TALKING POINTS: DCI MEETING WITH JUDGE CLARK -- MIDDLE EAST PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000802040004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: MEMORANDUM

'Approved-For-Release 2006/05/03: CIA-RDP84BOO049ROO0802040004-9
SECRETI
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI 6195-82
28 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: A/NIO/NESA
A/NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Talking Points: DCI Meeting with Judge Clark -- Middle
East Prospects
1. If the West Beirut question is resolved by Ambassador Habib's
efforts, Lebanese attention will focus on the Presidential election.
Israel and Syria will each seek to preserve its respective sphere of
influence:
Israel will stay in the south by keeping troops there,
buttressing Haddad and backing Bashir's electoral strategy.
Syria will push to increase.its ties to Muslims and leftists
,while retaining troops in the Bekaa.
The US can probably tolerate this de facto partition for a time. Both Tel
Aviv and Damascus will have satisfied their immediate security needs. Over
the longer term, however, this partition would be unstable as each side and
its Lebanese surrogates seek to expand their influence. US policy moves to
resolve the Palestinian issue would have the best chance of keeping
tensions contained.
2. The Israeli-Phalange relationship has become somewhat more tense.
Since the invasion Bashir has sought to avoid overly close association with
Sharon and Begin -- sparking some resentment in Tel Aviv. This is a
potentially positive feature for the US because it offers some room to
maneuver with Bashir and could enhance Phalange acceptability with the
Saudis and Syrians.
3. The confluence of regional events -- the continuing impasse over
Beirut and-the Gulf war -- harbor great risks for US policy goals
throughout the region by enhancing the position of anti-US radicals of both
the Palestinian and Shia fundamentalist variety. The threat of an outright
Iranian victory at Al Basrah -- the so-called "worst case" scenario --
This Memo is classified
SECRET in its entirety.
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still carries great risks for the Gulf states and for their relations with
us. It is the judgment of the Community that Iranian control of. southern
Iraq, from Al Basrah to the Kuwaiti border, will bring about the kind of
accommodation to Iranian policies within Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar that
will encourage Shia radicalism there and perhaps even in Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and Oman.
Attachment:
Memo to DCI (DDI-6191-82)