EGYPT S FOREIGN POSTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002410040-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 40
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/05118: CIA-RDP84B00049R001002410040-5
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Egypt's Forei gn Posture
There are signs that Egypt already is moving toward a more independent
foreign policy stance:.
-- Cairo has requested the return of Soviet technicians
to operate and maintain some Soviet-built plants;
-- President Mubarak has indicated publicly that he is
considering agreeing to the return to Cairo of the
Soviet Ambassador;
-- There has been an increase in contacts between Egypt
and other moderate Arab. states, particularly Saudi
Arabia; and
-- Cairo has contracted for the purchase of Mirage 2000
fighter aircraft from France.
President Mubarak's visit to Washington comes at an important juncture
in US-Egyptian relations. There is a growing consensus among Egyptians that
the relationship with the US has failed to meet many of their expectations.
As the Israeli withdra4val from Sinai approaches, Egyptians are eager to end
their isolation in the Arab world and may take some symbolic moves to
distance themselves from 4ashington in order to facilitate a return to the
Arab mainstream.
Egyptian-French Arms Deal
Egypt's agreernent to purchase 20 Mi rage 2000 fighter ai rcraft from France
reflects Cairo's desire to:
-- diversify its arms supply; and
-- encourage Washington to accelerate military deliveries.
The French, for their part, were anxious to conclude this first foreign
sale of the Mirage 2000 and provided very generous credit terms.
Diversification of arms supply will please those officers. within the
Egyptian military who complain of too close ties with the United States and who
have been unhappy with the long lead times involved in US military deliveries.
The Mirage 2000 as a substitute for the US F-16 may, however, disappoint
the Egyptians.
 Approved For Release 2007/05118: CIA-RDP84B00049R001002410040-5
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SECRET
-- It is not yet on the production line. Mubarak said
he expects initial deliveries later this year, but
delivery is not likely before 1983 and then only if
Paris is willing to divert aircraft intended to fill
French Air Force orders. If not, deliveries will be
delayed until the mid-1980s.
-- India, a potential buyer, is not satisfied with the
aircraft's powerplant and avionics; .has refused to
buy until improvements are made.
While buying from the French meets Egyptian political objectives for
supply diversification, it will overtax already limited Egyptian manpo~ver
and logistic support capabilities.
Egypt-US: Arms Supply Negotiations
Mubarak is very sensitive to complaints from the Egyptian officer corps --
his key power base -- and will seek to obtain promises of expanded deliveries
and more generous credit terms. The Administration is searching for nev~r
initiatives to satisfy Mubarak's need to obtain something visible and
concrete to carry back to Egypt. Within the Department of State, there
apparently is a last-minute rush to devise something that ~vill satisfy both
sides.
With regard to financing, Mubarak ~vill press for greater "forgiveness" --
comparable to our arrangements with Israel -- and more concessional financing
terms, particularly in FY 1983 and beyond. The Administration apparently is
considering just that, perhaps making outright grants of some $250 million of
the current annual $900 million irr Foreign Military Sales credits.