POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARDS LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 8, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260010-~l ~d~ U a
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1107E F0 : Director of Central Intelligence
Fw.OM: Charles E. Waterman, NI0/MESA
SUS:? ='CT: Political and Economic Policy Towards Libya
As a general statement, I would favor the courses of action li:stee
under Option 2, "'Withdraw U.S. Business Personnel from Libya." The
t cc ~icmi c sanctions themselves, as described in the paper, do not have
:ee i in them and are symbolic only. The withdrawal of personnel,
~~; ; i_ c vi ng only a temporary effect on Libyan production capabi l ; ty,
dues removea serious impediment to utilization of a much larger range of
options in the future. This. would include political action, and so an,
without fear of reprisals on US citizens. This i mpl i catti on would not,
I suspect, bey lost on Qadhafi and may figure in his future- planning.
in short, oithdrawal renders any future warning more credible.
Charles E. Waterman
Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260010-6
 Approved For Release 2007/06/04: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200260010-6
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Talking Points for the DCI
Further Specifics Concerning Oadhafi's Reactions to a Demarche
We believe Oadhafi will be inclined on balance to permit-us
citizens to leave Libya before or after a demarche. But the
greater the level of confrontation, the greater the likelihood
that Oadhafi will take steps to harass the Americans or to hold
the Americans hostage. Accordingly, we believe it would be best
to get as many Americans out before a demarche as possible.
If the Americans are withdrawn before a demarche is issued,
they would be relatively safe. They could, however, expect
delays in their departures due to:
-- red tape in obtaining exist visas, probably due to an
excess of zeal on the part of local authorities.
-- demands that outstanding issues such as payment of back
taxes be dealt with before all are allowed to leave
(EXXON employees have reportedly run into such
problems).
-- Possible problems in arranging landing rights should
extra flights be needed.
After the US sends a private demarche, however, Qadhafi will
have been put on notice of what the US intends. The risk
increases that he will make the decision not to allow all
This memorandum was prepared b office of 25X1
Global Issues Office of Near 25X1
East South Asia Analysis 25X1
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Americans to leave in order to retain some control over US
actions. The resulting delays may look much like those
experienced in the former situation, but will be far more serious
and long-drawn out--presumably until the crisis is somehow
resolved. Should he decide to allow them to withdraw, there may
be a risk of crowd harassment.
nadhafi will be influenced by a number of factors:
-- Fears of his own and his country's safety. These will
trigger his survival instinct, inclining him to pull
back and seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
-- Qadhafi may turn to the Soviets for advice and for some
sort of guarantee of Libya's safety.
-- Oadhafi may also turn to such allies as he possesses in
the area for assurances of support--notably the Syrians,
but also other members of the Steadfastness Front (South
Yemen, the PLO, Algeria) and the Tripartite Agreement
(Ethiopia).
If a private demarche become public, Qadhafi's
psychological need to face down a superpower would be
engaged, escalating the situation dangerously.
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