SOVIET VIEWS OF AN IRANIAN INVASION OF IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000601500005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 12, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2007/07/11: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601500005-0
Talking Points for the DD
SOVA/CS/
12 July 1982
Soviet Views of an Irania
Soviets against it.
-- Soviets have--in
private that the
In Soviet eyes, the liabil
outweigh any potential ad
-- On the plus side
** They have
a low-key way--made known in public and
sties of an Iranian invasion greatly
love for Saddam, who has been moving
scow, and would like him out.
elcome any instability in conservative
states that Iranian predominance in
t produce.
hand:
away from M
They would
Persian Gull
Baghdad'mig
They have nci interest in seeing spread of Iranian-
style funda4entalism near their southern border.
S
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S
If Iran invades, Soviets re likely to avoid decisive action in
order to preserve their p sition with both sides.
-- If invasion were limited or got bogged down
** Pro-Iranian
An Iran tha
less suscpe
In wake of
Syria and t
which has a
deal a shar
Middle East
Soviets wou d continue generally noncommittal
policy thatithey have maintained throughout the war
and might attempt to promote mediated settlement.
If Iran drove deip into Iraq
clerical regime in Baghdad would
rmine Soviet position there.
is predominant in Gulf would be even
ible to Soviet inroads.
efeat in Lebanon of 2 Soviet allies--
e PLO--defeat of another government,
friendship treaty with Moscow, would
blow to USSR's image and position in
implicit public warnings to Tehran to
These are unlikely to deter Iranians, however,
Soviets could step up weapons deliveries to Iraq,
cut-off tra sit of Iranian imports through USSR,
employ Syri to urge restraint on Iran and issue
Iraqis already have surplus of arms and Tehran not
likely to 1 sten to verbal appeals from any
quarter. I
k-s
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-- Soviets possess capability for more forceful military
measures. They could:
** Order their 1,000 military advisers in Iraq to
assist Iraq Js in battle.
** Deploy air efense personnel and fighter pilots.
** Deploy airb me forces to Iraq.
** Pressure Te ran by mobilizing and maneuvering
forces on I anian border or conducting raids along
Iranian-Afg an border.
-- Moscow is unlike y to take these steps
In themselves, they won't stop determined Iranian
offensive, ithough they might act as a
psychologic 1 deterrent on Tehran.
Iranian reakthrough would force Soviets
to eithe employ the forces they sent--
which th y would want to avoid--or suffer
the embarrassment of withdrawal.
They would undermine Soviet Union's future
prospects i Iran and might drive Tehran closer to
West.
- We belie e USSR considers Iran a greater
geopolit cal prize than Iraq.
Such action would antagonize Iraq's adversary,
Syria, whit is a more important ally of the
USSR. Damascus would contrast it sharply with
Moscow's pa sivity in the Lebanon crisis.
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+~* Brezhnev's declining stamina and evidence that
succession politicking is in process could make
achieving a Politburo consensus on tough, risky
decisions a 1 the more difficult.
-- If Iran takes Ba hdad, Soviets:
Will attempt to make best of unwelcome situation
and minimize strains with Tehran.
Might hope that an Iranian-installed regime in
Baghdad will not last long and that Iraqi Army's
continuing heavy dependence on Soviet weaponry will
enable US$ eventually to rebuild its position
Moscow will be quick to counter any US moves in response to an
invasion.
-- Any beefed-up US naval presence in Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf will be met with similar increases in
strength of Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron.
-- Soviets will att mpt to make capital with Iran of any US
regional milita moves that appear to oppose invasion.
Approved For Release 2007/07/11: CIA-RDP84B00049R000601500005-0