INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON LIBYAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 7, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260002-5
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260002-5
 Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260002-5
- According to best estimates, there are currently about 1,400 Americans
in Libya. This figure represents a decline of about 600 in the past one
to two weeks. A large majority of Americans in Libya are with the oil
companies. Most oil company dependents have previously left Libya;
there are probably not more than 300-400 dependents remaining (rough
estimate only). The oil companies have small technical and managerial
staffs in Tripoli, which possibly total 200-300 people. At any given
time, there are probably another 100 Americans in Tripoli, including.
businessmen, teachers and professors, and transients (including journalists).
Roughly 50% of all Americans in Libya are located in the Tripoli area.
- The majority of oil company employees are located at widely scattered
exploration, production, refining and production sites, primarily in the
desert. We presume, but are not-certain, that most if not all Americans
have been withdrawn from the ESSO facilities at Marsa Brega. There are
a few (exact number unknown) Americans working on private contracts with
the Libyan National Oil Company, the Brega Marketing Company, and the
Arabian Gulf Exploration Company'(all Libyan Government organizations)
in Benghazi and Tobruq.
- There is another small American community in Benghazi, consisting of
businessmen and teachers, which probably does not number more than about
50-75 persons.
- Exit visas are needed to leave Libya. Possible that first indication
of withdrawal will cause Qadhafi to slow down issuance of visas. Denial
of exit visas would make de facto hostages of Americans.
 Approved For ReI~~At p17/R61jtP5 RDP84B00049R000200260002-5
Quadaffi is likely to react to any public pressure as challenge more
likely to precipitate than deter action. Thus any communication designed to
deter his assassination campaign should be private and should include as much
specific information as possible on our knowledge of his plans, people working
on operational plans.
Unless Qadhafi is overthrown, overt military or economic action is
likely to intensify his terrorist activities. It will probably increase
Soviet military presence in Libya directly and by surrogates. All this
could result in strengthening the regime rather than weakening it.
A private communication and withdrawal of Americans is about as far
as is possible to go without bringing into play these long repercussions
which could strengthen Qadhafi's position and weaken ours. In the event
of a terrorist attack after warning, economic and military reaction may
be appropriate and necessary but are likely to be largely symbolic in their
impact. A very serious and well funded political action operation aimed
at overthrowing Qadhafi from within is a more effective response.
Another consideration -- some attack on U.S. officer is statistically
likely over the next few months. We may not be able to unequivocally
identify it as Libyan inspired. In these circumstances, military reprisals
might be difficult to justify.
 Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260002-5
T SECRET 7 Dec 81 25X1
25X1
- Would certainly respond politically but are unlikely to precipitate
military confrontation.
- Will want to do something to maintain credibility with other proxies
and friends elsewhere in Middle East--Syria, Yemens.
- Reaction likely depend on scenario. If, in response to assassination
of high U.S. official, likely not to do anything. If in response to hit a
U.S. installation or seizing of hostages, strong reaction becomes more likely.
- Good chance that Soviets would step in as they did in Egypt in 1970
to provide air defense system with Soviet personnel (Egypt 15,000 Soviets).
- Would give Soviets an opportunity to move in and develop overt
military relations with Libyans on a basis which could be justified as
defensive.
- This would put U.S. in position where if there is to be any further
action or confrontation it would be the U.S. attacking Soviet units dedicated
to Libyan defense.
- In reaction to the withdrawal of Americans from Libya:
-- Moscow would give broad propaganda play to the US evacuation,
hoping both to deter the US from military action and fan Libyan
apprehensions of US intentions in order to increase Tripoli's
dependence on the USSR.
-- The USSR might deploy either reconnaissance aircraft or naval
ships to Libya as a show of support.