TESTIMONY TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000701970004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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,.
TQP~Ct~ET
MATERIAL FOR DCI's BRIEFING ON POLAND BEFORE.
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
10 FEBRUARY 1982
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. 'testimony to Senate Select Committee on Irr~elliaence
Mr. Chairman:
:.;, .I_have been asked~to discuss with you the Intelligence Community's
performance in assessing developments in Poland prior to Qecember 13th and
in alerting US policymakers to the possibi]ity of forceful confrontation.
Sy way of introduction, let me break that general question into some sub-
questions and tell you the answers we gave at the time:.. I shall-then go
in some more detail_'into_the chronology_of events and.-our reporting of them.
What, then, were the essential subquestions as we saw them?
1. Would the Soviets accept the role which Solidarity was winning for
itself? The evidence indicated that what Solidarity was in the process
of achieving was deeply repugnant to the Soviets, and that they were
working hard to roll back Solidarity's gains; and we reported this.
But where and when, precisely, the Soviets would draw a tine and
..compel compliance from the Poles was far less clear and evoked
divergent opinions within the Community--particularly in light of
the remarkable toleration by the Soviets for so long of developments
in Poland that-most observers at the outset believed they would never
accept. It is highly probable that the Soviet leadership itself
vacillated on policy toward Poland.
2. Why did the Soviets not invade~in December 80--January~8l and there ~~:
again in the March--April $1 time period when they .came so close to
doing so? We reported that this Soviet military pressure, particularly.
in March--April, had produced commitments from the Kania-Jaruzelski
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 leadership to begin serious planning for martial taw with active
Soviet assistance--a very important development since it put the
.Soviets in the position of simultaneously shaping Polish planning
and of improving their access to Polish decisionmakers. Later we
also did a stuc(y of the hypothetical costs and benefits of an
invasion for the Soviets. That study was not predictive~in nature
but it did bring out the .high costs which the Soviets could incur.
It thus pointed to the preferability of having the Poles themselves
carry out the rollback of Solidarity.
3. What sort of leverage did the Soviets have? I have already alluded
to Soviet public and private pressures, which we reported as the
information became available to us. In November 1981, we also did
an extensive stuc(y of Soviet economic leverage and concluded that
this area offered the Soviets considerable scope far pressure and
that Moscow was making repeated threats to cut back the supply .of
raw materials.
4. What kind of plans were the Poles making? We reported in detail on
Polish planning, with Soviet assistance, for martfat law and, in
essence,. told the policy community what eventually happened
on December 13th.
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5. Did we precisely predict when martial law would be imposed? No, we
did not. But on October 30th 1981 we reported to the President and
other selected members of the NSC that Polish plans for martial law
had been completed and Polish police and military farces prepared for
the operation. We also accurately described the details of these plans
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and explained that, because the Polish troops would not be moved
into place until immediately prior to martial Taw's imposition, we
would have no tactical warning of it. We had previously reported
that Jaruzelski and the Polish military leadership favored proceeding
with the martial law. plans. In early December 1981 additional
information on Polish martial law plans became available to us, and
on 7 December a full status report was prepared.
After this introduction, I would now like.to_rev%ew the history_of.Polish
planning for martial law and our reporting of it:
1. Martial, law preparations first became a major theme in our reporting
on Poland in the months following the December 1980 crisis.
a. In December, the Soviets had threatened to invade and impose
martial law by themselves, but the Poles dissauded them.
b. .Thereafter, .the Poles began serious planning for martial
.law, and we reported these preparations.
-- to the President and key cabinet level officials
(special PDBs)
-- and to the overall policymaking community (NIDs) in
-more general form and without using information which
was timely but extremely sensitive.
c. By tti1arch 1981, wewere reporting that the Soviets` primary
strategy .for dealing with the Polish problem was to pressure
the Polish authorities to impose martial law (see NID 3/13/81).
.,-Based on our knowl-edge of martial law planning, we also were
reporting that we would have no advance warnin if martial
law were imposed (see NID 3/23/81).
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From April, to Juiy 1981, we reported continuing Soviet pressures to
impose martial law. Polish resistance and temporizing, however,
.prompted .the Soviets to shift their attention to bringing about
changes in the Polish leadership. .
3. After the~Party Congress ended on 20 July, government ~raposals for
price increases intensified-the struggle with Solidarity, and we
reported renewed planning by the regime for martial law operations.
a. In early August, for example, we told the President that the
attitude of Polish leaders toward Solidarity had toughened
markedly and martial law plans were being updated and coordinated.
with senior Soviet miiitary officers in Poland..
In late August in.a paper given to key cabinet members, we
reported on Polish plans ~o impose martial law.either piecemeal
or in toto. (See special r~emo.}
4.. After the first round of Solidarity's National Congress between
5-10 September, we reported especially intense preparations by the
regime for martial law and a significant shift of opinion in favor
of imposing martial law on the part of Polish miiitary leaders,
including Jaruzelski.
a. On t2 September, r:e told the President that the Chief of
the Polish General Staff had told his'coileagues that Poland
was "approaching the institution of martial law" and that a
decision to act might be made within a few days.
b. On 18 September in a Special Analysis in the NID, we reported
that the Intelligence Community had detected a nualitative
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change in the attitudes of Solidarity and the Government
that greatly increased-the prospects for, confrontation:
We also reported that the regime had prepared a detailed
plan of military measures including curfews, arrest of
Solidarity leaders, and total military control of the
country.
c.. On 2~4 September, we reported that the Polish Politburo had
rejected the military`s plan on l5 September for the
imposition of martial law and that the Palish leadership
was deeply divided over this issue. 4!e also reported that
the finaT.decision would probably be determined by a
combination of the second round of the Solidarity Congress
and the severity of~Soviet pressure, which remained high.
5. In the final months before the imposition of martial law, our greatest
problem was to determine whether these differences within the leadership
had. been resolved.
a. On 19 October, we reported that Jaruzelski's replacement of
Kania as Party Secretary on .the previous day had increased the
chances of confrontation and remi.rided oc~r.readers that the
contingency planning for the imposition of martial law
apparently was complete.
~'b. On 30 October, we reported to the President that plans for
martial law had been completed and a schedule prepared that
indicated when, relative to-the declaration of martial Taw,
the various farces involved in the operation would begin their
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activities. Because troops apparently would not be moved
into place until ir~mediately prior to "N-hour", we again
concluded (first time 3/28j81) that we could expect little
warning of the implementation of martial law.
c. In early December 1981, a full status report reviewed in
detail how martial law would be carried aut and stated that
recent activity was. consistent with the final preparations
that would precede implementation of the martial law plan.
.The report also noted that there were .signs that regime
moderates were still seeking to?find political solutions to
contentious issues, and. that there was no evidence that the
.Soviets were beginning parallel preparations.
d. Thus, in the course of the year we alerted policymakers?both
to martial law preparations and to the high probability that
we would get little or no warning. In the event, we received
no evidence that a decision. had been made to proceed with the
martial law plan. Instead, the evidence indicated continuing
hesitation. On 25 November, we learned
that several days. before, Soviet General
Staff officers had reviewed the Polish plans for martial law
and offered to help imP]ement them, but that the Poles had
declined their Soviet .offer. We reported this on 28 November..
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 eclassified in Pa
e. :s On 10 .December, we reported that Marshal Kulikov, along
with a group of senior officers, was back in Warsaw.
f. 1On 11 December,.a day before the imposition of martial ]aw,
we reported an .increase in the public pressure that the
Soviets were exerting on the Poles. We were not aware of
any political intentions to impose martial taw or of any
military or police movements until only hours before martial
law was imposed.
ter. Chairman, the information I have outlined-might give the impression
that there was a Ilearly discernible crescendo in Poland pointing toward the
imposition of martial law. Such was .not the case. Despite the increasing
.collaboration between the Soviets and Palish mi~titary authorities behind
the scenes, there-were also disagreements within the Polish political .leader-
ship. In public, Jaruzelski continued to take a conciliatory posture and
other events, such as Parliament`s increasing independence, allowed some
hope that. the government, Church, and Solidarity would still be able to
reach some sort of agreement. We did report on these various moves and
possibilities of accommodation as well. The general thrust of our reports
to policymakers, however,. pointed to. a government perfecting its martial taw
plan f'and having the ability to choose the best time to implement it.
In~retrospect, then, how well did the Intelligence Community do?
We did not. predict the precise moment at which martial taw was imposed.
In addition, in our own minds we probably somewhat overestimated the prepara-
tions which Solidarity had made for such a contingency and the immediate
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resistance that the action would evoke from the Foiish people; consequently,
our reports may have been too skeptical about the regime's capacity effectively
to execute the action. But, we did tell policymakers that the most likely
scenario was not a Soviet invasion but a Polish imposition of martial law
with the Soviets active only behind the scenes. We described how martial
law was to be implemented and pointed out that we could provide little or
no warning of impending action. On the night of 12 to 13 .December, Jaruzelski
set in train the martial law moves which we had been describing to our top
policymakers for months and which we had last summarized in early December 1981.
On balance, I believe the Intelligence Community did a commendable job in
assessing the train of events in Poland prior to December 13th.
~ 0 FE3 ~r82
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