POLAND S PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT 12 TO 18 MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701880013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

A g gd fFor Release 2007/03/09: CIA-RDP84B00049RO
Central
Intelligence
007%ff@j13-9
Poland's Prospects
Over the Next 12 to 18 Months
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
Secret
MORI
review(s)
completed.
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25
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
S N I E 12.6-82
POLAND'S PROSPECTS
OVER THE NEXT 12 TO 18 MONTHS
Information available as of 30 August 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 5
II. THE INTERNAL SITUATION .................................................................. 5
A. Jaruzelski's Strategy and Tactics ............................................................ 5
B. The Other Actors on the Domestic Scene ............................................. 6
The Society .............................................................................................. 6
Solidarity ................................................................................................. 7
The Catholic Church .............................................................................. 9
The Army and the Security Forces ....................................................... 10
The Party ................................................................................................. 10
III. THE ECONOMY ......................................................................................... 11
Domestic Aspects .................................................................................... 11
International Aspects .............................................................................. 11
IV. THE USSR .................................................................................................... 12
V. PROSPECTS ................................................................................................. 13
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KEY JUDGMENTS
There has been little change in the internal political situation since
the issuance of SNIE 12.6-82 in March 1982. The Jaruzelski regime
tried but has not succeeded in gaining popular acceptance and contin-
ues to rule through fear and intimidation. It has not shown any
willingness to seek a genuine political accommodation with either the
Polish people or their spokesmen.
Within the ruling elite, Jaruzelski has shown bureaucratic skill and
an ability to obtain Moscow's implicit support in order to solidify his
own position. Although his actions have preserved what could be saved
of the traditional Communist system of rule, they have brought little
succor to the party per se. It remains moribund. Society at large remains
opposed to the regime but so far has limited its resistance largely to pas-
sive resistance. Of its two institutional pillars, the Church, under
Glemp's leadership, is placing greater emphasis on calm than on support
for Solidarity; the latter has established an underground Temporary
Coordinating Committee (TKK) but is still groping for an effective
strategy. For now it seems to have settled on brief job actions, peaceful
demonstrations, and other forms of protest as well as the threat of a gen-
eral strike as a means of bringing pressure on the regime.
Solidarity's showing on 31 August probably failed to convince
Jaruzelski of the need for compromise. The leaders of Solidarity and the
regime will now be debating future tactics, and hardliners on both sides
may now argue for more aggressive action.
The union's leaders will cite the turnout of demonstrators against
overwhelming odds as a moral victory. The regime has claimed that
65,000 people took part, 4,050 persons were detained, three demonstra-
tors were killed and 63 injured, and 148 policemen were injured. But
Solidarity has paid a high price in the two weeks of demonstrations:
- The authorities seized underground printing presses and report-
edly arrested scores responsible for underground literature. The
founder of Radio Solidarity was also arrested.
- Many activists were presumably spotted in connection with the
demonstrations and will be apprehended.
Solidarity leaders will be under pressure to come up with more
effective ways to force concessions from the regime. Their prospects are
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not bright. For the next few months, the union will have to concentrate
on creating a structure less vulnerable to penetration by the security
services. Radicals probably will want to keep the heat on. Some may
press for more violent forms of resistance. Although there has been no
clear-cut trend toward violence thus far, molotov cocktails have now
been used for the first time. And the security services have shown they
are not reluctant to use their weapons.
The demonstrations probably did nothing to shake Jaruzelski's
conviction that time is on his side and that he can eventually wear down
Solidarity's will to resist. He may be pressed by the security services to
take an even tougher approach to prevent future demonstrations. They
may encourage him to arrest more underground activists and possibly
even to dissolve Solidarity altogether. If the direct and open challenges
to his rule fade away, Jaruzelski may well improve the cosmetics of
martial law (possibly even replacing it with less odious emergency
powers) but is unlikely to change its substance.
Jaruzelski talks about economic reforms and has granted enter-
prises more flexibility to make decisions on production, employment,
and investment. Widespread shortages and the inefficient approaches of
ensconced managers have resulted in little, if any, changes from the
centralized approach of the pre-Solidarity period.
The much vaunted turn to the East has produced little increase in
assistance, a situation which is unlikely to change in view of the
widespread economic problems in CEMA. Economic interaction with
the West will continue to be limited by Warsaw's inability to obtain
necessary financing, including debt relief. As a result of domestic
rigidity and the shortage of needed Western economic inputs, the
economy is likely to stagnate at the mid-1970s level.
Of all the major actors in the Polish drama, the USSR has the most
cause to be generally satisfied. Although eight months of martial law
have not brought the Soviet headache over Poland to an end, Jaruzelski
has performed a valuable service for the Kremlin by bringing a measure
of stability to Poland, preserving a tolerable form of Communist rule,
and relieving the USSR of having to use its own forces. Although
Moscow cannot be satisfied with the state of the Polish Communist
Party, it seems resigned to the party's current inactivity and willing to
grant Jaruzelski a degree of tactical freedom-so long as he continues to
satisfy the Soviets' strategic requirements on the fundamental issues of
control and Poland's role in Warsaw Pact operations. This he is likely to
do since there are no fundamental differences between him and the
Soviets on these issues.
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The political stalemate between the Polish people and its rulers
continues. It could be broken, however, by the intrusion of unpredict-
able events such as the recurrence of major strikes, the use of political
terrorism by underground opposition forces, or an ill-considered move
by an overconfident regime. On balance, however, we believe the most
likely prospect is for a continuation of the present situation: rule from
the top by a regime headed by Jaruzelski, with control over a dispirited
population assured by the use of force.
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DISCUSSION
1. The purpose of this Memorandum is to take a
fresh reading of the Polish situation some eight months
after the imposition of martial law and to look at the
prospects for Polish actions and trends over the next
year that might have ramifications for US policy.
2. Generally, the conclusions in SNIE 12.6-82 of 25
March 1982 have held up in light of Polish develop-
ments since then:
? Jaruzelski does not differ with the Soviets on the
fundamental issues of control and Poland's role in
Warsaw Pact operations.
? Martial law has effectively ruled out genuine
political accommodation, and the national political
stalemate continues.
? Economic output has stabilized at least temporar-
ily but at a very low level, and the standard of
living has fallen to the early-to-mid-1970s level.
? The Soviets are generally satisfied with Jaruzelski's
actions, which have relieved them of the unpleas-
ant prospect of imposing orderly force of arms.
3. Developments since March 1982, however, allow
a more refined assessment of:
? Jaruzelski's tactics and what they reveal about his
long-range intentions.
? The internal and external constraints which im-
pinge on his actions.
? The popular mood and expectations concerning
the Jaruzelski regime.
? The development of an underground Solidarity
resistance movement.
? The military and party establishments as the or-
gans of rule and the security apparat as the key
instrument of control.
? The economic-financial prospects, including the
impact of the Western sanctions and of the CEMA
connection.
? Moscow's perception of the Polish situation and
Jaruzelski, and how it is trying to influence both.
A. Jaruzelski's Strategy and Tactics
4. Jaruzelski's primary goal, which has overshad-
owed all others, remains that of the maintenance of
control over the society at large. He has sought to
project an appearance of calm and order, while
moving quickly to maintain order in the country by
stifling demonstrations as well as other expressions of
dissent. This will probably hold true over the next year
and circumscribe all other near- or mid-term objec-
tives he now has or may set for himself.
5. An important corollary to maintaining control
has been Jaruzelski's consolidation of his position
within the leadership. He has displayed more bureau-
cratic savvy than we earlier attributed to him. Recent-
ly, he maneuvered to remove some hardline opponents
(particularly his reputed rival, Politburo member, and
now Foreign Minister, Olszowski), as well as a few
relatively liberal party figures from the Secretariat, in
a move that was clearly intended to placate Moscow.
He has continued to place military figures loyal to him
in key administrative and party positions as part of the
process of expanding his still narrow power base and
of combating corruption and incompetence.
6. Jaruzelski's initial hope, as expressed in his De-
cember speeches, seems to have been that the Polish
people, even including some Solidarity leaders, would
accept the necessity and fact of martial law and come
to terms with the regime. That has not happened, and
Jaruzelski now has little choice-short of a policy
reversal-but to hope that time is on his side and that
eventually economic prospects will improve enough to
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create the basis of some acceptable, if grudging,
modus vivendi with Polish society. He apparently
calculates that the discipline of martial law together
with the significantly lowered popular expectation will
continue to blunt Solidarity plans to turn public
sympathy into mass action.
7. In the meantime, Jaruzelski will continue to
dispose of those parts of martial law that he no longer
needs and to promise more concessions if society at
large maintains the discipline he wants. In this way, he
hopes to minimize the risks of being challenged by a
resurgent underground movement, to split the opposi-
tion, and to coax Western governments into lifting or
easing their economic sanctions and Western bankers
into rescheduling Poland's debts. At the same time, he
will not hesitate to reimpose measures that had been
lifted earlier, using each incident as an object lesson
that resistance is not only futile but also
counterproductive.
8. Jaruzelski's moves in late July and early August
were a good illustration of this dual-track approach. In
an eagerly awaited speech on 21 July, he announced
the lifting of the curfew, the easing of restrictions on
internal travel and communications, and the release of
over 1,200 internees, some on probation. He did not
release Solidarity's national leaders and advisers and
hundreds of political dissidents. He also did not parole
the several thousand people sentenced to jail terms for
martial law offenses since December 1981-meaning
that the number of people deprived of freedom has
not changed materially since December. He did not
offer any prospects for meaningful compromise. At
the same time, the government continued to detain
suspected resisters, to manhandle peaceful demonstra-
tors, and, when the disappointment over Jaruzelski's
speech produced increased resistance activity, to re-
arrest or reintern some people.
9. Jaruzelski is likely to continue to show a measure
of restraint in the treatment of martial law violators to
cultivate the view that his regime is preferable to any
alternative. Although a number of suspected resistance
leaders have received terms of up to 10 years, the
courts have not, to the dismay of the more hardline
members of the officialdom, applied the full force of
law in every case. Jaruzelski's flexibility and sensitivity
to appearance was behind his publicly expressed hope
in mid-July to end martial law by the end of the year.
The catch was that he would only do so if granted
emergency powers by the Parliament, that is, martial
law would continue under another name.
10. Our assessment of the regime's economic re-
form policy is unchanged. The regime has taken some
reform measures, but these have been limited and
often subordinated to central programs which allocate
resources from the top. Jaruzelski has repeatedly
talked about the need for some kind of economic
reform but seems unwilling to permit major moves to
decentralize decisionmaking because of his desire to
maintain control. Although enterprises have been giv-
en more flexibility to make decisions on production,
employment, and investment, they have continued to
be hampered by shortages and by the existence of
inviolable priority sectors which have first claim on
resources. Jaruzelski has blamed enterprises for not
using those new freedoms to raise labor productivity,
cut material costs, and discharge unneeded workers.
Reform advocates, however, have complained that
bureaucratic resistance to change remains strong. Con-
sequently most of the economy will probably continue
to be tightly run by martial law plenipotentiaries
following centrally determined production plans.
11. In March we estimated that Jaruzelski would
continue to follow policies that are generally to Mos-
cow's liking. He has increasingly lashed out at the
United States and, to a lesser extent, its Western allies
for maintaining sanctions. By blaming the West for
Poland's difficulties, he evidently hopes to garner a
measure of sympathy from the public. Thus far,
however, there is little evidence to indicate that he has
gained appreciable support. Ironically, the regime's
anti-US propaganda may have sowed the seeds of
some false assumptions about the sanctions. There are
some indications that many in the economic establish-
ment anticipate a sudden and significant turn for the
better when the sanctions are lifted. In fact, this is not
likely.
B. The Other Actors on the Domestic Scene
The Society
12. Polish society remains opposed to martial law
but it is not ready, at least so far, to mount a frontal
challenge to martial law and Jaruzelski. The reasons
are several. A feeling of exhaustion had set in before
13 December which the shock effect of martial law
reinforced. Most importantly, a substantial portion of
the population has been intimidated by the regime.
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Not only is there a good prospect of being imprisoned
for dissident activities, but the regime's policy of firing
dissident employees has dampened opposition. The
Church's appeals for moderation and against violence
have also had a calming effect. Finally, with Walesa in
internment, the Polish society today seems to be
without a charismatic leader who might have a chance
to rekindle the spirit of resistance and translate it into
united active opposition.
13. This is not to say that tension within society is
not high or that Poles in large numbers could not be
galvanized to take action. Indeed, active popular
opposition could mount and consequently increase the
possibility of demonstrations and violence in the com-
ing months. In anticipation the regime has toughened
its rhetoric and has taken precautionary measures. Its
sense of insecurity also explains why Jaruzelski would
or could not go further in relaxing martial law in July
and why the authorities feel they cannot afford the
risks of releasing Walesa and the rest of the union
leaders.
14. The extent and nature of the demonstrations
depend predominantly on the mood of the Polish
workers, especially in the larger factories and ship-
yards. Our ability to gauge their attitudes is limited by
the impossibility of estimating how unforeseeable
events could turn quiet frustration into active opposi-
tion. Consequently, we may not be in the position to
predict much in advance if and when their present
mood of passive resistance turned to one of open
militancy.
15. The absence of overt opposition by workers
does not mean compliance with governmental wishes.
Absenteeism and slipshod work continue to affect
economic performance and clearly worry the re-
gime-so much so that the press has implicitly admit-
ted that more workdays are being lost to absenteeism
now than were lost to strikes in the heyday of
Solidarity. This continued passive resistance, in the
long term, could bring even more pressure on the
government than demonstrations against which brute
force can be used effectively.
Solidarity
16. As stated in March, Solidarity as a legally
recognized, truly independent national trade union
organization is dead. But the intervening months, and
most recently the disturbances on 31 August, have
shown that Solidarity as an opposition force-even if
not legally recognized-is alive. It is likely to continue
both as a repository of widely shared national aspira-
tions as well as an organization whose surviving or
rebuilt infrastructure has been forced to operate un-
derground. This circumstance has made it difficult to
size up its nature, extent, and strength. But it has yet to
demonstrate its ability to mobilize its former mass
membership on a scale that could force upon Jaru-
zelski the choice of negotiating or resorting to use of
the military.
17. After some false starts, the organization of
active nationwide underground resistance has been
assumed by a Temporary Coordinating Commission
(TKK). It announced its existence on the clandestine
Radio Solidarity on 22 April, when its four original
members were said to have met at a secret location to
coordinate the union's underground activity until its
elected national leaders are released from internment.
All four are former regional Solidarity leaders and
represent Warsaw (Bujak), Gdansk (Lis, who is also
former national vice president), Wroclaw (Frasyniuk),
and Krakow (Hardek).
18. TKK has apparently been able to maintain some
contact with the rank-and-file members, especially in
larger factories, through couriers, underground publi-
cations, and Radio Solidarity. TKK has developed
some ability to gauge worker sentiment and coordinate
work stoppages and other forms of protests. Neverthe-
less, we suspect some protest activity may have been
either spontaneous expressions of opposition or the
work of numerous smaller and more radical fringe
organizations (for example, the Committee for Nation-
al Defense) or of what is left of the now banned
National Student Organization. There have also been
persistent rumors that some of the protests were the
result of deliberate provocation by the security forces
designed to decimate the ranks of union activists.
19. We do not have solid information on the extent
to which the union infrastructure has survived or has
been rebuilt. There are indications that, in a number
of regions like Gdansk and Wroclaw, the union organi-
zation functions as a network of five-member clandes-
tine cells linking large enterprises. The underground
Solidarity organization is clearly handicapped by lack
of funds (the union's assets were seized by the authori-
ties), by slow and cumbersome means of communica-
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tion among the various units, by the fact that many of
the more experienced activists have either been in-
terned or imprisoned for martial law violations, and by
the need to maintain extreme vigilance against infil-
tration by the security police. Despite the union's best
efforts, it is doubtful that many of its activities escape
detection by the security organs for a very long time.
They may in fact be purposely leaving some organiz-
ers at large in order to monitor underground activities.
The success of the regime's move against Solidarity in
December 1981 shows that the security apparatus had
maintained its efficiency even when operating in the
relatively open political environment of the 1980-81
period.
20. Because of these operating restraints and inter-
nal disputes, a visible TKK strategy for challenging the
regime has so far not yet emerged. There is every
reason to believe that the overwhelming majority of
the 10-million-strong membership remains sympathet-
ic to the union and its ideals. But at least so far, the
bulk of the blue-collar workers have generally opted
for passive resistance as an expression of opposition in
part because they believe street demonstrations to be
counterproductive.
21. There are two reasons why the underground
appeals have not attracted as much support as the
union's former membership might have suggested.
First, the industrial workers lined up behind the strikes
and the union in 1980-81 because they believed they
could extract significant wage and other economic
concessions from the regime. They gradually came to
realize that most of the wage increases were not
covered by consumer goods and that future strikes for
economic benefits would be meaningless.
22. Second, the occupational strike-the union's
principal weapon-has been rendered very difficult to
use because of fear of violent retaliation by the
authorities and divisions within the TKK. There is
considerable dispute both within TKK as well as
between it and some of the interned Solidarity leaders
and advisers over whether or not to call a general
strike. The latter have for some time been advocating
the need to prepare for a general strike, regardless of
the consequences. TKK's drift toward a possible gener-
al strike has been slow and hampered by the view that
the underground should limit itself to peaceful demon-
strations in trying to pressure the regime into resuming
dialogue, lifting the suspension on Solidarity's activity,
and freeing its interned leaders. Moreover, the TKK
recognizes that a general strike would certainly incur a
violent response from the security organs and would
not automatically result in government concessions.
Additionally, TKK leaders apparently are motivated
by the belief that, so long as Solidarity's charter is
suspended and not formally revoked, the underground
should not provide the authorities with the excuse to
ban the union forever. Jaruzelski and some of his more
pragmatic advisers have apparently been aware of this
sentiment and that is probably why the regime has
refrained from delegalizing the union.
23. The disturbances that took place throughout the
country on 31 August were comparable to those in
early May. Although all the returns are not yet in,
clearly the demostrations did not exceed the ability of
the security forces.
24. Solidarity's showing on 31 August probably
failed to convince Jaruzelski of the need for compro-
mise. The leaders of Solidarity and the regime will
now be debating future tactics, and hardliners on both
sides may now argue for more aggressive action.
25. The union's leaders will cite the turnout of
demonstrators against ovewhelming odds as a moral
victory. The regime has claimed that 65,000 people
took part, 4,050 persons were detained, three demon-
strators were killed and 63 injured, and 148 policemen
were injured. But Solidarity has paid a high price in
the two weeks of demonstrations:
? The authorities seized underground printing press-
es and reportedly arrested scores responsible for
underground literature. The founder of Radio
Solidarity was also arrested.
? Many activists were presumably spotted in connec-
tion with the demonstrations and will be
apprehended.
26. Solidarity leaders will be under pressure to
come up with more effective ways to force concessions
from the regime. Their prospects are not bright. For
the next few months, the union will have to concen-
trate on creating a structure less vulnerable to penetra-
tion by the security services. Radicals probably will
want to keep the heat on. Some may press for more
violent forms of resistance. Although there has been no
clear-cut trend toward violence thus far, molotov
cocktails have now been used for the first time. And
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the security services have shown they are not reluctant
to use their weapons.
27. The demonstrations probably did nothing to
shake Jaruzelski's conviction that time is on his side
and that he can eventually wear down Solidarity's will
to resist. He may be pressed by the security services to
take an even tougher approach to prevent future
demonstrations. They may encourage him to arrest
more underground activists and possibly even to dis-
solve Solidarity altogether.
28. Although the short-term outlook for the union is
dim, continued popular dissatisfaction will keep alive
its spirit and the possibility for more unpredictable,
spontaneous demonstrations. The demonstrations thus
far have been sufficiently impressive that the regime
seems certain to continue its repressive activities. If the
direct and open challenges to his rule fade away,
Jaruzelski may well improve the cosmetics of martial
law (possibly even replacing it with less odious emer-
gency powers) but is unlikely to change its substance.
29. The prospects are for a continuation of a
drawn-out war of attrition. The regime may intensify
its plans for launching a new trade union movement.
It would, at best, be composed of nominally autono-
mous unions organized along branch and professional
lines in factories but without any territorial structure
such as Solidarity had. From the regime's standpoint,
however, it could create even greater division in the
TKK and simultaneously have international cosmetic
appeal. But it would not mean the end of Solidarity as
it has come to exist since the imposition of martial law.
30. Under martial law the Church has retained its
traditional role as broker between the regime and
society. Its official position has been largely deter-
mined by the view, as articulated by Archbishop-
Primate Glemp, that the Jaruzelski regime is prefera-
ble to any likely alternative and that violence
therefore should be avoided to protect society and the
country from greater peril. The Church's behavior has
also been motivated by its desire to preserve the
concessions won for it largely by Solidarity in the past
two years.
31. The Catholic Church occupies a special place in
Jaruzelski's designs, and his attitude toward it proba-
bly illustrates his willingness to compromise. Recogniz-
ing the Church's moral authority as well as its en-
hanced political influence now that Solidarity has been
forced underground, Jaruzelski has not only exempted
the Church from the strictures of martial law but also
left intact most of the gains it made after August 1980.
Jaruzelski both appreciates and wants to exploit the
important role the Church can play in any attempt at
national reconciliation. He may also be conscious of
the inadvisability of taking on two enemies at one
time, a consideration he probably used in resisting
hardline pressure to trim the Church's prerogatives.
For now, the destruction of Solidarity remains his
main objective.
32. Jaruzelski probably has had to defend his deci-
sion to exclude the Church from martial law restric-
tions in the face of criticism from hardliners. The
latter frequently have argued that the Church has
protected fugitive Solidarity leaders and activists, as-
sisted in putting out clandestine publications, and
allowed church services to become staging grounds for
protests. On the other hand, the Episcopate, especially
Glemp, has remained steadfastly opposed-publicly at
times-to Western sanctions, arguing that the nation
and the economy were exhausted by the prolonged
crisis and that lifting them would benefit the people
and the country more than the regime. (Pope John
Paul II shared this view originally but later changed
his position when he became aware of the difficulties
the sanctions were causing the regime.)
33. In contrast to his initial protests against martial
law in open support for restoration of Solidarity,
Glemp in recent months has become more reticent.
What backing Solidarity has received from the Church
has mostly come from members of the lower clergy
and several members of the Episcopate. The latter
have at times spoken in highly critical tones of what
they termed Glemp's weak leadership, a sentiment
that is almost certainly shared by many within the
hierarchy and Solidarity. The criticism has thus far
been muted in large part in order to protect unity.
Nevertheless, we have heard of instances when some
clergymen have gone so far as to refuse to read
Glemp's pastoral letters from the pulpits.
34. Pope John Paul II has also reportedly been less
than satisfied with Glemp's inability to stand up to the
regime more forcefully. But for the sake of Church
unity, the Pope, too, has acquiesced in the role the
Church has played under Glemp in trying to calm
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passions. Apparently similar considerations also made
him agree to postpone his planned trip to Poland until
some time next year. We do not anticipate a signifi-
cant change in church-state relations in the coming
months. Despite signs of growing apprehension about
Glemp's ineffectual leadership, the Church officials
will continue to use their periodic contacts with the
regime to press for the release of internees, amnesty
for those arrested and imprisoned, and for lifting
martial law. In fact, these contacts, which have taken
place largely behind the scenes, will probably consti-
tute the only dialogue that can be expected between
the Jaruzelski regime and society in the foreseeable
future.
The Army and the Security Forces
35. The period since last December has shown a
pattern of uneasy calm punctuated by periodic civil
disturbances. Since protests thus far have been con-
tained by relying on regular police and motorized
security forces (ZOMO), Jaruzelski has been spared the
need to test regular Army units in direct confrontation
with the workers.
36. There is evidence that the Army's standing with
the populace has slipped. For example, the number of
applicants for officers' schools has evidently dimin-
ished to such an extent that the Army has dropped
competitive examinations and is apparently accepting
almost all candidates. The depth of this decline in
popular acceptance and its long-term consequences, if
any, are not clear.
37. Paradoxically, the fact that Jaruzelski has made
only limited use of the Army has made him more
reliant on the security forces over which he has less
control. Despite the fact that the Ministry of Interior is
under General Kiszczak, who is reputed to be loyal to
Jaruzelski, his predecessor and now Politburo member
Milewski serves as the party's overseer of the entire
security apparatus. Apparently it is Milewski through
whom the Soviets have gained increased influence
over the past two years. This may be one reason why
Jaruzelski has not been able to remove Milewski from
the Politburo as he had allegedly intended.
38. Aside from the security apparatus, Jaruzelski
probably also has to take into account the views of
hardliners on the Military Council of National Salva-
tion. Although Jaruzelski remains in overall charge of
the council, members such as Generals Molczyk and
Urbanowicz probably closely reflect Moscow's views
during deliberations over such sensitive matters as the
pace of relaxation of martial law, the disposition of
internees, relations with the Church, and the now
postponed papal visit.
The Party
39. Jaruzelski imposed martial law in order to
protect what remained of the traditional system of
Communist rule when it became clear that the party
by itself was incapable of doing so. In the past eight
months, the party has failed to make any headway
toward recovery and there are no prospects that it will
be able to reassert its leading role. This is due primari-
ly to its continued total rejection by the public as well
as to Jaruzelski's own reservations about it. The party
has been reduced to little more than its professional
cadres, most of whom are careerists who are satisfied
with the blows dealt to Solidarity, but resent their own
loss of stature and fear for their future.
40. We anticipate that Jaruzelski will continue to
appoint his own men, mostly military, to key party
positions. As long as the traditional party has not been
revived, which at best will take years, its careerists will
not be able to resume their previously unchallenged
preeminent roles. The question of whether the mili-
tary will turn power over to the civilian sector is,
therefore, largely meaningless. The more interesting
question, which cannot yet be answered, is what will
be the long-range effect on the functioning and out-
look of the party of the appointments to party posi-
tions of men who rose through military rather than
party channels.
41. Taken as a whole, then, the disposition and
relative strengths of the key actors on the Polish scene
have not been altered appreciably since March. Al-
though Jaruzelski has made some progress toward
consolidating his personal position, the party is still in
disarray. His mainstay remains the Army, but he
knows he cannot use it without risk and, therefore,
continues to rely on the security police as the chief
enforcer of martial law. The Church by appealing for
moderation has helped maintain an uneasy calm, but
its appeals for dialogue, most forcefully expressed in
its April theses, have not been answered by the regime.
Solidarity still represents the aspirations of society. The
impasse between society and the regime continues.
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Domestic Aspects
42. Economic performance during the next year is
likely to remain at the level of the mid-1970s in the
absence of substantial new Western credits or massive
aid from the USSR. Neither seems likely.
43. The government has stopped the decline in
industrial production (see chart), but there is little
prospect of much near-term growth. Mining output,
which is only marginally dependent on imports from
the West, has increased sharply this year because of
compulsory Saturday work. But there will be little
further growth without a longer workweek-an un-
likely prospect. Manufactured goods industries will
continue to be constrained by import shortages caused
by the lack of Western credit and the need to hold
down imports to pay some debt. The regime also faces
growing labor problems, including increased absentee-
ism and skilled-labor shortages, as hundreds of thou-
sands of older workers have opted for early retire-
ment. The regime's drastic investment cuts-28
percent in the first half of 1982 and 55 percent since
Poland: Monthly Industrial Production
Seasonally Adjusted, Index: November 1976=100
110
1982a
~ I I I 1 1
70 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1978-may also hold down near-term output although
the major impact will come in future years.
44. The agricultural sector will be unable to meet
the needs of the country despite an estimated, above-
average harvest of 20-21 million tons. The regime
plans to double grain procurements from private
farmers to make up for some of the at least 3-million-
ton gap resulting from reduced imports. The govern-
ment thus far has refused, however, to increase pro-
curement prices because it wants to include farmers in
the austerity program and fears farmers might sell
smaller quantities of higher priced grain and keep
more to feed livestock. Instead, the government is
considering a number of coercive programs including
the possible imposition of compulsory deliveries. The
regime is reluctant, however, to implement such a
draconian measure because it realizes that farmers
might react by cutting back production, thus drawing
the government into a confrontation.
45. Polish consumers face some further deteriora-
tion in living standards during the rest of 1982 and
have little hope of much rebound in the next several
years. Consumers have already been hit hard: in the
first six months of this year the cost of living climbed
104 percent and workers' incomes increased only 58
percent. Supplies of goods on the retail market de-
clined by 13 percent during the first half of this year.
Consequently some consumers cannot afford meat and
other basic foodstuffs, while high income earners face
shortages of manufactured goods. Consumer frustra-
tions will continue to feed popular unhappiness with
the martial law regime.
International Aspects
46. The regime's effort to turn to the East to make
up for the lack of Western imports will probably bring
little payoff in the next 12 months. CEMA countries
do not have many of the goods needed by Poland and,
in any case, have their own economic problems that
will continue to limit their assistance to Warsaw. The
USSR has reduced its support this year by permitting
Poland to run a trade deficit (projected to reach $1.7
billion) of only some two-thirds of the 1981 level. The
Soviets apparently have replaced only some $150-200
million of traditional Polish imports from the West.
Although this will ease some bottlenecks, it will not
boost output significantly. Moreover, the Poles must
repay the Soviets with 85 percent of the additional
production derived from these materials.
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47. For the foreseeable future, the "debt noose"
will block imports which are badly needed for eco-
nomic recovery. Banks are unwilling to extend new
credits for imports because of Warsaw's inability to
service past loans, and most Western governments
have stopped credit guarantees since martial law.
Without credits, Poland's objective is to run a surplus
that is small enough to allow imports of vital goods
from the West and to pay the minimum debt service
necessary to prevent formal default.
48. Poland has covered the interest on its 1981
rescheduling agreements, but arrears on 1982 obliga-
tions-principal and interest-are at least $6 billion
through August. Major Western banks and the Poles
recently agreed on terms to reschedule $2.3 billion in
1982 obligations, but the Poles may not be able to
make the payments called for in the agreement.
Payment to banks will have to accelerate considerably
to cover the estimated $330 million which is due 20
October. A likely scenario is a repetition of the 1981
experience, when Polish failure to meet payment
deadlines led to several postponements of the signature
of the agreement. Poland is likely to remain in
technical default because of its inability to pay unre-
scheduled obligations. The banks' refusal to declare
default despite arrears, delays, and broken agreements
testifies to the creditors' desire to avoid or delay as
long as possible the writing off of Polish loans.
49. Western governments continue to refuse to
reschedule obligations due them in 1982, although
several West European countries are pressing to open
debt relief talks if only to improve their chances for
receiving Polish payments. It is unlikely, however, that
the governments would receive significant payments.
Poland probably would request total debt relief, and
may not be able to pay obligations which would not be
rescheduled. The Poles are likely to place greater
priority in paying banks because of the recent agree-
ment and because any one of the multitude of the
creditor banks could trigger default.
50. The much vaunted policy of reorientation of
economic relations toward the East notwithstanding,
Poland probably would respond to a lifting of sanc-
tions with a renewed request to Western governments
for a massive aid package including total debt relief
and perhaps several billion dollars in concessionary
credits and guarantees to finance imports of grain,
food, spare parts, and industrial raw materials. Such a
package could provide a major boost to the Polish
economy, but only if it were large enough to cover
unrescheduled debt service. In 1981, for example,
Western governments provided some $4 billion in
credit guarantees, which freed a similar amount of
export earnings for debt service rather than resulting
in an increase in imports. The prospects seem poor for
a favorable response from the West. Even before
martial law, Western governments were rejecting the
bulk of Warsaw's aid requests because of budget
constraints, the fluid political situation in Poland, the
ineffectiveness of Poland's economic policy, and the
uncertain prospects for repayment. These factors
probably would continue to dominate their attitudes
toward a package for Poland.
51. Although eight months of martial law have not
brought the Soviet headache over Poland to an end,
General Jaruzelski has performed a valuable service
for the Kremlin by bringing a measure of stability to
Poland and relieving the Soviets of the unpleasant
prospect of using their own arms to work their will.
With his unsuccessful attempts to restore the Polish
economy to health-despite scattered signs of im-
provement-and with his failure to revive the Polish
party of which he is formally head, Jaruzelski may
have disappointed the Soviets. But as a result of his
action last December, Moscow now confronts a situa-
tion that, if still unpredictable, is seen as manageable.
The Soviet leadership thus has concluded that Jaru-
zelski is currently the Polish leader best situated-as
chief of the Army as well as the party-and tempera-
mentally best suited to protect their interests in Po-
land. He is also a known quantity in Soviet political
and military circles-a major factor in his favor.
52. In strategic political terms, Jaruzelski clearly has
little independence and must always take the Soviet
Union into account. He appreciates the need to coordi-
nate his general line with Moscow and to retain its
support for his policies. Whatever his own innermost
predilections, he must have the implicit backing of
Soviet arms in order to govern.
53. As the man who implemented martial law-
and who has thus far made it stick-Jaruzelski has a
degree of tactical independence from the Soviets.
Aside from the fact that it is hard to imagine who else
could better serve Moscow's interest in Poland at this
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time, giving Jaruzelski a bit of tether-or at least the
appearance of it-may serve Soviet interests to the
extent it fosters perceptions in Poland and the West
that he is a genuine national leader and that Moscow is
not directly ordering developments within Poland.
Moscow may also recognize that it simply makes
operational sense to give Jaruzelski the tactical flexibil-
ity he needs to deal quickly and decisively with day-
to-day issues.
54. Moscow has not hesitated to proffer its fraternal
advice. It campaigned publicly and is believed to have
argued strongly in private against allowing the Pope to
visit Poland this year-advice which Jaruzelski evi-
dently took into account when he postponed the trip.
It continues to urge Jaruzelski to rout counterrevolu-
tion and may thereby be signaling a measure of
uncertainty about the more flexible aspects of his
policies as well as a feeling that his relaxation of
martial law was premature and may backfire. Jaru-
zelski has visited the Soviet Union twice this year to
confer with Soviet leaders, and although there were
some hints of possible frictions (also perceptible when
Jaruzelski met with Premier Tikhonov at the CEMA
Summit in Budapest), the process of close consultation
between Jaruzelski and the Kremlin seems to be
continuing.
55. In the final analysis, the question of how much
latitude the Soviets are willing to give Jaruzelski will
be closely tied to their perception of how well he is
handling the situation in Poland.
56. So far as we know, no potential successor to
Brezhnev holds a view of the Polish situation different
from his. The Soviet succession thus is unlikely to
bring a shift in Moscow's policy toward Poland,
especially in the short term. Of course, as indicated in
SNIE 12.6-82, if an abrupt turn of events in Poland
coincided with intense political maneuvering in Mos-
cow, the interaction of the two could significantly
influence the Soviet succession, Moscow's policy to-
ward Poland, and naturally the situation in Poland. In
the meantime, however, Moscow's attitude toward
both Jaruzelski and Poland will be one of watchful
concern.
57. The outlook is for continued political stalemate,
with Jaruzelski pursuing a cautious policy designed to
wear down domestic and external opposition. This
precludes meeting the three criteria for lifting the
sanctions, as defined by the United States and its allies,
but Jaruzelski will continue, whenever internal condi-
tions permit it, to make periodic gestures toward a
gradual relaxation of martial law such as he has made
so far.
58. This stalemate could be broken by the intrusion
of essentially unpredictable events into the Polish
political drama as a consequence of spontaneous
events. The appearance of political terrorism, absent
so far, could spark retaliation from the security serv-
ices that could quickly and dramatically escalate the
crisis. An ill-considered action by an overconfident
regime could, as it did in 1970, 1976, and 1980, spark
a strong social reaction.
59. Solidarity's leadership is likely to remain in-
terned for as long as the regime considers this isolation
necessary for its own security. The future of the union,
too, is unlikely to be resolved in a manner that its
leaders, both in the underground or in internment, can
or are likely to accept. This, in turn, is bound to keep
the underground resistance movement alive, if not
thriving.
60. The economic situation will show little, if any,
improvements, a circumstance whose impact on the
population is difficult to predict. Despite the low
expectations among the populace, consumer frustra-
tion could lead to a renewal of the strikes on a scale
greater than we have witnessed so far this year. If this
happened, it could lead to Jaruzelski's fall. At this
point, however, we judge this to be an outside possibil-
ity. More likely, Polish society is entering a period of
apathy and resignation.
61. In sum, Jaruzelski is most likely to continue his
present policies, which will result, at best, in his
continuing to control a dispirited society with only
moderate use of outright force.
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