EAST-WEST POLICY STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000400750015-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 8, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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July 8, 1981
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NSC review completed
EAST-WEST PCSLICY STUDY
is
State Dept. review completed
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EAST-WEST POLICY STUDY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Overview:- The Present Situation and Future Prospects
The-Soviet-American relationship will be entering a
new- anangerous-phase during-the coming deca e, in epend-
e to of any major US policy changes. Increased Soviet power
threatens the free and open international order the U.S. has
sought to maintain throughout the postwar period. The most
urgent dangers are:- (1) Soviet use of its own and rox
forces to acquire new strategic advantages, particularly in
politically unstable but vital regions; and (2) Soviet efforts
to divide the US from its major allies through a combination
of thre-a-t-s-777 inducements.
In this setting, our East-West policy will be based on
the following remises: 1 that the East-West-competition
re Elects fun amental and enduring conflicts of interests,
purpose and outlook; (2) that the US should move beyond its
passive post-Vietnam foreign 20licy and provide greater
leadership to enab a the West to compete more effectively;
(3)-that over the near term, given the legacy we have
inherited, we often-will have to compete with the USSR under
unfavorable circumstance; and (4) some positive interactions
? and negotiations with Moscow are possible and desirable 'and
can help to susta-in a consensus both at home and abroa in
favor of a more competitive posture.
Our ability to meet this challenge will have to be
based on a long-term effort to rebuild American and Western
ower and willingness to assume higher risks in defending
our interests. We cannot reverse trends favoring the Soviet
Union overnight; to do so at all will require considerable
patience and resourcefulness. In the short term, we must
make use of our existing assets more efficiently by taking
advantage of special areas of American and Western strength,
while exploiting Soviet weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
US global strategy must improve our position by joining
American strength to that of allied and friendly countries.
We should draw on an informal but interlocking coalition of
European and Asian allies, our strategic association with
China, and our partnerships with key "Third World" countries.
The US must be the fulcrum of this structure, providing -Me-
leadership needed to integrate Western assets and defend
vital Western interests. On this basis we can ensure a
sustainable internationalist US foreign policy for the
1980s.
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We recognize that-it often will be difficult to
generate ade uac te'support_from our allies and-friends
for US-policies-toward-the-Soviet Union. The US goals
enumerated In the sttudy represent our desiderata. We
recognize-that it will be necessorrto make some adjust-
ments in US ositio''nsiin working out compromises with
our allies on East-West issues. Some US interests will
be of sufficient importance that we will need to act
unilaterally in pursuing particular courses of action.
The NSC therefore should commission an urgent studv-on
Major Alliance Relationships, developing a detailed-strategy
and tactics for dealing with our allies, both in Europe
and in Asia, in the pursit of major US political, economic
and military objectives A, The NSC also should establish
a Standing IG to ensure proper implementation of the
decisions flowing from-the-East-West study.
The Soviet Union will act wigorously to protect and
expand its position against a new y assertive American-
foreign policy; it has a great many instruments for ding
so. We should avoid unnecessary confrontations and take
account of vital Soviet interests in devising means for
countering aggressive Soviet behavior. But this should
not keep us from competing_forcefully with the USSR in
defense of our own interests. We cannot buy time by accom-
modation; such a course also would mislead our public
and our allies as to .our purposes and steadfastness. Moscow
is likely in any case to take actions that challenge our
interests and the costs of accepting aggressive Soviet
behavior are simply too high.
The long-term weaknesses of the Soviet Union, the
economic and political strengths of the West and the man-
date embodied in the November elections encourage us to
believe that an effective policy toward the Soviet Union is
within our reach as long as we make full use of our strengths.
Yet the material costs and political difficulties must not
be understated. Large and continuing economic burdens for
defense must be patiently and skillfully defended before
the Congress and the public. We will have to create and
enlarge relationships with states that are critical Soviet
targets or strategically decisive. Finally, regaining the
initiative will sometimes require that we accept immediate
risks in order to avoid greater albeit more long-term ones.
For example, security assistance to endangered allies and
friends at this time can avoid more serious problems later.
A strong consensus both at home and abroad will be
crucia to sustaining these policies. We also will have
to take the lead on issues of critical importance, with-
out letting uncertainty over the extent of domestic or
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i allied support deprive us of essential freedom of action.
Success-will depend on a strong sense of priorities and on
effective leadership.
II. Soviet-Strengths-and-Weaknesses
Management of the East-West relationship requires a
dispassionate tallying of Moscow's strengths and weaknesses.
Over the near term,-the Soviet Union possesses several dis-
tinct-advantages in its competition with the United States:
First, it enjoys, and in the short term will increase its
significant military advantages in key regions, accompanied
by a greatly improved nuclear balance; second, it is in a
position to exploit instability in many areas of the
developing world crucial to Western interests, particularly
the-Persian Gul ; third, it has built up a network of allies,
clients and proxies throughout the Third Wor ourth,
from their recent use, Soviet-armed forces and those of its
allies and proxies are gaining operational self-confidence
and an enhanced capacity for intimidation; fifth, it can
play upon a residual Western attachment to detente to
separate the US from its allies; and sixth, Moscow can
pursue its objectives in relative freedom from domestic
political constraints and dependence on~eign resources.
? At the same time the Soviets must contend with a
number of liabilities: First, Soviet economic growth will
continue to stagnate in this decade for reasons inherent
in the system it elf; second, the USSR is on the verge of
a wholesale leadershi change that could hamper the conduct
of foreign policy; third, all the industrial democracies and
China are hostile to the USSR, which threatens their security
interests; fourth the Soviets may increasingly suffer from
imperial overextension, due to the weaknesses of Soviet
proxies and dependents and the instability of Eastern
Europe, if the West shows sufficient resistance; and
finally, Marxism-Leninism is a bankrupt ideology which
fails to answer the needs either of the people it is
purported to serve or of the developing nations in the
Third World.
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Unfortunately, these long-term liabilities do not
lessen the dan ers'that we now face.. Indeed, the combin-
ation of short-term strengths an ong-term weakness may
prompt the Soviets to capitalize on their advanta a now.
The Soviets may regard the ener vulnerability of the
West and their own ability to exploit military power for
political purposes in the Persian Gulf area as an opportunity
of historic proportions to cripple the Western alliance once
and or al . Moscow's ong-term problems will be of little
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benefit to us unless we can defend our interests over the
short-run and establish trends favorable to us.
III. U.S. Policy-Toward East-West Relations
The overriding objective of U.S. policy toward the
Soviet Union is to blunt and contain Soviet, imperialism.
This goal involves appreciably increasing costs and risks
of Soviet expansionism and, to the extent feasible, en-
couraging democratic processes in the USSR.
. This Administration will pursue the following goals
with regard to-the Soviet Union:
A. Restoring a satisfactory military balance.
Because military power is a necessary basis for com-
peting with the Soviets eff ctivel , US forces will have
to be increased across the board. The Soviets Have widened
their existing superiority in conventional forces in Europe,
Asia and the broad Persian Gulf/Middle East region, supple-
menting them with a network of proxies in the Third World.
This has occurred against the backdrop of a shift in the
strategic and theater nuclear balances, which weakens
deterrence and the US strategic commitments on which it is
? based.'
Military modernization must emphasize the procurement
of systems which take advantage of American strengths an
exploit Soviet vulnerabilities, including those of Soviet
proxies.
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o Nuclear Forces. The overall nuclear balance
is not satisfactory, and our programs of strategic and
theater modernization are not yet, even in combination,
adequate to redress the balance. At a minimum we need to
restore the nuclear balance and to improve the ability o
these forces to support US deterrent commitments. Nuclear
force improvements should be gauged not simply by static
quantitative measures, but also by qualitative factors, such
as C I, that have a practical military significance, i.e.,
that provide enduring capability to destroy targets of
military significance. Consideration of effective anti-
ballistic missile systems also should be considered.
o Regional Forces. The forces of the US and its
allies are insufficient to meet common security needs.
Accordingly, the US must modernize and expand its conven-
tional force structure with emphasis on four areas. First,
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in cooperation with our allies and regional nations, we must
work to create. ca abilities ade uate-to meet the-full array
of Soviet-an -regional-threats,-above all in the Persian
Gulf-area. We must improve our own capability to utilize
access to local facilities already obtained, working
steadily for gradual increases as regional nations gain more
confidence in us. Second, we must reverse the deterioration
of-re ional-balances in Europe and Asia. Third, the US must
establish an improved margin of maritime superiority to put
at risk-the-global Soviet-navy-and to strengthen-our-capacity
to manage the re ional crises.' Finally, the US should improve
its arms trans ter capa i ity by making additional resources
available on a timely basis to meet the needs of regional
allies threatened by the Soviets or their proxies.
Our arms control policy must be an integral element of
our-national security policy. The US-should pursue-a realistic
arms control policy aimed at verifiable agreements that
directly enhance national security by limiting those Soviet
systems which are most threatening to us and facilitating
our force modernization plans. Disarmament or restrictions
on new technologies for their own sake should be eschewed,
as well as agreements negotiated simply to improve the
atmosphere of superpower relations. Instead, we need to set
tougher substantive standards that challenge the Soviets to
? accept true parity at reduced levels an prepare both US and
Euro can ublic o anion to acce t no a regiments at a i
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these are not met. The US needs to establish the primacy of
our own military programs as the basis for assuring security;
in ee this is the only way we can expect to achieve
meaningful limits on Soviet weaponry. We should recognize
that this arms control strategy may make it unlikely that
negotiate. agreements will be achieved in the short run.
B. Defending Western interests in areas of instability.
The greatest danger of Soviet use of military force,
either directly or by proxy, arises in' the Third World.
The US must break out of its post-Vietnam passivity and
adopt a counter-offensive strategy that seizes the initiative
from the Soviets by opposing them and their proxies, where
possible at times and places of our own choosing. Such a
strategy would seek to discourage the further use and growth
of the proxy network by driving up both risks and costs of
Moscow's Third World invo vements, by exploiting the vulnera-
bilities' of Soviet proxies and by weakening their Soviet
connection through appropriate use of incentives and disin-
centives. Many of these regimes are narrowly based with
severe ethnic, social, sectarian and economic problems.
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Afghanistan, Cuba, South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia repre-
sent particularly important points of Soviet exposure. On
an ideological plane, the-US should put the spotlight on the
aggressive - activities and-interna shortcomings-o -Soviet
proxies-and--keepthem-on-the-defensive. This counteroffen-
sive strategy must be carefully t aailored in light of regional,
political and cultural realities.
We also should seek to preempt Soviet opportunism
through timely political-action and constructive-economic
policies-to-prevent-instability,-promote prosperity and
resolve-di putes. Our concerns tor-security nd peaceful
progress are mutually reinforcing. It is essential that the
United States continue to present a positive alternative to
the aims and repression that the Soviet Union offers to the
Third World, while understanding that our support for some
types of political and economic reform can generate instabil-
ity which can be exploited by Moscow.
Given our present constraints, we need to set priorities
among US interests in the Third World. Above-all,-the US
and its allies must be able to defend Western-interests in
the strategic Persian Gulf and Near East area. We,.together
with our allies and regional friends, need capabilities
adequate to protect Western access to oil against direct
challenge and to -respond to the politically disruptive
shadow cast by Soviet power. Horizontal escalation may be a
useful stop-gap but cannot itself be counted onto deal with
the threat as the Soviets have such options of their own.
'We must expand coo eration with allies outside of the region
and with regional friends that are capable of countering
Soviet proxies. But our experience in Iran indicates that
there is no substitute for direct U.S. power projection and
such cooperation is lik-eTy UT-Be achieved only i the US can
demonstrate its own increased capability and commitment to
help its friends.
Our counter-offensive strategy should be applied at
once to Afghanistan. We should with other states combine
intense political pressure for a total Soviet withdrawal,
appropriate encouragement to Afghan freedom fighters, major
security assistance to Pakistan and a concerted political
program to illuminate Soviet aggressive behavior in the
Third World.
Finally, our emphasis on the Persian Gulf should not
obscure our enduring interest in other parts of the develop-
ing world, particularly the current volatile Central American
? area, the ASEAN states and southern Africa.
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West-West quarrels of the sort that pligued the laft adminis-
tration; If there ire hard times ahead with Mos -owthey
should bete its no . hnr m the a fiance. We must urc
Euuro eanleade leaders ' wo:.- a~C ctivve oward reduci K TO 2211-
tical constraints )rl_ ,elr, a erase po, c wand to )37n us
lira countering Mosc)w.
Our key goals in Europe are:
o To improve and e n l a r g e consultation and coc-dina-
tion with our alli as p rti u ar y on Issues ou si
? Europe.
0 To increasA our allies' commitment ofr sou-ces to
the common defense, both in Europe and in areas vet fl to
the alliance. The US must provide defense liad rsr..p and
a nuclear umbrella r but the allies must do more in strength-
ening conventional forces and sustaining LRTNF i,ode-nization.
We will have to se,rk a redefinition of the "div sic -i of
labor. 10
0 To achieve reement among allies on an arras control
strategy we s oul3 meet the aI" ie olit ca ne Z-1 ~r a v able
energy, on the Sovet bloc, to to a collect ve at cz to
prevent the emer e.ce of future vulnerabilities end to
re nforce Western ties. We must put major press re on the
Europeans to minimize the strategic implications of-the
proposed European/toviet gas pipeline . Common iolicies are
needed on export credits and technology transfer. The coverage
and effectiveness cif COCOM rules should be improied.
arms control proce,.s, and to use that process t"> ? ionstrate
US commitment and .~oviet resistance to parity, ..rmE reduction
and effective, ver fiable arms control, while e?sur'ng that
negotiations do no interfere with NATO mod r i atl~n In
particular, while ;.aintaining a lIbberate rac:.'rc negoti-
ating JRTNF arms c,>ntrol, we must resist delays in Moderniza-
tion aria d ploymen-.:.
o To prevent F'estern economic dependence, pirt_i:2ularly in
o To achieve greater understandinj of US i.olitical
ic- an "p fa-
Ram
economic an a en: e o c es European--
mentar o inxon, e~pec a y among the successor- ge.'ierat on
of Europeans.-
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C. Improving Cooperation with our European Allies.
The US-must-forge-anew-alliance consensus for its
strategy-towards-the-Soviet Union, against the background
of European doubts about American leadership, extensive
economic links with the Soviet bloc, energy dependence on
the Middle East and fear of Soviet power. We should avoid
West-West quarrels of the sort that plagued the last adminis-
tration; if there are hard times ahead with Moscow, they
should benefit, not harm the alliance. We must urge
Euro can leaders to work actively toward reducing the poli-
tical constraints on t eir de tense policies an to Join us
in countering Moscow.
Our key goals in Europe are:
o To-improve and enlarge consultation and coordina-
tion with-our allies, particularly on issues outside Europe.
o To increase our allies' commitment of resources to
the common defense, both in Europe and in areas vital to
the alliance. The US must provide defense leadership and.
is a nuclear umbrella, but the allies must do more in strength-
ening conventional forces and sustaining LRTNF modernization.
We will have to seek a redefinition of the "division of
labor."
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o To achieve agreement among allies on an arms control
strategy we should meet the allied political need for a visible
arms contro .process, and to use that process to demonstrate
US commitment and Soviet resistance to parity, arms reduction
and effective, verifiable arms control, while ensuring that
negotiations do not interfere with NATO modernization. In
particular, while maintaining a deliberate track for negoti-
ating LRTNF arms control, we must resist delays in moderniza-
tion and deployment.
o To arrest growing European economic dependence,
particular) energy, on the Soviet bloc, to take co ec- StAf~
tfve action to prevent the emergence of future vulnerabil- WAIJTS
ities and to reinforce Western ties. The proposed European/ {~isiiL' H a
Soviet gas pipeine is not in our interest and should be S(C-T10Ns
handled to, avoid further European vulnerability. Common OECD DF_j,ETED
policies are needed on export credits and technology transfer.
The coverage and effectiveness of COCOM rules should be
improved. These policies also will require a consistent US
policy of denying the Soviets important economic support.
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o To achieve-greater understanding of US political,
economic- an a ense-po icies-by European pub is an ar ia-
mentary-opinion, especially among the "successor generation's
of Europeans.
D. Developing-the-Potential of East Asian Allies
and Friends.
East Asia has enormous economic capability, but is
militarily weak. Both Japan and China will face major
difficulties in realizing their very large growth potential
as counter-weights to Soviet power. As they do so, US
policy will aim to increase the security of the region
againgt outside pressures and interference and to preserve
balance among the East Asian powers. We can reach this goal
by encouraging the strengthening of friendly regional
states,-while recognizing that their power cannot become a
substitute for that of the US. We will need to continue to
play a crucial balancing and integrating role.
Japan and China have the greatest potential.
o In light of Ja an's key role as an ally and the
? world's second largest economic power, we should afford
Tokyo equal status and treatment with our NATO allies,
consu t c ose y-wit the Japanese-an encourage recent
trends toward greater Japanese engagement in global issues.
Japan should play a greater role in areas of common alliance
concern outside East Asia through supportive diplomacy and
economic assistance. While reconfirming our commitment to
Japanese security, we also will encourage the acquisition of
a military ca abilit by Japan to provide for its defense,
within its constitutional constraints, in such critical
areas as air defense, anti-submarine warfare and protection
of sea lanes in the Pacific.
o China's hostility to the USSR is of great political
and strategic importance; our goal is to solidity our
developing relationship with China and to strengthen
Chinars ability to re is st Soviet intimidation. But the
Sino-American strategic association must be handled with
care, as Chinese interests and ambitions sometimes diverge
from our own. We should strengthen Chinese defensive
capabilities selectively w i ermaintaining our strong
support for the security of Taiwan.
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D. Deielopina the Potential of East Asia i A] lies -
and Friends.
East-Asia has enormous economic capabilit', tat is
militarily weak. Both Japan and Chinn: will fe :e r ijor
difficulties in realizing their very large grc nth >otential
as counter-weights to Soviet power. Ia they d) sc , US
policy will aim to increase the security of tto! rtlion
against outside Pressures and interference and to ?reserve
balance among the East Asian powers. We can riaci this goal
by encouraging the strengthening of friendly r?gicnal
states, while recognizing that their ,ower car'ot become a
substitute or tt,at p the US. We w nee t continue o
play a crucial balancing an zntegrating_role.
Japan and China have the greatest potenti 31.
o Inlight of Japan's key role r~s an all r ar d the
world's secon rgest economic r>ower, we- shout-T7 Eot3
Too e q u a l states an treatmen our TC aI:,
consult c ose1 . i t`h the Japanese- se- -ann encoira i F cent
trends toward greater Ja aanneese en a e~ient n 100 tissues.
7;-Pan should p1a}a greater role in a-Bas o c3mm n allia ce
concern outside T ' a s t P . s '-hrough sup')ortive a ipl' miji cy an4
economic assistarce. While reconfirrn.ng our c~mm tlnent tb
Japanese securit we so wil encourage the 3c is ti of
a mi iary capa6iYity by Japan to prove or its a ense,
within its constitutional constraintsinsuch cr.t al
areas as.air defense, anti-submarine warfare and jro ection
of sea lanes in the Pacific.
o China's tostilfty to the USSR Is of fiat political
and strategic_3 ni )rtance; amour got is to solic i our developing relat i onsEi? with China and to strc at en
China's abi it t o resit Soviet int ni ation. B t the
Tnno` mer can strategic _assoc?iation mist be Bin-`4T d wi?h
care, as Chinese interests and ambitions comet ime diverge
from our own. Va should strengthen Chinese c efe give
capabilities seTf ct~vet w i e maintaining our st on
support for the tecurity of Taiwan.
Beyond Chine and Japan, we will atrangth(n s curity
cooperation with our Korean, Australian and Ncw Z-aland
allies. We will also want to bolater support for the
ASEAN states to Iromote their Westerh orients!ion and to
strengthen' their ability to stand up to Vietnimesa and
Soviet expansionism.
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E. Refashioning East-West economic relations to make them R~ W1tltE.
consistent with broad US political-military oijec.:ives.
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Far from moderating Soviet political-militar} behavior,
the extensive East-West economic ties of the Fist decade have
created constituencies among' our allies, some 3f Caom
are vulnerable to Soviet pressure. We need tc define
the guideaines for- permissible East-West trade. I uture
Western :jconomie policy 1 must meet three major zri1 ter a:
o It must not increase the Soviet ca achy to wage
war. USpo icy _will_ seek signs scanty 'Impro _c o~ntrols
over the transfer of-technolo important to aili'ary pro-
uction an to ir. u3 sstria sectors that indirectly support
military capability.
o It must narrow opportunities for Soviet ( con mic
levers a over the west. While recognizing the t rea _er stake of
our allies in comiercial ties with the East, we mus,_ seek to
limit and ultimat?1y to reverse political vulne--a-bi? tes
arising from the growth of East-West economic aiid eiergy
interdependence.
o It must not unduly relieve general Sovie : resource STArr.0-
iRI
constraints, associated political difficulties or
responsibility for East European economic probl