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July 7, 1983
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 ;1 , n e U&N` I MASTER FILE UPY Directorate of ? -get- I t ll 00 NOT GIVE OUT OR MARK ON Terrorism Review GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Copy 4 7 8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 K1 Secret 3 Highlights Terrorism Review F (OGI) 25X1 Perspective-The Palestinian Split and International Terrorism) 25X1 The Fatah Rebellion: The Background and the Players (OGI) Future Terrorism (OGI) 17 Italian Terrorists Target Prisons (OGI) 19 Reverberations From a Skyjacki g The Politics of Counterterrorism (OGI) 23 Argentina: Status of the Monteneros (ALA) Peru: Terrorist Activity in Lima (OGI) Special Analysis-Rightist Terrorism in Spain (EURA) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Jxi Terrorism ReviewF- Perspective The Palestinian Split and International Terrorism 25X1 25X1 25X1 The rebellion within Fatah-the dominant PLO group-means, in our view, a greater possibility of Palestinian terrorism directed against American interests. The mutiny against Arafat's leadership and policies has opened the PLO to rejectionist, anti-American forces including Syria, Libya, Iran, and radical Palestinian groups. It has undermined the authority of Arafat and his associates who have kept a lid on anti-US terrorism and reduced the influence of Arab moderates. The tide clearly is running against continuation of the moratorium on international terrorism by PLO-affiliated groups, which had been imposed in the mid-1970s to facilitate a political settlement in the Middle East. One of the issues dividing Fatah is Arafat's strategy of following the diplomatic track. Emboldened by defiance of Arafat's authority and encouraged by such radical elements as Syria and Libya, Palestinian groups already prone to violence are now beyond the 25X1 discipline of the moderate PLO leadership. former Black September planner Abu Da'ud has thrown in with anti-Arafat forces. He describes himself as head of "foreign operations," which, given Abu Da'ud's involvement in Palestinian terrorism in the past, may point to resumption of attacks outside the Middle East. 25X1 Increased influence in the PLO by radical groups and rejectionist states puts American interests at greater risk to terrorist attack. Syria has put together a terrorist network with headquarters in Damascus to conduct operations in Lebanon designed to undermine PLO and Arab moderates and inhibit implementation of the troop-withdrawal agreement. One of the PLO-affiliated groups heavily involved is Black June, which was responsible for assassinating PLO Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a Syrian surrogate. Another group prominent in this Syrian strategy is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 25X1 Secret Syria also is encouraging Libyan and Iranian support to Fatah rebels and rejectionist groups. The Libyans heavily fund the PFLP-GC coordinated in Damascus appears, moreover, to include splinter Lebanese Shia groups who also receive financial assistance and operational direction from Iranian .intelligence officers in Lebanon. In order to shore up his position, Arafat himself might authorize terrorist attacks to appeal to hardliners. Unverified information indicates Fatah was involved in a harassing attack against the multinational peacekeeping force (MNF) in March and preparations for another in April. Because MNF forces shield Palestinian civilians remaining in Beirut, we suspect Palestinian terrorists will refrain from conducting large-scale attacks against the MNF. In Europe, however, Palestinian infrastructures that could support terrorist operations are in place For the near term, we believe fissures in Fatah and radical attempts to take over effective control of the PLO make terrorist attacks against US interests in the Middle East more likely. In the longer term, our reading at this juncture is that moderate forces in the PLO who had enforced the moratorium on terrorism will suffer a loss of influence. While prominent moderate personalities, including Arafat himself, may survive, their authority will be diminished, making the successor PLO more radical and more likely to countenance international terrorism to achieve its goals. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Highlights Alert List Threat Level in Middle East Remains High. We believe that US nationals and fa- cilities in the Middle East continue to be at high risk of terrorist attack. Sandinista Assassins Target Contra Leaders. The powerful bomb that exploded in downtown San Jose on 29 June prematurely detonated. It had been intended for use against Eden Pastora or other leaders of the anti-Sandinista organization ARDE, according to Costa Rican authorities. One of the perpetrators, identified as a naturalized Nicaraguan and probable Sandinista agent, was killed in the explosion. Costa Rican security officials fear the incident may be the beginning of an intensified terrorist campaign by Managua against the anti-Sandinistas. Terrorism in French Territories. The Revolutionary Caribbean Alliance-a proindependence group responsible for the late May terrorist bombings in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana-has claimed responsibility for four 3 Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 recent bomb attacks in Paris. Several bomb threats have been made in the French Antilles recently, including one against the US Consul General in Martinique. Although the callers may not have been associated with the Alliance, and no bombs were found, this raises the possibility that the recent surge in terrorist activities in the three overseas departments may be extended to US personnel or facilities. numerous bombs have been placed in and around Pretoria. Although the South African Police maintains that there is no indication that terrorists are targeting diplomatic facilities or personnel, the US Embassy there is adjacent to police headquarters, and bombs have been found at police facilities outside Pretoria. Probable Increase in Attacks Against Haitian Government. On 4 June 1983, a US Court acquitted Hector Riobe Brigade activist Joel Deeb for his alleged involve- ment in a raid mounted in Haiti during which an American tourist was wounded. We believe the acquittal will be viewed by the Haitian exile community as vindication and may result in increased antiregime activity. Significant Developments Americans Held Hostage. Two Americans and three Europeans were taken hostage by southern Sudanese rebels in Boma National Park in far southwest Sudan on 27 June. The rebels demanded a ransom, military uniforms, and that a political statement be broadcast on VOA and BBC by 6 July or the hostages would be shot. One of the rebel leaders has been linked to Libya and has made broadcasts on Radio-Libya. The rebels have claimed that they came from Ethiopia. New Group Claims Turin Assassination. The newly formed Red Brigades (BR) splinter, Common Organization for the Liberation of Prisoners (COLP), claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Turin Chief State Prosecutor Bruno Caccia, who was gunned down by masked men in a passing car on 26 June 1983. COLP has promised an explanation for the attack; however, the most obvious motivation may be the arrest of top BR leader Pietro Vanzi, announced on 23 June. We note the BR has recently threatened to avenge terrorist prosecutions, and Caccia had played a key role in dismantling the BR and Prima Linea groups in Piedmont. Terrorist Elected to Italian Parliament. Toni Negri-founder of the extremist group Autonomia and an important ideological influence in the Red Brigades- was elected to the Italian parliament in the 26-27 June national elections. Negri, who is in prison, is.now eligible for release on grounds of parliamentary immunity. We believe Italian terrorists will interpret Negri's election as indicating broad public support for'terrorist operations, and a surge in terrorism may follow. Negri's success is likely to prompt other groups to explore ways of exploiting legal political procedures to obtain publicity and legitimacy for their radical objectives. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 French Counterterrorism Effort in Trouble. Public disclosures of illegal procedures and alleged coverups by members of France's elite counterterrorist squad, the GIGN, may have seriously eroded public confidence in the French counterterror- ism effort. A French court has ruled that the GIGN arrests of three Irish terrorists in Vincennes on 28 August 1982-touted as the first major success in Mitterrand's "war on terrorism"-were procedurally illegal. The release of the terrorists was followed by court-ordered prosecution of two of the arresting gendarmerie officers for perjury. Rumors that the Secretary of State for Public Security is assembling a new counterterrorism staff have also reflected negatively on the counterterrorism Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret The Fatah Rebellion: The Background and the Players possible terrorist fallout. The mutiny among Fatah forces, initially an intra- PLO matter, rapidly encompassed Syria, Libya, and radical non-PLO groups. This article is intended to help readers of the Terrorism Review better under- stand the rebellion, the lineup of players, and the Background The rebellion in the Bekaa Valley in early May was precipitated by Arafat's decision to solidify his control over Palestinian forces there by installing loyalists in senior military positions. His strategy backfired when the loyalists were emphatically rejected by Palestinian troops because of their poor performance during Israel's incursion into Lebanon last year. Arafat's refusal to revoke these appointments, coupled with his authoritarian style of leadership and his perceived lack of consultations with prominent Fatah cadre on policy and strategy issues, resulted in the insurrection. The mutiny was able to take hold and spread because some rebel demands enjoy broad support within Fa- tah. Since losing his Beirut headquarters, moreover, Arafat has been unable to exert the same degree of control over radical PLO elements that he had in the 25X1 '25X1 bly interpreted by leftists as a message from Arafat that any actions threatening moderate control of the Tensions between moderate and militant Palestinians have been brewing for years. Fatah leftists have long suspected that Arafat had a hand in the assassinations of a prominent leftist, Majid Abu Sharara, in 1981 .and a top PLO military officer, Sa'd al-Sayil (Abu Walid), in 1982. Underlying differences were brought to a head by Arafat's attempts to negotiate a Palestin- ian settlement with King Hussein. Fatah's mutilation and execution of five Black June members in the Bekaa in May also heightened tensions. The BJO members were reportedly planning to assassinate moderate PLO leaders, but their execution was proba- 25X1 PLO would not go unanswered. Secret 25X1 GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 The Players The two main leaders of the mutiny are Col. Said 25X1 Muragha (Abu Musa), a respected Fatah military commander, and leftist Fatah politician Muhammad Nimr Saleh (Abu Salih). former Black September leader, 25X1 Muhammad Da'ud Awda (Abu Da'ud) is secretly working on behalf of the rebels and is in charge of their security and foreign operations. The leaders have received support from Libya, Syria, militant Palestinians, and various PLO groups, who seek to exploit the situation to advance their own interest. Libya has provided arms and ammunition to the dissidents through the Popular Front for the Libera- tion of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and has moved its military contingent, which was sta- tioned on the Syrian-Lebanese border, into the Bekaa Syrian involvement has been central to the rebellion against Arafat. Syria initially urged Black . June members in the Bekaa, who were subsequently caught and executed by Fatah, to take action against mainline PLO leaders. Black June, a renegade, non- PLO group committed to destroying Arafat and the moderate PLO, has been used by Syria in the past in Various PLO groups have indicated their support for the Fatah dissidents, including the PFLP-GC, Saiqa, the Popular Struggle Front (PSF), and the Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP). Two larger PLO groups, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 The Fatah Rebellion: The Lineup PLO groups Fatah: The established moderate leader- ship, including Khalil al- Wazir and Salah Khalaf, is supporting Arafat, as are a significant number of Fatah mem- bers. Arab Liberation Front (ALF): A small Iraqi surrogate group, with most of its members in Baghdad, will support Ara- fat as long as Iraq does. Arab States Iraq: Has publicly supported Arafat's leadership. Saudi Arabia: Continues to financially and politically support Arafat's leader- ship. Fatah: Abu Musa, a respected military com- mander and Fatah political leftist, Abu Saleh, are the two leaders of the Fatah mutiny. They have been joined by other respected military personalities such as Abu Raad, and an unknown number of Fatah members in the Bekaa Valley. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (PFLP-GC): This Syrian- directed and Libyan-funded group has provided the most direct support to the leftists of all the PLO groups. Undoubtedly at Syrian behest, the group has given material and military support and has served to keep tensions high in the Bekaa. Saiqa: Another Syrian surrogate group that will provide whatever support Syria commands. Popular Struggle Front (PSF)-. A small, ardently rejectionist group that supports the ideology and demands of the Fatah leftists. Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP). Another small radical group closely aligned with DFLP and the PFLP because of its Marxist ideology. The group provides limited political and military support to the dissidents. Black June Organization: (BJO) This radical Palestinian group receives support from Syria and Iraq and has devoted itself to destroying the moderate PLO. The group has formed operation- al ties with both the PFLP-GC and Saiqa and has members in the Bekaa. Abu Da'ud: A former Black September leader, Abu Da'ud is reportedly secretly working with the rebels as chief of "security and foreign operations." Abu Da'ud's expertise and terrorist contacts would significantly augment the rebels' capability for carrying out terrorist operations. Syria: Has indirectly fomented and fueled the mutiny to serve its own foreign policy interests. Ammunition and weapons have reportedly been given to the rebels as well as logistic support. Libya: has provided significant financial, mili- tary, and political support. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)-. A Marxist group and the second-largest PLO group after Fa- tah. The leadership has publicly support- ed Arafat, but some of the group's members have joined the rebels and privately share sympathy for some of the rebels' demands. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP,1 This Marxist-Leninist group has generally supported' mainline PLO policies in the past. Like the PFLP it has publicly supported Arafat but would realign itself with the dissidents if it believed that to be in its best interests. The group is closely aligned with Moscow. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Palestine (DFLP) and the PFLP, have publicly come out in support of Arafat, although some of their members have joined the rebels and many others share some dissident views. Though neither of these two groups would like to see the PLO under Syrian domination, it is unlikely that they would risk an open confrontation with Syria on the issue of Arafat's 25X1 leadership. Implications for Terrorism The mutiny of Fatah forces has thus far been confined developing tensions within the Palestinian communi- ties in Kuwait and the Yemen Arab Republic. If Arafat is unable to reintegrate the leftists, they will to the Bekaa, though there has been probably attempt to form a separate radical Palestin- ian block under Syrian and Libyan tutelage, which would significantly increase the international terrorist threat. In the wake of the Fatah split, the Syrians have established terrorist networks in Beirut to be used in staging operations in Lebanon, including attacks 25X1 against US Marines in the multinational peacekeep- ing force and against Lebanese politicians] Musa and Black June leader Abu Nidal are collabo- rating in the planning of terrorist operations in Leba- Terrorist attacks may also spill over into the European arena as groups and factions jockey for power. Arafat may have to countenance some of these attacks; he may even feel obliged to lift his ban on international terrorism in order to reestablish unity within the PLO, though we consider this less likely at this juncture. In any case, we believe that the PLO is shifting to a more militant posture, which is likely to contribute to an escalation of terrorist operations, including attacks outside the Middle East. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Italy: The Likely Shane of Future Terrorism The following article is based onl I a cable from the US Embassy in Rome dated 13 June 1983 and entitled "Italian Terrorism: Down but Not Out. " The material in the cable has been somewhat shortened and modified, but every effort has been made to faithfully reflect the views and judgments of the author in Rome. Terrorism in Decline Five years after the kidnaping and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, Italian terrorists are in desperate shape. After having been a primary topic of writing, conversation, and speechmaking for almost a decade, terrorism is no longer at the center of atten- tion of the Italian people, politicians, and media. This has been the result of a recent, profound downturn in terrorist activity. The student uprisings of 1968 introduced a steep upward trend in the number of terrorist acts in Italy. A decade later the number of terrorist acts was still rising but so, now, was the number of police successes. Then in 1981-82 the number of terrorists arrested and jailed rose sharply while the number of major terrorist acts dropped off. There was very little terrorist activi- ty during the winter of 1982, as the national attention shifted to courtrooms across the land where acrimoni- ous debates were taking place between arrested ter- rorists who had decided to turn state's evidence and those who remained committed to the terrorist cause. More Terrorists in Prison At the end of May 1983 more than 1,800 Italian terrorists were behind bars, a thousand more than three years previously. More than two-thirds of the imprisoned terrorists were home-grown ` leftists, chiefly from the Red Brigades (708) and Prima Linea (290). These two groups suffered disproportionately ' Compared with domestic terrorists, foreign terrorists have never been much of a problem in Italy. from the government's improved concentration of force and efficiency and from its success in exploiting the avalanche of captured terrorists who took advan- tage of temporary laws authorizing sharply reduced sentences for those who "repented" and cooperated with the police. Less is known about Italian rightwing terrorists, whose bombing of the Bologna railroad station in 1980 caused 86 deaths (making it the most lethal terrorist act in modern Italian history) and catapulted rightist extremism onto the center stage of public attention. Although the police have not cracked the Bologna bombing, they have been active, wounding and capturing one of the two most wanted rightwing Italian terrorists in Bolivia late in 1982 (he later died from the wounds). The rightists have claimed credit for few terrorist acts lately, perhaps because almost 500 of them were in prison at the end of May. What the Authorities Think Antiterrorist authorities claim that at their high point in the late 1970s the Red Brigades and Prima Linea alone totaled about 3,500 active members; today they can count on hardly more than a couple hundred loyalists outside prison. The police believe (although they lack firm evidence) that most of these loyalists are scattered, disorganized, and dispirited. The cur- rent lack of public concern about terrorism mainly reflects this drop in the fortunes of these two premier leftist terrorist groups. Complacency is hardly justified, however, while 226 leftist and 78 rightist terrorists-including many ac- cused of murder-remain on the government's wanted lists. Moreover, past police estimates of the strength of Italian terrorist groups have repeatedly been signif- icantly low. In addition to those on wanted lists, there must undoubtedly be others never identified or freshly recruited. Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Decadence During the four-month period February through May, there were only three terrorist acts that could be classified as attempted murders; only one succeeded. One of the failures, the 3 May shooting of Socialist labor lawyer Gino Giugni, was instructive in that it demonstrated how low Italian leftist terrorism has sunk from the professionalism of the Red Brigades at its peak. The classic Red Brigades terrorist actions, whether kneecappings, kidnapings, or assassinations, had cer- tain characteristics in common: ? The nature and timing of each action were intensely symbolic. ? The carefully chosen victims were highly visible, politically significant, and ideologically antipathetic to the Red Brigades. ? The actions were usually linked to popular grievances. Thus, Moro was the ultimate political magician, able on behalf of Christian Democratic governments to conciliate opposing forces-even the Communists- while Giugni was closely identified with the recent labor-management accord that brought credit to the Fanfani government. Moro was kidnaped on a day of great importance to the future of the government coalition of that time, while Giugni was shot as preparations for new national elections began. Yet, the attack on Giugni was like a bad photocopy of a classic Red Brigade action. The large team that kidnaped Moro blew away his five bodyguards in an impressive display of orchestrated precision. The young woman who shot Giugni fired seven times from close range but, owing to her precarious perch on the back of a moving motor scooter, only wounded him slightly. Aside from the driver of the scooter, she apparently had no accomplices. Down but Not Out The lower levels of terrorist activity and increasing evidence of terrorist incompetence are happy develop- ments. Nevertheless, it is too soon to assume that the three attacks in four months are "the final flicks of the serpent's tail," as some Italian commentators have written. In rolling up thousands of terrorists and mountains of arms, the police scored successes im- pressive to the public and devastating to the terrorist organizations. In themselves, however, these successes will not necessarily deter a resurgence in terrorist activity. Italy is not home free yet. Those who doubt that terrorism will again become an important factor in Italy usually have in mind the renaissance of the Red Brigades or the emergence of new but similar groups with highly structured and centralized organizations whose objective is radical change or at least destabilization of the political system. The skeptics point out that the terrorists of the 1970s clearly failed to achieve that objective. In fact, the recognition that they would fail, which crystallized after the technically perfect but pragmat- ically unsuccessful Aldo Moro operation, was a major cause of the subsequent factionalization of the Red Brigades and contributed importantly to its decline. Moreover, the level of social discontent today is in no way comparable to that of 1968, when a series of street disturbances of escalating violence led thou- sands of young dissident Italians down the path toward terrorism. Two Disturbing Possibilities We agree with the skeptics. The days of the Red Brigades and similar organizations are essentially over in Italy. Yet, we can envisage other, equally worrisome forms of terrorism emerging in the 1980s. For example, the type of terrorism associated with West Germany's Revolutionary Cells (RZ) has never taken root in Italy, but sentiments that could support it exist here. The West German authorities find these terrorists very hard to neutralize because they operate in tiny groups, often almost spontaneously, and appar- ently without central coordination or much logistic support. The RZ motivation may be described as a protest against economic deprivation in a mature industrial society. While less grandiose than, say, that of the Red Brigades, this motivation is not without potential appeal in Italy. Moreover, it need only appeal to a handful of people at the beginning-the Red Brigades Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 started with 50 stalwarts in 1970, Prima Linea with only 20 in 1976. Even at the height of their influence, moreover, the leftist terrorist organizations were wild- ly unpopular, according to public opinion polls. Lack of widespread support would not prevent a loosely knit organization like the RZ from arising on Italian soil on the basis of frustration felt by only a tiny minority of Italian dissidents. Perhaps more dangerous from the official US view- point would be the development of terrorism inspired by opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons. Indeed, recent propaganda from Red Brigade and other leftist terrorist sources has indicated they are trying to attract support by identifying themselves with the presumably large number of politically non- violent Italians who harbor antinuclear and antimili- tary sentiments. These efforts have met little but apathy. Even the much-publicized scheduled deploy- ment of cruise missiles in Comiso, Sicily, has not attracted much local opposition. The group of rather disorganized antinuclear pickets there is composed largely of foreigners. If classic-Italian terrorism is in eclipse and the shape of Italian terrorism to come is not yet visible, the reservoir of potential terrorists is large and obvious. A considerable number of younger Italians have re- ceived some sort of higher education but have not been able to find jobs that would permit them to live according to their heightened expectations-in fact, many can find no jobs at all. It is not unlikely that some of them will end up lashing out with violence against their society or against the larger Western system of which their society is a part. How they frame this violence will determine the nature of Italian terrorism during the rest of the 1980s. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret Italian Terrorists Target Prisons The release of imprisoned terrorist leaders, in our view, has become the top priority among Italian The latest arrests of Italian terrorists.throughout Italy have led to the discovery by Italian authorities of a newly formed Red Brigade (BR) splinter, Common Organization for the Liberation of Prisoners (COLP). Plans and documents found in safehouses indicate . that the new group is targeting several prisons where Italian terrorists are being held. The Italian carabi- nieri believe COLP is led by imprisoned BR leader Giovanni Senzani but have no information regarding the size and strength of this group. Prisons appear to be high-priority targets of other Italian terrorist groups as well. Tapes found 11 May in Rome in an Armed Proletarian Power (APP) safehouse included detailed terrorist interrogation of a prison guard, later slain, concerning Rebibia Prison, its structure, physical plant, and personnel move- ments. In another safehouse, authorities found plans for an attack on a Florence prison holding terrorists. Arrests in Milan of the Walter Alasia BR Column leader Roberto Adamoli and four column members on 6-7 June led to a safehouse containing plans of various prisons. Adamoli had recently publicly identified per- sonnel of the penitentiary system-especially the head of San Vittore Prison, which holds several BR mem- bers-as targets of his group Italian terrorists apparently have recognized the ne- cessity of joining forces to liberate jailed terrorist leaders in order to provide cadre for a resurgence of Italian terrorism. BR and Prima Linea (PL) terrorists who have escaped from prisons have been in contact regarding prison operations. Italian police suspect that PL member Massino Carfara, who mastermind- ed a jailbreak from Ronconi Prison in January 1982, probably provided detailed information regarding the prison to BR contacts before his rearrest in April. Police also believe PL terrorist Luigi Rapisanda, arrested on 2 June, was in contact with BR member Federica Meroni, who had escaped from Ronconi Prison; Meroni is known to have links to COLP and is suspected of having had links to the Rome BR column before her arrest on 1 June. 25X1 Attempts by BR columns to reorganize have been hampered by the lack of effective leadership. Most of the recently arrested members of various BR splinters have been either support personnel or new, previously unidentified members, none of whom has exhibited the ability to plan or conduct successful terrorist attacks. Italian terrorists apparently believe their best hope-at least in the short term-is to free their jailed comrades. 25X1 Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret Reverberations From a Skyjacking The Politics of Counterterrorism The recent hijacking of a Chinese airliner to South Korea was resolved smoothly, after precedent-setting negotiations between representatives of the govern- ments concerned. The principles of the 1971 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Hijacking were upheld. The South Koreans extracted a modest ges- ture of recognition from the Chinese but apparently gained little permanent benefit from the affair. Among interested onlookers, Taipei suffered another minor humiliation, while P'yongyang ultimately found its interests preserved. Some loose ends remain; in particular, the fate of the skyjackers has yet to be decided. Background On 5 May 1983, six Chinese citizens hijacked a Chinese Civil Aviation Administration (CAAC) air- liner en route from Shenyang to Shanghai with 105 passengers and crew. After shooting their way into the cockpit of the aging British-made Trident and wound- ing two crewmen who offered resistance, the hijackers forced the pilot to fly toward Seoul. Once across the Demilitarized Zone, the aircraft was escorted by South Korean fighters to a landing at a US military base. The hijackers demanded to meet the Taiwan Ambassador and to be flown to Taiwan, but after several hours of negotiations with US and South Korean officials, they released the passengers and surrendered. It was the first successful international hijacking of a CAAC flight. In the absence of direct communications links be- tween the Governments of China and South Korea, US and Japanese diplomats were used to establish contacts that culminated in unprecedented direct negotiations between the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and an official CAAC delega- tion that came to Seoul on 7 May. The Chinese officials in the delegation, headed by CAAC Director Shen Tu, who has ministerial rank, were the first to set foot in Seoul since the Korean War. After several days of negotiations, the South Korean Government, which is a signatory of the Hague Convention, agreed to repatriate the plane and passengers but elected to keep the skyjackers, promising to prosecute them under South Korean laws-as the convention permits. 25X1 Both Beijing and Seoul had good reasons to work out a quick and smooth resolution, even if it meant operating through a kind of temporary international short-circuit. Beijing wanted to limit the damage to its international image and get the plane, passengers, and skyjackers back. Seoul wanted to maximize the profit from this unexpected opportunity, especially in terms of obtaining evidence of tacit recognition by China and of discomfiting North Korea. Both sides achieved most of their goals, but partly at the expense of their respective allies, North Korea and Taiwan. 25X1 Hope in Seoul By engaging in some modest brinksmanship during the negotiations with the CAAC delegation, the South Koreans extracted from the Chinese a modest gesture of official recognition in the form of a written statement signed by the leaders of both negotiating teams under their official titles. Seoul is hoping, however, that the negotiations will eventually lead to broader bilateral contacts. So far, except for some polite words of appreciation and some forbearance in propaganda forums, Beijing has shown no evidence of cooperating. For example, Beijing recently refused visas to South Korean citizens who wanted to attend two UN-sponsored conferences in China. According to the US Embassy in Seoul, when the South Korean Ambassador to the United Nations. complained about this to a Chinese diplomat in New York, he was only given a pro forma explanation. On this occasion as Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 well as others, the US Embassy added, the South Koreans have made it clear to the Chinese that this issue could affect what happens to the skyjackers. Frustration in Taipei The Taiwan Government has been fiercely lobbying for the immediate release of the skyjackers-even though it-is also a signatory to the Hague Convention. Taipei holds that the skyjackers are freedom-seeking heroes who should not be prosecuted, but instead sent immediately to Taiwan where their propaganda value can be exploited. That might have little impact, according to US observers in Taipei, who report that the Taiwanese are generally apathetic about defec- tions, which they regard as "mainlander shows." To the embarrassment of the government, public gather- ings supporting the skyjackers have been only sparsely attended. The South Koreans have kept Taiwanese officials at arm's length, For weeks, Ithe South Korean MFA refused to allow Taiwanese diplomats to meet the skyjackers, and Taipei's Ambassador Hsueh Yu-ch'i was unable to secure an audience with South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk to discuss the matter. Although the South Koreans denied they had changed their attitudes toward China and Taiwan, Ambassa- dor Hsueh has described the South Koreans as imple- menting a de facto two-China policy. Taipei has now given up trying to dissuade the South Koreans from trying the skyjack- ers. Instead, it is pressing fora speedy trial, in the hope that soon after the trial the skyjackers will be released and allowed to go to Taiwan. Anxiety in P'yongyang On. 17, May the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian would visit P'yongyang in late May. The timing of the announce- ment, only days after the resolution of.the hijacking, coupled with repeated unsolicited denials by' Chinese officials that the trip had anything to do with the hijacking, suggested that Beijing had in fact initiated the visit to reassure P'yopngyang about China's con- tacts with South Korea the Chinese Government quietly hosted a visit by Kim Chong-il, the son of North Korean leader Kim Il- song. In another action reflecting discreet support of his position as the successor to Kim 11-song, the Chinese also recently published excerpts from the younger Kim's treatise on Marxism-Leninism What Will Befall the Skyjackers? The written agreement signed by the representatives of China and South Korea on 10 May does not mention what is to become of the skyjackers. Publicly, officially, and repeatedly, however, South Korean officials have promised to put the skyjackers on trial and to punish them for their criminal actions before considering their requests for asylum in Taiwan. Originally, the government had planned to get the whole matter over with quickly by holding the trial early in June. There was great difference of opinion within the government, however, over what sentences the skyjackers should receive. According to a senior MFA official, the sentiment in some military and Ministry of Justice circles, reflect- ing heavy pressure from Taiwanese interests, favored suspended sentences for all but the two who had used the pistols. In this view, even the latter should receive only light sentences (two or three years), which could also be subsequently suspended by a lower court judge. MFA officials and others taking the opposing, "inter- national view" supported heavy sentences of seven years or more, as required by South Korea's own antiskyjacking law. Under South Korean legal proce- dures, such sentences cannot be so easily suspended. These officials believe that the South Korean Govern- ment has much to lose internationally by letting the skyjackers off lightly. In addition, they speculate that by retaining control over the skyjackers, Seoul may Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 make it harder for China to refuse to participate in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics, both of which are to be held in South Korea. The interna- tionalists concede, however, that a continued Chinese refusal to issue visas permitting South Korean repre- sentatives to attend UN-sponsored conferences in China weakens their position. Justice said that President Chon Tu Hwan had instructed him to uphold the Hague Convention and avert criticism from both Western and Communist countries by putting the skyjackers on trial. He indicated, however, that because the President wants to defer until next year any decision on the final disposition of the skyjackers, the trial would be delayed until late this year. The Justice Minister commented that President Chon wants to accommo- date Taiwan by releasing the skyjackers, but only if it can be done without fanfare. This delay implies that the South Koreans are leaning against issuing strong sentences (since for maximum benefit those would be imposed quickly and forth- rightly) but fear the consequences of issuing only nominal sentences. Obviously, the Chinese Govern- ment would strongly object to perfunctory punishment of the skyjackers; of perhaps more importance to Seoul's decisionmakers, however, have been explicit statements of US concern (reflecting, in turn, the concerted position of the Economic Summit countries, which have formally agreed to ban commercial flights between their countries and any country that violates the Hague Convention). Meanwhile, according to the Minister of Justice, although no promises have been made to the skyjack- ers, they have been told informally that they will be turned over to Taiwan eventually. They are being treated well, in accordance with specific instructions from President Chon; they even receive a special diet of Chinese food. Impact of the Hague Convention Seoul's relatively lenient treatment of the skyjackers to date suggests that many in the government do not really consider them guilty of a crime against human- ity (as skyjacking is defined in the Hague Convention) but instead sympathize with their desire to escape from China. Nevertheless, Seoul's handling of the hijacking-in particular, the fact that Seoul repatriat- ed the passengers without soliciting further defec- tions-suggests that political considerations were up- permost in the minds of the South Koreans. Seoul recognized the limits of the concessions Beijing was likely to make in the short term and sought mainly to create an atmosphere favorable for subsequent con- tacts. In other words, even in the absence of a Hague Convention and of an Economic Summit agreement that gives it teeth, the South Koreans might have acted much the same way. Still, the convention did help to define the parameters of the negotiations with China and has buttressed the position of the South Korean officials who take the internationalist view. Similarly, because of the convention, Chinese officials had a standard (as did the rest of the world) against which to measure South Korean cooperation and to determine how much gratitude would be appropriate. 25X1 In contrast, it is apparent that, to the Taiwanese Government, the fact that the skyjackers were Chi- nese defectors loomed much larger than whether or not South Korea adhered to the provisions of the Hague Convention. If a Chinese airliner is ever hijacked to Taiwan, there will be powerful pressures on the government to ignore the Convention. A 25X Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret Argentina: Status of the Montoneros lup to several dozen leftist Montonero guerrillas have reen- tered the country and may be planning to resume military activities. Well-publicized incidents-inter- ruptions of television broadcasts by Montonero propa- ganda speeches, discovery of weapons caches, and other crimes for which the terrorists reportedly have claimed responsibility-have reinforced concerns. early April, the police have captured some 10 Mon- the press reports that police have killed several leaders in firefights. The deaths of the Montonero.leaders-one of whom was reportedly found with weapons, funds, and plans for further subversive activity-have been used by regime officials to bolster the position of the security services against civilian critics who have called for an end to the military's role in internal security matters. Regime leaders, for example, followed up the most recent shootout with a highly publicized report that detailed the history of Montonero terrorist activity. They also privately briefed leading politicians on the ongoing terrorist threat. Although there is growing evidence that the shootings may have been staged executions, the report and briefings have thus far helped dissipate criticism by most moderate politi- cians; all but the harshest regime critics have publicly acknowledged the need for continued efforts to com- bat subversion. In our view, the Montoneros are unlikely to mount more than small-scale operations over the coming months. The security forces continue to successfully penetrate their organization abroad and apparently have had little difficulty in ferreting out what little remains of the terrorist network in Argentina. In addition to the high personal risk of renewed terrorist actions, the Montoneros may calculate that more intense activities could prompt a military crackdown, posing a threat to the transition to civilian rule, 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 scheduled for next January. The security forces ap- parently recognize these constraints For now and probably beyond elections in October, the Montoneros are likely to focus on oliti 1 action. they continue to work through organized labor and leftist political parties. The extreme left wing of the predom- inant Peronist Party appears to be especially open to Montonero influence. Its leader, Vicente Saadi,r is a longtime25X1 backer of the Montoneros and receives a monthly stipend from funds kept in Mexico. In addition, his newspaper, La Voz, was started about two years ago with Montonero capital and has become an important vehicle for the organization's propaganda. Should the Montoneros decide to renew terrorist 25X1 activity, moral support would remain strong among some Latin American leftists, but we judge that material assistance, if forthcoming, would be limited. The Mexicans and Bolivians, for example, while willing to provide a safehaven, would not supply the Montoneros with weapons and would probably block significant arms buys and militar activity their borders. The Cubans have renewed their commitment to the terrorists after a year's respite. Havana, however, is already spread thin and, considering the high political costs and low likelihood of success, is unlikely to furnish more than shelter, training, some financial assistance, and covert propaganda support; Nicaragua would probably fol- low a similar policy. Outside Latin America, the PLO would probably continue to provide training and political support. 25X1 Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01 Peru: Terrorist Activity in Lima Despite government counterterrorist operations and the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency, the Sendero Luminoso (SL) has. continued terrorist operations in rural areas of Peru and recently has increased attacks in Lima. Since late May, SL has carried out almost daily attacks on electrical power stations as well as periodic bombings of government buildings and businesses in Lima and other urban centers. On 12 June, explosions blacked out the city of Cuzco for two hours, and other explosions occurred in several places including the US-Peruvian Binational Center. CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret 25X1 25X1 Estimates of SL strength, though soft, indicate there are currently between 200 and 250 activists in Lima. The increased level of SL activity has led to the arrests of several SL members nearly one-third of the leadership in attacks, primarily directed against the Peruvian Gov- Lima. While the loss of leadership will probably result in some disarray within the urban forces, we believe 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01 Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret Special Analysis Rightist Terrorism in Spain Rightist terrorism emerged in Spain during the final years of the Franco regime in response to the loosen- ing of authoritarian controls. As ultraright groups grew more concerned that liberalization would follow Franco's death, they stepped up their attacks against organizations, individuals, and business establish- ments they suspected of democratic or leftist leanings. Illegal extreme rightist activity in Spain also involves some elements of the military in what Spaniards call golpismo ("coupism").' Furthermore, we suspect that the many rightists retained in the bureaucracy from the fascist era may provide cover for rightist terror- ists, who undoubtedly have been further energized by the accession to power last October of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). Should the Socialists conduct a more thorough purge of Francoists from positions of power, the loss of official protection would weaken rightist terrorist groups, but it might also add to their ranks some of those affected by the purge. Terrorist Groups One of the most prominent rightist terrorist organiza- tions is the Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance (AAA). In February 1977, the AAA took credit for the most spectacular incident of rightist terrorism, the so-called Atocha massacre in which five Communist labor lawyers were machinegunned to death in a union office. The group also claimed responsibility for the 1977 murders of a Madrid woman socialist and a Barcelona industrialist, as well as for a Barcelona ' Golpismo in Spain refers to rightwing coup attempts by military figures. The most famous of these occurred in February 1981 when military men seized the Spanish Cortes. Several officers were arrested in October 1982 on suspicion of coup plotting just prior to Spain: Rightwing Terrorist Groups/Organizations FJ FJ AJT Youth Force (Fuerza Joven) Youth Front (Frente de la Juventud) Group of Traditionalist Youth (Agrupacion de Juven- tudes Tradicionalistas) Spanish Friends of Europe Club (Circulo Espanol de Amigos de Europa) Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance (Alianza Aposto- lica Anticomunista) BOG Blind Obedience Groups BVE Spanish Basque Battalion (Batallon Vasco Espanol) GCR Warriors of Christ the King (Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey) FNT National Labor Force (Fuerza Nacional del Trabajo) ASNT National Union Action of Labor (Accion Sindacalista Nacional de Trabajo) Cl Iberian Cross (Cruz Iberiaa) AHM Association of Soldiers' Sons (Associacion de Hijos de Militares) NGE MRN JAS New Guard of Spain (Nueva Guardia de Espana) National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Re- volucionario Nacional) Front Line (Primera Linea de FET y de las JONS) Blue Division (Division Azul) Union Action Youths (Juventudes de Accion Sindacal) Armed Revolutionary Groups (Grupos Armados Revolucionarios) Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 newspaper bombing that killed one person and injured several others. In October 1977, Spanish police arrest- ed 11 men in Barcelona, accusing them of member- ship in AAA. One was a wealthy businessman de- scribed by a reliable Madrid newspaper as a prominent figure in far-right activities. Despite these arrests, AAA has remained essentially an enigmatic organization. The Spanish press has occasionally credited the group with later terrorist activities, but Spanish security forces have not confirmed these allegations. the Spanish Basque Battalion (BVE), first identified in 1980, is another important terrorist group. In February 1980, BVE claimed to have murdered a Madrid university stu- dent whom it accused of collaborating with the leftist Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement (ETA). One year later, BVE announced by telephone that it would conduct a campaign against any Basque leftists and threatened to kill 200 Basque nationalists. Subse- quently it claimed several murders of Basque leftists in February and March 1981, as well as the robbery later that year of arms and uniforms from a French military installation in the Pyrenees. Following the massive Socialist victory in October 1982, BVE issued a communique saying that it rejected socialism, was declaring war on the state, and intended to force the release of two Army officers arrested just prior to the elections for coup plotting. Although BVE has not followed through on that threat, Spanish police speculate that some minor bombings just across the French border in early November 1982 may have been the organization's work. In November 1982, Spanish security I reported on a new rightist organization, the Blind Obedience Group (BOG). BOG's real significance, lies in its organization and alleged con- tacts with political dissidents. It is said to be made up of small cells of armed men, some 200 in Madrid and an unknown number in Valladolid. Spanish security officials have not accused BOG of any terrorist acts to date but have implicated it in coup planning by the military men arrested in Madrid just before the 1982 national election. Nevertheless, they do not yet con- sider the group to be a serious security threat. Warriors of Christ the King (GCR), said by the press to date from the late 1960s, is led by Mariano Sanchez Covisa, who claims that the organization is made up of patriotic Spaniards defending national traditions against the forces of progressivism. GCR was credited in the early 1970s with a series of attacks on bookstores, art galleries, and movie theaters dis- playing "progressive" works. Press accounts allege that it also attacked Communists, individuals loyal to democratic ideals, liberal priests, Basque separatists, and leftist university centers. Spanish police report only two incidents involving the group since 1976. They suspect, however, that a leftist student killed in Madrid in January 1977 was a GCR victim and that the group bombed a Madrid cafeteria in 1979, caus- ing heavy damage but no loss of life. GCR again received publicity in December 1981 when it undertook a campaign to organize midlevel Army officers in support of General Jaime Milans del Bosch, a leader of the attempted coup in February 1981. In mid-December 1981, the US Embassy in Madrid observed that GCR enjoyed little support and was known mainly for spray-painting walls and occa- sional bullying tactics at public events. The names of at least 20 other rightist organizations appear in information from responsible press organs. We do not, however, have sufficient information to judge how many of these are Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 " 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret actually terrorist groups. In our view, several names probably are no more than cover labels for other organizations or designate relatively small groups of people. Three such groups seem worthy of mention The Spanish Friends of Europe Club (CEDADE), founded in 1966, is la neo-Nazi organization disposed to the use of violence but with no known actions to its credit. The National Trade Union Work Action (ASNT) is a fascist labor organization founded in 1980 by Jose Antonio As- siego Verdugo, a Malaga lawyer. According to the press, ASNT has attacked members of the socialist and Communist trade unions. Assiego Verdugo is currently in jail for illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Finally, Iberian Cross (CI) is characterized as a rightist group that favors violence and has been charged with bombing a Madrid bank. Political Party and Government Connections Much more than in other West European countries, the distinction between the political and terrorist far right in Spain is more apparent than real. Spain's only extreme right political party, until it disbanded in November 1982, was New Force (FN) headed by Madrid lawyer Blas Pinar Lopez. FN declared its total fidelity to the work and thinking of Franco, which-it interpreted as opposition to "liberalism, libertinism, and anarchy." Support for the FN in the parliamentary election of 1979 was only 2.1 percent, just enough to win a seat for Blas Pinar. When the party sank to 0.5 percent of the total vote in October 1982 and lost its only place in the Cortes, Pinar formally disbanded it. sometimes exclusive component of terrorist groups such as the Apostolic Anticommunist Alliance and the Spanish Basque Battalion. FN's youth wing, Youth Force, carried knives, clubs, and blackjacks and that many had been given fire- arms by the party. A small paramilitary corps within Youth Force, made up of particularly violent youths, acted as a guard for Pinar. We believe that Youth Force was essentially an action arm of FN, given more to violence than to political activity. Unlike its parent organization, it has not been disbanded and is expected to continue to engage in terrorist acts. We have few ~ reports of direct links be- L`'n tween Spanish rightist terrorists and members of the government bureaucracy, police, or military. BOG is reported to include some junior military officers an-4 policemen. In addition accordin to US Embassy officials connections exist between rightist terrorists an the military officers involved in the February 1981 coup attempt as well as those arrested for coup plotting in October 1982. Still, few details of these links are known. The paucity of evidence about ties between rightist terrorists, the military, or the police is striking al- though not surprising; Spain has only recently emerged from rightist authoritarian rule, and there has not been a massive purge of Francoists in the bureaucracy and military. We believe it possible that the absence of security service information on links between rightist terrorists and the political and mili- tary establishments-indeed, the shortage of informa- tion on any aspect of rightist terrorism-reflects the presence of such ties more than it suggests that far right terrorist groups are weaker in Spain than they are elsewhere in Western Europe. 25X1 International Contacts The only documented international links of Spanish rightist terrorists have been with Italians. In February 1977, Spanish Civil Guards arrested Warriors of Christ the King leader Mariano Sanchez Covisa and eight Italians for making submachineguns, counterfeit passports and other identity documents, and possess- ing illicit equipment. Two of the Italians, Salvatore Francia and Elio Massagrande, were known rightist terrorists wanted by the Italian police. The US Em- bassy in Madrid, quoting press sources, reported in May 1981 that Stefano Delle Chiaie, a prominent neofascist, had been in the city and that the 1976 25X1 Secret 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 murder of an Italian judge, Vittorio Occorsio was lanned at a bar there. since the late 1970s that youth from the neofascist Italian Social Movement have attended summer camps at FN locales in the Pyrenees. Media allegations of West German and French support for Spanish rightist terrorism have not been substantiated by Spanish authorities, but we suspect that small-scale liaison activity occasionally occurs. Finally, in the murky area between politics and terrorism, an abortive attempt occurred in 1978 to create an organization called Euroright. Italian Social Movement head Giorgio Almirante visited Madrid in the summer of 1978, reportedly at the request of Bias Pinar, to plan a meeting between their parties and that of their French counterpart, Jean-Marie Le Pen and his National Front. Their stated goal was an international organization to fight Communism. A meeting of the three in Paris produced nothing, but the Almirante-Blas Pinar contact lasted somewhat longer. In 1979 Bias Pinar publicly stated that FN had received $43,000 from Almirante's party for the coming national election in Spain. We have no other evidence, however, of continuation of these contacts. Outlook In Spain, the failure of the February 1981 coup attempt and the Socialists' strong electoral victory in October 1982 suggest that the appeal of rightist political ideas is narrowing. At the same time, howev- er, the Socialist victory has probably confirmed the worst fears of diehard Francoists and added to their anxieties. Recurrent reports and rumors of coup plot- ting among military officers as well as of rightist terrorist reorganization suggest continued-although diminished-activism by the frustrated right. Against this backdrop, the catalyst for new rightist terrorism could come from government efforts to promote so- cialist programs, particularly any attempted purge of Franco regime holdovers. As US Embassy officials in Madrid have pointed out, moreover, the elimination of the extreme rightist voice in parliament has removed a safety valve for the legal venting of such views. The upshot is that rightist terrorism or coup plotting-or a combination of the two-may still pose a potential threat to Spanish democracy as well as to leftist groups and individuals. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret Statistical Overview Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, September 1982-June 1983 a Sep Oct Total 49 57 Government officials 1 0 Diplomats 29 35 Military 9 13 Business 4 2 Private parties, tourists, missionaries, and students 5 3 Dec Jan Feb 47 56 58 2 6 2 22 27 33 10 11 2 8 1 9 Mar Apr May Jun 71 71 57 10 3 5 7 3 35 34 28 4 11 12 7 1 7 7 8 0 Total North America Latin America Western Europe 49 57 2 7 10 18 24 22 USSR/Eastern Europe 3 3 Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 Middle East and North Africa 5 3 Asia/other 4 3 Jan 56 3 14 19 1 Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks' 0 J F M A M J aFigures for the most recent months are subject to change as additional data are received. Car bomb in Baghdad killed 2, wounded 130; Ankara airport attack killed 9, wounded 70. Car bomb in Pretoria. S.A. killed 18, wounded 217. Bombing of US Embassy in Lebanon killed 57. wounded 120. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret Chronology This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology unless new information has been received. 25X1 17 April 1983 West Berlin: Arrests of Neo-Nazis Police arrested five known neo-Nazis after they smashed the windows of an occupied house and two parked cars in the Kreuzberg district of the US sector. Four were formerly members of the now defunct German Workers' Youth Group. 25X1 28 April 1983 West Berlin: Bombing in US Sector An explosion on the 13th floor of the Credit Institute for Housing Construction caused heavy damage. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility in a confessor letter. - 25X1 18 May 1983 confessor letter. West Germany: Arson Attack on Construction Company Near Stuttgart, equipment belonging to the Zueblin Construction Company, which is involved in the controversial extension of a runway at Frankfurt airport, was heavily damaged. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsibility in a 25X1 Guatemala: Kidnap Victim Murdered Security forces raided two safehouses of the dissident wing of the Guatemalan Communist Party and discovered the body of banker Humberto Rosales, who had been abducted on 13 April. Two terrorists were killed in the raid, and a cache of arms, documents, and propaganda was uncovered.F---] 25X1 35 Secret GI TR 83-014 7 July 1983 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 12 June 1983 West Germany: Possible Terrorist Surveillance In Mannheim, military police observed three occupants in a car bearing French li- cense plates photographing the US Army housing facilities. (Blueprints of this area were discovered in May in a garbage container on the base.) Later that day, a simi- lar vehicle was observed at the German-US celebration in nearby Worms, where several high-ranking US officials were present. stations, and banks-the usual targets of ETA/M attacks 14 June 1983 Spain: ETA/M Apology In Bilbao, the Basque terrorist organization Fatherland and Liberty/ Military (ETA/M) claimed responsibility for the "accidental" killing of an innocent bystander. In a communique, ETA/M claimed it was attempting to bomb the car belonging to the Bilbao Civil Guard chief, who escaped without injuries. The group also issued a warning to Basques to avoid police headquarters, Civil Guard 20 June 1983 Greece: Second ASALA Communique Warns of Attacks in Turkey In Athens, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) issued a second communique claiming responsibility for the 16 June attack at the Istanbul covered bazaar that killed two and injured 23. The ASALA statement threatened continued attacks on all Turkish political, economic, and tourist institutions by ASALA "suicide commandos." This ASALA shift toward indis- criminate, random attacks in Turkey increases the likelihood of deaths and injuries Spain: Bombing of US Bank In Bilbao, the Basque terrorist group Iraultza ("Revolution") claimed responsibil- ity for the bombing of the Bank of America office. Iraultza has been responsible for the bombing of several US-linked companies in the Basque country since 25X1 21 June 1983 Spain: More Iraultza Bombings In San Sebastian, Iraultza claimed responsibility for two predawn bombings of US-affiliated companies, which caused little damage and no injuries. The group claimed the attacks were part of a campaign against US interests in the Basque country and were intended to oppose Spain's pro-US position on INF deployment. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret the BR, which can ill afford the loss of one of its most skilled organizers. Italy: Important Red Brigade Leader Arrested In Rome, Italian police arrested Pietro Vanzi, a major leader of the Red Brigades (BR), believed to be the leader of the Rome BR Militarist Column. Vanzi had al- ready been sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in the Moro killing and the Dozier kidnaping. We expect the arrest of Vanzi will have a significant impact on Venezuela: Counterterrorist Sweep According to press reports, Venezuelan authorities carried out a series of raids in Caracas, arresting 20 suspected Bandera Roja members. Authorities reportedly. also discovered a major arms cache, military uniforms, and equipment to form a variety of documents. The raids show a continued ability on the part of the government to prevent the Bandera Roja from reemerging as a major terrorist 22 June 1983 Spain: Car Bomb Kills Civil Guard Officer In San Sebastian, a car bomb killed a member of the Spanish Civil Guard. At least one other person was injured and nearby cars damaged by the blast. Although no group has claimed credit for the bomb, police suspect ETA M, which has frequently targeted police and Civil Guardsmen. 25X1 France: Bombs Hit French Airline In Paris, the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC) claimed responsibility for four early morning bombings of airlines offices, which caused damage but no injuries. In a communique, ARC called for the liberation of Guadeloupe political prisoners being held in French colonial jails. Since 28 May, ARC has undertaken a bombing campaign on the French Caribbean, and some 20 attacks are attributed to this organization. 25X1 Movement (AO) suspected of involvement in a Padova bombing in 1982. Italy: Arrest of Autonomia Members In Naples, the Italian police arrested two members of the Autonomia Organization 25X1 France: Sentencing Direct Action Leader In Paris, Frederic Oriach, the leader of the leftist terrorist group Direct Action, re- ceived a six-year sentence-two years more than the prosecutor requested-for his involvement in a bombing campaign, which resulted in the deaths of two bomb-dis- posal experts. Two other members of the group were also sentenced to jail terms. 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Spain: Second Car Bomb Kills Police Officer In San Sebastian, the radical ETA/M splinter Anticapitalist Autonomous Com- mandos (CAA), claimed responsibility for the car bomb, which killed one police of- Spain: Increased Basque Terrorism In San Sebastian, police deactivated a 25-kilo bomb found on the roof of a large national police station. ETA/M later claimed responsibility for the attempt. We suspect the recent increase in terrorist activity is a reaction to the government's widely publicized antiterrorist plan 24 June 1983 West Germany: Attempted Bombing Prior to Bush Visit In Duesseldorf, a bomb was discovered in the gas tank of a car outside Litton Busi- ness Systems, an American firm. It had been set to go off during the night, but the detonator was defective. German police suspect the bomb was connected to Vice President Bush's trip to the Duesseldorf area the next day. No group has claimed responsibility, but the Revolutionary Cells have perpetrated similar attacks on US firms in the area during the past two years. Greece: Bombing of Albanian Embassy Car In Athens, the previously unknown Front for the Liberation of Northern Ipiros (MAVI) claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Albanian Ambassador's car. A leaflet claimed the attack was in retaliation against the "tyrannical" Albanian regime. West Germany: Protesters Arrested In Krefeld, police arrested 33 people after demonstrations against Vice President Bush's visit turned violent. several of those arrested are so-called RAF legals Portugal: Establishment of New Counterterrorist Support Unit In Lisbon, the Portuguese Republican National Guard-responsible for public order in rural areas-has been authorized to form a Mines and Booby-Trap Unit. The presidential decree followed several booby-trap ambushes, believed to have been the work of the terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25). Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret 26 June 1983 Italy: Assassination Claim by,Red Brigades Splinter In Turin, the newly formed Red Brigades (BR) splinter, Common Organization for the Liberation of Prisoners (COLP), claimed responsibility for the assassination of Turin Chief State Prosecutor Bruno Caccia who was gunned down by masked men in a passing car. COLP has promised to provide a communique explaining its reasons for the attack; however, police are convinced of the legitimacy of the BR claim based on the modus operandi used, which closely follows previous BR Spain: Arrest of Basque Terrorists In the Basque region, the Spanish Civil Guard arrested 21 suspected members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Military Wing ETA M) and confiscated numerous weapons, ammunition, and explosives. 25X1 26-27 June 1983 Italy: Terrorist Elected to Parliament Toni Negri, the founder of Autonomia and a prominent Red Brigades member, was elected to the Italian parliament in the national elections. Negri, who is in prison, is eligible for release on grounds of parliamentry immunity. We believe Italian terrorists will interpret Negri's election as indicating broad public support for terrorist operations; a surge in terrorism may follow. 25X1 27 June 1983 Spain: Killings Continue in Northern Spain In Pamplona, terrorists believed to be members of ETA/M killed a Spanish Air Force officer, marking the fourth death in the Basque region since 14 June. We also note that ETA appears to be expanding to conduct more operations within the Navarre region-an area claimed by the Basques as a part of their national Sudan: Americans Held Hostage Two Americans, one German, one Canadian, and a Dutchman were taken hostage by The Liberation Front of South Sudan. in Boma National Park. The rebels demanded a large ransom,, military clothing, and a broadcast on VOA and BBC of a political statement by 6 July. Observers estimate about 50 men are holding the hostages. 25X1 West Germany: Bombing in Protest of Runway Extension In Frankfurt, a bomb exploded outside the home of the airport chief causing considerable damage, but no injuries. The same day a bomb at the airport's training center was defused by police. The Revolutionary Cells claimed responsi- bility for both bombs.F___1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 El Salvador: American Embassy Attacked-Again The US Embassy in San Salvador was attacked with an RPG-2 rocket and machinegun fire, which shattered windows but caused only light damage and no injuries. The attack was claimed by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 28 June 1983 South Africa: Roodepoort Bombing Two explosions in a government. office building in Roodepoort destroyed the first floor offices of the Department of Internal Affairs; there was no damage to police district headquarters and a mine labor authority on the other floors. Corsica: Bomb Planted at Corsican Police Station In Propriano, rain dampened the burning fuse of a powerful bomb placed outside a police station, narrowly avoiding a potentially lethal explosion. The attempted bombing followed a surge of violence-a machinegun attack on a barracks and a shotgun attack on a police station-in retaliation for the suspected murder of a na- tionalist leader. Despite the arrest of six known underworld figures for the disappearance of militant nationalist Guy Orsini, we expect violence in Corsica to 29 June 1983 Costa Rica: Attempt Made on Contra Leaders. The powerful bomb that exploded in downtown San Jose was prematurely detonated, according to Costa Rican authorities. It had been intended for use against Eden Pastora or other leaders of the anti-Sandinista organization ARDE. One of the perpetrators, identified as a naturalized Nicaraguan and probable Sandinista agent, was killed in the explosion. 30 June 1983 Colombia: Anti-US Bombings In a call to a Bucaramanga radio station, the National Liberation Army (ELN) claimed credit for several bombings against US-related targets in that city. The caller said that the attacks against the Binational Center, an affiliate of the First National City Bank of New York, and a Mormon church were in protest of US policies in Central America. Another bomb placed at the home of a US citizen was found and deactivated by police. Secret 40 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Seem Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100200001-8