GHANA: RAWLINGS TAKES CHARGE AGAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400093-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2007
• Sequence Number: 93
• Publication Date: January 27, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ghana: Rawlir>!as Takes
Charge Again
The structure and direction of Ghana's new govern-
ment still is uncertain nearly a month after a New
Year's Eve coup that brought former Flight Lieuten-
ant Jerry Rawlings to power for the second time in
two years. Rawlings, a self-professed populist, has
proclaimed a "Holy War" against corruption and has
promised to involve the public in still undefined plans
to transform Ghana's social and economic order.
Rawlings has sought to assure Western aid donors
and foreign investors by pledging to honor Ghana's
existing international obligations and by promising a
policy of genuine nonalignment. But the new regime's
quick decision to resume relations with Libya and the
presence of radicals in the government have raised
major questions.
The government is experiencing difficulty attracting
prominent civilians to serve and most Ghanaians are
showing little enthusiasm toward Rawlings. No major
opposition to the new regime has surfaced, but atti-
tudes in the military are divided at best. Unless
Rawlings moves soon to assert firm leadership and
take concrete measures to reverse Ghana's disastrous
20-year economic decline, further unrest may erupt.
As the government attempts to grapple with economic
and internal security problems, it may become more
leftist than its predecessors. This could galvanize
ambivalent moderates in the military into anti-Rawl-
ings activity.
Background to the Coup
Jerry Rawlings ruled Ghana from June to September
1979 in a government made up of junior officers and
enlisted men. His coup in 1979 was a direct response
to the economic mismanagement and corruption that
marked the previous eight years of military rule in
Ghana. He quickly became a folk hero to Ghana's
military and civilian have-nots by championing a
"revolution" to stamp out corruption, extravagance,
and malpractices that had brought Ghana to the brink
of collapse.
In practice, Rawlings produced few results. His popu-
larity eroded, and the regime became increasingly
bogged down in tribal infighting. His government
barely held together long enough to meet the target
date for return to civilian rule-a date set by an
earlier regime that Rawlings decided to honor.
Soon after handing over power to an elected civilian
government led by President Limann, Rawlings came
to regret his decision, blaming Limann for Ghana's
worsening economic crisis. Several coup plots alleged-
ly involving Rawlings were uncovered during Li-
mann's rule, including one shortly before the actual
takeover, but the civilian government feared arresting
him because of his popularity. By late 1981, Limann,
a colorless civil servant, had come under growing
public criticism for failing to halt infighting and
corruption in the ruling party and for avoiding long-
overdue economic reforms demanded by the IMF.
Secret
ALA AR 82-003
27 January 1982
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The New Regime's Aims
Rawlings is no less obsessed than before with the
plight of Ghana's have-nots. He has repeated his
promise to raise the standard of living and to rid the
country of corruption and mismanagement. In his
first major speech two days after the coup, Rawlings
dwelled on his commitment to restructure Ghanaian
society by involving the people in decisionmaking.F
Rawlings appears to be trying to avoid the mistakes of
his first regime. His attempts to project a moderate
image and promises to follow a nonaligned foreign
policy are calculated efforts to avoid alienating the
Western investors and economic aid donors. Rawl-
ings's behavior in 1979, particularly the summary
executions of several former heads of state and other
prominent Ghanaians, aroused Western and African
ire and prompted Nigeria to cut off oil supplies.F_
New Government Structure
Plans call for the government to be controlled by a
seven-man Provisional National Defense Council led
by Rawlings. Four more members may be appointed
later. The only prominent moderate to join the council
is Chief of Defense Staff Brig. Gen. Nunoo Mensah.
The other five members, three civilians and two
enlisted men, are obscure, mediocre radicals. The
council is tribally and regionally balanced-Rawlings
is the only Ewe tribesman, for example-but its day-
to-day operations and the influence of its members are
unclear.
The two enlisted men represent the newly formed
Armed Forces Defense Committees, one of several
undefined structures established by the regime to
defend the "gains of the revolution" and to expose
sabotuers and counterrevolutionaries. Other groups
include Workers Defense Committees and People's
Defense Committees, which appear to be Ghanaian
versions of similar structures found in Libya and other
radical African states.
People's Tribunals are being formed outside existing
laws to enforce the regime's anticorruption drive.
Plans call for public trials of former government
officials but apparently not executions. There is still a
possibility, however, that Rawlings will not be able to
avoid a witch hunt, particularly as sentiment grows to
deal harshly with former members of the Limann
government.
Key Figures
Rawlings, a 34-year-old former Air Force pilot and
the son of a Scottish father and a mother from the
Ewe tribe, appears to be making all the major deci-
sions. Although supposedly more aware politically
than during his 1979 regime, Rawlins still is said to
be ideologically immature
hi le frustrated---
with the gap between rich and poor and the collapse of
the Ghanaian economy, he has never developed ade-
quate plans for rectifying these ills.
Rawlings rebuffed Libyan and Ethiopian delegations
that came to Accra shortly after his coup in 1979, and
he took offense at Fidel Castro's belittling of his
"revolution" during a visit to Havana for the Non-
aligned summit later that year. Despite his early snub
of Libya, Rawlings maintained loose contacts with
Libya after he left office, visiting Trinoli in 1980 and
praising Libyan society.
In addition to Nunoo Mensah, Rawlings's other key
military associate is Army Commander Arnold
Quainoo, who is of mixed Ewe-Akan blood. Both men
served in Rawlings's first government but were forci-
bly retired by Limann. They are regarded as moder-
ates and pragmatists who are well disposed toward the
Nunoo Mensah and Quainoo have served as primary
contacts between the new government and Western
diplomats, and have expressed concern over the possi-
bility of Libyan inroads in Ghana should Western
economic aid falter. Nunoo Mensah and Quainoo
apparently believe they can keep the new regime on a
moderate course, but there is some evidence they do
not get along well together. Quainoo, unlike Nunoo
Mensah, has not been appointed to the ruling council.
Little is known of the other five members of the
council other than they appear to owe their positions
to their roles as key representatives of military and
civilian interest groups. Reverend Vincent Kwabena
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Secret
Damuah, a leftist Catholic priest and possibly a
Fante, reportedly takes the Church's social teachings
seriously. He was a vocal critic of corruption during
the Nkrumah regime (1957-66) and was briefly im-
prisoned by Nkrumah. Army Warrant Officer Class
One Joseph Adjei Buadi, Coordinator of the Armed
Forces Defense Committees and apparently an
Ashanti tribesman, has been in the Army since 1964
and served as Rawlings's aide in 1979. Army Sgt.
Daniel Alolga Akata-Pore, secretary of the Armed
Forces Defense Committees, is a northerner. He was
involved in Rawlings's first coup but was subsequently
on the periphery of Rawlings's inner circle. He at-
tended law school following his forced retirement
from the Army by the Limann government.
Jaochim Amartee Kwei, a radical trade unionist and
member of the Ga tribe, was dismissed by the Limann
government for leading a wildcat strike and a one-day
occupation of parliament in 1980. He does not get
along with current labor leaders and may be behind
efforts to intimidate the leadership of Ghana's Trade
Union Congress, which represents 520,000 workers
and which has traditionally eschewed politics. Kwei is
said to be close to one of Rawlings's leftist advisers-
Tsatsu Tsikata. Chris Bukari Atim, reportedly a
northern Builsa tribesman, was a student leader in
Ghana's leftist National Union of Ghanaian Students
before his graduation in 1979. He subsequently be-
came an editor of a pro-Rawlings newsletter that had
an anti-Western and anti-American slant]
Although not on the council, other figures appear
influential as well. Ben Forjoe, a former civil servant,
is in charge of revamping internal security and prob-
ably will be named Minister for Internal Affairs
Forjoe has
selected Kofi Quantson, a former director of security
under Rawlings, as his assistant. Both men are consid-
ered with moderate views.
They are suspicious of the Communist Bloc and can
be expected to monitor closely Libyan activities in
Ghana.
Rawlings's closest leftist advisers probably are the
Tsikata brothers, although they are not officially part
of the new government. Kojo and Tastsu Tsikata are
Ewe tribesmen and cousins of Rawlings. Kojo Tsikata
is a retired military officer and a self-styled Marxist
and African revolutionary with wide connections in
militant circles at home and abroad. He maintains
close contacts with the Cubans and has urged Rawl-
ings to adopt Cuba and Ethiopia as models for Ghana.
Tsatsu Tsikata is a Marxist-oriented law instructor at
the University of Ghana. He was frequently on the
lecture circuit during the Limann regime, propound-
ing Rawlings's populist and "revolutionary" virtues.
Popular Reactions
Most Ghanaians have shown little enthusiasm for the
new government. Although Limann was widely fault-
ed as a weak and lackluster leader, the public appears
to realize that Rawlings probably offers no better
alternative-given his past record. Some radical 25X1
fringe groups have expressed support for the regime,
hoping to gain influence, but most prominent moder-
ates have adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
Middle class professionals, who fear they have the 25X1
most to lose under Rawlings, have criticized the
People's Courts and have called on the regime to
return Ghana to civilian rule by next year. Rawlings
seems to envision a prolonged stay in power this time
and has given no public clues about his views on
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The leaders of the Trade Union Congress have reluc-
tantly expressed lukewarm support for the new regime
and have organized some demonstrations on Rawl-
ings's behalf. They probably hope these actions will
forestall interference with trade unions and help
preserve the organization's independence.
The jubilation among lower ranking military person- 25X1
nel that accompanied Rawlings's takeover in 1979 is 25X1
not evident this time around. Retired soldiers involved
in the coup and the small group of enlisted men who
rallied shortly after the start of the coup are loyal to 25X1 25X1
Rawlings. But most military personnel are apathetic,
and they remain a potentially volatile force.
Many officers who blame Rawlings for the split
between officers and enlisted men in 1979 are not
pleased at Rawlings's return. Rawlings's supporters
on the Provisional National Defense Council are
keeping a close watch on the officer corps, which so
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influenced radical regime in Ghana with alarm.
Rawlings has sent a goodwill delegation to Upper
Volta, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria in an effort to
assure these countries that Ghana will honor the
commitments of the previous government and that his
a young lieutenant,
Foreign Responses
Libya quickly recognized the new government, and
offered to aid it by sending troops and food. Rawlings
rejected the military help, but expressed interest in
economic aid. He quickly announced the resumption
of diplomatic relations that had been severed in
November 1980 by the Limann government. This
move probably was motivated in part by his desire to
have an alternative oil supplier in case of a possible
cutoff by Nigeria. Although Rawlings has several
advisers with pro-Libyan sympathies, he has been
careful thus far in his dealings with the Libyans,
knowing that many Ghanaians, including those in the
military, would not welcome Libyan meddling.
The USSR is taking an optimistic view of the new
regime, blaming Ghana's economic and social prob-
lems on previous pro-Western governments and
launching a disinformation campaign against the
United States. Encouraged by the resumption of
diplomatic relations with Libya, the Soviets would
like to establish cordial relations with the new govern-
ment and regain the position they once enjoyed in
Ghana under radical President Nkrumah.
Western governments have been deliberately circum-
spect toward the new regime. While disappointed at
the demise of democratic civilian rule, they hope that
by not cutting off their economic aid they can con-
vince Rawlings to adhere to a moderate and non-
aligned course. Fears persist, however, that Rawlings
will turn to radical solutions in his quest for a "new
Ghana."
All neighboring states are taking a low-key approach
until the Rawlings government is established and its
orientation becomes clear. Nigeria supplies over 80
percent of Ghana's petroleum and hopes that by
continuing its oil shipments Rawlings will be less
inclined to turn to the Libyans or Soviets for support.
Most of Ghana's pro-Western neighbors are vulner-
able to Libyan meddling and would view a Libyan-
regime wants to continue normal relations.
Economic Woes
Economic conditions were the catalyst for the coup
and Rawlings must begin to take action soon if he
wants to gain public confidence in his regime. Rawl-
ings is likely to have difficulty lining up economic
advisers and forming a recovery program for Ghana's
deteriorating financial situation. With foreign ex-
change nearly exhausted and world markets for its
primary exports depressed, Ghana must look to out-
side sources for money to meet daily operating ex-
penses. Only an agreement with the IMF can bring in
the necessary balance-of-payments support; such an
accord could pave the way for some Western donor
aid and up to $275 million from the Fund itself.
Ghana's only immediate hope, however, is to get the
82,000 metric tons of cocoa now upcountry to port, a
move that would bring in about $160 million.
The supply of goods in the marketplace is drying up
because Rawlings's call for reduced prices on staples
has heightened consumer demand but lowered seller's
profits. Ghana is unable to increase imports because
most banks are unwilling to issue new letters of
credit-the country already is roughly $100 million in
arrears on foreign exchange remittances. Moreover,
Ghana owes Nigeria $120 million for past oil deliv-
eries and currently has a supply of only two months'
worth of gasoline and one month of crude oil.
If Rawlings cannot do something soon to improve
living conditions, the public may lose patience as
consumer goods disappear and other problems remain
unrelieved. Unrest could again develop, forcing Rawl-
ings to become more leftist in a search for radical
solutions to the country's economic crisis. If Rawlings
turns to his radical advisers and attempts to galvanize
the people with revolutionary measures, moderate
military officers may believe it necessary to take
matters into their own hands
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