SIG ON CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701810013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 16, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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Approved For Release 2008/03/24 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000701810013-6
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1. The SIG convened under Judge Clark on
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Mr. Carlucci, Gen. Pustay, Mr. Ikle, Mr. West,
Ms.
March. Present were
Dyke, and Messrs.
Wolfowitz, Burt, Enders, McFarlane, Fontaine, Alien, Stein and myself.
2. The meeting opened with a discussion of the broad strategy
paper for Central America. There was considerable discussion of the
"going to the source" approach, with Carlucci arguing that the paper was
all right on Central America but overstated our capabilities against
Cuba. Enders outlined a number of economic measures that might be taken
to strengthen the Central America portion of the paper. It was agreed
that the Central America elements (~'s 1, 4, 5 & 8) would be brought
before the NSC on Thursday. The Cuban elements would be reworked and
presented later. We were asked to provide an assessment of Cuban
vulnerabilities as part of this exercise. (I assume we have material on
the shelf that will suit.)
3. The meeting then turned to the question of a determination on
Nicaragua. I led off with a short briefing using the text of the
prepared presentation with the exception of the two ticks in Paragraph
4. I noted that until coordination on the paper had been completed, it
should be understood that these were CIA positions. Enders added that
he did not believe these positions were contentious ones and no one took
issue. Judge Clark then expressed some unhappiness that the Community
in 30 days could not "find out" precisely what was going on. He said
that what we had here were theories, not evidence. I responded that I
had been reading the conclusions of a paper and had not presented the
evidence that lay behind it. There was evidence, but it was
fragmentary, as is usual in intelligence situations. The sum of the
evidence formed a persuasive case for intelligence officers but it did
not prove the case in a court of law, or for Con,Qress or the public.
Carlucci weighed ir. in support of my posi_ion.
4. Enders then presented the options paper. He said that the
intelligence case rules out Options 1 and 2. As to 3 and 4, he felt
that the longer we delayed a showdown with ticaragua the better off we
were. Therefore, he recommended Option 4. After some more discussion,
NSC review completed
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Approved For Release 2008/03/24 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000701810013-6
 Approved For Release 2008/03/24 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000701810013-6
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it ,was agreed that Option 4 would be recormnended to the NSC on Thursday
with the reference to PL-480 aid changed to eliminate any s~~~gestiion
that we would deliver in three weeks.
Richard Lehman
Cha irntan
National Intelligence Council
1 - DD/NFA
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - AS/NFAC
1 - John Stein, A/DDO
Distribution:
1 - Bob Gates, D/DCI/DDCI/ES
1 - NIO/LA
1 - C/NIC Chrono
1 - SIG File
1 - NFAC Registry
cGrvcTi
Approved For Release 2008/03/24 :CIA-RDP84B00049R000701810013-6