CUBA: PROMOTING ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AMERICA
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S
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Publication Date:
September 1, 1981
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REPORT
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Cuba:
Promoting Armed Struggle
in South America
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
PA 81-10372
September 1981
Copy '2 9 5
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af"ff National Secret
r vi cigu
Assessment
Cuba:
Promoting Armed Struggle
in South America
Information available as of 1 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
uba/Caribbean Analytical Center,
Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Latin
America Division, OPA
The assessment was coordinated with the Office of
Strategic Research, the Office of Economic
Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America.
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Secret
PA 81-10372
September 1981
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Cuba:
Promoting Armed Struggle
in South America
Key Judgments Since the overthrow of President Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979, armed
struggle has played an increasing role in Cuba's policy toward Latin
America. A trend-which shows no sign of abating-has been established
toward greater risk-taking and growing dependence on violent revolution as
a mainstay of foreign policy.
Cuba's hard line has Soviet blessing. The Soviets have come to acknowl-
edge that under certain circumstances rebel groups can serve as the
revolutionary vanguard more effectively than can the local Communist
party.
The keystone of Cuba's policy is the development of a strong paramilitary
force in target countries like Colombia to provide muscle for revolutionary
movements regardless of the path to power they choose. In countries where
the electoral route is closed, such as Chile, a paramilitary force is needed to
carry out guerrilla warfare.
Even if revolutionaries can gain power through elections, the Cuban
leadership believes force will still be required to consolidate victory and to
defend against the inevitable counterrevolution-a lesson learned from the
Allende experience in Chile.
In countries where prospects for revolutionary change are dim, Castro
probably believes that a rise in terrorism will provoke enough government
repression to lead to mass alienation, one of the factors necessary for
revolutionary success. Havana is willing to train guerrillas even from
Argentina and Uruguay, where there is little chance of overthrowing the
government, in part because the trained insurgents constitute reserves that
can fight elsewhere in fulfillment of their "international duty"-as they
did in Nicaragua in 1979.
As long as Castro and his ex-guerrilla comrades remain the policymaking
elite in Cuba, Havana's foreign policy will prize armed struggle. To these
activists, violent revolution is a political philosophy deeply rooted in their
personal experience. They are convinced that the systems that govern most
countries today cannot meet the needs of the masses and therefore must be
replaced.
Secret
PA 81-10372
September 1981
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The Castro regime may revise its tactics as a result of setbacks, but its
commitment to violent revolution will not change. Any falloff in its support
for Latin American revolutionaries would require events similar to those of
the late 1960s-a series of major guerrilla defeats, Cuba's virtual isolation
in the hemisphere, and strong pressure from the USSR.
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Key Judgments
Revising Revolutionary Theory
Increasing Sophistication
Supporting South American Revolutionaries
A Long-Range Goal
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Cuba:
Promoting Armed Struggle
in South America
Return to Subversion
During most of the 1970s Havana's support for
revolutionary movements in Latin America was at a
low ebb:
? No Cubans were known to have operated with any
insurgent group from 1971 to 1978.
? Cuba evidently did not supply any rebel group with
arms or ammunition from 1974 to late 1978.
? Before 1978, only a few Cuban-trained guerrillas
left the island to return to their native countries.
At a conference of the hemisphere's Communist
parties in Havana in 1975-the first such gathering
since 1964-Cuban leaders proclaimed that the van-
guard role in the Latin American revolutionary strug-
gle would be played by orthodox Communist parties
instead of the leftist revolutionaries Havana had been
backing. In a virtual capitulation to the Soviet view,
Cuba even agreed to withhold support from any group
not endorsed by the pro-Soviet Communist party of
the country concerned. These concessions in effect
prevented those groups espousing violence as the route
to power from receiving Cuban help. By early 1977
Cuban support of Latin American revolutionaries had
reached its lowest point.
The impetus for a reappraisal of Havana's revolution-
ary strategy originated in late 1978 as the Sandinista
threat to the Somoza regime became significant. At
the same time, hardliners gained influence in the
Cuban leadership, strengthening the regime's inclina-
tion to increase support to revolutionary movements
throughout Latin America.'
By the summer of 1980 Castro had become heavily
involved in promoting an "insurrectionist line." On 26
July he gave his most forceful public endorsement of
the need for armed struggle in almost a decade.
Havana again had become actively engaged in the
There will be no coups d'etat in Nicaragua
because the people have the power. The people
have the arms. What happened in Chile cannot
happen here. It cannot happen. What happened
in Bolivia will not happen here. It cannot hap-
pen.... The experiences of Guatemala, El
Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there
is no other way than the revolution, that there is 25X1
noformula other than the revolutionary armed
struggle, which is the thesis Cuba has defended.
Fidel Castro
26 July 1980
development of strong revolutionary vanguard move-
ments in the hemisphere. Central America clearly was
to receive the greatest emphasis, but a major effort
also was aimed at several South American nations.
Revising Revolutionary Theory. Somoza's defeat in
Nicaragua had an immediate effect on Cuban and
Soviet revolutionary doctrine. The new approach be-
gan to emerge in March 1980 following a three-day
regional "theoretical conference" in Havana. Unlike
the meeting in 1975, representatives of insurgent
groups from several countries-including El Salvador,
Guatemala, Venezuela, and Chile-participated
along with the orthodox Communist partiesF__1
At the same time, Soviet academicians writing in the
March 1980 issue of Latinskaya Amerika-the jour-
nal of the Institute for Latin America of the USSR
Academy of Sciences-suggested that paramilitary
groups in Latin America, such as the Sandinistas and
Castro's own 26 July Movement, could sometimes
assume the role of the revolutionary vanguard more
effectively than the orthodox Communist parties
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In a clear demonstration of Moscow's acceptance of
the doctrine of armed struggle, the Nicaraguan Com-
munists were publicly criticized in a Latinskaya
Amerika article for not cooperating with the Sandin-
istas. The article cautioned Latin American Commu-
nist parties against claiming to possess a monopoly on
the truth and against pinning sectarian labels such as
"adventurists" and "extremists" on leftist groups
working for forceful change.
Moscow has been careful, however, not to exclude the
orthodox Communist parties from a role in this
revolutionary process. It has continued to express
confidence that in the aftermath of a revolution in
which old political, social, and economic institutions
are destroyed, the Communist party eventually will
gain control despite greater contributions made by
other elements of the revolutionary front.
Increasing Sophistication. Support for the doctrine of
armed struggle did not mean an unconditional return
to Cuba's simplistic approach of the 1960s, when the
insertion of a guerrilla team in the field was consid-
ered all that was needed to spark a revolutionary
upheaval. Three themes central to the conference in
1975 continued to receive strong emphasis-unifica-
tion of the left, creation of broad international sup-
port, and development of links to the masses-but
these were now components of an overall strategy of
for not developing a paramilitary force strong enough
to prevent the coup that unseated him in 1973, and
they are determined to make sure that other revolu-
tionaries who achieve power through elections do not
make the same mistake
On the other hand, if the left does not succeed by
legitimate means, it can claim that the only way to
right social ills is violent revolution, thus providing
theoretical justification for armed struggle. A strong
paramilitary capability is therefore required regard-
less of the success or failure of the electoral effort, and
the earlier it is created, the sooner the left will be
prepared to take advantage of opportunities as they
arise
Supporting South American Revolutionaries
Havana's enthusiasm about developments in Central
America quickly grew to include South America.
South American revolutionaries and other leftists
visiting Havana in early 1979 received much the same
armed insurrection
The Cubans and the Soviets constantly tout the
Sandinista example as evidence of the critical role
played by leftist unity and international support in
achieving and retaining power. They view these as
requisites for legitimizing the revolution and safe-
guarding it against counterrevolution and outside
interference. Although leftist forces also must
strengthen their paramilitary capabilities and try to
exploit legitimate paths to power until those paths
prove fruitless, unity is seen as the linchpin
If the unified left succeeds through elections, as
Salvador Allende did in Chile in 1970, the possession
of a strong paramilitary capability protects the leftist
leadership and provides insurance against the armed
forces which, in Cuba's view, are irreversibly opposed
to revolutionary change. The Cubans faulted Allende
Following the theoretical conference in March 1980,
the pace of Havana's activities accelerated. The Cas-
tro regime increased its efforts to promote leftist
unity, especially in Colombia and Ecuador, and began
pressing other groups to move from political strategy
to armed struggle. For instance, the Cuban Commu-
nist Party invited Chilean leftists to Havana in June
1980, after which leaders of three Chilean guerrilla
factions announced the formation of a broad front to
coordinate armed struggle. Following another meet-
ing in Havana in December, exiled leaders of a
faction of the Chilean Socialist Party and the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left issued a joint state-
ment pledging unity and declaring armed rebellion
the only feasible way to overthrow the Pinochet
regime.
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Fidel Castro surrounded by leaders of the Nicaraguan Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) at 26 July 1979 celebrations in
Reflecting the level of Havana's interest, Fidel Castro
became personally involved in some of these efforts.
Havana's tactical advice was accompanied by a sharp
increase in direct support to South American insur-
gents, particularly those from Chile, Colombia, and to
a lesser extent Argentina. In the last case, Havana
focused its efforts primarily on activities outside
Argentina. For example, Cuba employed a number of
Montoneros in the so-called "Internationalist Bri-
gade" that fought alongside the Sandinistas in Nica-
ragua in 1979. The Cuban media, meantime, provided
favorable coverage of all such exploits.
The Colombian Model. The recent Cuban-supported
subversive effort in Colombia appears to be a textbook
example of Cuba's approach to much of Latin Amer-
ica in the coming decade.' It seems clear that Havana
readily risked a rupture in relations to undermine
Colombia's Government and institutions through a
combination of armed struggle and legitimate politi-
cal activity
Cuba had maintained contact for years with the
Colombian M-19, an urban terrorist group headed by
Jaime Bateman. It was not until after the M-19's
seizure of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic in
Bogota in late February 1980, however, that the
Castro regime began to view the group as having
significant revolutionary potential and offered major
support
Another factor contributing to the Cuban decision to
act as a catalyst in Colombia almost certainly was
Castro's indignation over the role Bogota played in
blocking Havana from a seat on the United Nations
Security Council in late 1979. Moreover, as we judge
from the Cuban Communist Party newspaper, Castro
has never forgiven President Turbay for his hostility
to Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, when
Turbay served as Foreign Minister
By October some 200 guerrilla trainees had begun to
arrive in Cuba via Panama. Havana's willingness to
accept such a large number of trainees suggests a
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Colombia: Guerrilla Infiltration
Aruba
{Neth.)
Approximate area of
guerrilla clashes
'`1 Guerrilla infiltration
route
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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considerable degree of coordination as well as agree-
ment on a guerrilla strategy for Colombia.
A Long-Range Goal. It is unlikely that the Cubans,
with more than two decades of experience in guerrilla
operations, would have involved themselves so deeply
with such a poorly trained, inexperienced group unless
they expected a payoff over the long term. The short
duration of the group's training
suggest that its immedi-
ate mission was not to undertake antigovernment
operations but to gain practical experience in survival
in a region where pressure from counterinsurgency
forces was believed to be minimal.
Havana almost certainly considered the return of the
nascent guerrilla force to Colombia as the first stage
in a long-term process that would weed out the weak
and uncommitted while creating a rural paramilitary
force to complement the M-19's effective urban appa-
ratus. The Cubans may have looked upon the M-19's
urban and rural elements as essential underpinning
for Bateman's participation in the electoral process,
but the guerrilla fiasco this spring almost certainly
ruled out the prospect that Colombian authorities
would allow Bateman or any other guerrilla leader to
run for offices
There also were signs that Havana had urged another
Colombian guerrilla group, the National Liberation
Army, to establish a political party to supplement its
armed struggle efforts. In addition, one year ago,
Cuba's military journal interviewed the head of the
Colombian Communist Party and headlined his opti-
mistic comments regarding the left's chances in pur-
suing the electoral route through the formation of a
Frente Amplio
In retrospect, Cuba's involvement in the M-19 affair
indicates that Havana was not trying to take advan-
tage of transient opportunities or institutional flaws it
paths prove fruitless.
might have perceived in Colombia. Rather, it was
following the same broad strategy it has outlined for
other leftist groups: unification of the left, enhance-
ment of the left's paramilitary capability, and exploi-
tation of the legitimate paths to power until these
Outlook
The degree of Cuban involvement in a country's
revolutionary process at any given time will be deter-
mined by a variety of factors ranging from Cuba's
economic self-interest to Castro's whim. In the Co-
lombian case Castro's distaste for the Turbay admin-
istration was a major factor behind Cuban support to
the insurgents, while Havana's ideological animosity 25X1
toward the government in Argentina has been tem-
pered by its need for Argentine credits. Also pertinent
is Moscow's desire to improve relations with Argenti-
na. The Soviet connection has more significance now
than in the past when Cuban adventurism caused
serious strains in relations with the USSR. The
Castro regime's current approach to exporting revolu-
tion raises fewer problems with its mentor because
Havana takes Soviet goals and interests more into
consideration in formulating policy. In addition, the
Cubans have made a genuine effort to reduce friction
with the various Communist parties of the hemisphere
and to include them in its plans and activities.
This has resulted in increased confidence in Moscow
that the Cubans will not act in a manner that will
embarrass the Soviets or endanger their priorities.
Cuba has been so convincing in its cooperation that
Moscow has given its formal blessing to the Cuban
revision of revolutionary theory on the composition of
the vanguard in the violent stage of the revolutionary
process. With Soviet and Cuban policy toward Latin
America so well synchronized, there is little chance of
Havana deliberately embarking on an adventure that
would knowingly provoke Moscow
If, however, the Soviets anticipated that Cuban
actions would provoke strong countermeasures by the
US, Moscow's desire to exploit advantages probably
would be replaced by a greater interest in avoiding
major reversals to its interests in the area, particularly
its heavy investment in Cuba. In such a situation
Castro probably would be receptive to Soviet urgings
that he avoid a confrontation with Washington.
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Increased US nonmilitary pressures also would give
Castro some pause, but would not by themselves force
him to abandon his long-term revolutionary goals or
forgo probing for new opportunities. He responded to
US warnings on El Salvador, for example, by appar-
ently reducing his aid to the Salvadoran insurgents,
but at the same time he was sponsoring the return of
the M-19 guerrillas to Colombia. Under most circum-
stances-short of impending direct US military
action-Castro will probably continue, and even ex-
pand, his support of regional revolutionaries. In his
logic, such support is an effective weapon to divert US
attention. Over the longer term, he believes this
approach will produce additional revolutionary allies
in the region to help undercut US influence and
power.
Castro is not so single-minded, however, as to pursue
a course he believes holds little or no chance of
producing benefits. A string of crippling guerrilla
setbacks in Latin America would cause him to ques-
tion whether continuation of heavy Cuban support
was warranted. If a series of such defeats were
combined with other major reversals, such as a return
to Cuba's isolation in the hemisphere and the appear-
ance of friction between Havana and Moscow over the
issue of armed struggle, the Cuban leader would be
likely-as he did in the early 1970s-to return to a
more pragmatic policy.
In sum, Castro will continue to promote, and perhaps
escalate, revolutionary activity throughout Latin
America-albeit less recklessly than in the 1960s.
Havana sees prospects for a successful revolution as
brightest in Central America and therefore will con-
centrate its efforts in that region. Nevertheless, the
Cubans also will continue to support insurgent groups
in South America. The Cuban leader sees promising
opportunities through promotion of insurgency to
advance Cuban objectives in the region and to restore
a sense of revolutionary momentum at home in a
period when little else seems to be working to his
regime's advantage.
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