NSC MEETING ON START -- FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000300520002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 19, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAB A NSDD
TAB B Interim Restraints
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TAB C Consensus START Issues
TAB D Mobile ICBMs
TAB E Talking Points on the SALT II Protocol
TAB F Talking Points on Cap on Warheads
TAB G Talking Points on SALT I and II Restraints
TAB H Background paper on Telemetry Denial
TAB I Talking Points on Access to Flight Test Data
TAB J Talking Points on Mobile ICBMs
TAB K Excess Missiles
TAB L Brezhnev's 18 May Speech
State Dept. review completed
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-SYSTEM II
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
? SECRET
May 19, 1982
Ms. Nancy Bearg-Dyke
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Mr. L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Meehan
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Mr. William Schneider
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
Ms. Jacqueline Tillman
Executive Assistant to the
United Nations
Representative to the United Nations
Colonel Charles F. Stebbins
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Joseph Presel
Executive Assistant
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Chief Negotiator
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Executive Secretary
.Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START -- Friday, May 21, 1982
The attached papers on START policy issues have been prepared by the
START Interdepartmental Group in accord with NSDD-33 for discussion
and decision at the National Security Council meeting to be held in
the White House Cabinet Room on Friday, May 21, at 9:30 a.m.
Michael O. Wheeler Ow-
Staff Secretary
SECRET
Review May 19, 2002
Classified and Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
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May 18, 1982
MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: START Papers for NSC Meeting
Attached are three papers prepared by the Inter-
departmental Group on START Policy for review by the NSC
at its May 21 meeting. These papers are:
1) Interim Restraints: We will circulate tomorrow a
revision of the attached paper, incorporating new language
from OSD on Option 3, plus any appropriate alterations to
other options.
2) Consensus START Issues
3) Mobile ICBMs
A series of collateral constraints is under review by
the Interdepartmental Group. On a number of these issues,
there is interagency agreement in principle:
1) There should be counting rules to associate the
number of re-entry vehicles with each missile type, and
to associate missile types with their launchers.
2) There should be a comprehensive disclosure of
agreed baseline data for the parameters limited by START.
However, these and other possible collateral constraints
require further refinement and technical analysis, including
an evaluation of their interrelationships, before a compre-
hensive package or alternative options can be presented for
decision.
The issue of ICBM refire/reconstitution capabilities
also requires additional analysis, including an evaluation
of the verification difficulties and the necessity of
limits on non-deployed missiles.
The IG will in the immediate future prepare analyses of
collateral constraints and the ICBM refire/reconsitution issue,
with the intention of providing recommendations or options to
the NSC in time for decision prior to the opening of START
negotiations.
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary
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It has been U.S. policy during the Reagan Administration
to take no action that would undercut existing SALT agreements
pending the completion of our START policy review provided
the Soviets exercise similar restraint. With our policy review
nearly completed, we must now decide what kind of interim
restraints would best serve our interests after START nego-
tiations begin. There will be substantial interest in some
form of interim restraint from the Congress, our Allies,
and the public as we proceed with START negotiations. A
decision on interim restraints must be consistent with our
position on units of account and therefore has been delayed
until now.
IMPACT OF CURRENT POLICY
Under SALT I Interim Agreement (IA) restraints, both
sides would be required to dismantle submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers; the U.S. would dismantle
retired Polaris launchers while the Soviets would dismantle
deployed submarine launchers.
To comply with SALT II provisions, the Soviets are
observing its limit of 820 multiple warhead (MIRVed)
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the 30 per
year production restriction on the Backfire bomber. Without
this restraint, the Soviets could deploy over 160 additional
MIRVed ICBMs by 1985.
SALT II limitations affect U.S. programs in the following
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-- the planned U.S. MIRVed missile deployments would
put the U.S. over the combined MIRV limits 'of 1200 and 1320
before the end of 1985;
-- those MX_basing mode alternatives that would build
new fixed launchers would violate the SALT II (and IA) ban
on such construction. We have made no basing decisions,
however, and any impact would be several years away.
There is general agreement that this Administration
should adopt some form of interim restraint. This is espe-
cially important if we are to avoid new pressures for
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? ratifying SALT II, which would surely cause a contentious and
ultimately harmful debate. There are two broad approaches
available:
1) Continuation of our current policy ("Not undercut
existing agreements"): This would continue the current
restraints on Soviet and U.S. forces if the Soviets continue
to adhere to the same constraints. For two to three
years there would be only modest impact on U.S. strategic
plans. The impact on Soviet strategic forces, as indicated
above, would be more significant: the Intelligence Community
believes they would deploy MIRVed ICBMs well beyond the
constraints of SALT II. The limitations of the SALT II
Protocol would have applied only through the end of 1981 and
thus would not be a part of this policy. The SALT I IA
restraints would require both sides to continue dismantling
old missile firing submarines as new ones were deployed; a
SALT II restraint alone would not. Continuing our present
policy would, however, permit substantial warhead growth
on both sides.
It is the view of the agencies that support Option 1
that it represents the most effective means of avoiding a
prolonged and divisive debate over the future status of the
? SALT II treaty. There are a number of valid, reasons why we
do not wish to ratify or renegotiate SALT II, including its
unequal treatment of heavy ICBMs, its failure to capture
Backfire, and its deficiencies with respect to verification.
None of these major problems can be addressed in the context
of an interim restraint regime without opening a new nego-
tiation with the Soviets -- which would inevitably divert us
from the priority task of strategic arms reductions to which
the President has committed his Administration. .
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On the other hand, to reject any form of interim restraint
-- or to declare a policy to which the Soviets would not
adhere -- would free the USSR to take steps, such as the
deployment of additional MIRVed ICBMs, which the Intelligence
Community considers likely, and which we could not match in
the short term. The intentional ambiguity in our current
policy -- which does not assert that we will "adhere to"
existing agreements -- provides flexibility to continue our
own strategic force modernization while both inhibiting
possible Soviet moves and most effectively defusing the
SALT II issue politically.
An option which seeks to pick and choose among existing
particular SALT provisions would in effect leave the Soviets
unconstrained and thus would heighten debate in the U.S. and
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against ratification, while at the same time
stimulating
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creased opposition to the eventual MX basing
scheme.
Europe over the wisdom of not ratifying SALT II. In addition,
this approach would suggest that the Administration's opposi-
tion to SALT II stems primarily from the concern that the
treaty would inhibit MX basing options -- which is not the
case. In so narrowing the basis for our opposition to SALT
II, the approach would undercut--our ability to make our case
2) A new but temporary restraint that would supplement
our current policy. The U.S. could initiate START negotiations
with a public proposal not to increase the total number of bal-
listic missile warheads beyond the number currently deployed
by either side, provided the Soviet Union exercised the same
restraint. This proposal to "cap" ballistic missile warheads
could allow the Administration to capture the political initia-
tive, respond to the groundswell of demand for real arms con-
trol, and allow us to distance ourselves from SALT II.
Under such a missile warhead cap, modernization within
existing ballistic missile warhead numbers would be permitted.
We would continue to deploy new SLBMs on Trident submarines;
and after 1986, MX would begin to be deployed. Without a cap,
these deployments would be a net addition to currently deployed
systems; but under a missile warhead "cap", old systems would
be replaced with more survivable new systems.
The Soviets would, however, be unlikely to accept such a
proposal; in all probability they would reject it as inequit-
able or make a counter-proposal which could, for example, in-
clude a cap on bomber weapons. In addition, this could require
extensive negotiations which would distract from the principal
negotiating effort.
3) A new policy that expresses U.S. determination to
achieve strategic stability by a combination of modernization
and arms control, and that distances the Administration from
acceptance of SALT I and II. OSD has provided the following
rationale:
This policy would be stated as follows: In order to en-
hance strategic stability the United States will modernize its
strategic forces while negotiating for substantial reductions.
It will continue to respect those provisions of existing agree-
ments that do not adversely affect the President's program of
stategic force modernization which is essential to protecting
the U.S. deterrent and achieving stability and strategic arms
reductions.
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The Office of the Secretary of Defense believes that the
proposal of some other agencies to extend the policy adopted
during the Administration's review of START policy runs a sig-
nificant risk of committing us to abide by SALT I and II for the
indefinite future. This would leave the administration vulner-
able to the charge that despite the argument that it is seri-
ously flawed, it had tacitly accepted SALT II after all.
In the event a START treaty has not been concluded by
1984, critics will argue that the stubborn refusal to ratify
SALT II has doomed the prospects for an arms limitation treaty,
stimulated a world wide anti-nuclear movement affecting the
U.S. and it allies, and yielded the arms-control initiative to
the Soviet Union.
The argument that, "Since we are abiding by SALT II, why
not ratify it and cause the Soviets to make the 10% reduction
the treaty requires?" has broad (and growing) appeal to which
we will lack a simple but persuasive answer unless we clearly
establish the basis on which we continue to oppose the SALT II
treaty.
OSD believes that there is a simple, coherent basis upon
which to distance the Administration from SALT II: it may con-
flict with the President's modernization program. The most
important example is the deployment of a survivable MX missile.
If it entails the construction of new, fixed ICBM launchers,
as "Dense Pack" may well, deployment of the MX would almost
certainly violate SALT II.
Once the Administration has adopted a post-review policy
of adhering to SALT II there will be no turning-point oppor-
tunity to alter that policy. The initiation of START may well
be the last logical opportunity to establish a policy we can
sustain through 1984.
A policy of adherence to SALT II so long as the Soviets
show "similar restraint" has the additional unfortunate conno-
tation that current Soviet behavior does in fact exhibit "re-
straint." The fact is that the Soviet strategic build-up con-
tinues relentlessly. We ought not to contribute to the legiti-
macy of their claim to moderation or restraint.
It is difficult for anyone not a proponent of SALT II to
argue with the formulation we propose. It does not say that
we will depart from the SALT II limits. It does say that we
will be guided by the requirements for modernization, stability
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and arms control. And it implies, quite properly in our view,
that if those objectives cannot be reached within the confines
of SALT II, we will depart from SALT II. Such a formulation
would protect the MX no matter how based. And it would give
the Administration a far more plausible argument than it now
has for refusing to ratify SALT"II.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After considering the merits of these three interim
restraint options, the START Interagency Group was unable to
reach a consensus. OSD and the START Negotiator believe
that our policy should be Option 3, distancing the U.S. from
SALT by stressing national security requirements. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA support Option 1, agreeing
that this policy should be reviewed regularly to ensure that
it remains in the U.S. interest.
The Option 2 cap on warheads would have some military
advantages over Option 1, if the verification, negotiating,
and political drawbacks could be overcome. It is the opinion
of the Interagency Group that these drawbacks outweigh the
military advantages.
Recommendations:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA recommend
that the interim restraint policy of the U.S. be Option 1,
continuing our current policy of not undercutting existing
SALT agreements provided the Soviets exercise similar
restraint.
Approve Disapprove
OSD and the START Negotiator recommend that the interim
restraint policy of the U.S. be option 3, distancing the
U.S. from SALT by stressing national security requirements.
Approve Disapprove
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CONSENSUS START ISSUES
There is interagency consensus on the following
positions for inclusion in the US position on START.
1. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)
The US should not seek special limits on ALCMs
themselves. ALCM carriers should not be subject to
restrictions beyond those applicable to other heavy
bombers. All agencies agree that the US should not
propose limits on maximum ALCM loadings per bomber in
our START proposal. (Some believe that we might even-
tually consider accepting such limits consistent with
our force requirements in return for significant Soviet
concessions.)
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2. Access to Flight Test Data
Access to flight test telemetry is essential to the
verification of certain START limitations. All agencies
agree that the US should seek a ban on all telemetry
encryption in flight tests of START-limited systems. Addi-
tional measures to ensure access to relevant flight test
data may also be required. Decisions on additional measures
should be made after the provisions of a START agreement
become more clear. Such decisions should balance the value
of additional information for monitoring Soviet START-
limited activities against the impact of reciprocal measures
on US flight test practices.
3. Missile Fli ht Tests
The US should not -seek a limitation which would set an
annual quota of missile flight tests.
4. Bomber Pre-Launch Survivability
One potentially useful limitation appears to be a ban
on "depressed trajectory" SLBM flight tests. However,
because of verification problems and the possible impli-
cations for certain US systems (e.g., flight tests of
Trident II), we should not propose a ban on such testing
pending further review.
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5. Limits on Air Defenses
We do not envisage air defense limitations in a
START agreement. We should, however, use the lack of
constraints on Soviet air defenses to achieve preferen-
tial treatment of US bombers and their weapons in START.
6. Limits on Civil Defense
Although the Soviet Union has a considerably more
active civil defense program than the US, we should not
seek civil defense limitations in START. Such limitations
would be very difficult to negotiate or verify and could
inhibit US civil defense programs.
7. Limits on Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities
As there appears to be no compelling US security
requirement for ASW limitations, they should not be
included in our START proposal.
RECOMMENDATION: All agencies recommend that these
positions be approved for use in formulating the US START
position.
Approve Disapprove
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Mobile ICBMs
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Background Considerations
The US was unable to gain Soviet acceptance of a land-mobile
ban in the 1972 Interim Agreement, but stated unilaterally that it
would regard Soviet mobile deployments to be inconsistent with
the Agreement.
Mobile ICBMs were banned for the duration of the SALT II
Protocol, but would have been permitted under the Treaty itself
after expiration of the Protocol. Toward the end of the SALT II
negotiations, the US put the Soviets on notice that it intended
to deploy mobile ICBM launchers in the NIPS deceptive-basing
system then under consideration.
Until final decisions are taken on MX basing, which are not
likely before the opening of START, we will not know whether the
US will be required to deploy mobile ICBMs. Some MX deployment
options may call for transporting the missile in its cannister
between permanent hardened facilities. In addition, we may wish
to protect the option to deploy systems in the future for other
new ICBMs.
The Soviets have developed and will probably soon test a
small, solid-propellant ICBM that would be suitable for off-road
mobile deployment (similar to the SS-20 IRBMs basing arrangement).
They have also developed a medium, solid-propellant missile that
could conceivably be deployed as a mobile, perhaps deceptively
based. And unlike the US, the Soviets do not face public opinion
constraints on their mobile programs.
Even with intrusive verification measures, there could be
substantial uncertainties in our estimates of the number of
Soviet mobile ICBMs. The degree of monitoring uncertainty would
depend on such factors as the basing arrangement employed, the
number of mobiles deployed, and the effectiveness of agreed
collateral constraints and cooperative verification measures.
Lions
1. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs.
Among the advantages of a mobile ban are that it would avoid
the verification i iculties associated with counting mobiles;
it would close off a deployment option that the Soviets were in a
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much better position to use than the US; and it would 'make it
easier for us to disrupt Soviet ICBM refire operations by target-
ing (fixed) ICBM launchers.
Among the disadvantages are that it would close off future
US mobile options for MX or a smaller ICBM; it would prevent the
Soviets from moving to a more survivable land-basing system which
it can be argued would have a destabilizing effect; and, by
constraining Soviet efforts to promote the survivability of their
ICBM force, it could make them reluctant to accept significant
reductions.
2. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs with a definition of mobility
that excluded deceptive basing from the prohibition.
Among the advantages, this would define mobility and transport-
ability so as to ban SS-20-type deployments of ICBMs while
permitting the kind of basing approach we might wish to employ.
Among the disadvantages, it would legitimize Soviet deceptive
basing which, depending on the cooperative measures worked out,
might be difficult to verify. And given previous US treatment of
? deceptive basing as a mobile concept, it would be difficult to
gain acceptance of the proposed definition
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3. Propose that mobiles be permitted, but only in accordance
with certain requirements designed to facilitate verification.
Under this approach, the Treaty would have to specify
criteria for permitted mobile deployments (e.g., central basing,
data exchanges) and call for additional collateral constraints
and cooperative measures to promote verifiability.
The advantages of this option are that it would give us
flexibility for MX or future mobile ICBM basing; it could provide
for stringent measures to count Soviet mobiles; and it would
enable the Soviets to move to more survivable ICBM basing which
could have a stabilizing effect.
The disadvantages are that it would involve greater verifi-
cation uncertainties than a ban; it would provide an option that
the Soviets are more likely to exploit; and it might lead to
disagreements on what is verifiable. It could also complicate
the serious problem of dealing with refires and reconstitution.
4. Make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial
position.
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The main advantage of this approach is that it would hold
open our options for dealing with. mobiles in START at least until
after a final 'decision is made on MX basing and until we know
about possible US requirements for a new mobile ICBM. Otherwise,
on the one hand, by opting for a ban on mobiles we could be
ruling out a system needed for national security. On the other
hand, by choosing to allow mobiles, we could be allowing the
Soviets freedom to deploy systems which would pose severe
verification and refire problems.
The main disadvantage is that it foregoes the opportunity to
lay down a strong position from the outset.
Conclusion: All agencies recommend that the US adopt option 4.
However, the Chairman of the START delegation supports option.2.
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TALKING POINTS
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The Protocol
All options for interim restraint assume that the SALT II Protocol, which was
scheduled to expire at the end of 1981, will be abandoned.
- While this may hold some advantages for the U.S., the Soviets
are in a good position to move forward rapidly in some of the
areas limited by the Protocol:
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TALKING POINTS
CAP on Ballistic Missile Warheads
The JCS proposal to "cap" ballistic missile warheads at current levels
appears to call for missile-by-missile counting.
- This would be all but impossible to monitor with NTM
? Since the Soviets have tested and deployed both MIRVed
and single-RV variants of their MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs,
there is considerable uncertainty as to the present
warhead count.
? For most systems, the Soviets could increase deployed
RVs undetected during periodic maintenance.
SOVIET MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs
MIRVed ICBMs
Mod 1 4 MIRVs
Mod 2 Single RV
Mod 3 4 MIRVs
Mod 1 Single RV
Mod 2 8/10 MIRVs
Mod 3 Single RV
Mod 4 10/12/14 MIRVs
SS-19
Mod 1 4/6 MIRVs
Mod 2 Single RV
Mod 3 6 MIRVs
MIRVed SLBM
Mod 1 2/3 MIRVs
Mod 2 Single RV
Mod 3 7 MIRVs
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SALT I and II Restraints
If the U.S. abandons SALT I and II as interim restraints -- as proposed by
OSD -- the Soviets are in a position to move forward in a number of areas most
of which are projected in the unconstrained forces in NIE 11-3/8-81:
-- Not have to compensate for new nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines being deployed, with dismantling of others, such as
Y-class SSBNs (we expect the 14th D-III unit to begin sea trials
this summer and estimate that between 1982 and 1986 nine new
SSBNs with 168 SLBM launchers will be deployed).
-- Increase the number of MIRV-accountable SS-17 and SS-19 ICBM
launchers beyond the sublimit on such launchers.
-- Increase the amount of telemetry encryption on systems covered
by the Treaty. There are no technical barriers to such a move.
? -- Test more than one "new type" ICBM (two solid-propellant ICBMs
could begin flight testing at any time).
-- Increase Backfire production and/or begin aerial refueling of it.
-- Increase the number of RVs on existing ICBMs. (We believe the
SS-18 Mod 4 was designed to carry a total of 14 RVs).
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TALKING POINTS
Mobile ICBMs
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Without a ban on land-mobile ICBMs, we believe that the Soviets could
begin flight testing their small, solid propellant ICBM from a mobile
launcher at any time. If testing began soon, it would be ready for
deployment in 1985.
The deployment of a mobile could make counting deployed missiles,
aggregate numbers of warheads (RVs), and aggregate throw-weight much more
difficult.
With central basing:
CIA: 10-25% uncertainty
DIA: 25-50% uncertainty
Other basing modes:
50-90% uncertainty
- These uncertainties could be reduced by:
? Passive cooperative measures
e.g., Designated deployment areas
Requirement for central basing
Standard base configuration
? Active cooperative measures
e.g., On-site inspection
Technical monitoring devices
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Excess Missiles
The USSR produces extra missiles for maintenance and training, and these may form,
in time of war, a reserve force for refiring.
We believe that the USSR maintains reserve missiles for its ICBM force beyond
the number required for maintenance and training, but we are uncertain about
the extent of these reserves.
We do not believe that the USSR is planning to use its older ICBMs as part of a
strategic reserve force, because:
- Older launchers (SS-7, SS-8, SS-9) have been dismantled or converted.
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We believe that some newer missiles (SS-17, 18, 19) are available for a reserve
missile force
The Soviets have plans to reconstitute strategic forces, but we are highly un-
certain about their actual capabilities.
- Overall, we believe the Soviets could maintain the combat effectiveness
of many of the surviving withheld weapons and would be able to re-
constitute strategic forces to at least some extent with surviving
reserve weapons and materiel.
Damage to the logistic system and requirements for decontamination
would stretch out the time required for reconstitution.
- Vulnerabilities:
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Soft ICBM support areas
Rail transfer points
Rear storage depots
Each of these facilities can handle only a few missiles at a time.
? Rail and road networks could be damaged severely.
- These vulnerabilities could be reduced by:
? Dispersing combat reserves before the outbreak of war, or during the war
Delivering reserves to remote off-loading points
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TALKING POINTS
Brezhnev's 18 May Speech
In regard to START, Brezhnev said:
- Soviets ready to begin talks "...without delay."
- U.S. ready to resume talks "...a step in the right direction."
= Soviets in favor of "...substantial reductions."
- U.S. position on reductions "...absolutely unilateral ... because U.S. would
like in general to exclude from the talks the strategic arms it is now
most intensively developing."
- Talks, to be successful, "... should be conducted with due regard for each
other's security interests and strictly in accordance with principle of
equality and equal security."
- Also "... necessary to preserve everything positive that has been achieved
earlier. The talks do not start from scratch but a good deal of far from
useless work has been done."
? - Proposes that "... strategic armaments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. be
frozen right now, as soon as the talks begin. Frozen quantitatively. And
so that their modernization is limited to the utmost."
We conclude that:
- The Soviets are willing to begin negotiations soon.
- They will play to U.S. and European public opinion favorable to SALT II
and/or a freeze.
- They will seek to preserve as much as they can of SALT II.
- Despite Brezhnev's nod toward "substantial reductions," we see no
indication that the Soviets are thinking of reductions in terms of new
approaches.
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