OVERVIEW OF SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00049R001002400028-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 22, 2007
Sequence Number:
28
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP84B00049R001002400028-0.pdf | 263.75 KB |
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rT
I would like to present a brief overview of the situation
in the Middle East re ion 5X1
25X1
I. Area Brief
1. Egypt. President Mubarak, a little more than three
months after the assassination of Anwar Sadat, has taken hold
better than most observers expected. He presents a sincere
straightforward image and is free of the taint of corruption
associated with many figures of the Sadat era. Although he
has taken steps against corruption, he has yet to undertake a
thorough housecleaning. He faces formidable problems,
occasioned chiefly by a population growth of one million a
year and the mal-distribution of wealth that reached glaring
proportions during the Sadat era. The succession to Mubarak,
in case of an untoward incident has not been established,
though it will begin to be if and when Mubarak names a vice
president.
2. In short, the success of the Mubarak regime is not
assured, and thus Egypt, which is vital to U.S. interests in
the area, will continue to need extensive U.S. help and
support. The final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai is as of
the present writing due to take place as scheduled in late
April, but this could be upset by a number of actions, such as
an Israeli move in force into southern Lebanon. This could
provoke a reaction of support for the Arabs from Mubarak,
causing the Israelis to go back on their commitment to
withdraw from the Sinai. If the withdrawal does not take
place, Mubarak's prestige will suffer a serious blow.
3. Israel. If the Israelis do complete their pullout
from the Sinai, the likelihood is that Mubarak will then move
to restore his relations with the Arabs, including the Saudis.
There seems little prospect that Egypt and Israel can come to
an agreement on a statement of principles for the autonomy
regime in the West Bank in Gaza before the scheduled pullout
from the Sinai. Mubarak will not be able to bring himself to
sign a agreement of principles which does not allow for valid
autonomy for the Palestinians. After the pullout takes place,
there will be less inclination on the part of Mubarak to be
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accommodating with the Israelis on the Palestinian issue. It
is possible that Mubarak may eventually associate himself with
some form of the Fahd plan as he develops closer relations
with the now estranged Arabs and possibly restores full
diplomatic ties with the Soviets as well.
4. Israel is dominated by a governing group which is
increasingly inclined to go it alone and which considers
itself no longer able to fully trust the degree of commitment
of the U.S. How far the Israeli leadership will pursue the
theme of going it alone remains to be seen: if Israel carries
out provocative actions to an extreme this could lead to a
sharp reduction of U.S. military and economic support. The
Israeli leadership at this point appears to feel that it has
enough assets and goodwill in the U.S. so that any halt in
assistance would not be effective or long-lived. fTTie"Israelis
are known to feel that the balance of power in Lebanon has
shifted since the ceasefire of last July away from their
allies the Phalange and in favor of the Palestinians and the
Lebanese left. The Israelis may seek to redress this balance
by a massive strike into southern and central Lebanon, in an
attempt to deal a blow against Syrian forces in Lebanon and
smash PLO elements in southern Lebanon Defense Minister
Sharon appears to be the leading proponent of such an action,
and his views increasingly cannot be ignored, as he is the
leading candidate to succeed Prime Minister Begin. Sharon is
more unpredictable and even more inclined to challenge the
U.S. than is Begin.
5. If, as is expected, there is no effective agreement
in prin le for the West Bank-Gaza autonomy regime before the
final Sinai withdrawal, it is possible that the Israelis may
hold up the withdrawal or, having gone through with it, then
move to establish stronger control legally and politically
over the West Bank -.2
6. Arab Position. In the face of these Israeli
challenges, the Arabs will be helpless to intervene, though
drastic Israeli action such as annexation of the West Bank
will further pol ize Arab, third world and Western opinion
?"'??aganstJlrael: T e likelihood of a Soviet intervention in
support of Syria should the Israelis strike at Syrian forces
in Lebanon is slim, but as time goes by the Syrians will
continue to strengthen their military and political ties with
the USSR. As Arab opinion continues to polarize in the face
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CRET
of Israeli aggressive actions, Jordan, and particularly King
Husayn, will be in an increasingly difficult position, feeling
the pressure to adopt the political stances of the radical
Arab countries. The same is true for Saudi Arabia, whose oil
resources remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks by
Palestinian and other extremist elements in the Peninsula.
Saudi Arabia's eastern region, and the Arab principalities
along the Persian Gulf, face potential subversion and unrest
face potential subversion and unrest by virture of the fact of
their large Shia populations which can be manipulated by an
increasingly strident Tehran regime.
7. Iran. Over the past months the Islamic Republican
Party (IRP) has gained the ascendancy over its opponents, the
mujahidin and their allies. Iran is gradually gaining the
upper hand in the war with Iraq, and the Tehran regime
continues unremittingly hostile to the U.S. Iran is taking on
the trappings of a radical third-world state, consolidating
its relations with such powers as Syria and Libya. Though
some in the IRP leadership, such as President Khamenei,
apparently believe that a closer relationship with the USSR
will serve as protection against the U.S., we have no
confirmation of widespread rumors of a Soviet advisory
presence in the security services and the government
bureaucracy. The long term prospects for stability in Iran
are dubious, as the contest for power following the death of
Khomeini could reduce the country to virtual civil war.
8. Morocco. King Hassan's domestic fortunes have been
inextricably linked to the Sahara question since the early
1970's, with emphasis on regaining the former Spanish colony.
Morocco gained the battlefield initiative in mid 1980, and the
subsequent successful construction of the defense perimeter in
the territory's northwest frustrated the guerrilla's ability
to stage hit-and-run attacks. In mid October 1981 the
Polisario forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Morrocan
garrison at Guelta Zemmour in the Sahara, with the enhanced
capability of the newly introduced SA-6 missile. Although the
level Polisario forces will probably be unable to sustain this
high of activity or regain the initiative, over the short term
this demonstrated a significant Polisario capability to
inflict ser damage on the Moroccans.
9. Hassan's endorsement last June of the OAU plan for a
referendum on the territory's future has reduced Moroccan
isolation somewhat and opened an avenue for legitimizing
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Moroccan control. The King nevertheless faces domestic
pressures, and severe economic and financial problems. Also,
political leaders privately question the King's strategy to
bring peace to the Sahara and fear that Morocco will be unable
to ensure a favorable outcome if the referendum occurs.
10. Much still depends on Algiers' willingness to
cooperate and Hassan's ability to minimize OAU and UN
involvement in a way that ensures the referendum results will
be palatable at home. This is by no means assured.
11. As you know, a special relationship has long existed
between Morocco and the U.S. because of Rabat's generally
pro-Western stance and moderation on Middle East issues. King
Hassan believes a different climate now prevails in the U.S.
and during his next visit to Washington in the spring he will
promote bilateral ties. The King is sure to raise Morocco's
economic plight during his visit and will probably request
concessionary economic and military help for the war in the
Sahara.
12. North Yemen. In North Yemen the authority of the
regime of Ali Abdallah Salih is gradually eroding as the
National Democratic Front continues its gradual subversion of
the southern part of the YAR, while at the same time making
insistent demands that it be included in the government in
Sana. The Tripartite Pact of August 1981 between South Yemen,
Ethiopia, and Libya has strengthened the threat potential of
South Yemen against both North Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The
alliance in turn has strengthened the other two parties as
well. A commitment has been made by Qadhafi to provide
financial assistance to Ethiopia, and Libya has lessened its
own isolation by establishing links with Addis Ababa and Aden.
13. Libya. Libya remains a serious subversive and
terrorist threat despite its pullout from Chad in late 1981.
Qadhafi is actively working on operations to assassinate
Sudan's President Nimeiri and bring about the fall of his
government. Qadhafi continues to aid Palestinian extremist
elements in Lebanon with occasional deliveries of arms by sea.
Moreover, he has given substantial military and financial help
to the Polisario in the past, although he has claimed to the
Moroccans he has provided the Polisario nothing since the
Moroccan-Libyan rapprochement at the Nairobi Summit in 1980.
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