NATO SUMMIT PREPARATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000500980004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Treasury -
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel
NSC review completed
UNCLASSIFIED
(With Classified Attachments)
Senior Interagency Group No. 17
SUBJECT: NATO Summit Preparations
Attached you will find the papers for consideration at the
Wednesday, March 3, meeting of the Senior Interagency Group on
NATO Summit preparations.
a~ gr~~itC~~
Executive Secret r
Attachments:
1. Agenda
2. Discussion Paper
3. Work Program
4. Calendar of Relevant Events
State Dept. review completed
March 1, 1982
- Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
- Mr. Michael 0. Wheeler
- COL John Stanford
- LTC Edward Bucknell
CIA -
OVP
NSC
DOD
JCS
UNCLASSIFIED
(With Classified Attachments)
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CONFIDENTIAL
AGENDA FOR MARCH 3 SIG
1. Opening Remarks by Chairman.
2. General discussion of Summit:
A. Outcome.
B. Timing (Relationship to Versailles).
C. Building Blocks.
I. Political Elements:
(1) NATO's Image.
(2) East-West Relations.
(3) East-West Trade and Tech Transfer.
(4) Out-of-Area Issues/Global Concerns.
(5) U.S. Commitment to NATO.
(6) Directions for the Alliance in the
80's.
II. Arms Control:
(1) INF.
(2) START.
(3) MBFR.
(4) CDE.
III. Defense.
3. Work Program/Calendar.
4. Constitution of IG.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SIG DISCUSSION PAPER
THE NATO SUMMIT: AN ATLANTIC AGENDA FOR THE 1980's
The Summit will, first of all, be a forum which focuses
major attention on the leadership of the Alliance. In this,
his first NATO meeting, the US President will occupy center
stage. His influence will be a powerful instrument for
achieving the substantive results we seek; the success or
failure of the Summit will be measured by the extent to which
he is judged to have achieved his goals. The Summit is thus in
every sense of the word a Presidential show. It is therefore
essential that the US emerge from it as the confident leader of
a unified Alliance.
This is all the more important in that the NATO Summit will
take place against the background of serious and growing
differences within the Alliance on a number of economic,
defense and foreign policy issues. In this policy context, the
Summit is an opportunity to focus on areas where there is a
convergence of views within the Alliance, to advance agreement
to the extent possible and to lay the foundation for greater
Alliance consensus in the future. The public message should be
the Alliance's continuing vitality and relevance to the issues
of the 1980's, as well as its enduring unity on fundamental
values. A strong message along these lines will be important
for its impact on three key audiences: the US, Europe and the
USSR. -
Outcome
Against this background, we should work to achieve the
following specific outcomes at the Summit:
--Summit endorsement of the framework of global restraint
and responsibility as an overall Alliance objective. This
framework has been endorsed by the last two NATO Foreign
Ministers' meetings; it groups defense, global concerns and
arms control in a way that puts the Allies on record as sharply
critical of Soviet behavior and moves away from the
detente-defense balance of the Harmel Report, without directly
challenging a concept to which many European leaders remain
committed.
--To point the Alliance in the direction of the 1980's and
a hard look at the problems and opportunities which face it.
An issue for consideration is how specific an outcome we should
seek in this regard; one possibility would be Summit
endorsement for a Wise Men's study on future directions in the
Alliance (not to include detailed defense analysis).. -
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--To make conventional defense issues a major focus of the
Summit. Possible outcomes include a Summit Statement of
Principles for Current and Future Conventional Defense efforts
or, alternately, a mandate for a broad conventional defense
review (see below).
Timing
In planning for the NATO Summit, we need to bear in mind
that it will be immediately preceded by the Versailles Economic
Summit. It is important that neither Summit overshadow the
other (particularly since not all the NATO Allies will
participate in Versailles). Moreover, the treatment of certain
issues at Versailles (for example, East-West trade) will affect
not only how they are handled at Bonn, but to some degree the
atmospherics as well.
Building Blocks
To achieve the outcomes we want, we have at our disposal
the following building blocks:
I. Political Issues
1.-.NATO's Image: The Summit should project an image of
Alliance vitality and relevance. Assuming the necessary
ratification procedures are completed in time, Spain's entry
into NATO will be the major event in this regard--a symbol of a
vigorous, growing Alliance. We should also highlight NATO's
enduring common commitment to peace through security and to
fundamental Western values.
2. East-West Relations . In all likelihood, Poland will
be a major subject for discussion at the Summit. We will want
to highlight the common elements of the Alliance position and
focus on what has been achieved. Whether we will also want to
seek further movement on sanctions will depend on
circumstances, including the treatment of the sanctions issue
at the Versailles Summit.
Beyond Poland, the Summit declaration should focus on the
outlines of East-West relations for the 1980's, building on the
framework of global restraint and responsibility developed at
the last two Foreign Ministers' meetings. This will link
defense, global concerns and arms control in the context of a
generally critical Allied stance on Soviet behavior. It will
also continue the shift in Alliance statements away from the
Harmel Report's equibalanced emphasis on defense and detente.
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3. Out-Of-Area Issues and Global Concerns. Building on
the heightened Allied concern over out-of area threats to the
Alliance that has evolved over the past two years as a result
of Afghanistan and other objectionable Soviet behavior, and
using our overall framework of global restraint and
responsibility, we will want explicit recognition by the Summit
of this threat. Specifically, we should seek language in the
Summit declaration endorsing individual or collective Alliance
efforts which contribute to out-of-area stability and to
Western and regional security. We should continue to nudge the
Allies on the specific areas where we have sought increased
cooperation from them. However, we also wish to avoid divisive
debate at the Summit on issues where we continue to have
important differences--for example, the Arab-Israeli dispute,
El Salvador and Libya.
4. The US Commitment to NATO. A reaffirmation of the full
U.S. commitment to Europe's defense and security for the 1980's
should be a major feature of the Summit. It would represent a
powerful marker that the US, 35 years after the Marshall plan,
remains wedded to an Alliance rather than a unilateral
course--in our own national interest as well as for the sake of
the Allies. We will want such an affirmation to be in the
context of solid Allied support by all for stronger NATO
defense.
5."}' Directions for the Alliance in the 1980's. The Summit
should convey a sense of a forward-looking Alliance--that is,
an Alliance willing to take a close fresh look at the concerns
that will face it during the 1980's. As noted above, this
could be accomplished in a number of ways: one would be to
have the Summit call for a Wise Men's study of future
directions in the Alliance; such an undertaking could deal with
broad questions of the Alliance's role in the 1980's and
beyond: for example, NATO's approach to the Soviet Union and
East-West relations; relations of Allies with the Third World;
consultative modalities; NATO and the public, etc. (but not
detailed defense analysis).
II. Defense
Conventional defense should be a major focus of the Summit,
with the need for a greater common Allied undertaking and the
relevance of conventional efforts to raising the nuclear
threshold as important underlying themes. Whether or not to
seek specific increased commitments at that time is a question
we need to answer. In any case, we should seek to lay-the
groundwork for a sustained future effort.
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As regards specific summit outcomes, several are possible.
One would be a Summit Statement of Principles for current and
future conventional defense efforts, which could encompass
burden sharing, defense spending levels, RSI, defense equipment
cooperation, and improved planning. Another would be to have
the Summit mandate a broad review of NATO's conventional
defense posture designed to explore improved ways to implement
NATO's strategy of forward defense.
III. Arms Control
Whether we will want significant arms control outcomes at
the Summit will depend to a large degree on the situation in
Poland at that time. Certain of our Allies will have a strong
interest in an arms control outcome; the Bonn venue will make
this particularly compelling for the Germans. In addition, the
near simultaneous meeting of the SSOD will guarantee a major
public focus on arms control (Schmidt himself will be going a
few days after the Summit). Below are some possible building
blocks for an arms control outcome; other initiatives can be
considered as appropriate:
1. INF. While INF should not be a major focus of Summit
attention, the summit should sustain the momentum of the
President's November 18 INF proposal. A possible outcome, if
it would be helpful in the context of Allied unity, would be
Summit endorsement to the basic principles of our negotiating
approach, particularly those where we anticipate eventual
European pressure to compromise (i.e. global vs. regional
limits; non-inclusion of third country systems; focus on
missiles). In parallel with any endorsement of our negotiating
approach, the Summit declaration should also contain a
reaffirmation of the modernization track, along the lines of
the Gleneagles formula.
2. START. Events in Poland, will, of course be a
determining factor on this question. If the decision to begin
START negotiations is made before June, the announcement should
be timed for maximum impact at the Summit. An announcement
made shortly beforehand, perhaps in the President's Westminster
speech, could help secure European support for our other Summit
objectives and dampen charges from the Europeans that this
Administration is uninterested in arms control.
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3. MBFR. We may be in a position to move forward the new
approach to MBFR which we are now exploring with the UK and
FRG. This would link any initial US-Soviet reduction to a
commitment to subsequent, more substiantial reductions leading
to the common ceiling--thus ensuring militarily significant and
advantageous results. This would give the Alliance an-
initiative in the conventional arms control area and might in
succeeding months deflect some of the pressure from the INF
negotiations. However, any new MBFR initiative would have to
be carefully considered in the context of the current Polish
situation. It should, in addition, be carefully integrated
with whatever outcomes we seek on conventional defense.
4. CDE. By June, CSCE will probably be in recess, with
plans to reconvene in the fall. There may be pressure from
some of the Allies to say something' positive at the Summit
about CDE. We should insist that any such statement make clear
the link to the situation in Poland (and of course the need for
balance on human rights).
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CONFIDENTIAL
NATO SUMMIT
SIG/IG WORK PROGRAM
COMPLETION TASK RESPONSIBILITY COMMENT
March 3
1st SIG meeting
March 8
Circulate for IG:
3. To include
1. Congr. game plan
State
Ministerials,
2. Draft Summit Decl.
State
Key Allies, NATO
3. Consult. Strat.
State
Permreps, Visits
with Allies
March 10
1st IG meeting
March 12
Draft Summit Decl. to
Must get out early
USNATO
State
if US to keep lead
March 15
Circulate for IG:
1. Draft cable to USNATO
on Summit defense
State/DOD
component
2. Draft Pres. ltr to
NATO Heads of St/Govt
State
March 17
Meeting of IG or WG
Wk of 3/15
Discussions with Hill
May seek resolution
on support for Summit
NSC
supporting US posi-
(res/hrgs/studies, etc.)
tion before and/or
after Summit
March 19
Action memo to Pres.
on Summit Issues/Themes
State
March 26
Action Memo to Pres.
on sked and bilats
State
April 5
Presidential ltr to NATO
We will want to nail
Heads of St/Govt
State
down US approach to
summit
April 9
Formal tasking for Summit
NSC/State/
preparations (brfg bks)
DOD
CONFIDENTIAL
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COMPLETION TASK RESPONSIBILITY COMMENT
April 16
Status Rpt on DPC Min.
Will be key meeting
preparations as they
DOD
for agreement on de-
relate to Summit
fense aspects of
Summit
April 23
Final decisions on
sked/bilats
April 27
Status Rpt on NAC Min.
There is emerging
preparations as they
State
consensus at NATO
relate to Summit
that Summit Declara-
tion should be
agreed by Ministers
at Spring NAC
May 21
Final version of Summit
scope paper
State
May 24
Summit briefing books
completed
May 26
(As appropriate) Final
The Bonn
drafts of President's
State
speech will be
Westminister and Bonn
key stage-setter
speeches
for the Summit
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NATO SUMMIT: CALENDAR OF RELEVANT EVENTS
April 5
April 19-23
Late April
May 1
May 6-7
May 17-18
May 21
June 1
June 4-6
June 7
June 8-9
June 9-10
Instructed NATO Permreps exchange on Summit
Declaration themes.
Congressional discussions begin.
Instructed Permreps exchange on draft Summit
declaration.
NPG Ministerial, Colorado Springs.
Presidential letter to NATO Heads of State/
Government dispatched.
SPD Congress.
Possible MBFR Trilateral.
Completion of START interagency work.
DPC Ministerial, Brussels.
NAC Ministerial, Luxembourg.
Final version of Summit scope paper due.
Backgrounder on Summits for Washington Press
Corps.
Versailles Economic Summit.
President's visit to Rome.
President's visit to London.
NATO Summit in Bonn.
CONFIDENTIAL
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
QDC1
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DOG
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/EEO
14
D/Pers
15
D/OEA
16
C/PAD/OEA
17
SA/IA
V
18
A0/DCI
19
C/IPD/OIS
20
21
22
Executive Secretary
Z
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