EGYPTIAN POLICY TOWARD LEBANON AND THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000802040005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 28, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP84B00049R000802040005-8
SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
State Dept. review completed.
DDI 6191-82
28 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
A/NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Egyptian Policy Toward Lebanon and the US
1. The Lebanese crisis is gradually having a chilling effect on US-
Egyptian ties and on Cairo's perception of how to proceed in the Arab-
Israeli peace process. Ambassador Atherton has reported growing
frustrations at both the elite and mass level among Egyptians who resent
Cairo's inability to restrain Israel, influence events in Lebanon or alter
US policy toward the PLO. As a result, the Egyptians have become less and
less helpful:
-- At the UN Egypt continues to work with France to
sponsor a pro-PLO resolution calling for PLO-Israeli talks and
promises of future self-determination. Both Cairo and Paris
are increasingly worried that the US has no long range
Palestinian policy and that Washington is pursuing a West
Beirut settlement as an end in itself, not a step toward a
larger Lebanese or Arab-Israeli settlement.
Mubarak has refused to commit Egypt to take in any significant
number of PLO fighters (Habib wants Egypt to take 4000),
although he is on record as willing to take some.
2. To date Egyptian frustrations have been kept within bounds.
Mubarak recognizes the enormous leverage Washington has over Egypt through
military and economic aid, and few Egyptians want to risk provoking
Israel. As a result, Egypt has moved carefully to avoid any fundamental
rupture in ties with Tel Aviv and left open the option of resuming the
autonomy talks after an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (and if the
Israelis drop their insistence on holding talks in Jerusalem).
3. There is a growing danger, however, that Mubarak's patience will
flag and some more dramatic Egyptian move will ensue. Public pressure is
building for a more visible Egyptian policy to press-ire the US. Even the
This Memo is- classified
SECRET) i n its enti rety.
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semi-official newspaper, Al-Ahram, has called for a boycott of US trade and
opposition groups have called for a break in relations with Israel and for
sending volunteers to fight with the PLO. While Mubarak will try to avoid
such controversial moves, an Israeli attack on West Beirut would produce
strong pressure for retaliation against Israel and probably the US:
-- Cairo's Ambassador in Tel Aviv might be recalled or
normalization reversed.
-- The US and Israeli Embassies could be exposed to
demonstrations.
-- Cairo could renounce the autonomy talks.
4. Even absent such a dramatic Egyptian policy shift, the Lebanese
imbroglio has severely undermined Egyptian confidence in the autonomy
process. It has reduced the chances Mubarak will make any serious effort
to compromise in the talks, especially if a resumption of the Camp David
process threatened to damage his efforts to improve ties with the Saudis.
Moreover, the Egyptian disillusionment with the US over Lebanon is sure to
have a long term negative impact on US-Egyptian strategic cooperation.
Finally, Mubarak's impotence with regard to Lebanon and Israel inevitably
undermines his prestige at home -- the opposition is increasingly restive
-- probably strengthening the hand of his fundamentalist foes.
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Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP84B00049R000802040005-8