TALKING POINTS: SOVIET REACTIONS TO MIDDLE EAST FIGHTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490104-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 104
• Publication Date: June 7, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490104-2
S':CRr^?r
TALKING POINTS:; Soviet Reactions to Middle East Fighting
7 June 1982
To-US Naval Movements
The SovIlet Navy is unlikely, to interfere with the proposed
US evacuation-of civilian personnel from Lebanon.
.(
SoviOt! ships normally conduct surveillance of US naval
movements and we would expect them to trail the transit
group and intcnsify'surveillance as the US increases the
number of ships in-the Ea3tern Mediterranean.
In pet Mid?,Aast crises, the Soviets have limited
theca elves to similar nooprovocative actions.
There ae. 40 Soviet ships currently in the Mediterranean
w
c
w are at
anchorages it the Eastern Mediterranean. Two destroyers And an
attack subraakine are making a th eduled port call in Dubrovnik,
Yugoslavia a d a single nuclear-powered cruise missile attack
including eijht:surface combatants--five of
hi
h
and severa' smaller ships to
art as tattletales--may move to the
area off the. (coast of. Lebanon to Monitor the US evac
Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490104-2
submarine is on patrol in the Central Mediterranean.. A portion
of these for~es~-probah7y at pease. one major surface combatant
.,indications off Soviet ship movements. in reaction to the Lebanon
crisis.
uat.on
operation. AIecause of the conflict in Lobanon, the Soviets also
may decide to gradually. reinforce the Mediterranean Squadron as
they have done during previous cri:;as. . Thus far there is no
 Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490104-2
SECRET
the Preseint Situation:
Lebanon to- rally both radical and moderate: Arabs and to isolate
the. US with-11srael in the Middle East.
Soviet media. has reacted quickly and predictably,
repeated a charge that Israeli incursion was
?*co di.lmated" with the US.
Leba4eve-Syrian coast and t?cr augment the Squadron.
IncrlAse - intelligence collection oa the area and provide
inteI1igence support to Syrian and PLO leaders
Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490104-2
fou1ait*g ; on alleged US-Israeli
conflict remains
Israeli,-Syrian clash
confined to Lebanon with no major
Moscow's response will not go beyond media
of US and Israel.. .During previous
and diplomat3.c sonde)nations
confrontati4t over
Syrian3 any preason
Lebanon,
Soviet military support
Soviets probrbly anticipate
W11 .increas
.To Major larieli-Syrian Clashes in Lebanon:
any action against the Israelis. The
that, in
the
any event,
Syrian and Palestinian,pol._itical
the situation
and military
dependence of the USSR. 'r I Sdvs et14.1. Pk.lt~ r, ?/ ON 6 74,
174 yJt, f ` , W O fr rM1lw r,4&. s V,# Ap
Neverth~:less, a major clash
current crisis in
collusion. Pravda- today
Syria
1-C,
and Israel in
Lebanon. would probably prompt the Soviets,- to take steps- -.short of
,direct militry intervention---to demonutr.ate support for Syria.
In this case!
the USSR is likely t;o:
--~ Mount an immediate resupply operation to Syria.
Repn4i ti.onpart of the Mediterranean Squadron toward the
the Soviets have never given the
believe that the Damascus would have direct
 Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490104-2
Over. the. past several weeks, however, the Soviets have
appeared somLwhat?more ambiguous regarding backlog for Syria.
A senior Soviet Middle East expert recently told our
chare. in Amma-a that the USSR cannot stand idly by if
Syri n "targets" are attacked in Lebanon by Israel
.prey imahl y a re.Ference to Syrian SAM sites in Bekaa.
One report alleges USSR has
p g promised Damascus that an
Israeli attack on the SAMs would prompt Soviet personnel
to assume a greater role in Syria's air defense.
This could mean that Soviet air defense units would assume
some of the fir defepse burden around Damascus in Syria, visably
demonstrating. Soviet support and freeing Syrian crews to move to
Lebanon. A $iskier---and far less likely--option would be to
5uV1ET Aut W A10 MIStj#.E i.
introduce Sojriet fighter unit-:,into Syria. oviat fighter units
could be mov d by air and be ready for operations in a mirlimum of
three days
At the UN:
Soviet ~ctiviti.es in the-UN will be designed to make
political ca
ital. with thA Arabs
at, US erpe.nse.
Sov'i+.t Ambassador to Lebanon told reporters yesterday
that I the USSR wi.11 `take all measures available to
''den,unce" srael.
The *SSR will support any resolution calling for
sanctions against Israel.
Approved For Release 2007/07/12 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000601490104-2
25X1