TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100340001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Terrorism
Review.
GI TR 84-002
19 January 1984
Copy 4 7 9
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Secret
Terrorism
Review F-
1 Perspective: Terrorism Becoming More Lethal
Robin Schreiber, OGI
Highlights
Dave Cariens, Beth Seeger, OGI
17 Spain: Terrorist Resurgence
Colin Winston, EURA
Chief. Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues,
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Secret
Terrorism
Review F-
Perspective Terrorism Becoming More Lethal
The most ominous development in terrorism during the past year was the increase
in state support of terrorist activity. Paralleling this growth was a probably related
increase in the lethality of terrorist attacks. Middle Eastern terrorists did the most
damage, capping the year with the spectacular bombing in October of the US and
French MNF Headquarters in Beirut:
? The 18 April bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, the 23 October bombing of
the US and French MNF Headquarters facilities, and the multiple bombings at
US, French, and local government facilities in Kuwait were carried out by
radical Shias of different nationalities. More significantly, however, these
attacks almost certainly ,were Iranian and/or Syrian instigated and supported,
and that support may have been the key to their effective implementation.
? A decided step-up in activity by radical Palestinian Abu Nidal's Black June
operatives, particularly the targeting of Jordanian diplomatic personnel abroad,
evidently was in retaliation for Amman's refusal to free from imprisonment
several Black June members. The Abu Nidal group now operates out of
Damascus and acts with Syrian financial and material support, a factor that may
well give Black June a new and more potent vitality.
Access to the resources of sovereign governments greatly enhances terrorist
groups' capabilities to plan, organize, and carry out their operations. In the Middle
East, increased access to the financial, material, and manpower resources of Iran
and Syria, for example, supplemented by the rabid anti-Americanism that
currently permeates the region and the ready availability of individuals willing to
die for their religious or secular ideals make for a particularly lethal combination.
Moreover, governments trying to devise counterterrorism programs against state-
sponsored terrorism are faced with a very different set of problems.
The accompanying chart also points out that while the Middle East is the
dominant locale for world-class terrorism, that region holds no monopoly on
violence:
Secret
GI TR 84-002
19 January 1984
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? In France, the Carlos group came to life just as the year ended. The group
claimed credit for two New Year's Eve bombings-one in the Marseilles railroad
station and another on a train en route to Paris from Marseilles-asserting that
the bombings were in retaliation for French attacks against Shiite terrorist bases
near Baalabakk in Lebanon.
? In Spain, Basque separatists became increasingly active in 1983 and their
terrorist operations spilled over into France as Spanish police pursued Basque
activists who had sought refuge there. The terrorist acts of the Fatherland and
Liberty Group (ETA) were supplemented by those of Iraultza. Attacks by
Iraultza appeared to be heavily weighted against US interests.
? The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru maintained a very high level of
activity throughout the year, but its ultimate impact was limited by its failure to
achieve its stated goal-to interrupt the November elections.
Some groups remained mercifully quiet-though we find only slight consolation
here. While some no doubt found their efforts stymied by actions of local security,
others may simply be regrouping, rebuilding damaged capabilities, or waiting for
the propitious moment to resume operations:
? Armenian terrorists, very active during the middle months of 1983, were quiet
during the waning months of the year. The leftist ASALA group is in the process
of reorganizing while members of the rightist group, JCAG, may be awaiting the
conclusion of trials of some of their members before resuming active operations.
Little if any comfort can be taken from their current inactivity-a resumption of
attacks against Turks can be expected.
? Apart from Black June, most Palestinian terrorist groups remained relatively
inactive throughout the year. They were wrapped up in their own internecine
struggles and, in the case of the more moderate Fatah, continued to adhere to
Arafat's longstanding ban on terrorism.
What can we conclude from one year's tally of terrorist group activity?
? That terrorism does not occur in a vacuum, that the political and social
environment may provide clues to the where and why of heightened terrorism
but are insufficient to clear our cloudy crystal ball.
? That terrorism is a continuously evolving phenomenon, with new motivations,
new groups, new locales, and new techniques surfacing on an unpredictable
schedule.
? That those who plan counterterrorism programs must try to be as imaginative as
terrorists are in devising new methods to counter the new techniques that surely
will surface.
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Activity and Impact of Terrorism, 1983
Transnational Groups
Level of operational activity
? Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)
Heavy
Croatian Terrorists
? Moderate Black June Organization (BJO) (Palestinian)
15th of May Organization (Palestinian)
? Light
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC)
Impact on target
Fatah
? Severe
Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
? Moderate Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Saiqa (Palestinian)
Absence of symbol indicates
no information/no impact.
Red Brigades (BR), Autonomia (Italy)
Revolutionary Cells (RZ) (West Germany)
7 ~
- y
d
ti tt)
A
QOQ
Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
? ?
? ?
. ?
? ?
Japanese Red Army (JRA)
Carlos Apparat
? ?
? ?
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon From Foreigners
? ?
? ?
? ?
European Groups
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) (UK)
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (UK)
? ?
?.
? ?
? ?
ETA and GRAPO (Spain)
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
FP-25 (Portugal)
? ?
Action Directe (France)
??
??
00
Red Army Faction (RAF) (West Germany)
?
? 0
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
Revolutionary Peoples Struggle (ELA), 17 November Group (Greece)
? ?
Note: This chart is part of a quarterly series. The judgments-while not reflective of
specific quantitative criteria-were made by regional and/or terrorist group analysts in
coordination with computer systems analysts.
a,
s
a
Qs~
L
~
L
L a
v d
O2
Dev Sol, Dev Yol, MLAPU, THKP/ C, TPLF/P, TIKB (Turkey)
? ?
Asian/African Groups
AI-Zulfikar (Pakistan)
Ananda Marg (India)
African National Congress (ANC) (South Africa) (
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
Latin American Groups
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) a
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
Peoples Revolutionary Union/Popular Liberation Movement (CINCHONERO) (Honduras)
? ?
? ?
. ?
?
Popular Revolutionary Forces (Lorenzo Zelaya) (Honduras)
? ?
19th of April Movement (M-19) (Colombia)
? ?
? ?
?
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Colombia)
? ?
? ?
?
Red Flag (Venezuela)
Sendero Luminoso (SL) (Peru)
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
Monteneros (Argentina)
MIR (Chile)
? ?
State Sponsors
Syria
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
Iran
? ?
? ?
? ?
? ?
Libya
Iraq
Yugoslavia
? ?
a An umbrella group that includes Guerrilla Army of
the Poor (EGP); Revolutionary Organization of the
People in Arms (ORPA); Rebel Armed Forces (FAR);
Guatemalan Communist Party/Dissident Faction
(PGT/D).
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Highlights
emphasis on killing selected individuals.
Lebanon: New Trend in Terrorism. Terrorists in Beirut may be nutting more
a Lebanese political group is to begin recruiting 25X1
wounded by a sniper.
terrorist groups in Beirut have been trying to obtain, or have
succeeded in acquiring, silenced weapons for use in assassinations. On 3 January, a
French Embassy employee was wounded by a lone gunman using a silenced
weapon. About two weeks earlier in the same area of Beirut a US serviceman was
people-principally Druze-to kill US and French officials. The victims are to be
identified by their "Western appearance" and their vehicles' diplomatic license
plates. Care reportedly is to be taken to avoid injuring Lebanese citizens.
Meanwhile 25X1
As precautions 25X1
alert for any sign that a cease-fire had led MNF forces to relax security.F_ ~ 25X1
against car bombs are improved, terrorists probably view attacks against single
individuals as one of several alternatives. Even if most of Lebanon's factions were
to agree to a cease-fire, various radical elements-particularly the Iranians-
would still pose a major terrorist threat. Terrorist groups would be particularly
Syria: Encouraging Terrorist Activity Against Jordanian Targets. 25X1
against targets in Jordan. These include the Muslim Brotherhood, foreign
embassies, moderate PLO officials, and Jordanian interests. Attacks may coincide
with PLO chief Arafat's anticipated visit to Amman this weekend. In this
connection, a 12-pound bomb was discovered and defused last week outside the
Islamic Center in Irbid, Jordan. he timing 25X1
device on the bomb was similar to others fabricated and shipped by the Syrian
Ba'th Party to Syrian-controlled groups in Jordan 25X1
Saiqa, Syria's surrogate group in the PLO, recently has been planning attacks in
Irbid and in the Jordan River valley a ainst the Syrian opposition group, the
Muslim Brotherhood. 25X1
Libya-is encouraging increased terrorist activity by groups under its direction
Secret
GI TR 84-002
19 January 1984
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Key Indicators France: Trial ofASALA Members May Provoke Violence. The trial of four
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) members which
begins on 24 January may provoke terrorist violence. The individuals are accused
of the September 1981 takeover of the Turkish Embassy in Paris during which a
security guard was killed, a Turkish diplomat seriously wounded, and 51 persons
held hostage for 15 hours before the group surrendered to French police. The trial
will last one week and is expected to prompt protest demonstrations and threats
from the large Armenian community in Paris. In view of ASALA's past
retaliatory attacks against governments imprisoning ASALA members, the
French Government anticipates violence aimed at intimidating the courts into
releasing the Armenian suspects. In a September 1981 press conference, ASALA
leader Hagop Hagopian threatened the French Government for reneging on
promises to grant political asylum to the four ASALA members. Despite the
disruption of ASALA's infrastructure by French police following the July 1983
Orly airport bombing, we believe ASALA'still retains sufficient capability to
conduct terrorist violence-especially bombings-in Paris and may attack French
interests if its members are convicted
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Lebanon: Possible Mockup of Marine Position for Terrorist Training. At the site
near An-Nassariyah in the Bekaa Valley, what appears to be a helicopter landing
pad-similar to the one in the Marine compound at the Beirut airport-was
constructed shortly after the helicopter pad was added to the US Marine
compound in Beirut. the pad is approximately the same distance 25X1
from a nearby road as the Marine pad is from the Beirut airport road. Terrorists
often use mockups to rehearse operations, and the landing pad-which is near a
suspected terrorist camp-could serve as a landmark for an aerial attack. There
have been several reports in recent weeks of Iranian or Shia extremist plans to
attack the MNF using helicopters or light planes. It should be noted, however, that
the suspected terrorist camp is close-to Syrian positions in the An-Nassariyah area,
and the helipad could be intended for conventional not terrorist, use; it could be
used for the transport of supplies and personnel. 25X1
Significant Developments West Germany: Terrorist Trial Postponed. The West German Government has
postponed indefinitely the upcoming trial of Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann, one of
the terrorists involved in the 1975 attack on the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna,
which was led by Carlos. She is currently in jail in Switzerland, after having been
convicted of other terrorist crimes, and the postponement may reflect extradition
problems. However, in a letter last fall to the West German Embassy in Jidda,
Carlos threatened bomb attacks in West Germany if Kroecher-Tiedemann is
brought from Switzerland to stand trial. West German authorities have denied 25X1
that they are bowing to blackmail.
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Spain: Basque Terrorist Group Targets Socialists. The Anticapitalist Autonomous
Commandos (CAA)-an anarchist offshoot of the Basque separatist group
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)-announced on 12 January that the Socialist Party
of Spain would be its main target for future terrorist attacks. We suspect CAA's
targeting of the Socialist Party is linked to Basque separatists' belief that the
Spanish Government is involved in a series of attacks against ETA members living
in France (see following item). CAA previously espoused a violent antibusiness,
anti-imperialist policy and frequently targeted businesses in the Basque region
experiencing labor difficulties. During 1983, CAA's repertoire widened to include
arson, kidnapings, bombings, and machinegun attacks on Spanish National Police.
The last attack by CAA-the 28 May 1983 midday assassination of two Spanish
Civil Guardsmen in a crowded post office in Pamplona-indicated a new trend
toward indiscriminate violence by the group. We believe the CAA warning poses a
serious threat to Socialist Party members and facilities.
Spain: Counterterrorist Killings Spark Threats of Reprisals. The killing of well-
known Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) militant Miguel Antonio Giokoetxea
on 28 December in the French Basque country was the second such assassination
in nine days by a new organization known as the Antiterrorist Liberation Group
(GAL). GAL has criticized the lack of French cooperation in the struggle against
ETA terrorists. The two killings are the latest incidents in a campaign that began
in mid-October with the disappearance of two alleged ETA members in Bayonne,
France. Basque groups-along with elements of the Spanish press-are charging
the GAL is a hit squad organized, or at least assisted, by the Spanish police, who
are conducting a "dirty war" against ETA members who have sought refuge in
France. Basque groups have threatened to retaliate with more violence in Spain
while GAL has promised additional reprisals in France, setting the stage for a
spiral of violence in both countries. Large demonstrations of Basques protestin
the killings have already led to clashes with police on both sides of the border
Kuwait: Possible Acquittal of Bombing Suspects.
the prosecutor's office in Kuwait has decided not to try 19 of the 21 suspects held
for the bombing of the US Embassy and other facilities on 12 December. The
prosecutor contends that a solid case cannot be made against the suspects whose
confessions reportedly were extracted under torture, but the most likely
explanation is that Kuwait is trying to placate Iran, which is said to have
threatened to kill 10 members of the Kuwaiti ruling family for each suspect
executed. Security officials, who were proud of their swift apprehension of the
suspects, are bitter about the decision. If the prosecutor's decision stands, failure to
try the suspects probably will further deepen tensions in Kuwait between the Sunni
and Shia communities and damage morale in the security services.
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Costa Rica: Formation ofAntiterrorist Unit. The government is formulating plans
to establish a 200-man antiterrorist unit to be based in San Jose. Communications
equipment, already purchased, will enable the new unit to communicate with all
elements of the Civil and Rural Guard, including Coast Guard vessels and
aircraft. A major problem could be the
government's inability to rapidly deploy the unit to the scene of a terrorist incident
because the military has only six aircraft and limited wheeled vehicles in its
inventory.
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The Sarajevo Winter Olympics:
Prospects for a Terrorist Incident
We have no solid evidence that terrorists are planning
an incident at the Winter Olympics (8-19 February),
but a number of terrorist groups might well be
interested in exploiting the games for publicity
purposes. We believe that-should violence occur-it
probably would be at the hands of one of the various
radical Yugoslav emigre organizations.
The Yugoslav security services have for years
targeted the emigres and neutralized much of the
terrorist activity planned within Yugoslavia and
against its foreign missions. With the Olympics,
however, Yugoslav authorities will be confronted with
an unprecedented number of foreign visitors; the
resources of their security services will be strained to
the limit. It will be difficult to adequately screen
everyone coming into the country, even with the
assistance of the West German Government.
The Emigre Threat
Terrorism is not new to the Balkans. Indeed,
throughout the 20th century a variety of terrorists
have left a bloody trail, the most infamous incident
being the assassination of the Austrian heir to the
25X1 throne in 1914-in Sarajevo-which precipitated
World War I.
Post-World War II Yugoslavia has had to cope with
terrorist threats from several emigre quarters. The
government has been assisted by the fact that bitter
ethnic hatreds and political differences have
prevented these groups from mounting a united
opposition. Even within groups of the same nationality
there are sharp divisions on goals and tactics.
Nevertheless, the strong dedication to "a cause" has
produced a number of successes, ranging from the
headline-grabbing murders of Yugoslav diplomats or
blowing up of a Yugoslav airliner to the more
mundane distribution of anti-Titoist leaflets inside
Yugoslavia.
There are three main groups of emigres whom
Yugoslav officials are monitoring closely-the Croats,
the Albanians, and the Serbs. 25X1
The Croats. The group most likely to attempt to
disrupt the Olympics would be one of the Croatian
extremist organizations. We have no solid evidence
that a terrorist operation is planned, but we believe an
incident is possible. Croatian emigres have
demonstrated a capability to carry out terrorist
attacks both inside and outside Yugoslavia. These
groups are well aware of the historical significance of
Sarajevo and would like nothing better than to
embarrass the post-Tito regime. The Croatian
extremists are dedicated to the destruction of the
Yugoslav state and the creation of an independent
Croatia. There are between 3,000 and 5,000 Croatian
emigres worldwide-mainly in Germany-who
belong to groups advocating violence.
If there is an incident at the Olympics, it is likely to
originate with one of four emigre organizations: the
Croatian National Committee, the Croatian National
Resistance, the Croatian Liberation Movement, or the
Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood. A terrorist
attack against any Yugoslav installation, either inside
or outside the country, at the time of the Olympics
would hold a great deal of appeal for the Croats
because:
? It would gain publicity for the Croatian cause.
? It would avenge the murders of Croatian emigre
activists believed to have been carried out by
Yugoslav intelligence.
? Bosnia-Hercegovina, the site of the Winter
Olympics, is a region claimed for Croatia by the
emigres.
? It could jeopardize tourism and thereby deal an
economic blow to Yugoslavia's already troubled
economy. 25X1
Secret
GI TR 84-002
19 January 1984
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The Albanians. A second, highly volatile group of
emigres are the ethnic Albanians from the Yugoslav
autonomous province of Kosovo. Although they are
less numerous and not as well organized as the Croats,
they have both the motive and some capability to
attempt to foment terrorism. They also funnel aid to
Albanians still in Kosovo and could utilize them to
carry out a terrorist strike.
In postwar Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Albanians were
subjected to harsh discrimination by the Serbs and
their national expression and aspirations were brutally
suppressed. Pent-up frustrations following years of
abuse burst into riots in late 1968, and sporadic
disturbances have continued since that time. Officials
in Belgrade have pointed an accusing finger at both
Tirana and emigre circles in the West. Meddling from
Tirana appears to have been more of propaganda
activity, rather than supplying money and/or arms.
Albania has trained Yugoslav
Albanians isubversive activity. Following that
training, the Albanians reportedly were sent back to
Yugoslavia to carry out terrorist activity.
The more violent emigres in the West, however, may
be a different story. We lack information on their
organization and their specific goals, although they
are reported to supply money, and possibly weapons,
to Albanians in Kosovo.
The Serbs. Of the three major Yugoslav emigre
groups, we believe the Serbs are the least likely to
plan or carry out a terrorist attack.
The majority of Serb emigres oppose the Communists
and want to reestablish Serb dominance in
Yugoslavia. Available evidence indicates the Serbs
are not well organized and not as prone to violence as
either the Croats or Albanians. There are, however,
individual Serbs who are willing to use violence
against Yugoslav installations abroad. If the Serbs
were to be responsible for a terrorist attack, it most
likely would be perpetrated by the Serbian Youth
Movement for Freedom or the Serbian Western
Guard.
The' Nonemigre Threat
Other terrorists such as the Armenians or radical pro-
Iranians might seize the opportunity of the Olympics
to strike. Because these groups have no apparent axe
to grind with Belgrade, their targets probably would
be foreign nationals at the Olympics, or possibly
diplomatic missions in Belgrade.
The Armenians. One Armenian terrorist group-the
rightwing Justice Commandos for the Armenian
Genocide (JCAG)-murdered the Turkish
Ambassador to Yugoslavia in March 1983. The
JCAG and the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) seek revenge for
the genocide of Armenians at the hands of the Turks
in 1915 and the union of all Armenians into an
independent state. Both groups have systematically
carried out a series of bombings and murders against
Turkish targets since 1975. We suspect JCAG-
based on its earlier successful attack in Yugoslavia-
is capable of conducting attacks during the Olympic
games. ASALA, in our view, lacks a support apparat
in Yugoslavia, and its operations have been disrupted
by a bitter internal dispute over the organization's use
of indiscriminate violence.
The Iranians. Although we have no evidence of
Iranian plans for terrorist attacks in Yugoslavia,
Iranian-sponsored terrorism cannot be ruled out.
Possible targets could include US participants. Iraq
will not be represented at the games.
High-level Bosnian officials have told Western
diplomats privately that they are worried Tehran
might send a "hit team" to Sarajevo in reaction to the
trial and sentencing of 12 Muslim activists in
Sarajevo last summer. It is possible that the Iranians
already have assets inside Yugoslavia who could
assist, or even carry out, a terrorist attack. Yugoslav
Muslims have made pilgrimages to Iran where they
appear to have been indoctrinated with Khomeini-
style Muslim fundamentalism. Muslim agitation has
also prompted Belgrade to deport several Iranian
student troublemakers.
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Palestinians. We believe that Palestinian terrorism,
although possible, is unlikely to occur in Yugoslavia.
Belgrade recognizes the PLO and is a strong
supporter of the Palestinian cause. In return for its
backing of the Palestinian cause, Belgrade apparently
has been promised that no Palestinian terrorist act
will take place on Yugoslav soil. While non-PLO
radical Palestinians such as Abu Nidal or Abu
Ibrahim might not honor such an agreement, the
absence of an Israeli team at the Winter Games
removes what would otherwise be a prime target.
Yugoslav cities. Recently a team of US security
specialists met with Yugoslav officials to both
exchange information and to review security plans
Libyans. Libyan-sponsored terrorism also does not
appear likely. Relations between Belgrade and Tripoli
are good, and Libya would want to avoid
embarrassing Yugoslavs or damaging their bilateral
relations. Yugoslavia is engaged in a number of major
construction projects in Libya, and the Yugoslavs
train Libyan technicians and pilots.
Yugoslav Preparations. Yugoslav security has worked
hard for two and a half years to prevent a terrorist
incident at the Olympics. Nevertheless the task of
guaranteeing the security of the Olympic spectators
and participants is a large and difficult one and the
possibility exists that a terrorist could penetrate the
country's security.
Security plans and preparations for the games have
been centralized under the "Sarajevo Organizing
Committee for Olympic Security," headed by
Tomislav Juric. The committee has full responsibility
for Olympic accreditation, VIP security, and overall
physical security. Moreover, the Yugoslav intelligence
service has for decades pursued an intensive
antiterrorist program at home and abroad and has
successfully used a variety of techniques to defuse the
terrorist threat posed by the emigres.
Most recently, with an eye toward the Olympics, the
Yugoslavs have engaged in a series of high-level
consultations with a variety of Western countries to
monitor and neutralize the emigre threat, as well as to
improve security. The West German Government has
agreed to cooperate with Yugoslav security personnel
in screening airport arrivals in Sarajevo and other
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Basque Autonomous Region
% San
Sebastian-
Bilbao
Vizcaya Guipuzcoa
Basque Country
GOHEIRRI MIS 1
" Pamplona
Navarre
Kilometers
International boundary
Autonomous region
boundary
Province boundary
capital
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Spain: Terrorist Resurgence
For over 20 years the Spanish Government has been
locked in combat with ETA, the Basque terrorist
organization. The Spanish Socialists' election victory
in October 1982 spurred speculation that the new
government-many of whose members sympathized
with ETA when it was fighting Franco's
dictatorship-might cut a deal with the terrorists.
During his first months in office, Prime Minister
Felipe Gonzalez in fact did seek indirect negotiations
with the terrorists, but ETA refused even temporarily
to lay down its arms. Recently, Madrid has adopted a
much tougher antiterrorist line, and ETA has
reaffirmed its devotion to violence by unleashing a
new wave of murders and kidnapings. As a result, the
Basque problem has returned to the center of Spanish
politics, and the eradication of ETA has become
perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Gonzalez
administration.
The Terrorist Offensive
ETA's current offensive began last summer after the
collapse of the so-called peace table negotiations
among HB (Popular Unity, ETA's political front), the
PNV, and Madrid. According to an official of the
Basque Regional Government, ETA's leadership-
concerned by a lack of concrete results and a decline
in morale-came under pressure from the ranks to
reassert the organization's presence in the Basque
Country by stepping up terrorist actions. HB
launched the first phase of the offensive, probably at
the instigation of ETA-M. Throughout Euzkadi (the
Basque region), HB militants burned Spanish flags
and verbally and physically assaulted the
representatives of the central government in the
region. The "war of the flags" significantly raised
political tensions in the Basque provinces and irritated
the military, which is particularly sensitive to what it
perceives as threats to either the reality or the symbols
of national unity.
The Basque terrorist organization ETA has spawned
a number of factions since the early 1970s, the most
important being the military (ETA-M) and political-
military (ETA-PM) wings. Press reports credit the
dominant military faction with between 300 and 600
full-time members, while ETA-PM is alleged to
possess from as few as a dozen to no more than 100
full-time terrorists. There is, in our view, little doubt
that the prestige, influence, and size of all ETA
factions is declining. A top Spanish police official
claims that ETA has lost two-thirds of its core
members over the past three years and is currently
performing at the limit of its capabilities. We believe
that this decline is above all due to reduced backing
from the Basque population, which has undermined
ETA's recruitment and increased the organization's
logistic and operational difficulties. Nonetheless,
ETA still retains several important strengths. The
terrorists continue to enjoy a sgfehaven in southern
France, and counterterrorist cooperation between
Madrid and Paris remains minimal. But, above all,
ETA still profits from its image as the only diehard
defender of Basque independence. While the Basque
population as a whole is coming to view an
independent Basque state as an unrealistic goal, the
largely Basque-speaking inhabitants of the isolated
Goheirri mountains apparently do not. ETA
continues to recruit heavily in this region, although
probably at a somewhat slower pace than in the past.
Secret
GI TR 84-002
19 January 1984
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Demonstration in Bilbao
"against the dirty war"
that Basque politicians
allege Madrid is waging
against ETA in southern
France.
A
~w fir. 5 ~? i
The massive floods of late August somewhat muted
the political effervescence caused by the flag-burning
incidents, but tensions rose again in the fall, this time
as a result of ETA-PM actions. In October the poli-
milis kidnaped and murdered Capt. Alberto Martin
Barrios, of the Spanish Army's Pharmacy Brigade.
The counterproductive nature of this action lends
credence to the hypothesis that the current rash of
ETA killings is prompted more by a desperate need to
boost morale among the terrorists than by a coherent
revolutionary strategy. Martin's membership in the
Pharmacy Brigade made ETA's claim that it wanted
to interrogate him concerning the government's
antiterrorist program seem especially ludicrous. And
the captain's image as a loving father, family man,
and avid Basque ethnic evoked widespread sympathy
for him within Euzkadi. His murder triggered an
unparalleled outpouring of public hostility toward
ETA. The largest Basque anti-ETA demonstration in
memory-supported by all the parties save HB-was
held in Bilbao. ETA-PM, however, was not cowed. It
responded by abducting a prominent Basque
businessman whose family-no doubt impressed by
Martin's fate-paid more than $500,000 for his safe
return. ETA-M then murdered several civil guards
and alleged police informers. By the end of 1983, the
number of deaths by terrorist violence had overtaken
the previous year's total.
The Response in Madrid
The Socialist government took advantage of the
uproar over the Martin killing to toughen its stance
against terrorism. Gonzalez publicly renewed his vow
never to negotiate with assassins, and he specifically
dismissed the PNV's call for a "political solution" to
the terrorist problem by affirming that only rigorous
police measures could excise the ETA cancer. The
government, however, did not stop at rhetoric, but
pushed a series of special antiterrorist laws through
Parliament, including:
? Stiffer punishment for terrorists and their
collaborators.
? Provisions for closing down media entities that
regularly lend moral support to terrorism.
? Authority to dissolve political parties whose
members are convicted of terrorist crimes.
? Loosened restrictions on police searches and
surveillance.
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? Reductions in penalties for terrorists who
collaborate with the authorities.
These provisions do not mark a new phase in the
government's antiterrorist program, but only legalize
what has long been standard police practice.
There are indications, however, that Madrid is
considering a fundamental shift in its anti-ETA
strategy. According to the press, the government
plans to send scores of unarmed plainclothes
policemen into southern France to gather information
regarding ETA. But whether the Spanish police will
restrict their activities to intelligence gathering is
open to question. Shortly after the Martin killing,
French gendarmes detained four Spanish policemen
for "scuffling" with an ETA-PM leader. We believe
that the Spaniards intended to abduct the terrorist
and return him to Spain. The incident, in our view,
points up the danger that bungled operations in a
"dirty war" against ETA could severely discredit the
Gonzalez administration, which makes much of its
devotion to democratic freedoms and legalities
The government, however, appears determined to
adopt an unorthodox strategy in dealing with ETA.
Gonzalez
has agreed to the formation of a group of mercenaries,
controlled by the Army, to combat the terrorists
outside the law.
the mercenaries would not necessarily be Spaniards
and that their mission would be to assassinate ETA
leaders in Spain and France. A so-called Group for
Antiterrorist Liberation (GAL), similar in nature to
the strong-arm squads contemplated by the
government, has in fact surfaced in southern France.
GAL has murdered two well known ETA-M activists
in southern France and kidnapped a Spanish
businessman in Hendaye who was suspected of
collaborating with the terrorists. Madrid has
somewhat halfheartedly denied any knowledge of or
connections to GAL, but Basque politicians, clearly
convinced of the central government's complicity,
have protested vociferously. The Spanish press is rife
with speculation that the authorities are behind GAL,
and the Gonzalez government has indicated that it is
prepared to go to great lengths to extirpate ETA. F_
... and in Vitoria
More surprising than Madrid's tough response to the
terrorists' offensive was the reaction in Vitoria, the
Basque capital. The PNV, which controls the Basque
Regional Government, has frequently been tepid in its 25X1
public condemnations of ETA violence. This time,
however, the party's top leaders outdid themselves in
repudiating terrorism. The PNV helped organize the
massive anti-ETA rally in Bilbao, and party president
Arzallus highlighted the priority of the struggle
against ETA at the PNV's annual "party day"
celebration in October. These developments seem to
be part of a general acceptance by the PNV
leadership of the need to confront ETA openly.
Vitoria, in our view, has finally realized that ETA
violence-not Madrid's "repression"-constitutes the
greater danger to Spanish democracy and therefore to
Basque autonomy.
In keeping with this new outlook, the PNV executive
committee, according to the press, has ordered its
local chapters to cease all collaboration with HB. The 25X1
same sources report that the top party leaders have
become convinced that the abertzale (Basque patriot)
component of HB has been completely absorbed by
the party's dominant Marxist-Leninist social
revolutionary faction. With an eye toward the election
of representatives to the regional parliament in
March, the PNV hopes to attract new voters from the
nonnationalist (but not anti-Basque) right, rather than
from sympathizers of Herri Batasuna. While the
PNV hierarchy may have written off the radical
Basque separatists as allies, the party's rank and file is
not so moderate. The Average PNV voter remains
much more sympathetic toward HB than toward
Madrid-based parties. According to a poll of PNV
supporters, 34 percent would back an alliance with
HB and Euzkadiko Ezkerra (a small party once
affiliated with ETA-PM), 21 percent would prefer a 25X1
pact with HB alone, and a mere 6 percent would opt
for an agreement with the nonnationalist right.
Clearly, the PNV's reorientation will have to progress
slowly if the party is not to alienate its voters. HB
remains a potent focus for ultranationalist sentiment
in the Basque region: a week after the historic anti- 25X1
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ETA rally in Bilbao the party sponsored a pro-ETA
march that drew almost as many demonstrators. The
PNV's fear of losing part of its nationalist following to
HB continues, in our view, to temper the leadership's
desire for closer cooperation with the central
government and leads to frequent angry public
exchanges between Madrid and Vitoria that further
raise political tensions in the Basque region.
Loss of a Golden Opportunity?
We view the lack of full collaboration between the
Basque and central governments as one of the chief
stumblingblocks to effective police action against
ETA. Madrid publicly asserts that the PNV and the
Basque government refuse to share valuable
intelligence with the national police. Basque
politicians, according to US Embassy reporting, claim
that Madrid fails to consult with them, violates the
spirit of Basque autonomy by dealing with ETA on its
own, and discounts the value of the public support the
PNV could mobilize against the terrorists.
In the immediate aftermath of the Martin killing,
however, it seemed that real cooperation between
Madrid and Vitoria was about to begin. When the
Socialist government first announced its plans for new
antiterrorist legislation, PNV spokesman did not
follow tradition by immediately condemning the
project because it put police measures ahead of a
"political solution" to the ETA problem. They did not
exclude supporting the government's package if the
PNV were allowed to participate in its formulation.
Madrid, however, brushed aside these tentative offers
and pushed the laws through Parliament without
consulting the Basques. We believe that by so doing
the Gonzalez administration sacrificed a golden
opportunity to draw the Basque government into the
struggle against ETA. This error has further strained
relations between Madrid and Vitoria. The Basque
government-understandably offended at being
ignored while the central government consistently
consults the rightwing Popular Alliance opposition-
has demanded total control over antiterrorist
operations in the region. This unrealistic and probably
unconstitutional request has irritated Madrid and has
added to the misunderstanding between the two
governments.
Outlook
We believe that in the short term ETA will step up its
attacks. Press reports indicate that ETA-M wants to
pull off a spectacular action and may be gunning for
Prime Minister Gonzalez himself. While we doubt
that the terrorists have the infrastructure and
logistical support to reach so well protected a target,
they will probably be able to escalate the general level
of violence. The various Spanish police forces are
currently plagued by morale problems stemming from
the influx of Socialist appointees, interservice
rivalries, and mundane problems such as low pay. The
police have made little progress combating ETA
during the first year of Socialist rule. For example,
only some 250 supposed terrorists have been detained
this year (as compared to 520 in 1982), and less than
half of these have been successfully prosecuted. Also,
Madrid and Vitoria will remain at loggerheads at
least until the Basque parliamentary elections are
held in March. Only when the campaign is over and
political passions have subsided is there a chance of
significant cooperation between the central and
Basque regional governments.
It is true that the long-run odds are not in ETA's
favor. The slow but sure devolution of powers to the
regional government will continue to reduce public
support for terrorism in the Basque Country.
Weariness with a never-ending struggle on the part of
even the most dedicated separatists will almost
certainly make recruitment more difficult and tempt
many terrorists to retire. The coordinated opposition
of Madrid and Vitoria to ETA-which we see as
probable over the long term-will vastly increase the
police pressure on the terrorists. These developments,
however, may take years to come to full fruition. Until
then, ETA will continue to kill military officers,
industrialists, and civil guards. And it will retain the
residual capacity to assassinate major political
leaders-and thereby to jeopardize the stability of
democratic institutions in Spain.
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secret
Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents, 1983 a
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
1983
Total
1982
Total
57
59
77
82
59
66
71
60
58
86
100
123
898
791
Government officials
6
3
4
5
8
10
10
4
2
2
2
6
62
30
Diplomats
27
33
36
40
28
25
33
37
37
46
50
63
455
413
Military
11
2
11
13
8
4
10
2
9
25
19
13
127
89
Business
2
9
8
7
9
8
7
8
4
9
17
13
101
145
Private parties, tourists
7
8
7
10
2
16
6
6
4
4
9
18
97
29
Other
4
4
11
7
4
3
5
3
2
0
3
10
56
85
Category of International Terrorist Incidents, 1983 a
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
1983
Total
1982
Total 57 59 77 82 59 66 71 60
58
86
100
123
898
791
Kidnaping 2 4 4 3 3 2 3 6
3
1
7
3
41
31
Barricade 1 2 3 4 2 2 3 1
3
8
4
2
35
18
Armed attack 0 2 2 4 1 2 3 0
2
1
1
6
24
7
Hijacking 4 6 3 4 7 6 10 3
2
0
1
0
46
30
Assassination 4 1 4 5 2 4 2 3
3
4
2
7
41
46
Threats, hoax 20 15 29 25 18 17 24 23
24
37
42
62
336
263
Sniping 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 1
1
3
2
0
13
22
Other 3 2 4 5 4 1 4 1
2
13
5
4
48
39
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1983 a
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
1983
Total
1982
Total 57 59 77 82 59 66 71 60
58
86
100
123
898
791
North America 3 5 5 6 11 2 6 3
4
0
6
6
57
61
Latin America 13 10 18 20 12 19 20 15
11
27
21
21
207
172
Western Europe 20 26 33 20 18 20 15 21
20
36
41
41
311
340
USSR/Eastern Europe 1 1 3 0 1 0 2- 1
1
0
1
0
11
16
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 3 4 5 4 8 2 5
0
2
5
1
39
18
Mideast and North Africa 14 6 12 23 8 16 21 11
14
11
16
41
193
122
Asia/other 6 8 2 8 5 1 5 4
8
10
10
13
80
62
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International Terrorist Incidents and Attacks, 1982-83
International Terrorist Incidents 140
Number of Incidents
1982
1983
Involving US
Number of Incidents
Deaths and Injuries Due to
International Attacks
Number of Victims
Jr,
RbFhl~ dffl
Bombing of US Marine
Hqs. and French post
in Beirut
Multiple bombings in
Paris, London, Beirut,
and Kuwait
Car bomb in
Pretoria, S.A.
Bombing of US
Embassy in Lebanon
Bombing of Gulf Air
Boeing 737 in UAE
desert
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Chronology
This chronology includes significant events, incidents, and trends in international
terrorism. It provides commentary on their background, importance, and wider
implications. It does not treat events listed in previous editions of the chronology
unless new information has been received.
29 December 1983 Turkey: Discovery of Suitcase Bomb
A bomb was discovered at Yesilkoy Airport on an Istanbul-Rome flight as the
plane was loading. The bomb-1.5 kilograms of plastic explosive with a sophisti-
cated delayed detonating device-was defused by the police. The bag containing
the bomb had been checked through to New York aboard a Pan American flight
from Rome, raising the possibility that the device was intended to go off after the
bag was transferred to the Pan American flight. No group has yet claimed
responsibility for the incident.
31 December 1983 West Germany: Bombings Claimed by Rote Zora
Simultaneous bombings at the Nixdorf computer firm in Hannover and a credit in-
formation bureau in Neuss were claimed by Rote Zora, the women's organization
within the Revolutionary Cells. The group stated the attacks were to protest the
massive collection and storage of computerized data relating to German citizens.
Late December 1983 West Germany: Bundeswehr Construction Site Firebombed
An explosion at an ammunition depot under construction caused minor damage.
West German security officials have no leads in the case.
.Italy: Antonov Back to Prison
On 13 January, Rome's Court of Liberty ordered Sergei Antonov, the Bulgarian
who is charged with complicity in the papal assassination attempt, transferred
back to prison from house arrest. He has three days to appeal the ruling. Italian
press has speculated that the action was taken to prevent Antonov from attempting
to flee the country and to protect Antonov's life. A senior magistrate has told US
Embassy officials that he believed Antonov would go to trial and would not be ab-
solved.
25 Secret
GI TR 84-002
19 January 1984
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Lebanon: Continued Attacks on French Interests
During the first two weeks of January, attacks on French interests in Beirut
continued:
? On 1 January, the French Cultural Center in Tripoli was bombed.
? On 3 January, a French driver was killed with a silenced pistol while he was sit-
ting in a French Embassy vehicle.
? On 12 January, an Egyptian official was fired at while riding in a car with
French diplomatic plates. Four shots were discharged from a silenced revolver
when a car pulled up alongside the one in which the official was riding-the offi-
cial was unharmed.
? On 12 January, there was an RPG attack on the French Embassy in Beirut.
? On 13 January, the wife of the French Cultural Attache was slightly wounded
when she was shot while riding in a car with French diplomatic plates.
1 January 1984 West Germany: Violent Demonstrations at Startbahn West
In Frankfurt, demonstrators hurled molotov cocktails and metal objects at police
guarding the runway. West German security officials reported various acts of
sabotage, and several police vehicles were damaged in the attacks. Startbahn West
has been the site of numerous protest activities during the past two years, although
anti-Startbahn demonstrations had diminished recently.
2 January 1984 Italy: Arson To Protest Italian Prison System
A group calling itself "Proletarians for Communism" claimed credit for burning
the car of a student attending the school for prison guards in Portici, south of Na-
ples. One bystander was killed in the resultant explosion.
this group-an offshoot faction of
"Autonomia"-first surfaced in October 1983. Italian police authorities reported-
ly believe this act was meant to underscore the need for prison reform, as well as to
signal retaliation for the cooperation of two "repentant" Red Brigades terrorists
with Italian authorities.
3 January 1984 Turkey: Arrest of Terrorists
In Istanbul, security forces arrested 36 left-wing extremists believed to be
members of the terrorist group Revolutionary Path (Dev Yol). The arrests followed
police investigation of the 6 December robbery of a goldsmith's shop in which the
proprietor was killed. The group apparently was responsible for other robberies of
goldsmith shops. We suspect the terrorists are committing robberies to obtain
funds to finance their attempts to reorganize.
25X1
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France: Attack by French Basques
In Anglet, the French Basque terrorist group Iparretarak claimed credit for
strafing a riot police station. No one was injured in the attack.
4 January 1984 Spain: Bombings in Basque Country
In Lasarte, two bombs exploded outside banks, causing damage but no casualties.
Although no group has claimed credit for the blasts, we believe a faction of the
Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was responsible. ETA has
conducted similar attacks against financial institutions in its campaign to extort
"revolutionary taxes."
4 January 1984 United States: Conviction in Slaying of Turkish Diplomat
In Los Angeles, a jury convicted Hampig Sassounian-an alleged member of the
Armenian terrorist group Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide--of
first degree murder in'the 1982 ambush slaying of the Turkish Consul General.
The jury finding of "special circumstances" in the killing-Sassounian lay in wait
for the victim-could result in life imprisonment without parole or death in the gas
chamber. Penalty deliberations were scheduled to begin 9 January.
Guadeloupe: Police Close Radio Station
Radio Ynite, apparently a center for Alliance Revolutionnaire Caraibe (ARC)
activity, was raided and closed down by local authorities. ARC activists are
believed responsible for a series of terrorist bombings on the island.
5 January 1984 Guatemala: Guerrilla Safehouse Raided
Local press reported that authorities raided a guerrilla safehouse in Guatemala
City, killing one guerrilla and capturing propaganda, grenades, ammunition, and
materials used to make claymore mines.
8 January 1984 West Germany: Bombing at South African Embassy
In Bonn, a molotov cocktail exploded in front of the Embassy, but there were no
damages or injuries. West German police think it was the work of an individual,
and not a terrorist organization.
Tunisia: Pipeline Sabotaged
A four-man commando team, entering Tunisia from Libya, used explosives to
destroy a feeder pipeline from Algeria. The fire was finally brought under control
when the Algerians stopped the oil flow. The Tunisian Foreign Ministry has sent a
memorandum to Libyan authorities protesting the incident.
25X1
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Basque separatist group Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was probably responsible.
Spain: Bombings in Basque Country
Suspected Basque guerrillas threw petrol bombs at two bank branches in San
Sebastian and fired shots at two other banks in Basauri. These attacks resulted in
damage but no casualties. Police also defused a bomb planted outside an industrial
firm in Renteria. Although no group has claimed credit for these attacks, the
Corsica: Separatist Bombings Continue
In Ajaccio, nine bombs exploded during the night, destroying villas owned by
French citizens. One man was killed and a second seriously injured in a premature
explosion. Police believe the two men were attempting to plant the device at a villa
when it exploded. Although no group claimed credit, we believe the National Front
for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) was responsible for the blasts-the latest in
a long series of attacks over the past few years aimed at property owned by French.
and for the bombing of the French Cultural Center in Tripoli, Lebanon.)
Investigation is continuing to determine any links between these incidents.
France: Explosives Discovered on Madrid-Paris Train
A package containing 15 pounds of explosives-but not connected to a detonating
device-was found aboard a Madrid-Paris train. Police have not yet determined
when the explosives were put aboard the train nor who was responsible. Ten days
earlier, two people were killed when a bomb exploded aboard a high-speed train
traveling from Marseilles to Lyon. (The international terrorist known as Carlos
sent a letter to the French Government claiming responsibility for the two attacks
11 January 1984 Zaire: Explosion at Kinshasa Airport
Luggage offloaded from an Aeroflot flight exploded in the baggage area of the
Kinshasa airport, destroying virtually everything in the baggage room and shaking
the main terminal and adjoining buildings. Zairian security forces have arrested
the four Chadians who owned the luggage.
caused serious property damage. No one was injured in the blast.
Spain: Basque Terrorist Bombs
In Bilbao, ETA/M claimed credit for a bomb attack on an office complex that
25X1
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by French police for a terrorist attack in which three police officers were kille
France: Arrest of French Basque Terrorists
In Bayonne, police arrested five members of the French Basque terrorist group
Iparretarak as they were taking journalists to a clandestine news conference.
Iparretarak claimed credit for several minor bombings in the French Basque
region during the summer of 1983. Several Iparretarak members are being sou ht
Portugal: Court Acquits BJO Member
Mohammed Hussein Rashid, a member of Abu Nidal's Black June Organization
on trial for the April 1983 murder of PLO official Issam Sartawi, was acquitted.
Rashid told the court that he had not actually shot Sartawi but was acting as a de-
coy to draw attention away from the real killer, Youssef Al-Awad. Al-Awad was
also captured by Portuguese authorities but has not yet been tried.
12 January 1984 Spain: Bombings Continue in Basque Country
In Villabona, the Military wing of ETA claimed credit for the bombing of a bank
which caused damage but no injuries.
13 January 1984 Guatemala: Another Safehouse Raided
According to Reuters, soldiers backed by tanks and helicopters raided a guerrilla
safehouse only two blocks from the Presidental Palace. Authorities reported three
guerrillas were killed in the attack and two members of the security force were
attempts to extort "revolutionary taxes."
France: Bank Bombings in French Basque Country
In Aix-en-Provence, bombs exploded outside three banks during the night, causing
damage but no injuries. No group has yet claimed credit for the attacks. French
Basques may be copying Spanish Basque terrorists who frequently bomb banks in
15 January 1984 Argentina: Bomb Thrown at Vatican Embassy
A firebomb was thrown at the Papal Nunciature in Buenos Aires, apparently in
protest against an agreement mediated by the Pope for Argentina and Chile to be-
gin negotiations to resolve their territorial dispute over the Beagle Channel.
Neither injuries nor major damage occurred; no group has claimed responsibility.
16 January 1984 Lebanon: End of Investigation Into Meloy Assassination
The GOL investigation into the 1976 assassinations of US Ambassador Meloy and
two of his companions in Beirut ended today after a bill of indictment was
published calling for the death penalty for one assassin and life imprisonment for
the other two. All three assassins were members of the PFLPand were sentenced
in absentia-one has never been apprehended, and the other two were released on
their own recognizance several weeks ago.
29 Secret
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17 January 1984 Lebanon: Saudi Diplomat Kidnaped
Lebanese security reports a senior Saudi diplomat was kidnaped in Beirut and one
of his aides was shot
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100340001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100340001-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100340001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100340001-3
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP84-00893R000100340001-3