DISCUSSION PAPER FOR NSC MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200320002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 21, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WashingW. 0 C. 2OS20
December 21, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. VAMCC
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting
Attached is a paper for discussion at this morning's
NSC meeting.
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary
M
RDS-1;;3'1'2/21/01
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f?ewiItd. 12(:0(1/
SECRET
`U.S./Allied Responses to Developments in Poland
In o~der to prevent further deterioration in Poland,
establis the conditions for reconciliation which would
preserve the gains and prospects of reform, and deter the
Soviet Union from further interference, we are confronted with
the necessity to begin now to make difficult choices vis-a-vis
both Warsaw and Moscow. These actions would be taken
unilaterally as well as within NATO and with other key nations.
Our objectives should be (1) to forestall further
deterioration in Poland, and to keep the situation reversible
and reconcilable; and (2) to put the Soviets on notice that we
hold them accountable for Poland and that their complicity has
costs. In pursuing these objectives, we should bear in mind
the need (1) while taking actions against the USSR/Poland, to
keep some measures in reserve as deterrence should the
situation worsen or the Soviets intervene physically; and (2)
to prevent a split in the West of the kind that took place
after the invasion of Afghanistan. If our decisions even on
purely national actions are to achieve their objectives, Wt
must bring the Allies with us.
The following list summarizes actions which already have
been taken and additional steps which we should now consider:
I
A. ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN (in NSC memorandum to the President of
Decembe 9
We have:
1) suspended shipment of remaining 6,000 tons of surplus
dairy products to Poland;
2) suspended renewal of export insurance for Po:
31-.activated jnternational organizations (UN SYG, URHM,
ILO) t' weigh in or. human rights questions; ,,_
We have also decided, for the present:
1) to go ahead with humanitarian food aid for Poland
provided we get guarantees from the Polish authorities that we
c;n monitor distribution;
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I 1 4-
2) not to invoke the exceptional circumstances" clause of
the 19B1 Polish debt agreement at this time;
3) not to hold up the International Harvester licerise for
exports to: the Soviet Union;
B. OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN WITHIN A MATS? yr Z-AM
pending consultation with the Allies urther cons i iLtitzm c
our part; (some of these measures are referred to is bSC
memorandum to the President of December 19)
Vie-a-Vis Poland
1) Suspend Polish regczest for :4F ae=bership.
2) Establish tie no ezcepticra" policy for Pot'tnL ha. MCC. .
? t - ?
3) Reconsider allowing Polish fishing fleet access to 3Z.b.
waters.
4) Presidential letter to Jaruzelski
5) Advise banks that we are not invoking the "exceptional
circumstances" clause, and thus are not seeking a default
situation.
6) Seek Papal visit try Us:saK.
Vis-a-Vis the Soviet union/others
1) Letter to Brezhnev making clear that we hold the 1:?S8
accountable for its obvious role in Polish sttuattoo a t)%at
we are z1eviewing entire relationship accordingly.
2) Inform Soviets that ,3enuary 26-28 Haig-Gromylco meeting
is unde# review in light of Polish developments.
3) riefly but publicly recall Ambassador Hartcaa-tor
consult tionsj
4) Suspend negotiations on a new maritime agreement and
impose +trict port access regime when current agreement expires
Decembe 31: i
5) tefuse to seta new date for talks on a long-tens gzait~
egreeme~ f~
SECRET
I (
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SECRET
51 Seek Acapid ratification in NATO capital.a r4 Spbr.Ssh
Alliance membership. ` ?'
7) Suspend Aeroflot flights to the U.S.
8) Work with the Allies to seek a halt to the expo=t ct oil.
and gas equipment to the Soviet Union.
9) Reconsider the International Harvester license ter salt
of combine technology ttYhe license has already 'Leer. issush).
10) Reconsider issuance of an export license to Caterpillar
for 200 pipelayers.
1) Add oolisb situation to
exports to for a vnfoz.
tightening of COCOM co
12) High-level trip to consult with Allies, Japanese.
Chinese.
13) Call for UNSC/UNGA action.
14) Warn other Warsaw Pact countries.
C. ADDITIONAL ALLIANCE STEPS WE SHOULD BEGIN NOW TO CONSIDER
Some of the stepa listed above are included in the 'e u'
of sanctions approved in NATO for consideration iii Lt-mm ,.'4 .t 4t
assi.ve Soviet intervention in Poland. The tollowing it
contains all remais'.itng elements of the NATQ-agctf3 garcaz'a
they are directed fundamentally at the Soviet Union. It should
bie noted that, i le ma pcsi`r emergency CSCE meeting or. Poland -- this variant .a; nat
!en di scusped in EATO)'
4) Make protest 6ema:rr'Y'1-s J&Y'PYrr b'15 as appYppsiaZs&.
S) Conduct extensive campaigns of public condemnation.
6) Recall of ambassadors for consultations.
7). Postpone resqpption of 1!h'P negotiations, now sat foz
3nuary 12 (this is technically a U.S. unilateral ac)--snv. .rrra ..?_.?
squires Allied support).
B)'Suspend 'MBFR' negotiations.
9)i Suspend all exchanges of high level visits with Warsaw
act states participating in repression, or intervention in
gland.
10) Impose additional restrictions on Soviet and other
srticipating Warsaw Pact embassies and orgenizatiosas,
ncluding limits on travel and staff (i.e., perhaps impose
gual ceilings).
2.) Suspend major cultural, academic, scientific and
thletic exchanges rind events and, if applicable ar+dt
ecessaryi the execution of cultural agreements.
Economic Measures
1), Embargo on exports to the Soviet Union affecting all reap
ontracts for exports.'
2)1 Denial of new official credits, credit guarantees an&
redit insurance for exports to the Soviet Union.
3) Restrictions on'Soviet.commercia,l aviation to and from
ther Allied countries.
4.) Re$trictiors.on Soviet use of Allied ports arA of Allied
se of th~'Tr,Ans-Siberian land bridge.
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 5) Commitment to accelerate review of proposals to tighten
ng-term COCOM restrictions on technology transfer to the
-Viet Union.
6) Redpction of Soviet non-diplomatic, commercial
!presentet*on.
7) Suspension of participation in Siberian natural gas
-oj ect .
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SECRET
WASj IINGTON
December 19, 1981
Poland
The discussion this morning will be broken down into three parts.
You will be requested to make decisions on the following points:
I. Rescheduling Polish Debt
A. Should the U.S. invoke the "exceptional circumstances"
clause of the 1981 debt agreement? "Exceptional circum-
stances" is having a country refuse to give an extension
on credit owed them.
B. Assuming the U.S. commercial banks are not paid, should
the U.S. government communicate to the banks its desire
not to have default proceedings at this time.
1. Contact leading banks and express U.S. desire
to negotiate.
2. Contact leading banks and indicate U.S. government
not invoking "exceptional circumstances".
II. Food Aid to Poland
A. Last April we sold $71 million worth of dried milk
and butter to Poland. Approximately 1000- has not been delivered.
Should that be stopped?
B. CARE has a program to distribute tens of thousands
of CARE packages to the elderly and infirm. Should we
hold up shipments on this until we have guarantees that
we can monitor its distribution?
III. Economic Measures
Against Poland
A. Take action to suspend Polish request for membership
in IMF.
B. Reconsider allowing Polish fishing fleet access to
U.S. waters.
C. Seek Allies' agreement as a "no exception" policy for
Poland in COCOM.
D. Suspend renewal of export insurance for Poland by The
Ex-Im Bank.
SECRET
REVIEW ON DECEMBER 19, 1987
CLASSIFIED BY ADMIRAL NANCE ;
i9 m __ 4
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? SECRET I -2-
Against USSR
A. Suspend negotiations indefinitely as a maritime agreement.
B. Refuse to set a new date for talks or a long-term grain
agreement.
C. Encourage Western banks not to lend $200 million Soviets
now want to borrow.
D. Add the Polish situation to our arguments for a major
tightening of COCOM controls in exports to the Soviets.
E. Work with our Allies to seek a halt to the export of
oil and gas equipment to the Soviets.
F. Reconsider the International Harvester and Caterpillar
export licenses.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
December 21, 1981
is .
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. i1? CF
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Discussion Paper for NSC Meeting
paper for discussion at this morning's
Attached is a pap
NSC meeting
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Discussion Paper
SECRET
RDS-;L, 3 L2/1i/u1
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.SECRET
U.S./Allied Res onses to Developments in Polan4
In cider' to prevent further deterioration in Polar..,
establish the conditions for reconciliation which would
preserves thej gains and -prospects of reform, and deter the
Soviet Union from further interference, we are confronted with
the necessity to begin now to make difficult choices vis-a-vis
both Warsaw and Moscow. These actions would be taken
unilatera3ly as wel3 as within NATO and with other key nations.
Our objectives should be (1) to forestall further
deterioration in PolalId, and to keep the situation reversible
and reconcilable; and (2) to put the Soviets on notice that we
-'Hold them accountable for Poland and that their complicity has
costs. In pursuing these objectives, we should bear in mind
the need: (1) while taking actions against the USSR/Poland, to
keep some measures in reserve as deterrence should the
situation worsen or the Soviets intervene physically; and (2)
to prevent a split in the West of the kind that took place
after the invasion of Afghanistan. If our decisions even on.
purely national actions are to achieve their objectives. ;+e-
must bring the Allies with us.
The following list summarizes actions which already have
been taken and 'additional 'steps which we should now consider.
A. ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN (in NSC memorandum to the Presideft of
Decembers 19
We have;
1) suspended shipment of remaining 6,000 tons of surplus
dairy products to Poland;,
2) suspended renewal of export insurance for Poland;
3) .activated international organizations (UN SYG, UtAR C,
ILO) t; weigh in or. human rights cjueations;
We have also decided, for the presents
1) to qo ahead with humanitarian food aid for Poland
p3:ovided we get guarantees from the Polish authorities that we
cnn monitor distribution;
SECRET
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2) not to invoke' the "exceptional circumstances" clause of
the 1981 Polish 3ebt agreement at this time;
3) not to hold tip the International Ba venter license for
exports to the Soviet Union-
B. OTHER ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN WITHIN A HAT?r ::%- DZ: Q-s
z~
pending consultation with the Allies further cons
our park` (some of these measures are referred to i:t :CSC
memorandum-to the Pre.ident of December 19)
Vis-a-vis Poland
1) Suspend Pali b; reguest .or 1!'F re=`rership.
2) Establish t,;-e ex=?Pt:-_n-s" policy 4c. Pc.L' . Lix.Mr-".
3) Reconsider' allowing Polish fishing fleet access to V.S.
4) Presidential letter to Jaruzelski
5) Advise banks that we are not invoicing the "exceptional
circumstances" clause, and thus are not seeking a default
situation.:
6) Seek Papal visit
Vis-a-Vis the Soviet Unlorlothers
1) Letter to Brezhnev na3ting clear that we hold; tte .T2S -
accountable for its obvious tole in Polish situation .a~ tl-azt
we are reviewing entire relationship accordingly.
2) Inform Soviets that -January
uncle; review: in light of Polish
25-28 Haig-Gro:ayko teetiag
developments.
3) briefly but publicly recall Ambassador
consultations/_ - -.--
4) Suspend negotiations on
impose strict port access regime
necember 31.
5) Refuse
acjreemer-t. !
E;
Hartarart -for
a new sraritime agreement and
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when current agreement expires
new date for talks on a long-te%,m greirs
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SECRET
61 Seek wapid rati ?ication in NATO capita's rA S, tar.
Alliance membership. ?
f 71 Suspend Aeroflot flights to the U . S .
8) Work with` the Allies to seek a halt to tlbxe expo='L cNt nil"'
and gas equipxvent to the Soviet Union.
9) Reconsider the International Harvester licenses tax sale
of combine technology tthe license has already taa::
10) Reconsider issuance of an export license to Catexpillar
for 200 pipe3ay ers.
11) Add Polish situation to out arguments for a ma3s>r
tightening of COCOM 'controls on exports to t-he Sov3e2: Unioo.
12) High-level trip to consult with Allies, Japanese.
Chinese.
13) Call for UNSC/UNGA action.
14) Warn other Warsaw Pact countries.
C.. ADDITIONAL ALLIANCE STEPS WE SHOULD BEGIN' NOW O CONSIDER
' Some` of the steps listed above are included in the 'Imeau`
of son Lt11:1 =e approved in NATO for cons ideraktirrr, 3Ti ='a `L & c
massive Soviet intervention in Poland. The fol1awin9 list
contains all remais-.ing elements of the IdAT{ +~cL=