SIG MEETING ON CBW ARMS CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000400830020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 29, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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S/S 8128189
SECRET
September 29, 1981
NSC review completed - may be declassified in
full
TO: See Distribution List Below
SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on CBW Arms Control
The Department of State will convene a SIG meeting
on CBW Arms Control on Monday, October 5, 10:30 a.m. in
the Deputy Secretary's Conference Room. The SIG will
be chaired by Under Secretary Stoessel. A strategy
paper prepared by the CBW Arms Control Working'Group
is attached.
Attendance is limited to principal plus one from
each invited agency. Please advise Sheila Lopez, 632-5804,
of your attendees.
z ,Paul' ewer, III
Executive Secretary
Distribution:
OVP - Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC - Mr. Allen Lenz
DOD - Mr. Jay Rixse
JCS - LTC Edward Bucknell
ACDA - Mr. Robert Grey;
CIA -
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GDS 9/28/87
State Dept. review
completed
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Strategy for CBW Arms Control
I. Background
Soviet behaviour in general and Soviet unwillingness to
take satisfactory steps to alleviate, or even respond to, US
concerns about Soviet activities in the field of chemical
and biological warfare have negatively affected US/Soviet
relations and raised serious questions about the real nature
of the Soviet threat -- not only to US security, but to
world peace and security as well. The tense international
climate which exists as a result has made the prospects for
forward movement in the area of arms control extremely
difficult at best, and reinforces the importance of adopting
a firm and unyielding stance in support of strict and
effective arms control verification and compliance. It also
makes clear the need for a more realistic international
appraisal of the sources of and solutions to the problems
which are creating international instability and threatening
the security of nations.
The area of chemical and biological weapons (CBW)
offers opportunities for articulating a principled and
consistent arms control philosophy and for countering the
Soviet propaganda effort on arms control by focussing
international attention on verification and compliance
questions. The evolution of US policy regarding CBW arms
control will be watched carefully by foreign audiences and
must be orchestrated to convey the proper signals to
our Allies, the Soviets and neutral/non-aligned States.
? When the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was
negotiated in 1972, the US recognized that it could not
be reliably verified. However, the US judged such an
agreement to be in the national interest because the US had
no intention of continuing a BW program of its own, because
of the general abhorrence.of biological weapons, and because
the questionable military utility of biological weapons was
thought to make violations unlikely and the consequences of
any violation minimal.
Accumulating evidence has now made it clear that the
judgment regarding probable compliance with the agreement
Full title: Convention on the development, production and
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapon's and on their destruction
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was optimistic. Intelligence available to the US, some of
it very recent, has raised serious concerns that, since the
signing of the BWC in 1972, the Soviets:
-- have continued a biological warfare-related research
and development program and may have developed,
produced and stockpiled biological weapons (BW); and
-- may have supplied mycotoxins (substances covered by
the BWC) for use in Southeast Asia, and possibly
used them in Afghanistan.
The US renounced biological ana toxin weapons altogether
in 1969, and is unlikely to reactivate its BW program under
any circumstances.
The Warsaw Pact currently presents a very serious
chemical weapons (CW) threat. Given the present imbalance,
Warsaw Pact CW use would result in high NATO casualties and
have a major impact on all military operations. Chemical
weapons are considered by the Soviets to confer an important
military advantage, and extremely tight security is observed
regarding them. There have been numerous reports of the use
of.CW_.by the Soviets in Afghanistan and possible Soviet
involvement in the reported use of CW in Southeast Asia.
Some of the reports indicate the use of lethal agents, some
of which (i.e., mycotoxins) are also covered by the B6vC.
The US proposals for a CW agreement that have been
under negotiation in recent, years are aimed at a ban on the
production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons
and the destruction of existing chemical stocks and their
means of production, and call for verification, inter alia,
by on-site inspection. The negotiations have been stalled
as a result of Soviet intransigence on verification. US
insistence on adequate verification, however, has been
widely supported by the Allies and others.
Any agreement further limiting chemical weapons would
involve verification difficulties comparable to those
connected with the BWC. Furthermore, totally effective
verification of a CW prohibition by NTM alone is virtually
impossible with present and foreseeable technology. In any
event, conclusion of a comprehensive CW prohibition in the
foreseeable future is remote at best. Accordingly, an
effective deterrent to the use of CW is required to redress
the present imbalance in US vs. Soviet capabilities and -to
enable the. US to negotiate from a strengthened-position
should it be decided to continue CW arms control efforts.
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Current US planning calls for extensive modernization
of our CW capabilities as a deterrent against Soviet CW use.
Whatever the US does with respect to CW arms control, we
will be pressured by the Allies and Congress to link CW
modernization to CW arms control in the manner of theater
nuclear modernization. The US has an overriding interest in
ensuring that CW modernization proceeds, and that the new
munitions are eventually deployed. The US also has an
interest in not being forced, as deployment becomes more
imminent, to link that step to arms control. This suggests
that the USG should, while the CW deployment issue is still
remote, elaborate a position on CW arms control which can be
sustained over the long term.
Verification/Compliance
With respect to Soviet compliance with the BWC, the US
has made a number of bilateral demarches to the Soviets
seeking information concerning the outbreak of anthrax in
1979, reportedly caused by an accident at a suspect B4
facility located in that city; the matter was also raised at
the 1980 BWC Review Conference. Reports of the use of
chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan are under
investigation by the UN by a specially appointed international
experts group which is scheduled to submit a report to the
UNGA this fall.
Focus at the UNGA on verification and compliance
questions can allow the US both to embarrass the Soviets and
to begin expounding a principled position on these issues
which we can carry into other arms control fora. By the
same token, a positive US stance in favour of verifiable and
genuine arms control measures in this field will reinforce
the impact of US compliance concerns in the international
community. We must, therefore, carefully consider the
position we want to adopt with respect to BW, CW and other
arms control agreements as well. Promotion of cooperative
measures, such as on-site inspection, will be a common
element in US verification/compliance policy generally. Yet
it must be recognized that there are limits to the utility
of such methods, particularly in the BW/CW area.. On-site
inspection procedures (e.g., the composition of the inspec-
tion team, the number of challenge inspections permitted per
year, the maximum time period between inspection request and
the arrival of the team at the site, the areas to be open to
inspection, etc.) would have to be carefully defined to be
effective without intolerably burdening US industry. Colla-
teral constraints and cooperative measures also would
require careful formulation.
II. Objectives '
with respect both to BW and CW, US objectives'are:.
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-- to support US and Allied CW modernization
efforts;
-- while protecting US intelligence sources
and methods, to expose the magnitude of -
Soviet BW and CW programs and to get the
Soviets to halt or curtail illicit activities;
-- to make the Soviets pay an appropriate
political price for these activities;
-- to reduce Soviet credibility and counter
Soviet propaganda in other areas;
-- to establish useful precedents and send
appropriate signals regarding US policy
in these and other arms control fora; and.
-- to shift the onus for the lack of progress
in CW arms control from the US to the USSR.
III. Strategy
In considering the various strategies for handling
US policy on CW and BW set forth below, it is important to
bear in mind both the linkages and differences which exist
between the two issues.
With respect to BF;, US strategy should be as follows:
-- make one more bilateral demarche to the Soviets
(to be done September 24);
-- use the UNGA First (Political) Committee,
particularly debate on the issue of reports
of CW use in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea,
and discussions in the CD and elsewhere to
continue to expose the CBW activities of the
Soviets and the..r friends to international
criticism;
-- support convening of a meeting of States Parties
to the BWC to seek to strengthen its verification
and compliance mechanisms in the light of concerns
over current lack of compliance, and to provide
an additional forum for highlighting our concerns
over Soviet non-compliance;
failing a satisfactory outcome to. these steps,
the US might take the issue to the UN.Security
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Council and/or withdraw from the BWC.
With respect to CW, there are three issues to be
addresse in deciding our strategy on CW arms control:
-- Will the US support CW arms control of any sort in
any forum?
-- What our ultimate objective for any new
arms control agreement in this field should
be (i.e., a complete ban on CW production,
development and stockpiling, or a more
limited prohibition)?
-- If it is decided to pursue CW arms control
negotiations, what forum should be used to
do so (i.e., US/Soviet bilaterals or multi-
lateral negotiations in the CD)?
Given the unsatisfactory precedent of the BWC, a total
ban on CW production and stockpiling is an ambitious goal.
The question arises as to whether the USG might not better
redirect its efforts toward negotiating less comprehensive
limits on production, stockpiling and/or deployment as an
interim step toward a comprehensive ban. As the US is
already party to an agreement banning CW use, and as
the US has long supported the 'objective of a comprehensive
CW ban, any more limited ban could appear (and would be
portrayed by the USSR) as a step back, designed to legitimize
an increase in US CW capacity rather than to reduce global
capabilities. In addition, it is generally true that a
total ban is not as difficult to monitor as partial limits.
There are two alternative fora for CW arms control
negotiations -- bilateral US/Soviet negotiations or multi-
lateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.
Different approaches have been suggested tailored to these
alternatives channels:
(1) The US could indicate willingness to resume bilateral
CW arms control' negotiations with the Soviets on
the condition that they agree to discuss US concerns
about Soviet activities in the CW/BW field; or
(2) The US could announce that its attitude toward
further CW negotiations will be affected by Soviet
behaviour and international response to evidence
regarding illicit BW/CW activities by the Soviets
and their allies, but that the US could accept CD
-(.,negotiations on a CW agreement, the initiall
focus of which should be on issues of.verifi-
cation and compliance.
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Alternatively the US might announce that Soviet behavior
and unwillingness to resolve US concerns about compliance
with the BWC and international constraints on the use
of CW, as well as Soviet intransigence on effective verifica-
tion arrangements, make it unrealistic and impossible to
pursue a CW prohibition at the present time.
In order to implement the strategy laid out above,
policy decisions on the following points will be required:
-- the strategy agreed by the IG for handling the issue
of Soviet compl-fiance with the BWC;
-- the US objective for CW arms control, if any,
i.e., a comprehensive ban or more limited
constraints;
-- the forum for negotiation of CW arms control,'if
any, i.e., bilateral or in the CD.
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CBW ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY PAPER
Drafted by:CBW Arms Control Working Group
9/25/81
Cleared by:: CIA
NSC
OSD
AC DA
IO/UNP
L/PM
PM/S~P
EUR/RPM
SKraemer
)(In Subs.)
WBode
-
- RMikulak.
- RWilcox
- MMatheson
- JDobbins
MSc nei er
ABohlen
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