OPTIONS FOR SAFE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00933R000500120017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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Science and Technology Advisory Panel
Dear Stan,
This document discusses in greater detail certain of
the points about SAFE raised with you during the STAP
meeting on Friday, 14 March 80; included are options we
believe to be workable and recommend for your consideration.
Needless to say, the undersigned and the rest of STAP
would be anxious to provide any further support you might
seek in more extended explorations of these points.
STATINTL
STATINTL
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Options for SAFE
A Report of the DCI's
Science and Technology Advisory Panel
STIC 80-002
April 1980
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MIT
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1. Introduction
2. Strengthening the SAFE Management
3. A True Pilot SAFE
4. The Users of SAFE
5. The Methodology of Evaluation
6. An Advisory Council on Technology
Appendix I--STAP Questions Regarding SAFE
Appendix II--Managing VM/CMS Systems for User
Effectiveness
Human Factors: Impact on Interactive
Computing
i.1 i
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STAP OPTIONS FOR SAFE
1. Introduction
On 18 March 1980 we forwarded to you eight questions
regarding the future evolution of the SAFE system and the
relation of CIA SAFE to other community systems (See
Appendix I). In this report we propose various actions
which, if implemented, could yield a more valuable community
asset in the long run. Because of the size of the system and
its complexity, a delay (6 months to two years) in IOC can
be anticipated. Productive use of this delay time can be
made, as we discuss in subsequent sections.
In our examination of SAFE, we were impressed with the
need for a community manager of the ADP-communication
systems, None now exists and SAFE is not being integrated
into an overall community architecture. As a result the
incremental value of SAFE will be less than it could be.
Even without a community manager, the future capabilities of
SAFE could he strengthened and possible steps in that
direction are described in Section 2. The longer term
questions of technical direction of the overall Intelligence
Community ADP-communication systems will be the subject of
additional STAP analysis and should be considered a separate
issue from that of SAFE.
The evolutionary development of SAFE will. require
analysis of how the community uses SAFE. Sections 3 and 4
describe means by which such analysis could proceed. As SAFE
comes on line, it will be essential for future planning to
evaluate its usefulness. A possible means for evaluation is
described in Section 5.
Finally, we believe that a rich body of experience in
systems similar to SAFE exists and could be beneficially
applied to enhancing SAFE"s capabilities. To this end, we
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propose in Section 6 establishment of an Advisory Council on
Technology for, SAFE.
This report primarily examines CIA SAFE and its use by
the Intelligence Community. Our emphasis on CIA SAFE derives
from the fact that NFAC stands to benefit greatly from a
truly operational SAFE. DIA needs center on the accuracy,
maintenance capability and general utility of their large
encyclopedic files. These files require restructuring and
improved maintenance capability as well as a high level of
concurrency in use. Our analysis focuses on the analyst
support function of SAFE; this function is of secondary
importance to DIA. DIA's requirement can more easily be met
than CIA's. Thus while we propose a "true pilot SAFE" for
CIA, such an activity should not impede the development of
the DIA SAFE. Indeed, the.lessons learned in the "true pilot
SAFE" will. be of use in the evolutionary development of the
DIA system.
In outlining the options for the future, we are fully
aware of and appreciate the concerns of the SAFE management
office and the Office of Central Reference. The steps
outlined below will delay the scheduled delivery of an
operational system, but we believe that the present schedule
cannot be met since such critical items as command language
and central hardware have not yet been decided upon. The
delay we anticipate can be put to use to obtain operational
experience on a "true pilot SAFE." The delays whether
anticipated or not will cause problems with OMB and Congress
and these should be recognized now.
2. Strengthening the SAFE Management
Strengthening of the community management of SAFE is
essential. if it is to become effective in satisfying its
prescribed functions, and be capable of expanding flexibly
and responsibly to aid the entire community.
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The fundamental component of such strengthening must be
increased technological. awareness and capability at the
appropriate managerial echelon. It is vital that decisions
that affect the future performance of a large part of the
community not be made by default by those who do not
exercise the corresponding responsibility. Such decisions
should not be delegated either to lower echelons or to
contractors.
The context of SAFE is a large and intimidating R&D
effort. Technical decisions must be made amidst both
aggressive contractor actions and critical ongoing
operational tasks. These decisions may commit the community
far beyond the decisionmaker's ken.
Management itself, as an abstract: entity, must be able
to deploy experience and judgment in the following areas, at
lea as t
1) Intelligence Production
a) Collection
b) Processing
c) Storage and retrieval
d) Analysis
e) Output: and distribution
2) Analytic processes: Some experience and grasp in
substantive areas of intelligence; that is, economic,
political., military, or S&T.
3) Technology and R&D for Intelligence
a) Information sciences
b) Communications
c) Computer technology
4) Management and Human Factors
Whatever the particular details of the management
structure, it is clear that experience and decisionmaking
capacity must: be accompanied by the appropriate
authority--that requires rank and status to match the
control to be exercised.
Given the ongoing function of intelligence production,
Technology and R&D (number 3) is the most difficult area to
fill, because it has been and is changing so fast.
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Nevertheless, it is vital to fill it, for otherwise most of
the important decisions about SAFE will be made without
considering the potential for technological growth or
possible technical constraints.
Delegation is always necessary in any large management
task, but the overall management responsibility cannot be
delegated away. IE the managers cannot themselves be
technologically knowledgeable enough to monitor the
technological decisions about design and performance, they
must establish a mechanism to ensure that decisions are
adequately monitored and verified. ---~
There are several possible ways of doing that:
1) Hire, beg, or borrow deputies with the needed
competencies.
2) Borrow consulting as needed from other
operating offices in the community. A problem with this
is that loyalties and motivation will almost surely be
at best divided,
3) Establish a continuing Advisory Council on
Technology (ACT), combining in-house and outside
experts. This is useful chiefly for guidance on the
most important decisions, and for monitoring directions
and performance.
4) Establish similar Ad Hoc Panels for particular
important decisions. Such panels must invest a lot of
time becoming aware of the context of the problem, so
their cost-effectiveness will be low on the average.
Furthermore, they cannot perform the monitoring
function. They may be essential. in crises or surprise
contingencies.
5) Establish a responsive contractor management
scheme. It is hard for contractors to understand deeply
the desiderata that obtain for a system like SAFE, for
integration with the most profound processes of
intelligence production.
On a project as crucial as SAFE,
above, cou led with number 3,
tec no ogical competence are probably
we recommend number 1
Deputies with full
essential, if only to
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provide full-time support with undivided loyalties. They
must, of course, have the rank and authority to deal with
their contractor counterparts.
It is also likely that some outside expert advice would
be helpful; and for 3) above, a standing Advisory Council on
Technology (ACT) would seem most fitting. It is not clear
whether the council should restrict its considerations to
SAFE, or should in fact ultimately deal with a broader range
of technological problems. These questions are amplified
below in Section 6.
3. A True Pilot SAFE
Interim SAFE was initiated in 1974 as a set of
capabilities on a 370/158 run by ODP. Four main capabilities
were sought for the original SAFE project, and they are
still valid today:
1) A mail/message/distribution system
2) Private files available on-line for analysts
3) Public files available on-line for analysts
4) on-line facilities for read, edit, write, and
document production
These four have to be somewhat extended and modified in
detail to match either today's purported goals or the real
needs that underlie the requirements for the system.
The chief uses made of interim SAFE were:
1) To provide limited experience for certain
analysts in order to survey their expressed needs.
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2) To demonstrate the capabilities to management
echelons, in order to help with the budget and funding
processes.
3) To derive certain specifications that might
serve as guides for the actual SAFE system
specifications.
4) To illustrate the capabilities in the
intelligence environment to possible proposed SAFE
contractors.
It is important to observe that Interim SAFE was never
used as a pilot: _ s stem ~ ~-._ theft term___ is used in
engineering--that is, to provide experience with a small
system whose performance is operationally projected to be
what the final system ought to be. In practice, of course,
the pilot system serves in engineering to modify
requirements and specifications in both usage and
engineering.
In Interim SAFE, we were informed that in general
statistics about usage were not gathered because they would
be "not representative."
The questions that ought to be answered by a true pilot
SAFE include:
1) What are the usage patterns of naive users?
2) What are the usage patterns of experienced
users?
3) What needs for modifications of SAFE
performance become manifest from the transition of
naive users to experienced ones?
4) What are the user documentation and training
requirements?
5) What new requirements emerge from the
experienced usage?
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