D/NESA COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT PAPER "LEBANON: ELEMENTS OF A US STRATEGY."

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490057-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 57
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490057-5
D/NESA Comments on the draft paper "Lebanon: Elements of
a US Strategy."
With a few minor changes the tics on P. 8 of the draft
represent the list of objectives I submitted to the working
group putting this paper together. I would like to take off
from my original list and offer some thoughts on how those
objectives might be achieved to take advantage of the change
in the status quo brought about by the Israeli invasion.
My original list was:
1. Withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon.
2. Withdrawal of Syrian forces from western Lebanon
to the Northern Biqa' Valley.
3. Withdrawal of Palestinian forces from south
Leban n to their camps in the Beirut area, the
shifting of all their heavy weapons to Syria and
an agreed upon number of armored elements to be
stationed in the camps for security purpose with
small arms only
4. cDisbanding and/or integration into the LAF of
all militias, including Haddad's.
5. The creation of a strong credible LAF.
6. The election of a strong Lebanese President.
7. he establishment of an international fund to
work for the reconstruction of Lebanon .7
first and essential step is to convene in Beirut,
h
e
T
as soon as possible, a conference of key Lebanese political
figures to agree on the above. The LAF could begin its
rehabilitation by taking over the security arrangements in
the city, doing away with the "Green Line" that divides the
city and enforcing the "no militia" rule.
The Israelis will not leave Lebanon unless the security
of their northern borders is guaranteed and unless the new
status quo is recognized. I believe the following formulation
would satisfy the Israelis while, at the same time, work toward
the creation of a strong Lebanese Army and the disbanding of
militias. Lebanese militias will be notified that their mem-
bers will have three choices:
Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490057-5
 Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490057-5
Qualified members can join the LAF, join a regional national
guard or turn in their military weapons and retire. In a
national guard mode the men remaining in the militias will
not wear uniforms or bear arms unless they are in training,
or are called out in a civil disturbance or natural catastrophe.
Also, they will not cross the lines of their assigned regions
(like our own state national guards). They will be responsible
to the governor and ultimately the President.
Immediately after the conference of notables in Beirut is
over, security for Beirut will be turned over to the gendarmerie
and the expanded LAF will move south to take over positions from
the Lebanon-Israeli border to the Litani. This newly expanded
LAF will need credible arms from the US and will have to have
US military training teams (MTTs) to work with them to bring
about their rapid improvement. This will show a US commitment,
while strenghtening the LAF and should satisfy the Israelis'
concerns about this area.
The area from the Litani north to Sidon will be covered
by an expanded UNIFIL force. The main goal of this force will
be to keep heavy weapons from being introduced into this region.
This is the one task UNIFIL performed well in the south and
should meet Israeli concerns. If this force is vetoed by the
Soviets, the Lebanese Government should request an interna-
tional force structured along UNIFIL lines. The Arab oil
states should be tapped to pay for this force. The US should
decline to participate in this force citing its involvement in
"training" the LAF to the south.
The conference of notables should appoint several commit-
tees to deal with the following problems:
1. The Palestinian Committee. This committee
should work with the Palestinian leadership to es-
tablish camp areas in the Beirut region, in the Biqa'
and in North Lebanon near Tripoli. An agreement on
the number of armed men per camp and the types of
weapons should also be reached. Lastly, it should
make it clear that no force will have heavy weapons
in Lebanon except the LAF and possibly some Syrian
units in the Northern Biqa':
2. The Election Committee. This committee, which
would include Muslims, will agree upon a strong
presidential candidate who will have wide accept-
ance.
Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490057-5
 Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490057-5
3. The Military Committee. Will oversee the crea-
tion of a strong credible military force responsible
to the central government.
4. The Reconstruction Committee. Will draw up a
plan for the reconstruction of Lebanon, with the
priority on South Lebanon, and seek funding for
that plan.
The Syrian position will be a delicate one and should be
handled by means of a statement issued by the conference of
notables recognizing the special relationship between Syria
and Lebanon, the vital role Syria played during the civil war
and asking Syria to remain in the Northern Biqa' Valley pend-
ing the election of a new president who will be empowered to
discuss Syrian force presence in Lebanon with the Syrian Gov-
ernment on the basis of understanding each other's security
requirements.
If the conference of notables can agree on most of the
above, and it should do so quickly, this game plan should be
presented to the Israelis with a request that they withdraw
from Lebanon according to a schedule that reflects a certain
achievement level of each of the goals. The US must urge
Israel, in the strongest possible terms, to come up with a
reasonable withdrawal schedule soonest to ensure the credibil-
ity of the new political situation in Lebanon.
Comment: I believe the Israelis are waiting for us to
push for something like this. They can't do it themselves
because it would never sell, it would have an Israeli stamp.
They have presented us with an opportunity and we must be
forceful and creative enough to seize it and act boldly.
Consultations with appropriate parties, including the Israelis,
would be in order.
Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490057-5