RESPONSE TO DCI QUERIES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00049R000200310002-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 4, 2007
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 18, 1981
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
Approved For Release 2007/05/08 - CIARDP84B0O049R00020031Q002-9
18 December 1981
RESPONSE TO DCI QUERIES
If the Polish government..makes martial law work and
settles Poland, will it allow the Soviets additional
freedom of action elsewhere?
Stabilization of the situation in Poland would have
some impact on Soviet freedom of action. If the Pol&sh
government's gamble on martial law obviates the
necessity for direct Soviet intervention, Moscow could
stand to gain at least indirectly. R solution to the
Polish crisis would enhance Soviet credibility in any.-
gesture or demonstration of support for Syria against..
Israel, Libya against Egypt, or even Cuba against they
United States. The Soviets may even he tempted to
divert international attention from their vulnerability.
on their t+testern border by stepping up actions in-
Central America. More generally, Soviet policymakers
and planners will he free to turn their attention to
other problems.
Soviet freedom of maneuver elsewhere will continue
to be circumscribed, however, at least in some measure,
by the following:
Approved For Release 2007/05/06,: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200310002-9
CONFIDENTIAL
grain and the credits to finance them.
-- The prospect of a costly arms race with the
-- A stagnant economy, with. serious problems in the
agricultural and consumer goods sectors, and a growing
need to rely on the West for imports of technology and
both strategic and intermediate-range
-- Soviet actions already are in part responses to
United States in
nuclear arms.
regional developments which will be unaffected by-events
in Poland.
-- The need to sustain a Western commitment to=
detente, and to avoid provoking greater US military
support for China.
law measures, the root causes of the Polish crisis=-4
fossilized central economy, and the onus of massivei
Z:' t
widespread citizen disaffection with the.PUWP, a
eliminated.
Approved For Release 2d67/05/06 ; C14-RPP84BOO049ROO0200310002-9
Is there any relation between the escalation of
leftist activity in Central America, mobilization in
North Korea, Poland, and Afghanistan?
We have no evidence of any direct connection among'
the events in question--escalation of leftist activity
in Central America, mobilization in North Norea,
augmentation of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and the-
deepening crisis in Poland. Recent political and
military actions in those areas suggest less a carefully
coordinated global offensive across a broad front.thhan
relatively isolated developments explicable for the mbst
part in terms of local circumstances and interests.:
-- Moscow almost certainly does-not relish th
prospect of having its military burden in Afghanistan
compounded by the necessity for a military intervene .pn
to quell disturbances In 'Poland.
-- Moscow has:no influence in P'yongyang; it I
unlikely it was consulted during preparations far t
recent mobilization exercise there.
-- Moscow's support for leftist forces in Centra
America is a response to local opportunities, althou;h'.?
it would hardly he adverse to having developments there
divert US and Western attention from events in Poland.
Approved For Release 2007/05106-: C.IA-RDP84B00049R000200310002-9
It is more likely that political leaders in the
third world may take advantage of the preoccupation of
the superpowers in order to advance their interests.
Kim I1-sung, for example, may-believe that this is an
opportune moment for heating up differences on the
Korean peninsula. Central America leftists may also see
an opportunity to escalate their actions in view of
global preoccupation with the Polish crisis. Israel's
annexation of the Golan may have been predicated on the
notion that there would be little international-reaction
at this crucial juncture.
nrafted by:
Analyst, SOWPA/F
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Approved F r eke se 2007/05/06: CIA-RDP84B00049R' 0200310002-9
SUBJECT: Response to DQ Queries
O & 1 - D/SOYA
1 - Ch/PAD
1 - Ch/PA/F
I
2 - PAT) (file)
2 - PA/F (file)
SWAP (l8 nec. 1981)