TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Directorate Seereet.
Intelligence of I MASILI( FILE COPY I
06 NOT GIVE OUT
W MARK O
Review
Terrorism
Seffetr-
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
copy 4 9 7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Terrorism
ReviewF-
1 Perspective-Terrorists in Beirut Break Their Own Vicious Record
(OGI)
3 Highlights
5 Car Bombs: Potent Weapon in the Middle East Terrorist Arsenal
(DO//AD)
West Germany: Radicals' Plans Thwarted
7 (OGI)
9 Basque Terrorists Surface in Central America
(OGI, OCR)
11 Anatomy of a Terrorist Incident: The Rangoon Bombing
(OGI)
13 Terrorist Use of East European Weapons
(OGI)
17 17 Statistical Overview
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Review
Perspective Terrorists in Beirut Break Their Own Vicious Record
The almost simultaneous attacks early Sunday morning on the headquarters
compounds of the US and French contingents of the Multinational Force resulted
in the highest casualty toll attributable to terrorists in the 15 years for which we
have records. As of this writing, the bodies of 216 US Marines and 42 French sol-
diers have been dug from the rubble, with the grisly task not yet finished. Scores
more were wounded, and many are still unaccounted for.
Beirut is no stranger to this sort of violence. In August 1978, a terrorist bomb de-
stroyed an apartment house in the city, killing 161 people in what was, until last -
Sunday, the bloodiest terrorist incident of recent times. Earlier this year a car
bomb attack on the US Embassy in Beirut ended 65 lives.
Who did it? Details of the latest atrocities are now beginning to emerge from the
fog of allegation and speculation, but the picture is far from complete. Alleged
spokesmen for at least four groups-all obscure. Islamic revolutionary organiza-
tions-have claimed credit. Probably none of them was responsible. The best
intelligence data available so far point toward pro-Iranian Shiite radicals as the
most likely attackers. Such perpetrators would probably have had Iranian
encouragement, and possibly training, advice, and concrete assistance as well. The
modus operandi of the attackers was strikingly similar to that employed in earlier
car bombings in Baghdad believe to have been carried out at the behest of Iran.F
Some Lebanese Government officials believe that the Syrian Government knew of
the attack in advance and may have helped plan and implement it. At the very
least, by allowing known Shiite extremists to operate in Syrian-controlled territory
and to cross Syrian-controlled lines, Damascus must bear some of the responsibil-
ity.
Whoever drove the trucks-or provided the explosives or designed the attacks-
several major points stand out:
? Many factions in the Lebanese dispute would welcome a US withdrawal. Among
them, more than one might believe that such an attack would promote this
objective.
1 Secret
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
? There are persons and groups in the Middle East who approve of and want to be
associated with what we in the West regard as an atrocity. This contributes to
the difficulty of identifying those responsible.
? Even though the Iranian and Syrian Governments were probably involved, the
acts could have been committed without the assistance of any state. Eliminating
state support for such tactics thus would not necessarily eliminate them-
although a strong counterterrorism effort by all of the states in the area would
make such attacks very difficult to carry out.
Was there warning? Yes and no. Only two days before the attack, the US National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia alerted senior officials of
the Intelligence Community about the growing threat to the Marine peacekeeping
force. The report concluded: "The Marines will remain an easy target for any
group that wants to halt the peace process." Numerous analysts in both the US
Government and the press had already reached-and reported-the same conclu-
sion. Nevertheless there was no specific warning that this particular attack would
What can we learn? Twice this year the United States has suffered shocking losses
in kamikaze attacks against its installations. As it happens, both took place in
Beirut. US installations all over the world, however, are vulnerable to such attacks,
because physical security measures are rarely designed to prevent suicide attacks.
Moreover, it is hard for Westerners to comprehend the willingness-even eager-
ness-of some religious and ideological fanatics to forfeit their lives in exchange
for American lives. According. to a Marine who watched the attack last Sunday,
the driver of the truck died with a smile on his face.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Highlights
Alert List Middle East/ Western Europe: Terrorist Threat Reports. In the wake of the
devastating bombings in Beirut, we have received a number of reports of plans by
terrorists-variously identified as Muslim radicals, Iranians, and Syrians-to
launch additional operations within Lebanon and Western Europe against targets
of several different nationalities. It is difficult, at this point, to evaluate these
reports; some, almost certainly, represent valid threats.
(There also
is a known demonstration effect whereby the success of terrorist operations
encourages other terrorists to follow through with their own planned attacks.
Whatever the case, the bombing last Sunday can only increase the threat US
installations in the Middle East will face in the coming months.
Costa Rica: Possible Plot Against US Official. The Director of Costa Rican
Intelligence advised US Embassy officials that it had uncovered a plan by a 15-
man group-composed primarily of Costa Rican nationals-to kidnap a US
Embassy officer and members of the Costa Rican judiciary in an attempt to obtain
the release of imprisoned terrorists. an
official of the Nicaraguan Embassy may be functioning in a liaison capacity with
the unit, which also includes a Salvadoran and reportedly is headed by a Chilean.
The kidnaping plot follows a series of incidents that together demonstrate a
deterioration in the security climate.
Nigeria: Reported Threat to US Embassy. The US Embassy in Lagos has been
placed on alert-and the Nigerian police force there reinforced-because of an
unsubstantiated report of a Libyan-backed terrorist threat.
Key Indicators Iraq To Cut Off Support for Black June. President Saddam Husayn told French
reporters that Iraq will no longer provide assistance to Abu Nidal, the leader of the
radical Palestinian splinter group, Black June. Iraq has provided Black June with
safehaven and financial'support since the mid-1970s. This year, however, relations
have deteriorated as Baghdad has curtailed Black June's operational freedom. The
Iraqis have been reluctant to cut their links with Black June-which has provided
them with a potent terrorist option-and to cede to Syria total control over the or-
ganization. Saddam may now be willing to relinquish his limited leverage over
Abu Nidal in order to undercut charges from the West that Iraq supports
international terrorism.
Secret
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Netherlands: Peace Campers To Step Up Action. Press reports indicate that
demonstrators manning a peace camp at Woensdrecht, where cruise missiles are to
be stationed, have decided to adopt a new "hard line" against INF deployment.
They have warned that they will not hesitate to enter military territory.F 25X1
Significant Developments Bombings in Beirut. Massive car bombs destroyed the headquarters of the US
Marine contingent and damaged a French military post in Beirut. More than 200
US Marines and 42 French soldiers were killed, and approximately another 100
were wounded. Although an individual claiming to represent a previously unknown
group, the Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement, called the French news agency
in Beirut to claim credit, radical, pro-Iranian Shias, who are active against the
Multinational Force in Beirut, are the prime suspects in the attacks. The President
of Iran's Supreme Court subsequently praised the attack and said, "The United
States and France.... have learned their lesson...."
France: Arrest of ASALA Bomber. The arrest of an Armenian in Marseilles on
8 October in connection with the Orly Airport bombing represents success for
French police in solving the Orly Airport bombing. The suspect, Soner Nayir, was
arrested as he stepped off a train from Paris. He had earlier been identified by po-
lice as the electronics specialist who designed the sophisticated firing circuit for the
Orly bomb, which killed eight and injured 54 people. Police also have arrested six
other Armenian militants in Paris who are suspected of sheltering Nayir. We
believe the arrest of ASALA's bombmaker has dealt a serious-if temporary-
blow to ASALA's terrorist capabilites in France.
Secret 4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Car Bombs:
Potent Weapon in the
Middle East Terrorist Arsenal
The car bombs that destroyed the headquarters of the
US and French contingents of the Multinational
Force in Beirut on Sunday are the latest examples of
the growing use in the Middle East of this terrorist
instrument. The use of car bombs in the Middle East
is a relatively recent phenomenon, with the first
recorded incident dating back to 24 April 1977, when
a bomb hidden on an Israeli bus exploded. Since then,
car bombs have been a regular and more frequent
item in the arsenal of Middle Eastern terrorists: four
in 1978, six in 1979, five in 1980, 13 in 1981, 12 in
1982, and 12 as of 7 August 1983.'
Although various Middle Eastern countries have been
the venue for one or more car bombs-Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Turkey-Leba-
non heads the list, having been the site of 31 of 55
incidents. The first one to occur in Lebanon, however,
was not until 22 January 1979, when Ali Hasan
Salamah, PLO Chief Yasir Arafat's chief of security,
was killed when a bomb exploded in a parked car as
his own car rode by. Only one other car bomb incident
was recorded in Lebanon in 1977, but, thereafter, the
incident rate increased: four in 1980; nine in 1981,
eight in 1982, and eight in 1983 as of 7 August.
Aside from a series of bombs planted on Israeli buses
in 1977, 1978, and 1979, car bombs in the Middle
East have fallen into several distinct patterns:
? Those detonated by remote control as the intended
target passed by, as in the cases of the Salamah
assassination and a 19 October 1983 attack against
a US Marine patrol in Beirut.
? Those parked in a chosen spot and then detonated
either by remote control or by a timer at a time
chosen by the terrorists, usually determined as likely
to inflict the highest possible number of casualties,
as in the case of the 7 August explosion of a car in a
market in Baa'lbakk, Lebanon, and in another that
occurred two days earlier near the Ash-Sha'rani
Mosque in Tripoli, Lebanon.
? Those driven into or up to the target and then
detonated, as in the case of the destruction of the
US Embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983 and Marine
headquarters in Beirut on 22 October. (A variation
on this technique was the car bombing of the French
Embassy in Beirut on 24 May 1982, in which a car
driven by a secretary going to work was detonated
by remote control as she drove through the Embassy
gate.)
So many different groups have claimed credit for the
recorded car bombings in the Middle East that it is
not possible to attribute their increasing use to the
fact that some specific group has become enamored of
them. The Palestine Liberation Organization, Fatah,
Palestine Revolutionary Armed Force, Muslim Broth-
erhood, Iraqi Liberation Army, Eagles of the Pales-
tinian Revolution, Holy Struggle Organization, Front
for the Liberation of Lebanon From Foreigners, Is-
lamic Dawa Party, Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-General Command, Islamic Jihad, Free
Nasserite Revolutionaries, and Organization for Ven-
geance of the Martyrs of Sabra and Shatila are only
some of the groups that have claimed, or have been
credited with, responsibility for one or more car
bombings. Most likely the explanation is that, having
belatedly come to realize the effectiveness of car
bombs-that is, the difficulty of protecting facilities
or individuals against them and the attention they
attract by the large number of casualties they often
inflict-more and more Middle Eastern groups are
turning to their use.
' This article is drawn from a study of car bombings that occurred
through early August 1983. Our data emphasize incidents affecting
US interests and do not account for every car bombing that
occurred during that period.
Secret
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
West Germany:
Radicals' Plans Thwarted
Extensive security precautions by the West German
police precluded serious violence by terrorist sympa-
thizer groups during the recent anti-INF (intermedi-
ate-range nuclear forces) demonstrations in northern
Germany. Some West German officials fear, however,
that the past "Action Week" period could prove to be
the most dangerous in the anti-INF campaign be-
cause of the high level of frustration among militant
groups that have failed to generate serious violence
thus far.
West German security officials had warned that
violence was likely during the three days of scheduled
protest demonstrations in Bremerhaven and Norden-
ham, and US military transports were temporarily
suspended in this area because of the anticipated
threat. The West Germans based their assessment on
the number of Red Army Faction supporters and
suspected Revolutionary Cells members who had par-
ticipated in planning sessions and surveillance activi-
officials, these radicals intended to focus their violent
activities on the US military base in Bremerhaven..
In response to these indicators, 6,000 police, backed
by armored personnel carriers, were brought in to
protect the site. Access roads leading onto the base
were sealed off to the demonstrators. Although most
of the demonstrations were peaceful, battles between
police and a small group of organized militants, who
were masked and armed with slingshots and steel
pellets, broke out at the end of the three-day period.
Militants smashed windows and fired signal flares at
police, who were forced to drive the rioters away with
water cannons.
fringe was well prepared to engage in violent con-
frontations during these demonstrations, but was un-
able to do so because of the extensive police presence.
7 these extremist
groups had not focused extensively on the 22 October
demonstrations, but the West German police were
also well prepared for them, and there was no serious
violence. Security precautions against terrorist acts-
as opposed to planned demonstrations-are more
difficult; terrorist support groups will not face such
elaborate police mechanisms should they engage in
future anti-INF activities.)
Secret
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Basque Terrorists Surface
in Central America
The arrest in San Jose, Costa Rica, of a Basque
terrorist charged with plotting to assassinate-with
the possible help of Nicaragua-anti-Sandinista
leader Eden Pastora appears to have damaged Sandi-
nista relations with the Spanish Government, further
exacerbated tensions between Costa Rica and Nicara-
gua, and focused attention on Spanish Basque activi-
ties in Central America.
Police arrested terrorist Gregorio Jimenez Morales, a
member of the Military Wing of the Basque Father-
land and Liberty (ETA/M), on 8 September when
they found him sketching the approaches to the
Pastora home. Local authorities believe Jimenez, an
explosives expert, may have been involved in the
unsuccessful bombing attempt on Pastora's political
headquarters in San Jose on 29 June. Jimenez has
been linked by Spanish authorities to at least six
bombings in Spain. According to Costa Rican offi-
cials, the ETA had ordered him to monitor the
movements of the anti-Sandinista leadership and sus-
pect he was part of a 12-man team that entered the
country in the summer of 1983 via Nicaragua.
Spanish security officials who traveled to Costa Rica
to assist in the investigation determined that the
plotters rented at least six houses and two apartments
and that four of the residences probably served as
observation posts to surveil Pastora's home and move-
ments. The investigators concluded the team probably
planned to attack the convoy carrying Pastora with
grenades and automatic weapons. They have no evi-
dence, however, that links Nicaragua firmly to the
plot.
The Spanish Government has requested that the
Costa Rican Attorney General's Office continue to
detain Jimenez pending a formal extradition request.
Before extradition can even be considered, however,
Jimenez must face Costa Rican charges of document
falsification and involvement in a terrorist conspiracy.
In our view, extradition is unlikely because of Costa
Rican fears of ETA retaliation, the government's
tradition of granting asylum, and the restrictive na-
ture of Costa Rica's extradition treaty with Spain.
Officials are more likely to follow the precedent set in
a similar terrorist trial earlier this year in which those 25X1
convicted were expelled from the country but not
repatriated to their homeland.
The political fallout from the Jimenez arrest has been
heavy, particularly in Spain. According to Embassy
reporting, the case has attracted wide public attention
there and has become a political embarrassment to
Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, a supporter
of the Sandinista government. In Costa Rica, too, the
incident has had political repercussions, exacerbating
already strained relations between Managua and San
Jose. Costa Rica has withdrawn its Ambassador to
Managua, and Madrid papers quote President Monge
as stating that Jimenez admitted his mission was to 25X1
assassinate leaders of the anti-Sandinista opposition-
thus, implicitly charging that the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment was behind the plot.
We are frankly puzzled as to why the ETA would.
involve itself in an operation that runs the inherent
risk-if unravelled-of calling attention to the ETA
presence in the region, particularly from Latin Ameri-
can security forces, including those of countries where
ETA members traditionally have found sanctuary and
a permissive operational environment. As one possible
motive, Spanish officials note that, although the ETA
is able to obtain small arms on the European arms
market, it has been unable to secure heavy weaponry;
they believe Nicaragua may have agreed to provide
such arms as the quid pro quo for the Pastora
operation. Other possible inducements, we speculate,
could have included money, training, and a secure
refuge in Nicaragua.
Secret
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Gregorio Jimenez Morales
has also used the alias Jorge Zuniga Varela. Accord-
ing to official Spanish records, Jimenez is a member
of a commando group known as Andatza, whose
weapons cache has included four Browning pistols,
one Sten submachinegun, several kilos of GOMA-2,
and detonators, along with fuses and ammunition for
these items. Costa Rican authorities believe Jimenez
was involved in an explosion that occurred on 29
June 1983 in a San Jose parking lot, killing one
Nicaraguan and seriously injuring another.
Official Spanish records identify him with thefollow-
ing operations in Spain:
? 31 January 1981: blew up the Iberduero electric
company relay tower in Guipuzcoa.
? April-July 1981: carried out four attacks on two
Iberduero transformers and one substation in
Guipuzcoa.
? 14 August 1981: stole a car at gunpoint and
machinegunned the Bank of Vizcaya in Tolosa.
? 25 August 1981: attacked- Iberduero offices in
Tolosa and stole a land rover, subsequently burned.
? 6 November 1981: stole a vehicle at gunpoint and
raided National Documentation and Identification
offices in Tolosa.
? 17 December 1981: placed a bomb in the car of the
father-in-law of a Civil Guard officer in Tolosa; the
man was not killed.
? 19 January 1982: stole a vehicle at gunpoint and
machinegunned the Tolosa home of an industrialist
who had refused to pay ETA/M's "revolutionary
taxes. "
? 3 February 1982: stole a vehicle at gunpoint and
placed an explosive device in a bar in Tolosa.
Gregorio Jimenez-also known as El Pistolas-is a
native of Tolosa, in the Basque province of Guipuz-
coa, Spain. The 29-year-old Jimenez worked as a
plumber in Spain before he joined ETA/M in 1979.
Trained by ETA in explosives and in covert action, he
had carried out several successful operations in the
Basque country before he was detained by Spanish
police. He was able to conceal his identity and
subsequently escaped to France. In a confession made
shortly after his arrest in Costa Rica-but later
retracted-Jimenez admitted that ETA had directed
him to observe Eden Pastora's movements but denied
knowledge of a plot against him or other ARDE
leaders.
Costa Rican police files show that Jimenez entered
the country with a false Spanish passport in the name
of Lorenzo Avila Teijon. He has told police that he
In our view, both ETA and the Nicaraguans have lost
face as a result of this operation. The case has caused
the ETA's activities and its links to the Basque
communities in Latin America to come under in-
creased scrutiny. At the same time, Nicaragua has
suffered a loss of credibility among its Spanish sup-
porters and members of the Socialist International.
? Participated in the kidnaping in Tolosa of two 25X1
individuals, one of whom was murdered.
We believe that Sandinista sensitivity to international
concerns lowers the risk for the moment that ETA or
other groups acting on its behalf will undertake
further operations against the-anti-Sandinista leader-
ship.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Anatomy of a Terrorist Incident:
The Rangoon Bombing
On 9 October 1983, a bomb explosion killed 17 senior
South Korean officials attending a ceremonial func-
tion in Rangoon, Burma. Over the next three days,
the Burmese captured two ethnic Koreans and killed
another as suspects in the bombing. The evidence to
date is inconclusive but points to North Korea as the
perpetrator of the attack.
The explosion occurred at the Martyrs' Mausoleum
shortly before Republic of Korea (ROK) President
Chun Doo Hwan was to appear for a pro forma
wreath-laying ceremony. The official members of the
Korean entourage were already seated when ROK
Ambassador Lee Kae Chul arrived with a police
escort and ROK flag flying, just a few minutes before
the scheduled start of the ceremony. As Lee stepped
from his car, the military bugler sounded a salute; the
Ambassador proceeded to the flagpole to present the
ROK colors and then walked into the mausoleum.
The band struck up the ROK national anthem. As
best we can reconstruct the train of events, the
bomber-probably assuming that this signaled the
arrival of President Chun-detonated the bomb with
a remote mechanism. The explosives were placed to
cause maximum impact at the site occupied by the
ROK dignitaries, whose seating positions had been
preset by protocol. As a result, 17 Koreans were killed
and 15 injured. Three Burmese, apparently all jour-
nalists, also were killed and another 33 injured.
The device used in the explosion was a claymore-type
bomb. Its placement-along with a second fragmen-
tation bomb that failed to detonate-on a ceiling
beam was clearly directed to cause maximum harm to
those in attendance. The unexploded bomb found at
the site contained about 700 ball bearings. An incen-
diary device of an antitank warhead type charged
with a small quantity of TNT and fuel, placed next to
the claymores, also failed to detonate.
Burmese and Korean security teams had inspected the
area-even using metal detectors-before the guests
were permitted to enter. According to the account of a
senior Burmese official, however, inspection of the
roof area-which had been painted only a week
earlier-was overlooked. Another unconfirmed ac-
count, quoting a functionary who delivered ceremoni- 25X1
al items to the mausoleum late on the night of 8
October, indicated that security personnel apparently
were not posted at the site overnight. On the assump-
tion that Burmese assistance was required to pull off
the incident, the entire Burmese security detachment
responsible for securing the area following the explo-
sion was detained, and laborers from the 4th Garrison
Engineers (Burmese Army) and the Burmese con-
struction corporation who had made repairs at the
mausoleum were arrested.
Detonation was by means of a radio wave remote-
controlled receiver effective as far as 1 to 2 kilometers
distant. Pieces of a transistor receiver were found
along with portions of a circuit diagram, a small
condensor, and magnets. Also found were pieces of six
Japanese-made 1.5-volt batteries of the same brand
used in the bombing at the US Cultural Center in
Taegu on 22 September 1983. The batteries used in
both bombings had a production date of January
1983.
The Burmese and the South Koreans have both set up
teams to investigate the bombing. Burmese authori-
ties have two Koreans (North Korean nationality has
not been confirmed) in custody. Both were wounded
during capture, but one is being questioned. There are
conflicting reports regarding interrogation of the sec-
ond. The Burmese committee, composed mainly of
senior police and military officials, is to submit its
report "as soon as possible." The Korean team has
Secret
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
already announced its expected conclusion that North
Korea is responsible for the bombing, citing the
following evidence:
? The explosives and other materials used, as well as
the apparent method of installation, were the same
as those developed and used by North Korea since
1969. The same method of installation was also used
in an unsuccessful 1970 assassination attempt
against the President of the ROK at the Memorial
Gate of the Korean National Cemetery.
? The equipment used in Rangoon is identical to that
found on North Korean agents who have infiltrated
South Korea.
? North Korean agents are trained to kill themselves
if capture seems inevitable. The suspects in the
Rangoon bombing resisted arrest by detonating
handgrenades. One was killed and two injured.
Although the ROK has acted with restraint thus far,
the pressure to retaliate will intensify if clear evidence
of North Korean responsibility is made public.
Secret 12
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Iq
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
secret
Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, January-October 1983 a
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Total
57
59
77
82
59
66
71
60
51
10
Government officials
6
3
4
5
8
10
10
4
2
0
Diplomats
27
33
36
40
28
25
33
37
34
7
Military
11
2
11
13
8
4
10
2
8
2
Business
2
9
8
7
9
8
7
8
4
0
Private parties, tourists,
missionaries, and students
7
8
7
10
2
16
6
6
1
1
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, January-October 1983 a
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Total
57
59
77
82
59
66
71
60
51
10
North America
3
5
5
6
11
2
6
3
4
0
Latin America
13
10
18
20
12
19
20
15
9
0
Western Europe
20
26
33
20
18
20
15
21
18
2
USSR/Eastern Europe
1
1
3
0
1
0
2
1
10
0
Sub-Saharan Africa
0
3
4
5
4
8
2
5
0
0
Middle East and North Africa
14
6
12
23
8
16
21
11
11
2
Asia/other
6
8
2
8
5
1
5
4
8
6
a Figures for the most recent months are subject to change as
additional data are received.
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks
Figures for the most recent months are subject to change
as additional data are received.
Bombing of US Marine Hqs.
and French post in Beirut
killed 195 and wounded 87
(preliminary).
Car bomb in Pretoria, S.A.
killed 18, wounded 217.
Bombing of US Embassy
in Lebanon killed 57,
wounded 120.
Bombing of Gulf Air
Boeing 737 in UAE desert
killing 111.
1982
? 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider.
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
unless new information has been received. 25X1
3 September 1983 Italy: Arrest of Neofascist Terrorist
The Italian press reported that police captured a neofascist terrorist wanted in
connection with the May 1982 assassination of 'a railway policeman in Rome. r
11 September 1983 Italy: Five Explosives Cause Blackout
During the night five explosive charges were detonated on the summit of Mount
Paganella, resulting in a radio and television blackout in the Trentino area. The
act was claimed by the "New Armed Partisans," who criticized the mass media
and made accusations against the Italian Government in connection with the
Italian contingent attached to the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut.
Turkey: Agca Trial To Begin 25X1
Mehmet Ali Agca will be tried in absentia in a military court in Istanbul on
charges of attempting to murder the Pope. The trial will begin within the next few
days.
October 1983 Netherlands: Peace Campers To Step Up Action
Press reports indicate that demonstrators manning a peace camp at Woensdrecht,
where cruise missiles are to be stationed, have decided to adopt a new "hard line"
against INF deployment. They have warned that they will not hesitate to enter
military territory.
19 Secret
GI TR 83-022
27 October 1983
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
4 October 1983 Italy: More Arrests of BR Members
The Division for General Investigations and Special Operations (DIGOS) and
Carabinieri, in a joint operation, arrested three Red Brigades (BR) terrorists in
Naples and one in Rome. Two other terrorist members, already incarcerated, were
served arrest warrants for crimes committed while members of the BR. One of
those arrested, Giovanni Marzatico-reportedly involved in efforts to recruit BR
members-is believed to be the leader of the.Naples Column. Several BR
documents were obtained during the arrests, but no weapons were recovered.
Italy: West German Terrorist Sentenced
According to the press, Christa Froehlich, who was arrested in Rome in 1982 for
bringing explosives into Italy, has been sentenced to six years and four months in
prison. Froehlich has past connections to the Red Army Faction and the
International Revolutionary Cells, but the Italian court did not have sufficient
evidence to convict her of terrorism.
6 October 1983 Chile: Bomb Attacks in Santiago
A bomb exploded at a branch of the Banco del Estado de Chile, causing a large
fire. A second bomb exploded at a supermarket, shattering windows and damaging
the facade of a nearby office building. No casualties were reported, and no group
has claimed responsibility.
7 October 1983 Corsica:. Bombings Continue
In Bastia, 10 bombs exploded in a 20-minute span, extensively damaging banks
and stores but causing no personal injuries. An 11th bomb exploded in the city of
Corte. Although no group has claimed credit for the attacks, we suspect the
outlawed Corsican separatist group, the National Front for the Liberation of
Corsica (FLNC), may have been responsible.
8 October 1983 Spain: ETA/M Claims Slaying of Police Officer
In Bilbao, the military wing of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA/M) has
claimed responsibility for the 3 October murder of a Spanish police officer.
Spain: Arrest of ETA Members
In Vizcaya and Alava, six alleged members of an ETA/M intelligence unit were
arrested by Spanish police. One person is accused of transmitting intelligence to
ETA leaders in France. ETA intelligence units are usually composed of younger
individuals who must prove themselves before being accepted into the ETA hard-
Colombia: Betancur Meets With M-19 Leaders in Spain
Colombian President Belisario Betancur held a two-hour meeting with 19th of
April (M-19) leaders Ivan Marino Ospina and Alvaro Fayad in Madrid, where
Betancur was to receive the Prince of Astaurias peace prize. No specific agreement
was reached at the meeting, but plans were reportedly made for future talks
between a presidential spokesman and the two guerrilla leaders.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
France: Update on Orly Airport Bombing
French security personnel, 125X1
arrested Soner Nayir in Marseille. Nayir had been identified by Varadjan -
Garbidjan-arrested a few days after the 15 July bombing at Orly Airport and
charged with the attack-as the person who made the bomb. When he was
arrested, Nayir had in his possession a West German passport that had been issued
to Uwe Johannes Mainka, a former member of the West German rightwing
terrorist group Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann.
Guatemala: Director of Guatemalan Daily Kidnaped
Pedro Julio Garcia, the Director General of Prensa Libre, was kidnaped from his
home by members of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT). The kidnapers
demanded dissemination of a manifesto in Central America, Mexico, and the
United States, as well as payment of a large ransom.
9 October 1983 Italy: Fire of Suspicious Origin Destroys Property of USAF Personnel
A fire of suspicious origin occurred aboard two trucks loaded with household goods
belonging to two USAF members assigned to Aviano Air Base. Responsibility for
the fire was claimed the same day in a telephone call to a Paduan newspaper by a
"group of Communists." The attack was apparently intended to underscore
opposition to the recent police intervention against the demonstrators in Comiso
who were protesting the upcoming cruise missile deployments.
10 October 1983 Chile: Bombings in Valparaiso/Vina del Mar
Unknown persons destroyed two railroad passenger cars with incendiary bombs,
slightly injuring one guard. At approximately the same time, two electrical
substations and 12 towers were also destroyed by bombs, causing a blackout
lasting half a day. No arrests were reported, and no group has claimed credit for
the incidents
Bolivia: La Paz Bombings
Two simultaneous bombings took place in La Paz. The first occurred at the home
of the owner of Ultima Hora, a La Paz daily newspaper, and shattered windows
but caused no casualties; the second took place at the La Paz University
Federation offices and caused considerable damage. A third bomb was discovered
and defused at the home of the president of the Confederation of Private
Enterprise. No one has claimed credit for the incidents
South Africa: ANC Destroys Fuel Depot
The African National Congress (ANC) claimed responsibility for the three limpet
mine explosions in Warm Baths that destroyed six gasoline tanks and rail and road 25X1
gas tankers. Two unexploded limpets found at a local civil defense headquarters
were timed to go off as policemen gathered to investigate the original explosion
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Spain: Bombing in Basque Country
In Bilbao, a bomb expoded in the offices of a transport company, causing damage
but no injuries. Althou2hno group has claimed credit for the attack, ETA is a
Guatemala: Terrorists Attack US Firm
The Peten base camp of Nello L. Teer International was attacked by some 25
armed men who occupied the installation and burned several pieces of heavy
construction equipment. No one was injured, but damage is reported to have been
extensive. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack
11 October 1983 Italy: Judge's Brother Murdered
In Maddaloni, gunmen attacked and killed Franco Imposimato and left his wife
critically wounded. Imposimato was the brother of Judge Ferdinando Imposimato,
who has been conducting a number of key investigations into terrorism and
organized crime. A caller to the Italian news agency ANSA stated, "We have
executed the brother of the hangman Judge Imposimato." There are reported to be
striking similarities between this attack and the September 1982 murder of
Palermo prefect Gen. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa.
13 October 1983 Spain: Civil Guard Member Assassinated
A Civil Guard member was gunned down by two suspected ETA/M assassins in
Renteria (Guipuzcoa) as he returned home from work.
Chile: Bombings During October National Protest Day
Several bombs exploded during the October national days of protest, sponsored by
the Popular Democratic Movement, a radical leftist coalition. Unidentified persons
hurled a bomb at the San Miguel municipality building in Santiago, shattering
windows and damaging the facade. A second bomb was thrown at a private home
by two individuals riding bicycles. The bomb shattered windows and set the house
on fire. Other terrorists bombed electricity posts in the Nunoa area of Santiago,
Chile: Carabinero Assassinated
Unidentified persons killed a Carabinero guarding a noncommissioned officers
quarters in Santiago. The assailants fled in a car, taking with them the
Carabinero's submachinegun, ammunition, and radio. This incident is similar to
the 9 September slaying of another Carabinero guard who was on duty in front of
a judge's residence. No group has claimed credit, and no one has been
apprehended for either killing.
Secret 22
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
14 October 1983 Yugoslavia: Bombs. Explode in Yugoslav Province
Two bombs exploded in the southern province of Kosovo, causing damage to
commercial and residential buildings but no casualties. In Kosovo-a poor region
populated mainly by ethnic Albanians-more than 600 people have been jailed
since the spring of 1981 for their part in nationalist riots or for organizing illegal
nationalist and separatist group
15 October 1983 Peru: Terrorists Black Out Lima Again
A group of Sendero Luminoso (SL) guerrillas briefly blacked out parts of Lima in
the first recurrence of large-scale, terrorist-perpetrated violence since the July
series of incidents in the capital. SL terrorists dynamited five electrical
transmission towers, blacking out several districts in Lima. Technicians restored 25X1
power quickly. The blackout was part of a coordinated, though poorly planned
series of incidents that took place in the capital and the emergency zone.
Peru: Terrorists Attack Lima Police Station
Unidentified individuals, presumably members of SL, fired automatic weapons
and hurled dynamite petards at a Peruvian investigating police (PIP) station in a
Lima suburb. Two police agents were seriously wounded. A police dragnet resulted
in the arrest of four suspects in the station's vicinity.
16 October 1983 Peru: Guerrillas Destroy Strategic Bridge
Members of SL bombed the Alcomachay bridge that links the Departments of
Ayacucho and Huancavelica, killing two policemen guarding the installation. The
attack followed a surge in violence that blacked out parts of Lima and left six
policemen and three civilians wounded the night before in half a dozen separate
.attacks in the Peruvian capital and in Huancavelica and Ayacucho.
17 October 1983 Mozambique: South African Raid
The Information Office of the African National Congress in Maputo was
destroyed by a South African Defense Force strike. South Africa claims the office
was used by the ANC to plan the 10 October bombing of a fuel depot in Warm
Baths, South Africa. Five people, four of them ANC members, were injured in the
attack.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
18 October 1983 Spain: ETA/M Acknowledges Responsibility for Murder
ETA/M issued a communique in Bilbao taking credit for the assassination in
Cadiz on 15 October of Argentine-born Alfredo Jorge Suar Muro, a physician in a
nearby prison. The communique stated that the shooting was the first attack
against staff members of Spanish prisons holding "Basque political prisoners." A
Madrid daily recently estimated that there are currently well over 300 ETA
prisoners, including members of the extreme radical "Comandos Autonomos
Anticapitalistas" in 12 prisons throughout the country.
Honduras: US Embassy Harassed
An unknown perpetrator in an unidentified pickup truck apparently threw a large
pyrotechnic device over the fence of a lot adjacent to the Embassy. It caused no
damage or personal injury, but the incident was reported by local media as
involving a medium-size bomb. To date, no group has claimed responsibility
Burma: Karen Abducts French Citizens
A Karen (Burmese insurgent) unit entered a French-sponsored cement factory
under construction in the Karen state and kidnaped a French couple and six
Burmese employees.
19 October 1983 Spain: Army Captain Executed by ETA/PM
Basque terrorists killed Spanish Army Capt. Alberto Martin Barrios, who had
been kidnaped two weeks ago by ETA/PM Assembly VIII. Police said Martin-
whose body was found on the outskirts of Bilbao-had been shot in the head at
pointblank range. The ETA/PM Assembly VIII kidnaped Martin to call attention
to the court martial of eight of its members and a Catalan separatist for a 1980
attack against the Berga military garrison. In telephone calls to Basque
newspapers, the organization claimed it had "executed" Martin following the
Spanish Government's refusal to meet its demand that a communique be read on
television condemning the upcoming trial.
Italy: Bombing at US Government Laboratory
A bomb exploded during the night at the US Agricultural Research Services
Entomology Lab in a suburb of Rome. The blast caused heavy damage to the
facility, but injured no one. An anonymous caller to the Italian news agency
ANSA claimed the bombing in the name of the "Anti-Imperialist Patrols for
Proletariat Internationalism," a group previously unknown to authorities.
According to the caller, the group also exploded a bomb at the offices of American
Express in the same area-though police said no such bombing occurred.
Secret 24
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Spain: Basque Terrorists Kill Businessman
Two presumed ETA/M terrorists gunned down Candido Cuna Gonzalez, a
businessman, in Renteria, hours after the funeral and burial in Bilbao of
assassinated Army Capt. Alberto Martin Barrios. The victim, accused by the
terrorists of collaboration with the police, had survived an earlier shooting attempt
by ETA/M. According to Spanish Government figures, ETA shootings and
bombings have claimed more than 400 lives-most of them civilian-since its
formation in 1968.
23 October 1983 Lebanon: Bombings in Beirut
Massive car bombs destroyed the headquarters of the US Marine contingent and
damaged a French military post in Beirut. More than 200 US Marines and 42
French soldiers were killed, and approximately another 100 were wounded.
Although an individual claiming to represent a previously unknown group, the
Free Islamic- Revolutionary Movement, called the French news agency in Beirut to
claim credit, the exact identity of the perpetrators is unknown. Radical, pro-
Iranian Shias are active against the MNF in Beirut, however, and are the prime
suspects in the attacks.
25 October 1983 India: Jordanian Ambassador Shot
The Jordanian Ambassador to India was shot and wounded in New Delhi by an
unknown assailant who escaped the scene in a motorized rickshaw. An eyewitness
identified the attacker as "non-Indian," but no group has yet claimed credit for the
attempted assassination.
26 October 1983 Italy: Jordanian Ambassador Shot
The Ambassador to the Vatican and his driver were wounded in an assassination
attempt in Rome. The assailants were described as Middle Eastern or North
African in appearance.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100280001-0