DCI MEETING WITH PFIAB, 10 MAY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001102690041-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: May 3, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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3 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM . Special Assistant to the Director for
Interdepartmental Affairs
SUBJECT : DCI Meeting with PFIAB, 10 May 1982
1. The Director is scheduled to meet with the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board on 10 May. This will be the Director's first
opportunity to meet with the full PFIAB since 13 January. He will want
to bring them up-to-date on the world scene as well as any significant
developments in the intelligence community. He probably will open the
meeting by introducing his nominee for Deputy Director, John McMahon.
2. For this meeting the Director needs the benefit of inputs from
all NFIB agencies. I request, therefore, that your staff serve as the
action component to pull together the community inputs and to prepare a
set of talking points for the Director's use.
3. The Director's book should consist of the following:
-- Talking points providing about a twenty minute presentation
on the world situation and significant developments in the
intelligence community.
-- Copies of the inputs from each of the agencies.
-- A summary of PFIAB activities and interactions with community
agencies since 13 January.
4. The DDI, in coordination with the NIOs, probably can pull together
most quickly talking points on the current world situation with a review of
significant events since 13 January. DIA and State/INR should be invited,
however, to make substantive contributions also. All other CIA components
as well as all other NFIB agencies should be asked to provide a brief summary
of significant developments and/or achievements in their particular areas of
concern. Finally, your staff is best positioned to pull together a summary of
PFIAB activities since 13 January, which will serve as background for the
Director.
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5. This package should be passed to me no later than COB Thursday,
6 May to allow the Director an opportunity to review it and request any
additional information on Friday, the 7th. Thank you for your assistance
on such short notice. I discussed this project last Friday with Walt Elder
who has already touched base with all NFIB agencies.
cc: Acting Director
Executive Director
Chairman, NIC
DDI.
DDO
DDS&T
DDA
'f tl 4 C., b t
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DRAFT LEADOFF PORTION OF DCI PRESENTATION OF PFIAB
When I spoke to you in January, I described some of the organizational
changes we had made and the program we had set in motion to improve our
collection capability--both technical and human source--and our analytical
apparatus, especially our ability to turn out timely, policy-oriented estimates.
I want to update you on these programs in a minute, but I would like to
start today with a quick review of the world situation. Events do not, of
course, stand still for our changes.
Over the past few weeks the attention of the world has been directed to
the Falkland Islands. Secretary Haig's effort to negotiate a settlement put a
premium on our capability to keep him and the President abreast of events. We
As the battle was joined around the Falklands, our attention began to turn
to some of the longer-term implications. We are worried not only about domestic
political developments in Argentina, but also about US relations with Latin America
in general. We are also concerned about the implications of this crisis for NATO's
military forces and for the political unity of the Alliance.
The Soviet Union, of course, is our number one priority. Economic performance
remains dismal--GNP growth was less than 2 percent each of last three years,
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SECRET
and agriculture is in the doldrums, although early signs suggest this year
may be marginally better than last. The Soviet hard currency shortage effects
not only purchases in the West, but traditional support for troubled East
European economies and even the regular subventions to communist parties in
the West. Even if Soviet agricultural output recovers from several terrible
years, slower growth in the labor force, declining productivity, and poor prospects
in the energy field are systemic problems that are likely to worsen.
We see the results in a variety of ways--cutbacks for the consumer, tougher
terms for the East Europeans and third world aid recipients, new incentives for
West Europeans to buy Soviet gas.
We cannot say that we have seen effect of economic stringency on the
defense budget which we believe will continue to grow at a rate of 4 percent a
year, taking an even larger share of GNP than it does now. The Soviets are still
in AFghanistan, seeking to improve their capability vis-a-vis China and NATO and
are deeply concerned about the resources the US is committing to defense.
On the strategic weapons side, this translates into initial deployment of
an AWACs next year, new MIRVed missiles for the Typhoon SSBN and sea-launched
cruise missiles in 1984, a new mobile solid propellent ICBM in 1985, and a
B-1 type bomber in 1986. These are just the systems well along in the test phase;
we are confident others are now rN R&D.
Our most recent strategic forces estimate gives the USSR the capability
to destroy close to 80 percent of our Minuteman silos today and over 90 percent
by 1990. Strategic defenses are moving forward as well, creating major
uncertainties about the effectiveness of a US retaliatcu strike.
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Some 300 operational SS-20s plus other improved intermediate systems
pose a particular th%'eat to Europe, and, of course, account for the Soviet
reluctance to accept the President's zero option proposal.
The conventional force balance is also heavily in Moscow's favor with
Warsaw Pact forces outnumbering NATO by two to one in divisions and tanks, and
by 1 1/2 to 1 in combat aircraft. New weapons and more of them per division,
have added to the USSR's qualitative edge.
The Soviet military buildup, combined with weak resistance, has also encouraged
Soviet activities in the Third World, using proxies and a diversified arsenal
of arms sales, military training, logistical assistance, propaganda and economic
aid, the USSR, in opportunistic fashion, continues to foster and exploit indigenous
unrest in many regions. This is done to undermine US influence, to bring Soviet
sympathizers to power and to acquire additional military bases. The resulting
Soviet influence in countries like Syria, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen, India
and Nicaragua, among others, will continue to cause difficulties for us and for
friendly governments throughout the Third World. Indeed, a number of Soviet
friends act both as surrogates for the USSR and, in the cases of Cuba, Libya,
and PLO and Syria, as conduits for Soviet-bloc arms and training to groups that
undertake terrorism.
Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership is in the midst of a succession; that is
the meaning of all the unkind press stories about Brezhnev's relatives, the
proliferation of Moscow rumors, and the shifting protocol standings of Politburo
leaders, most dramatically brought out by varied appearances on the Kremlin reviewing
stand. How long the sucession period will last and who will come out on top is,
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I must confess, not clear.
Brezhnev's health obviously is critical.
in early April that Brezhnev
would make a public appearance in 3-4 weeks. This was borne'out at the Lenin
Day ceremonies on 22 April and at May Day. KGB chief Andropov and Party Secretary
Chernenko head the field now. Of course, the important thing for us is not
who comes out on top, but what kind of policies a new leadership will adopt. We
do not expect any sudden, dramatic changes.
Other parts of the world also demand our attention:
--Poland.remains a problem and an enigma. The Soviets have continued to
to be uneasy about the internal situation and the ability of the regime
to cope. Violence had been promised, but all observers seemed to have
been somewhat uncertain as to what form it would take. The military
regime seems to have been especially surprised by the willingness of
the Polish people to risk life and limb on behalf of the freedom they
lost with martial law. The regime showed, however, that it is willing
to wse whatever force is required to maintain its control. This problem
will not go away and the authorities in Warsaw must now reevaluate their
policy on the pace of easing martial law restrictions.
--The Middle East is a tinder box--there is, in this case, no more apt
cliche. Israeli forces remain in strength in the north and on the
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Golan; almost any act of terrism could bring them into Lebanon again.
The West Bank remains volatile as the deep-seated feelings, on all
sides, continue to fester. Syria scraps with Iraq which hangs on
against Iran. The Gulf States have a great fear of a victoriouslran able
to refocus its energies to dominate the region. The moderates--Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt--are torn between their desire for US support
and a need to protect their domestic backsides against troublemaking by
the Palestinians or the radical states. Libya continues its support
for subversion in the Sudan, its involvement in the Yemens, and its warnings
to the US against sea or air activity in the international waters of
the Gulf of Sidra.
--Prospects for the Central American governments have improved somewhat
over the past few months although this must remain a very tentative judgement--
surely as long as the flow of arms to guerrilla groups continues. The
election in El Salvador and the agreement on a new president are hopeful
signs, as is the way the Rios-Montt government has taken control in
Guatemala. Nicaragua continues both its crackdown on the few remaining
non-Sandinista elements and its military buildup. Meanwhile, Soviet
arms shipments to Cuba are running at a higher level than any time since
the missile crisis. Many of these weapons are new and sophisticated.
Some are intended for transshipment to Central America; others will free
older Cuban weapons for transshipment.
--In sub-Saharan Africa, conditions remain volatile. For most of these
countries, the global recession, slowed exports, and tightening aid
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disbursements have sharply raised the risk of economic disaster.
For many, sporadic military action, aging national leaders, and/or
growing factionalism invite heightened Libyan, Soviet, or Cuban
adventurism. In southern Africa, frustration is mounting over the
Namibia stalemate. Areas of concern for the US over the next half
year are likely to include the fall of a pro-Western government in
Mauritius next month, the scheduledOAU pullout from Chad (also in June),
recurring South African military incursions into Angola, seriously
deepening economic problems in Zaire and Zambia, and growing financial
and pre-election tensions in Nigeria. On the plus side, the West
Africans appear to be resisting Libyan blandishments, and there has
been some progress in redressing the chaos left by Idi Amin in Uganda.
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