DECLARATION OF NATO PRINCIPLES FOR THE 1980 S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000500980002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 9, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
DECLARATION OF NATO PRINC_IPLES_F~R TgE 1 S
--- I TH? ATLANT2C PARTNERSHIP
1. Leaders of the free nations which are parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty, meeting in Bonn 35 years after the
conception of the Marshall Plan, reaffirm their dedication to__-~
the principles which brought about that collective enterprise .
and which inspired the Atlantic Alliance.
2. The NATO mer~bar states are linked by cowman values, ~ ----
vital interests, and a commitment to unity in diversity. They
are founded on shared concepts of democracy, human rights,
justice, and social progress, and the conviction.that the ~~~~
world's future lies not with totalitarian et~ires but w~i.t.h tb~
nations which secure the creative develogment of the individual
in freedom, justice and dignity. The accession of demoeaativ_
Spain both denonstrates and enhances the vitality-of this --
partnership. _~~-
3. The Allies are committed to guaraa~tea and, tbsough they
Alliance to defend, the fundamental liberties which q#wP tb+~r-
lives of their peoples full meaning and potential, among then -
freedom of conscience, of worship, of thought and speech, of
association and movement. Their societies are organised to -~
ensure freedom through the subordination of governments to the
rule ofy~law and consent of the governed. They believe firbly
that each nation should be able to seek its awn destiny in ----
accordance with the will of its people, in full sovereignty and
without outside pressure or threat.
4. The Alliance ensures security by deterring nggrre8sion of
intimidation through the maintenance of credible nuclear and
conventional forces, which will never be employed except in
response to an attack. The presence of America's forcEa in
Europe and the nuclear guarantee provided.by the United States
are a visible sign of this transatlantic solidarity. -_-
-- ..
5. NATO has guaranteed freedom, presesvec~ the peace-arid
safeguarded progress within the Atlantic Community for over a-=
generation. This, the longest period of stability and ~.__-
prosperity.in Europe fn this century, is the best measure of -
the unprecedented ~uccess of the Alliance. --_
coNgza~NTZ~
GDS%~~$~
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the Soviet Union.
permits progr
relationship sought by the Allies, theiz political and economic - -
relations with the Soviet Union cannot but be. affected.:_Th.Ry
will strengthen efforts to ensure that sensitive technologies= _ --
are not transferred to the Soviet Union and will not allow ~ __.
themselves to become dependent on exports to or imports from -=-. -
ensure their security in and beyond the Treaty area. On3.y
through effective deterrence and resolute defense can the
Allies bring the Soviet Union to accept that there is no
alternative to a relationship based on ree~traint and
responsibility. Until Soviet adherence to these principles
ess toward the constructive and secure -
w c g 9
r~erabers. The Zack of such restraint and responsibility on the ._._.----
part of the Soviet Union undermines security and cooperation i.a----
Europe and the world. it also threatens the possibility'fct .
progress-on the full agenda of -East-Went issues and dantege~t tt~ ~-_
prospects for the constructive East-West relationship which ttae
-Allies seek. -_ .
4. Soviet threats anti efforts to divide the AlliOg. have ___- _-
only strengthened their resolve to take those steps necegsatyl.
to maintain deterrence, redress the military balance, artd ~_
II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS
1. Predicated on the indivisibility of Atlantic security,
the Alliance was created and exists today to defend the
Atlantic democracies from the threat posed by Soviet poWeY and
expansionism. This threat continues to grow a8 t~ resulb.-of
Soviet policies aimed at the attainment of military superiority
and Soviet willingness to use or threaten the use of its _,
military strength in Europe and elsewhere. .
2. The increase in Soviet convention:l~ and -n~tcleac . ~~~ ~ '
arrzartents, aimed at achieving military aupesio~ity, continues --
unabated. The Soviet Union bears continuing responsibility for
the repression of the Polish people and persists in waging water
against the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. --~_-
Soviet intimidation of its neighbors, interferenoe in the
affairs of other nations, and exploitation of regional tensions
and domestic unrest threaten international peace and secutity._
3. A stable, progressive world order depends on reciprocal'-
adherence to the principles of restraint and responsibility --
?hi h have lon uided the conduct of the Alliance and its
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5. (Section on conventional defense to be completed.) _
b. The Allies acknowledge the difficulties, particularly
the social costs which impact most heavily on the needy,
caused by the world-wide economic situation. TheA~ the samang
concerted action to overcome these conditions.
t to aafeguaYd
v
ff
- _______ - .
or
time, they affirm that effective e
international peand bedondcthetAtlanticsCommunity.social peace ;
and progress in Y _ ?. ..__.
7. While improving deterrence, the 1-lli~ea also redediCat~r ________
ThBy will
themselves to strengthening peace through dialogue. '_ .
continue to work to maintain peace and security through ~ -----.
stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level.a4. ~'be- ? -~-_- --~
__ .
~.___
binding-and.
ificant
i
.
_
,
gn
negotiation of equitable, militarily s
ts is essential to this ___.
verifiable arms control agreemen
objective. Therefore, they call on the Soviet Union to
demonstrate the restraint and responsibility which are
necessary for achieving progress in arms control and
disarmament. ~-~ ~~
8. (Section on arms control, including CSCEj to b?
completed.)
III. NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS -
1. In an increasingly interdependent world, political, .
economic and military developments outside Europe, parti~~ularly
uences for~th+a
onse
t
q
c
in Southwest Asia, can have importan
vital interests of the Allies. They call on the Soviet nnicnai _-_.
d~et~ca of tba nations of --
to respect the sovereignty and indepen
and gsauine?
rogress
'
it
,
y,
p
the developing world. Stabil
non-alignment depend on freedom to develop economically and
socially without outside interferenge. Th? partners in rho
t contribute to the volution of the
Alliance will continue o __
grave problens confronting the developing nations. They -
challenge the Wazsaw Pact nations to do mare than provide arms)
to these countries. - _----~~
...-.
2. The Allies seek deeper-and_more-const^uc}~i~sPol2hev~l~i
:
_ ~??- -- - ---~
and economic reiaL~va,~ ..?
onsult among themselrea and work
will therefore continue to c
together with others to encourage stability and progress and -
reduce the risks of crisis in the developing world. A number
of Allied countries possess or are determined.to acquira~tbo
cession and to respond to requests by
a
gg
capability to deter
nations for neap in resisting threats to tt~ir:sacuribiC._~z_._._~..;~:
independence. _.- _~_ - _
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NATO SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS GAMEPLAN
NAC. The primary locus for these consultations will be thi
regular weekly NAC meetings at the Permrep level. To help _
ensure these NAC exchanges make a positive contribution they~~ -
should be preceded as appropriate by instructions for demarch~
l
consultations must be geared to solidifying A anc
prior to the Spring DPC and NAC Ministerials. -
.. _ .-
An extensive prograr.: of consultations with tho Allies is: a_ -_._ ~~-- --
must if we are to achieve our overall objectives at the ~IAT4 -~
Summit as well as to help preserve and protect the necessary. - --------
linkages to the yersailles Economic Summit. We should avail ._ _.-- ._
ourselves of the several opportunities presented by various ---
meetings and visits in the coming two to three months (saf -_ ___
attached calendar) to build the necessary consensus fvt as ~ - ---
acceptable Summit outcome. As our own thinking crystalliZes,_-----_.
we will need to adjust the content of our discussions __ - ---
accordingly,-moving from generalized thematic expositions to - -
specific decisions we want the Alliance to take in June?~? We
must also be prepared to address problem areas which Haight ____._.______
develop, e.g., hitches in the Spanish accession-process. Thesa.,___^ .
li a views
in capitals. - - _ .:
Consultations with Ke Allies. In addition, we will want-_
to seek e_ar y agreement with key Allies on critical issues as a
means of generating momentum. ---- __
High level visits. We must also take advantage of high
level visits such as those of Italian President Pertini tMarch
25} and Queen BeatriY of the Netherlands (.April 19-24) Co raise
Surnit-related issces. For example, the latter-visit might =__-:.
prove crucial to our efforts to expedite Dutch ratification of
High level Meetings. There Will likely be at least two SCG
s of
i
_^
n
meetings pr or to the Spring NAC Ministerial the marg
-- _~
which can be usefully exploited as venues for bilateral or -
_
collective consultations with senior Allied officials. Arses --
--:
control aspects of the Summit would be the prisaary but IIot ----
necessarily the only focus of such discussions: The two --
"Sherpa' meetings currently scheduled for April 22--i~3 and May
13-14 will afford opportunities to review with key All~ie$ how
to ensure the Versailles and NATO Summits complement and not- -
overshadow one another. _ ~_
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CON_FID, EN_T211L
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CALENDAR OF MEETINGS AIiD ;/252T8
d J
March.Z3-Z4
March 24
March 25
April 6
April 19-24
r-,- ~R ~
f ~
April 22-23
May 6-7
Mid-May ~ _
May 13-14
~lby ~ ~7-18
NPG Ministerial, Co3~orado~ 5priuq~:~
NAC Discussion of Draft Declar~ttaja
visit of Italian Pxesidant ~Pez;t,~?~
?.
SCG Meetinq, Brussels
Visit of wean Beatris
(NetherlandB~
"Sherpa' Meeting ProvaACa
~-rat3tCl~
DPC Ministerial, Bs~usssls~ ~~-
,. .
SCG Meeting, Brs~s~sls
"Sherpa' Meeting, Y~r.ssi
(with Pol~,t3tal.DireCtos~~: -.
NJ~C Miniatsriei, L~u~cemboutr~
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