CBW SIG ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000400830019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 2, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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NSC review completed - may be declassified in
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TO See Distribution List Below
SUBJECT: CBW SIG Issues
Attached for the information of addressees is a summary of
issues pertaining to the CBW question. The summary is intended
to define issues for decision, and is circulated as a supplement
to the paper circulated-on September 29.
The members of the SIG might wish to consider the attached
as the basis for a future. decision document which the SIG could
begin developing at its meeting on October 5. .
Executive Secrets
Distribution:
OVP - Ms.
NSC - Mr.
DOD - Mr.
CIA -
JCS - LTC
Nancy Bearg_ Dyke
Allen Lenz
Jay Rixse
ACDA - Mr. Robert Grey,
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GDS 10/2/87.
State Dept. review
completed
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Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control
ISSUES FOR DECISION
-- How to proceed on 'the issue of Soviet compliance
with the Biologica Weapons Convention (BWC) raised
by the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk and
recent evidence on the use of lethal mycotoxins in
Southeast Asia.
-- Whether and, if so, how to proceed with chemical
weapons (CW) arms control negotiations.
BACKGROUND
BWC Compliance
The US is a Party to and, together with the UK and
USSR, a Co Depositary for the 1975 Convention prohibiting the
development, production, and stockpiling of BW activities
which the US unilaterally renounced in 1969. In March 1980,
as a result of disturbing new intelligence, the US requested
bilateral technical consultations with the Soviets,. in
accordance with the BWC, regarding concerns that the 1979
outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk was related to activities
prohibited by the BWC. The US has made six such demarches
to the Soviets and has not received an explanation which
would satisfactorily resolve US concerns.
In September 1981, the US informed the UN and
announced publicly that it had obtained evidence regarding
the use of lethal mycotoxins (substances covered by the BWC)
in Southeast Asia. Therefore on October 1, 1981, the US
made another demarche, to the Soviet Charge in Washington,
detailing US concerns about the use of chemical weapons and
mycotoxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, and raised
once again the matter of the Sverdlovsk incident. The
Charge's preliminary response was to reject our concerns as
part of a propaganda ploy.
CW Arms Control
Since mid-1977 the US, pursuant to the agreement
reached at the 1974 Moscow Summit, has been actively engaged
in bilateral, US/Soviet negotiations and multilateral
efforts in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament (CD) aimed
at a achieving a complete, effective and verifiable prohibition
of CW development, production and stockpiling. Progress
was made initially on a number of key issues in the US/Soviet
talks. Since 1979, however, the negotiations have been
stalled by Soviet intransigence over verif-ication.- Additionally,
the US retaliatory capability in the CW area, as well as US
bargaining leverage in the bilaterals, has been eroded in
recent years as a result of the Carter Administration's
decisions to forego CW modernization.
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OPTIONS
BWC Compliance
On the question of how to proceed on the issue of
Soviet compliance with the BWC, the IG recommends that
the SIG approve the strategy outlined below to follow-up
the demarche made October 1:
-- Use the 36th UN General Assembly debate, particularly
debate in-the First (Political) Committee on the
issue of reports of CW use in Afghanistan, Laos and
Kampuchea, and discussions in the CD and other
appropriate international fora to continue to expose
the CBW activities of the Soviets and their friends
to international scrutiny and.criticism;
-- Support convening a meeting of States Parties to
the BWC to seek to strengthen its verification and
compliance mechanisms in light of Soviet non-compliance,
and to provide an additional forum for maintaining
international pressure on the Soviets about their
CBW activities; and
-- After assessing the results of the steps above, the
SIG and/or NSC would consider the possibility of
utilizing the final two remedies provided by the BWC
-- i.e., taking the issue to the UN Security Council
for action (an effort the Soviets will certainly
veto) and/or withdrawing from the BWC.
CW Arms Control
The questions of whether and, if so, how to proceed
with CW arms control negotiations have not been resolved by
the IG. The IG has, however, agreed that the primary US
objective in this area is-to ensure that the current CW
modernization plans proceed so that the US has a credible
and effective retaliatory capability which corrects the
existing imbalance in US vs. Soviet CW capabilities and, if
appropriate, which would `enable the US to regain negotiating
leverage in the area of CW arms control.
Regarding the question of whether to proceed with CW
arms control negotiations, it is generally recognized'
that agreement in the foreseeable future on a complete and
verifiable prohibition of CW development-, production and
stockpiling is remote under the best of circumstances,- The.
Soviets continue to refuse to deal realistically with out-
standing issues or to make the significant-concessions- in
the verification area which are required for ' a. verifiable
prohibition., A new and strengthened US position on verifica-
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tion, such as that considered by the IG, would be even more
difficult for the Soviets to accept because of its increased
intrusiveness and greater reliance on additional measures to
supplement National Technical Means (NTM). The question,
therefore, is not really whether the US will renounce
chemical weapons now and not proceed with CW modernization.
The question is whether the US will continue to be involved
in the negotiating process. The US would participate in
these negotiations with long-term (and low) expectations
that an effective agreement -- which is fully acceptable to
the US and which meets all our verification demands -- will
be concluded.
If it is decided that the US should continue to
proceed with CW arms control negotiations, it is then
necessary to decide how we should proceed. Specifically
decisions must be made on:
(1) The type of agreement -- i.e., whether the US
will continue to support efforts aimed at conclud-
ing a complete prohibition of CW development,
production and stockpiling; or alter its position
somewhat and seek a more limited prohibition, such
as agreed stockpile limits and annual production
quotas, toxicity thresholds, or regional deployment
restrictions, while maintaining a complete prohibi-
tion as a long-term objective.
(2) The forum for negotiations -- i.e., whether the
US would continue to negotiate bilaterally with the
Soviets, or shift its previous emphasis on bilaterals
to multilateral negotiations in the CD.
RECOMMENDATIONS
BWC Compliance
That the SIG recommend to the'NSC the strategy
recommended by the IG.
Approve Disapprove
CW Arms Control
(1) Whether to proceed with CW arms control:
(a) That the SIG recommend to the NSC that the
US proceed with CW arms control negotiations.
Approve Disapprove
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(b) Alternatively, that the SIG recommend to the
NSC that the US not proceed with CW arms control "negotiations,"
but support W~ arms control "discussions"in the CD (i.e., no
drafting of actual treaty text would take place).
Approve Disapprove
(c) Or that the SIG recommend to the NSC that
the US not proceed with CW arms control negotiations.
Approve Disapprove
(2) How to proceed with CW arms control:
(a) That the SIG recommend to the NSC that the
US resume bilateral US/Soviet negotiations on a complete CW
prohibition, but present new and strengthened proposals
on veri ication.
Approve Disapprove
(b) Alternatively, that the SIG recommend to the
NSC that the US resume bilateral US/Soviet negotiations, but
on a more limited prohibition as an interim step toward
conclusion of a complete prohibition.
Approve Disapprove
(c) Or that the SIG recommend to the NSC that
the US continue to support negotiation of a complete CW
prohibition, but that the US would present a new and streng-
thened verification position and shift. the emphasis from bi-
lateral negotiations to multilateral negotiations in the CD.
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Approve Disapprove
(d) Or that the SIG recommend to the NSC that
the US continue to support in principle the objective of a
complete CW prohibition, but, in the near-term, pursue
negotiations in the CD on a more limited prohibition..
Approve
Disapprove.
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