TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100290001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Review
Terrorism
Secret
GI TR 83-023
10 November 1983
497
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Terrorism
Review F
10 November 1983
Perspective-Cuban Response to Grenada Setback: Terrorist Danger Assessed
(OGI)
7 Colombia: The Kidnaping Capital of the World
(OGI)
9 Husayn al-Musawi and the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat in Lebanon) I 25X1
(OCR)
13 North Korea Responsible for Rangoon Bombing
(OGI)
15 Terrorist Use of East European Weapons-Czechoslovakia
(OGI)
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Deputy
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
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Terrorism
Review) 25X1
Perspective Cuban Response to Grenada Setback: Terrorist Danger Assessed 25X1
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, thwarted in his efforts to establish a Cuban
beachhead in Grenada, could seek to lash out at some of those who caused his
plans to be aborted. We believe that, while Castro is unlikely in the near term to
use Cuban assets to mount terrorist attacks against US personnel or installations,
he could seek to. vent his anger by conducting vendettas against other regional
leaders-Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga, Dominica's Prime Minister Charles, or
Prime Minister Adams of Barbados, for example-who have forcefully supported
US actions. in Grenada. It is also possible that individuals or groups that receive
Cuban support could ignore or misread Castro's signals and carry out anti-US
operations on their own.
Castro's response to his dramatic political setback in Grenada has been limited
thus far to the diplomatic and public relations fronts:
? Mass demonstrations have been organized to protest the US action.
? Cuban diplomatic missions apparently have lobbied host governments to refuse
recognition to the new Grenadian authorities, portraying them as puppets of the
United States.
? Havana has sought support in the United Nations and the Nonaligned Move-
ment for condemnations of the US action.
Havana enhanced its own defensive military posture perhaps out of genuine
concern that the United States could attack Cuba should anti-US operations occur
for which Washington finds Castro to blame. In response to Washington's
demarche concerning reported Cuban plans to instigate reprisals against the
United States, Havana denied any such intentions, chafed at US attempts to
"intimidate" Cuba, and refused to accept responsibility for the actions of others
who feel impelled to act in response to the US role in Grenada. In our judgment,
Castro probably will be particularly cautious in coming weeks to avoid even the ap-
pearance of indirect involvement with attacks against US targets for fear that they
could result in US retaliation.
The information currently available to us indicating Cuban encouragement of
anti-US violence by local Communist parties and radical groups elsewhere in the
hemisphere is both unconfirmed and of questionable reliability. Sponsorship of
such operations would not appear to square with Castro's perceived need to
continue to appear as a world statesman rather than a terrorist practitioner.
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GI TR 83-023
10 November 1983
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In fact, Castro has been going through an extended period of personal and political
stocktaking. The setback he suffered in Grenada cannot but be a painful reminder
that 30 years of revolutionary action have produced few definitive successes. He
has given the appearance in recent months of carefully walking a tightrope, trying
to strike a balance between defending his revolutionary credentials and avoiding a
misstep that could be used by Washington to justify some action against Cuba.
There may be greater danger, however, if Castro feels himself pushed to the wall.
For the most part a pragmatic decisionmaker, Castro has suffered the loss through
death of some of his closest and more judicious confidants-those who traditional-
ly counseled caution and pragmatism. If confronted with additional serious
political or economic setbacks in the coming weeks, Castro could revert to the kind
of reckless and injudicious behavior that characterized the early years of his
leadership. He could, in that event, sanction anti-US operations-particularly if he
can keep the Cuban hand hidden.
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Secret
Highlights
Lebanon: ASALA Threat To Attack US Targets. The Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), in a telephone call that claimed
responsibility for the attack on the Turkish Embassy in Beirut on 29 October, has
warned that the United States, France, and Turkey will be the targets of ASALA
operations until Armenia is liberated. To date, ASALA-using various cover
names-has. conducted five minor bomb attacks against US interests in Western
Europe. ASALA appears to have the capability to conduct terrorist attacks in
Beirut. We believe, however, that the question of terrorist attacks against non-
Turkish targets has become such a divisive issue within ASALA that future
attacks will be limited to Turkish targets.
Key Indicators Grenadian Fallout. Radical groups in several Latin American countries are using
US actions in Grenada as a pretext for engaging in demonstrations, harassment,
and attacks against US installations. In Bolivia, the US Consulate in Cochabamba
was broken into and sacked; in Medellin, Colombia, the Binational Center was
bombed and a local security guard shot; and in Valparaiso, Chile, the Binational
Center was bombed. Although the level of violence has, not been high thus far,
local terrorists or "crazies" may escalate the violence and target US-owned
businesses or personnel.
International: Black June Organization's Campaign Against Arab Moderates. A
spate of threats against Gulf moderates, following the recent shootings of
Jordanian diplomats in Rome and New Delhi and the suspicious crash of a Gulf
air carrier in the UAE, leads us to believe that Abu Nidal's group in Damascus
may be embarking on a terrorist campaign against Arab moderates. Some of the
terrorist acts may be aimed at gaining the release of imprisoned group members in
Jordan and Kuwait. According to US Embassy sources in Kuwait, US and
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GI TR 83-023
10 November 1983
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Western interests may be targeted there if the Kuwaiti Government does not
comply with the group's demands. In a possibly related incident, the son of the
Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UAE recently received a death threat which he has
attributed to BJO.
Significant Developments Terrorist Threat to Peruvian Municipal Elections. Sendero Luminoso (SL)
terrorists have stepped up efforts in both Lima and the emergency zone in
anticipation of the 13 November municipal elections. The group has staged a series
of coordinated attacks during the latter half of October. Although the primary
targets were police and police installations, others have included attacks on a
Communist labor headquarters, a newspaper office, the headquarters of the
Popular Action (AP) party, a US-owned factory, municipal buildings, and
electrical transmission towers. SL guerrillas have also threatened electoral
candidates and voters in the emergency zone. SL activity is expected to increase as
election day draws near.
Turkey: Preelection Surge of Terrorism. The general election on 6 November was
the focal point for a recent upsurge in terrorist activities-both within Turkey and
elsewhere in Western Europe. Three incidents in Turkey, bombings of Turkish
diplomatic facilities in Switzerland and West Germany, and three "protest"
takeovers of US firms by Turkish militants in Western Europe have underscored
radical leftist attempts to protest the military regime in Turkey. A captured
Revolutionary Way (Dev Yol) terrorist claimed to have received instructions to
carry out terrorist attacks in various regions of Turkey to create the impression
that terrorism was on the upswing. We believe counterterrorist forces are able to
suppress terrorism in Turkey at the present time.
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France: Release of Suspected Libyan Terrorist. French authorities released Sa'id
Mohamed Abdallah Rashid-a Libyan national wanted in Italy for his activities
in connection with international terrorism. The 28 October release apparently
came after the date when extradition papers for his return to Italy. could be
processed. Press reports suggest that Rashid's arrest on 6 October triggered the
detention of 37 French citizens in Tripoli between 9 and 11 October. The failure to
prosecute. Rashid may well be attributable to French fears of reprisal by the
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Colombia: The Kidnaping Capital
of the World
Kidnaping is but one facet of the violent guerrilla
struggle that has plagued Colombia for a generation
and that has resulted in the deaths of almost 20,000
people. Since early 1981, guerrilla or criminal groups
have seized more than 100 people a year and collected
millions of dollars annually in ransoms.' Currently,
Colombian police are working on at least 70 kidnap-
ing cases perpetrated by guerrilla groups, some of
which have been unsolved since 1980.2 So far this year
three American citizens have been kidnaped-two
have not yet been released.
A June 1983 article in the Colombian press, apparent-
ly based on information provided by military intelli-
gence sources, demonstrates that both leftist guerrilla
groups and criminal elements are involved in Colom-
bia's kidnaping problem. The article lists 130 individ-
uals currently being held for ransom in Colombia,'
and attributes 59 to the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), 18 to the 19th of April Move-
ment (M-19), five to the National Liberation Army
(ELN), seven to the Peoples Liberation Army (EPL),
one to the Pedro Leon Arboleda group, and 39 to
common criminals.
Establishing a reliable figure for the number of
kidnapings in Colombia, however, is complicated by
several factors. Many kidnapings are not reported
because families fear that notifying the local authori-
ties would endanger the victims' lives. Most reported
kidnapings remain unsolved in police files because,
quite often, the victims' families pay the demanded
ransom without notifying the authorities. In addition,
'Colombian officials admit that the true number of kidnaping cases
could be double that cited because families are reluctant to deal
with the authorities and often quietly pay ransoms without notify-
Secret
GI TR 83-023
10 November 1983
investigation into kidnaping incidents is hampered by
the fact that a number of the kidnapings are conduct-
ed by common criminals who operate under the name
of one or more of the local guerrilla groups. Converse-
ly, guerrilla groups have been known to take. credit for
kidnapings they did not commit or to hire criminal
gangs to conduct kidnapings.
The motivations underlying the kidnapings vary.only
in nuance from group to group. The most obvious
motive for kidnaping is money-kidnaping wealthy 25X1
citizens for ransom has proved to be a highly lucrative
and virtually riskless business in Colombia. In addi-
tion, guerrilla groups manage to exploit the kidnap-
ings for a number of less tangible reasons, such as
gaining publicity for their goals and demonstrating a
group's ability to operate in the face of government
counterinsurgency measures, thereby embarrassing
the Colombian Government
In an April interview with reporters held just before
his death, Jaime Bateman, leader of the M- 19, report-
edly implied yet another goal: to disrupt the
Colombian economy by intimidating businessmen and 25X1
multinational corporation executives and forcing them
to leave the country. In fact, the kidnapings are
exacerbating an already depressed economy by fur-
ther encouraging capital flight. Many leading Colom-
bian and foreign businessmen are leaving the country
as a result of the kidnaping threat. In addition, many
landowners are abandoning their land and moving to
the cities out of fear of guerrilla activity in their area.
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Although President Belisario Betancur and the Co-
lombian military often disagree on the best methods
to stem the guerrilla violence that has plagued the
country for decades, both sides agree that until mean-
ingful social and economic programs are enacted by
the government, the violence will continue. Because
governmental programs are unlikely to be successful
in the short term, the kidnaping problem is one that
will continue to.plague the Betancur administration
for some time to come
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Husayn al-Musawi and
the Islamic Fundamentalist
Threat in Lebanon
During the past year there have been many instances
of Shia-inspired violence in Lebanon. Presumably,
several Shia clans have participated in that violence,
but one-the Musawi-has been particularly active.
Its leading representative is Husayn al-Musawi, a
layman member. Musawi, also known as Abu
Hisham, is a veteran Shia leader and the head of the
Bekaa-based, pro-Iranian, extremist Amal of Islam
movement. This Islamic fundamentalist group, which
is also variously known as Hizb Allah (Party of God)
or the Husayn Suicide Commandos, has been linked
to the 23 October bombing
attacks on US and French Multinational Force
(MNF) components. Suicide missions, such as the
October attack on the MNF and the 18 April
bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, are consistent
with Shia fundamentalist philosophy, which equates
any death in the service of Islam with martyrdom and
direct access to heaven. Musawi has publicly denied
any involvement by his movement in the MNF
bombings. According to the US Embassy, Musawi
has said that he applauded the attacks, regretted that
he had not played a role in them, and hoped that he
Musawi, a militant Shia nationalist, had previously
been a member of Amal (Hope) of Islam-the largest
political-military organization of the Shia community
in Lebanon-since at least the late 1970s, but he
broke with the movement in the summer of 1982.
According to US diplomats in Beirut, he was removed
' Embassy have indicated that Amal of Islam and Hizb
Allah, a Bekaa-based organization founded by Shia clerics, were
originally distinct groups but have recently become more
interdependent, with Amal of Islam becoming one of the
constituent groups of the heavily Iranian-dependent Hizb Allah
from the organization because of his ties to Iran and
his commitment to using Amal as the vehicle for a
future Islamic revolution that would lead to an
Islamic republic in Lebanon similar to that in Iran.
While in Amal, he had served on the Command
Council (executive committee) at least during
1980-82, was secretary for youth affairs until mid-
1980, was elected spokesman in mid-1980, and at
some point during 1981-82 became vice president of
the organization, according to US diplomats.
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The extent of Musawi's strength is unclear. During
1980-82, while he was in Amal, he was the number-
two man in the leadership hierarchy and enjoyed the
support of approximately 25 percent of the Amal
membership. Musawi's breakaway from Amal,
according to the Embassy in Beirut, did not attract
much of a following initially, and he allegedly 25X1
attempted to rejoin the Amal Command Council. At
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Baalabakk-a longtime center of Islamic
fundamentalist activity in Lebanon-Musawi has
Musawi has apparently been able to extend his
influence to other Shia areas.
anal Amal of Islam are seen by many
Lebanese as the vanguard of an Iranian-influenced
revolutionary movement that could make major
Secret
GI TR 83-023
10 November 1983
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Husayn al-Musawi is sur-
rounded by three of his militia-
men as he tells reporters on 27
October 1983 in Baalabakk
that he had no involvement in
the bombing of the US Marine
headquarters and French post
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inroads among the Lebanese Shia and could pose a
threat to the central government, according to US
Embassy officers. At the same time, Musawi, who has
close relations with Damascus, is apparently being
used by Syria to press the leaders of Amal to be more
Musawi, who is about 40, has been described in one
newspaper account as quiet spoken, independent
minded, and charismatic. He is a former teacher.F-
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North Korea Responsible
for Rangoon Bombing
An official Burmese Government investigation has
concluded that the North Korean Government was
responsible for the 9 October bombing in Rangoon
that claimed the lives of 20 South Korean and
Burmese citizens and injured 46. One of the world's
most destructive terrorist attacks in 1983 in terms of
casualties, the Rangoon atrocity was unique among
incidents thus far in 1983 in that the victims included
high-level government leaders. Although the
premature detonation of the bomb spared the life of
its target, South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan,
the incident is the first instance in which the North
Koreans have themselves carried out an attempt on
the life of a South Korean leader outside South
Korea. It also lends credence to South Korean claims
that North Korea had attempted to arrange Chun's
murder by Canadian underworld figures in 1981. Of
more immediate concern, the North Korean failure to
get Chun this time is not likely to deter them from
attempting his assassination in the future.
North Korea has ample motive for wanting Chun out
of the way and his government discredited. Since
Chun took office in 1980, North Korean President
Kim I1-song has been dealt a series of setbacks in his
efforts to reunify the peninsula on his terms. Chun
quickly consolidated his control and has been working
to gain worldwide recognition and enhance the
prestige of his government. South Korean officials
had believed that North Korea might stage some
terrorist incident-made to appear the work of South
Korean dissidents-during the meeting of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union held in Seoul from 2 to 13
October. North Korea would have liked to have
demonstrated South Korea's inability to provide
security for participating delegations and thereby
scuttle plans for future international events in Seoul-
the IMF in 1985, the Asian Games in 1986, and the
Olympics in 1988. Tight security in South Korea,
however, limited the opportunities for a successful
terrorist attack. In Rangoon, on the other hand, the
North Koreans had an established presence and faced
less stringent security precautions, thus increasing
their chances for success. In addition, the June
announcement of Chun's trip allowed ample time for
planning. The possibility that North Korea could
stage a terrorist incident in South Korea during
President Reagan's Asian visit in November thus
remains a cause for concern, though not necessarily
for alarm.
Secret
GI TR 83-023
10 November 1983
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Terrorist Use of East European
Weapons-Czechoslovakia
Terrorist Use of Czechoslovak Weapons
Czechoslovak small arms are particular favorites of
terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups-probably
because many fire Western ammunition. Of the four
known versions of the Czechoslovak Skorpian subma-
chinegun, for example, only the 9-mm Makarov Mod-
el 65 fires a Soviet cartridge. The others shoot
Western ammunition that is readily available
throughout Europe and the Middle East (figure 1).
During the late 1970s, the Skorpian was the preferred
assassination weapon of Palestinian terrorists and of
those groups they supported. Press reports indicate
that two Skorpians were abandoned at a Parisian
safehouse by the international terrorist "Carlos" in
1975 and that Red Brigades terrorists killed former
Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 with the
same Skorpian previously used by the Brigades to
assassinate Francesco Coco, the chief prosecutor of
Genoa. According to a captured Red Brigades leader,
this weapon had been received from a radical Pales-
tinian organization less than a year before the Moro
attack. More recently, a Skorpian was discovered in
the baggage of two Palestinians who attempted to
smuggle several weapons into Austria on board a
regularly scheduled flight from Syria in July 1981,
A Skorpian
was also used in a machinegun attack on a synagogue
in Brussels in September 1982, according to a defense
attache report.
Although they may no longer be produced, Skorpians
are still available on the international gray arms
Figure 1. Skorpian. Seemingly tailor made for terrorists, the
Skorpian is less than 11 inches long with its wire shoulder brace
folded; weighs under 3 pounds; and is available with a sound
suppressor, night vision sight, and a "brass catcher" to collect the
expended cartridges. A selective fire weapon, the Skorpian can
operate on both the semiautomatic and full-automatic mode and
has a cyclic rate offtre of more than 750 rounds per minute.
In an apparent attempt to capture a share of the
market held by the Belgian-made Browning 9-mm
Hi-Power pistol, the Ceska Zbrojovka Machinery
Enterprise at Strakonice began production of a large 25X1
frame, large clip-capacity pistol in 1975 (figure 2).
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10 November 1983
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Figure 2. CZ-75. This weapon closely resembles the Browning Hi-
Power but features a 15-round clip and a double-action trigger that
allows the firearm to be carried ready to fire with the safety off, a
The CZ-75 was particularly popular among Turkish
terrorists during the late 1970s because it chambered
the same ammunition used in many of their subma-
chineguns and is superior to the standard Turkish
Kirikkale police sidearm that holds only eight car-
tidges of far less powerful .32- or .380-caliber ammu-
several thousand CZ-75 pistols were seized entering
Turkey illegally during 1979 alone. More recently,[
a CZ-75
was among those weapons confiscated in February
1983 from an arms cache belonging to the Kexel-
Hepp Group-a West German rightwing terrorist
organization.
Another popular Czechoslovak weapon is the
7.65-mm CZ-70 pistol, which-like the CZ-75-is
made for export (figure 3).
the Politico-Military wing of the Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA/PM) organization
probably possesses a number of these weapons.
defense attache reporting indicates that a CZ-70
Figure 3. CZ-70. Generally similar to the West German Walther
Police Pistol, this small, defensive sidearm features a double-
action trigger and high concealability that apparently compensate
for its underpowered cartridge and its limited clip capacity of eight
Yugoslavian couple in Brussels.
Other Czechoslovak pistols have been reported in the
possession of terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups.
According to press reports, French authorities claim
that the same 7.65-mm Czechoslovak pistol was used
in Paris to kill US Military Attache Col. Charles Ray
and Israeli diplomat Yacov Barsimantov in 1982, and
that a different weapon of the same make and caliber
was used in the unsuccessful attack on US Embassy
Charge Charles Chapman in 1981.'
Czechoslovakia also produces the 7.62-mm VZ-58
assault rifle, which, although similar in concept and
' We continue to believe, however, that these attacks may have been
committed with 7.65-mm Czechoslovak Skorpian submachineguns
and not with semiautomatic pistols. According to press reports,
French authorities have stated that the empty cartridge cases
recovered after all three attacks were fired from Czechoslovak
weapons with a vertical ejection system. If these reports are true,
then the murder weapons could not have been CZ-70 pistols-or
the older Czechoslovak 7.65-mm P-27 or CZ-50 pistols-which all
have standard Mauser-type right-hand ejection ports. Except for
one obscure pistol that has not been manufactured since the early
1920s, the only Czechoslovak 7.65-mm weapon with a vertical
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Figure 4. Czechoslovak VZ-58 assault rifles, once encountered
primarily in the hands of Middle Eastern terrorists, are beginning
external appearance to the AK-47 and AKM, is quite
different internally from the Soviet Kalashnikov rifle
(figure 4). According to open-source literature, after
Japanese Red Army (JRA) terrorists used this weapon
during the 1972 massacre at Lod Airport, a JRA unit
adopted this weapon's designation as its nom de
guerre. In late 1979, a US military officer in Turkey
observed a case of new, consecutively numbered
VZ-58 rifles seized from an illegal arms shipment by
Turkish authorities. More recently, Defense Depart-
ment reporting indicates that in August 1982 a senior
official of a local Italian law enforcement agency
confirmed press reports that a 7.62-mm Czechoslovak
"Kalashnikov" assault rifle was captured from a
family with a criminal background that was engaged
in illegal drug trafficking in Sicily.
a similar weapon was used during the
assassination of anti-Mafia Carabinieri General Dalla
Chiesa and his wife in September 1982 and during the
murder of Alfio Ferlito, the head of a Sicilian crimi-
nal family, who, along with three police escorts and a
driver, was ambushed and killed in June 1982.
In addition to their penchant for Czechoslovak small
arms, Middle Eastern and European terrorists have
also made extensive use of a Czechoslovak explosive
called Semtex-H.
from 197 to authorities discovered
Semtex-H-or its constituent ingredients, pentrite
and hexogen-in a number of separate bombs be-
lieved to have been made by Palestinian and Arme-
nian terrorist groups active in Paris. More recently,
large quantities of this explosive were discovered in
1982 in captured Red Brigades arms caches, I
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Statistical Overview
? Total, 1022
? Of which: US targets, 428
100
Category of
International
Terrorist Incidents,
1982-83, by
Month
J A S 0 N D J F M A M J J A S Oa N D
1982 1983
74 90 52 59 47 50 57 59 77 82 59 66 71 60 56 63 1022
Barricade,
hostage
Assassination 3 4 5 1 2 4 1 4 5 2 4 2 3 3 3
a Figures for the most recent months are subject
to change as additional data are received.
bBreak-ins, conspiracies, shootouts, etc.
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Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
unless new information has been received.
September 1983 Turkey: Discovery of Terrorist Explosives
In Istanbul, Turkish police reported the discovery of a buried cache-containing
2,000 rounds of ammunition, small quantities of TNT, C-3 plastic explosives, and
two pipe bombs-believed to belong to leftist organizations that were active prior
to the imposition of martial law on 12 September 1980.
28 September 1983 Turkey: Terrorists Killed in Counterterrorist Sweeps
In Hozat, Turkish National Police killed three members of the Turkish
Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist-Partisans (TCP-ML-P) during a hostage-
taking incident. Police believe the TCP-ML-P members were attempting to
reorganize in the Tunceli area prior to the 6 November Turkish general elections.
10 October 1983 Turkey: Terrorist Attack
In the leftist stronghold of Fatsa, members of the Revolutionary Way (Dev Yol)
shot and killed one villager and wounded another. Turkish police believe that the
commando attack was intended as a show of strength by the group in an effort to
retain credibility. The slain villager was a police informant. One of the terrorists
subsequently claimed' to have been instructed, reportedly by imprisoned terrorists,
to carry out several such acts in various regions of Turkey to create the impression
that terrorism was on the upswing. Police suspect the leadership group of Dev Yol
remains at large-presumably in Western Europe-and passes instructions and
guidance to members in Turkey via imprisoned leaders.
14 October 1983 Italy: Arrest of Two COLP Terrorists
Two members of the Common Organization for the Liberation of Prisoners
(COLP), a splinter group of the Red Brigades (BR) terrorist organization, were
arrested at their home near Rome. The recent vintage of a document found there
by police-October 1983-may indicate that the organization has plans to rebuild.
France: COLP Member Killed in Shootout
Ciro Rizzato, a former member of Autonomia who later joined COLP, was killed
in a shootout with Parisian police during a bank robbery apparently intended to
secure funds for the COLP. 25X1
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GI TR 83-023
10 November 1983
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15 October 1983 Corsica: Discovery of Arms Cache
Police discovered explosives, detonators, firearms, and handgrenades in a cache
believed to belong to the outlawed separatist group National Front for the
Liberation of Corsica (FLNC).
16 October 1983 France: Bombing Claimed by French Separatist Group
In Rennes, the Breton Liberation Front (FLB) claimed responsibility for the
bombing of the Judicial Services complex-and three other bombings since May
1982-in a telephone message to the French news agency AFP. The attack came
one day after the conviction of three Breton separatists for illegal arms possession.
The FLB, which has no formal structure and very few members, does not appear to
pose a serious terrorist threat in France.
Turkey: Counterterrorist Operation
In Fatsa, Turkish counterterrorist forces captured two Revolutionary Left (Dev
Sol) militants and killed two others in a shootout during a counterterrorist sweep of
Ordu Province. The terrorists were believed responsible for two murders in the
area committed by individuals wearing counterfeit Turkish military uniforms. The
terrorists were wearing commando-type uniforms when captured, and Turkish
police suspect-on the basis of information obtained from a recent arrest of a
Turkish terrorist-they were trained by Palestinians and infiltrated across the
Syrian border into Turkey. The Turkish Government recently has made several
demarches to the Syrian Government regarding Syrian training of and assistance
Mid-October 1983 Turkey: Discovery of Banner Bomb
In Hozat, Turkish security forces located and defused a banner bomb-an
explosive device suspended across a road or street with a banner proclaiming
revolutionary statements-a favorite tactic of Turkish terrorists. The message on
the banner apparently referred to Turkish counterterrorist sweeps in the eastern
Turkish province of Ordu, which resulted in the death of a terrorist. Ordu Province
has been the scene of three, possibly related, terrorist incidents since September
20 October 1983 Italy: Italian Army Trucks Damaged
The "Anti-Imperialist Patrols for Proletarian Internationalism" claimed
responsibility for arson attacks that damaged 11 Italian Army trucks parked in a
repair facility near Rome.
21 October 1983 Colombia: US-French Oil Company Attacked
National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas exploded five bombs at the
headquarters of a US-French oil drilling consortium in Giron municipality,
causing approximately $625,000 in damage. No injuries were reported.
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Corsica: Discovery of Arms Cache
In Ajaccio, police recovered 108 kilos of stolen. explosives believed destined for
Corsican separatists. One person was arrested and charged with the theft of the
dynamite-a type similar to that used by the Corsican Separatist Organization
FLNC.
22 October 1983 Spain: Bombings in Basque Region Claimed by ETA
In Yurre and Vilare, ETA/M terrorists claimed credit for the bombings of two
banks-which caused considerable damage but no injuries-and a Civil Guard
station.
Italy: Italian Military Attacked Again
The "Anti-Imperialist Patrols for Proletarian Internationalism" claimed
responsibility for planting a black powder bomb that damaged an Italian Air Force
radio pylon near Rome
West Germany: German Military Intelligence School Bombed
An early morning explosion caused considerable damage. Confessor letters
indicate that RAF supporters were responsible. This attack was very similar to the
bombing of the Officers' Club at Hahn Airbase in August.
Peru: Terrorists Hit Lima Again
For the second weekend in a row, Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorists staged
coordinated attacks in the capital, killing at least five people and wounding nine
others. During the 90-minute assault, terrorists fired machineguns and hurled
dynamite and bombs at nine separate targets, including two police stations, the
headquarters of the Governing Popular Action (AP) Party, a suburban city hall, a
bank, an army barracks, an American-owned factory, and two electrical
transmission towers.
23 October 1983 Spain: Bombings Continue in Basque Region
In Renteria, a bomb exploded near a public building, causing some damage.
Although no group has yet claimed credit for the attack, we believe a faction of
ETA was responsible. ETA appears to be resuming its attempts to extort a
"revolutionary tax" from financial institutions in the Basque region after a several-
week hiatus.
Spain: Escalation of Attacks in Basque Region
A bomb exploded in Spanish Navy headquarters in San Sebastian, causing
considerable damage but no injuries. No group has yet claimed credit for the
attack, but the use of Goma-2 explosive points to a faction of ETA as responsible
for the attack.) 25X1
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Spain: Attack on Spanish Civil Guard
A grenade attack on a Spanish Civil Guard headquarters in Lecumberri, in
Navarre Province, injured a baby. Although no group claimed credit for the
attack, we believe ETA was responsible for the attack-the continuation of an
upsurge in terrorist violence. Navarre Province is part of the area claimed as the
Basque homeland.
24 October 1983 Corsica: Bombings Continue
In Bastia, three bombs exploded at apartments of private citizens, causing some
property damage but no injuries. Police arrested three suspected members of the
FLNC immediately after the explosions.
25 October 1983 Pakistan: Latest Bombing in Lahore
Two people were killed and 17 injured in a bomb explosion in Lahore. The bomb
was thrown from a building into the crowd. No one has claimed responsibility
26 October 1983 Chad: Terrorist Attacks Claimed
The Organization for the Liberation of Chad from Fascism and Imperialism has
claimed responsibility for three bombings in N'Djamena during September and
October. The most recent explosion on 26 October occurred at a bar a few hundred
meters from the American chancery
Guatemala: Abducted Sisters of Leaders Released
The kidnaped sisters of current Head of State Gen. Mejia Victores and former
President Rios Montt were released by their captors in Guatemala City. The
releases came after the two families complied with guerrilla demands that included
publication of a manifesto.
Bolivia: Peruvian. Embassy in La Paz Bombed
A dynamite stick hurled at the Peruvian Embassy in La Paz seriously damaged the
building and others in the vicinity. No injuries were reported and no group has
27 October 1983 Spain: Light Sentences to ETA Guerrillas
In Lerida, an Army court-martial judge handed down sentences of 18 and 10
years, respectively, to eight Basque separatists and a Catalan nationalist for a 1980
raid on a Spanish military barracks in Berga. The trial took place amid increased
tension in Spain over terrorist violence-which resulted in three deaths in a two-
week period, including the death of a Spanish Army captain kidnaped by the
Political/Military wing of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA/PM) in an
attempt to gain freedom for the nine guerrillas
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South Africa: Bombing Attempt
A man carrying an explosive device wrapped in newspaper was arrested in
Pietermaritzburg when police became suspicious of his behavior. The apparent
target was Prime Minister Pieter Botha who was addressing a rally nearby.
28 October 1983 France: Bomb Threats Against US Firms
In Paris, three US firms received telephonic bomb threats from individuals
identifying themselves as members of the French leftist group Direct Action. No
reason for the threatened attacks was provided by callers.
29 October 1983 Lebanon: Attack on Turkish Embassy
In Beirut, two gunmen attacked the Turkish Embassy with automatic rifles and
handgrenades, causing minor property damage but no injuries. Security forces
arrested one individual whom they claimed admitted being a member of the
extremist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). An
anonymous caller later called the Agence France Presse news agency to claim
credit for the attack in the name of ASALA, stating that the "Martyr Viken
Ayvazian Group" was responsible. On the basis of the modus operandi-the
confessor call to a news agency and the identification of a specific commando
group named after an ASALA "martyr"-we believe ASALA was responsible for
the attack, the third attack in Beirut claimed by ASALA in the past six weeks
West Germany: Bombing of Turkish Consulate
In Stuttgart, a previously unknown Turkish group-the Brigades for the
Liberation of the Turkish People-claimed responsibility for a bomb that exploded
in front of the Turkish Consulate General. In a communique to police, the group
claimed the attack was to protest the 6 November general elections in Turkey. No
one was injured in the predawn blast that caused minor damage.
West Germany: Turkish Takeover of US Firm
In Frankfurt, eight Turkish leftists-protesting alleged CIA influence in the
Turkish elections-took over and held the Pan Am office for 30 minutes before
police rushed the building and subdued them. During interrogation, one of the
participants stated that additional occupations of US installations in West
Germany were planned but provided no additional details.
Chile: US-Chilean Cultural Center Bombed
Unknown individuals exploded a bomb inside the US-Chilean Cultural Center in
Valparaiso. Although the institute was occupied at the time, no casualties were
reported. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident
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30 October 1983 Bolivia: More Bombings
Two bombs exploded in Cochabamba-one at the offices of Los Tiempos
newspaper, and the second at the home of a rightwing senator of the Nationalistic
Democratic Action (ADN) party. The bombing of the newspaper offices resulted in
two injuries and caused extensive damage. No injuries were reported in the second
bombing. Although small red flags printed with "Bolivian Sendero Luminoso" had
been received by both the senator and the newspaper prior to the attacks, we do not
suspect a link with the Peruvian group of the same name. The bombings follow
several others in La Paz during the past few weeks.
Spain: Bombing in Basque Region
In Bilbao, one bomb exploded outside a bank and a second was safely defused at a
nearby bar. No one was injured in the explosion, which caused minor property
damage. We believe Basque separatists are resuming their attempts to extort
"revolutionary taxes" from financial institutions.
31 October 1983 Colombia: Bomb Exploded To Protest Grenada Invasion
A powerful bomb exploded outside the Colombian-American center in Medellin.
Although the facade of the building was badly damaged, no casualties were
reported. The National Liberation Army (ELN) called a local radio station to
claim credit for the incident, stating that it was in retaliation for US involvement
in Grenada and Central America]
Late October 1983 South Africa: ANC Members Sentenced
Two self-confessed African National Congress members have been convicted of
high treason and sentenced to 18 and 15 years by the Pretoria Supreme Court.
Charges of terrorism and attempted murder, which hold a maximum penalty of
death, were dismissed. The limited sentences indicate that the South African
Government is unlikely to impose the death sentence on accused terrorists who
1 November 1983 South Africa: Two Bombings in Durban
No one was seriously injured when two bombs exploded in Durban. One bomb was
placed in an empty bus at the depot; the other exploded at a police facility. No one
has claimed responsibility.
Japan: Car Firebomb Rams USAF Gatehouse
No damage nor casualties were reported when an unmanned car carrying a
firebomb hit the gatehouse at Yokota Air Force Base outside Tokyo. According to
Tokyo Metropolitan Police, the Hazama Faction of the Revolution Workers
Association was responsible. This followed an attack on a US military
communications facility near the USAF base in Iwakuni for which the leftwing
Middle Core Faction claimed responsibility.
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Martinique: US Consulate and Bank Bombed
The building housing the offices of the American Consulate and the Chase
Manhattan Bank was bombed. Only minor damage resulted and there were no
personal injuries. To date, no group has claimed responsibility but the incident is
believed related to the US actions in Grenada.
Switzerland: Bomb Left at Turkish Consulate General
In Zurich, police discovered an explosive device near the offices of the Turkish
Consulate General. Although no group has claimed credit for the device, a banner
with anti-Turkish regime slogans found near the bomb indicates Turkish leftists-
protesting the Turkish general elections-were responsible.
2 November 1983 France: Turkish Militants Seize US Firm
In Paris, Turkish leftists claiming membership in the radical leftist group Dev Sol
(Revolutionary Left) took over the Pan Am ticket office and held several people
hostage for 90 minutes before surrendering to French police. The four had beer
cans filled with electrical wires that they attempted to pass off as grenades. No one
was injured in the incident. The four men claimed to be protesting the martial law
government in Turkey, the 6 November elections, and CIA support of the military
junta.
The Netherlands: Militants Occupy US Firm
In Amsterdam, a group of protesters-10 members of the Turkish leftist group
Dev Sol (Revolutionary Left) and 10 members of the Dutch activist group
"Krackers"-occupied the Pan Am airlines office. The group departed without
incident after being given access to the media to protest the Turkish elections and
alleged US Government/ military involvement in Turkish affairs.
3 November 1983 West Germany: License Plates Stolen
In Baden-Wuerttemburg, four American license plates were stolen from a factory
belonging to a US Army subcontractor. In the past, the theft of license plates has
been an indicator of planned terrorist action.
4 November 1983 Djibouti: Bombing at French Market
A 1-kilo homemade bomb exploded at a prominent French market in downtown
Djibouti. There were no injuries and only minor damage. No one has claimed
responsibility.
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7 November 1983 West Germany: Neo-Nazi Meeting Raided
In Munich, police arrested 35 neo-Nazis and confiscated gas pistols and knives, af-
ter raiding a secret meeting at which plans were being made to mark the
anniversary of the beginning of the Holocaust. Michael Kuchnen, a leading neo-
Nazi figure, had addressed the group.
Greece: Jordanian Embassy Personnel Shot
Two security guards from the Jordanian Embassy were shot by a lone gunman, ac-
cording to press reports. One of the guards died and the other remains in critical
condition. The assassin, who was described as "Arab," escaped on a motorscooter,
according to eyewitnesses. Though no group has claimed credit, the method of
operation suggests that this may be another attack by the Abu Nidal group.
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