SIG DISCUSSION PAPER ON GULF OF SIDRA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000501120004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 12, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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July 12, 1982
NSC review completed -may be declassified in full
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Senior Interagency Group No. 14
TO OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
CIA -
DOD - COL John Stanford
SUBJECT: SIG Discussion Paper on Gulf of Sidra
Attached is a discussion paper for the SIG meeting Wednesday,
July 14, at noon. It reflects interagency comments. The intel-
ligence assessment referred to in the paper is available through
CIA and DIA channels.
TS820295/1.
CY~,_
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~'OP SECRET/SENSITIV.E (Working Paper)
SIG Discussion Paper: Gulf of Sidra
Issue: Should the US exercise in international waters claimed
by Libya and, if so, when and how?
1. Background
The United States has traditionally held naval exercises
in the Gulf of Sidra off Libya. A summary of those exercises,
including those which penetrated Libyan-claimed waters, is at
Tab 1. In 1973 Libya claimed that the Gulf, south of the line
12 nm north of 32 30' (see map at Tab 2), was Libyan territor-
ial waters. For the following six years the US continued ex-
ercises in the Gulf and sometimes below the Libyan closure
line. Following Libyan protests in 1980 and Libyan harrassment
of US reconnaissance flights, the US decided to discontinue ex-
ercises in Libyan claimed waters during the period of tension
caused by the Iran hostage crisis.
In August 1981, the US resumed its exercise program in the
area and penetrated below the closure line with aircraft and
ships. Two Libyan aircraft attacked US fighters below the line
and were shot down. Since then no US aircraft or ship has
penetrated the zone, even on routine reconnaissance missions.
Qadhafi has since repeatedly and publicly claimed that any
further US penetration of the Libyan zone would result in hos-
tile reaction on the part of the Libyans.
The issue currently under review is whether to hold an
exercise in the Gulf of Sidra this August. If it is decided to
hold an exercise in the area again, DOD recommends that the ex-
ercise be similar in character to last year's missile exercise,
i.e., that missiles would be fired at target drones. The ex-
ercise would be publicly designated as an area hazardous to
navigation through standard international notification proce-
dures. During the course of the exercise which may last up to
two days, US aircraft and ships will operate below the Libyan
claimed closure line.
The Gulf of Sidra is the most desirable place in the Medit-
teranean available for unconstrained open ocean missile exer-
cises. Our 1981. exercise there was part of our worldwide pro-
gram of challenging territorial water claims that we do not
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accept. Last year's exercise was, however, more than a resump-
tion of our previous exercise pattern. The exercise last year
was part of a US program to stand up to Libyan lawlessness.
To deter Libyan support of terrorism and subversion and to
encourage those opposing Libya, the US took a number of other
steps
o increased security assistance and intelligence co-
operation with threatened states;
o closed the Libyan People's Bureau in 'rJashington;
o withdrew American citizens from Libya; and
o imposed economic sanctions against Libya.
2. Relationship of an Exercise to U5 Objectives
Despite some attempts to reduce their visibility of sup-
port, the Libyans have continued to finance and foster terrorist
groups and forces subverting such friendly regimes as Sudan and
Somalia.
Some conditions have changed, however, since the exercise
last August. (1) Most of the. American citizens who were in
Libya have left at the request of the USG, (2) we have the com-
plicating factor of the current Lebanon crisis and it after-
math, (3) Qadhafi no longer has as much potential economic
leverage through withholding his oil from the world market;
the US, in particular, has no dependence on Libyan oil because
its importation has been banned, (4) allied and littoral
nations have expressed uneasiness about the prospects of an-
other exercise and a strong desire to be informed before any
further challenge to Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra, (5)
the Iranian defeat of Iraq has caused humilitation among Arab
nations and an invasion of Iraq is anticipated, and (6) we have
the precedent of a shootdown during the last exercise.
It is possible that in the wake of his anticipated election
to the OAU chairmanship in early August, Qadhafi will attempt
to use the OAU as a cover for further aggression (perhaps .the
introduction of Libyan forces into Chad again).
Holding another US exercise in the Gulf of Sidra could re-
inforce our opposition to Qadhafi and could encourage those
within and without Libya who oppose the Qadhafi regime. None-
theless, there are risks, as discussed below.
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As is indicated in the intelligence assessment attached,
Libya can be expected to attack any US exercise in the Gulf of
Sidra. Qadhafi has undertaken efforts to improve the capabil-
ity of Libya to respond to US forces operating in the Gulf of
Sidra. Dispersal and increased protection of aircraft indicate
that Libya expects US action in the event of conflict between _
forces at sea. One key judgment of the interagency assessment
is that hostile Libyan action against an exercise would almost
certainly involve attempting to intercept US aircraft and could
include attacks on US ships by fighter aircraft, submarines,
or ship launched surface-to-surface missiles.
At the same time, Libya has shown a facade of reasonable-
ness by indicating a willingness to have the US-Libyan differ-
ences over the Gulf .closure line adjudicated in the International
Court of Justice. Some states may question why we resumed ex-
ercises_without exploring that offer. Nonetheless, going to
the ICJ would set a precedent which many other nations could
use regarding their disputed waters.
In addition to the Libyan reaction, those of other states
are also central to our decision:
o Regional states will react in a largely negative, but
not uniform manner. Qadhafi has few friends in regional states
(except Syria, Ethiopia, and PDRY). Nonetheless, most area
governments would fear negative public reactions from their
people viewing the US "beating up" on a brother Arab state.
Some believe that area governments opposed to Qadhafi (Morocco, Tunisia,
Egypt) could view another incident as a futile gesture that
could increase Qadhafi's public standing, in the absence of
a. concerted program to assist in the establishment of a new
regime in Tripoli. The key issue this summer is the delicate
state of US relations with the Arab world because of Arab
perception of US support for Israel in Lebanon. A U5 action
that is seen in the Arab world as a provocation could tip the
balance against us at this delicate time.
o African reactions might be conditioned by the time
proximity of the exercise to the OAU summit in Tripoli during
the first week in August. They would react negatively if the
-exercise appeared to be a reaction to the OAU's selection of
Qadhaf i as chairman.
o European states could also react negatively to another
incident because it could add to anti-American feelings in
Europe if the US were seen to be provoking military confronta-
tions. Moreover, several Allies (Italy, Turkey) have lucrative
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economic ties with Libya and fear Libyan reprisals against US
bases in Europe.
o The Soviet Union would probably not back Libya with any-
thing more than propaganda and renewed offers to sell military
hardware. The Libyans are currently having a severe cash-flaw
problem and might be unable to buy new arms. They might be
forced to give in to Soviet base demands in trade for new arms.
In any event, CIA believes that the Soviets might increase
their naval and aircraft visits. An enlarged Soviet advisory
group is also a possible outcome.
3. War Powers
The War Powers Resolution requires prior consultations
with the Congress "in every possible instance" and a report
within 48 hours of the introduction of US forces into situa-
tions in which imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances. In 1981, there was no formal
War Powers notification or report, since we had no reason to
anticipate that hostilities were likely. Congressional leaders
were briefed after the exercises. Given the fact that Qadhafi
has publicly said he would attack US ships if they re-entered
the Gulf, the issue will need to be considered in connection
with any new exercise. We would need to assess the risk of
hostilities based on available information regarding Libyan
intentions immediately prior to an exercise to determine
whether prior consultations and a report would be required.
It would be prudent to consult in advance with the Congress
~n any event, however, to assure understanding of our objec-
tives. If any hostile incidents were to occur, we would need
to assess what further actions would be required under the
Resolution.
4. Rule of Engagement
Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE), which are predicated
on the inherent right of self-defense, will be in effect for
the exercise. Under peacetime ROE, a commander facing a situa-
tion where the potential for hostile action is present would
first attempt to control the situation without resorting to
force, either by separating his force from that particular
situation, or by communicating a warning to a potential adver-
sary to cease his activity or leave the area. Should a hos-
tile act be committed against a US unit, the commander would
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attempt to control the situation by applying defensive measures
(to include the use of minimum force) against the individual
perpetrator at first, and not the entire force to which the
adversary belongs. If it becomes evident that there are no
other means to dissuade another force from hostile action, the
on-scene commander is authorized to use armed force in order
to defend his forces. Each incident must be considered on an
individual basis and reevaluated as circumstances dictate.
5. US Response Options
In the event of large-scale or repeated Libyan attacks on
US forces, Washington authorities could permit the US forces
to move beyond immediate self-defense to initiate strikes
against aircraft and ships which, although deployed, had not
begun to attack. If strikes against Libyan territory are neces-
sary for self-defense, Washington authorities would have to re-
view the option to conduct strikes against military targets,
such as airfields, naval bases, and command and Control sites,
from which attacks were launched. Detailed plans are available
for review by the National Command Authority. Additional Con-
gressional consultations would be required as soon as possible
under either of these response options. (CIA believes that
strikes against military targets inside Libya would generate
certain international condemnation and raise the possibility of
active involvement by Soviet advisors already in Libya. )
6. Variables in a Decision
There are three factors that will comprise a decision on
this issue: a) whether to continue to exercise in Libyan
claimed waters, b) when to exercise next, and c) what type of
exercise to hold.
o Whether to Continue Exercises. All agencies support
continued exercises in Libyan claimed waters. These exercises
area necessary manifestation of our willingness to stand-up
to Libya, to support our world-wide freedom of navigation chal-
lenge program, and provide the Navy with desirable training.
Last year, several states (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Tunisia,
Sudan, Jordan, and Oman, to name a few) indicated approval of
US action in private if not publicly. In many cases, they
cited the fact that the US had conducted the operation in inter-
national waters and had given adequate notification to all con-
cerned. ~.
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TOP SECRST/SENSITIVE
If we do not exercise in the Gulf of Sidra anytime in the
future, there might be negative results for the US. The ab-
sence of another exercise would be noticed by regional states.
Qadhafi might point to the fact that he had deterred the US
with his threats. A recent Newsweek story that we had decided
against an exercise this year may provoke such a response. If
the US media emphasize that Washington decided not to hold an
exercise out of fear of incurring casualties, or for similar
reasons, it could tempt Qadhafi into imprudent statements.
Qadhafi might take note of the anniversary of the Gulf of Sidra
exercise in the Libyan press, reminding the public of the great
"victory" that the regime won by engaging a superpower in de-
fense of Libyan territory.
When to Exercise Next
The timing of an exercise is dependent upon the Sixth
Fleet carrier rotation schedule. The next target date for an
exercise is August 23. Ago/no-go decision would be required
no later than August 15, in order to consult with Congress,
notify the Allies, and issue an order for a notice to airmen
and mariners.
If the decision is taken that late, planning and movement
of assets (target drones, etc.) will have occurred. Because of
the large number of people involved in such planning and move-
ment, the chances of a press leak would be fairly high. Thus,
although it is possible to defer a decision until mid-August,
and then to defer the exercise, doing so may run the risk of
press stories that the US had cancelled a scheduled exercise.
Future carrier schedules indicate that the next best time will
be January 1983.
One view holds that we should not exercise in August.
This argument is that the normal adverse Arab reaction to a.
US-Libyan incident would be unacceptably negative in the wake
of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Arab states would still
be assessing our role in the Lebanon crisis and Arab publics.
would continue to feel anti-American sentiments. An incident
that could be seen as the US provoking an Arab state, could
produce sharply anti-US responses that would undercut the
-ability of moderate regimes to cooperate with us. This view
holds that we should prepare for an exercise in January.
Another view holds that we should exercise in August to
reinforce our freedom of the seas claim, and maintain~pres-
sure on Qadhafi as he begins his year as OAU chairman. This
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view holds that the climate in the Arab world may have improved
by late August, particularly if the US had by then been instru-
mental in saving the PLO in Beirut and effecting the beginnings
of an Israeli withdrawal. This view also holds that the Arab
world regards Libya as a separate issue from Lebanon, that
many in the Arab world reject Qadhafi, and that Arabs would
not see US action against Libya as part of a plot with the
Israelis to attack Arab states.
What Type of Exercise
The JCS recommend a missile exercise, as described earlier.
Such an exercise can be justified on the grounds of necessary
training, as well as the other reasons mentioned earlier. More?
over, a missile exercise may put the Task Force in a better
defensive position should the Libyans attack.
Another option is to sail through the Libyan claimed
waters with some number of ships and aircraft, without prior
notification to commercial traffic. The Intelligence commun-
ity believes that Libya would probably detect the movement and,
because Libyan forces have been told to expect a US invasion,
would probably respond aggressively. They might not, however,
have time to mount a major attack because of the absence of
prior notification.
The sail through option has some attractiveness because
by not clearly confronting Qadhafi it might limit the Libyan
response and, thus, the scope of any incident. Nonetheless,
the unexpectedness of a sail through may, CIA believes, jolt
the Libyans into an overreaction. Another disadvantage is that
it would allow Q adh afi to claim that he had deterred the US
from the type of exercises we had done in the past. The goal
of challenging Libyan territorial claims would be met, but the
goals of standing up to Qadhafi and providing missile training
might not be.
7. When and How to Notify Our Allies
For the 1981 Gulf of Sidra exercise, it was decided that
the US would do no more than have low level embassy officials
draw the attention of regional states to the issuance by the
US of Notices to Mariners (NOMAR) and Notices to Airmen (NOTAM)
3-5 days before the exercise. We chose this course to: 1)
limit time available to protest the exercise, and 2) minimize
Libyan preparations.
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Because of last year's incident and Qadhafi's public claims
that he will attack US forces in the Gulf and US nuclear facil-
ities in Europe if we stage another exercise, regional. states
and our Allies believe that we have an obligation to consult
with them over what they anticipate will be an exercise with
escalatory potential.
The decision tree, and a comparison of goals and options,
is at Tab 3. It should be noted that only a decision to con-
tinue exercises requires follow-on decisions; and only a deci-
sion to have some exercise in August requires a decision at
this time on the type of exercise. A decision to plan now for
an exercise on August 23, 1982 would entail a go/no-go decision
on execution by August 15.
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 .SECRET - ---- _..
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Subject: US Operations in the Vici;~ity of the Gulf of Sidra {S)
NA.7O:? POI*7TS : .
- Oct 73: Pern;anent representative of Libyan Fsrab
Republic to United Nations announced in a note verbale
that the Gulf of Sidra sout:: of 32?30'N was an integral
part of LIbya and under its complete sovereignty.
- COh1SIXTHF~LT condacts two-three opera ocean mi~siie
exercises each year to maintain fleet readiness
-- Gulf of Sidra is best area in Fl~diterranean to
conduct missile firings(located in inter;,ational
waters)
-- Other missile firing rar^,yes available to SIXT~3i'LT
are in controlled airspace which require prioc
coordination/scheduling
--- Namfi - scheduled through SHAPE IiQS; located
` north of Crete ~ ~.
--- Salto di Querra - controlled by Italians; located
southeast of aardinia
r
-Jul 77 - Apr 79: SIXTHFLT conducted exercises in Gulf
of Sidra on 5 occasions.,(Jul 77; Mar, Ju1,.Sep 78; Apr 79)
-- Not all exercises included operations south or
3 2 ? 3 0 '~'~
h
~ not w_re t
ey all missile exercises (MISSILEX)
Open ocean MISSILEX (OOM) a.id transit actiuit:?,~-- --
.-- 7 Sep 78 OOM: No .operations south of 32?30'N
-- 15/~?7 Feb 79 transit: Flight operations to' within 55N,S
of Libya _
--- D1o Libyan reaction
29 Jul 79 OOAi: Two S-3 aircraft conducted surveillance
operations south of 32?30'N for ap;~roxima;~ely night'
minutes -
--- Libyans protested MISSILEX
-- 20/22 Jan 80 transit: Two surface ships transited
across Gulf of Sidra at-32?35'N
--- No Libyan reactions noted
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-- 14 Jun 80 001: NOTAM included area south of 32?30'i~
--- Note verbaln delivered stating t~iat Libya "pro-
tests this hostile action and at tt--e sane time
reserves her right to ta'~ce all the meas;~res,
which she deeps ap?r~priate, to defend h?r
rights and legitimate interests ~,rithin her
territorial waters."
--- Libyans declared three airspace restrictions to
conduct military training in the same ar?a.
=-- State (Mr. David t~~wson) and OSD (;ir. R. Tnl. Komer )
requested that no US exercise activity be condc:cted~
south of 32?30'N
--- :linimal Libyan reaction to exercise (reconnais-
sauce activity}
-- 2i Sep 80 OOM: NOTAM included area south of 32?30'ti
--- Libyans protested operation
? s
--- Libyans declared forces_would exercise in same
area `~
--- Libyan air and surface activity and Soviet naval
"-
delayed the exercise
SUM~!ARY
_.__-_--
- During the June and Sep 1980 00~2s, US has cancelled planned activity.
south of 32?30'N in .response to Libyan protests
--- Provided tacit recognition of Libya's illegal
. mariti,m_ clai;r:
- NSC "Navigation and Overflight Policy Paper" a{~p:oved
in Feb 79 states: ~' - -
-- "US should exercise its rights in the face of
illegal claims to the extent practicable and should
avoid a~~tio~ls which are viewad as acquiescence in
such illegal claims."
----.Portions of the exercise were cancelled
--- Operations south of. 32?30~N cancelled
- ~. _
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~[EDITERRANEAN SEA
4 1 'B ~ Y. A
Nuts: TM U.S Govs-nn+s+rt rscoDntssr oMy
? 3 *rvtio~ mH? tsrrhwbl sas.
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AIRCRAFT TRAGIC
SNIP,'TRACK
FIGHTER CAP STATIGI~S
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T e of E~+ercise
foals
Live
Political Signal
LOS
i4issil~
About Qadhafi
Challenge
Training
Program
Missile Exercise
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sail Thru Exer
Maybe
Yes
No
Table 2
Decision Chart on Sidra Exercise
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
M5LEX
What
August
When to
Type
YES
Whether
Exercise
Next
Sail
Thru
to continue
exercises
January_
O]
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Ability of Options to Meet Policy Goals
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_
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
D
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
~
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/EEO
14
D/Pers
15
D/OEA
16
C/PAD/OEA
.
7
SA/IA
V'
18
AO/DCI
19
C/IPD/OIS
20
1~ ' -,
~
21
22
Exe`tu ivY4~ `e~retary
~..
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