POINTS OF DISCUSSION FOR CONGRESSMAN GORE AND ADMIRAL INMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002450012-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: MISC

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Congressman Gore probably will ask Admiral Inman:
"Do you believe that the thousands of students from Bloc countries who are in the
US cause significant problems regarding unwanted technology transfer? What is the
magnitude of the problem?"
--Visitors to the US are one of many avenues of technology transfer to Communist
countries.
--Among the visitors, graduate-level students and researchers in the hard sciences
and in engineering are most likely to be of concern.
--In these categories, there have been during the past year a few hundred Soviet
and Eastern European students and several thousand Chinese graduate scholars.
--The individual programs need to be looked at in order to gauge the extent of
technology transfer concern.
--Sometimes research topics are in areas of "emerging technologies" where
significant military and other applications are just becoming recognized and the
technologies are not yet either classified or export controlled.
-Other technologies under existing law and regulation cannot be exported--for
example by showing it to visitors who will return to Communist countries--without a
license review by Commerce or other appropriate agencies.
--In other instances, the US Government has a "proprietary" interest in the
university research, which may well be being funded via US Government contracts or
grants.
--These determinations are the responsibilities of the policy agencies (e.g., State,
Defense, Commerce); the Intelligence Community supports these deliberations by
providing intelligence information and analysis regarding the likely impact of the
expected transfer of technology.
--The Intelligence Community provides several hundred formal interagency opinions
on such cases each year, and a similar number of less formal and less coordinated
opinions (e.g., when time is of the essence).
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--When everything works right, the unwanted technology transfer is prevented, that
is the troublesome program is avoided or modified.
-There are many problems, however. For example:
--Adequate and timely information often is not available, particularly regarding
Soviet and East European programs that are privately funded and regarding the Chinese
scholars. This limits the usefulness and usability of the IC opinions and inhibits timely
and relevant action by the policy agencies.
--Inadequate governmental resources have aggravated the problem noted above
(e.g., the shortage of State EE officers available to make inquiries of US hosts regarding
proposed communist visitors).
--Historically, visa applications have not been considered and acted upon in light of
technology transfer concerns.
--Commerce and other regulations concerning the export of technical data are not
well known or understood in academe.
--Working out reasonable and feasible constraints on the access to technology
afforded foreign communist visitors very often requires the understanding and
cooperation of US academic hosts. This has not always been forthcoming.
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