CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: THE REGIME'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400094-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 94
• Publication Date: January 27, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central African Republic:
The Regime's Problems
and Prospects ~~
The pro-Western government of General Andre Ko-
lingba, which took over in September from the hapless
Dacko regime, faces growing criticism and dissent
inspired by economic and tribal problems. Although
the government's difficulties still appear manageable,
they threaten economic recovery efforts, could lead to
serious divisions in the military, and could increase
the country's vulnerability to Libyan-backed subver-
sion. Prospects for survival will depend on his ability
to placate political and tribal opposition, to progress
toward economic reconstruction, and to retain French
confidence in his leadership. French economic and
military backing is crucial to the new regime's surviv-
al. At present, Paris sees no alternative to Kolingba,
although under more ideal circumstances the Mitter-
rand government would prefer to be dealing with a
civilian regime. n
France is the Western country with the most direct
interest in the CAR, a former colony which received
its independence in 1960. Paris, viewing the CAR as
strategically important to its interests in the Central
African region, maintains a sizable contingent of
French troops in the country. The CAR shares bor-
ders with Chad and Sudan, which have been active
targets of Qadhafi's machinations, and serves as a
buffer state in French eyes against further Libyan
adventurism. The French military presence in the
CAR is particularly reassuring to mineral-rich Gabon
and Zaire, where France has significant economic
interests to protect.
Background to Kolingba's Takeover
Army Chief of Staff Kolingba reluctantly assumed
power on 1 September 1981 with the apparent approv-
al of the French and of then President David Dacko.
Kolingba claimed he planned to restore political and
economic order, a goal that had eluded Dacko. Dacko,
President from 1960 to 1966, was restored to power in
September 1979 by French troops, ending the tyranni-
cal rule of Emperor Bokassa. But Dacko's poor health
and gradual loss of political strength left him unable
President ojthe Central Africa Republic, Gen.
Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba
to cope with deteriorating political and economic
conditions, and he quickly lost the support of the
Mitterrand government.
Kolingba inherited the results of 15 years of political
and economic deterioration. Bokassa left a legacy of
political division, massive corruption, economic mis-
management, and abuse of human rights. Annual
declines in diamond and cotton production, rising
unemployment, and falling government revenues since
the late 1960s left the economy in a shambles.
Successive governments were unable to pay civil
service salaries without French budgetary support.
This led to a severe deterioration in the investment
climate, and foreign aid donors grew reluctant to give
assistance.
Kolingba also stepped into a bitter and divisive politi-
cal struggle marked by an uneasy standoff between
the previous regime and a coalition of opposition
Secret
ALA AR 82-003
27 January 1982
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parties. Political unrest had accelerated after the
March 1980 presidential election, in which Dacko
narrowly defeated the main opposition leader-Ange
Patasse-in an allegedly rigged contest. This led to
riots in Bangui, and Dacko's subsequent suspension of
legislative and municipal elections aroused further
discontent. Mounting opposition pressure for a role in
government culminated in the bombing in July of a
Bangui movie theater by a small, Libyan-backed
CAR political party. The situation was further polar-
ized by the banning of two major parties, the threat-
ened arrest of the charismatic Patasse, and the opposi-
tion's call for Dacko's resignation.
The New Regime
Kolingba, 45, is president of the ruling Military
Committee for National Recovery as well as Chief of
State, Defense Minister, and military Chief of Staff.
After eight years in the French Army, Kolingba rose
through the ranks of the CAR Army, serving under
Bokassa and Dacko. During his military career, Ko-
lingba gained a reputation as a straightforward,
apolitical soldier loyal to the government of the day.
Kolingba is a member of the small, southern Yakoma
tribe, and Central Africans initially welcomed his
leadership as a long overdue change from the political
predominance of southern M'Baka tribesmen under
Dacko and Bokassa. Lacking charisma, he remains
little known and has stayed out of the limelight as
much as possible. Moreover, Kolingba is a cautious
man, not prone to precipitate or radical action.)
Each of the 23 officers on the Military Committee for
National Recovery also holds a cabinet post. Kolingba
initially chose them because they represented a tribal,
regional, and political balance; he warned them
against partisan political activities. Although ostensi-
bly loyal to Kolingba, many Committee members
retain varying degrees of sympathy for one or another
of CAR's opposition groups. Several have been criti-
cized for lacking the technical expertise and exper-
ience to tackle the country's economic problems, and
for their excessive concern with salary and spoils of
office. Kolingba himself apparently favors a collegial
style of rule and does not usually make unilateral
decisions.
Upon assuming power, Kolingba suspended the con-
stitution and banned all political party activity. He
has promised to restore civilian rule once his regime is
satisfied that order and stability have been reestab-
lished. He has no political ambitions and does not
foresee an extended stay in power. Although he has
presented no timetable for a return to civilian rule,
Kolingba has expressed a desire to begin a dialogue
with leaders of the political groups.
The new regime's first priority has been to restore
investor confidence and revitalize the economy
through austerity and anticorruption programs. Ko-
lingba has pressed for economic and technical assist-
ance from a variety of Western and other nations in
an effort to reduce a budget deficit and to supplement
the country's traditonal dependence on France. The
new government, believing that it faces a serious
subversive threat from Libya, has also sought in-
creased foreign military assistance.
Political Problems
The goal of enforced political tranquility has so far
eluded the Kolingba regime. The initial wait-and-see
attitude of Central Africans toward the new regime
has given way to accusations by opposition groups of
tribal favoritism and autocratic government and to
countercharges by the regime of disloyalty in the
government. An atmosphere of mutual distrust and
paranoia is reappearing in Bangui, although not yet to
the extent that existed under Dacko. The regime's
planned austerity and anticorruption campaigns have
run into controversy that threatens to heighten the
political tensions.
Leaders of banned opposition groups (see chart) have
begun to complain that Kolingba's failure to submit a
timetable for return to civilian rule is deliberate, and
that he is forming a regime dominated by fellow
Yakoma tribesmen. A number of Yakoma cabinet
ministers continue to press Kolingba to expand the
tribe's role in government. Although Kolingba ap-
pears reluctant to consolidate Yakoma dominance, his
appointment of several fellow tribesmen to advisory
posts has fed tribal jealousies. Tribes of the northern
savannah region-the Kabas, Bayas, Bandas, and
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Opposition Groups in the Central African Republic
Orientation
Central African People's Liberation Movement
(MLPC) a
Leader: Ange Patasse (Kaba tribe)
Independent Grouping for Political Reflection and
Action (LIRA) a
Leader: Francois Pehoua (Yakoma tribe)
Movement for Democracy and Independence
(MDI) a
Leader: Francois Gueret (Yakoma tribe)
Revolutionary Action Group (GAR)
Leaders: Julien Zarambaud-Assingambi
(Yakoma tribe) and Guy Darlan (Banziri tribe)
Central African National Liberation Movement
(MCLN)
Leader: Rodolf Idi Lala (tribe unknown)
Oubangui Patriotic Front-Labor Party
(FPO-PT)
Leader.? Abel Goumba (tribe unknown)
Largest group. Bases its influence on northern tribal resentment of southern rule.
Leader uses socialist jargon, but is regarded as an opportunist. Calls for an early return
to civilian rule and multiparty politics. Suspected of receiving Libyan financial
support.
Personal vehicle of its leader who finished third in March 1981 presidential election. A
moderate, with no defined political program except for favoring a return to civilian
rule.
Small and most moderate group. Seeks a return to civilian rule. Leader draws support
mainly from civil servants and educated residents of Bangui.
Newest and smallest group. Composed of low-level government functionaries. Trying
to increase public awareness of the need to return to civilian rule by circulating
clandestine tracts.
Small, radical group reportedly receiving Libyan financial aid and guerrilla training.
Claims responsibility for 1981 terrorist bombing in Bangui.
Small and most radical party. Espouses Marxist-Leninism. Suspected by government
of receiving Soviet aid and some Libyan military training.b
a Remnants of political parties officially recognized by the former
Dacko regime and later banned by General Kolingba.
b Abel Goumba was recently reported to have been appointed rector
of the University of Bangui by the Kolingba government.
Mandjias-remain frustrated by the traditional domi-
nance of the southern-based M'Bakas and Yakomas,
who live in the "riverian" region along the Oubangui
This north-south rivalry could boost the political
fortunes of the charismatic Patasse. Patasse, the
major would-be contender for national leadership, is a
Kaba tribesman from the north and leader of the
largest opposition group, the Central African People's
Liberation Movement. Patasse's popularity is based
primarily on northern tribal resentment of southern
domination.
A proponent of African socialism, Patasse has a
reputation as a leftist. He also favors an early return
to civilian rule and to multiparty politics. Patasse has
remained in self-imposed exile in France since late
September, probably fearing arrest should he return
home. While abroad, he has cultivated contacts with
various European socialist parties in an apparently
unsuccessful search for support in opposing the Ko-
lingba government. He also has sought to establish his
credentials as a moderate with the French, but contin-
ues to be regarded by Paris as an unpredictable
political opportunist without a real program. ~~
Economic Challenges
At the time of Dacko's ouster, the country was in a
downward economic and financial spiral, character-
ized by declining per capita income, growing depend-
ence on imported food, ballooning budgetary and
trade deficits, and a degenerating transportation sys-
tem. The Kolingba government was immediately
forced to seek new lines of credit and foreign invest-
ment, and to try economic austerity measures to
secure continued French and international aid.
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Kolingba, however, has encountered growing public
resistance to his austerity program. The first crucial
measure announced by the new regime-put off by
the Dacko government for fear it would backfire
politically-was to reduce the civil service payroll,
which in the past absorbed two-thirds of the CAR's
budget. This action has prompted accusations of
forced retirements based on tribal bias and could
result in antigovernment demonstrations by officials
slated for retirement. Other potentially controversial
measures are scheduled reductions in the Army and
among Foreign Ministry personnel serving abroad.
Foreign Affairs: Friends and Foes
The survival of the new government depends on
continued French military and economic support. So
far the Mitterrand government is inclined to back the
regime, seeing no alternative. Although clearly favor-
ing an eventual return to civilian rule, France appears
unwilling to risk further political turmoil by pressing
any time soon for elections.
At the request of President Dacko, France increased
the number of its troops in the country from about
800 to 1,300 following Libya's occupation of Chad in
late 1980. These troops-some 800 at Bouar and 500
in Bangui-provide symbolic support for the CAR,
and serve as a psychological deterrent to Libyan
subversion and as an example of continuing French
commitment to the region.
Paris traditionally has been Bangui's largest source of
economic and financial aid. In 1981, France paid the
civil service salaries and financed one-half of the
CAR's $27 million budget deficit. France, however,
has said it would provide budgetary aid in 1982 only if
Bangui carries out IMF recommendations and some
politically unpopular reforms, such as reduced civil
service employment. Although Paris is likely to pro-
vide short-term assistance, such as month-to-month
payment of civil service salaries, it will continue to
press for stiff economic recovery measures. France
also provides development aid for commercial, agri-
cultural, and transportation projects involving some
425 French technicians.~~
Both Presidents Bongo of Gabon and Mobutu of
Zaire endorsed Kolingba's takeover and have pledged
their backing for his moderate regime. Both leaders
have offered small amounts of financial aid and have
tried to discourage Bangui from renewing relations
with Libya or the Soviets. Mobutu considers Kolingba
a "tribal brother" and the two leaders have developed
a close relationship. Opposition leaders in the CAR
lately have begun to complain that Bangui's close
relations with Gabon and Zaire-both authoritarian,
single-party states-are indicative of Kolingba's un-
willingness to return to democracy.
Relations with Marxist-oriented Congo are strained
by the presence in Brazzaville of CAR dissidents and
by the Congo's recent decision to accept a Libyan
People's Bureau. Followers of Abel Goumba's Ouban-
gui Patriotic Front and some disaffected members of
Bokassa's former imperial guard are exiles in the
Congo. Last year, the Congolese Government expelled
CAR opposition leader Idi Lala, head of the Central
African National Liberation Movement, after he
claimed responsibility for the terrorist bombings in
Bangui in July.
Libya's continuing ambitions in Chad stir Central
African fears over Qadhafi's aim to reduce French
influence in the region. Former President Dacko
broke relations with Tripoli in January 1980, claiming
that Libya was funding antigovernment student pro-
tests. Qadhafi reportedly still gives financial and
military aid to various CAR onoositionists, including
Patasse, Lala, and Goumba.
Patasse took refuge in Tripoli after the French-led
coup that ousted Bokassa and, during his exile in
France, he maintained contacts with the Libyans. His
followers were rumored to have received Libyan
weapons via Chad, and his reluctance to reveal the
source of his group's funds fueled suspicion that he
enjoyed Libyan financing.
paramilitary training.
Lala reportedly maintains a residence in Tripoli and is
rumored to control 200 Libyan-trained Central Afri-
can mercenaries, who were poised in N'Djamena to
infiltrate CAR during Libya's occupation of Chad.
There are some indications that followers of Abel
Goumba have transited Benin en route to Libya for
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Although the Soviets also were expelled from Bangui
in January 1980 by the jittery Dacko regime, Ko-
lingba may opportunistically resume diplomatic ties in
search of additional foreign assistance. The Soviets
had a sizable presence in Bangui during former
Emperor Bokassa's reign. Their assistance, particular-
ly medical and higher education personnel, was val-
ued. Nevertheless, the Central Africans will continue
to be wary of alleged Soviet aid to Goumba's Ouban-
?,~; Patrint;n Frnnt and other meddling by Moscow.
Outlook
The Kolingba regime is facing serious challenges from
tribal and political factionalism in the military gov-
ernment, and from seemingly intractable economic
problems. Thus far, the new President has tried to put
national interests ahead of his own tribal loyalties, but
he has been unable to submerge ethnic, regional, and
political squabbling in his government. His prelimi-
nary steps toward economic reconstruction have met
with public resistance and limited success.
To restore internal cohesion and effectiveness to his
regime, Kolingba will have to recruit badly needed
civilian administrators, remove some opposition sym-
pathizers, and improve the qualifications of his cabi-
net ministers. But these steps will risk worsening
tribal tensions and will boost northern support for
rival leader Patasse. Although Kolingba decreed that
cabinet ministers could not return to the military after
serving in government, discharged ministers could
become a source of political opposition.
The new regime's economic program has been effec-
tive only in stemming further deterioration, and the
search for increased foreign assistance has yielded
limited results. Unpopular austerity measures are
threatening to trigger protests by disgruntled civil
servants and students. Attempts by the political oppo-
sition to exploit this discontent, however, probably
would be undermined by deep divisions between oppo-
sition leaders.
Kolingba also may find it necessary to compromise his
pro-Western orientation by recognizing Libya and the
Soviet Union in a desperate search for foreign aid.
Although Qadhafi has withdrawn his troops from
Chad, deepening tribal and political divisions and
further economic deterioration could offer greater
opportunities for Libyan meddling. French support
seems secure in the short term, but if there were
serious outbreaks of civilian unrest and the Kolingba
regime grew increasingly unstable, France might
press for a return to civilian rule
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Togo The recent coup in neighboring Ghana has heightened President Eyadema's fears
that his 15-year-old, pro-Western regime could fall victim to similar economic and
tribal pressures. He is also apprehensive about Ghana's renewed relations with
Libya and the uncertain political orientation of the new Rawlings regime. Many
former officials of the deposed Limann government have fled to Togo, which could
become a source of friction with Accra.
Tllc'TovO%c1c Ci(1ernmeRt faces public dilsatisfactioR over an un(:ileckcd ccorxmlic
slowcirll~!I, crom?mic milnulnagrment, widespread alrruption, an(i ~cr~istcnt
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