POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND REGIONAL TENSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102650017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 14, 1981
• Content Type: NIE

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IUCFyAS.V Director of ecffi et
Intelligence
Political Instability
and Regional Tensions
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume II-Supporting Analysis
Secret
NIE 7-81
14 September 1981
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NIE 7-81
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
AND REGIONAL TENSIONS
Volume II-Supporting Analysis
Information available as of 14 September 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
ADDrO eri Fnr R ianco Onn-71r', n - n ---
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM .............................. 5
Internal Instability and Regional Tensions ........................................................... 5
Limits to Forecasting .............................................................................................. 6
Regional Variations ................................................................................................. 7
Exploitation by the USSR ....................................................................................... 8
Soviet Interest in Instability and Tensions ........................................................ 8
Assistance to Opposition Groups ........................................................................ 9
Use of Other States and Organizations ............................................................. 9
Restraining Influences ........................................................................................ 10
Impact on the United States .................................................................................. 10
REGIONAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 13
Europe ..................................................................................................................... 13
Greece ................................................................................................................... 15
Spain .................................................................................................................... 16
Yugoslavia ............................................................................................................ 17
Latin America ......................................................................................................... 19
Sources of Instability .......................................................................................... 21
Cuban and Soviet Subversion ............................................................................ 22
Critical Areas ...................................................................................................... 23
Prospects and Implications ................................................................................. 25
Sub-Saharan Africa ................................................................................................. 26
The Horn-of Africa ............................................................................................. 28
Zaire ..................................................................................................................... 29
Southern Africa ................................................................................................... 30
The Middle East ..................................................................................................... 31
The Arab-Israeli Conflict ................................................................................... 33
Egypt: Political and Economic Difficulties of President Sadat ...................... 35
Instability on the Arabian Peninsula ................................................................. 37
Political Turmoil in Iran .................................................................................... 40
Iraq: The Uncertain Future of President Saddam Hussein ............................. 40
South Asia ................................................................................................................ 41
The War in Afghanistan and Soviet-Pakistani Relations ................................. 41
India-Pakistan ..................................................................................................... 43
Internal Instability in Pakistan .......................................................................... 44
India ..................................................................................................................... 45
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East Asia .................................................................................................................. 46
Korea .................................................................................................................... 48
Regional Conflict in Southeast Asia .................................................................. 49
The ASEAN States .............................................................................................. 50
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KEY JUDGMENTS'
This Estimate addresses areas of high geopolitical importance to
the United States, outside the Soviet Bloc and China, in which political
instability or regional tensions are most likely to create problems of
major consequence for the United States during the next two to three
years. 2 Some of these will require crisis management, while others will
call for sustained policy attention and a redirection of intelligence
efforts. The Estimate addresses the principal sources of instability and
tensions in each area and the extent to which these problems are, or can
be, manipulated by the USSR or other outside powers. It also discusses
the implications of these questions for the United States.
Regional Tensions
The principal areas where regional tensions and armed con-
flicts are most likely to escalate and to necessitate US policy
responses are:
Israel-Arab states Afghanistan-Pakistan
Iraq-Iran India-Pakistan
Central America Vietnam-Kampuchea-Thailand
The Horn of Africa North Korea-South Korea
Southern Africa
Domestic Instability
A. The principal countries in which major change detrimental
to key US interests has at least an even chance of occurring in the
next two or three years are:
Iran Zaire
El Salvador Greece
Guatemala North Yemen
The Key Judgments are reproduced here as they appeared in volume I.
z Political instability is defined as the potential for sudden and significant change in the leadership,
policies, or condition of a country. The most dramatic manifestation of instability is the revolutionary
overthrow of a regime, as in Cuba in 1959 or Iran in 1979. Developments short of revolution, however,
sometimes lead states to alter their policies abruptly in ways that can substantially affect US interests. The
Estimate does not deal with the frequent coups d'etat in countries such as Bolivia, where coups shift the
spoils of office from one set of leaders to another but often have little effect on anyone else. Nor is it con-
cerned with political violence, including terrorism, that does not connote major political change. Regional
tensions are defined as strained relations between neighboring states that have significant potential for major
armed conflict. The Persian Gulf, the South Asian subcontinent, and the Korean Peninsula provide
outstanding examples. The Estimate does not address the initiation of war by major powers, but it does con-
sider the dangers of outside intervention in unstable areas or, as in Afghanistan, of intervention leading to
wider conflicts.
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, considers that Greece would more
appropriately be placed in category B, for the reason given in footnote 9 on page 15.
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B. The principal countries in which major change detrimental
to key US interests has a significant, although lesser, likelihood of
occurring in the next two or three years are:
Egypt 4 Pakistan
Oman 4 The Philippines
Spain Panama
C. In certain other important countries, political stability
appears to be fairly well assured in the next two or three years, but
there are deep-rooted social and economic forces at work that
might undermine stability and lead to major changes of great
consequence to the United States. These countries are:
Saudi Arabia Yugoslavia
Mexico India
Brazil
There is no "global instability" as such, but instead a myriad of in-
ternal and interstate conflicts. Many of these conflicts will be significant
for the United States primarily because the USSR or its close associates
will continue to aggravate, exploit, and in some cases promote them.
Because they are so often triggered by elusive and seemingly minor
events, certain new crises will erupt without warning. This will be
somewhat less likely, however, with respect to regional conflicts than to
coups and other internal disruptions.
In the less developed world the United States will continue at times
to face the dilemma of either accommodating popular but anti-US
opposition forces, or supporting ineffective and sometimes oppressive
governments. In some instances, the continuation in power of incum-
bent rulers may increase pressures for radical change, thus undermining
the long-term US objective of promoting constructive change through
nonviolent means.
The principal sources of instability and tension will remain local,
although in many instances exacerbated by outsiders-particularly the
USSR and its associates-seeking geopolitical advantage. The potential
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director of Intel-
ligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, agree that a change of regime in Egypt or Oman could be highly
detrimental to US interests but believe that the two countries would more properly be placed in category
C in terms of the relative likelihood of such an eventuality in the next two or three years. The Assistant
Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, concurs with regard to Oman.
' The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that Saudi Arabia should
be included in category B.
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for influence by the United States or other friendly countries will vary
from case to case, and those Western actions that are tailored to the spe-
cial characteristics of each situation will have the best prospects for
being effective.
There is a good chance that despite remedies offered by the United
States or governments friendly to it, certain crisis situations will work to
Soviet advantage, particularly those arising from racial divisions in
southern Africa and the Palestinian question in the Middle East. The
USSR and its friends have thus far been better able than the United
States to identify with positions on these issues that enjoy widespread
popular support.
Some cases of instability in the less developed world, however, can
almost certainly be resolved to US advantage. In many areas, the United
States enjoys respect and influence while the USSR and its close
associates-which have sometimes bungled their chances-are dis-
trusted. Certain new factors, moreover, especially world reactions to
events in Afghanistan and Poland, are enhancing the ability of a more
determined United States to influence events in the less developed
world.
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THE NATURE AND SOGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM
Internal Instability and Regional Tensions
1. Widespread instability and tension will persist
for the foreseeable future, particularly in the less
developed world. Few of the underlying problems
have solutions in sight.
2. Interstate conflicts growing out of acute regional
tensions are likely to present the most serious dangers
to US interests during the coming years. Many of these
tensions reflect longstanding national rivalries or eth-
nic antagonisms. Post-World War II decolonization,
by shattering earlier anticolonial alliances and reduc-
ing the influence of major powers, permitted many of
these tensions to break into the open. The immediate
issues may involve boundary disputes, access to water-
ways or natural resources, or local arms races and the
possible acquisition of nuclear weapons.
3. Decolonization has also encouraged regional con-
flict by bringing scores of new actors into international
politics and multiplying the competing claims to re-
gional leadership. Many of these new states refuse to
play by old rules. As seen most dramatically in
conflicts between some Middle Eastern regimes, rival
governments frequently regard each other as targets
for violence and subversion, not as legitimate members
of a world community.
4. Internal instability is largely the product of
acute social and economic discontent that produces
pressures too great for governments and societies to
contain, manage, or deflect. Rapid population growth
and meager resources are its most deeply rooted
sources, making it difficult for many governments to
meet material demands. The energy price spiral has
exacerbated this difficulty during the past decade. In
particular, the 1979-80 round of oil price increases
debilitated the economies of non-oil-exporting less
developed countries (LDCs), which last year saw their
oil import bill jump 55 percent and their current
account deficit rise to $59 billion. Largely because of
higher fuel costs, most of these countries had slower
economic growth in 1980 than in any other year since
1975. Where rapid economic development is still
possible (mostly in oil-exporting states), it often spawns
other problems: disruption of traditional social struc-
tures, increased economic inequality, and accelerated
urbanization, resulting in crushing demands on public
services and the loss of stabilizing ties to family,
village, and established customs.
5. There is no simple and direct relationship, how-
ever, between such difficulties and the level of discon-
tent. Much depends on the extent to which people
learn of differences in living conditions, perceive their
own condition to be a problem, and become exposed
to alternative solutions. The growth of education,
literacy, and modern mass communications in recent
years has heightened awareness on all these counts.
For example, the number of radio receivers per capita
in developing countries nearly doubled between 1965
and 1975. Such burgeoning of the capability to dis-
seminate ideas has helped to generate and focus
grievances and has increased the politically sensitive
proportion of the population in many countries.
6. Discontent leads to instability where the social
fabric is weak and there are no strong political
institutions capable of converting discontent into or-
derly change. Many LDCs lack such institutions,
because most of them have not developed traditions of
political compromise and a loyal opposition. In some
of these states, the regime's heavy reliance on foreign
support and its susceptibility to foreign influence run
counter to nationalist sentiment. Widespread corrup-
tion, inefficiency, and abuses of power foster further
cynicism and distrust of government in many of these
states. So do ethnic, tribal, and sectarian divisions,
since the boundaries inherited from the colonial era
place many people under the rule of longtime
adversaries.
7. Ethnic divisions and lack of natural resources are
irremovable, and rising energy prices and other global
economic developments are beyond the control of
most governments. Vulnerable regimes still have con-
siderable latitude in trying to cope with these and
other problems, but often they must choose among
equally unattractive alternatives. They might have a
choice between antagonizing the left and antagonizing
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the right, or between the costs of stagnation and the
risks of modernization, but they cannot make such
dilemmas vanish.
8. The principal choice is often between short-term
and long-term instability. Postponement of economic
reforms and austerity measures, such as reduction of
costly food subsidies, avoids immediate protests but
necessitates more drastic and painful steps later. Simi-
larly, harsh internal security practices may check
opposition movements but also increase hatred of the
regime, fueling stronger opposition in the future. The
tendency of most governments is to address immediate
problems at the expense of longer term ones. Because
of this, many unstable regimes will survive the period
of this Estimate, buying time with repression or with
spending that surpasses their means, but will emerge
even more vulnerable than they are now.
9. Internal instability and regional conflict are fre-
quently related:
- Many insurgencies receive sanctuary or other
support from neighboring states (as in southern
Africa and Central America).
- Internal instability may offer the opportunity to
confront a weakened and distracted enemy (as
Iraq was tempted by turmoil in Iran).
- A state may intervene in an unstable neighboring
country to forestall adverse political change (the
USSR in Afghanistan in 1979) or to reverse a
change that has already occurred (Tanzania in
Uganda in 1979).
- Military intervention in an internal conflict often
threatens other states and risks expansion into
interstate war (Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea
as a threat to Thailand).
- Dissatisfaction with the costs or outcome of a war
can severely erode a government's domestic sup-
port (as happened to Pakistan's Yahya Khan after
the 1971 defeat by India).
10. Outside powers frequently exploit internal in-
stability and regional tensions, aggravating both. In
parts of Latin America, Cuban and Soviet support for
revolutionary groups affects both the degree of insta-
bility and the character of possible successor regimes.
Some local conflicts, including those in the Horn of
Africa as well as in Central America, have become
complex international problems as they have become
entwined with East-West issues. Nevertheless, the
principal sources of instability and tensions remain
indigenous. Outside attempts to capitalize on, or to
reduce, such instability and tensions are apt to be only
partially effective if they do not take full account of
the local roots of conflict.
Limits to Forecasting
11. Although the sources of instability and tension
may be clear, the specific events that trigger a crisis
are often unforeseeable. This is particularly true of
internal disruptions, which generally lack indicators as
clear as the military deployments that sometimes
portend the outbreak of war. A catalyst of political
change may be as small and difficult to track as an
assassin's bullet, or as immune to political analysis as a
natural disaster. We cannot forecast exactly when an
unstable situation will erupt into crisis; and thus
neither can we forecast which of the many unstable
situations around the world will erupt during the
period of this Estimate. We can, however, roughly
estimate the probability of each potential crisis, identi-
fy the most important forces that could generate new
conflicts, and assess the degree to which these forces
might strengthen, abate, or be contained. We can also
identify those countries and regions-chiefly the ones
mentioned in the Key judgments of this Estimate-
that will require the closest attention by the Intelli-
gence Community because of their potential for en-
dangering US interests or because of gaps in our
knowledge of those areas.
12. Increases in internal instability are often dis-
cernible, but there are no reliable and universally
applicable indicators of when instability has reached a
dangerous level. Strikes, riots, and similar disorders do
not necessarily presage changes having significance for
US interests, because in many states they are habitual
and expected modes of expression. Normal levels of
unrest vary considerably fro
even within the same region. 5X1
[5X1
13. Nor does terrorist violence necessarily indicate a
critical level of instability. Terrorism, especially indis-
criminate attacks by nihilistic groups, generally can
bring about political change only indirectly, by pro-
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yoking repression, coups, or other unpopular actions
by political leaders or security forces. Change thus
depends not only on the amount of violence but on the
tolerance and resilience of the society and on the
wisdom and forbearance of the authorities.
14. A larger uncertainty involves countries or re-
gions that do not appear important to the United
States now but could become so because major powers
get involved, materially or symbolically. A struggle in
a country of little economic or strategic significance
would evolve into a major crisis if it came to be
perceived as a test of the power, resolve, or restraint of
the United States or the USSR. For example, the in-
surgency in El Salvador is important largely because of
Soviet and Cuban support to the rebels and because of
Washington's expanded commitment to the govern-
ment.
15. The pattern of East-West competition in some
unstable areas, however, will be largely determined by
circumstances outside either superpower's control. The
1974 coup in Ethiopia, for example, drastically revised
the US-Soviet rivalry in and around the Horn of
Africa. Other unexpected events-including initiatives
by local actors-could have comparable effects on the
stakes and shape of the superpower competition
elsewhere.
Regional Variai`ions
16. The sources and consequences of instability
have become increasingly international. Because of
economic interdependence, worldwide inflation and
recession buffet nearly every country. Because of
modern mass communications, people are more aware
of inequality. They are also more exposed to ideologies
that foster resentment of inequality and to revolution-
ary methods for altering it. Mass media have made
different publics responsive to certain of the same
issues, and have made it possible for unrest in one
country to stimulate it in another. Weapons flow
freely across international boundaries, with opposition
groups obtaining them from a variety of private and
governmental sources, sometimes with financing from
like-minded foreign governments. Despite these links,
however, there is no such thing as "global instabil-
ity"-that is, a single source or pattern of instability-
but instead an assortment of disparate problems in
many different unstable areas. The types of events
that can precipitate crises, the susceptibility c ,~2rp}~-
lems to foreign manipulation, and the consequences of
instability for US interests all vary considerably from
one trouble spot to another.
17. The trouble spots where crises are most likely to
arise during the period of this Estimate are discussed
in the regional annexes. No geographic breakdown,
however, can totally and fairly depict worldwide
patterns of instability. There is at least as much
variation within regions as among them. Furthermore,
several geographically focused problems cut across
conventional regional boundaries. For example, the
US-Soviet rivalry in the northwest Indian Ocean has
political consequences for states in Africa, the Middle
East, and South Asia. Similarly, the effects of the
Islamic resurgence are felt in portions of all three of
these regions as well as in Southeast Asia. Some local
tensions, such as between Libya and African states to
its south, cross regional boundaries.
18. Nevertheless, there are several broad differ-
ences among the six regions discussed in this volume
(beginning at paragraph 51), including:
- Economic problems as conaributors to irnstarroul-
iay: Simple lack of resources and the inability to
meet basic needs are the chief economic prob-
lems in most of the developing world. But most
European governments are relatively more con-
cerned about inflation, unemployment, currency
flows, and other problems of industrialized
economies. In some oil-exporting states of the
Middle East the principal economic threat to
stability is the disruptive effect of sudden wealth.
- ?oli ical weaknesses as conarihuaors ao imsaabill-
iay: African and Middle Eastern countries have
generally made the least progress toward broader
political participation and the development of
pluralistic institutions. Political cultures are rela-
tively more conducive to stability in Europe and,
to a lesser extent, Latin America, where most
states have long been independent and have had
greater opportunity to evolve political traditions
and institutions.
- Eahnic, ariball, and reiigious divisions as con-
aribuaors to insaabilliay: The most destabilizing
divisions vary from region to region, with racial
and tribal distinctions being important in Africa
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and religious or sectarian tensions being most
apparent in the Middle East and South Asia.
- Strengths and weaknesses of outside powers:
The ability and desire of each outside power to
influence events tend to vary from one region to
another, partly because of geography and histori-
cal ties. The same colonial connections that have
been a source of resentment may also be used as
channels for influence. Largely for this reason,
the West Europeans have larger roles in Africa
and the Middle East than in other areas. The
United States has the advantage in Latin Amer-
ica of proximity and of numerous economic and
political links, but also the disadvantage of being
widely perceived as an imperialist power, partly
because of past interventions. The USSR has a
similar mix of assets and liabilities in the Middle
East and South Asia, where its invasion of Af-
ghanistan is especially resented but also serves as
a reminder of its capacity for military interven-
tion or intimidation in these areas. China is a
significant player in East and South Asia, a lesser
one in Africa, and of relatively little consequence
elsewhere.
- Salient regional issues: Certain issues or cam-
paigns pervade the politics of an entire region,
although they may arouse much less interest
elsewhere. In the Middle East there is the de-
mand for a Palestinian homeland. In Africa there
is opposition to white minority rule in southern
Africa. Besides being direct causes of regional
conflict, these overriding concerns reduce the
flexibility of governments in solving other prob-
lems and shape-and constrain-the opportuni-
ties for outsiders to exert influence.
Exploitation by the USSR
Soviet Interest in Instability and Tensions
19. The Soviets see both opportunities and hazards
in political instability and regional conflict. Instability
in pro-Western states may offer the prospect of
strengthening leftist movements, establishing clandes-
tine assets, and bringing anti-Western and even pro-
Soviet elements to power. Elsewhere, however, it can
endanger Soviet interests. The Soviets' realization that
instability cuts both ways is reflected in their ideologi-
cal distinctions between "progressive" and "reaction-
ary" political change. The Soviets find their most
promising opportunities in the less developed world,
most of which was colonized by Western powers. The
USSR has been encouraged by its gains in such
countries as Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen,
and Vietnam, despite the setbacks it has suffered in
other LDCs.
20. Moscow has repeatedly and emphatically af-
firmed its commitment to revolution and support of
what it calls "national liberation" groups. This
support:
- Promotes the formation of anti-Western and,
Moscow hopes, pro-Soviet governments.
- Enhances the USSR's standing among nonaligned
countries by keeping it on the popular side of
several international issues, particularly those of
Palestine and of white minority rule in southern
Africa.
- Reinforces the USSR's status as a great power.
- Offsets the efforts of China, which has provided
smaller amounts of aid to revolutionary groups
and has challenged Moscow's self-proclaimed
role as the vanguard of world revolution.
21. The USSR sometimes attempts to create insta-
bility, but is far more active and successful in exploit-
ing it where it already exists. Because military assist-
ance is one of Moscow's most effective means of
expanding its influence, the Soviets are best able to
make inroads in areas where the possibility of revolu-
tionary violence or warfare creates a demand for arms.
In this regard, regional tensions may benefit Moscow
by making military aid appear more important to the
states involved than the economic and technical assist-
ance the West is better able than the Soviets to
provide. Similarly, Soviet ties to insurgent groups are
frequently based on Moscow's ability to supply weap-
ons and training.
22. The Soviets try to profit from instability in two
other ways, which do not necessarily require the
establishment of pro-Soviet regimes. One way is to
play on the fears of vulnerable nonaligned or pro-
Western governments to push them toward policies
more favorable to the USSR. A current target is
Pakistani President Zia: by threatening to subvert his
government, Moscow evidently hopes to intimidate
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Zia and to minimize his support for the Afghan
insurgents.
23. Another Soviet tactic is to attempt to discredit
the West through propaganda and covert activities.
Instability and local tensions expand Moscow's oppor-
tunities for linking Western governments to disruptive
and unpopular actions. For example, the USSR helped
to spread the lie through the Islamic world that the
United States was involved in seizing the Grand
Mosque of Mecca in 1979. A more recent Soviet
propaganda theme is that the United States intends to
intervene militarily in El Salvador. The USSR has long
used the "National Voice of Iran," a clandestine radio
operating from Soviet territory, to promote anti-
American themes in Iran. The Soviets also support
Cuba's extensive propaganda aimed at the Caribbean,
Latin America, and other parts of the Third World.
Assistance to Opposition Groups
24. The USSR provides a wide range of support to
opposition groups.' It furnishes weapons and training
to such armed resistance movements as SWAPO and
the PLO. Besides such military assistance, Soviet aid
includes money, propaganda, safehaven for exiled
leaders, and intelligence support.
25. Moscow also assists and seeks influence with
groups that are not challenging their governments now
but could do so in the future. It provides financial aid
and guidance to Communist parties and other pro-
Soviet political movements. It brings military officers
and young intelligentsia to the USSR for university
education or other training. This gives Moscow the
opportunity to indoctrinate the trainees in Marxism-
Leninism, to cultivate pro-Soviet sentiments, to iden-
tify individuals who might be exploited to serve Soviet
interests, and generally to make inroads into the
political-military establishments of the countries con-
cerned. Where possible, the Soviets also directly at-
tempt to penetrate the military, the civil bureaucracy,
or such mass organizations as labor unions and student
associations.
26. Many opposition elements supported or courted
by Moscow appear to have little chance for power in
the near term. But the Soviets cannot prophesy events
6 See SNIE 11/2-81, Soviet Support for International Terrorism
and Revolutionary Violence, 27 May 1981.
in unstable situations any better than we, and they try
to position themselves to exploit any opportunities that
might arise. They place a large number of bets,
evidently expecting that some will not pay off for
years.
27. Soviet decisions on where to place these bets
partly reflect the economic or geopolitical importance
of specific countries and the anticipated responses of
Western powers. In selecting specific recipients for its
aid, Moscow naturally prefers leftist revolutionaries
but otherwise pays less attention to a group's ideology
than to its prospects for success and its support for
Soviet state interests. The USSR has often slighted
avowed Marxists in favor of non-Marxists who ap-
peared to have more popular support. International
support is also important: sometimes the Soviets have
overtly assisted recipients of their covert support-
such as the PLO, SWAPO, and the Patriotic Front in
Rhodesia-only after such movements were recog-
nized by other states, the United Nations, or regional
bodies such as the Organization of African Unity. In
these cases, Moscow is probably acting not only to gain
influence over the guerrillas but also to preserve its
revolutionary credentials and its standing with other
countries.
Use of Other States and Organizations
28. The Soviets make use of a number of other
states and organizations in providing material support
to insurgents and opposition groups. These associates
include the Soviets' Cuban and East European allies,
such radical states as Libya, Syria, and South Yemen,
and certain Palestinian groups. In some instances, such
states or organizations serve as conduits for Soviet aid.
The relationship is less direct in other instances, with a
radical government furnishing arms from its own
stockpile and in turn being resupplied by the USSR.
The degree of collusion between Moscow and its
associates varies considerably. It is far closer with
Cuba, for example, than with Libya, and any of these
states may assist opposition groups independently.
Regardless, Soviet support better enables its associates
to assist revolutionary groups with weapons, training,
or even troops.
29. By staying at arm's length from some revolu-
tionaries, the Soviets are less likely to antagonize other
parties to a dispute and can more easily extract
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themselves from a losing cause. Furthermore, by
avoiding direct association with the Soviets, a group
may also be able to avoid the stigma of being con-
trolled by a great power. The link with Moscow is
sometimes the greatest handicap to avowedly pro-
Soviet parties in trying to organize and lead a broadly
based opposition.
30. The interests of the USSR and its associates are
seldom identical but often complementary. Although
Soviet leaders probably consider some of their associ-
ates' activities to be disadvantageous to the USSR, they
are generally willing to pay this price to enjoy the
benefits of the relationship. Libya, for example, de-
spite Qadhafi's unpredictability, pays large amounts of
hard currency for Soviet arms and could become
important to Moscow as a source of oil.
Restraining Influences
31. The initiation or instigation of coups, insurrec-
tions, or revolutions in areas outside the USSR's imme-
diate sphere of influence may not always serve Soviet
interests. In most cases, Moscow no doubt judges that
local pro-Soviet elements are too weak to assume
control and that prodding them into grabbing for
power prematurely would be counterproductive. It
often sees greater advantage in doing business with
incumbent governments-particularly governments,
such as those in Brazil and India, that have had serious
frictions with the United States-than in attempting to
overthrow them.
straint to Communist parties and other protege groups,
and frequently place higher priority on good state
relations than on support to local Communists. Mos-
cow apparently views certain radical nationalist re-
gimes, such as those in Syria and Libya, as serving
Soviet interests well enough that the risks of attempt-
ing to replace them with Communist governments
would be unacceptable. Relations with some moderate
or conservative regimes, especially those with impor-
tant resources or commodities to sell (such as Moroccan
phosphates), are also beneficial enough to the Soviets
that they choose not to jeopardize them with serious
support to radical opposition groups.
33. Against the possible benefits of bringing its
friends to power, Moscow must weigh potentially high
costs. An unsuccessful leftist coup or insurrection can
cause an angry ruler to turn away from the USSR and
toward the West (as President Nimeiri did after pro-
Soviet coup attempts against him in Sudan) or can
trigger a countercoup by rightists (as occurred in
Indonesia in 1965). If the leftists succeed, their seizure
of power could in some circumstances elicit damaging
responses from other states. Neighboring countries
might seek closer ties, including military cooperation,
with the United States or other Western powers.
Public opinion in the West could become more mili-
tant, delaying international negotiations and agree-
ments sought by Moscow.
34. For similar reasons, Moscow is sometimes cir-
cumspect in extending major support to leftist govern-
ments that have taken power peacefully. Close Soviet
ties to such a regime could encourage a politically fatal
domestic backlash (as against Chile's Allende in 1973)
or Western intervention (as against Guatemala's
Arbenz in 1954). It is probably to avoid comparable
reactions that the Soviets have so far been hesitant to
extend major aid directly to the revolutionary regimes
in Nicaragua and Grenada.
35. Local wars can also entail substantial costs and
risks to Moscow. As with the Iraq-Iran conflict, war
may make it more difficult to maintain good relations
with both belligerents. If a Soviet client is militarily
inferior to its enemy, it risks defeat and with it a blow
to Soviet prestige (Syria vis-a-vis Israel, for example).
More important, where both superpowers have high
stakes, a US-Soviet military confrontation is a danger.
Moscow can avoid these risks, however, as long as
tensions do not erupt into open warfare. Moreover,
these risks will not deter Moscow from exploiting
many interstate conflicts (such as those in the Middle
East and southern Africa), as well as opportunities
presented by internal instability (as in El Salvador and
Guatemala).
Impact on the United States
36. The destruction and disruption caused by revo-
lutions, insurgencies, and regional wars can inflict
significant costs on the United States and other third
parties, regardless of the political outcome of such
conflicts. Commerce, including shipment of strategic
resources, may be interrupted and foreign-owned
property destroyed. The breakdown of law enforce-
ment may ease the production or shipment of illicit
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narcotics, as it has in Iran. Refugees may become a
burden for neighboring countries, or for the United
States as a haven of last resort. Economic costs can be
substantial: interruption of oil exports by the Iraq-Iran
war, for example, would have been far more damag-
ing to Western economies were it not for softness in
the world oil market.
37. The United States suffers less directly but more
widely from the anti-Western aspects of ferment in
unstable areas. For most LDCs, independence meant
freedom from Western rule. Decolonization has not
ended accusations that wealthy Western states exercise
"neocolonialist" domination over the poor, a charge
the USSR has largely managed to escape. As the
leading Western power, the United States is the prime
target of such criticism even though it never acquired
a sizable colonial empire.
38. US economic and cultural influences are wide-
spread in developing countries. Exposure to the more
affluent US lifestyle makes the gap between rich and
poor more obvious. It nurtures resentment over the
gap, as well as the belief that the rich, to stay rich,
must be exploiting the poor. Moreover, Islamic funda-
mentalists and others anxious to return to traditional
ways of life oppose US influence as culturally damag-
ing regardless of the economic costs and benefits.
39. Upsurges of these sentiments can hurt US inter-
ests in several ways. US citizens, diplomatic missions,
or businesses can become special targets of violence.
New regimes that ride anti-US or anti-Western themes
to power are disinclined to cooperate openly with
Washington. Most important, friendly but insecure
governments become more cautious in supporting US
policies.
40. A sharp change in a country's internal politics,
however, does not necessarily imply a comparable
shift in its foreign relations. New regimes face many of
the same constraints and economic imperatives as the
old, usually including the financial need to export
natural resources to wherever they are in demand.
Often a government's radical rhetoric and domestic
policies will diverge sharply from its day-to-day for-
eign relations, as suggested by the desire of such states
as Angola, Libya, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe to do
business with the West.
41. Dependence on foreign lenders-many of
which are Western banks-is another economic link to
the West that many LDCs would probably retain even
if they underwent political change. At the start of
1981, 41 non-OPEC LDCs were each carrying more
than $1 billion of external debt, with Brazil ($54
billion) and Mexico ($49 billion) heading the list.
Brazil's debt will probably reach $60 billion this year,
and the current account deficits and financing re-
quirements of many other LDCs will also continue to
rise. Staying in good graces with the lenders is an
inducement for debt-ridden governments to avoid
radical or doctrinaire economic policies, particularly
any that would harm or scare away foreign invest-
ment.
42. Military and intelligence ties, and particularly
the use of facilities by US forces, are more likely than
economic relations to become casualties of political
change. Military links are conspicuous and widely
perceived as a compromise of nonalignment. The
removal of a US military presence could lead to the
introduction of Soviet or other foreign forces, but will
not necessarily do so in every case. Since the USSR's
invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant weakening
of Cuban and Soviet influence in the nonaligned
movement, nonalignment has shed some of its earlier
pro-Soviet bias. But whether a regime rejects a Soviet
military presence ultimately depends on whether it
avoids heavy reliance on Soviet aid, and this often
depends on how much assistance it can secure from
Western sources.
43. If a regime closely associated with the United
States falls, US prestige might also decline. Other
governments might interpret the event as a lesson in
the political hazards of cooperating too closely with
Washington, and thus become less cooperative
themselves.
44. Regional conflicts can pose direct problems for
the United States if a US ally is involved. This is true
even with-or especially with-a nominal ally such as
Pakistan, whose interests diverge in significant respects
from those of the United States. In such cases, Wash-
ington might face a difficult choice between risking
entrapment in a local war by providing support and
risking damage to the credibility of US commitments
by staying aloof. In other instances, an ally might take
abrupt actions that limit US policy options or damage
US relations with other governments, as occurred with
the recent Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear
facility.
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45. Instability and regional conflict sometimes
benefit the United States in certain respects. Several
times in the recent past-notably in Egypt, Sudan, and
Somalia-governments have turned abruptly away
from the USSR and toward the West because of an
external threat, a failed coup, or disappointing Soviet
support. The Persian Gulf war encouraged a similar
albeit less abrupt shift by Iraq and distracted Iran
from efforts to export its revolution. There could also
be favorable changes of leadership in unstable coun-
tries that now have anti-US regimes. Iran is currently
the outstanding example, although any markedly pro-
Western shift in Iranian politics would raise the
possibility of more pronounced Soviet pressure on
Tehran.
46. Regional conflicts and foreign military inter-
willing to cooperate with the United States on security
matters. The Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and the Vietnamese intervention in Kam-
puchea have all had this effect to some extent. The
attitudes of the moderates, however, will also continue
to depend on their perceptions of US strength and
determination. Moreover, many friendly nonaligned
states are less inclined than Washington to view their
security in terms of East-West competition. Some of
these states would resist expansion of US military
activity on their territories, believing it to be an
internal political liability and of little help in counter-
ing what they regard as their principal threats.
47. Some friendly governments might accept more
extensive security ties with the United States, despite
any negative political impact in their countries, be-
cause they value their relationship with Washington
example, Egyptian President Sadat's commitment to a
US-managed Middle East peace is one reason he has
approved US activities despite Egyptian sensitivity to
any foreign military presence. Keeping US activity at
a politically safe level in such countries will require
considerable US discretion in balancing local sensitivi-
ties against broader security objectives.
48. The United States will in many instances have
only a limited and indirect ability to alleviate instabil-
ity and regional tensions. US assistance can sometimes
counter the most immediate threats to a beleaguered
government and expand its options in dealing with
other problems, but solutions to those problems will
still depend on the foresight, leadership, and political
courage of the local rulers. Economic aid, for example,
does not eliminate economic inequality, nor does it
usually provide sufficient leverage to induce an other-
wise stubborn regime to enact needed reforms. The
United States will at times be caught between ineffec-
tive governments and popular but anti-US opposition
forces. In such cases, actions aimed simply at retaining
the incumbents and their policies can undermine long-
term stability by increasing pent-up pressures for
change.
49. In some unstable areas, action by a West Euro-
pean power-perhaps utilizing historical ties to a
former colony-would be more effective than any
steps taken by the United States. In other cases,
concerted allied support to moderate elements could
be useful, as it was during the Portuguese revolution.
US and allied objectives in some critical areas, howev-
er, are apt to differ-over the relative importance of
economic and military relations, for example-making
the management of instability and regional tensions a
potential source of friction within US alliances.
50. Despite continuing constraints, the United
States might have somewhat more ability to influence
events in unstable areas of the non-Communist world
during the next couple of years than it did during the
1970s, because of:
- The widespread perception that the current US
administration is more assertive in foreign affairs
than were its recent predecessors.
- The reduction of the USSR's support and credi-
bility, particularly in Southwest Asia, caused by
its invasion of Afghanistan.
- Moscow's focus on problems in Poland.
These developments have marginally increased the
willingness of at least some governments and popula-
tions to accept the advice, cooperation, and example of
the United States in preference to those of the USSR.
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