NSPG MEETING ON CUBAN EXCLUDABLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701760002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000701760002-4
S E C R E T
LA/COG-034/82
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
FROM :
Chief, Latin America Division
SUBJECT : NSPG Meeting on Cuban Excludables
1. The CIA is in general agreement with the conclusions of
the National Security Council that there are no inexpensive, easy,
or guaranteed methods of forcing the Castro Government to take
back the Cuban excludables.
a. The temporary resettlement of the excludables in
third countries for possible future repatriation to Cuba is a
non-starter. Even if we could find a third country willing to
accept them temporarily, there would be even less of a chance that
Castro would agree to readmit them into Cuba. if the excludables
were "forced" on a third country involuntarily, e.g., Nicaragua,
Grenada or Angola, there is no guarantee they would remain in that
country and that they would not be reexported elsewhere.
Moreover, the U.S. would in the process turn the excludables into
human pawns and thus mimic the actions of the Castro Government
which is far below our acceptable standards of behavior.
b. The forcible return of the excludables to Cuba with
the overt use of the U.S. armed forces or the pre-announced
placing of the excludables on a U.S. vessel and rendering it
inoperable in Cuban territorial waters would run the risk of loss
of life and most certainly would garner international opprobrium.
C. The deportation through or the incarceration at
Guantanamo Naval Base would unduly jeopardize the security of the
Base. Deportation via Guantanamo would violate our treaty with
Cuba re the Base and risk Cuban retaliation in the form of a
Mariel-type exodus focused on the base, thereby resulting in an
unprecedented civilian takeover of a U.S. military facility.
Incarceration of the excludables at Guantanamo would overwhelm
base facilities, cause serious security problems, and still not
insulate the excludables from U.S. court action ordering their
freedom.
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT
ARE CLASSIFIED S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2006 051(.25: CRIAER
 Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000701760002-4
S E C R E T
2. Against this bleak scenario we agree with the NSC that
the best hope from a cost-benefit analysis lies in some form of
suasion. Against a backdrop of seeking delays in the release of
the hard-core criminals from prison by delaying tactics in the
U.S. court system, the U.S. could initiate either a hardline or a
softline program of action to encourage the Castro Government to
accept all or at least the hardened criminal element of the
excludables.
a. .Hardline program aimed at exploiting Cuba's
-economic and political vulnerabilities. Under this program we
would inform the Castro Government that if it did not accept the
return of all or some designated portion of the excludables, the
U.S. would systematically implement a series of economic-political
measures against Cuba aimed at exploiting their economic and
political vulnerabilities. -
b. Draw down frozen Cuban.assets in U.S. banks
estimated at at least $50 million to fund the continued incar-
ceration of the excludables. Cuba has no similar liquid U.S.
assets-frozen in Cuba against which to retaliate- in kind.
C. Exploring the latitude and prerogatives the U.S.
Government can legally exercise as sole legal claimant for
expropriated U.S. properties in Cuba. For example, can the U.S.
Government place liens on all Cuban-owned properties in non-
communist countries or on Cuban exports to non-communist markets?
d. Escalate planned tightening of U.S. economic
sanctions against Cuba such as reducing the tourist flow to Cuba
from the U. S.,'discontinuing Air Cubana. land ing rights in the
U.S., and banning future calls to U.S. ports by vessels doing
business with Cuba, to name a few.
politicize the Issue:
e. Raise the issue in all international fora ranging
from the UN Security Council and the UN Commissions on refugees
and on human rights to the International Court of Justice in
The Hague, if possible, and in the non-aligned movement via U.S.
allies in the Third World.
f. Restrict travel by Cuban officials in the U.S. to a
fifty mile radius of New York and Washington. While Havana would
most certainly retaliate in kind, Cuba would be the bigger loser
given the relative scale of travels by the respective government
officials.
g. Terminate the issuance of visas to visiting Cuban
officials or extend such visas only on a one-for-fifty basis for
every fifty excludables returned to Cuba.
S E C R E T '
Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CPA-RDP84B00049R000701760002-4
 Approved For Release 2006/05/lb k1CIQ-RDI$84800049R000701760002-4
h. Request that Moscow intercede to resolve the issue
with the U.S. in turn compromising on an important U.S.-Soviet
bilateral issue as an inducement to the USSR.
i. Take up Mexican President Lopez Portillo's offer
which has been endorsed y the Castro regime to arbitrate out-
standing differences between Cuba and the U.S. In return, the
U.S.. could compromise on an important U.S.-Mexican bilateral issue
as a further inducement to Mexico.
3. A softer and perhaps politically less desirable approach
would be to "bribe" the Castro Government to accept the return of
all or most of the excludables by offering Havana a mix of
political and economic "carrots."
a. Offer Cuba U.S.-origin offshore oil exploration and
drilling technology. A major Cuban oil find would reduce Cuba's
economic problems and possibly some of its dependence on the USSR.
b. Offer Cuba a lump-sum payment of cash or its
equivalent for each excludable returned, e.g., perhaps the annual
cost of $15,000 - $20,000 to the U. S. to keep that excludable
i
ncarcerated in the U.S.
C. Accept into the U.S. a specified number -- say
fifty -- of legal Cuban refugees, pre-screened by the U.S., for
each of the criminals returned to Cuba. Such large dispro-
portionate exchange ratios are not uncommon in prisoner of war
exchanges.
d. Give hard assurances to Havana that the U.S. will
not initiate military action against Cuba and/or Nicaragua.
e. Seek the extradition of Orlando Bosch from
Venezuela to Cuba. Bosch is currently in prison on charges of
sabotaging a Cuban airplane in 1976. The incident cost many Cuban
lives and is a very emotional issue with the Cubans.
f. Attempt to arrange an exchange of Cuban POW's held
by Unita forces in Angola for the return of some of the
excludables to Cuba.
Deputy Director for Operations
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2006/05/253 CIA-RDP84B00049R000701760002-4