heavy pressure from Taiwanese interests, favored
suspended sentences for all but the two who had used
the pistols. In this view, even the latter should receive
only light sentences (two or three years), which could
also be subsequently suspended by a lower court
judge.
MFA officials and others taking the opposing, "inter-
national view" supported heavy sentences of seven
years or more, as required by South Korea's own
antiskyjacking law. Under South Korean legal proce-
dures, such sentences cannot be so easily suspended.
These officials believe that the South Korean Govern-
ment has much to lose internationally by letting the
skyjackers off lightly. In addition, they speculate that
by retaining control over the skyjackers, Seoul may
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make it harder for China to refuse to participate in
the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics, both
of which are to be held in South Korea. The interna-
tionalists concede, however, that a continued Chinese
refusal to issue visas permitting South Korean repre-
sentatives to attend UN-sponsored conferences in
China weakens their position.
Justice said that President Chon Tu Hwan had
instructed him to uphold the Hague Convention and
avert criticism from both Western and Communist
countries by putting the skyjackers on trial. He
indicated, however, that because the President wants
to defer until next year any decision on the final
disposition of the skyjackers, the trial would be
delayed until late this year. The Justice Minister
commented that President Chon wants to accommo-
date Taiwan by releasing the skyjackers, but only if it
can be done without fanfare.
This delay implies that the South Koreans are leaning
against issuing strong sentences (since for maximum
benefit those would be imposed quickly and forth-
rightly) but fear the consequences of issuing only
nominal sentences. Obviously, the Chinese Govern-
ment would strongly object to perfunctory punishment
of the skyjackers; of perhaps more importance to
Seoul's decisionmakers, however, have been explicit
statements of US concern (reflecting, in turn, the
concerted position of the Economic Summit countries,
which have formally agreed to ban commercial flights
between their countries and any country that violates
the Hague Convention).
Meanwhile, according to the Minister of Justice,
although no promises have been made to the skyjack-
ers, they have been told informally that they will be
turned over to Taiwan eventually. They are being
treated well, in accordance with specific instructions
from President Chon; they even receive a special diet
of Chinese food.
Impact of the Hague Convention
Seoul's relatively lenient treatment of the skyjackers
to date suggests that many in the government do not
really consider them guilty of a crime against human-
ity (as skyjacking is defined in the Hague Convention)
but instead sympathize with their desire to escape
from China. Nevertheless, Seoul's handling of the
hijacking-in particular, the fact that Seoul repatriat-
ed the passengers without soliciting further defec-
tions-suggests that political considerations were up-
permost in the minds of the South Koreans. Seoul
recognized the limits of the concessions Beijing was
likely to make in the short term and sought mainly to
create an atmosphere favorable for subsequent con-
tacts. In other words, even in the absence of a Hague
Convention and of an Economic Summit agreement
that gives it teeth, the South Koreans might have
acted much the same way. Still, the convention did
help to define the parameters of the negotiations with
China and has buttressed the position of the South
Korean officials who take the internationalist view.
Similarly, because of the convention, Chinese officials
had a standard (as did the rest of the world) against
which to measure South Korean cooperation and to
determine how much gratitude would be appropriate.
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In contrast, it is apparent that, to the Taiwanese
Government, the fact that the skyjackers were Chi-
nese defectors loomed much larger than whether or
not South Korea adhered to the provisions of the
Hague Convention. If a Chinese airliner is ever
hijacked to Taiwan, there will be powerful pressures
on the government to ignore the Convention.
A
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Argentina: Status of the Montoneros
lup to
several dozen leftist Montonero guerrillas have reen-
tered the country and may be planning to resume
military activities. Well-publicized incidents-inter-
ruptions of television broadcasts by Montonero propa-
ganda speeches, discovery of weapons caches, and
other crimes for which the terrorists reportedly have
claimed responsibility-have reinforced concerns.
early April, the police have captured some 10 Mon-
the press reports that police have killed
several leaders in firefights.
The deaths of the Montonero.leaders-one of whom
was reportedly found with weapons, funds, and plans
for further subversive activity-have been used by
regime officials to bolster the position of the security
services against civilian critics who have called for an
end to the military's role in internal security matters.
Regime leaders, for example, followed up the most
recent shootout with a highly publicized report that
detailed the history of Montonero terrorist activity.
They also privately briefed leading politicians on the
ongoing terrorist threat. Although there is growing
evidence that the shootings may have been staged
executions, the report and briefings have thus far
helped dissipate criticism by most moderate politi-
cians; all but the harshest regime critics have publicly
acknowledged the need for continued efforts to com-
bat subversion.
In our view, the Montoneros are unlikely to mount
more than small-scale operations over the coming
months. The security forces continue to successfully
penetrate their organization abroad and apparently
have had little difficulty in ferreting out what little
remains of the terrorist network in Argentina. In
addition to the high personal risk of renewed terrorist
actions, the Montoneros may calculate that more
intense activities could prompt a military crackdown,
posing a threat to the transition to civilian rule,
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scheduled for next January. The security forces ap-
parently recognize these constraints
For now and probably beyond elections in October,
the Montoneros are likely to focus on oliti 1 action.
they
continue to work through organized labor and leftist
political parties. The extreme left wing of the predom-
inant Peronist Party appears to be especially open to
Montonero influence. Its leader, Vicente Saadi,r
is a longtime25X1
backer of the Montoneros and receives a monthly
stipend from funds kept in Mexico. In addition, his
newspaper, La Voz, was started about two years ago
with Montonero capital and has become an important
vehicle for the organization's propaganda.
Should the Montoneros decide to renew terrorist 25X1
activity, moral support would remain strong among
some Latin American leftists, but we judge that
material assistance, if forthcoming, would be limited.
The Mexicans and Bolivians, for example, while
willing to provide a safehaven, would not supply the
Montoneros with weapons and would probably block
significant arms buys and militar activity
their borders. The Cubans
have
renewed their commitment to the terrorists after a
year's respite. Havana, however, is already spread
thin and, considering the high political costs and low
likelihood of success, is unlikely to furnish more than
shelter, training, some financial assistance, and covert
propaganda support; Nicaragua would probably fol-
low a similar policy. Outside Latin America, the PLO
would probably continue to provide training and
political support. 25X1
Secret
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Peru: Terrorist Activity in Lima
Despite government counterterrorist operations and
the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency,
the Sendero Luminoso (SL) has. continued terrorist
operations in rural areas of Peru and recently has
increased attacks in Lima.
Since late May, SL has carried out almost daily
attacks on electrical power stations as well as periodic
bombings of government buildings and businesses in
Lima and other urban centers. On 12 June, explosions
blacked out the city of Cuzco for two hours, and other
explosions occurred in several places including the
US-Peruvian Binational Center.
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Estimates of SL strength, though soft, indicate there
are currently between 200 and 250 activists in Lima.
The increased level of SL activity has led to the
arrests of several SL members
nearly one-third of the leadership in
attacks, primarily directed against the Peruvian Gov-
Lima. While the loss of leadership will probably result
in some disarray within the urban forces, we believe
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Special Analysis
Rightist Terrorism in Spain
Rightist terrorism emerged in Spain during the final
years of the Franco regime in response to the loosen-
ing of authoritarian controls. As ultraright groups
grew more concerned that liberalization would follow
Franco's death, they stepped up their attacks against
organizations, individuals, and business establish-
ments they suspected of democratic or leftist leanings.
Illegal extreme rightist activity in Spain also involves
some elements of the military in what Spaniards call
golpismo ("coupism").' Furthermore, we suspect that
the many rightists retained in the bureaucracy from
the fascist era may provide cover for rightist terror-
ists, who undoubtedly have been further energized by
the accession to power last October of the Spanish
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). Should the Socialists
conduct a more thorough purge of Francoists from
positions of power, the loss of official protection would
weaken rightist terrorist groups, but it might also add
to their ranks some of those affected by the purge.
Terrorist Groups
One of the most prominent rightist terrorist organiza-
tions is the Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance (AAA).
In February 1977, the AAA took credit for the most
spectacular incident of rightist terrorism, the so-called
Atocha massacre in which five Communist labor
lawyers were machinegunned to death in a union
office. The group also claimed responsibility for the
1977 murders of a Madrid woman socialist and a
Barcelona industrialist, as well as for a Barcelona
' Golpismo in Spain refers to rightwing coup attempts by military
figures. The most famous of these occurred in February 1981 when
military men seized the Spanish Cortes. Several officers were
arrested in October 1982 on suspicion of coup plotting just prior to
Spain:
Rightwing Terrorist Groups/Organizations
FJ
FJ
AJT
Youth Force (Fuerza Joven)
Youth Front (Frente de la Juventud)
Group of Traditionalist Youth (Agrupacion de Juven-
tudes Tradicionalistas)
Spanish Friends of Europe Club (Circulo Espanol de
Amigos de Europa)
Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance (Alianza Aposto-
lica Anticomunista)
BOG Blind Obedience Groups
BVE Spanish Basque Battalion (Batallon Vasco Espanol)
GCR Warriors of Christ the King (Guerrilleros de Cristo
Rey)
FNT National Labor Force (Fuerza Nacional del Trabajo)
ASNT National Union Action of Labor (Accion Sindacalista
Nacional de Trabajo)
Cl Iberian Cross (Cruz Iberiaa)
AHM Association of Soldiers' Sons (Associacion de Hijos de
Militares)
NGE
MRN
JAS
New Guard of Spain (Nueva Guardia de Espana)
National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Re-
volucionario Nacional)
Front Line (Primera Linea de FET y de las JONS)
Blue Division (Division Azul)
Union Action Youths (Juventudes de Accion
Sindacal)
Armed Revolutionary Groups (Grupos Armados
Revolucionarios)
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newspaper bombing that killed one person and injured
several others. In October 1977, Spanish police arrest-
ed 11 men in Barcelona, accusing them of member-
ship in AAA. One was a wealthy businessman de-
scribed by a reliable Madrid newspaper as a
prominent figure in far-right activities. Despite these
arrests, AAA has remained essentially an enigmatic
organization. The Spanish press has occasionally
credited the group with later terrorist activities, but
Spanish security forces have not confirmed these
allegations.
the Spanish Basque
Battalion (BVE), first identified in 1980, is another
important terrorist group. In February 1980, BVE
claimed to have murdered a Madrid university stu-
dent whom it accused of collaborating with the leftist
Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement (ETA).
One year later, BVE announced by telephone that it
would conduct a campaign against any Basque leftists
and threatened to kill 200 Basque nationalists. Subse-
quently it claimed several murders of Basque leftists
in February and March 1981, as well as the robbery
later that year of arms and uniforms from a French
military installation in the Pyrenees.
Following the massive Socialist victory in October
1982, BVE issued a communique saying that it
rejected socialism, was declaring war on the state, and
intended to force the release of two Army officers
arrested just prior to the elections for coup plotting.
Although BVE has not followed through on that
threat, Spanish police speculate that some minor
bombings just across the French border in early
November 1982 may have been the organization's
work.
In November 1982, Spanish security I reported
on a new rightist organization, the Blind Obedience
Group (BOG). BOG's real significance,
lies in its organization and alleged con-
tacts with political dissidents. It is said to be made up
of small cells of armed men, some 200 in Madrid and
an unknown number in Valladolid. Spanish security
officials have not accused BOG of any terrorist acts to
date but have implicated it in coup planning by the
military men arrested in Madrid just before the 1982
national election. Nevertheless, they do not yet con-
sider the group to be a serious security threat.
Warriors of Christ the King (GCR), said by the press
to date from the late 1960s, is led by Mariano
Sanchez Covisa, who claims that the organization is
made up of patriotic Spaniards defending national
traditions against the forces of progressivism. GCR
was credited in the early 1970s with a series of attacks
on bookstores, art galleries, and movie theaters dis-
playing "progressive" works. Press accounts allege
that it also attacked Communists, individuals loyal to
democratic ideals, liberal priests, Basque separatists,
and leftist university centers. Spanish police report
only two incidents involving the group since 1976.
They suspect, however, that a leftist student killed in
Madrid in January 1977 was a GCR victim and that
the group bombed a Madrid cafeteria in 1979, caus-
ing heavy damage but no loss of life.
GCR again received publicity in December 1981
when it undertook a campaign to organize midlevel
Army officers in support of General Jaime Milans del
Bosch, a leader of the attempted coup in February
1981. In mid-December 1981, the US Embassy in
Madrid observed that GCR enjoyed little support and
was known mainly for spray-painting walls and occa-
sional bullying tactics at public events.
The names of at least 20 other rightist organizations
appear in information from
responsible press organs. We do not, however, have
sufficient information to judge how many of these are
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actually terrorist groups. In our view, several names
probably are no more than cover labels for other
organizations or designate relatively small groups of
people. Three such groups seem worthy of mention
The Spanish Friends of Europe Club (CEDADE),
founded in 1966, is la
neo-Nazi organization disposed to the use of violence
but with no known actions to its credit. The National
Trade Union Work Action (ASNT) is a fascist labor
organization founded in 1980 by Jose Antonio As-
siego Verdugo, a Malaga lawyer. According to the
press, ASNT has attacked members of the socialist
and Communist trade unions. Assiego Verdugo is
currently in jail for illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Finally, Iberian Cross (CI) is characterized
as a rightist group that favors violence and has been
charged with bombing a Madrid bank.
Political Party and Government
Connections
Much more than in other West European countries,
the distinction between the political and terrorist far
right in Spain is more apparent than real. Spain's only
extreme right political party, until it disbanded in
November 1982, was New Force (FN) headed by
Madrid lawyer Blas Pinar Lopez. FN declared its
total fidelity to the work and thinking of Franco,
which-it interpreted as opposition to "liberalism,
libertinism, and anarchy." Support for the FN in the
parliamentary election of 1979 was only 2.1 percent,
just enough to win a seat for Blas Pinar. When the
party sank to 0.5 percent of the total vote in October
1982 and lost its only place in the Cortes, Pinar
formally disbanded it.
sometimes exclusive component of terrorist groups
such as the Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance and
the Spanish Basque Battalion.
FN's youth wing, Youth Force, carried knives, clubs,
and blackjacks and that many had been given fire-
arms by the party. A small paramilitary corps within
Youth Force, made up of particularly violent youths,
acted as a guard for Pinar. We believe that Youth
Force was essentially an action arm of FN, given
more to violence than to political activity. Unlike its
parent organization, it has not been disbanded and is
expected to continue to engage in terrorist acts.
We have few ~ reports of direct links be- L`'n
tween Spanish rightist terrorists and members of the
government bureaucracy, police, or military. BOG is
reported to include some junior military officers an-4
policemen. In addition accordin to US Embassy
officials connections exist
between rightist terrorists an the military officers
involved in the February 1981 coup attempt as well as
those arrested for coup plotting in October 1982. Still,
few details of these links are known.
The paucity of evidence about ties between rightist
terrorists, the military, or the police is striking al-
though not surprising; Spain has only recently
emerged from rightist authoritarian rule, and there
has not been a massive purge of Francoists in the
bureaucracy and military. We believe it possible that
the absence of security service information on links
between rightist terrorists and the political and mili-
tary establishments-indeed, the shortage of informa-
tion on any aspect of rightist terrorism-reflects the
presence of such ties more than it suggests that far
right terrorist groups are weaker in Spain than they
are elsewhere in Western Europe. 25X1
International Contacts
The only documented international links of Spanish
rightist terrorists have been with Italians. In February
1977, Spanish Civil Guards arrested Warriors of
Christ the King leader Mariano Sanchez Covisa and
eight Italians for making submachineguns, counterfeit
passports and other identity documents, and possess-
ing illicit equipment. Two of the Italians, Salvatore
Francia and Elio Massagrande, were known rightist
terrorists wanted by the Italian police. The US Em-
bassy in Madrid, quoting press sources, reported in
May 1981 that Stefano Delle Chiaie, a prominent
neofascist, had been in the city and that the 1976
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murder of an Italian judge, Vittorio Occorsio was
lanned at a bar there.
since the
late 1970s that youth from the neofascist Italian
Social Movement have attended summer camps at
FN locales in the Pyrenees. Media allegations of West
German and French support for Spanish rightist
terrorism have not been substantiated by Spanish
authorities, but we suspect that small-scale liaison
activity occasionally occurs.
Finally, in the murky area between politics and
terrorism, an abortive attempt occurred in 1978 to
create an organization called Euroright. Italian Social
Movement head Giorgio Almirante visited Madrid in
the summer of 1978, reportedly at the request of Bias
Pinar, to plan a meeting between their parties and
that of their French counterpart, Jean-Marie Le Pen
and his National Front. Their stated goal was an
international organization to fight Communism. A
meeting of the three in Paris produced nothing, but
the Almirante-Blas Pinar contact lasted somewhat
longer. In 1979 Bias Pinar publicly stated that FN
had received $43,000 from Almirante's party for the
coming national election in Spain. We have no other
evidence, however, of continuation of these contacts.
Outlook
In Spain, the failure of the February 1981 coup
attempt and the Socialists' strong electoral victory in
October 1982 suggest that the appeal of rightist
political ideas is narrowing. At the same time, howev-
er, the Socialist victory has probably confirmed the
worst fears of diehard Francoists and added to their
anxieties. Recurrent reports and rumors of coup plot-
ting among military officers as well as of rightist
terrorist reorganization suggest continued-although
diminished-activism by the frustrated right. Against
this backdrop, the catalyst for new rightist terrorism
could come from government efforts to promote so-
cialist programs, particularly any attempted purge of
Franco regime holdovers. As US Embassy officials in
Madrid have pointed out, moreover, the elimination of
the extreme rightist voice in parliament has removed
a safety valve for the legal venting of such views. The
upshot is that rightist terrorism or coup plotting-or a
combination of the two-may still pose a potential
threat to Spanish democracy as well as to leftist
groups and individuals.
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Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, September 1982-June 1983 a
Sep
Oct
Total
49
57
Government officials
1
0
Diplomats
29
35
Military
9
13
Business
4
2
Private parties, tourists,
missionaries, and students
5
3
Dec Jan Feb
47 56 58
2 6 2
22 27 33
10 11 2
8 1 9
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
71
71
57
10
3
5
7
3
35
34
28
4
11
12
7
1
7
7
8
0
Total
North America
Latin America
Western Europe
49 57
2 7
10 18
24 22
USSR/Eastern Europe 3 3
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1
Middle East and North Africa 5 3
Asia/other 4 3
Jan
56
3
14
19
1
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks'
0 J F M A M J
aFigures for the most recent months are subject to change
as additional data are received.
Car bomb in Baghdad
killed 2, wounded 130;
Ankara airport attack
killed 9, wounded 70.
Car bomb in Pretoria. S.A.
killed 18, wounded 217.
Bombing of US Embassy
in Lebanon killed 57.
wounded 120.
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Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
unless new information has been received. 25X1
17 April 1983 West Berlin: Arrests of Neo-Nazis
Police arrested five known neo-Nazis after they smashed the windows of an
occupied house and two parked cars in the Kreuzberg district of the US sector.
Four were formerly members of the now defunct German Workers' Youth Group.
25X1
28 April 1983 West Berlin: Bombing in US Sector
An explosion on the 13th floor of the Credit Institute for Housing Construction
caused heavy damage. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility in a
confessor letter. - 25X1
18 May 1983
confessor letter.
West Germany: Arson Attack on Construction Company
Near Stuttgart, equipment belonging to the Zueblin Construction Company,
which is involved in the controversial extension of a runway at Frankfurt airport,
was heavily damaged. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility in a 25X1
Guatemala: Kidnap Victim Murdered
Security forces raided two safehouses of the dissident wing of the Guatemalan
Communist Party and discovered the body of banker Humberto Rosales, who had
been abducted on 13 April. Two terrorists were killed in the raid, and a cache of
arms, documents, and propaganda was uncovered.F---] 25X1
35 Secret
GI TR 83-014
7 July 1983
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12 June 1983 West Germany: Possible Terrorist Surveillance
In Mannheim, military police observed three occupants in a car bearing French li-
cense plates photographing the US Army housing facilities. (Blueprints of this area
were discovered in May in a garbage container on the base.) Later that day, a simi-
lar vehicle was observed at the German-US celebration in nearby Worms, where
several high-ranking US officials were present.
stations, and banks-the usual targets of ETA/M attacks
14 June 1983 Spain: ETA/M Apology
In Bilbao, the Basque terrorist organization Fatherland and Liberty/ Military
(ETA/M) claimed responsibility for the "accidental" killing of an innocent
bystander. In a communique, ETA/M claimed it was attempting to bomb the car
belonging to the Bilbao Civil Guard chief, who escaped without injuries. The group
also issued a warning to Basques to avoid police headquarters, Civil Guard
20 June 1983 Greece: Second ASALA Communique Warns of Attacks in Turkey
In Athens, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
issued a second communique claiming responsibility for the 16 June attack at the
Istanbul covered bazaar that killed two and injured 23. The ASALA statement
threatened continued attacks on all Turkish political, economic, and tourist
institutions by ASALA "suicide commandos." This ASALA shift toward indis-
criminate, random attacks in Turkey increases the likelihood of deaths and injuries
Spain: Bombing of US Bank
In Bilbao, the Basque terrorist group Iraultza ("Revolution") claimed responsibil-
ity for the bombing of the Bank of America office. Iraultza has been responsible
for the bombing of several US-linked companies in the Basque country since 25X1
21 June 1983 Spain: More Iraultza Bombings
In San Sebastian, Iraultza claimed responsibility for two predawn bombings of
US-affiliated companies, which caused little damage and no injuries. The group
claimed the attacks were part of a campaign against US interests in the Basque
country and were intended to oppose Spain's pro-US position on INF deployment.
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the BR, which can ill afford the loss of one of its most skilled organizers.
Italy: Important Red Brigade Leader Arrested
In Rome, Italian police arrested Pietro Vanzi, a major leader of the Red Brigades
(BR), believed to be the leader of the Rome BR Militarist Column. Vanzi had al-
ready been sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in the Moro killing and the
Dozier kidnaping. We expect the arrest of Vanzi will have a significant impact on
Venezuela: Counterterrorist Sweep
According to press reports, Venezuelan authorities carried out a series of raids in
Caracas, arresting 20 suspected Bandera Roja members. Authorities reportedly.
also discovered a major arms cache, military uniforms, and equipment to form a
variety of documents. The raids show a continued ability on the part of the
government to prevent the Bandera Roja from reemerging as a major terrorist
22 June 1983 Spain: Car Bomb Kills Civil Guard Officer
In San Sebastian, a car bomb killed a member of the Spanish Civil Guard. At least
one other person was injured and nearby cars damaged by the blast. Although no
group has claimed credit for the bomb, police suspect ETA M, which has
frequently targeted police and Civil Guardsmen. 25X1
France: Bombs Hit French Airline
In Paris, the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC) claimed responsibility for
four early morning bombings of airlines offices, which caused damage but no
injuries. In a communique, ARC called for the liberation of Guadeloupe political
prisoners being held in French colonial jails. Since 28 May, ARC has undertaken a
bombing campaign on the French Caribbean, and some 20 attacks are attributed
to this organization. 25X1
Movement (AO) suspected of involvement in a Padova bombing in 1982.
Italy: Arrest of Autonomia Members
In Naples, the Italian police arrested two members of the Autonomia Organization
25X1
France: Sentencing Direct Action Leader
In Paris, Frederic Oriach, the leader of the leftist terrorist group Direct Action, re-
ceived a six-year sentence-two years more than the prosecutor requested-for his
involvement in a bombing campaign, which resulted in the deaths of two bomb-dis-
posal experts. Two other members of the group were also sentenced to jail terms.
25X1
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Spain: Second Car Bomb Kills Police Officer
In San Sebastian, the radical ETA/M splinter Anticapitalist Autonomous Com-
mandos (CAA), claimed responsibility for the car bomb, which killed one police of-
Spain: Increased Basque Terrorism
In San Sebastian, police deactivated a 25-kilo bomb found on the roof of a large
national police station. ETA/M later claimed responsibility for the attempt. We
suspect the recent increase in terrorist activity is a reaction to the government's
widely publicized antiterrorist plan
24 June 1983 West Germany: Attempted Bombing Prior to Bush Visit
In Duesseldorf, a bomb was discovered in the gas tank of a car outside Litton Busi-
ness Systems, an American firm. It had been set to go off during the night, but the
detonator was defective. German police suspect the bomb was connected to Vice
President Bush's trip to the Duesseldorf area the next day. No group has claimed
responsibility, but the Revolutionary Cells have perpetrated similar attacks on US
firms in the area during the past two years.
Greece: Bombing of Albanian Embassy Car
In Athens, the previously unknown Front for the Liberation of Northern Ipiros
(MAVI) claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Albanian Ambassador's car.
A leaflet claimed the attack was in retaliation against the "tyrannical" Albanian
regime.
West Germany: Protesters Arrested
In Krefeld, police arrested 33 people after demonstrations against Vice President
Bush's visit turned violent. several of those arrested
are so-called RAF legals
Portugal: Establishment of New Counterterrorist Support Unit
In Lisbon, the Portuguese Republican National Guard-responsible for public
order in rural areas-has been authorized to form a Mines and Booby-Trap Unit.
The presidential decree followed several booby-trap ambushes, believed to have
been the work of the terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25).
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26 June 1983 Italy: Assassination Claim by,Red Brigades Splinter
In Turin, the newly formed Red Brigades (BR) splinter, Common Organization for
the Liberation of Prisoners (COLP), claimed responsibility for the assassination of
Turin Chief State Prosecutor Bruno Caccia who was gunned down by masked men
in a passing car. COLP has promised to provide a communique explaining its
reasons for the attack; however, police are convinced of the legitimacy of the BR
claim based on the modus operandi used, which closely follows previous BR
Spain: Arrest of Basque Terrorists
In the Basque region, the Spanish Civil Guard arrested 21 suspected members of
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Military Wing ETA M) and confiscated
numerous weapons, ammunition, and explosives. 25X1
26-27 June 1983 Italy: Terrorist Elected to Parliament
Toni Negri, the founder of Autonomia and a prominent Red Brigades member,
was elected to the Italian parliament in the national elections. Negri, who is in
prison, is eligible for release on grounds of parliamentry immunity. We believe
Italian terrorists will interpret Negri's election as indicating broad public support
for terrorist operations; a surge in terrorism may follow. 25X1
27 June 1983 Spain: Killings Continue in Northern Spain
In Pamplona, terrorists believed to be members of ETA/M killed a Spanish Air
Force officer, marking the fourth death in the Basque region since 14 June. We
also note that ETA appears to be expanding to conduct more operations within the
Navarre region-an area claimed by the Basques as a part of their national
Sudan: Americans Held Hostage
Two Americans, one German, one Canadian, and a Dutchman were taken hostage
by The Liberation Front of South Sudan. in Boma National Park. The rebels
demanded a large ransom,, military clothing, and a broadcast on VOA and BBC of
a political statement by 6 July. Observers estimate about 50 men are holding the
hostages. 25X1
West Germany: Bombing in Protest of Runway Extension
In Frankfurt, a bomb exploded outside the home of the airport chief causing
considerable damage, but no injuries. The same day a bomb at the airport's
training center was defused by police. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsi-
bility for both bombs.F___1 25X1
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El Salvador: American Embassy Attacked-Again
The US Embassy in San Salvador was attacked with an RPG-2 rocket and
machinegun fire, which shattered windows but caused only light damage and no
injuries. The attack was claimed by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front
28 June 1983 South Africa: Roodepoort Bombing
Two explosions in a government. office building in Roodepoort destroyed the first
floor offices of the Department of Internal Affairs; there was no damage to police
district headquarters and a mine labor authority on the other floors.
Corsica: Bomb Planted at Corsican Police Station
In Propriano, rain dampened the burning fuse of a powerful bomb placed outside a
police station, narrowly avoiding a potentially lethal explosion. The attempted
bombing followed a surge of violence-a machinegun attack on a barracks and a
shotgun attack on a police station-in retaliation for the suspected murder of a na-
tionalist leader. Despite the arrest of six known underworld figures for the
disappearance of militant nationalist Guy Orsini, we expect violence in Corsica to
29 June 1983 Costa Rica: Attempt Made on Contra Leaders.
The powerful bomb that exploded in downtown San Jose was prematurely
detonated, according to Costa Rican authorities. It had been intended for use
against Eden Pastora or other leaders of the anti-Sandinista organization ARDE.
One of the perpetrators, identified as a naturalized Nicaraguan and probable
Sandinista agent, was killed in the explosion.
30 June 1983 Colombia: Anti-US Bombings
In a call to a Bucaramanga radio station, the National Liberation Army (ELN)
claimed credit for several bombings against US-related targets in that city. The
caller said that the attacks against the Binational Center, an affiliate of the First
National City Bank of New York, and a Mormon church were in protest of US
policies in Central America. Another bomb placed at the home of a US citizen was
found and deactivated by police.
Secret 40
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