NSC CUBA POLICY REVIEW - INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701890017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: November 10, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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10 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kenneth Dam
.Deputy Secretary of State
SUBJECT : NSC Cuba Policy Review - Interagency Intelligence Assessment
1. On 25 October 1982, Judge William Clark tasked the Executive Branch
to produce a number of items relevant to a review of US policy toward Cuba.
One task given the CIA was to "prepare an Intelligence Community update on
all Cuban activities inimical to US interests and other possible actions the
Castro government might take in the next year." The. original instructions
from Judge Clark directed us to provide our material to you by cob 10 Nov 1982.
2. Attached is an Interagency Intelligence Assessment: "Cuban Actions
Inimical to US Interests." It has been formally coordinated by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board, and, therefore, reflects the considered judgment
of the entire Intelligence Community.
3. This Intelligence Assessment describes current Cuban subversive
and military operations in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. It
also discusses the worldwide Cuban use of diplomacy, propaganda and covert
action for anti-US purposes, as well as the military threat in peacetime
or wartime posed by Cuban and Soviet military assets in Cuba. A three-page
Summary precedes the main text.
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9 November 1982
CUBAN ACTIONS INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS: SUMMARY
The likelihood of an accommodation with Castro in the next two years
The Castro regime is engaged in a broad range of activities designed to
promote radical change and undermine US influence worldwide. From the Cuban
perspective, the US is, and always will be, the principal threat. We believe
these actions will continue as long as Fidel Castro and his guerrilla veterans
remain in power. Only the intensity varies, determined by the conditions in
each country and Cuba's ability to exploit them. Six former US presidents
tried to negotiate Cuba into accommodation; all failed and the available
intelligence information suggests that there is virtually no prospect for a
genuine accommodation with Cuba on major issues in the next two years.. This,
despite the fact that a modus vivendi may continue on some secondary but
potentially troublesome issues like air piracy.
PART 1: Current Cuban international activities hostile to the US
In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations in Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda,
and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide.
In Latin America and the Caribbean
--Cuba is directly supporting active insurgencies in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Colombia and is laying the groundwork in Honduras,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Chile. Hundreds of Latin
American terrorists and guerrillas have been trained in Cuba in
recent years.
--Havana is heavily engaged in the consolidation of power in
Nicaragua and Grenada.
--Where guerrilla strategies are presently non-productive, Havana is
relying on a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent
covert action to undercut US influence.
In Africa:
--Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian personnel propping
up Angola and Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other
countries. Other African targets of Cuban-assisted subversive
groups are South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and Morocco.
In the Middle East:
--Cuba has aligned itself closely with. the PLO and the radical Arab
States (Libya and South Yemen).
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In Europe:
--Cuba uses political and economic tactics to create and exploit
differences between Washington and its allies.
PART 2: Possible additional Cuban activities hostile to US interests in 1983-84
During the coming 12-18 months, these activities will continue and in
certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castro regime precludes
anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Latin
America will continue to be a priority target.
--Subversion will continue apace, especially in Central America, but
also in Colombia and Chile.
--Cuba will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift
in Suriname and Bolivia.
--Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to
begin supporting subversive efforts there.
--If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened from without, Havana
would almost certainly send additional combat forces unless
deterred by the credible threat of US military forces.
--It is not certain, however, that Cuba's promotion of subversion
will steadily increase in all cases. Under certain circumstances,
Castro could be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile
temporarily if convinced it would advance his overall goal of
diminishing US influence in the hemisphere.
--Cuba can be expected to promote strongly the creation of a regional
organization that excludes the US.
--Cuba will probably retaliate strongly with jamming of US domestic
radio and counterbroadcasts if Radio Marti goes on the air (Castro
mi ht also threaten another Mariel-type exodus of refugees to the
US?.
In Africa, Havana will maintain its military support for Angola and
Ethiopia:
--Cuba's reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola, as long as the
stability of the Marxist-Leninist government is in doubt, will
hinder a Namibian settlement.
--A military threat to Mozambique from South Africa could bring an
increased Cuban military presence there.
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Elsewhere, Cuba is likely to:
--Continue its cooperation with the PLO, Libya, and other radical
Arab states.
--Expand its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions between the US
and its European allies.
PART 3: The military threat posed by Cuban and Soviet military-related
assets in Cuba.
Cuba has over 250,000 persons in its armed forces, and an air force with
more than 250 MIG fighters.
--Cuba serves as a base for Soviet intelligence gathering and
propaganda activities in the Western Hemisphere.
--In the event of war between the US and the USSR, Cuba could serve
as a recovery and turn around base for Soviet air and naval units
attacking the US.
--During a major world war, the US Naval Base at Guantanamo would be
vulnerable to Cuba's increasing military capabilities. A more
serious potential threat is Cuban capability to harass or interfere
with sea and air routes in the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico/Straits of
Florida areas. This would be of particular concern because of the
amount of US commerce -particularly oil -- that passes through
this region and when unhampered transit from southern US ports and
through Caribbean sea lanes would be required, such as for US
reenforcement of NATO.
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Central Intelligence Ag ncy
INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
9November 1982
CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS
Table of Contents
Page
Summary i - iii
PART 1: Current Cuban International Activities Hostile -1
to the United States
Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods 1
Latin America 3
Africa 5
Middle East 7
Other International Actions 8
PART II: Possible Additional Cuban International Actions 10
Hostile to US Interests in 1983-1984
Overview 10
Latin America 10
Africa and .the Middle East 12
Other areas 13
PART III: The Military Threat Posed by Cuban and Soviet 13
Military Assets in Cuba
Trends in the Acquisition of Military Equipment 14
ANNEX: Cuban Military Forces 15
Cuban Presence and Activities in Latin America 17
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Caribbean 18
Cuban Presence and Activities in Africa 19
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Middle East 21
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Far East 22
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security, Judge William Clark. It was
prepared under the auspices of the NIO/LA by the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis, CIA, and coordinated with the National Foreign Intelligence
Board.
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PART I: Current Cuban International Activities Hostile to the US
Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods
Cuban activities hostile to the United States run the gamut
from universally accepted diplomatic, commercial, military, and
cultural practices and behavior to covert destabilization,
disinformation, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. Tactics are.
chosen according to the possibilities seen in each country, but
the fundamental goal in each case is the same.
Subversion, encompassing anything from espionage and the
promotion of coups to the training, funding, advising, and arming
of paramilitary forces, is' employed against governments that
refuse to support Cuba's anti-US policies. The list of targets
of Cuban subversion includes governments friendly to the US and
countries where there are important US commercial interests. In
target countries where insurgency is not yet practical, Cuba is
working behind the scenes to unify the leftist forces, help them
develop broad links to the population, give them international
exposure and support, and provide them with political and
paramilitary training to enable them to create and take advantage
of political opportunities.
Havana is also using diplomacy to increase Cuban influence
in a number of countries and convince governments that
confrontation rather than accommodation is the appropriate way to
deal with Washington. This diplomatic approach is bolstered by
strong doses of propaganda designed to exploit frictions between
the US and its allies and sow distrust of US intentions. Where
possible, trade is, used to undercut the US or US businesses or to
provide Cuba with entre into political circles where anti-US
policies can be promoted.
Havana places especially heavy emphasis on cultural
activities as a means of creating good will toward-Cuba and
establishing contacts with cultural, intellectual, academic, and
sports figures who can then be exploited in an anti-US fashion.
The Cuban leadership has consistently given high priority to
maintaining and expanding the already-established, broad body of
literature that places a hostile, highly ideological
interpretation on history and current events with the intention
of promoting popular misconceptions about the US and thus
poisoning US relations for many decades.
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If circumstances allow, Havana is not above using both the
hard and soft approaches at the same time in one country.
Colombia, for example, recognizes that the Cubans are committed
in theory to improving formal ties through overt channels while
continuing covert support for Colombian insurgents. Many
governments, however, have not learned that the existence of
diplomatic relations with the Castro regime is no insurance
against Cuban subversion.
The scope of these activities hostile to the US is not
limited to a few countries or even to one general region. It is
worldwide. Only the intensity varies, determined by the
conditions in each country, Cuba's ability to exploit them, and
Soviet support. Although Cuba has forty thousand troops and
other personnel in Africa, the main focus of its attention will
continue to be Latin America.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuba is directly
supporting active insur encies in three countries (El Salvador,
Colombia, and Guatemala) and working with varying degrees of
intensity to create the organizations and political conditions
propitious for insurgency in four others (Costa Rica, Honduras,
the Dominican Republic, and Chile). While investing heavily in
the consolidation of the regimes in Grenada (600 Cubans in
country) and Nicaragua (7,000 to 8,000 Cubans in country), Havana
is overtly hostile to three other countries (Uruguay, Paraguay,
and Haiti) but apparently recognizes that little can presently be
done to initiate successful armed struggle there. Elsewhere in
the region, Havana is depending primarily on diplomacy and non-
violent means to convince governments to support Cuba's effort to
isolate the US.
In Africa, Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian
personnel propping up Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola and
Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other countries. Other
African targets of Cuban-assisted subversive groups are South
Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and Morocco. Reluctant to withdraw
troops from Angola, the Cubans are a key obstacle to a Namibian
settlement.
In the Middle East, Cuba has aligned itself closely with the
PLO and the radical governments of the region, which is
complemented by a very aggressive Cuban policy against Israel.
There are some 4,500 Cuban civilian and military personnel in six
countries of the region with about 3,000 working in Libya.
In West Europe, Cuba sees great opportunities to create and
exploit policy i erences between the US and its allies and
views the emergence of democratic socialist governments as
particularly favorable to Cuban interests. Havana is trying to
marshal support in these circles for Cuba's position on such
issues as the consolidation of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua and
the provision of international recognition and juridical status
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to the Salvadoran insurgents. Cuban effectiveness, however, is
currently constrained by the need to renegotiate the Castro
regime's indebtedness with a number of these countries.
Similarly, Cuba's impending loss of the chairmanship of the
Nonaligned Movement--and Castro's obvious pro-Soviet bias during
his three-year stint in the chair--is blunting its efforts in
portions of the Third World. Havana, nevertheless, will continue
to try to use the movement to generate anti-US sentiment and is
certain to take advantage of the seventh summit in India early
next year as a launching platform for anti-US rhetoric. Havana
continues to try to embarrass the US in the United Nations on the
issue of Puerto Rican independence and can be expecte to attempt
to extract advantage from Nicaragua's success in gaining a seat
on the Security Council.
Latin America
After the ouster of the Somoza government in Nicaragua in
1979, Latin America again became a major focus of attention in
Cuban foreign policy circles. Havana tried quickly to duplicate
the success elsewhere in Central America but setbacks there and
in Colombia in early 1981 dashed the Cubans' hopes for quick
victory and caused them to shift to a medium-term strategy (two
to three years). At the same time, Latin American reaction to
the events in the Falkland Islands convinced the Cubans that the
time was ripe to mobilize the region's governments to create a
multilateral organization excluding the US and deal a death blow
to the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty.
In Central America, Nicaragua remains the key. The Castro
regime sees the consolidation of the Marxist-Leninist Directorate
there as important enough to justify a pact which
commits Cuba to Nicaragua's defense. An estimated 5,500 Cuban
civilians and some 1,500 to 2,000 Cuban military personnel
currently in Nicaragua are evidence of the Castro regime's
readiness to back the Sandinista government.
Nicaragua is also seen by Havana as an invaluable platform
from which to support insurgency in El Salvador and Guatemala and
as an important transportation center through which Central
American leftists, insurgents and supporters of the extreme left
can travel to and from Havana without detection. Despite Cuban
calls for a "negotiated political solution" in Central America,
Havana's efforts to train and supply Salvadoran and Guatemalan
insurgents have shown little sign of abating. Cuban and
Nicaraguan efforts to organize the Honduran far left and prepare
it for eventual guerrilla warfare are also continuing as-are
Havana's-plans to destabilize the Monge government in Costa
Rica. Cuban speeches at the International Theoretical Conference
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in Havana in April indicate clearly that the Castro regime is
firmly wedded to the armed struggle doctrine in Central
America. The call for negotiations is simply a ploy developed to
buy time for the guerrillas and mislead Western opinion or to get
them into a position of influence from which they can eventually
take power.
After the death of Omar Torrijos, Panamanian policy shifted
away from its support of the extreme left in Central America.
Cuba's loss of influence is of considerable concern in Havana,
and has led to Cuban and Nicaraguan actions to help the far left
step up its organizational and political work. The Castro regime
will probably increase subversive operations in Panama if it
perceives that the Panamanian government's tilt away from the
extreme left in the region will continue.
Cuba highly values its close diplomatic ties with Mexico and
professes to understand that the Mexican government will not
tolerate interference in internal politics.
While the Cubans are still confident about their close ties
to the Mexican government, they probably are wary that Mexico's
economic problems could have far-reaching political
repercussions. It is reasonable to expect Havana to have
contingency plans, on the one hand, to limit the damage any such
repercussions might have on Cuban-Mexican relations and, on the
other, to exploit any opportunities to exacerbate Mexico-US
frictions.
In the Caribbean, Havana is quick to take advantage of
opportunities as they arise but, except for Suriname, does not
for the moment have good prospects for a dramatic expansion in
Cuban influence. The Cuba-Grenada alliance, and the alarming
Cuban-sponsored military buildup there, has raised sensitivities
in the Caribbean ministates, and Havana will probably find local
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fears of Cuban meddling difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, the
Cubans continue their efforts to expand their contacts with
leftists and intellectuals in the region and probably intend to
use Radio Free Grenada to blanket the area with anti-US
propaganda.
Cuba is also working vigorously to ingratiate itself with
the Bouterse government in Suriname, and the Cuban presence in
Paramaribo is likely to increase. Guyana appears to have very
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The cooling in Cuban-Guyanese relations
or Havana to improve its image in Caracas
by shifting to a more neutral position in the Guyana-Venezuela
dispute over the Essequibo region.
In South America, Chile remains the target of occasional
infiltrations by Cuban-trained terrorists but even Havana
realizes that conditions for a successful insurgency in Chile--as
in Uruguay and Paraguay--simply do not exist. Nevertheless,
Havana is working to develop the infrastructure necessary for
organized opposition once conditions improve. At the same time,
Havana is wooing Bolivia, Argentina, and Venezuela with an eye to
promoting the demise of the OAS and replacing it with an all
Latin American organization through which the region, acting as a
whole, can confront the US and force its demands on Washington.
Even the new. government in Bogota has demonstrated a willingness
to downplay Havana's blatant intervention with the M-19
insurgents in early 1981. The Cubans probably now view Colombia
in the same fashion they view Argentina, Bolivia, and Venezuela--
countries where emphasis on diplomacy, at least for the moment,
is more likely to produce dividends than an aggressive,
subversive approach.
Africa
Cuba remains active in Africa but clearly does not view the
area as having the same political potential that it had in the
1970s when Havana was involved in a major effort to expand formal
ties in the Third World as a means of reducing the Castro
regime's diplomatic isolation. Entrenched in Angola, Cuba has
reason to act with restraint when tempted to embark on large-
scale military operations elsewhere. The remarkably successful
drive during the last decade to expand Cuban influence has slowed
markedly as Havana's attention has shifted to Latin America and
Cuba's chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement draws to an end.
Nevertheless, the Castro regime's revolutionary commitments in
Africa, its military dependence on the Soviet Union and,
therefore, its need to support Soviet policy, its need to export
labor, and its desire not to alienate African allies, all point
to Havana's continued strong interest in the region and probably
an increase in the Cuban civilian presence there.
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In Angola, Havana will probably not risk the expulsion of
its forces by acquiescing in serious negotiations for an internal
settlement or solution to Namibia. The Cubans have indicated
clearly that they intend to keep their 20,000 to 25,000 combat
troops in country as long as the Marxist-Leninist regime there is
threatened by South African-backed guerrillas. The Cubans were
reported to have modestly increased their forces in late summer
with veteran reinforcements from Cuba and now seem to be taking a
greater part in the actual fighting against Angolan insurgents.
The civilian presence in Angola remains about 4,500. Even though
Havana now has formed diplomatic ties with Zaire, Cubans in
Angola presumably continue to support insurgents who hope to
seize power in Zaire's Shaba Province. Insurgents of the African
National Congress of South Africa also reportedly receive Cuban
support at their training camps in Angola.
In Ethiopia, the Cubans have limited themselves largely to
garrison duty, having been withdrawn from combat after the defeat
of Somali forces in the Ogaden campaign. There are now an
estimated 11,000 to 13,000 Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia
with another 1,000 civilians aiding the Mengistu government in
various capacities such as public health, construction, and
education. The Cuban forces serve as a strategic reserve to
deter renewed Somali adventurism and to protect the Mengistu
regime. With Soviet logistical help, they also would be capable
of rapid deployment elsewhere in Africa and Southwest Asia.
In Mozambique, Cuba now has an estimated 800 to 1,000
military personnel with another 1,000 civilians in political and
technical advisory positions. The current threat to the Machel
government posed by South African backed guerrillas raises the
possibility that Maputo may ask for Cuban combat troops. We
believe Havana's response would depend largely on Soviet
wishes. The Cubans clearly have a distaste for taking casualties
in combat, but they would probably provide a large number of
troops at Moscow's urging and with the proviso that the Soviets
assured logistical support.
As for Namibia, Cuba continues to support SWAPO. Cuba would
undoubtedly view a SWAPO-dominated Namibia with favor. Should
SWAPO come into control in Namibia, Cuba along with the Soviets
and the East Germans, would offer to provide technical and
security assistance. The Cubans might also seek to use Namibia
as a springboard for subversive operations against South
Africa. The majority view in the Intelligence Community is that
this is likely, but some analysts feel a SWAPO-led Namibia would
be reluctant to risk South African retaliation.
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Middle East
Cuban efforts to expand its influence in the Middle East
enjoyed a measure of success until the war between Iran and Iraq
forced the Castro regime, as chairman of the Nonaligned Movement,
into the role of mediator. Relations between Havana and Baghdad
soured as the Iraqis perceived a Cuban tilt toward Iran. A top
Cuban emissary visited Baghdad late last month on a fence-
building mission but it is unlikely that he was successful in
restoring ties to their former good standing. Cuba has let about
500 of its civilian personnel stay in Iraq--mainly medical
teams--to try to soothe Iraqi sensitivities. As in Africa, Cuba
will continue to protect its interests in the Middle East and, to
earn hard currency, will try to increase its non-diplomatic
presence there.
The presence of some 3,000 Cubans in Libya, mainly involved
in the fields of construction and public health, suggests a
warmth in bilateral ties that is deceiving. Castro's and
Qadhafi's egos have clashed on more than one occasion and neither
appears to place much trust in the other. At.the same time, Cuba
is anxious to develop access to Libya's wealth and, in addition
to increasing the number of Cuban workers in Libya, Castro may be
willing to provide Cuban support for Libyan adventurism as a
means of ingratiating himself with Qadhafi. The relationship has
already paid off for Cuba in terms of Libyan financial support
for Havana's allies in Grenada and Nicaragua.
Havana has good relations with the PLO and continues to
provide training in Cuba for PLO personnel. The Cubans
apparently were incensed at Moscow's failure to help the PLO in
the recent debacle in Lebanon, but Havana itself was in no
position to provide more than propaganda support and backing in
international forums. Cooperation with the PLO enhances Havana's
ability to engage in subversion worldwide and increases the
likelihood that Cuba's clandestine resources will be used
selectively to help achieve PLO goals. However, the PLO is not a
monolithic organization. It is a coalition of several disparate
groupings, with variations in ideology, ranging from moderate to
Marxist-Leninist, some of which are well-disposed to the Cuban
connection.
Cuba also has provided training for Polisario forces and
continues to maintain a medical team of about 200 Cubans at a
Polisario camp in Algeria. We suspect there may be a handful of
Cuban military advisers there, but Algeria's reluctance to permit
Havana to increase its assistance means that Cuba's support will
be limited mainly to propaganda and backing in the UN and
Nonaligned Movement. The Castro regime, nevertheless, is
strongly committed to backing the Polisario in its war against
Morocco.
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Cuba still has an estimated 650 military and civilian
personnel in South Yemen providing military advice, training the
.militia, and ensuring the government's leftist political
orientation. Some Cubans reportedly have been involved in
training foreign insurgents--for example, Omani guerrillas and
dissidents from North Yemen--and we assume this type of activity
persists.
Other International Actions
Heartened by the emergence of various democratic socialist
parties as leading forces in a number of countries of West
Europe, Havana sees great opportunities to exacerbate frictions
between Washington and its Western allies. The Castro regime,
for example, would like to generate West European diplomatic
pressure on Washington to cease its military support for the
government in El Salvador; the Cubans believe that without US
arms, the government would succumb to the insurgents. Havana
would also like to see a repetition of French military sales to
Nicaragua or similar actions that embarrass Washington and damage
US prestige. The Cubans are finding, however, that their ability
to exploit frictions is being hampered by Havana's necessity of
renegotiating outstanding loans with a number of creditors in
Europe and Japan.
Havana is continuing its program of long standing to
influence both public and private opinion in the US. A key
aspect of this effort is to help create opposition to continued
US military assistance to the government of El Salvador. Toward
this end, the Castro regime -- in concert with the Soviet line --
is promoting the concept of a negotiated political solution in
Central America. Knowing it has great appeal for the US media,
it is also promoting a comparison with the US military experience
in Vietnam as a means of souring US public opinion on additional
military aid to the Salvadoran government.
In the Nonaligned Movement, Cuba continues to reflect Soviet
interests and is working to activate pro-Soviet attitudes and to
alienate the Third World from the US. Cuba's effectiveness,
however, has been reduced markedly by its blatant, repeated abuse
of its role as chairman over the past three years.
Cuba has a vast, well organized infrastructure, built up
over the years with Soviet encouragement and support, for
expanding its influence abroad in a variety of ways, legal and
illegal. The Cuban Communist Party Central Committee's America
Department, for example, determines what approach is to be used
in a particular country--at times, Havana utilizes both the
diplomatic approach and subversion coincidentially--and then
becomes directly involved in policy execution. If a decision is
made to follow the armed struggle route in a particular country,
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the Central Committee's Department of Special Operations provides
logistical support, ensuring that the appropriate facilities of
the Cuban armed forces and security services are prepared for any
task from training foreign recruits to shipping munitions
secretly.
The party, in coordination with Moscow, periodically holds
International Theoretical Conferences to establish the
ideological lines it expects revolutionary groups to follow. The
Cuban Interior Ministry uses its elite Special Troops to train
foreign recruits in any skills needed for clandestine or
insurgent activity, be it frogman training, paratroop training,
guerrilla tactics, hand-to-hand combat, weapons familiarization,
communications, or use of demolition charges.
Cuba also has an outstanding propaganda apparatus--Radio
Havana, Prensa Latina, newspapers, magazines, covert publications
and radios, journalists' organizations, and a stable of foreign
writers and intellectuals--which is used to help shape public
opinion around the world, give international exposure and
prestige to insurgent groups, and undercut US credibility. The
Interior Ministry also has an efficient intelligence collection
apparatus, the DGI, and an internal security force, the USE,
which penetrates exile communities abroad to promote friction and
discredit refugees.
Any Cuban ministry or governmental entity can be, and has
been, used to support insurgent operations when necessary. The
Communications Ministry provides communications links for agents
abroad, for Cuban missions abroad, and for Cuban embassies; the
Ministry of the Fishing Industry and Ministry of Merchant Marine
and Ports provide' facilities fer shipping arms clandestinely as
does Cubana Airlines, a branch of the Transportation Ministry.
Even Cuba's mass organizations--for women, students, peasants,
union members, and the population in general--operate schools
where foreigners are trained in ideology and techniques for
organizing and promoting mass organizations in their own
countries.
The Cuban experience in subversive operations dates from the
time the current leadership was carrying out the Cuban revolution
in the 1950s. The Castro regime, therefore, has a large number
of experienced cadres ready to train foreign insurgents in the
skills of the trade or take the field with them to carry out the
revolution.
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PART II: Possible Additional Cuban International Actions
Hostile to Interests in 19-9-3--8-4-
Overview
The very nature of the Castro regime precludes anything but
an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Castro
needs this adversary relationship:
-- To guarantee Soviet aid indispensable to his survival
(In the present climate of US-Soviet relations, Castro
would hardly expect the Soviets to take kindly to a
rapprochement with Washington that threatened Soviet
interests in Cuba).
-- To justify and excuse continued austerity at home (he
uses the US as the standard whipping boy whenever in
need of a scapegoat).
-- To allow him to assume a major role on the world stage
(portraying the US as hostile permits him to assume the
hero's role in a David vs. Goliath drama).
This adversary relationship will not change as long as
Castro is in power. The guerrilla elite that dominates the
current leadership developed its political beliefs during the
guerrilla struggle against former dictator Batista. The
experiences of that campaign and the initial years of power
consolidation created an unswerving commitment to the philosophy
of armed struggle and a visceral distrust of US intentions.
From their perspective, the US is -- and always will be --
the principal threat. Promoting revolution is seen as a means of
defending Cuba from the US threat (i.e.: the US has limited
resources and cannot make war on Cuba, if it is busy fighting a
number of small wars elsewhere). It also provides allies such as
Nicaragua and Grenada.
The future holds no change in the Castro regime's anti-US
orientation. Strategy and tactics may change to suit the
opportunity, but the general policy goal--to reduce US
influence--will remain the same. Havana's efforts are likely to
be directed in several different areas.
Latin America
Latin America will be the priority target probably for the
remainder of the decade. Subversion will continue apace,
especially in Central America, and Cuban support for Nicaragua
will remain a very high priority.
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In the-event of a war between Nicaragua and Honduras or a
serious threat to Sandinista control posed by armed exile groups,--
Cuba would probably increase its military support to Nicaragua.
The Cuban Air Force and Cubana Airlines have the capability to
fly several thousand combat troops with their personal weapons
into the Managua area within about two weeks. Control of the
airfields in Nicaragua is critical to the performance of this
operation. -
Cuban Air Force fighters could fly directly to the Managua
area and operate from there if fuel and ordnance are
prepositioned. Inserting MIG fighters directly from Cuba would
be a very difficult and risky operation, however, unless the
runway at Puerto Cabezas on the Atlantic coast is lengthened to
provide a refueling stop.
Cuba has the ability to airlift up to a battalion of ground
troops or paratroopers to several smaller airfields in Nicaragua,
and could even air drop them if necessary. Cuba lacks the
capability to airlift bulk cargo, however, and would have to send
any tanks, artillery, helicopters, and large radars by ship.
Most heavy equipment would have to transit the Panama Canal
because Nicaragua's Atlantic coast ports lack the facilities to
unload them.
Cuban merchant vessels provide a modest sealift capability,
but only a few small draft vessels can use the Atlantic coast
posts. The Soviets have recently delivered one amphibious -
landing ship to Cuba--and a second is enroute--but their capacity
is small.
Panama is obviously becoming a serious concern in Havana,
and an effort is likely to be made to convince the Panamanian
extreme left that resorting to armed struggle will eventually be
necessary to achieve true independence. Cuba will urge the far
left to send recruits to Cuba'for training as a contingency,
should the Castro regime's efforts to improve relations with the
Panamanian government fail and the Cuban presence in Panama be
threatened.
Havana will watch events in Mexico carefully to guard its
interests there and take advantage of any opportunity to sabotage
US-Mexican relations. Cuba will try to expand its influence in
Suriname and will devote considerable effort to consolidating the
revolution in Grenada. It is reasonable to expect Havana to use
Grenada as a base from which to propagandize the eastern
Caribbean and to conduct liaison with leftists in that area.
Cuba's greatest potential for military intervention in the
eastern Caribbean will be realized when the new airfield in
Grenada is completed next year. Although it is not scheduled to
open until 1984, it could be ready for military operations before
then once the runway is complete and fuel storage is provided.
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Grenada could then serve as a staging base for Cuban ground and
air operations in support of its friends in the area. Grenada,
Suriname, and possibly Guyana would find this potential for swift-
military support comforting, while others like Venezuela and
Trinidad and Tobogo might find it intimidating. The airfield
will also give Cuba a convenient stopover for troops en route to
-Africa.
Havana is certain to expand its efforts to destroy or at
least weaken the OAS and, through wooing new governments in a
number of Latin American countries, to create a new regional
organization that excludes Washington. This is a major
preoccupation of the Castro regime, and it may be willing to
reduce its subversive profile in certain countries if convinced
such temporary retrenchment would contribute significantly toward
that end.
Africa and the Middle East
The Cuban presence in Angola, military and civilian, will
continue at high levels, as long as Luanda needs and requests
Havana's support to stave off collapse. It also serves both
Soviet and Cuban foreign policy objectives. Although the Cubans
are reluctant to become more deeply involved in combat in Angola
or elsewhere in Africa--such as Mozambique--Havana will do so if
necessary to remain in Moscow's good graces. Cuba is simply too
dependent on Soviet economic assistance to say no without a major
justification.
As for a Namibian settlement, Havana will work to scuttle it
if Moscow so desires. Without such pressure, however, Havana
would probably want to avoid the onus of such meddling so long as
a settlement meant nothing more than a token withdrawal of Cuban
troops. On the other hand, if a total Cuban troop withdrawal is
a condition of a settlement, Havana and Luanda would not comply,
no matter what the outcome for SWAPO. In any event, Cuban
support in Angola for. SWAPO and the African National Congress
will continue.
The Cuban combat forces in Angola and Ethiopia are primarily
dedicated to defending Marxist-Leninist regimes in those two
countries from their foreign and domestic enemies. Providing
additional military advisors and instructors to these or other
African regimes is well within Cuba's current capabilities.
Providing combat troops to Mozambique or any other nation would
be much more difficult unless the troops could be taken from
those already in Africa. Calling up additional reservists for
internationalist combat duty would raise the domestic costs to
the Castro regime, and would require another large airlift and
sealift operation. Considerable Soviet assistance to airlift
heavy equipment and to provide logistical support would also be
necessary.
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In the-Middle East Havana will try to increase the number of
civilian workers it now has in some of the Arab countries and
thus acquire hard currency. Cuba will attempt to send workers to
Algeria to participate in large scale construction projects,
although the Algerian reaction is likely to continue to be
negative. Cuba may become more closely linked to radical Middle
East groups, supporting their efforts in Latin America and
profiting from their contacts and facilities in other parts of
the world.
Other Areas
There are other areas where Cuba will be active in
undermining US policy and influence. High priority will continue
to be given to efforts to influence public opinion and private
interests in the US itself. If the US military threat to Cuba is
perceived to increase, Havana will almost certainly manipulate
Puerto Rican terrorists and the Cuban exile community to cause
disturbances within the US.
Cuba is likely to retaliate in kind against perceived
hostile actions from the US. Radio Marti, for example, is
certain to provoke powerful counterbroadcasts from Cuba and heavy
interference to US broadcasters. If Radio Marti causes
significant discontent in Cuba, Castro could threaten another
mass refugee exodus to punish the US.
Havana will continue to pay considerable attention to
cultivating European countries, especially Spain and France,
looking for political support on issues such as consolidating the
Sandinista's position in Nicaragua, justifying the Cuban military
presence in Angola, and gaining international juridical standing
for insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala.
PART 3: The Military Threat Posed by Cuban and
Soviet Military Assets in Cuba.
During a major world war, Cuba's primary concern would be
survival and defense of the island. The sizeable and well-
equipped Cuban military would be expected to offer a credible and
stiff defense of the homeland. There is little likelihood that
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Cuba would attempt offensive military action against the United
States except at Guantanamo Naval Base. Nonetheless, a number of
US targets would be vulnerable to Cuba's increasing offensive
military capabilities. A more serious potential threat is Cuban
capability to harass or interfere with sea and air routes in the
Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico/Straits of Florida areas. This would be
of particular concern because of the amount of US commerce --
particularly oil -- that passes through this region and when
unhampered transit from southern US ports and through Caribbean
sea lanes would be required, such as for US reenforcement of
NATO. The presence of Cuban FOXTROT-Class submarines intensified
this threat. Use of air bases in Nicaragua and possibly in
Grenada would put Cuban fighter aircraft within range to threaten
the Panama Canal and sea lines of communication in the
Caribbean.* The Soviets would likely continue to use Cuba during
a war as a base for intelligence collection against US military
operations. They might also use the island to recover Soviet
combat aircraft or naval ships.
Trends in the Acquisition of Military Equipment
The Soviet Union has provided Cuba an increasing amount of
technologically sophisticated military equipment over the past
two years, and the scale of arms deliveries is not slackening.
Fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMS.), and new radars
to improve Cuba's air defenses have been at the top of the
list. Further deliveries of MIG-23s, SAMS, and possibly some
MIG-25 Foxbat interceptors can be expected in the next few years.
Recent construction of naval support facilities in the
Cienfuegos area suggests the Cuban navy will also be expanding
significantly. more submarines, some larger
surface combatants, and more amphibious landing ships are
expected. While these improvements will not greatly alter the
minimal direct threat Cuba poses to the continental US, they will
serve to further intimidate US friends in the Caribbean.
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ANNEX: CUBAN MILITARY FORCES
Ground Forces
1 Armored Division
Personnel
6,000
29,000
3,000
8,000
63000
Sub Totals
6 Mechanized Infantry Divisions
1 Infantry Division
20 Reserve Divisions (cadre)
Combat and Service Support
Expeditionary Force, Angola
Expeditionary Force, Ethiopia
Air Force
Navy
TOTAL: Regular Military Forces
Ready Reservists
Territorial Militia
63,000
20,000-25,000
11,000-13,000
31,000-38,000
18, 500*
12,000
31,000-38,000
18,500
12,000
125,000-132,000
95,000-125,000
300,000
*2,000 of these are serving with the Angolan and Ethiopian Air Forces.
The aircraft they fly belong to the host countries.
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Air Force
0 MIG-23
OMIG-21
MIG-i7
AN-26 (Transports)
Navy
1 Koni-class frigate
Foxtrot-class submarines
71 OSA and Komar Missile Patrol Boats
Cubana Airlines
IL-62 (capacity 186)
rU-154 (capacity 168)
ritannia (capacity 100)
L-18 (capacity 122)
AN-24 (capacity 50)
IL-14 (capacity 36)
YAK-40 (capacity 32)
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CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
Country
Diplomatic
Relations
Estimated
Cuban Presence
Military Civilian Total
Cuians training leftist-1
terrorists/guerrillas-:in the
past years.
Belize
Chile
yes
Colombia2
N
m
=
Costa Rica3
yes
Ecuador4
yes
El Salvador
- yes
Guatemala-
yes
Honduras
yes
Mexico
yes
yes
Nicaragua5
yes
1700-2300 5500-6000
7200-8300
Panama
yes
1/Reflects information available.
2/Diplomatic relations suspended March 1981.
3/Relations broken by Costa Ric
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5/Cuban instructors train Central American guerrillas in Nicaragua.
Countries with nationals'
in Cuba for technical/,'
academic education in the
past year.
yes
'' yes
yes
yes
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CUBAN ACTIVITIES AND PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN
Cubans training lefttstl Countries with nationals)
Estimated revolutionaries in the in Cuba for technical/
Diplomatic Cuban Presence past year. academic education in the
.Country Relations Military Civilian Total past year.
Antigua
Dominica yes
Dominican Rep.
Grenada2 yes 10-12 6003 610-612
Guyana yes 27 27
Guadeloupe '
Jamaica4
St. Lucia yes
St. Vincent .
Suriname yes
yes
1Reflects'information-available.
2Cuba is training small numbers of East %!V an revolutionaries in Grenada.
3Cuban civilian presence will return to early nex year.
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yes
 CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA
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Countries with nationalsl
Country
Diplomatic.
Relations
Estimated
Cuban Presence
Military Civilian Total
Cubans training leftistl
revolutionaries in the
past year. -=
in Cuba for technical/
academic education in the
past year.
Angola2
yes
20,000-
4,500
24,500-
25,000
29,500
Benin
yes
20
26
46
Botswana
yes
Burundi
yes
16
16
Cape Verde
. yes
6-12
.10
16-22
Congo3
yes
500
100-200
600-700
f yes
N
m
m
I
I
Ethiopia
yes
11,000-
12,000
13,000
1,000
14,000
Gambia
yes.
Guinea
yes
20-30
200-225
220-255
Guinea-
Bissau
yes
50
100-150
150-200
iReflects information available.
2Cubans training SWAPO and'ANC guerrillas in Angola.
3Excludes about 1500-2000 Cuban military personnel in Pointe Noire, Congo, supporting activities In the Angolan exclave of Cabinda.
They are.included'in the number of Cuban miliary in Angola.
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 CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA (cont'd)
Countries with hn
es
: p
~~} WR~jWQQj0~890017-4n Cuba
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a for technical/
Country .
Diplomatic
Relations.
Estimated revolutionaries in the
Cuban Presence past year*
Military Civilian Total:
academic education.in the
past year.
Lesotho
yes
Madagascar
, yes
10-12
10-12
yes
Mali
yes
8
8
Mozambique4
yes
1,000
1,000
2,000
Rwanda
yes
N _-
m
CI
Sao Tome
yes
30-50
200-250
230-300
M
1
-4
Seychelles
yes
4
20-25
24-29
Sierra Leone
yes
10-20
Tanzania '
yes
80
80
Uganda
. yes
10-10
Zimbabwe
yes
iReflects information available.
4Cuban instructors at bases training ANC guerrillas outside Maputo.
I
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 m l
n N
m 1
.;..._,
Country
Diplomatic
Relations
Approved For Release
Estimated
Cuban Presence
Military Civilian Total
Cubans training leftist'
revolutionaries in the._-
past year.
Afghanistan
yes
unk2
50
50+
Algeria
yes
50
50
Libya3.
yes
unk2
3200
3200+
Iran
. yes
unk2
Iraq4
yes
500
500
South Yemeni
yes
100
600
Saharan
Democratic
Arab Republic yes
(Polisario)
Countries with nationals'
in Cuba for technical/
academic education in the
past year.
yes .
yes
yes
6 yes
yes yes
100-150 ? 100-150
'Reflects information available. .
elieve there is a Cuban military presence.
Cuban Instructors are assigned to some guerrilla training camps in Libya and South Yemen.
4Cuban presence reduced from 3500 this fall due to dangers posed by the Iran-Iraq war.
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CUBAN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST
Estimated
Diplomatic Cuban Presence
Country Relations Military Civilian Total
Kampuchea yes
Mongolia yes
Vietnam yes
1Reflects information available.'-
20 20 '
Countries with nationals!
Cubans training leftist1 in Cuba for technical/
revolutionaries in the academic education in the
past year. past year.
50-60 50-60
500 500
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