CHAPTER XII. CONCLUSIONS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00951R000200120001-8
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• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 1999
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Release 1999/09/2SEG ''DP84-00951 R000200120001-8
Chapter XII. Conclusions
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
Two articles from the Fall 1957 issue of Studies in Intelligence might help
understand part of the dilem ra of OCR during the past twenty years ( 1947 - 1967).
The first, by R.S. Cline (DUI from 1962 to 1966), Is Intelligence Over-Coordinated?
discusses the possibility that coordination has been abused by the Intelligence
Community. Coordination has caused delay in the appearance of)and often vapid results
in the preparation ofJnational estimates. Cline suggestedt
that the US national security system would be better served if the intelligence
community took a less vigorous view of the meaning of coordination and
substituted more informal techniques of consultation. In this way the
intelligence community could share knowledge and wisdom without delaying or
weakening the product. I /
By interesting coincidence, the next article, by R.J. Smith (DDI from 1966 on),
Coordination and Responsibility, stresses the need for coordination in the preparation
of national estimates. Briefly he discusses the ways to improve the procedural and
semantic understandings that would result in better products "through gradual, slow
advance by small adjustments here and there." He concludes by stating that the
coordination process must stay because it is the heart of national intelligence;
the problem is "to make it tick strongly." Z./
OCR sometimes felt over-coordinated; it had many responsibilities, including
coordination with its many-faceted ma-44igin rs. Although national estimates, coor-
dination and OCR do not seem related, the issues raised are similar. Two senior CIA
officials (both of whom were later DDI' and thus responsible for OCR) had different
views about coordination. Divergence of opinion is healthy. The divergences emphasize
the difficulty in definition, whether it be coordination or central reference.
Central reference service has also been called the heart of an intelligence organiza-
tion, just as libraries have been called the heart of universities. What is important
to one group is inconsequential to another. Many differences are more semantic than
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25X1A
25X1A
1. Neither top CIA management nor the users of OCR have known exactly what were,
nor much less could they define the parameters of)a complep 'central reference
VIL" ,e e .~ a qe urcc~
W ,trae olwre-4~- a. f""If
service in practical terms,/It seemed as though management wanted OCR to
urv fewer ffq&, a "Cowes e 4 a,.,os"
A As related in Chapter XI, the DCI (McCbne) in 1964 wanted the best
possible systems for the handling of information in CIA. Yet at about the same time,
av~
butt them several years
to 1967 'A OCR's manpower
ceiling was reduced
in ten years. L1/ This included the
25X1A - positions received from the State Department for biographic operations in 1961.
Reasonable proof has been presented to show that OCR wanted to improve its services
and "image" consistently but was frustrated on many counts - management support,
ILLEGIB
manpower, and money.
2. OCR played an important part in the coordination of intelligence processing
ILL E GIB in the US Government. Through its committee activities, such as AHIP, CODIB, and
PROCIB, OCR led the Intelligence Community in many joint efforts which eased the
burden on any single member. Some of these activities preceded Presidential,
Congressional and indeed CIA top management interest in how to handle the mass of
information pouring in to the US Government. Even in requirements and collection
guidance OCR did the spade-work for coordinating internal and external thinking in
n1 .1 4-s.c."d 441-24-
these areas. Resultant organizational components were removed from OCR jurisdiction.
A
3. A recurring theme concerning OCR was that it accumulated too much data and
therefore could not find efficiently the little useful information. At any time
OCR could have cut its intake, staff/and costs by at least one-half. But which half?
From the very beginning OCR attempted to get analyst cooperation in determining what
receipts were important by assisting in certain steps in the intelligence document
SEC FT
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retrieval system, but these efforts were all spurts of momentary enthusiasm. In the
formative days of the Intellofax System, analysts did contribute abstracts, and some
helped with revisions of the indexes used by OCR. Usually, however, OCR had to
decide what to index and how to do it; at one time six interpretations of
indexing systems were used to ensure adequate coverage of variegated materials
(Intellofax, Intelligence Periodicals Index, and the specialized indexing of the
Biographic, Graphics, Industrial and Special Registers). As OCR sophistication
developed in processing its receipts, the quality of the selection o -b t--}^ ^u t
iato.?t.kr improved in al l the i,rcvt divisions mentioned. But selection was
based ususally on request patterns, with a certain amount of "anticipatory" selection
also. Many crisis situations were provided prompt reference support by OCR because it
had decided to process certain categories of material in different ways. The basic
soundness of the original planning for OCR was demonstrated by the fact that for at
least 15 of its first 20 years, it had the flexibility of operations to modify
procedures that produced results in an environment of constant change. There was also
a certain uniqueness to OCR's early operations for which there were not many prece-
dents. How does one handle enclosures to a special category of documents when they
25X1 B
ran the gamut from
OCR had to improvise as it went along,
4. Standing still in the sweeping flow of modern information handling techniques
Iri cl nel 'lo Siahd
is the certain way to stagnation in this fast-moving area. OCR Plemen still,
and was in the active forefront of many of the best developments in the field. It
constructed some equipme n on its own, tested dozens of others, inspired experimenta-
tion and worked jointly with groups trying to achieve the ultimate. Always, however,
OCR wanted proof that the proposed system was better than the one it had. So it was
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a
with computers. As Robert Townsend, former president of Avis, was quoted as
writing, "I've never known a company seriously injured by automating too slowly,
but there are some classic cases of companies bankrupted by computerizing premature-
ly." Retrieval of information with the assistance of machines is only as good
as the system developed for arranging the information put into the machines, whether
the system is called classification or language or index. OCR did not want to go
too far too fast; it could not move into the computer world without adequate
preparation. As a well-known expert in the field of information systems, I.A.
Wahrheit, IBM, recently stated;
It is recognized that a program must be tailored to fit the available
resources and that it is not always possible to build an ideal system.
Nevertheless, design objectives must be established even though they cannot
be immediately realized. If the ultimate objectives are understood, then the
program development will be orderly and later reconversions will be kept to
a minimum. Therefore, even though the design objectives may not be achieved
for a number of years, they should be established so that current implementa-
tion can be carried out in a rational manner with some assurance that the
system will grow and develop. b/ 25X1B
This is precisely what OCR did. In the case of - for example, the prohibitive
fiscal and manpower costs made adoption of the complete program impossible, yet the
many lessons learned were instrumental in the planning for the mid-1967 reorganization.
KT.-4 )D ~oh 10 ove
~/. There were many people trained and employed by OCR who developed into a cadre
h
of real professionals in the field of information handling. When OCR realized the
dearth of professional librarians for recruitment, it selected some of its most
promising librarians and sponsored thl-
its for advanced degrees in library
of oco rear e and 6'Fher mackin.e
science. Scores were trained in pertinent aspects of IBMAcapabilities, both EAM and
EDP. Language and area familiarization programs were stressed for OCR analysts
requiring this type of background to improve their ? Management
1^
courses were taken to develop potentials to deal with the increasing problems of
good leadership. Attendance and membership in professional associations,)" encouraged.
A
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5.- itself, however, was a traumatic experience for OCR. The paradox of
25X1 B
top management i.7 OCR retrenchment while i was planning for sizable
a -S-4l e - 25X1 B
expansion reduced OCR to schizophreniao A . 1
tatrd~y-gahe
periods- of e#f gal? r
y R1 ref-f&ce?Wh ; h&d=not itr r r*re e. Some
ueveiupment worK on - was done by people who wer not-intelligence
officers r tug cost conscious ---
the m 25X1 B P'*
The OCR people trained forte in many cases *W brilliantly but
k- Ve
hhe~y were bewildered by the paradox
4/ ~a E~ ie~ 1t Jul.. t~s to :. _ i
re>l.a t i,a,n; 7 i p that i existed a.
. ;t4e~ pa betwee ~
25X1 B~~-~ ~
.l .tIQne of the benefits, however, derived from- ' r, buttressed by
the reporting media required by PFIAB and PPB, was the development of better manage-
ment information than OCR had in the past.
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25X1A
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ILLEGIB
25X1A
INSERT/
25X1A
7. The converse of the movement of key people out of OCR was true to a much
lesser degree. Few key people are known to have requested assignment to OCR. It
has had only three Directors:
44
leaders - came from outside OCR
25X1A
(1963 - ). There were
pkFt Deputy Directors from 1947 - 1969
25X1A
25X1A
(1947 - 1957); _ (1957 - 1963); and
t ese
though from NPIC, is considered an alumnus of OCR). Appen ix shows in
detail the chronology of the OCR service of its key personnel. Division Chiefs
4
have had A long period of continuity. Though there was one rotation of three
new blood was promoted in rank in mid-1967.
Division Chiefs in 1961, there have been few changes since that time until some
25X1A
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As a result of the varied experience gained by many OCR people, some Agency:
components looked upon OCR as a training ground for excellent prospect ; the "raids"
r
on OCR got so bad at one time that was compelled to insist ona two-year stay
in OCR by each new recruit. There were two sides to this situation! fdne was the
unfortunate fact that OCR salaries were lower, the work less interesting to some
and the opportunity for creative intelligence activity seemed limited"Ae more
.3-
positive side was that the people who left OCR for other components brought with
25X1A them a knowledge of OCR capabilities. Many Agency components had leading people
trained completely or at least for part of their career in OCR; to mention but a
25X1A few with their next assignment:
-1 w SE
lots of hard work, some inconsistencies but above all - to complete the full circle
of con 4lusions - a determined effort to establish its identity. Was it really an
The history of OCR is thus a record of proud achievements, much strain,
Office of Central Reference? For the future, will it truly be the Central Reference
.4% e/ktJ
Service of CIA? The answer to both is negative. Some of the reasons for this have
it can only be considered an office of some reference services. '-Whether the basic
organization of CIA should be changed to make the conglomerat'ki4-7 of all reference
services a reality is outside both the purview and the competence of the historian.
opinion. As long as true reference services exist in components other than OCR,
already been ktl'-d. Conjectures could fill pages that still could qualify only as
I
ILI 1~EGIB
-8
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Chapter XII. Conc
In the/Fall J957 issue
not writte$ with this in mi'n
weakeryi`ny
of OCR Burin the past twet ty
i n to l l i,genc
ext article, by R.J.
from 1962 to 196Is Intellig a Over-Conrdinated~,
that coordination has b
delay and often vapid
suggested.
substitute d
that the US _/
na
community,to
ok
en abused by the
Studies in Intelli,ence,
nevertheless might help e
years (1947 - 1967). Th
results in the prepara
onal security syst
a less vigorous vie
re informal techni
community could sha
e
e product. I /
By in
eresting coincidence, the
on acid Re-sponsibility, str
nderstandings that would
~ional estimates. Briefly he
slow advance by
coordination proce
problem is to mak
OCR ra seem
for OCR) h
divergences
Secondly, central
organisation.
12ant
Approved
articles though obiously
plain part of the dilemna
first, by R.S. Cline (DDI
discusses the possibility
telligence Communit
tion of national estimates. Cline
e/nwould be better served
of the meaning of coordi
es of consultation. In th
knowledge and wisdom wi
discusses the ways
all adjustments here and
s must stay because it i
s
it tick strongly."
Z-/
felt over-coordinated;
W its many-faceted ramific
l'a of -t&_ opracuea~
mod. thsrc
two senior CIA officials (b
h of whom were later
different views about coordi
ation. Divergence
ti 1 . 1o s,7s . 64,,0,19.. A4 VP C
DDIs and thus responsible
f thinking is healthy.
heart of an intelligence
~ference service% ha4a also been called the
Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP84-00951 R
had many responsibilities, including
It in better pr ducts "through gradual,
ere." He conclu by stating that the
he heart of nations intelligence; the
tions. Although nation.
if the intelligence
ation and
s way the
hout delaying or
th (DDI from 1966 on),
ination in the prepara-
to improve the procedural
1 estimates and
ti
a . '('9a,, ana
00200120001-8
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25X1A
25X1A
1. Neither top CIA management not the users 9CR have known exactly what
were, nor much less: could they define the parameters of a compleat/central reference
wanted the best possi
." As related ih Chapter XI, the DCI McCone) in 1964
same time, OCR los
FDD-OCR total of
25X1 A to _ /
ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
25X1A
operations,
A
proof has been presented o show that OCR wan d to improve its serves and "image"
consistently but was frus rated on many coun s - manpower, money an management
support.
2. OCR played an imp rtant part in the coor 'nation of int lligence processing
in the US Government. Throw h its n committee ac ivities, s ch as AHIP, CODIB,
and PROCIB, OCR led the Intel gence Community in ma y joint of its which eased
5"m,
the burden on any single member. Hof' of these acti ities precede Presidential,
Congressional and indeed CIA op management inter st in how to handl the mass
of information pouring in the US Government Even in requirements nd collection
guidance OCR did the spa e work for coordinat ng internal and extern I thinking in
these areas. Resultant rganizational compone is were removed fro OCR jurisdiction.
3. A recurring theme
and therefore could not find effi iently the little us ful i formation. At any time
OCR could have cut its intake, s aff and costs by at east o e-half. But which half?
From the very beginning OCR tr ed to get analyst c Aeration in determining what
Irv
P the intelligence document
receipts were important,by ssisting certain st ps
of it
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ndling of informa ion in CIA. Yet at that
endin with a combined
authorized by 1 July 1964. The
from l95o25X17A OCR's manpo
theM positions rec~
25X1A
next year an ther -were cut.
er ceiling was r duced from=
ved from State for kiographic?_,,,.
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retrieval !stem, but these efforts wer a spurts of momen y e thusiasm.
25X1 B
25X1 B
and so a helped with revisions of the indexes used by qCR. Usufally, however, OCR
had to e ' what to index and ow to do it,- at one t
of indexing sys ms were used to
(Intellofax, Int
Biographic, Grap
developed in p
various interpretations
riegated materials
and the specialize indexing of the
Registers). As OCR sophistication
cessing its receipts, the q4ality of the sele/tion of what to put
into the syste~s improved in all the in-pu
41;kt A
t divisions ment'oned. But selection was
based usually on equest patterns, with a certain amount of "anticipatory" selection
also. Many crisis sit tions were provi ed prompt refer nce support by OCR because
it had decided to proc ss certain cate ories of materia in different ways. The
basic soundness of th original planni g for OCR was demo strated by the fact that
for 15 of its first 0 years, it had the lexibility of oper ions to modify
procedures t pro uciog results in an enviro ent of constant c nge. Besides that,
there was a uniqu ness of OCR's early operations r which there we a not many
precedents. How doe`s one
+', a S P ec1a
enclosures Aran the gamu
handle enclosures to transmittal documents,jwhen the
cateEory o3 dvvne f5,
from
OCR had to impro ise many times.
L+. Standing still in the sweeping flow o modern informat
is the certain way stagnation in this fa t-moving area.
and was in the acts a forefront of many of t e best develo
constructed some equipment on its own, tested 'ozens,, inspi
on handling techniques
never stood still,
nts in the field. It
ed experimentation
chieve the ultimate. Always, however,
OCR wanted proof that th proposed system wah better than the\one it had. So it was
and worked jointly with m ny groups trying to
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wit.-ccv,nutcrs. As obc:rt Townsend
~'r L;i1C~ L/ve never known a corm
rr somc classic cases
th the assistan e of machines is only as good
+.d for arrar,;in the inforrr:ation\ut into the machines, whether
d/classification or language or index, OCR did not want to go
could not move 1to the computer world ithout ac:yuate
prcnaration. As a well-known expert
"'anrhei t, ? IM/recently stated;
is
sou
~ver
b imr,
Program
recognized that a p
ccs and that it is
heless, design obje
diately realized,
development will b
a :mi ni mu
for a numb
C;Jn can be
system w i l l
Therefore, even
the ultimate objective
orderly and later recoq
ough the design objec
of years, they s
arried out in a rs
row and develop. ~..
onal manner with
the available
an ideal system.
even though they cannot
are unde;-stood, then the
versions GWi 1 i bt kept to
Ives may not be~ achieved
o that current 'ir-iplerre nta-
ome assurance that the
There/were many people traine'and employed by OCR who de3eloped into a cadre
of rcai pro essionals in the field f information handling. Y !hen OCR realized the
dearth of p ofessrional librarians for recruitment, it selecte some of is most
promising li rarians and soonsor-d this training for advan
science. Scores vere trained in p rtinent aspects of ISM
EDP. Language an area familiarizatio programs were str
requiring this 'ype of background to iriorove their servic
courses were t ken to develop potenti 1 s to deal with the
d degrees in library
aoabilities, both EAM. and
ssed for OCR analysts
capabilities. Management
increasing problems of
ssociations was encouraged.
good leadership. -Attendance and merAership in professional
proved.. For Release 1/@9 1 D0-2 M-2Q004 -&__ _.._v
toner nt was cuot(9d as
:ny snrious1y ii~jur.d by autom&tinc, tc;o..slowly,
of companies bankr:r)ted by co,outer-izin-; pref^ature-
gram must be tailored to
of always possible to buil
tives must be established
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s "' 7 Sult the varies' experience game',-! _iy liieny ;CF, oco'lie, sor_ r ^~
25X1A
25X1A
%es tiv . si de was t, at the neople who le- , OCR for other cor-noonent: 5rcu ht wl th
io the'. ooportuni for creative 1 t i , l i t t ~t act: vi i ty see..med irrti teu. The more
.:niortuna act that 'OCR salaries were lower, the work l int~_r`:sti nR Samme
)C., by coo i nela`. recruit. i h ';re 1':i,re two sides to this situation. P ac Yrjs trc
cnm-On n s looked upon as a trainir ;round Fdr excellent r)ros,)(-,cts; t;-;c: ''raids"
et so hod a, t o n e tune that W a s connci led to inist on a t,/.c-yc ar spay
a :Inowledge o'.f OCR capabi l i ties. Many Age cy coiiloonents had le- ai ng people
t rc',i ned comPle_tel or at least for part of thci, career in OCR; to i"ltion but
f.w with their n_xt assignment:
story of OCR is thus a record/of proud achievemetts, much strain,
,lork,; some inconsistencies, Vut above all - to complete the ful i circle
of conslusions\-Iladetermined effort to.stablish its identity\Was it really an
Rcrv i ce of CIA? The anst~ r to both is ne rati ve. Some of the reasons t r this have
already been told. Conje Lures could fill p es that still could quality only as
minion. As long as tru reference services exis in components other hart OCR,
i t can only be consid red an office of sorne rcfere cc services. Whet cr
the basic
brrianization of CI should be'changed to make the conglomeration all reference
is outside both the purviewjnd the cornpetenje of the historian.
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 roved For R lese 1999/04 CIA-R P. Iff951 R0002001200d1-8
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