REVALIDATION OF LIBYAN PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200370035-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: January 31, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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? i
National Intelligence Council
DDI 811-82
31 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Charles E. Waterman
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Revalidation of Libyan Planning
1. Attached is a composite paper put together by State/SP designed
to revalidate or reconsider previous NSC decisions regarding policy on
Libya. We have concurred in the substance of the paper, as it fairly
adequately presents the current situation regarding Libyan terrorism,
and outlines the prospective costs to us of proceeding with economic or
military sanctions. A Libyan Task Force meeting will consider the paper on
the afternoon of 1 February, and a NSC meeting (principals only) is
scheduled for 4 February.
2. The paper recommends the following decisions be taken, with which
we did not concur or non-concur as they are policy and not intelligence
matters:
a. A ban on imports of Libyan petroleum, and either
concurrently or later a full or partial export ban,
be implemented without further Libyan provocation.
b. Various military options proposed by the JCS be adopted
after a Libyan terrorist action, with due regard for the
degree to which Libyan responsibility is ambiguous.
3. I have no problem with the latter, but personally recommend a CIA
position against the automatic imposition of economic sanctions be taken at
the NSC and perhaps initially in the Task Force. Reasons follow:
This Memo is classified
SECRET in its entirety.
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVW ON JAN 2002
DERIVED FM MULTIPLE
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a. All concerned acknowledge the proposed economic
measures are essentially devoid of serious impact
on Libya. The study concedes this fact, and
then justifies doing it on grounds of morality and
to stop US funding of Libyan terrorism. This
reasoning is at least consistent and perhaps
emotionally satisfying; but in my judgment not a
basis on which to take actions without beneficial
impact.
b. The study then justifies the proposed actions as designed to
"end Libyan support for terrorism, inhibit Libya from
undermining governments friendly to the US, and to
influence Libya to stop assassination efforts." These
happy results will not flow from automatic economic
sanctions, and represent a logical disconnect in the
report.
c. On the more practical side, any economic sanctions we
impose will take some toll in relations with the West
Europeans and moderate Arabs. While this study accurately
presents this toll as relatively minimal, ineffective
actions of this type will not enhance our standing with
these states on other issues of importance (i.e. Polish-
related sanctions on the Soviets, Palestinian autonomy
talks, etc.).
4. CIA's psychological assessment of Qadhafi clearly states he responds
best to discreet pressure, and feels compelled to render a belligerent response
when publicly challenged. Lip service is given this analysis in the study,
but its policy recommendations ignore it.
5. I recommend a position on the policy issue which would include the
following:
a. No automatic implementation of economic measures without
further provocation.
- He must permanently cease international terrorist
support directly or indirectly.
He must cease destabilization of Sudan and Somalia.
- If he does not cease such activity, he faces escalating
hostility from us of all varieties.
SECRET
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SECRET
c. Deliberate commencement by CIA of internal destabilizing
activity designed to be psychologically threatening
to Qadhafi.
6. In essence, I believe he must quietly, and perhaps on more than one
occasion, be informed of our minimum conditions, and results monitored over
a period of several months. Internal destabilizing activity, in the face of
continuing unacceptable activity, would be more effective with Qadhafi
than the proposed overt economic measures, which frankly will appear like
impotent bluster.
7. I would appreciate guidance on what position to assume, if any,
at the 1 February Task Force meeting.
r& ar es waterman
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 Approved For Release 2007/06/25: CIA-RDP84B00049R000200370035-7
DDI 811-82
31 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Revalidation of Libyan Planning
Attachment:
Revalidation Paper
Distribution:
1 - DCI w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - ER w/att
1 - DDI w/att
1 - C/NIC w/att
1 - C/NE/DDO w/att
1 - D/NESA w/att
1 - DDI Registry w/o att
2 - NIO/NESA (1 w/att; 1 w/o att)
1 - ED/CIA w/att
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