BACKGROUND NOTES: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LOSSES AND SOME ACTIONS TO STOP THEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102690018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

MEMORANDUM FO
The attached is for the DCI's meeting with the
k=r
- A paper on what might be done to stop
technology transfer losses.
- A copy of the material (in table form)
of what I presented the PFIAB S&T Working
Group (John Foster's group) in April.
- Several copies of the Unclassified paper.
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Background Notes
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LOSSES AND SOME ACTIONS TO STOP THEM
1. The loss of militarily significant US technology can be
traced to three basic technology transfer channels:
1. Open Source Acquisitions
2. Trade-related Transfer
3. Soviet Bloc Intelligence Operations
The principal responsibility for stemming losses through the
first two channels, Trade and Open Sources, resides within the
Export Control Community and other appropriate Government
Departments. The Intelligence Community can help with these
efforts and does; for example:
-- by providing intelligence support for export control
license and CoCom List reviews;
-- by providing intelligence for export control enforcement
activities, particularly those involving evasion or diversion of
CoCom countries' controlled exports;
--by alerting government and private organizations that
Soviet acquisition of their publications, S&T information, and
data bases is contributing to Soviet military capabilities; and
--by working with joint government public groups such as the
one underway now at the National Academy of Sciences seeking to
find an equitable way to protect defense-sensitive technology
being developed on University campuses.
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SOVIET INTELLIGENCE THREAT:
2. Stopping Soviet Bloc Intelligence operations--
clandestine, technical and overt -- aimed at the acquisition of
US and other Western (including Japanese technology), both in the
US and abroad, is viewed as solely an Intelligence Community (IC)
responsibility, whether the technology is classified, export
controlled, company proprietary or openly available. The IC is
expected to stop the Soviet and East European intelligence
service acquisitions of technology that can harm our national
security.
3. Based on recent analyses of extremely hard intelligence
we now believe that the vast majority--as much as three-fourths
(3/4)-- of militarily significant Western technology being
acquired by the Soviet Bloc is the result of Soviet and East
European intelligence activities. Furthermore, we believe:
-- that the overwhelming majority of classified US technology
is being acquired abroad,
-- that East European intelligence services are significant
contributors to the Soviet acquisition effort,
-- that Soviet and East European intelligence services,
working closely with their ministries of foreign trade,
play the key role in illegal trade acquisitions, both in
the United States and abroad, operating through agents,
cooperating businessmen, and cover organizations in Soviet
Bloc trade and manufacturing ministries,
-- that more and more, militarily significant technology is
being acquired through the illegal acquisition of company
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proprietary technology and defense-sensitive but
unclassified government S&T publications and sponsored
research, and
-- that Soviet Bloc intelligence acquires some of the
militarily significant technologies through overt
collection from open sources such as universities, S&T
conferences, and exchange programs, and trade fairs in the
United States.
4. Possible Countermeasure Actions: To effectively counter
Soviet Bloc intelligence efforts, the US must develop a strategy
and plan to cope with all three intelligence related acquisition
activities simultaneous) : clandestine, technical (mainly
SIGINT), and overt. At the same time these US intelligence
counter actions must be closely coordinated with Export Control
enforcement and Government-led efforts to protect open sources
and alert the general public to the problem. And, possibly even
more important, the US effort to stop the loss of our technology
in the US must be projected abroad. Among the actions that can
be initiated to accomplish this are the following:
First
The US Government must develop an integrated program to
cope with US technology losses abroad.
US counterintelligence-- CIA and the Military-- must be
explicitly focused on the problem as a joint effort, with
the protection of US defense related technology, persons
(including companies), and organizations, located abroad
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being the primary objective.
Allied counterintelligence and internal security services
must be alerted to our concerns for the protection of US
technology abroad and the nature of the overall threat.
John McMahon's recent European trip has now started this
process.
US intelligence elements abroad should be directed to
support US export control efforts at each key post,
working as part of a country-team effort. US
counterintelligence should also assist US Customs' efforts
worldwide in their efforts.
A foreign public awareness effort concerning technology
transfer losses should be mounted through CIA's liaison
activities with allied intelligence services.
Secondly
These international efforts of the US Intelligence
Community should be closely coordinated with new programs
and initiatives being implemented in the United States:
-- Counterintelligence operations aimed at stopping the
losses of classified and export controlled US technology
in the US should be conducted through normal CIA-FBI
channels, such as is presently being done.
-- A long-range strategy for disrupting the Soviet technology
acquisition programs and undermining Soviet Bloc
intelligence services in the minds of their military-
industrial consumers should be developed for
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counterintelligence and covert action operations; this
should be done with great care and high security.
-- Defense contractor industrial security, which is mainly
directed at protecting classified documentary technology,
must be improved to account for the HUMINT threat posed by
Soviet Bloc intelligence that often seeks company
unclassified proprietary technology associated with
defense production and not the weapon system itself.
-- Foreign intelligence operations involving US technology
and US persons should be closely coordinated through the
Justice Department-led Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on
Domestic Enforcement; such activity is just now beginning.
-- Protection of unclassified, defense-sensitive S&T
information and related Government sponsored research must
be better protected from Soviet Bloc intelligence
activities.
-- Protection from hostile intelligence services must be
developed for non-defense firms engaged in high technology
R&D that may either assist Warsaw Pact military efforts or
may be used as critical components in future US weapons.
If we are to be successful in stopping the flow of militarily
significant technologies to our military adversaries, all of
these intelligence related activities will have to be as well
coordinated as the overall Soviet acquisition program itself.
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