FAR EAST KAMPUCHEA-VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001002490035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/0511 ~E~~AZRDP84B00049R001002490035-3
FAR EAST
Kan~nuchea-Vietnam
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international acceptance, and preserve propaganda initiatives.
A. The military balance still favors the Vietnamese (180,000) and PRK forces
(15-20,000), but they have been unable to consolidate control.
1. Vietnamese and PRK for?ces are deployed largely in defensive positions
near towns, rice growing areas, and important roads.
2. Pol Pot's DK guerrillas (35,000) are making occupation painful and
costly to Hanoi.
3. Son Sann's KPNLF (6-8,000) and Sihanouk's Moulinaka (800) are not a
viable military alternative to DK, but KPNLF has potential to expand.
6. Political maneuvering currently focuses on Singaporean proposal for a
"loose coalition" to keep Khmer resistance talks on track.
1. DK has dissolved Kampuchean Communist Party to improve image but
balking at Singaporean proposal because of loss of authority.
2. Son Sann and Sihanouk also reluctant but being pressed by Singapore
and Thailand.
3. Hanoi concerned over the potential strength and appeal of broadly
based coalition of DK, KPNLF, and Sihanouk.
C. The Soviets also have an equity in Vietnam and Indochina.
1. Soviets keeping Vietnam afloat economically by contributing $2-3
million per day, and maintaining flo-v of weapons and supplies but
at slower rate than previous two years.
7. Soviet presence and use of facilities at Cam Ranh Bay has unproved
Soviets' military position in the region.
3. Soviet military advisors are helping Vietnamese modernize and re-
equip air, ground, and naval forces. Soviet naval units occasionally
participate in joint exercises with Vietnamese. '
China
Der~^ ~iaoping continues to dominate Chinese politics as he attempts to
Cr1t,irC' Cc!;1t1nU~lilOn of 1115 pOlltlCdl r'.nd eCOnoJl1C rcforrilS.
A. Deng and allies are still restoring institutions damaged during Mao era
and building sup~}ort for reform program minimizing Plaoist ideology.
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 Approved For Release 20~~f1T10 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001002490035-3
1. Key leaders have reservations about portions of Deng's reform program.
B. Economic development is China's first priority with more investment to
agriculture and light industry and less to heavy industry.
1. Neva policies will mean slower growth but better foundation for future
economic development.
C. China's economic problems have hit the military hard with modernization
postponed and defense spending reduced.
1. China's large conventional forces hardest hit with ground forces
being cut and weapons production reduced, as Chinese emphasize
selective production.
2. Chinese officials still interested in Western weapons and technology
and recently concluded deal with UK.
3. China's strategic weapons programs continue to move forward. China
launched first nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarine and
begun flight testing of its missile.
D. The military balance in the Taiwan Strait area has not changed since nor-
malization with China stronger in numbers and Tai~van's forces qualitatively
superior.
1. .China is not capable of successfully invading Taiwan because it lacks
necessary air- and sealift capability.
2. China could blockade or seize the offshore islands, but such actions
would be costly.
3. Taiwan does not currently need advanced weapons to retain qualitative
edge.
E. Beijing has become increasingly concerned over the past year about US
intentions toward Taiwan.
1. The Chinese are threatening to downgrade relations to the charge
1eve1 if the US provides Taiwan with advanced weapons--especially the
FX fighter.
2. The Chinese also hope to reach agreement with the US on the eventual
termination of all military support to Taiwan.
3. Continuing weapons sales at past levels probably would be tolerated.
 Approved For Release 2007/05110 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001002490035-3
Approved Far Release 2007/05110 :CIA-RDP84B00049R001002490035-3