DCI TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WORLDWIDE WRAP-UP 4 FEBRUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R000902300005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 4, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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DCI TESTIMONY
before
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Worldwide Wrap-up
4 February 1982
I plan to give you an overview of the many levels of rivalry and of
actual and potential conflict which concern us around the world. I plan to
do this briefly, largely in the context of what has developed recently and
what we see ahead. Then my colleagues will deal in some greater detail with
those matters for which they are responsible.
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What I have to tell you is gleaned and backed up by some 60 intelligence
estimates this year by the intelligence community through the National Foreign
Intelligence Board. You might look at the list and note anything that interests
you. We don't publish a catalog and have classified this list since it may tell
something. If you would like a briefing on any of them, we would be pleased
to oblige.
The Soviets have achieved strategic nuclear capabilities at least equal
to our own and continue to further improve the accuracy and striking power of
their offensive forces, with deployment of additional MIRVed land based and
submarine based intercontinental missiles and BACKFIRE bombers, plus some 300
SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe and the Far East.
We see no let-up in their drive to develop and deploy still further
improvements in their strategic arsenal.
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The Soviets are upgrading missile defenses at Moscow, constructing new
large radars and developing new ABM systems.and components. This will give
them several options for widespread ABM deployment in the late.1980s.
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In strategic air defenses, we estimate that by the mid-1980s the Soviets
will have deployed in large numbers a variety of systems--interceptors,
SAMs, and AWACs--that will give thema much greater technical capability to
engage low-altitude planes and cruise missiles.
The magnitude of Soviet space programs gives ominous indications of future 25X1
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military applications in space.
Overriding these force development programs, the Soviets emphasize command,
control, and communications (C3) as critical to nuclear warfighting.
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All the evidence indicates that the Soviets are attempting to prepare their
leaders and military forces for the possibility of having to fight a nuclear
war, and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex
conflict situations. They are well aware that the course of a nuclear conflict
will probably not go according to plans. But they believe that preparations
in force structure, doctrine and training to continue operations after a nuclear
attack will limit damage and raise the prospects for a favorable outcome.
In conventional forces, Warsaw Pact forces outnumber NATO 'n 25X1
divisions and tanks andi 'n combat aircraft. The Warsaw pact
divisions are smaller, but they are more heavily armed. The past few years
have widened the numerical disparity and eroded the qualitative edge NATO
once had. Warsaw Pact manpower has grown by nearly 300,000 men and 7,000
main battle tanks and 7,000 artillery pieces have been added. Most of the
recent improvements have been to Soviet forces. Moscow's East European allies,
which account for about half of the initially available Pact forces, have
equipment which is obsolete relative to the Soviets and NATO.
The Soviet Union would depend heavily on its Warsaw Pact allies at least
in the early stages of a war with NATO. Poland provides 15 divisions, about
25% of the Pact's forces, and controls critical lines of communications between
the Pact's forward based forces and Moscow'.s primary reinforcement base. The
Soviets are likely to be reluctant to risk military encounter with NATO until
their interests in Poland are fully assured.
In the technological race, there is the constant threat of a breakthrough
which could tip the strategic balance against us.
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,During this year we have established that the increasing sophistication,
accuracy, power, impenetrability and countermeasure capability of Soviet
weapons, against which we must defend ourselves, is based on our own expenditures
in research and development to a far greater degree than we had ever dreamed.
The Soviets conduct a massive far-flung and well organized effort to get
technology from the West through trade, theft, illegal purchase, espionage,
scientific exchanges and study programs. This has given them a huge free ride
on our military R&D and on our civilian technology. We have paid for much of
the vastly increased military threat which will now require us to increase our
military spending by hundreds of billions of dollars over this decade.
This expanding Soviet military power will back up growing aggressiveness
in seeking enhanced political and economic influence on a worldwide scale. In
the military domain they continue to improve their ability to project power
over considerable distances.- This was first seen in moving tanks and other
heavy weapons to link up with Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia.
We know the Soviets have examined exercise scenarios calling for the
introduction of large Soviet forces into Iran, planning to occupy the country
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over a six-week period. In the military districts opposite Iran they maintain
23 divisions, with 13 additional divisions available in their strategic reserve.
We estimate that within a month or so they could prepare a force of 10-20
divisions for operations in Iran.
However, although the Soviets have the world's largest airborne force,
Moscow's capability to project and support those forces beyond contiguous
areas is currently constrained by a shortage of long-range transports and
their inability to provide fighter cover for operations far from the USSR.
They have only enough aircraft to move one airborne division at a time. We
estimate the Soviets have the capability to airlift an airborne division of
7,000 men and their equipment to the Middle East
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period of several days. They could sealift a motorized rifle division with
12,000 men and 200 tanks to the region in two weeks. This would be beyond the
range of Russian-based tactical airpower and without basing near the intended
operational area, the Soviets could conduct military operations only against
light opposition.
Beyond the direct reach of its military power, Moscow, with its proxies
and clients, Cuba, Vietnam, East Germany, Libya and North Korea, seeks power
and influence in the Third World through a sophisticated mix of tactics
including traditional diplomacy, aid to revolutionary groups, active disinfor-
mation measures and extensive arms aid. All the problems and conflicts around
the world do not originate in Moscow, but the Soviets and their associates are
skillful and diligent in finding and exploiting opportunities to weaken the
United States and separate it from its friends and allies.
The Soviets in 1980 sold about one-third more arms to the Third World
than we did. They offer better terms and more speedy delivery. This is a
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drastic shift from the late 1970s when we sold twice as many arms as they did.
Moscow's ability to quickly meet its clients' needs for arms was shown last
year in Cuba, where Soviet arms deliveries more than tripled from about 20,000
to over 60,000 tons. The number of Soviet military advisors in the Third World
continues to grow, now numbering almost 16,000. This is four times as many
as 1965 and double the number in 1975. Arms sales now account for over 16%
of Soviet hard currency earnings, second only to oil and energy exports.
Moscow also combines traditional diplomacy and subversion to undermine hostile
government and to befriend leftist ones. Almost 8,000 Soviets are assigned to
official Soviet installations in the Third World. About
are KGB and GRU intelligence officers. At the same time, Moscow's involvement
in the Third World is becoming increasingly costly and is generating its own
counteraction. The USSR and its clients are now bogged down in five major
counterinsurgency campaigns (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique)
which they are having a hard time winning and Soviet economic assistance to
its clients becomes more and more burdensome.
Now let's look at specific areas starting with the Middle East.
For Egypt, failure to regain the Sinai from Israel in April would be a
serious setback. There are misgivings in Israel but we expect that Begin will
be able to meet his Sinai commitment, even though it is clear that Mubarak
intends a gradual warming of relations with the Arab world. Mubarak has made
it clear that he intends to re-establish economic and diplomatic relationships
with the Soviet Union and open up arms supply relationships with France and
probably other countries. In this, a primary objective will be to reduce the
domestic cost of the perception of exclusive dependence on the United States,
which he believes contributed to fundamentalist disenchantment with Sadat.
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The prospect of bridging the gap between Egypt and Israel on Palestinian
autonomy is not promising. Egypt wants an autonomy agreement that gives the
West Bank Arabs sufficient power and responsibility to attract broad Palestinian
support. The Israelis want an agreement that restricts the powers of the
Self Governing Authority to administrative matters and leaves control of the
territory and all key security issues with Israel. If a reluctant Israel does
go through with the Sinai withdrawal, Begin is likely to move quickly to estab-
lish stronger control legally and politically over the West Bank. This is a
delicately balanced situation which can be upset by changes in mood and as yet
unseen circumstances particularly in Lebanon where the Israelis consider the
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continued presence of increasingly well armed Fedayeen a threat to their security.
The likelihood of a Soviet intervention in support of Syria is slim,
but as time goes by the Syrians will continue to strengthen their military and
political ties with the USSR.
With the exception of continued leftist insurgency in North Yemen supported
by Soviet-supported South Yemen, the prospects for stability in the Arabian
Peninsula remain good over the next year. There is no detectable organized
opposition to the Saudi regime. Should Iran predominate in its conflict with
Iraq, as current trends indicate, we are likely to see renewed political agitation
in the Shia areas of the Persian Gulf. We have already seen an attempt on the
part of Khomeini's Islamic Guard at a coup in Bahrain with its predominantly
Shia population. The end game of the Iran-Iraq war might also lead to further
attacks on oil-related targets in both countries and possibly on the Arab side
of the Gulf.
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In Iran, the clerical regime has significantly consolidated its control
during the past six months, and appears to have broken the main strength of
the principal opposition group, the leftist Mujahedin. The Iranian military
has also seized the momentum in the war with Iraq. The standing and power of
the Revolutionary Guards has been enhanced. Also, there appears to be increas-
ingly frequent collaboration between the Soviets and the Islamic Republican
Party--particularly in arms procurement and probably security matters. What
we may be contending with in a year's time is not a power vacuum, as we had
feared, but a strengthened fundamentalist central regime with increasingly
closer Soviet ties. Iran looks increasingly like Algeria, Libya and other
pro-Soviet Third World countries.
In Afghanistan, things are going badly for the Soviets. Soviet soldiers
in the cities do not leave their barracks at night and the Soviet road convoys
are confined to the main roads and sometimes required to stay off them for
days at a time. The insurgents control 60% of the country. Recently, the
Soviets increased their military strength there by 5,000-10,000 men. For the
Soviets to crush the insurgency and more effectively limit insurgent support
across the borders, the Soviets would probably need at least 300,000 additional
men.
Pakistan, while nervous about pressure from Russia and potential pressure
from India, remains firm in quiet support of the Afghan resistance.
In Libya, an apparent recent assassination attempt on Qadhafi highlights
his vulnerability to an unpredictable act of this nature. During the fall,
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Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen entered into a pact to threaten Sudan, Somalia,
and North Yemen, all of them economically and militarily very wobbly. This,
in turn, can constitute a threat to Saudi Arabia and possibly Oman. Sudan is
particularly vulnerable and under the most persistent Libyan aggression Libya's
withdrawal from Chad last November is probably only temporary, motivated by
Qadhafi's desire to ensure his assumption of the chairmanship of the Orga-
nization of African Unity next July.
There are not many states in Africa which do not find themselves threatened
or heavily influenced by some combination of Eastern Bloc arms, Libyan money or
Cuban troops. We see Libya moving in West Africa threatening Niger, Mali, and
Togo, seeking influence with the new military government in Ghana, developing
Benin as a base from which to destablize Nigeria with guerrillas brought from
Central Africa and Chad and trained in Libya. Morocco faces severe pressure
with economic problems arising from poor harvests and heavy unemployment in
Casablanca, and desert nomads in the Western Sahara, known as Polisarios,
knocking its planes out of the air with Soviet SAMs, based on Algerian soil
and funded by Libyan money.
There are 13,000 Cuban troops and 1,700 Soviet military advisors in Ethiopia,
most of them in the Ogaden region on the Somalia border where they work together
with Libyan-trained Somali dissidents.
In Angola, there is a weak economy and 25,000-30,000 Cubans, 75% of whom
are military, together with 2,000-3,000 Soviet and East German advisors.
The struggle for South Africa is being played out mainly in northern
Namibia and southern Angola, where South African military forces are arrayed
against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed guerrillas of SWAPO, which operate out of
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Angola. South Africa has constrained SWAPO's ability to operate in Namibia by
conducting aggressive cross-border operations into Angola during the past year
and a half.
In Zaire, there is general agreement that the danger of an outbreak of
hostilities in Shaba is greater than at any time over the past three years.
Although reporting is sketchy at best, it would appear that Soviet support
has been offered to an incursion from Angola.
In Central America violence reigns. Managua has become an international
city as Cubans, Soviets, East Germans, Bulgarians, North Vietnamese, North
Koreans and radical Arabs support insurgency in El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras and develop Nicaragua into a superpower on a Central American scale.
(Nicaragua with a population of
2 1/2 million is on the way to military power which will dominate surrounding
countries with a population of 18 million. Somoza had a national guard of
11,000 at the height of the Sandinista insurgency. The country is now
divided into seven military districts
an army of 20,000 and a militia of 20,000 being steadily
increased, with an announced goal of 50,000 in the army and 200,000 in the
militia.
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dominant Cuban influence in Nicaragua is reflected in Havana's nearly 6,000
advisers, some 1,800 of whom are military/security personnel. With guidance
from Cuban and East German security personnel, a block by block organization
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just like in Cuba is being imposed along with increasing repression of the
leading moderates, intellectuals, opposition politicians, businessmen and
independent media.
All this is generating a growing number of dissidents within Nicaragua.
Nicaraguans who have exiled themselves 'in Honduras and Costa Rica are now close
to 30,000. Indians on the isolated east coast have been attacked and their
villages razed. As a result, thousands have crossed into Honduras to join the
exiles. The Sandinistas' mounting concern about raids by anti-regime bands
operating largely from Honduras increases the likelihood that Managua will
move decisively against anti-Sandinista camps in that country.
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In El Salvador, some 5,000 armed insurgents are locked in a war of attrition
against government forces numbering 24,000. The insurgents are supplied with
arms and trained leaders by air and sea from Nicaragua, smuggled by land through
Honduras, and controlled through a communications network operated from Nicaragua.
The El Salvador government's land reform and other economic measures are being
implemented but are seriously impeded by the civil war. Real and threatened
attacks on economic targets reduce investment faster than economic assistance
can be provided. The failure of last January's final offensive to spark a
popular uprising forced the guerrillas to adopt more modest short-term goals,
while counting on economic sabotage, mounting armed forces' casualties, and
international condemnation of the government to tip the balance in their favor
over the longer term. The guerrillas' current priority is to disrupt the
28 March elections. They got a big lift from last week's night time sabotage
job which destroyed a large portion of the government's air force at a major
airport near San Salvador. This is likely to provide additional steam to the
insurgents''plan to escalate small unit attacks on power, transportation and
other economic targets to damage the economy and intimidate voters away from
the polls.
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Guerrilla activity in Guatemala has increased sharply since last fall,
reflecting a major growth in the strength of the insurgents, whom we now estimate
to number some 4,500. The Cubans and Nicaraguans are also laying the groundwork
for an eventual insurgency in Honduras and are accelerating guerrilla training.
The force of these insurgencies, the concerted nature of their external support,
and the magnitude of the Nicaraguan military buildup is creating increasing
concern throughout Latin America as witnessed by the recent vote in the Organi-
zation of American States overwhelmingly supporting the election plan of the
government in El Salvador, by the opposition voiced by the South American
states to Mexican and French expresssions of support for the insurgents in
El Salvador, and by the more recent call by Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador
for assistance from Colombia, Venezuela and the United States against the
threat they perceive from their joint neighbor, Nicaragua.
Going to the Orient, the Chinese leadership continues to plan for its
own succession. Although the aging Deng Xiaoping remains preeminent, his
economic development policies favoring agriculture and light industry are
producing modest results at best. Moreover, Deng and his allies must still
restore institutions damaged during the Mao era and build support for a reform
program that minimizes the role of ideology. Some military leaders and many
middle-level bureaucrats have reservations about these policies. If a smooth
succession to Deng is implemented, Soviet capabilities to expand their influence
at China's expense will be minimized; a failed succession, on the other hand,
would present the Soviets with tempting opportunities. China-US relations
remain heavily influenced by Taiwan. .As a result, mutually acceptable management
of the Taiwan arms sale issue tops the Chinese-US agenda for 1982.
The military stalemate in Kampuchea has led to increased political
maneuvering among Communist and non-Communist resistances forces and their
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supporters outside Kampuchea. Although the military balance still favors
Vietnam (180,000) and their Kampuchean puppets (15-20,000), they are unable
to consolidate control. Singapore and Thailand are pressing for a loose
coalition of Communist and non-Communist resistance forces with the objective
of forcing Hanoi to seek a political solution. Both the Soviets and the
Chinese also have equities in Vietnam and Indochina. The Soviets keep
Vietnam afloat economically by contributing $2-3 million per day and gain
the use of facilities in Cam Ranh Bay. The Chinese, for their part, continue
to support the resistance forces while occasionally threatening to "teach
Vietnam a second lesson" along their common border. These measures'are
designed to force the Vietnamese out of Kampuchea and the Soviets out of
Vietnam, but they are unlikely to succeed soon.
Of all these arenas of rivalry, in the long run the relative economic and
political performance of the free societies and the command societies may be
the most relevant and critical. Third World countries are finding that military
aid from the Soviet Union does not solve their pressing economic problems.
Moscow's proxies--Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, and Nicaragua--have
become economic basket cases. The world has witnessed the failure of the
Communist system in Poland. The prospect is that the Polish military will
find it more difficult to govern than it was to decapitate the Solidarity
movement which is likely to continue as a powerful force if only in passive
resistance.
A Soviet Union running out of hard currency will face growing financial
demands to keep things going not only in Poland, but in Rumania, Cuba, Vietnam,
and other satellites. Within Russia, for three years in a row, overall economic
growth was less than 2% and the harvest failure got worse each year. Growth
is slowing in the labor.force, in investment, in labor productivity, in primary
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energy production, and in overall industrial output. Economic problems have
brought a growing social malaise, with rising alcoholism, higher labor turnover,
more corruption and black market activities, and growing resentment among the
increasing Moslem and non-Russian population against Moscow's domination. A
continuation of a 4% annual increase in Soviet military outlays while economic
growth remains in the 2% range can only squeeze consumption, worker productivity
and investment still harder. What we have been witnessing in Poland during
these last six weeks may well symbolize the ultimate failure of the command
economy, proof that it cannot work without brutality and repression.
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On the other side of the curtain, in Western Europe, unemployment, social
dissidence and political tension will run high. The political turn to the
left in France and Greece seems likely to compound and further complicate
these tensions. The way Europe balances its commitment to security against the
,Soviet military threat and its temptation to ease growing unemployment by credits
to a Soviet Union running out of hard currency seems likely to be at the heart
of the East-West relationship. As we look around the world, it appears that.
only the market economies of East Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore are doing well. In addressing the concerns I have outlined, we
have a heavy stake in how well the nations of the Atlantic Alliance and East
Asia mesh their economic and political gears and outperform the command economies
in the economic and political arena.
National Intelligence Council, is prepared to deal further with that subject
and then introduce his colleagues who will deal more fully with the specific
military matters and geographic areas -I have touched on.
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